



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

July 28, 2015

EN 50556
EN 50589

Dr. Ronald J. Land
Site Manager
AREVA, Inc.
2101 Horn Rapids Road
Richland, WA 99354-0130

**SUBJECT: AREVA INC. (RICHLAND) – NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 70-1257/2015-003**

Dear Dr. Land:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted announced, routine inspections from April 1 to June 30, 2015, at the AREVA INC., facility in Richland, Washington. The purpose of these inspections was to perform routine reviews of operational safety, criticality safety, maintenance and surveillance of safety controls, and an evaluation of an emergency preparedness exercise. The enclosed report presents the results of the inspections. At the conclusion of the inspections, the results were discussed with you and members of your staff at exit meetings held on April 9 and April 29, 2015.

During the inspections, NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license, as they relate to public health and safety, to confirm compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspections consisted of facility walk-downs, selective examinations of relevant procedures and records, interviews with plant personnel, and observations of activities. No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, or from the NRC's Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

R. Land

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If you have any questions, please call me at (404) 997-4555.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eric C. Michel, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-1257
License No. SNM-1227

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/2015-003
w/Supplemental Information

cc: (See page 3)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II

Docket No.: 70-1257

License No.: SNM-1227

Report No.: 70-1257/2015-003

Licensee: AREVA, Inc.

Facility: Richland Facility

Location: Richland, Washington 99354

Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2015

Inspectors: N. Pitoniak, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section A.1)
B. Adkins, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector In-Training (Section A.2)
T. Sippel, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section A.2)
N. Peterka, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section B.1)
M. Crespo, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector (B.2)
M. Romano, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section B.2)
M. Toth, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section B.2)

Approved by: E. Michel, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AREVA, INC. - RICHLAND
NRC Integrated Inspection Report 70-1257/2015-003
April 1 through June 30, 2015

Inspections were conducted by regional inspectors during normal shifts in the areas of operational safety, criticality safety, maintenance and surveillance of safety controls, and an evaluation of an emergency preparedness exercise. The inspectors performed a selective examination of licensee activities that were accomplished by direct observation of safety-significant activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of facility records.

Safety Operations

- The items relied on for safety (IROFS) reviewed were properly implemented and maintained in order to perform their intended safety function. The Operational Safety program was implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Paragraph A.1)
- The nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program was implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Paragraph A.2)

Facility Support

- The Maintenance and Surveillance program was implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Paragraph B.1)
- The Emergency Preparedness exercise was implemented in accordance with the Emergency Plan, license application, and applicable regulatory requirements. (Paragraph B.2)

Special Topics

- Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-001, EN 50556 - Failed IROFS - Check valve on a steam supply line.
- LER 2014-002, EN 50589 - Involving an OSHA reportable injury.

Attachment

Key Points of Contact
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed
Inspection Procedures Used
Documents Reviewed

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The AREVA Richland facility converts uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) into uranium dioxide (UO₂) for the fabrication of low-enriched fuel assemblies used in commercial light water reactors. During the inspection period, normal production activities were ongoing.

A. Safety Operations

1. Operational Safety (Inspection Procedure (IP) 88020)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors conducted a general plant tour to determine plant status, equipment condition, and compliance with combustible material control and housekeeping requirements. The facility was completing a scheduled shutdown period with limited operations ongoing. Therefore, the inspectors focused on those areas currently in operation, records reviews, and interviews with operators. The records reviewed included, but were not limited to, internal licensee program assessments, functional tests, and training documents.

The inspection centered on the dry conversion facility (DCF), the UO₂ process area, and the Solid Waste Uranium Recovery (SWUR) area. The inspectors selected items relied on for safety (IROFS) that included active engineered (AEC), passive engineered (PEC), and administrative controls. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's programs to ensure that the selected IROFS were maintained and available to meet the performance requirements as stated in 10 CFR 70.61. The review included process area walk downs using select piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) and a review of management measures in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(d).

Through interviews with various operators and technicians and direct observation, the inspectors determined that required safety controls were adequately implemented. The inspectors observed operators' performance and confirmed adherence to applicable procedures. The inspectors observed operations activities involving the cleaning of the centrifuge bowl in the SWUR area and identified no issues of concern. The inspectors reviewed the postings and operator aids applicable to the tasks being observed and determined that these postings and operator aids were current, reflected safety controls, and were followed by licensee personnel.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's training program to verify that training and qualification commitments were satisfied and maintained current for a selection of personnel. The inspectors interviewed several operators in regards to the SWUR area safety control requirements (administrative IROFS in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) summary) and noted that the operators were knowledgeable of the potential hazards in the area and determined that their training was adequate.

