

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

December 7, 1978

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


RE: RII:FJ
50-269/78-25
50-270/78-24
50-287/78-25

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In regard to Mr. F. J. Long's letter dated November 15, 1978, which transmitted Inspection Report 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24, 50-287/78-25, Duke Power Company does not consider the information to be proprietary.

Please find attached a response to the item of non-compliance.

Very truly yours,


W. O. Parker, Jr.

RLG:cg

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
RESPONSE TO OIE INSPECTION REPORT
50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24, 50-287/78-25

Item

Based on the results of the NRC inspection conducted on October 18-20, 1978, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements as indicated below. These items have been categorized as described in our correspondence to you dated December 31, 1974.

Technical Specification 3.5.1.2, Table 3.5.1-1 requires a minimum degree of redundancy for engineered safeguards protective channels.

Contrary to this requirement, the minimum degree of redundancy for engineered safeguards protective channels was less than that specified in Table 3.5.1-2, Column B and operation was not limited as specified in Table 3.5.1-2, Column C on the following occasions:

- 1) On December 29, 1977, Reactor Coolant Pressure Engineered Safeguards Channel No. 1 was inoperable for approximately fourteen and one half hours without being placed in the tripped condition.
- 2) On August 6, 1978, the Reactor Building Pressure Engineered Safeguards Channel No. "A" was declared inoperable and remained inoperable for approximately two days without being placed in the tripped condition.

This item is an infraction.

Response

This infraction was the result of training and procedural deficiencies. In this regard, the following corrective actions were taken:

1. A letter to all licensed operators was distributed which discussed the requirements to maintain a minimum degree of redundancy for both RPS and ES channels and provided specific instructions for placing an ES channel in the tripped condition.
2. The Periodic Instrument Surveillance Procedure was revised to require the operators to place an ES or RPS channel in the tripped state when it is out of calibration.
3. The actions required as the result of an inoperable ES or RPS channel have been included in the training program for use in operator requalification training sessions.