



Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

CNL-15-137

July 27, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2  
Construction Permit No. CPPR-92  
NRC Docket No. 50-391

Subject: **Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Status of Regulatory Framework for the Completion of Construction and Licensing for Unit 2 - Revision 13 (TAC No. MD6311), and Status of Generic Communications for Unit 2 - Revision 13 (TAC No. MD8314)**

Reference: 1. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Status of Regulatory Framework for the Completion of Construction and Licensing for Unit 2 - Revision 12 (TAC No. MD6311), and Status of Generic Communications for Unit 2 - Revision 12, dated September 2, 2014 (TAC No. MD8314)"

This letter provides an updated status of the Regulatory Framework for the completion of WBN Unit 2 construction and licensing activities, as well as an updated status of Generic Communications applicable to WBN Unit 2. Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) last revision to these two status updates, Revision 12, was submitted on September 2, 2014 (Reference 1).

Enclosure 1 provides the revised Regulatory Framework Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplements Review Matrix Master Table. Enclosure 2 provides a version of the master table showing only those items revised in Revision 13.

Enclosure 3 provides the revised Generic Communications Master Table. Enclosure 4 provides a version of the master table showing only those items revised in Revision 13.

The following table summarizes the status of the Regulatory Framework and Generic Communications items applicable to WBN Unit 2. The status codes are defined on the last page of each enclosure.

STATUS	SER / SSER	GENERIC COMM.	TOTAL
<b>C:</b> CLOSED	320	177	497
<b>CI:</b> CLOSED / IMPLEMENTATION	1	45	46
<b>CO:</b> CLOSED - OPEN: Staff has approved closure of the item; however, TVA actions remain to be completed.	13	31	44
<b>CT:</b> CLOSED / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS	0	0	0
<b>O:</b> OPEN	6	0	6
<b>OI:</b> OPEN / INSPECTION	5	0	5
<b>OT:</b> OPEN / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS	1	0	1
<b>OV:</b> OPEN / VALIDATION	0	1	1
<b>S:</b> SUBMITTED	13	14	27
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>627</b>

There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this submittal.  
If you have any questions, please contact Gordon Arent at (423) 365-2004.

Respectfully,



J. W. Shea  
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing

Enclosures

cc: See Page 3

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Enclosures:

1. SER and Supplements Review Matrix - Master Table
2. SER and Supplements Review Matrix - Revision 13 Changes
3. Generic Communications - Master Table
4. Generic Communications - Revision 13 Changes

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator, Region II  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2  
NRC Project Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

**Enclosure 1**

**SER and Supplements Review Matrix - Master Table**

**SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTS  
(NUREG-0847) REVIEW MATRIX: MASTER TABLE**

SER SECTION	SSER #	* -- REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1.0.0		NA --	Overview only
1.1.0		NA --	Overview only
1.1.1		NA --	Overview only
1.1.2		NA --	Overview only
1.1.3		NA --	Overview only
1.1.4		NA --	Overview only
1.2.0		NA --	Overview only
1.3.0		NA --	Overview only
1.3.1		NA --	Overview only
1.3.2		NA --	Overview only
1.4.0		NA --	Overview only
1.5.0		NA --	Overview only
1.6.0		NA --	Overview only
1.7.0		NA --	Overview only
1.8.0		NA --	Overview only
1.9.0		NA --	Overview only

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1.10.0		NA	Overview only
2.0.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
2.1.0	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.1.1	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-3 of SSER22 has "3" in the "Note" column for this item.</p> <p>Note 3 reads, "In SSER 21, this issue was identified as 'Resolved.' However, TVA made changes to the Unit 2 FSAR affecting the previous staff conclusions. The staff evaluated the changes and the results are documented in this SSER."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.1.2	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-3 of SSER22 has "3" in the "Note" column for this item.</p> <p>Note 3 reads, "In SSER 21, this issue was identified as 'Resolved.' However, TVA made changes to the Unit 2 FSAR affecting the previous staff conclusions. The staff evaluated the changes and the results are documented in this SSER."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.1.3	22	C	SRP requirement.
		06	<p>Unit 2 Action: Update FSAR for present and projected population over the lifetime of the plant.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>Amendment 94 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on August 27, 2009.</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Part of this amendment revised population information in Section 2.1.3.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.1.4	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>"CONCLUSIONS" left open until all items in subsection are closed.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.2.0	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.2.1	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>SRP requirement.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Update FSAR for potential external hazards and hazardous materials.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>Amendment 94 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on August 27, 2009.</p> <p>Part of this amendment revised the description of hazardous material shipped past the plant in Section 2.2.2.2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.2.2	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>SRP requirement.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Update FSAR for projected annual number of aircraft flights.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p>

Amendment 94 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on August 27, 2009.

Part of this amendment revised information concerning airports and numbers of aircraft flights in Section 2.2.2.5.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

2.2.3	22	<b>C</b>	"CONCLUSIONS" left open until all items in subsection are closed.
		<b>06</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

2.3.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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2.3.1	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>06</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

2.3.1 of SSER22 includes:

"In Section 2.3.1 of FSAR Amendment 101 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103140314), TVA provided revised information on average and limiting values associated with tornadoes, strong winds and storms, hail, lightning, and snowfall resulting from consideration of the more recently measured NCDC and WBN site data.

TVA also updated the assessment of the probability that a tornado would strike the WBN site and the associated recurrence interval. TVA's current estimate of tornado strike probability, ...

Based on sampling the revised information provided by TVA, the NRC staff has concluded that TVA used acceptable references and information to develop the updates."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

2.3.2	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>06</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

2.3.2 of SSER22 includes:

"In Section 2.3.2 of WBN FSAR Amendment 101, dated October 29, 2010, TVA revised information on average and limiting values associated with temperature, precipitation, snowfall, atmospheric water vapor content, fog, and onsite wind measurements resulting from consideration of the more recently measured NCDC and WBN site data. Based on sampling the revised information provided, the NRC staff has concluded that TVA used acceptable references and information to develop the updates."



SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

2.3.3	25	C	See 13.3.3 (Emergency Preparedness Evaluation Conclusions).
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

2.3.3 of SSER22 includes:

"TVA described several updates in equipment and procedures. TVA also stated that it developed the WBN onsite meteorological program to be consistent with the guidance given in RG 1.23, Revision 1, "Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants," issued March 2007, which is a revision from the previous phase of the program, developed to be consistent with the guidance in RG 1.23, Revision 0, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," issued February 1972. The NRC staff finds the use of this RG version acceptable.

In addition, TVA provided tables of joint windspeed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability data for onsite meteorological measurements made from 1974 through 1993. SSER 15 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072060488) discussed these data, but the tables, which are an update of previous tables for 1974 through 1988, were not included in prior amendments because of an oversight. The NRC staff finds this replacement acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

2.3.3 of SSER25 includes:

"Meteorological data summarized in the JFD formats were reasonably consistent with the data provided in the hourly data summary formats. On the basis of this review, the NRC staff concluded that the data files provided by TVA for 1991 through 2010 give an adequate representation of the site conditions to facilitate calculation of the CR, EAB, and LPZ  $\chi/Q$  values for DBA and  $\chi/Q$  and D/Q values for routine release dose assessments for WBN Unit 2.

The JFD summary for the data from 1991 through 2010 provided by letter dated November 7, 2011, and a discussion of the long-term representativeness of these data should be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that these updates have been made by TVA. This is Open Item 136 (Appendix HH)."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 2.3.3 included the following for Open Item 136:

"TVA updated the FSAR in Amendment 107 to the FSAR to address the open item. The NRC staff verified the update to the FSAR. Therefore, Open Item 136 is closed."

The SSER status remains as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.3.4	25	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>TVA updated information on portions of the metrology program in FSAR amendment 83. This was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER14.</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.3.4 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff previously addressed this section in SSER 15. TVA revised the reference number for Table 2.3-64a to Table 2.3-65. The NRC staff finds this change to be editorial and, therefore, acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.3.4 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>"In its letter dated September 15, 2011, TVA stated that it would revise FSAR Section 15.5 in a future amendment to reflect the <math>\chi/Q</math> values presented in that letter. TVA reflected the EAB and LPZ <math>\chi/Q</math> values from its letter dated June 27, 2011, in FSAR Amendment 105, dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11236A158). The NRC staff will confirm, upon receipt, that TVA integrated the updated CR <math>\chi/Q</math> values from its letter dated September 15, 2011, into a future amendment of the FSAR. This is Open Item 137 (Appendix HH)."</p> <hr/> <p>SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26, Section 2.3.4 included the following for Open Item 137:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed Amendment 107 to the FSAR and verified that it included the updated values. Therefore, Open Item 137 is closed."</p> <p>The SSER status remains as "Resolved."</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Correct Status to "C."</p>
2.3.5	25	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>TVA updated information on portions of the metrology program in FSAR amendment 83. This was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER14.</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.3.5 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>"The updated annual average <math>\chi/Q</math> and D/Q values associated with the specific receptor locations appear in</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.
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# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Table 11.3-8, and the sets of values for the 16 radial sectors are in Tables 2.3-75A and 2.3-75B, of FSAR Amendment 104, dated June 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11178A155). In addition, in FSAR Section 2.3.5, TVA stated that it discussed this topic in the WBN Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). FSAR Section 11.3 also discusses this topic. Upon receipt of the updated ODCM, the NRC staff will confirm that TVA made the corresponding revisions related to the updated annual average  $\chi/Q$  and D/Q values. This is Open Item 138 (Appendix HH). "

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; this letter included the following for Open Item 138:

"Item No. 138 regarding an updated Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) to reflect annual average  $\chi/Q$  and D/Q values has been addressed by Revision 20 of the current station ODCM. A copy of the current ODCM has been provided via CD to the NRR Project Manager for NRC review."

## REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 2.3.4 included the following for Open Item 138:

"The NRC staff reviewed the updated ODCM and Amendment 109 to the FSAR, and verified that the updated values had been included. Therefore, Open Item 138 is closed."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected Status to "CLOSED." SSER26 showed the status for this item as "Resolved."

2.4.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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2.4.1	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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2.4.2	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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2.4.3	27	<b>C</b>	
		<b>13</b>	

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Approved for both units in SER.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."
2.4.4	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
2.4.5	0	C	GL 89-22, "Potential For Increased Roof Load Due to Changes in Maximum Precipitation" – Answer to informal question provided in TVA letter dated December 16, 1981, and subsequently included in FSAR. GL did not require a response. No further action required.
2.4.6	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
2.4.7	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
2.4.8	27	C	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for design basis groundwater level for ERCW pipeline
		13	Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a description of the analysis used to determine the 25-year groundwater level for the ERCW pipeline. Staff closed issue in SSER3.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			Status in SSER21 is "Open (NRR)."
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."
2.4.9	22	C	SRP requirement.
		12	Unit 2 Action: Update FSAR for present and projected use of local and regional groundwater.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			Amendment 93 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on April 30, 2009.
			Part of this amendment updated the name of one of the downstream surface water intakes in Section 2.4.12.2.
			Section 2.4.9.2 of SSER22 includes:
			"The NRC staff has concluded that the change to the name of the intake is administrative and did not affect the location or relative concentration result associated with the intake. Since the change does not affect the

conclusions identified in the FSAR, the staff finds it acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

Based on NRC's conclusion that this item is "resolved," as stated in SSER 22, dated February 2011), no further action is required.

