

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
POWER BUILDING  
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28201

A. C. THIES  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

May 26, 1981

P. O. Box 2178

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
IE Inspection Report  
50-269/81-07  
50-270/81-07  
50-287/81-07

Dear Sir:

With regard to R. C. Lewis' letter of May 1, 1981 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the information contained therein to be proprietary.

Please find attached responses to the cited items of noncompliance.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, executed on May 26, 1981.

Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies

ACT:pw  
Attachment

8107080495 810618  
PDR ADOCK 05000269  
Q PDR

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Response to IE Inspection Report 50-269/81-07, -270/81-07, -287/81-07

Violation

- A. Technical Specification 6.4.1.e requires the station to be operated and maintained in accordance with procedures.

Contrary to the above, on March 4, 1981, licensee maintenance personnel did not follow instructions for repair of emergency power switching logic cables in that the cables were removed from cable trays without proper authorization or notification. Removal of these cables from their cable trays caused them to be inoperable.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.) and applies to Oconee Unit 3.

Response

- 1) Admission or denial of the alleged violation:

This violation is correct to the extent that the cables were not seismically supported for a relatively brief period of time; however, the system was always able to perform its intended function, especially considering the low probability of a seismic event.

- 2) Reasons for the violation:

This incident was the result of personnel error. Although the maintenance supervisor in charge of the cable replacement had been instructed on the correct job sequence, he decided to have portions of the old cables removed from the cable trays before they were properly taken out of service to facilitate pulling the new cables. The supervisor had not been informed by the cognizant maintenance coordinator that this type action would render the old cables seismically inoperable.

- 3) Corrective actions taken and results:

Appropriate disciplinary action has been taken against the responsible personnel.

- 4) Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

Because of the unique circumstances of this incident, no further corrective action is deemed necessary. Other details of the incident may be found in the April 13, 1981 letter report from W. O. Parker, Jr. to J. P. O'Reilly.

- 5) Date when full compliance will be achieved:

Because of the unique circumstances of this incident, this section is not applicable.

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Response to IE Inspection Report 50-269/81-07, -270/81-07, -287/81-07

Violation

- B. Technical Specification 4.1 specifies the frequency and type of surveillance to be applied to equipment for plant operation.

Contrary to the above, two monthly surveillance checks and one refueling surveillance calibration added to the Technical Specification by amendment 92/92/89, effective January 28, 1981, were not performed on schedule.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.) and applies to Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3.

Response

The response to this alleged violation is still under final preparation and review. This response will be provided to Region II by June 5, 1981.

This incident has undergone formal investigation and documentation by the Station. All surveillances addressed by the alleged violation are now being performed on a frequency consistent with Technical Specification requirements.

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Response to IE Inspection Report 50-269/81-07, -270/81-07, -287/81-07

Violation

- C. Technical Specification 3.7.1(b) requires two independent emergency power paths be operable whenever the reactor is heated above 200°F. Planned removal of one power path is permitted provided certain tests are performed as specified in Technical Specification 3.7.2.

Contrary to the above, the underground power path through transformer 2CT4 was removed from service through an error in breaker alignment, and remained misaligned for at least 20 hours. The required surveillance tests were not performed during this period as specified by Technical Specification 3.7.2.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.E.) and applies to Oconee Unit 2.

Response

- 1) Admission or denial of the alleged violation:

Duke Power agrees that this violation is correct as stated.

- 2) Reasons for the violation:

This violation was the result of personnel error. A Nuclear Control Operator incorrectly positioned the Main Feeder Bus to Standby Feeder Bus breaker switches in the "Manual" position in order to verify energization of the Standby Bus during performance of the auxiliary Service Water Pump Periodic Test. He also failed to return the switches to the "Auto" position following completion of the test. The switches were returned to the "Auto" position after they were found in the wrong position.

- 3) Corrective actions taken and results:

Appropriate disciplinary action, including counseling, has been taken against the operator at fault. This incident has been discussed in Shift Supervisor and shift crew meetings. The importance of making proper, detailed survey rounds of the control rooms by unit supervisors, control room personnel, and Shift Technical Advisors was emphasized as necessary to achieve proper shift turnover of each unit. In recent weeks several abnormal indications have been promptly discovered during these surveys of the control rooms, thus verifying the effectiveness of the noted corrective action.

- 4) Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

As additional corrective action, an evaluation will be made of the present Operations surveillance and shift turnover procedures in order to identify any changes necessary to improve these procedures.

- 5) Date when full compliance will be achieved:

The evaluation of Section 4, above, will be completed by August 1, 1981. Other details of this incident have previously been reported in LER RO-270/81-07, dated April 24, 1981.