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DUKE POWER

May 2, 1990

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Inspection Report 50-269, -270, -287/90-06

Dear Sir:

By a letter dated April 2, 1990, the NRC had issued a Notice of Violation and an Inspection Report 50-269, -270, -287/90-06. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, I am submitting a written response to the violation identified in the inspection report.

Further, on April 22, 1990, a similar event as addressed in this violation occurred at Oconee. It was discovered that two (2) Vendor employees, who had been unfavorably terminated April 12, 1990 still retained active security badges. Unlike the event addressed in this response, neither of these individuals entered the Protected Area subsequent to their termination. This event was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71. Additional corrective measures will be evaluated pending investigation of this event. A Licensee Event Report will be submitted by May 22, providing details of the event and results of the investigation.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker

PFG/106/lcs

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Mr. P. H. Skinner
NRC Resident Inspector
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Reply to a Notice of Violation

Violation

Paragraph 8.5 of the licensee's Physical Security Plan states, "in the case of an individual's involuntary termination for cause, the individual's unescorted access, identification badge and all entry devices shall be revoked prior to or simultaneously with notifying the individual of his or her termination."

Contrary to the above, on January 5, 1990, a vendor, who had been previously terminated on the evening of January 4, was allowed unescorted access to the protected area for approximately four and one half hours.

Response

1. Admission or Denial of the Violation

The violation is correct as stated. The event was identified by Duke Power Company Security personnel on January 5, 1990. The event was reported to the NRC by LER 269/90-S01, submitted by a Duke letter dated February 19, 1990.

2. Reason for the Violation

The event occurred as a result of a "management deficiency," failure to implement 10 CFR requirements which consisted of several contributing factors.

- A) In response to a previous LER, LER 269/88-S03, and subsequent Violation 89-10-01 (May 23, 1989), Duke had committed to developing and implementing a training program for the nuclear access program for both Duke and Vendor employees to ensure program awareness. Duke achieved the commitment for vendors/contractors on October 4 and 11, 1989. Training was conducted on these days relative to Security and Fitness for Duty requirements by Duke Power Human Resources Group. A representative from Wometco Food Vending Services attended the October 11, 1989 training. This representative in turn was expected to provide training to other Wometco supervisors. Wometco conducted internal company training for FFD but did not address security requirements relative to Violation 89-10-01. The Wometco representative did not recognize the significance of the security information provided during the Human Resources training.
- B) The Wometco Supervisor who failed to notify security to pull the terminated employees badges was assigned to Oconee in July 1989. Personnel from the Oconee Contract Services Section (CSS) conducted informal training with this supervisor prior to this event. This training consisted of general discussion of security

requirements and Wometco/Duke interface, but was not documented. As stated in LER 269/90-S01, this supervisor failed to implement the instructions communicated to him by CSS personnel by failing to terminate the badges of the two employees who were terminated for poor work performance. One of these employees entered the Protected Area the day after they were terminated and remained inside for approximately four (4) and one half hours unescorted.

- C) Duke Human Resources Group has developed a program entitled the "Duke Power Nuclear Access Program" for vendors and contractors. This program provides information relative to proper security badge terminations. No documentation can be provided by Human Resources Group showing a copy of this procedure had been sent to the Wometco headquarters prior to this event. Wometco General Managers cannot substantiate that they have or have not received a copy of this procedure at their headquarters.

3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved:

- A) Upon notification, security terminated the badges of the two Wometco employees who had been terminated.
- B) A self study training program that was developed as part of the committed corrective action for LER 269/88-S03 for Duke Power Company personnel who have responsibility for terminating employees, was given to permanent site contract supervisors at Oconee Nuclear Station. Documentation of the training was achieved. The Wometco site supervisors completed training on January 26, 1990.
- C) The need to follow security requirements was reinforced with vendor contract supervisors at Oconee.
- D) The vendor/contractor version of the Duke Nuclear Access Program was revised to further clarify and emphasize the termination process and the associated security requirements. The revised procedure was mailed to all vendor and contract companies. This item was completed on April 19, 1990.
- E) Oconee Station Directive 3.4.1 was revised April 25, 1990 to emphasize the need to consider badge control as part of the employee termination process.

4. Corrective Steps Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

- A) Develop an addendum to be added to existing and future contracts with vendors and contractors who have employees working within a nuclear station, who requires unescorted access, and to make adherence to security requirements a contract obligation (tentative completion date July 1, 1990).
- B) Revise General Employee Training (GET) to include terminations and the security requirements in the GET Handbook (tentative completion date, December 31, 1990).

5. Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved:

Planned corrective action will be completed by December 31, 1990.