2.4.10	24	O	Staff found flood emergency plan and draft Technical Specifications acceptable in original 1982 SER.
		13	Unit 2 Action: Address in Technical Specifications as appropriate.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

Amendment B of the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

TRM TLCO 3.7.2 provides the Flood Protection Plan.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

2.4.10 of SSER24 includes:

"As described above, the staff reviewed TVA's response to EMC-B-RAI-1 and the revised Figure 2.4-72 and found them acceptable. In order to confirm the stability analysis of the sand baskets used by TVA in the WBN Unit 2 licensing basis, TVA will perform either a hydrology analysis without crediting the use of the sand baskets at the Fort Loudoun dam for the seismic dam failure and flood combination, or TVA will perform a seismic test of the sand baskets, as stated in TVA's letter dated April 20, 2011. TVA will report the results of this analysis or test to the NRC by October 31, 2011. This is Open Item 133 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"TVA should provide the NRC staff with supporting technical justification for the statements in Amendment 104 of FSAR Section 2.4.4.1, 'Dam Failure Permutations,' page 2.4-32 (in the section 'Multiple Failures') that, 'Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar have previously been judged not to fail for the OBE (0.09 g). Postulation of Tellico failure in this combination has not been evaluated but is bounded by the SSE failure of Norris, Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico.' This is Open Item 134 (Appendix HH).

Conclusions

As discussed above, the NRC staff verified that TVA's changes in FSAR Section 2.4 are acceptable because they are consistent with the latest available information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Hydrologic Engineering Center; the National Weather Service document, 'Probable Maximum and TVA Precipitation Estimates with Areal Distribution for Tennessee River Drainages Less Than 3,000 Square Miles in Area,' and the U.S. Geological Survey, National Water Information System.

Based on the staff's review of Amendment 104 to WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 2.4.3 and the information provided by TVA in its letters dated April 20 and May 20, 2011, TVA adequately addressed the staff's questions regarding the dependence of the predicted PMF on the temporary modifications (sand baskets) currently in place at the dams in the vicinity of WBN. As discussed above, the staff proposes two license conditions related to the flooding protection at Watts Bar Unit 2.

Flooding Protection Proposed License Condition No. 1:

TVA will submit to the NRC staff by August 31, 2012, for review and approval, a summary of the results of the finite element analysis, which demonstrates that the Cherokee and Douglas dams are fully stable under design basis probable maximum flood loading conditions for the long-term stability analysis, including how the preestablished acceptance criteria were met.

Flooding Protection Proposed License Condition No. 2:

TVA will submit to the NRC staff, before completion of the first operating cycle, its longterm modification plan to raise the height of the embankments associated with the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar dams. The submittal shall include analyses to demonstrate that, when the modifications are complete, the embankments will meet the applicable structural loading conditions, stability requirements, and functionality considerations to ensure that the design basis probable maximum flood limits are not exceeded at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. All modifications to raise the height of the embankments shall be completed within 3 years from the date of issuance of the operating license."

Open Item 134 Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide to the NRC staff supporting technical justification for the statements in Amendment 104 of FSAR Section 2.4.4.1, 'Dam Failure Permutations,' page 2.4-32 (in the section 'Multiple Failures') that, 'Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar have previously been judged not to fail for the OBE (0.09 g). Postulation of Tellico failure in this combination has not been evaluated but is bounded by the SSE failure of Norris, Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico.' (SSER 24, Section 2.4.10)"

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

For Open Item 133:

TVA to NRC letter dated October 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11306A193) provided the results of the analysis. Enclosure 1 to this letter included:

"In the Reference letter, TVA committed to perform either a hydrology analysis without crediting the use of the sand baskets at Fort Loudoun dam for the seismic dam failure and flood combination or perform a seismic test of the sand baskets. This commitment was made because Fort Loudoun dam was the only location where credit for sand baskets was taken during a seismic event.

To address the commitment, TVA re-performed the hydrological analysis (Calculation CDQ000020080080) for the seismic failure combinations which utilized sand baskets to increase the elevation of embankments at the dams. In this reanalysis, the sand baskets were not credited to increase the height of the Fort Loudoun embankment. As a result of this reanalysis, the flood elevation at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) increased from 731.11 feet to 731.17 feet, and the flow discharge past the plant increased from 977,618 cubic feet per second to 979,385 cubic feet per second. The flood wave warning time decreased from 36 hours to 35 hours, which is still greater than the controlling warning time of 28 hours. These elevation, flow, and warning time changes will be provided in the next update of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR."

The committed change was implemented via Amendment 107 to the Unit 2 FSAR. TVA to NRC letter dated November 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11333A054) submitted this revision to the NRC.

For Open Item 134:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 6, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12255A200) contained the following:

From the cover letter:

"Enclosure 1 provides a summary of the long-term stability analysis methodology. Enclosure 2 provides the list of regulatory commitments contained within this letter."

From Enclosure 2:

"TVA is committed to prudently pursuing a dam safety improvement project. The modifications for Cherokee and Douglas Dams will be designed and implemented prior to WBN Unit 2 startup."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 included the following under 2.4.10 (page 2-1):

"Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 133

Open Item 133 states, "In order to confirm the stability analysis of the sand baskets used by TVA in the WBN Unit 2 licensing basis, TVA will perform either a hydrology analysis without crediting the use of the sand baskets at the Fort Loudoun Dam for the seismic dam failure and flood combination, or TVA will perform a seismic test of the sand baskets, as stated in TVA's letter dated April 20, 2011. TVA will report the results of this analysis or test to the NRC by October 31, 2011."

By letter dated October 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11306A193), TVA informed NRC that TVA performed the hydrology analysis without use of the sand baskets under TVA Calculation CSQ000020080080, "Flood Levels at WBN and SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear Plant] from Seismic Dam Failures." The hydrology analysis confirms the sand baskets are not required to be in place during and following the seismic events defined in Section 2.4.4 of the WBN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

By letter dated July 19, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13205A173), TVA notified the NRC staff that a permanent modification to replace the sand baskets located at the four dams had been chosen. The permanent modification consists of a combination of concrete floodwalls and raised earthen embankments or earthen berms. Heights of these modifications would range from 2.3 feet to 6.6 feet depending on the location. By letter dated April 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14122A219), TVA committed to removing the sand baskets (HESCO barriers) and completing the installation of the permanent modifications by October 31, 2015, except for 1900 feet at the Fort Loudoun Dam that will be completed by February 1, 2017.

Based on TVA's description of the permanent modifications, and the commitment to remove the sand baskets (HESCO barriers) and complete the permanent modifications in a reasonable timeframe, the NRC staff considers Open Item 133 to be closed."

SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

2.4.11	NA	Addressed in 2.4.6.
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2.4.12	NA	Addressed in 2.4.7.
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2.4.13	NA	Addressed in 2.4.9.
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2.4.14	NA	Addressed in 2.4.10.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.5.0	24	C 07	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.5 of SSER24 includes:</p> <p>“Summary and Conclusion</p> <p>The NRC staff reviewed Amendment 95 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 2.5.4, ‘Properties of Subsurface Materials and Foundations,’ and noted some changes that required clarification. Based on its review of TVA’s responses, the staff concluded that TVA’s responses were acceptable, because the typographical errors that occurred during the change from one electronic format to another were corrected by Amendment 98. Since there are no substantive changes to WBN Unit 2 FSAR Sections 2.5 through 2.5.5 since the NRC staff approved the sections during the licensing for WBN Unit 1, the sections are acceptable.”</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p>
2.5.1	0	C	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
2.5.2	0	C	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
2.5.3	0	C	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
2.5.4	11	C 03	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for design differential settlement of piping and electrical components</p> <p>Analysis was presented to staff in September 1983. Staff found analysis and results acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER3.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for analysis of sheetpile walls</p> <p>Staff performed audit in September 1982, and determined TVA had used reasonable assumptions. Staff closed issue in SSER3.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for material and geometric damping in soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis</p> <p>Staff performed audit in September 1982, and determined TVA had used reasonable assumptions. Staff closed issue in SSER3.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE (1) on liquefaction beneath ERCW pipelines and Class 1E electrical conduit.</p> <p>Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a description of the underground barriers along the ERCW pipelines. Staff agreed the barriers provide sufficient confinement to any liquefied soil. Staff closed issue in SSER3.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>FSAR amendment 54-63 was reviewed in SSER9. NRC determined that the conclusions previously issued in the SER and SSER3 remained unchanged.</p>



SER	SSER	*
SECTION	#	REV.

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

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The Special Program (SP) for Soil Liquefaction was reviewed in SSER11.

NRC IR 50-390/92-45 and 50-391/92-45 concluded that TVA had correctly implemented the SP and that it was closed. SSER11 accepted the implementation for WBN Unit 1. Per TVA letter dated August 3, 2007, implementation of the Soil Liquefaction SP is complete for both units.

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## REVISION 03 UPDATE:

NRC IR 50-391/2009-605 noted that the Soil Liquefaction SP was closed for Unit 2.

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2.5.5	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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2.5.6	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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2.6.0	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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		<b>06</b>	

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## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 2.6 of SSER22 includes:

"The staff reviewed Chapter 2 of the original WBN FSAR, dated September 27, 1976 ... and determined that the FSAR has never contained a Section 2.6."

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3.0.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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3.1.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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3.1.1	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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3.1.2	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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3.2.0	14	<b>C</b>	In SSER14, the staff reviewed revisions to Table 3.2-2, "Summary of Criteria - Mechanical System Components", and found the table acceptable.
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		<b>01</b>	

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3.2.1	8	<b>C</b>	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for seismic classification of structures, systems, and components important to safety
		---	
		<b>01</b>	

The staff reviewed Amendment 49 to FSAR and actions implemented by TVA to address ERCW seismic classification in SSER3 and found them acceptable, pending verification of actions. Staff closed issue on ERCW seismic category upgrade and seismic classification in SSER5.

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CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for ERCW upgrade to seismic category 1

Staff verified that required portion of ERCW had been upgraded or replaced satisfactorily in SSER5 and closed this issue.

In SSER6, the staff addressed and resolved an issue on Category I boundary.

OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving seismic classification of cable trays and conduits

In SSER6, staff identified an issue on seismic classification of cable trays and conduits being categorized as I(L). In its May 8, 1991, letter, TVA proposed to analyze conduits as Seismic Category I subsystems. Additionally, in a September 18, 1991 letter, TVA agreed to perform cable tray qualification using conventional linear elastic analysis methods, considering nonlinear response behavior on a case-by-case basis and to submit these cases to the staff for approval. The staff resolved this issue in SSER8.

3.2.2	21	<b>C</b> 13	Section 3.2.2 of SSER3 discusses confirmatory issues for seismic classification and upgrade of ERCW that are already included in 3.2.1.
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Staff accepted implementation of Heat Code Traceability CAP for Unit 1 in SSER7.

Unit 2 Action: Complete CAP using Unit 1 approach.

Staff reviewed updated information in Amendment 68 on use of codes and standards in SSER9 and stated that prior conclusions were unchanged.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Heat Code Traceability CAP.