The inspectors reviewed select corrective action program (CAP) entries for the period occurring since the last NRC operational safety inspection and determined that deviations from procedures and unforeseen process changes, including any infractions, affecting nuclear criticality, chemical, radiological, or fire safety were documented and effectively investigated.

b. Conclusion

No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

2. Nuclear Criticality Safety (IPs 88015, 88016, and 88017)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's NCS program and analyses to assure the safety of fissile material operations through compliance with 10 CFR 70 and the license application. The inspectors reviewed selected NCS documents to determine whether criticality safety of risk-significant operations was assured through engineered and administrative controls with adequate safety margin, preparation, and review by qualified staff. The NCS analyses demonstrated adequate identification and control of NCS hazards to assure operations within subcritical levels through appropriate limits on controlled parameters. The inspectors interviewed five licensee criticality engineers, two managers, and two operators regarding operations, equipment, and controls. The inspectors reviewed aspects of selected NCS-related IROFS, including 603, 604, 605, 617, 629, 3519, 3526, 3527, and 3528 to verify that the performance requirements were met for selected accident sequences.

The inspectors reviewed the procedures and commitments for monthly audits and walk-downs. Also, the inspectors ensured that the licensee was meeting the commitments via interviews with engineers and observing an audit being performed. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the most recent NCS monthly audits to confirm that appropriate issues were identified and resolved. The inspectors reviewed the five monthly audits that were completed since the last NCS inspection in October 2014 (E04-07-201410 to E04-07-201502). The inspectors noted that the monthly audits were performed by NCS engineers who reviewed open NCS infractions; reviewed plant operations for compliance with license requirements, procedures and postings; and examined equipment and operations to determine that past evaluations remained adequate. The inspectors confirmed that deficiencies identified during audits were entered into the licensee's CAP, WebCAP, and had been or were being satisfactorily addressed.

The inspectors interviewed licensee engineers and security officers about the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS). The inspectors reviewed CAAS coverage calculations (E04-09-001) and determined the calculations to be adequate. The inspectors reviewed the design of the detectors, including a detailed review of the circuitry drawings (EMF-601,685) for the CAAS, and interviewed the licensee engineer about their logic, set points, reliability, evacuation plans, and procedures for compensatory measures. The inspectors verified that the design, detector type and alarm signal were uniform across the site. The inspectors observed that the CAAS audibility was tested in order to confirm that the CAAS remained functional after maintenance activities. The CAAS was tested quarterly through use of both emergency evacuation drills and preventative maintenance procedures.

The inspectors performed plant walk-downs of the Specialty Fuels building, which includes the SWUR, and the Ammonium Diuranate (ADU) building. Inspectors focused on the incinerator and waste handling processes in SWUR and, in ADU, the calciner and steam boiler systems. The inspectors determined that risk-significant, fissile material operations were being conducted safely and in accordance with regulatory requirements.

The inspectors interviewed operations staff and NCS engineers before and during walk-downs. The inspectors verified that controls identified in NCS analyses were adequately installed or functionally tested to ensure safety. The inspectors also verified that safety was being maintained for observed facility operations. The cognizant NCS engineers were knowledgeable and interacted regularly with operators on the process floors.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a selection of recent internally-reported events. The inspectors reviewed the progress of investigations and interviewed licensee staff considering the events and the associated corrective actions. The inspectors observed that the events were investigated in accordance with procedures and appropriate corrective actions were assigned and tracked.

b. Conclusion

No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

B. Facility Support

1. Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls (IP 88025)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors interviewed select senior managers, supervisors, engineers, technicians, and operators to evaluate maintenance and surveillance program activities. The inspectors verified that IROFS and other safety controls were adequately maintained available and reliable to perform their safety function when needed.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's work control program had provisions to ensure adequate pre-job planning and preparation of work packages to support maintenance and surveillance activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance and surveillance work packages for accuracy and concluded that test packages challenged and verified operability of IROFS and safety controls.

The inspectors observed and reviewed maintenance work activities on selected systems and processes within the DCF, SWUR and the ADU areas. The inspectors determined that work activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements and approved procedures. The inspectors verified that post-maintenance testing and calibrations, as specified by the licensee's requirements, were adequately performed prior to restoring equipment to operational status. The inspectors noted that completed work packages were subsequently reviewed prior to returning equipment to service.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution program and verified that performance issues relating to the maintenance and surveillance of IROFS and safety controls were entered into the corrective action program. The

inspectors determined that effective corrective actions were taken when a safety control failed or had degraded.

b. Conclusion

No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

2. Evaluation of Exercises and Drills (IP 88051)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the emergency drill scenario and discussed the exercise objectives with licensee personnel before the exercise. The inspectors walked down the plant to assess the effectiveness of any visual aids used in the drill and verified that the licensee had not pre-staged equipment in advance of the exercise.

