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 FACIL:50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.
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 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

DOCKET #
 05000270

SUBJECT: LER 88-003-00:on 880826,turbine/reactor trip due to
 equipment malfunction.

W/8 ltr.

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NOTES:AEOD/Ornstein:lcy.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 5							
TITLE (4) Turbine/Reactor Trip due to Equipment Malfunction																											
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH		DAY		YEAR		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		MONTH		DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAMES									
0 8		2 6		8 8		8 8		0 0 3		0 0		0 9		2 6		8 8		DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0									
OPERATING MODE (9)		N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10)		1 0 0		20.402(b)						20.406(c)						X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)					
				20.406(a)(1)(i)						50.36(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)					
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)						50.36(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vi)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)											
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)											
				20.406(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(x)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																											
NAME Philip J. North, Licensing										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 0 4 3 1 7 3 1 - 7 4 5 1 6																	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS																	
X	SIN	ILISM	31212	No																							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)										MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO																	

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 26, 1988, at 1557 hours while operating at 100% Reactor Power, the Unit 2 Main Turbine (MT) tripped resulting in an anticipatory Reactor trip. The MT trip was initiated by a false high water level indication in the "2A2" Moisture Separator Reheater (MSRH). The false high water level trip indication occurred because conductors associated with the "2A2" MSRH high water level trip switch "short-circuited" against the switch housing. The "short circuit" occurred because brittle insulation separated from the conductors, allowing them to make contact with the switch housing.

The immediate corrective action was to stabilize the unit at hot shutdown. The supplemental corrective actions included determining the cause of the unit trip and repairing the degraded conductors. The root cause of this unit trip was the shorted circuit in the MSRH high level trip switch, which was caused by the failure of the conductor insulation in the circuit.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

SEQUENCE OF EVENTSDate/TimeDescription

August 26, 1988/1556

Unit 2 was operating at 100% power.

1557

Moisture Separator Reheater high water level trip signal was received.

Unit 2 Turbine tripped.

Unit 2 Reactor tripped.

Post trip troubleshooting began.

1800

Moisture Separator Reheater high water level trip switch was repaired.

1847

The Reactor was returned to critical.

August 27, 1988/0006

The Turbine Generator was placed on-line.

Background:

The Moisture Separator Reheater (MSRH) System [EIIS:SN] separates water from the High Pressure Turbine [EIIS:TRB] exhaust steam and reheats the steam prior to supplying it to the three Low Pressure Turbines. The MSRH System includes four MSRH's, each consisting of a moisture separator section with two stages of reheaters, and two each of the following: first stage reheater drain tanks, second stage reheater drain tanks, moisture separator drain tanks, and moisture separator drain tank pumps.

Water separated from the steam in the moisture separators is collected in moisture separator drain tanks A and B. The normal flow path of water from the moisture separator drain tanks is to the condenser.

In the event of a high water level in the Moisture Separator Drain Tank, a computer alarm is sounded and recorded in the Control Room, thereby alerting Operations personnel of the condition. If the tank water level continues to increase, water will back up to a water level sensing device associated with the moisture separators. Upon detecting the MSRH high water level, a trip circuit is automatically activated to trip the Main Turbine, thereby protecting the turbine from damage due to moisture.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
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Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2	0500027088	88	003	000	03	OF	05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Description of Incident

On August 26, 1988, Unit 2 was operating at approximately 100% full power. At approximately 1557 hours, a false high Moisture Separator Reheater (MSRH) high water level computer alarm was received in the Unit 2 Control Room. Also at 1557 hours the Main Turbine tripped which caused a Reactor anticipatory trip.

After the trip, Operations and Instrument and Electrical (I&E) personnel and the Shift Engineer began investigating the cause of the trip. The Events Recorder, Alarm Typer, and Utility Typer indicated the Main Turbine trip and the Reactor Trip. The Utility Typer printout had recorded a trip due to a MSRH high water level.

The MSRH high water level indication was not accompanied by other high water level indications, contrary to expectations if an actual MSRH high water level condition had existed. In order for the MSRH high water level sensor to actuate due to actual high water level, the Moisture Separator Drain Tank (MSDT) level would be expected to backup to the MSRH. Computer alarms and level indications associated with a MSDT high level would be recorded by the Utility Typer and Alarm Typer. No abnormal MSDT conditions were recorded during this incident, thereby causing personnel investigating the trip to suspect a failure of the MSRH high water level trip circuitry as causing the trip. Also, during an actual high water level condition, a timer delay of approximately ten seconds, occurs between the MSRH high level computer alarm and the Main Turbine trip. Thereby, Operations personnel are alerted to the high water level condition. Operations personnel received no indication of a high level MSRH condition prior to the trip.