In SSER21, the Heat Code Traceability CAP was resolved. Completion of Heat Code Traceability CAP is tracked under 23.2.9.

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

IPS Item 010 (Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Heat Code Traceability CAP Plan) was closed in Inspection Report 391/2012-602.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

The Heat Code Traceability CAP has been completed.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.3.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.3.1	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.3.2	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.4.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.4.1	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.4.2		NA	Addressed in 3.4.1.
3.5.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.5.1	22	C 06	<p>In SSER9, the staff determined that a new spectrum used for the design of a new DG building and other Category I structures built after 1979 was acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER14, clarification in Amendment 79 on internal missile sources was reviewed and did not change prior conclusions. Staff also reviewed revised information on turbine missiles and concluded that impact of potential missiles was insignificant.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 3.5.1.3 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"During its review, the NRC staff identified an open item to review TVA's testing frequency of once every 6 months for turbine valves. ...</p> <p>Since TVA's calculations used NRC-approved methodology and had a large margin of safety between the calculated P1 value and the NRC criterion, the NRC staff finds that the proposed test frequency of once every 6 months for turbine valves is acceptable, and the open item is closed."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
3.5.2	22	C 06	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for modifications to protect Diesel Generators</p> <p>TVA submitted a proposed design modification for installation of a reinforced concrete curb around the diesel exhaust stacks to protect them from damage in a letter dated November 24, 1982. The staff found this acceptable and closed this issue in SSER2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 3.5.2 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review of Section 3.5.2 of Amendment 97 to the WBN FSAR, the NRC staff concludes that</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>those SSCs identified by TVA as requiring protection from externally generated missiles conform to the relevant regulatory requirements and are, therefore, acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
3.5.3	0	C 01	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
3.6.0	21	CO 13	<p>In SSER6, the staff accepted TVA approaches involving arbitrary intermediate breaks, determination of intermediate break locations and analysis of jet impingement loads.</p> <p>In SSER11, the staff reviewed results of the MELB Special Program and determined that the conclusion in the SER finding plant design for protection against piping failures outside containment was still valid.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete Special Program using the Unit 1 approach.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the MELB SP.</p> <p>In SSER21, the MELB Special Program was resolved. Completion of MELB SP is tracked under 23.3.8.</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved." Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
3.6.1	22	C 06	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving main steam line break (MSLB) outside containment</p> <p>In a letter dated November 30, 1992, TVA submitted a new evaluation for both Units 1 and 2 accounting for increased environmental temperatures in the MSVV rooms due to release of superheated steam and later submitted, by letter dated March 28, 1994, additional information related to the assumptions made in this analysis for both units. The staff reviewed this information together with their detailed evaluation and acceptance of the same methodology applied at Sequoyah and concluded that the MSLB analysis for the WBN MSVV rooms, including the effects of superheated steam, was acceptable and identified this issue as resolved in SSER14.</p> <p>In SSER14, the staff reviewed the construction of response spectra for the steel containment vessel resulting from the compartment pressure transients caused by pipe break and TVA modeling of the SCV for both units (see TVA letter dated December 30, 1993) and concluded that the methodology for obtaining shell dynamic displacements and construction of spectra were acceptable.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p>

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

3.6.1 of SSER22 includes:

"Therefore, the staff concludes that the design meets the requirements of GDC 4 regarding protection against pipe failures in fluid systems outside containment and is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

3.6.2	22	<b>C</b>	The 3.6.2 discussion in SSER14 on response spectra for the SCV refers to the evaluation provided in 3.6.1.
		<b>06</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-5 of SSER22 has "3" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 3 reads, "In SSER 21, this issue was identified as 'Resolved.' However, TVA made changes to the Unit 2 FSAR affecting the previous staff conclusions. The staff evaluated the changes and the results are documented in this SSER."

Section 3.6.2 of SSER22 includes:

"Therefore, the staff finds TVA's changes and modifications to Section 3.6B.2 of FSAR Amendment 95 to be acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

3.6.3	24	<b>C</b>	New section in SRP 1987. Approved for both units in Appendix J of SSER5. The staff concluded in SSER12 that TVA may eliminate pressurizer surge line rupture from the design basis for Units 1 and 2.
		<b>07</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

3.6.3 of SSER22 includes:

"The leak before-break evaluation methods are consistent with SRP Section 3.6.3 and are, therefore, acceptable, pending the resolution of Open Item 15 regarding the completion of PWSCC mitigation activities."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

3.6.3 of SSER 24 includes:

"Since TVA confirmed that it has committed to Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Material Reliability Program (MRP)-139, Revision 1, December 2008, and used the MSIP® process, as documented in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.5.3.3.1, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has completed reasonable PWSCC mitigation activities on the Alloy 600 DMBWs in the primary loop piping. Therefore, Open Item 15 is closed."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.7.0	21	<b>C</b> <b>03</b>	<p>The staff concluded in SSER6 that FSAR section 3.7 which was added to describe Set A, Set B and Set C seismic analysis was consistent with the Seismic Analysis CAP.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete CAP using the Unit 1 approach.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Seismic Analysis CAP .</p> <p>In SSER21, the Seismic Analysis CAP was resolved. Completion of the Seismic Analysis CAP is tracked under 23.2.16.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC IR 50-391/2010-602 noted that the Seismic Analysis CAP was closed for Unit 2.</p>
3.7.1	21	<b>C</b> <b>03</b>	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving update of FSAR for seismic design issues</p> <p>The staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 68 and found that required changes had been incorporated into the FSAR, as committed to in TVA letter dated December 18, 1990, for Units 1 and 2, and issue was deemed resolved in SSER6. SSER9 stated the Seismic Analysis CAP was acceptably implemented for Unit 1. SSER16 discusses use of a vertical PGA of .15g rather than .18g for Set B spectra and determined that it was acceptable.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete CAP using Unit 1 approach.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Seismic Analysis CAP .</p> <p>In SSER21, the Seismic Analysis CAP was resolved. Completion of the Seismic Analysis CAP is tracked under 23.2.16.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC IR 50-391/2010-602 noted that the Seismic Analysis CAP was closed for Unit 2.</p>
3.7.2	21	<b>C</b> <b>03</b>	<p>3.7.2.1.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving mass eccentricity</p> <p>In a letter dated May 8, 1991, for Units 1 and 2, TVA provided clarification that actual mass eccentricities from such items as equipment hatch and lock used in evaluating the steel containment vessel for an earthquake load were replaced by a 5% accidental eccentricity. This was demonstrated to be conservative. TVA also proposed a revision to the FSAR to document this change. The staff found this acceptable and resolved this issue in SSER8.</p>

3.7.2.1.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving comparison of Set A vs. Set B response

The staff considered this item (opened in SSER6) resolved in SSER11 based on audits and inspections since SSER6.

Unit 2 Action: Complete Seismic Analysis CAP using the Unit 1 approach.

In SSER16, the staff discussed the review and acceptability of the NSSS-ICS modeling for seismic analysis.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Seismic Analysis CAP .

In SSER21, the Seismic Analysis CAP was resolved. Completion of the Seismic Analysis CAP is tracked under 23.2.16.

REVISION 03 UPDATE:

NRC IR 50-391/2010-602 noted that the Seismic Analysis CAP was closed for Unit 2.

3.7.3	22	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving number of peak cycles to be used for OBE
		<b>06</b>	<p>In SSER6, the staff identified an issue involving the number of peak cycles to be used for OBE. In a letter dated May 8, 1991, for both units, TVA proposed to revise the FSAR for ASME Section III Class I piping analysis to include the assumption of 5 OBEs and 1 SSE and a minimum of 10 peak stress cycles per event. The staff accepted this in SSER8.</p> <p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving use of code cases, damping factors for conduit and use of worst case, critical case and bounding case</p> <p>In SSER6, the staff identified outstanding issues involving code case use, damping factors for conduit and use of worst case, critical case and bounding case. Deficiencies identified in the use of worst case, critical case and bounding calculations were resolved in IR 50-390/93-201, and this issue was considered resolved for Unit 1 in SSER12.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Addressed in CAP/SP. The Unit 1 approach will be used for Unit 2.</p> <p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving 1.2 multi mode factor</p> <p>In SSER6, the staff identified an issue involving a 1.2 multi-mode factor. In SSER8, the staff continued to review the use of a multi-mode factor of 1.2. The staff reviewed verification studies performed by TVA to justify the use of a 1.2 multi-mode factor in seismic evaluation of certain sub systems in SSER8 and SSER9 and, after TVA provided further confirmation of supporting calculations, the use of Complete Quadratic Combinations and validity of two degree of freedom predictions in a letter dated October 10, 1991, for both units, the staff considered this issue resolved in SSER9.</p>

Conduit Supports Corrective Action Program. Process was reviewed and determined to be acceptable for Unit 1 in SER dated September 1, 1989.

Unit 2 Action: Addressed in CAP/SP. The Unit 1 approach will be used for Unit 2.

In SSER6, the staff reviewed several other seismic analysis considerations including combination of components of earthquake motion, use of load factors in simplified analysis of equipment, consideration of torsional effects of eccentric masses in piping analysis; damping values for cable trays, HVAC and equipment and components; analysis of mounting for equipment and components; and loads and load combinations used in design of HVAC ducts and supports and found them acceptable.

In SSER7, the staff reviewed the seismic design of the Refueling Water Storage Tank, the only safety related above ground vertical steel tank in the plant, and found it acceptable.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is "Open (NRR)."

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Seismic Analysis CAP and the Conduit Supports CAP.

In SSER21, the Seismic Analysis CAP was resolved. Completion of the Seismic Analysis CAP is tracked under 23.2.16.

In SSER21, the Conduit Supports CAP was resolved. Completion of the Electrical Conduit and Conduit Supports CAP is tracked under 23.2.16.

