



July 27, 2015

Stephen L. Smith
Plant Manager

WO 15-0045

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Technical Specification 5.6.8 – Post Accident
Monitoring (PAM) Report

Gentlemen:

The Attachment provides the PAM Report for the inoperability of the Reactor Vessel Water Level Function for greater than 30 days. Wolf Creek Generating Station Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.8, "PAM Report," requires the submittal of the report within 14 days after entry into Condition B of TS 3.3.3, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation." Condition B of TS 3.3.3 was entered on July 13, 2015. This condition was entered due to a Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS) train (TS Table 3.3.3-1, Function 5) being inoperable.

This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4093, or Mr. William T. Muilenburg at (620) 364-4186.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. L. Smith".

Stephen L. Smith

SLS/rlt

Attachment

cc: M. L. Dapas (NRC), w/a
C. F. Lyon (NRC), w/a
A. A. Rosebrook (NRC), w/a
Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/a

ADD
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Technical Specification 5.6.8 - Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Report

Background

On June 13, 2015, Control Room operators observed the resistance temperature detector (RTD) BBTE1324 output for the 'B' train of Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) had failed. At 1455 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," Condition A was entered when a Reactor Vessel Water Level channel was determined to be inoperable. TS Table 3.3.3-1, Function 5, "Reactor Vessel Water Level," requires 2 channels to be OPERABLE. Required Action A.1 of TS 3.3.3 requires restoring the required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days. On July 13, 2015, TS 3.3.3 Condition B was entered when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A was not met. Required Action B.1 requires initiation of action in accordance with TS 5.6.8, "PAM Report," and requires that a report be submitted within 14 days after entry into Condition B.

Reactor Vessel Water Level is a Type B, Category 1 variable provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling. It is also used for accident diagnosis and to determine reactor coolant inventory adequacy. The RVLIS provides an indication of reactor vessel water level from the bottom of the reactor vessel to the top of the reactor during natural circulation conditions and an indication of reactor core and internals pressure drop for any combination of operating reactor coolant pumps. The RVLIS consists of four reactor vessel water level indicators divided into two separate trains; each includes a narrow range and wide range indication. A channel is considered a train. A channel is considered OPERABLE when both its narrow range and wide range indicators are OPERABLE.

Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring

Alternate means of monitoring reactor vessel water level are available to Control Room operators while the 'B' train of RVLIS is not OPERABLE. Additional PAM instrumentation that provides for verification of core cooling and long term surveillance include the 'A' train of RVLIS (Function 5), reactor coolant system subcooling monitor (Function 4), pressurizer level indication (Function 11), and core exit temperature (Functions 14, 15, 16, and 17).

Cause of Inoperability

On June 13, 2015, Control Room operators observed the resistance temperature detector (RTD) BBTE1324 was indicating a failed low condition on the Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS). Further testing on July 1, 2015 did not find a definitive cause for the failure of BBTE1324.

Plans and Schedule for Restoring the Instrumentation Channel of the Function to Operable Status

The RVLIS RTDs and corresponding leads to the instrument channels are located inside the secondary shield wall and are inaccessible to personnel while operating at power due to radiological conditions in this area that prohibit access by plant personnel. Further troubleshooting may only be done during shutdown periods. Additional troubleshooting and necessary corrective actions is planned for Refueling Outage 21 (Fall 2016) unless the actions are taken during a forced outage prior to the refueling outage.