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's graded biennial exercise conducted on Wednesday, April 29, 2015. The scenario consisted of a simulated large gasoline fire near a UF₆ cylinder pad resulting from a fork truck accident with a semi-truck. Specifically, the exercise tested the ability of the licensee to respond to a large scale fire with a potential special nuclear material (SNM) off-site plume, coordinate with off-site response organizations, and respond to personnel injuries and a fatality.

At the initiation of the emergency drill, the inspectors determined that the licensee adequately assessed the accident scenario, analyzed the plant condition, and classified the event. The event was classified as a site area emergency in accordance with the Emergency Plan. The inspectors observed the activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and noted that required positions were fully staffed as per the Emergency Plan. The inspectors verified that the protective action recommendations (PARs) implemented by the EOC were in accordance with those outlined in the Emergency Plan.

The inspectors verified that the on-site communications to the workers were consistent with the PARs implemented by the EOC. The workers participated in the evacuation and personnel accountability actions in accordance with applicable procedures.

The inspectors determined that the Emergency Director maintained adequate command and control of the EOC. The inspectors reviewed the decision making involved in determining how to respond to the fire with the potential of breaching a UF₆ cylinder on the pad. The inspectors found this determination process to be adequate.

The inspectors observed members of the licensee's emergency response team as the arrival of the off-site emergency responders, including the Richland Fire Department and Paramedic, assembled at the designated assembly area. The inspectors observed the emergency response team search and rescue activities for casualties, i.e., triage of the affected personnel.

The inspectors noted the Incident Commander maintained adequate command and control of the emergency response team and effectively coordinated actions with the off-site emergency responders. The inspectors verified that the emergency response team

activities were appropriate for the exercise scenario and were adequate in meeting the drill objectives.

The inspectors observed the staff critiques of the emergency exercise. The inspectors determined that the critiques were effective at identifying lessons learned and areas for improvement. The inspectors verified that the licensee documented items discussed and recorded these items in the after-action reports in the corrective action program, as CR 2015-3849.

b. Conclusion

No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

C. Special Topics

1. Event Follow-Up

a. (Closed) LER 2014-001, Event Notification (EN) 50556 - Failed IROFS - Check valve on a steam supply line

On October 20, 2014, IROFS 3527 failed to pass its annual functional test. IROFS 3527 is a check valve credited with controlling mass by preventing backflow into the unfavorable geometry steam boiler. This event was initially screened as non-reportable. However, the next morning, during a peer check of the reportability determination, a licensee NCS engineer identified an accident sequence that had only one IROFS remaining. While this sequence met the performance requirements, it was a criticality sequence for which only one IROFS was remaining and had been in that state for more than eight hours. As such it was reportable per the version of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A that was in effect at the time of discovery. The licensee reported this event within one hour of recognizing the event met the conditions for reportability.

However, a revision to Appendix A went into effect on January 26, 2015, that removed this reporting requirement. The NRC determined that this reporting requirement was not needed because "events now captured by paragraph (a)(5) would be of relatively low safety significance if compliance with the performance requirements were maintained." (Per 79 Federal Register 55721, dated September 26, 2014). The late report of a condition that met the performance requirements and was not currently reportable constitutes a "[failure] to implement requirements that [has] insignificant ... regulatory impact..." (Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E). Therefore, this issue constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with section 2.3.1 of the 'NRC Enforcement Policy'.

b. (Closed) LER 2014-002, EN 50589 – Concurrent report involving an OSHA reportable injury

The incident was discussed with the licensee and reviewed against reporting requirements in effect at the time of the injury. The event resulted in the hospitalization of a single employee based on work-related activities. OSHA requirements of 29 CFR 1904.39 (a)(2) required the licensee to report to OSHA within 24 hours an event resulting in the hospitalization of 3 or more employees. The Washington State

Department of Labor and Industries Safety Standards for Core Rules WAC 296-800-32005 required a report to the state be made within 8 hours of an event resulting in in-patient hospitalization of a single employee. Although not a required OSHA reportable event, the licensee provided notification to the NRC under EN 50589. The inspectors noted that OSHA regulation 29 CFR 1904.39 modified reporting requirements effective 1/1/2015 to require reporting events resulting in-patient hospitalization of a single employee, similar to the Washington State requirements. This issue is closed.

c. (Closed) EN 48287 – Fire in Plasma Cutter Recirculating Ventilation System-Alert Declaration

An audit of issued NRC reports identified that in IR 2012-005, the above EN was improperly characterized as an open inspector follow-up item (2012-005-01). The item should have been designated as a closed LER 2012-007-0. The tracking database has been updated to reflect this.