REVISION 03 UPDATE:

NRC IR 50-391/2010-602 noted that the Seismic Analysis CAP was closed for Unit 2.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 3.7.3.18 of SSER22 includes:

"Since WBN Units 1 and 2 share a common control room, TVA has applied to Unit 2 the Unit 1 methodology of qualifying the main control room components. The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's submittal and confirmed that the methodology and results pertaining to Unit 1 are applicable to Unit 2. Therefore, the staff considers this section resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

3.7.4	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.8.0	22	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving load combinations and stress allowables
		<b>13</b>	In response to staff concerns regarding use of ductility ratio when considering thermally induced stresses, TVA stated in a letter dated April 6, 1992, for both units, that they would use a methodology consistent with SRP 3.8.4 for the design of steel members and use the linear elastic provision of DG-C 1.6.12, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Steel Structures with Thermal Restraint," except for the energy balance provision of Section C.2.3.1. The staff found this acceptable. TVA also agreed, in its May 8, 1991, letter for both units, that any further sampling of structural welds after the issuance of NCIG-2, Rev. 2 would be to that revision. This issue was resolved in SSER9.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			Page 1-5 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.
			Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."
			SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
			Corrected STATUS to "C."
3.8.1	3	<b>C</b>	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - verify buckling methodology
		<b>01</b>	In response to staff concern, TVA submitted a letter dated May 16, 1984, for both units, stating that TVA calculations already accounted for new information from NRC-sponsored research programs, particularly information concerning reinforcement around shell (vessel) opening. Based on their review of the response, the staff closed this issue in SSER3.
3.8.2	7	<b>C</b>	The staff accepted implementation of the Concrete Quality Special Program for Unit 1 in SSER7. This program is considered closed for Unit 2 based on the work performed for Unit 1. The was identified in a TVA letter dated August 3, 2007, WBN - Unit 2 - Reactivation of Construction Activities
3.8.3	21	<b>O</b>	The staff reviewed materials, allowable stresses and load cases for the watertight equipment hatch cover in an FSAR Table in Amendment and found them acceptable for both units in SSER14.
		<b>02</b>	The staff reviewed allowable stresses for Category I structural steel and found them acceptable for both units in SSER16.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

SER SECTION	SSER #	* -- REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.8.4	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.9.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
3.9.1	22	CO 06	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving assumption in piping analysis for water-hammer due to check valve slam</p> <p>In SSER6, the NRC expressed concern regarding TVA's piping analysis that postulated failure of certain supports. TVA submitted an August 4, 1992, letter stating that, where possible, supports were upgraded in the analysis to maintain structural integrity during the postulated loading scenario. The issue was resolved in SSER13.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Modify supports as needed.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>3.9.1 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Based on the review of Section 3.9.1 of Amendment 97 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that TVA complies with the regulatory requirements relevant to this section. Therefore, the open item (SSER 6 OI 20(a) for Section 3.9.1) is closed."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
3.9.2	22	C 06	<p>The staff reviewed "Pre-operational Vibration and Dynamic Effects Testing on Piping", and found this area acceptable in SSER14.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>3.9.2 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Based on the review of Section 3.9.2 described above, the NRC staff concludes that TVA complies with the regulatory requirements relevant to this section."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
3.9.3	22	C 06	<p>3.9.3.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving use of experience data to qualify category I(L) piping</p> <p>The staff identified a concern regarding the use of experience data as a method of seismic qualification of Category I(L) piping in SSER6. TVA stated in a letter dated December 18, 1990 for both units, that it was performing a verification program to validate the original seismic design basis for Category I(L) piping, including a screening criteria based on earthquake experience data to identify items requiring further evaluation and bounding case analysis to demonstrate the conservatism of the screening criteria. In a September 20, 1991, for both units, letter, TVA provided revised criteria for the bounding case analysis. Based on the staff's evaluation, the issue was considered resolved in SSER8.</p> <p>3.9.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION - Relief and safety valve testing (II.D.1)</p> <p>Staff found TVA approach in response to this issue, using information from EPRI valve test program and performing modifications to safety and relief discharge piping and supports, was acceptable. Issue was considered resolved in SSER3.</p>

## 3.9.3.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving operating characteristics of main steam safety valves

The staff identified a concern with operating characteristics of main steam safety valves in SSER6. In a letter dated June 21, 1991, TVA responded to NRC concerns regarding the design and installation of MSSVs stated that all valves and piping components were analyzed for all MSSV discharge loads acting simultaneously, combined with other required loads and this was accepted by the staff. In the same letter, TVA also provided the method used to establish the MSSV adjustment ring settings for plant valves and this was acceptable to the staff. This resolved the issue in SSER7.

Unit 2 Action: Provide basis of applicability of Unit 1 MSSV analysis to Unit 2.

## 3.9.3.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involving baseplate flexibility and its effect on anchor bolt loads

The staff continued to review baseplate flexibility and its effect on anchor bolt loads. The issue remained open in SSER6. The TVA response to this issue, in a letter dated July 26, 1991, for both units, described an update to the previous response for B 79-02 and its civil design standard for concrete anchorage, which incorporated an increase in anchor stiffness and consideration of prying forces for thin baseplates analyzed by hand. The staff determined that this adequately resolved the issue in SSER8.

## 3.9.3.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving stiffness and deflection limits for seismic Category I pipe supports

The staff questioned new support stiffness and deflection limits for seismic Category I pipe supports in SSER6. The TVA program to demonstrate that change in design criteria which uses stiffness and deflection limits for Category I pipe supports did not compromise the adequacy of pipe supports, was submitted in a TVA letter dated September 30, 1991, for both units, and was found to be acceptable by the staff and the issue was resolved in SSER8.

## 3.9.3.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE, staff was awaiting TVA concurrence on their position with respect to margin for critical buckling of pipe supports

In a letter dated May 14, 1984, TVA provided results of a sampling program and determined that compressive stresses for pipe supports did not exceed acceptance criteria established by NRC and staff considered this issue resolved in SSER4.

The staff reviewed proposed new criteria for service load combinations and associated stress limits for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pipe supports in SSER6 and found them acceptable.

In SSER15, the staff found the response to NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, "Performance Testing of Relief and Safety Valves," acceptable.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA determined that the Unit 1 MSSV analysis was applicable to Unit 2.

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

Section 10.1 was amended to reference the Westinghouse safety evaluation that evaluated the effect of the MSSV blowdown on the LOCA related FSAR analysis results.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 3.9.3 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its review of Section 3.9.3 of Amendment 97 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that TVA complies with the regulatory requirements relevant to this section."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

3.9.4	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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3.9.5	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

3.9.5 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA as discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that the RVI components in WBN Unit 2 are consistent with the previously NRC-approved components in WBN Unit 1. Therefore, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 RVI components listed in Section 4.2.2 of FSAR Amendment 95 are acceptable, pending the resolution of Open Item 71. Additionally, TVA's compliance with the ASME Code requirements for design and inspection provides adequate assurance that the licensee will maintain the level of quality and safety for the RVI components during the current license period."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open."

Open Item 71 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"By letter dated April 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI 11110513), TVA withdrew its commitment to replace the Unit 2 clevis insert bolts. TVA should provide further justification for the decision to not replace the bolts to the NRC staff. (Section 3.9.5)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 3.9.5 included the following for Open Item 71:

"TVA provided additional information supporting the withdrawal of the commitment by letter dated October 24, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11299A130).

The NRC staff reviewed TVA's justification for withdrawal of the commitment to replace the Alloy X-750 clevis insert bolts. The following summary lists the NRC staff's understanding of TVA's justification for retaining the existing bolts:

- \* Only one documented failure of clevis insert bolts has occurred, this failure was discovered at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (D.C. Cook, Unit 1) in 2010. The root cause of this failure remains indeterminate.

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- \* The D.C. Cook, Unit 1 failure has not been definitively attributed to SCC.
- \* Clevis insert bolt failures would be detected through the normal American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), Section XI in service inspections conducted during each 10-year inspection interval.
- \* Industry experience from inservice inspections does not support the existence of a widespread problem with clevis insert bolt failures. In its letter dated October 24, 2011, TVA cited information from eight plants indicating that inservice inspections within the last 5 years found no evidence of clevis insert bolt failures, and cited 12 more plants that should have performed inservice inspections within this time period with no reports of clevis insert bolt failures. In its previous letter dated April 21, 2011, TVA cited approximately 15 years of operating experience at WBN Unit 1, with no evidence of degradation of the clevis insert bolts.

The NRC staff reviewed TVA's justification for withdrawal of the commitment, as summarized above. The NRC staff agrees with TVA's assessment of operating experience related to clevis insert bolts, however, it notes that other Alloy X-750 components in RVI have experienced failures caused by SCC, most notably control rod guide tube support pins (split pins) in RVIs designed by Westinghouse. Alloy X-750 baffle-to-former bolts in a German PWR (Biblis-A) also experienced cracking attributed to SCC. Most of the failed split pins and the baffle-to-former bolts were in the AH3 or a similar heat treatment condition; however, even some split pins in the HTH condition experienced SCC, which was attributed to poor surface condition. Furthermore, information from the Electric Power Research Institute Materials Reliability Program indicates that SSC is the most likely cause of the D.C. Cook, Unit 1 clevis insert bolt failure. Therefore, the NRC staff recommends that TVA closely monitor operating experience related to RVI components fabricated from Alloy X-750, including both clevis insert bolts and other components, to determine whether it will need to replace the clevis insert bolts in the future.

Based on the foregoing, the NRC staff concludes that TVA may withdraw its commitment to replace the existing clevis insert bolts before plant startup. Therefore, Open Item 71 is closed. The NRC staff recommends that TVA monitor relevant industry experience and that it replace the bolts in the future, if necessary, based on operating experience.

The SSER status remains as "Open."

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

3.9.6	22	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION on inservice testing of pumps and valves
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		<b>13</b>	The staff stated that they were reviewing TVA's response to GL 89-04, addressing acceptable IST programs and the license condition on inservice testing of pumps and valves remained open in SSER5. TVA committed to submit a revised ASME Section XI Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program six months before the projected date of operating license issuance in an August 21, 1989, letter. On this basis, the staff considered that the proposed license condition was no longer required in SSER12.
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OUTSTANDING ISSUE required that Technical Specifications include limiting condition for operation that requires plant shutdown or system isolation when leak limits are not met. Staff had not reviewed Technical Specifications.

The safety evaluation in SSER14 states that the staff did not find any IST issues that would prevent issuance of an operating license for Unit 1. The item was resolved in SSER14.

Unit 2 Action: Submit Technical Specifications.

In SSER18, the staff approved a proposed alternative for set pressure testing of the three pressurizer safety

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

relief valves that provide overpressure protection for the reactor coolant system.

In SSER20, the staff discussed 13 issues that remained to be resolved for the pump and valve inservice testing program and stated that they had been addressed in a manner that complies with the staff's position and they granted relief for an additional relief request.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

TS LCO 3.4.13 provides the requirements for RCS Operational Leakage. Included in this is a requirement to shutdown the unit if leakage can not be reduced to within limits within the specified time frame.

TS LCO 3.4.14 provides the requirements for RCS Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage. Included in this is a requirement to shutdown the unit if leakage can not be reduced to within limits within the specified time frame.

TS 5.7.2.11 provides the Inservice Testing Program.

### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 3.9.6 of SSER22 includes:

"Currently, the development and submittal of an acceptable IST program for the WBN Unit 2 is Open Item 13 (Appendix HH). The NRC will include its evaluation of the IST program in a future supplement to the SER before it issues an OL for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

### REVISION 11 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated December 12, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13358A066) provided the NRC with a copy of TVA Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100-006, "Inservice Testing Program" for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2. The TI addresses both the updated Unit 1 and initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program.

Additionally, the letter contained, "The submittal of the WBN IST Program document, including the WBN2 PST Program (Enclosure 1), the exemption request (Enclosure 2), and the relief requests (Enclosure 3), described above, will also satisfy SSER 22, Appendix HH, Open Item No. 13.

### REVISION 12 UPDATE:

NRC requested TVA to re-issue with 1 letter for each unit.

TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014, provided the NRC with TVA Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100.006, Revision 1, "Inservice Testing Program," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2, including Relief Requests (10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5)(iii)).

The letter noted, "The TI is a combined Unit 1/Unit 2 program document and is being submitted for staff review for the licensing of Unit 2. This TI addresses the initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program for pumps, valves, dynamic restraints (snubbers), and pressure-relief devices. The previously submitted Unit 2, "Preservice Test (PST) Plan," (Reference 3) is superseded in its

entirety by the TI provided in Enclosure 1.”