Following the trip, Operations generated a work request to investigate and repair the cause of the MSRH high level trip. Upon investigation, I&E technicians discovered that conductors associated with the "2A2" MSRH high water level trip switch [EIIS:LS] were "short-circuiting" against the switch assembly housing.

Investigation also indicated that the conductor insulation, which had become cracked and brittle during operation, left gaps which exposed portions of bare conductor to the switch housing. The "2A1" MSRH high level trip switch had no "short-circuiting" present but the conductor insulation was cracked. The "2B1" and "2B2" MSRH high level trip switch conductor insulation appeared to be free of cracks and embrittlement. Repairs to the "2A1" and "2A2" switch wiring were completed at approximately 1800 hours.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

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Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2	0500027088	88	003	00	04	OF 05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 308A's) (17)

In general, the post-trip plant response was normal. The average Reactor Coolant System [EIIS:AB] temperature stabilized at approximately 557 degrees. Pressurizer level decreased from the pre-trip value of 220 inches to a minimum value of 70 inches. The Pressurizer level was increased and maintained at approximately 170 inches after the 2B High Pressure Injection [EIIS:BQ] pump was manually started. The maximum Control Rod Drive breaker opening time was 51 milliseconds, which was within required limits. The Main Steam [EIIS:SB] Relief Valves responded properly. The Steam Generator [EIIS:SG] post-trip levels were maintained at approximately 25 inches, which is considered normal.

The Reactor was returned to critical at 1847 hours that same day. The Turbine Generator was placed on line at 0006 hours on August 27, 1988.

Cause of Occurrence:

The root cause of the Unit 2 trip was equipment malfunction due to the "short-circuiting" of the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSRH) high water level switch conductors against the switch assembly housing, resulting in a false high indication in the MSRH.

A review of the work request history associated with the Unit 2 MSRH high water level trip switches revealed that the switches were checked by procedure as required at the last Unit 2 Refueling Outage. The procedure checks the ability of the switches to initiate a Turbine trip signal due to high water level and is required to be performed at every Refueling Outage. However, the procedure does not require technicians to inspect the switch conductor insulation.

During the Management Transient Review Meeting on August 30, 1988, it was identified that the MSRH level sensors are located such that they are susceptible to being bumped by personnel, thereby potentially causing a Unit trip. Operations personnel agreed to generate a work request to fabricate and install guards over the sensors on all three Units. Mechanical Maintenance agreed to fabricate and install the guards.

The malfunction of the MSRH high water level trip switch is not NPRDS reportable because the switch is not contained within the reportable scoping system of the NPRDS program. The MSRH high water level trip sensor assembly is Model 402 manufactured by Magnetrol.

A review of past LERs revealed that there have been other Unit trips in the past three years, of which approximately eight were due to equipment failure.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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EXPIRES 8/31/85

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Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

However, none of the Unit trips were due to conductor insulation failures. Therefore this event is nonrecurring. No personnel injuries, radiation exposures, or releases of radioactive material resulted from this Unit trip. This incident is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73a(2)(iv).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to stabilize the unit at hot shutdown conditions.

Subsequent corrective actions were to:

Repair the Unit 2 Moisture Separator Reheater (MSRH) high water level trip switch conductors prior to startup;

Check the Unit 1 and Unit 3 MSRH high water level trip switches and replace Unit 1 switch assemblies and heat-damaged conductors. No problems were found on Unit 3;

Review other situations in which Unit trips may be initiated due to heat-induced failure of instrumentation conductor insulation. The Turbine Exhaust Hood Thermostat was the only potential problem situation identified as a result of the review. The Unit 3 Turbine Exhaust Hood Thermostat conductor insulation was checked on September 12, 1988, and was verified as being free of heat-induced damage.

Planned corrective actions are for:

Instrument and Electrical Management to include in procedures the need to visually inspect, on a Refueling Outage basis, MSRH and Turbine Exhaust Hood Thermostat trip switch conductor insulation and to repair as necessary;

Operations Management to initiate a request to fabricate and install guards over the MSRH high level sensors on all three units;

Mechanical Maintenance to fabricate and install MSRH high level sensor guards.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Integrated Control System [EII:JA] responded properly during the unit trip. The Operations Control Room personnel safely controlled the Reactor following the trip. No actuation of Engineered Safeguards systems [EII:JE] or pressurizer relief valves occurred, and no Reactor Coolant System leakage was induced. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Duke Power Company
P.O. Box 33198
Charlotte, N.C. 28242

Mr. J. F. ...
Vice President
Nuclear Production
Duke Power Company



DUKE POWER

September 26, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-269, -270, -287
LER 270/88-03

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 270/88-03 concerning a Unit 2 reactor trip on August 26, 1988.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker
PJN/392/mmj

Attachment

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