D. **Exit Meeting**

The inspection scope and results were presented to members of the licensee's staff at daily debriefings during the inspection and at the exit meetings on April 9 and April 29, 2015, with T. Tate and staff. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. Proprietary information was discussed, but not included in the report.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

1. KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
S. Cline	Millwright & Pipefitter Supervisor
W. Coggin	SWUR Supervisor
D. Curran	DCF Supervisor
J. Davis	Packaging Engineer
J. Deist	Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
W. Doan	ISA Criticality Safety
D. Durham	Radiation Safety Supervisor
M. Durst	Engineering
S. Edwards	Project Manager
D. Harris	Engineering
J. Kreitzburg	Criticality Safety Engineer
R. Land	Site Manager
P. Lee	Preventive Maintenance Manager
B. Lewis	Electrical Engineering Supervisor
L. Maas	Licensing and Compliance Manager
C. Manning	Nuclear Criticality Safety Manager
S. Nunez	Safety and Security Supervisor
K. Olsen	Engineering
D. Petersen	Transportation Manager
S. Powers	Project and Reliability Engineering Manager
V. Sakach	Health Physicist
L. Stephens	Operations Strategy and Supply Chain Manager
T. Tate	Environmental, Health, Safety and Licensing Manager
B. Tilden	Operations Manager
J. Veysey	Plant Engineering Technical Support & Maintenance Mgr.
H. Welker	Instruments & Electrician Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, production staff, and office personnel.

2. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

<u>Closed</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Title</u>
07001257/2014-001	LER	EN 50556 - Failed IROFS - Check valve on a steam supply line
07001257/2014-002	LER	EN 50589, Concurrent report involving an OSHA reportable injury.

3. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 88015	NCS Program
IP 88016	NCS Evaluations
IP 88017	CAAS
IP 88020	Operational Safety
IP 88025	Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls
IP 88051	Evaluation of Exercises and Drills

4. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Records:

C070P007, Boiler Low Pressure 12 month IN, completed on February 10, 2015
 C205P007, Gadolinium SCRP Recovery 6 month IN, Revision (Rev.) 2, dated August 20, 2012, completed on November 25, 2014
 C670I007, Xmitter T/C Type K 1 year Inspection, completed on February 19, 2015
 C670I007, Xmitter T/C Type K 1 Year IN, completed on August 26, 2014
 C670I018, Xmitter T/C Type K 1 Year IN, completed on January 4, 2015
 C670P016, Boiler Steam SWUR 12 month OPWA, completed on September 17, 2014
 C670P017, SWUR Box Feed Low Temperature Interlock Check 12 month OPWA, completed on September 17, 2014
 C942P001, UO2 Boiler Check Valve and Vacuum Breaker 12 month PF, Rev. #3, dated March 2, 2015
 IG000016-0017 Detector, Neutron 1 Year Inspection, completed on May 15, 2014
 IG000016-0005 Detector, Neutron 1 Year Inspection, completed on May 9, 2014
 IMM02084, Flowmeter 1 Year Inspection, completed on January 31, 2015
 IRM01892, Secondary Standard Pin-19160-02 recertified on 10/15/14
 PM003887, Criticality Howlers 6 month EL, completed on January 25, 2015
 PM005155, Power Supply UPS Central Alarm Station 36 month EL, completed on March 23, 2014
 E04-07-201410, "NCS Audit/Inspection Report – October 2014," Version 1.0.
 E04-07-201411, "NCS Audit/Inspection Report – November 2014," Version 1.0
 E04-07-201412, "NCS Audit/Inspection Report – December 2014," Version 1.0
 E04-07-201501, "NCS Audit/Inspection Report – January 2015," Version 1.0
 E04-07-201502, "NCS Audit/Inspection Report – February 2015," Version 1.0
 E04-09-001, "HRR Criticality Accident Alarm System Coverage Demonstration," Version 2.1
 E04-NCSA-120, "UNH Reprocessing," Version 19
 E04-NCSA-120, "UNH Reprocessing," Version 21
 E04-NCSA-190, "UO₂ Pellet Dissolution," Version 15
 E04-NCSA-322, "UO_x Powder Download Operation," Version 12
 E04-NCSA-370, "UO₂ Pellet Pressing," Version 12
 E04-NCSA-390, "UO₂ Pellet Grinding & Inspection," Version 15
 E04-NCSA-620, "NAF Pellet Grinding & Inspection," Version 16
 E04-NCSA-670, "Solid Waste Uranium Recovery Process," Version 8
 E04-NCSA-785, "Modular Extraction/Recovery Facility," Version 2
 NCS Infraction 2014-32, dated October 21, 2014
 NCS Infraction 2015-01, dated January 23, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-02, dated January 23, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-03, dated January 28, 2015, Version 1