This letter also provided the following new commitment:

“Item B of Reference 1 requested clarification of FSAR Section 3.9.6. This clarification will be included in FSAR Amendment 112 scheduled for late May.” Note that Reference 1 was NRC to TVA letter dated April 18, 2014.

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TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014, submitted Amendment 112 to the Unit 2 FSAR to the NRC. The second paragraph of the second page of the cover letter reads as follows: “In addition, FSAR Change Package 2-112-10 addresses a clarification to the IST Program code of record as committed to in Reference 2.” Note that this Reference 2 was the TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014.

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 included the following under 3.9.6 (page 3-1):

“Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 13

“Open Item 13 states, ‘TVA is expected to submit an IST [inservice testing] program and specific relief requests for WBN Unit 2 nine months before the projected date of OL issuance.’

TVA submitted the IST program on May 12, 2014 for WBN Unit 2. By letter dated October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14289A222), NRC approved the program. Therefore, the staff considers Open Item 13 to be closed.”

SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

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3.9.7	NA	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
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3.9.8	NA	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
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3.10.0	23	CO	In SSER1 the staff discussed their evaluation of the TVA program for qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment for seismic and other loads, and opened the OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving adequacy of frequency test, peak broadening of response spectra, reconciling actual field mounting by welding vs. testing configuration mounted by bolting and need for surveillance and maintenance programs to address aging.
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The staff provided a status of these issues in SSER3 and closed peak broadening of response spectra, use of damping values, consideration of nozzle loads, and status of seismic qualification. Other specific issues were closed in this supplement as well.

In SSER5, the staff stated that this issue remained open.

In a letter dated December 1, 1982, TVA provided justification for single-frequency tests to seismically qualify the Reactor Protection System cabinet. This showed that test response spectra (TRS) were substantially higher than broadened required response spectra (RRS) throughout the required frequency range. The staff evaluated test results and building seismic behavior and considered this aspect of the testing issue closed in SSER6.

Staff concerns on the impact of aging on seismic performance were resolved in SSER6 based on discussions with TVA technical personnel and review of maintenance and surveillance instruction manuals.



## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

There was a specific issue on installing spacers for the 125V DC vital batteries as was done during qualification testing and required by the manufacturer. The issue was closed in SSER6 when it was determined that spacers had been installed.

With regard to the overall issue on adequacy of testing, the staff performed an audit as part of Appendix S of SSER9. This included a review of the TVA approach, criteria and action plan to address effect of directional coupling and verification that acceleration at each device location is less than .95g because relay chatter at higher acceleration levels is expected. TRS enveloped RRS for all directions. The staff found the above to be in accordance with SRP 3.10 and IEEE 344-1975 and closed the issue.

For reconciling the impact for equipment actually mounted using welding but tested with mounting by bolting, in-situ test results were provided to NRC (in letters dated April 30, 1985, and January 30, 1986) along with Westinghouse report on seismic qualification by analysis and testing for the main control board. The staff reviewed these results and on the basis of the consistency of all results provided, concluded that the issue was resolved in SSER6.

Unit 2 Action: Complete Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP using the Unit 1 approach.

-----

In SSER4, the staff reviewed an issue on the vibration of deep draft pumps and found it acceptable.

In SSER8, the staff accepted a proposed revision to FSAR Section 3.7.3.16 to indicate that the alternative seismic qualification method is to follow the requirements of IEEE Standard 344-1971 and address the guidelines of SRP Section 3.10.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP .

In SSER21, the Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP was resolved. Completion of the Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP is tracked under 23.2.6.

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

3.10 of SSER23 includes:

"Summary and Conclusions

Based on its review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 95 and the information provided by TVA in its letter dated July 31, 2010, the staff concludes that TVA did not make any substantive changes to Section 3.10 of the FSAR, as reviewed and approved by the NRC staff in NUREG-0847 and its Supplements 1-9. Therefore, the staff concludes that Section 3.10 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is acceptable."

-----

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

IPS Item 007 (Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Equipment Seismic Corrective Action Program) was closed in Inspection Report 391/2014-615, dated February 13, 2015.



-----  
 Changed Status to "CO." The NRC has closed the item; however, TVA has remaining action.

3.11.0	27	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE - TVA program not submitted at time of SER
		<b>13</b>	The EQ program was submitted after issuance of the SER. It was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER15.  Unit 2 Action: Complete EQ Special Program.

-----  
 REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the EQ SP.

In SSER21, the Environmental Qualification Special Program was resolved. The EQ program is tracked under 23.3.4.

-----  
 REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 3.11.3 of SSER22 included, "The staff will update this SSER upon satisfactory closure of the open items identified in Appendix HH, consistent with the staff's approach to the review and acceptance of the WBN Unit 1 EQ program."

The following Open Items of Appendix HH are applicable to this item: 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24.

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "OPEN (NRR)."

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 Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, the action for Open Item 16 is for NRC Inspection / Review.

-----  
 Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, the action for Open Item 17 is for NRC Inspection / Review.

-----  
 TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 18:

"Addressed in the response to RAI 3.11 - EQ - 1. in TVA to NRC letter dated December 17, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) - Response to Requests for Additional Information' (ADAMS Accession No. ML103540560)."

-----  
 TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 19:

"WBN Unit 2 Environmental Qualification procedures were provided to the NRC Regional Inspectors for the Environmental Qualification Inspection the week of April 18, 2011 for closure of this action item."

-----  
 TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 20:

"The refurbishment of the 6.9 kV motors for Unit 2 involved routine maintenance activities. These maintenance activities did not modify or repair the motor insulation system originally supplied by Westinghouse. However, review of the original qualification report indicates that the testing performed meets the requirements for a Category I qualification. Motors which only require routine maintenance will have their binders revised and will be re-classified as Category I.

In one case (Containment Spray Pump Motor), the maintenance activities determined the need to rewind the motor. The rewind motor insulation system is qualified in accordance with the EPRI motor rewind program which meets Category I criteria."

-----

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 21:

"The closure package has been provided to the WBN Unit 2 Resident Inspectors."

-----

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 22:

"This item was addressed in the response to RAI 3.11 - EQ - 3.b. in TVA to NRC letter dated December 17, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information' (ADAMS Accession No. ML103540560). The response stated, "For EQ applications, the replacement terminal blocks will be new GE CR151B terminal blocks certified to test reports that document qualification to NUREG-0588, Category I criteria.

TVA discussed this issue with the NRC during the ACRS meeting on February 24, 2011. The NRC staff accepted TVA's explanation of the term "equivalent" as provided above. Therefore, TVA considers this item to be closed."

-----

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 23:

"TVA will qualify the MSIV solenoids to the Category I criteria."

-----

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 24:

"Calculation 'A Review of Electronic Components in a Radiation Environment of  $\leq 5 \times 10^4$  RADS' is provided as Attachment 2."

[Since ACCESS does not use exponents, it is clarified that " $\leq 5 \times 10^4$ " is equal to " $\leq 5 \times 10^4$ ."]

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NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed SSER22 (Appendix HH) Open Items 18 and 19.

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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 20.

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-607 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 21.

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REVISION 12 UPDATE:

For Open Item 23:

TVA has issued Environmental Qualification Documentation Package Binder WBNEQ-SOL-010 qualifying the MSIV solenoids to the criteria of 10CFR50.49 and/or NUREG-0588 Category I. The binder includes the qualification test report.

-----

TVA to NRC letter dated January 28, 2014, the letter contains the following:

"During verification and validation of Unit 2 Environmental Qualification (EQ) cables, TVA determined that procurement and installation dates of some Unit 2 EQ cables did not meet the cutoff dates for procurement (May 23, 1980, as specified in IE Bulletin 79-01B, Supplement 2) and installation (February 22, 1983, as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision 1). One population of such cables was discussed in Reference 1 (TVA to NRC letter dated March 18, 2013), and the acceptance for their use was documented in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 22."

The letter updates the information provided for the population of Category II electrical cables installed in Unit 2.

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## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 17 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-615, dated February 13, 2015.

Open Item 23 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-608, dated November 14, 2014.

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This section contains 9 SSER Open Items (Ois). As an aide to track them, the following has been added:

OI	STATUS
16	This item remains OPEN for NRC Inspection / Review.
17	This item remains OPEN in the SSER. It has been closed in an Inspection Report.
18	This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1. Revision 06 of this document documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
19	This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1. Revision 06 of this document documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
20	This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1. Revision 07 of this document documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
21	This item was CLOSED in SSER25; however, it was only in the SSER Open Item Closure Table. Revision 07 of this section documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
22	This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1.
23	This item was CLOSED in SSER27 as delineated in the current section.
24	This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1.

-----

SSER27 included the following under 3.11 (pages 3-1 and 3-2):

"3.11.2 Evaluation

3.11.2.2.1 Electrical Equipment in a Harsh Environment

In SSER 22, published in January 2011, the NRC staff documented its review of Section 3.11 of the FSAR. During its review, the NRC staff communicated to TVA a concern regarding the qualification of cables purchased under Contract 81K5-830078 for construction of WBN Unit 2. NRC staff sent TVA a Request for Additional Information on July 30, 2010, asking for additional information related to the cables in question. TVA responded to the NRC in a letter dated September 1, 2010, that these particular cables were properly qualified.

By letter dated August 3, 2011, as supplemented by letters dated June 13, 2012, and March 18, 2013, TVA identified additional cables similar to those discussed in the September 1, 2010, letter. Since 10 CFR 50.49(l) states "Replacement equipment must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of this section unless there are sound reasons to the contrary," the NRC staff questioned the origin of these additional cables.

TVA's letter dated March 18, 2013, clearly identifies the origin of the cables installed at WBN Unit 2, and states that they meet the qualification criteria of NUREG-0588, Category II, using the guidelines established in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 323-1971, "IEEE Trial Use Standard; General Guide for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." TVA stated that these cables were purchased prior to May 23, 1980, and were in the utility's stock prior to February 22, 1983. TVA also states that some of the cables were installed in WBN Unit 2, between 1980 and 1983, and another portion was installed between 1983 and 1985 (when construction was halted).

10 CFR 50.49(k) states "Applicants for and holders of operating licenses are not required to requalify electric equipment important to safety in accordance with the provisions of this section if the Commission has previously required qualification of that equipment in accordance with "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors," November 1979 (DOR Guidelines), or NUREG-0588 (For Comment version), "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment."

Since these cables were purchased and in the utility's stock prior to February 22, 1983; installed as new equipment rather than replacement equipment; and that the cables meet the qualification criteria of NUREG-0588, Category II, the NRC staff finds that these additional cables meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49(k). Because the cables are not replacement equipment, 50.49(l) is inapplicable.

#### Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

##### Open Item 23

Open Item 23 states, "Resolve whether or not TVA's reasoning for not upgrading the MSIV [main steam isolation valve] solenoid valves to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(i)."

TVA stated that the original WBN Unit 2 MSIVs are qualified to NUREG-0588, Category II. TVA is refurbishing the MSIVs by replacing the missing subcomponents, including the solenoid valves, terminal blocks, and manufacturing wiring, with components of the same make, model, and type as supplied on the original purchase order. With the exception of the solenoid valves, the subcomponents will be qualified to NUREG-0588, Category I requirements. According to TVA, the solenoid valves cannot be upgraded because equivalent subcomponents qualified to NUREG-0588, Category I, requirements are not available. The NRC staff does not consider TVA's justification for not upgrading the MSIV solenoid valves to Category I, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(i), to be a sound reason.

By letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), TVA stated that the MSIV solenoid valves would be upgraded to Category I. In inspection report 05000391/2014608 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182), the NRC staff documented where it reviewed TVA's Environmental Qualification Documentation Package binder as well as the qualification test reports and found that TVA had successfully qualified the MSIV solenoid valves to the Category I criteria as committed.

Based on this response, the staff considers Open Item 23 to be closed."

SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

3.12.0	NA	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.12.1		NA --	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
3.12.2		NA --	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
3.12.3		NA --	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
3.12.4		NA --	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
3.12.5		NA --	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
3.12.6		NA --	Addressed in 3.9.1 through 3.9.3.
3.13.0	22	C -- 11	<p>Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 3.13 of SER22 was as follows:</p> <p>"3.13 Threaded Fasteners</p> <p>In SSER 21, Section 1.7, the NRC staff identified Section 3.13.0 as an issue but did not list the issue status. NRC Bulletin 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants," dated June 2, 1982, addressed threaded fasteners. In its letter dated March 20, 2008, TVA committed to implementing the actions of NRC Bulletin 82-02 in WBN Unit 2, using the same approach as it used on Unit 1. NRC Inspection Report 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08, dated March 29, 1985, documented receipt and review of TVA's response to Bulletin 82-02, and documented closure of the Bulletin for WBN Unit 1, based upon the NRC's verification of TVA's actions.</p> <p>The NRC staff concludes that TVA's approach to addressing this issue for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable, based upon its commitment to implement Bulletin 82-02 for WBN Unit 2, using the same approach as at Unit 1."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-607 (September 30, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1982-02.</p>
4.0.0	0	C --	Approved for both units in SER.
4.1.0	0	C --	Approved for both units in SER.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
4.2.0	27	C — — 13	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.2 includes:</p> <p>“Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in the proposed WBN Unit 2 FSAR, the NRC staff concludes that no substantive differences exist between the fuel system designs for WBN Unit 1 and WBN, Unit 2. In the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) associated with SECY-07-0096, "Possible Reactivation of Construction and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2," dated July 25, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072060688), the Commission stated that it supports a licensing review approach that employs the current licensing basis for WBN Unit 1 as the reference basis for the review and licensing of WBN, Unit 2. Since no substantive differences exist between the design for WBN Unit 2 and the previously reviewed and approved fuel system design for WBN Unit 1, the staff concludes that the fuel system design for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
4.2.1	23	C — — 09	<p>In SSER13, NRC determined that internal fuel rod pressure was not key design information that needed to be included in the WBN Unit 1 Technical Specifications.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.</p> <p>FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of the second generation Robust Fuel Assembly design (RFA-2).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.2.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“All aspects of the Westinghouse fuel design are based on mechanical tests, in-reactor operating experience, and engineering analyses. Additionally, the performance of the design inside the reactor is subject to the continuing surveillance programs of Westinghouse and individual utilities. These programs provide confirmatory and current design performance information.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p>

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

4.2.2	27	<b>C</b>	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE on cladding collapse calculations
		<b>13</b>	The staff reviewed the calculation for the predicted cladding collapse for the most limiting Watts Bar fuel and found it acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.2.2 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its review, as documented in the safety evaluation for WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 46, the NRC staff determined that TVA used the appropriate methodology and acceptance criteria for evaluating the fuel rod performance of RFA-2 fuel. Because the acceptance criteria were satisfied, the NRC staff concludes that the RFA-2 fuel design is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

AND

"The NRC staff is unclear whether the use of a thermal conductivity model that does not account for burnup degradation remains conservative, given the expected time in life of the maximum stored energy in the fuel. The NRC staff needs additional information from TVA to demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model. This is Open Item 61 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Open Item 61 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model. (Section 4.2.2)"

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### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

-----

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

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Unit 2 fuel has been received.

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### REVISION 11 UPDATE:

TVA To NRC Letter Dated August 6, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13225A024) provided The Required Information.

The cover letter included, "The information provided in Enclosures 1 and 4 completes TVA's response to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) Appendix HH, Open Item 61."

The letter also provided mark-ups of Unit 2 FSAR 15.4.1 and a commitment that the changes will be incorporated in Amendment 110.

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TVA to NRC letter dated August 14, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13254A310) submitted Amendment 110 to the Unit 2 FSAR. This amendment included the changes to Unit 2 FSAR 15.4.1 as committed above.

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### REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 22, 2014, provided computer code input data that the NRC can use to perform a confirmatory evaluation of the Thermal Conductivity Degradation (TCD) effect on the Large-Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis for Unit 2.

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 4.4.2:

“Open Item 61

Open Item 61 states “TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model.”

By letter dated August 6, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13225A024), TVA submitted new PAD fuel performance data generated for WBN Unit 2 with an updated PAD model (PAD4TCD) that includes explicit modeling of thermal conductivity degradation.

By letter dated May 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A250), TVA submitted computer code input data requested by the NRC staff in order to perform a confirmatory analysis.

Based upon (1) comparison of the PAD4TCD model predictions against Halden high burnup fuel temperature measurements and (2) good agreement of the temperature dependent and exposure dependent coefficients between PAD4TCD and FRAPCON-3.4 thermal conductivity models, the NRC staff has previously found the PAD4TCD thermal conductivity model acceptable during the review of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) (ADAMS Accession No. ML11293A365). Using the information supplied in the May 22, 2014, letter, the NRC staff performed a confirmatory analysis similar to that performed in the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 EPU, which demonstrated that there is good agreement between PAD4TCD and FRAPCON-3.5 for the fuel design planned for WBN Unit 2. Based upon the previous review of PAD4TCD done for the Turkey Point 3 and 4 EPU and the confirmatory analysis performed by the NRC staff on the Watts Bar fuel, the NRC staff finds that this open item has been satisfied and considers Open Item 61 to be closed.

Similar to other interim uses of PAD4TCD, the NRC staff is proposing a license condition on PAD4TCD. The proposed license condition is as follows:

PAD TCD Proposed License Condition:

PAD4TCD may be used to establish core operating limits prior to the initial cycle, and prior to any remaining portion of the initial cycle. PAD4TCD may not be used to establish core operating limits prior to any reload cycle, and prior to any remaining portion of any reload cycle.”

SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

4.2.3	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>09</b>	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - identify margins and to offset reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod bowing and incorporating residual bow penalty into the Technical Specifications.</p> <p>In SSER2, the staff concluded TVA had an acceptable means of analyzing the effects of fuel rod bowing and determining any residual rod bowing penalties on the departure from nucleate boiling ratio and total peaking power. Staff closed the issue in SSER2.</p> <p>In SSER10, NRC reviewed design loading conditions for the reactor vessel internals and raised an issue on the seismic analysis of the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs). TVA's letter dated June 15, 1993, for both units discussed CRDM seismic operability. In SSER13, the NRC documented that concerns related to CRDM seismic qualification had been resolved.</p>
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Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.2.3 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its safety evaluation for WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 46, the NRC staff concludes that the homogenous core of RFA-2 fuel for WBN Unit 2 is bounded by the WBN Unit 1 mixed core analysis and is, therefore, acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

4.2.4	26	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		13	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.2.4 of SSER23 includes:

"Since the proposed WBN Unit 2 TS 3.4.16 SRs are the same as those previously approved for WBN Unit 1 and they are consistent with NUREG-1431, the staff concludes that the proposed WBN Unit 2 TS 3.4.16 SRs are acceptable."

SSER23 does NOT show a status for this item.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Page 1-7 of SSER26 shows a status of "Resolved" for this item [line item "(82)"].

4.2.5	23	<b>C</b>	"FUEL DESIGN CONCLUSIONS" left open until all items in subsection are closed.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.2.5 of SSER23 states:

"Based on its review of the WBN fuel safety analysis, the satisfactory experience with this fuel type in other operating reactors, and its previous approval of this fuel type in WBN Unit 1, the NRC staff concludes that the RFA-2 fuel for WBN Unit 2 will perform its function adequately and that TVA has met all applicable regulatory requirements."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
4.3.0	23	<b>C</b>  <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.3 includes:</p> <p>“Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in the proposed WBN Unit 2 FSAR and in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 92, the NRC staff concludes that no substantive differences exist between the nuclear design of WBN Unit 1 and the design for WBN, Unit 2. In its SRM for SECY-07-0096, the Commission stated that it supports a licensing review approach that employs the current licensing basis for WBN Unit 1 as the reference basis for the review and licensing of WBN, Unit 2. Since no substantive differences exist between the design for WBN Unit 2 and the previously reviewed and approved nuclear design for WBN Unit 1, the staff concludes that the nuclear design for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable.”</p>
4.3.1	23	<b>C</b>  <b>09</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the V5H fuel design and found use of V5H fuel acceptable.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.</p> <p>FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.3.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“In the SER, the NRC staff concluded that the nuclear design bases presented in the FSAR conform to the requirements of GDC 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and are, therefore, acceptable. Based on its review, as described below, the NRC staff concludes that the nuclear design bases continue to conform to the aforementioned GDC.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 fuel has been received.</p>
4.3.2	23	<b>C</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the V5H fuel design and found use of V5H fuel acceptable.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.
			<p>-----</p> <p>In SSER15, NRC reviewed TVA's proposed changes to the FSAR from a reanalysis of Pressurized Thermal Shock. The analysis was subsequently incorporated into the FSAR.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.</p> <p>FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.3.2 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed the WBN Unit 2 reactor core design parameters and verified that the parameters are consistent with those used in similar reactors, such as the McGuire Nuclear Station (see WBN Unit 2 FSAR Table 4.1-1,"Reactor Design Comparison Table") and WBN Unit 1 (see WBN Unit 1 FSAR Table 4.1-1,"Reactor Design Comparison Table"). Based on its approval of these similar core design parameters and satisfactory industry operating experience with these designs, the staff concludes that the reactor core design parameters proposed in WBN Unit 2 are acceptable."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."</p>

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

4.3.3	23	<b>C</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the V5H fuel design and found use of V5H fuel acceptable.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.3.3 of SSER23 includes:

"Since the methods have been approved by the NRC and validated by industry operating experience, the NRC staff concludes that these methods are acceptable for use in calculating the nuclear characteristics of the WBN Unit 2 core."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			Unit 2 fuel has been received.
4.3.4	23	<b>C</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the V5H fuel design and found use of V5H fuel acceptable.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.
			FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:
			4.3.4 of SSER23 includes:
			"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR dated February 8, 2008, and in WBN Unit 2 Amendment 92, the NRC staff concludes that there are no substantive differences between the nuclear designs of WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. Since the staff has previously reviewed and approved the nuclear design for WBN Unit 1 and no substantive differences exist between the designs of the two units, as noted in SSER Section 4.3.2 above, the staff concludes that the nuclear design bases, features, and limits for WBN Unit 2 continue to conform to the requirements of GDC 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28. Therefore, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 design is acceptable."
			SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
			REVISION 09 UPDATE:
			TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.
			RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:
			"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.
			Response:
			The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."
			Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.
			Unit 2 fuel has been received.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
4.4.0	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4 includes:</p> <p>“Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in the proposed WBN Unit 2 FSAR and in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 92, the NRC staff concludes that no substantive differences exist between the thermal-hydraulic design for WBN Unit 1 and the thermal-hydraulic design for WBN, Unit 2. In the SRM for SECY-07-0096, the Commission stated that it supports a licensing review approach that employs the current licensing basis for WBN Unit 1 as the reference basis for the review and licensing of WBN, Unit 2. Since the staff has previously reviewed and approved the thermal-hydraulic design for WBN Unit 1 and no substantive differences exist between the designs of the two units, the staff concludes that the thermal-hydraulic design for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable without further review.”</p>
4.4.1	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“These performance and safety criteria are based on the event classification scheme and safety criteria of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.2-1973, "Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water Reactor Plants," and limited to the criteria that apply to the plant's thermal-hydraulic design. ANSI N 18.2-1973 specifies additional criteria (e.g., those that pertain to pressure boundary integrity); other sections of this report identify these criteria, as applicable. The NRC staff stated these same performance and safety criteria for WBN in Section 4.4.1 of the SER.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p>
4.4.2	23	<b>C</b> <b>09</b>	<p>In SSER12, NRC evaluated a change in reactor coolant flow (upflow) for both units. NRC concluded in a July 28, 1993 letter for both units that the proposed upflow modification was acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.</p> <p>FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4.2 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“To satisfy the above criteria, the design bases discussed below apply to the thermal-hydraulic design of the</p>



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

reactor core, as stated by the NRC staff in Section 4.4.2 of the SER and by TVA in Section 4.4.1 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 101."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

4.4.3	23	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE concerning removal of RTD bypass system
		<b>09</b>	<p>This outstanding issue was opened in SSER6. Staff issued an SER dated June 13, 1989, for Unit 1 only that approved replacement of the RTD bypass system with an Eagle-21 microprocessor system for monitoring reactor coolant temperature. NRC provided their initial assessment of the RTD bypass removal for WBN Unit 1 in SSER8. This SER was reproduced in SSER8, Appendix R. In SSER16, NRC reviewed the flow measurement uncertainty value for the reactor coolant system.</p> <p>TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.</p> <p>In SSER12, NRC evaluated a change in reactor coolant flow (upflow) for both units. NRC concluded that the proposed upflow modification was acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed thermal hydraulic methodologies and concluded that the V5H thermal-hydraulic design was acceptable for Watts Bar.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p>

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER23]

### 4.4.3.1 includes:

"TVA has proposed a DNBR value of 1.23 to ensure that there is a 95-percent probability at a 95-percent confidence level that critical heat flux will not occur on the limiting fuel rod. TVA used this same DNBR value for the RFA-2 fuel in WBN, Unit 1. Since TVA has used an NRC-approved methodology, described in WCAP-1 1397-P-A, "Revised Thermal Design Procedure," issued April 1989, the NRC staff concludes that the DNB design methodology used in the design of WBN Unit 2 is acceptable."

### 4.4.3.2 includes:

"The coolant flow based on thermal design flow for WBN Unit 2 as stated in Table 4.4-1 'Thermal and Hydraulic Comparison Table, of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is the same as that stated in WBN Unit 1 FSAR Amendment 8, dated April 20, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101230435). Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the core flow is acceptable."

### 4.4.3.3 includes:

"Based on operating experience, flow stability experience, and the thermal-hydraulic design of Westinghouse PWRs, the NRC staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that hydrodynamic instability will not occur at WBN, Unit 2."

### 4.4.3.4 reads:

"By letter dated June 13, 1989 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073511999), the NRC staff approved the Eagle-21 microprocessor system used at WBN Unit 1 for measuring RCS temperature. Chapter 7 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 101, states that WBN Unit 2 will use the same system; therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the system is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

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Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

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Unit 2 fuel has been received.

4.4.4	23	C — — 09
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In SSER13, NRC reviewed TVA's responses to a request for additional information concerning fuel rod bowing and crud buildup for WBN Unit 1.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.4.4 of SSER23 includes:

"WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 46 approved the addition to the WBN Unit 1 TS of three methodologies (WRB-2M DNB correlation, revised thermal design procedure, and VIPRE-01) to determine cycle-specific core operating limits, in support of TVA's use of the Westinghouse 17x17 array RFA-2 fuel design with IFMs at WBN, Unit 1. Based on the information provided by TVA in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 101 and TVA's use of NRC-approved methodologies in its analysis, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has acceptably addressed fuel rod bowing for the RFA-2 fuel in WBN, Unit 2."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

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REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

4.4.5	23	<b>CO</b> <b>07</b>	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE / LICENSE CONDITION on review of Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) startup report and inclusion of limiting conditions for LPMS in Technical Specifications</p> <p>TVA letters dated February 25, 1982, and November 10, 1982, provided a description of operator training and an evaluation of conformance to RG 1.133. In SSER3, the staff closed the confirmatory issue and opened a license condition to track submittal of the startup test results and the alert level setting. In SSER5, the staff closed the LICENSE CONDITION to a TVA commitment to provide the startup test results and the alert level settings made in a letter dated September 19, 1990, for both units. In SSER16, NRC reviewed additional information and revised commitments associated with the LPMS. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence, TVA will replace the LPMS.</p>
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Unit 2 Action: Provide the startup test results and the alert level settings.

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.4.5 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed LPMS at WBN Unit 2 conforms to the guidance in Regulatory Position C. 1 of RG 1.133, with nonsubstantive differences noted in FSAR Table 7.1-1 (e.g., WBN TS requirements for specific sensor locations were relocated to the licensee-controlled technical requirements manual). Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed LPMS at WBN Unit 2 is acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

4.4.6	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
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### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.4.6 of SSER23 includes:

"The NRC staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 thermal-hydraulic design is acceptable because its parameters are consistent with the NRC-approved thermal-hydraulic design parameters of WBN Unit 1 and McGuire, Units 1 and 2, which have a satisfactory operating history."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
4.4.7	23	<b>C</b>  <b>07</b>	<p>"Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-59-(N-1) Loop Operation in BWRs and PWRs – N-1 Loop operation was addressed in original 1982 SER (4.4.7).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Confirm Technical Specifications prohibit (N-1) Loop Operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>TS LCO 3.4.4 requires that four Reactor Coolant System loops be operable and in operation during Modes 1 and 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4.7 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"In its letter dated February 2, 2010, TVA provided developmental revision B of the WBN Unit 2 TS. Proposed Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.4 requires that "Four RCS loops shall be OPERABLE and in operation." This is the same TS requirement for WBN Unit 1 and so the NRC concludes that it is acceptable."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
4.4.8	27	<b>CO</b>  <b>13</b>	<p>LICENSE CONDITION - Detectors for Inadequate core cooling (II.F.2)</p> <p>GL 82-28 / NUREG-0737, II.F.2, "Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System" – In the original SER, the review of the ICC instrumentation was incomplete. The January 24, 1992, letter superseded the previous responses on this issue. TVA letter for Units 1 and 2 dated January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware. NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER10. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4.8 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review, the staff asked TVA several questions regarding the ICC instrumentation. TVA responded to these questions by letter dated October 26, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103020322). Enclosure 1 to this letter provided a Westinghouse document entitled, "Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), Licensing Technical Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P," issued October 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103020324; not publicly available). The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. This is Open Item 72 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 72 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA</p>

regarding the ICC instrumentation. (Section 4.4.8)"

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-608 closed GL 82-028 and NUREG-0737, II.F.2.

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER, Section 7.5.2.2 included the following for Open Item 72: "The NRC staff documented its review of the Common Q postaccident monitoring system (PAMS) and ICC in Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23. The staff generated Open Items 94–111 (Appendix HH) during its review. Therefore, Open Item 72 is closed, because it is subsumed by Open Items 94–111."

The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 changed the status to "Resolved." Status above was changed to CO because TVA has remaining action.

4.4.9	27	C	"CONCLUSION" left open until all items in subsection are closed.
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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.4.9 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its review of the analyses of the core thermal-hydraulic performance provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the core has been designed with appropriate margin to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during steady-state operation and anticipated operational occurrences. The thermal-hydraulic design of the core, therefore, meets the requirements of GDC 10 and is acceptable for preliminary design approval, pending completion of Open Item 72 (Appendix HH).

In Section 4.4.9 of the SER, the staff documented that TVA has committed to a preoperational and initial startup test program in accordance with RG 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," to measure and confirm the thermal-hydraulic design aspects."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 72 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. (Section 4.4.8)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER, Section 7.5.2.2 included the following for Open Item 72: "The NRC staff documented its review of the Common Q postaccident monitoring system (PAMS) and ICC in Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23. The staff generated Open Items 94–111 (Appendix HH) during its review. Therefore, Open Item 72 is closed, because it is subsumed by Open Items 94–111."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<hr/> <hr/>
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
4.5.0	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
4.5.1	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
4.5.2	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
4.6.0	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.6 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Section 4.2.3, "Reactivity Control System," of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR describes the functional design of the WBN Unit 2 reactivity control systems. The NRC staff compared Section 4.2.3 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR with Section 4.2.3 of the WBN Unit 1 FSAR and concluded that no substantive differences exist. Therefore, the staff concludes that Section 4.2.3 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is acceptable.</p> <p>FSAR Section 4.3, "Nuclear Design," describes the functional requirements of the reactivity control system. Section 4.3 of this SSER provides the staff's evaluation of the functional requirements of the reactivity control system."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
5.0.0	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
5.1.0	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>The staff stated that the Eagle 21 microprocessor system was an acceptable replacement of the resistance temperature detector (RTD) bypass system for monitoring reactor cooling temperature in SSER5. In SSER6, the staff noted that TVA had incorporated the information for this new design into the FSAR and said they would track results of the review of this design change as an outstanding issue - Removal of RTD Bypass System (See 4.4.3).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide additional information for NRC review per 7.2.1.</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Page 1-7 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

Corrected STATUS to "C."

5.2.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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5.2.1	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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06

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 5.2.1.4 of SSER22 includes:

"During its review of TVA's WBN Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 97, dated January 11, 2010, the NRC staff questioned TVA's use of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case 1423-2, "Wrought Type 304 and 316 with Nitrogen Added, Sections I, III, VIII, Division 1 and 2," without committing to the limitations and modifications listed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.84, "Design, Fabrication, and Materials Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section III," for this Code case. By letter dated November 9, 2010, TVA responded to the staff, stating the following:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR inadvertently incorporated Code Case 1423-2 into Table 5.2-8. ... A future amendment to Unit 2 FSAR Table 5.2-8 will remove the reference to Code Case 1423-2 for the branch nozzles material specifications. A change to Section 5.2.1.4 will not be necessary because the future amendment will reconcile Table 5.2-8 and Section 5.2.1.4.