NCS Infraction 2015-03, dated January 30, 2015, Version 2
 NCS Infraction 2015-04, dated January 29, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-05, dated January 16, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-07, dated February 17, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-08, dated February 23, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-09, dated March 15, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-010, dated March 13, 2015
 NCS Infraction 2015-011, dated March 20, 2015
 Emergency Exercise Drill Scenario
 Emergency Plan Version 10.0
 Various Emergency Preparedness Procedures
 Critique/Lessons Learned Summary for AREVA Richland Facility Emergency Field
 Exercise conducted on April 29, 2015, dated June 7, 2015
 Training and Qualification Audit Report, dated December 23, 2014
 Portfolio Curriculum Item Status Report – personnel training records

Procedures:

AID-10008, Reference 150 – Digital Multi-meter and Fluke Multifunction Calibrations, Rev. 2.3
 AID-10094, Reference 101 Dwyer Flowmeters for Room Air Samples, Rev. 3
 AID-10200, Reference 315 Kobold SV Flowmeter/Switch, Rev. 2.3, dated August 22, 2013
 AID-40789, Create SAP Notification/Order, Rev. 4.1
 AID-10492, Baseline Design Criteria, Rev. 1
 MCP-30039, Hot Work Procedure, Rev. 8
 MCP-30383, Preventative Maintenance, Rev. 5
 SOP-40789, Work Order Instructions, Rev. 14
 SOP-40791, Maintenance Work Permit (MWP) and Pre-Job Briefing (PJB), Rev. 10.1
 SOP-40839, Instrument Repetitive Maintenance (IRM), Rev. 11
 SOP-40841, Preventative Maintenance, Rev. 9
 SOP-40857, Maintenance Hot Work Permit Procedure, Rev. 7
 E04-05-01, "Criticality Safety – NCS Standards," Version 15
 E04-06-002, "Routine Nuclear Criticality Safety Audits,"
 E04-06-004, "Preparation & Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Documents," Version 10, dated April 2, 2015
 E04-06-007, "Routine Nuclear Criticality Safety Walkthroughs," Version 3.1, dated April 6, 2015
 E09-06-009, "Criticality System Alarm & Test Procedures,"
 PM005155, "Power Supply UPS Central Alarm Station 36mo EL," Rev. 0, dated July 27, 2010
 ADM-00008, Control of Operator Aids in Richland Operations, Version 5.0
 E04-NCSA-070, Criticality Safety – NCSA ADU Line-ADU Process, Version 15.0
 E12-01-007, Justification of Continued Operation Under Compensatory Safety Measures, Version 6.0
 MCP-30160, Preparation of Parameter Sheets, Version 7.0
 SOP-40193, SWUR Operations, Version 5.2
 SOP-40274, Chemical Operations – ADU Conversion Process Startup – ADU Line 2, Version 16.0
 SOP-40281, K-32 Process Offgas (POG) Ventilation System, Version 8.0
 1703-76, Issue Investigation and Causal Analysis Procedure, Rev. 20

1703-77, US Fuel Business Corrective Action Program, Rev. 36
1723-01, US Fuel Business Unit Training Process

Condition Reports Review:

CR 2014-0919, 1038, 5432, 7650, 6489, 1567, 2769, 3503, 5070, 5222, 5300, 5967,
6056, 6321, 6405, 6902, 6489
CR-2015-1482, 1608, 2154, 2269, 3106

Other Documents:

Certificate of Calibration for Fluke 743B #6915601
Certificate of Calibration for 19505-04 Ketema S&K Flowmeter
Certificate of Calibration for 19502-12 Wavetek Multifunction Calibration
UO₂ / ADU Boiler Installation Control Wiring Diagram, EMF-604,357, Rev. 10, Sheet 2
EMF-601,685, "Criticality System Comparator Panel 1 Elementary Diagram," Rev. 10.
ECN 8746, -IROFS Steam Check Valve Replacement – UO₂ Boiler