TVA's response is acceptable to the staff."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

5.2.2	23	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE on staff review of sensitivity study of required safety valve flow rate versus trip parameter
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07

TVA letter dated April 18, 1983, provided the safety valve sizing information and information on differences with the reference plant. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

In SSER15, the staff stated that subject to resolution of NUREG-737 Items II.D.1 (performance testing of relief and safety valves) and II.D.3 (indication of relief and safety valve position), overpressure protection at hot operating conditions will comply with the guidelines of SRP 5.2.2 and requirements of GDC 15. They noted that these items were found to be acceptable.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

5.2.2 of SSER24 includes:



"Conclusion

The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses related to the overpressure protection capability of the WBN Unit 2 during power operation. The NRC staff concludes that TVA has (1) adequately accounted for the pressurization events and the plant overpressure protection features and (2) demonstrated that the plant will have sufficient pressure relief capacity to ensure that pressure limits are not exceeded. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the overpressure protection features will provide adequate protection to meet the requirements of GDC 15 and 31. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the overpressure protection features acceptable with respect to overpressure protection during power operation."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

5.2.3	22	C
		06

Approved for both units in SER.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 5.2.3 of SSER22 included the following:

"SRP Section 5.2.3 contains the relevant NRC regulatory requirements for this area of review and the associated acceptance criteria."

"Since the provisions of ASME Code Case 1423-2 have been incorporated into the current ASME Code, and TVA has met the conditions previously required by the staff for use of this Code case for all austenitic stainless steels, the NRC staff finds the use of this ASME Code case acceptable."

The NRC staff finds that the changes made by TVA to the materials specifications meet the requirements of either a version of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a or ASME Code cases that have been accepted by the staff and therefore conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a. Thus, the staff finds the materials specifications acceptable."

"Based on TVA's consideration of operating experience related to zinc and the consideration of zinc addition in cycle-specific crud risk analyses, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has taken adequate measures to prevent adverse effects on fuel from zinc addition; therefore, TVA's actions are acceptable."

"Based on the staff's review of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97, as supplemented by letter dated July 31, 2010, regarding zinc addition to the primary system, the staff concludes that the changes to the reactor coolant chemistry are compatible with the RCPB materials and that the integrity of the RCPB will not be adversely affected. Therefore, the requirements of GDC 14 continue to be met, and TVA's proposed changes are acceptable."

The staff also concludes the changes to the materials specifications proposed by TVA in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 98 meet 10 CFR 50.55a, since the specifications are either ASME approved or the materials meet NRC staff-approved code cases."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

5.2.4	27	C
		13

LICENSE CONDITION – Inservice inspection (ISI) program

The ISI program is required to be submitted within 6 months of the date of issuance of the operating license. The applicable ASME Code edition and addenda are determined by reference to 50.55a(b) 12 months preceding the date of issuance of the OL. The staff reiterated this in SSER10. In SSER12, the LICENSE CONDITION was resolved by a TVA commitment to submit the program within six months after receiving the operating license.

Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 ISI program.

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

OUTSTANDING ISSUE - Unit 2 PSI program submitted April 30, 1990, with a partial listing of relief requests. This item tracked the staff review.

In the SER, the preservice inspection program was still under review. NRC reviewed the Unit 1 PSI program in SSERs 10, 12, and 16.

Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 PSI program.

### REVISION 03 UPDATE:

Preservice Inspection Plan, Program No. WBN-2 PSI, Revision 3 was submitted to the NRC on June 17, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101680561).

### REVISION 05 UPDATE:

Corrected status from "O" to "S."

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

5.2.4 of SSER23 includes:

"By letter dated June 17, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML101680561), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the applicant) submitted Revision 3 to its Preservice Inspection Program Plan to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff for review in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 2.

Appendix Z to this SSER includes the NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan."

4.0 (Conclusions) of Appendix Z reads as follows:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's submittal and concluded that TVA has addressed all of the regulatory requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a and, based the staff's review of the documents listed in Section 6 of this report, no deviations from applicable regulatory requirements or TVA's commitments were identified in the PSI Program Plan, Revision 3, for WBN Unit 2. Open Item 70 (Appendix HH of SSER 23), as noted in Section 3.2.3 of this report, remains open pending NRC staff verification of the populations and the number of required examinations in accordance with the reference code."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 70 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports "Summary Tables," to include numbers of components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code. (Section 3.2.3 of Appendix Z of SSER 23)"

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated November 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12311A296) contained the following:

"TVA hereby provides Revision 7 of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN 2) Preservice Inspection Program Plan. The Preservice Inspection Program Plan has been updated to reflect additional numbers of welds based on the issuance of design change documents. SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70 noted that Section 7 on support welds contained only "To Be Determined". The number of support welds for several but not all applicable plant systems has been added in Revision 7. It is TVA's position that the amount of information available in Section 7 is sufficient to permit the NRC Staff to complete their programmatic review of the WBN 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Should additional validation be required to support the closure of SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70, completion of the Preservice Inspection Program can be addressed as a validation activity."

#### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14133A296) contained the following:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100.006, Revision 1, "Inservice Testing Program," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2, including Relief Requests (10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5)(iii)).

The TI is a combined Unit 1/Unit 2 program document and is being submitted for staff review for the licensing of Unit 2. This TI addresses the initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program for pumps, valves, dynamic restraints (snubbers), and pressure-relief devices. The previously submitted Unit 2, "Preservice Test (PST) Plan," (Reference 3) is superseded in its entirety by the TI provided in Enclosure 1." Reference 3 was TVA to NRC letter dated March 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML110830677).

TVA to NRC letter dated August 5, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14224A597) provided response to RAIs that resulted from NRC's review of the TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014.

Appendix Z of SSER27 contained the following:

"Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

#### 3.0 EVALUATION OF PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM PLAN

#### 3.2 Review of ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code and OM [Operation and Maintenance] Code Requirements.

##### 3.2.3 Acceptability of the Examination Sample

##### Open Item 70

Open Item 70 states, 'TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI [preservice inspection] program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports 'Summary Tables,' to include numbers of components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code.'

By letter dated November 1, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12311A296), TVA submitted Revision 7 to the Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Revision 7 included new tables for Class 1, 2 and 3 non-exempt piping support distribution by system and type. In these new tables the licensee identified the number of supports in the population and the number of examinations required to complete the preservice examinations. The staff has reviewed these tables, and the supports identified for examination, and find that they meet the requirements of the 2001 Edition through the 2003 Addenda of ASME Code, Section XI. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that Open Item 70 has satisfactorily been completed and is closed."

The Status for 5.2.4 in SSER27 is "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
5.2.5	22	C — — 06	<p>In SSER9, the staff stated that since the UHI system has been eliminated from the WB design , the previous discussion of this system in the SER no longer applies, but the conclusions reached in the SER were still valid. In SSER11, the staff reviewed valve stem leakage and stated that the staff's prior conclusions about valve stem leakage were not affected. In SSER12, the staff retracted the requirement identified in the SER that if leakage is alarmed and confirmed in a flow path with no indicators, then the Technical Specifications require a water inventory material balance be initiated within one hour. The staff also provided a clarification of SER wording related to detection of intersystem leakage through check valves and stated that this did not change prior staff conclusions and the reactor coolant pressure boundary system remains acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>In SSER21 the status is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 5.2.5 of SSER22 included the following:</p> <p>"Based on the above and the previous staff evaluations, as documented in the SER and its supplements, the NRC staff concludes that the RCPB leakage detection systems are diverse and provide reasonable assurance that identified and unidentified primary system leakage will be detected in a timely manner.</p> <p>The systems meet the requirements of GDC 30 with respect to RCPB leakage detection and identification, as well as the guidelines of RG 1.45, "Guidance on Monitoring and Responding to Reactor Coolant System Leakage," Revision 1, issued May 2008, with respect to the RCPB leakage detection system design. Therefore, the staff finds these systems acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
5.2.6	16	C — — 01	<p>In SSER16, the staff reviewed the analysis of the RPV and internal components and found the use of the WECAN computer code acceptable.</p>
5.3.0	0	C — —	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
5.3.1	25	C — — 08	<p>The staff reviewed TVA's submittal on reactor vessel irradiation in SSER11 and stated that the WB reactor vessels acceptably satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.61.</p> <p>In SSER14, the staff determined that TVA complied with all the requirements in the current Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50 without exemptions and the previously approved exemptions were no longer needed.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The Conclusions portion of Section 5.3.1 in SSER22 states:</p>

"Pending resolution of Open Item 44 (Appendix HH), the NRC staff concludes that the changes to the FSAR pertaining to the RV materials surveillance program are acceptable because the surveillance program meets the provisions of ASTM E185-82 and, therefore, meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H.

The staff concludes that the USE and RTPTS values projected at EOL for WBN Unit 2 are acceptable because the values meet the criteria of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.61, respectively.

The staff concludes that the changes to the special processes meet the requirements of GDC 1 and 30 and 10 CFR 50.55a because the welding and NDE of the core support block attachment welds meet the requirements of ASME Code, Section III."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 44:

"This response clarifies how the initial and irradiated RTNDT values were determined for the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel beltline materials. Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.1 established that the vessel was designed to 1971 Addenda of the ASME Code, an edition that predates the requirements to determine the unirradiated RTNDT. (Those requirements were established in the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, whereas the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel was designed to an earlier version of the Code.) Because the tests performed to assess the adequacy of the fracture toughness predated the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, it was necessary to use the methods described in NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB) 5-2, 'Fracture Toughness Requirements for Older Plants.' For the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel, the vessel shell materials were tested by the vessel fabricator using both drop-weight and Charpy impact test specimens. The drop-weight specimens were tested to determine the unirradiated nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT) in accordance with ASTM E 208. In the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, the NDTT is used with axial (weak) orientation Charpy test data to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT. For Watts Bar Unit 2, the orientation of the Charpy impact test specimens was in the tangential (strong) orientation rather than in the axial (weak) orientation currently required in NB-2300 to determine the initial RTNDT. BTP MTEB 5-2 provides methods to determine the initial RTNDT using the drop-weight and Charpy impact test results generated for the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel shell forgings and welds. In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens in the tangential (strong) orientation were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2.

In addition to those tests performed by the vessel fabricator, unirradiated tests were performed on the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program materials. Tests consisted of Charpy impact specimens from the intermediate shell forging and the core region metal that were oriented in both the tangential (strong) and axial (weak) orientations. When the surveillance program Charpy impact specimens are used with the drop-weight NDTT values obtained by the vessel fabricator, the initial RTNDT values obtained using NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 are found to be conservative.

The irradiated RTNDT, termed the Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART), is used to establish the pressure-Temperature (P-T) limit curves for the vessel as documented in the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR). The PTLR for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.3. The initial P-T limit curves are based on predictions of the effects of irradiation using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, 'Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials.' As post-irradiation test results become available from the evaluation of test specimens from the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program, ASTM E 185-82, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels", uses those test results to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions based on the methods of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The reactor vessel irradiation surveillance program for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.4.3.6. The effect of irradiation is measured using the Charpy impact specimens. Note that there are no drop-weight test specimens irradiated as part of the Watts Bar Unit 2 surveillance program. The drop-weight specimens are used only for tests on the unirradiated material to determine the drop-weight NDTT.

In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens (strong orientation) were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2.

Additional tests performed as part of the reactor vessel surveillance program using Charpy impact specimens (weak orientation for the intermediate shell forging), and those data obtained following the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300 demonstrated the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 to be conservative. The irradiated RTNDT, termed the ART, will be determined using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99. As post-irradiation test results become available from the reactor vessel surveillance program materials (the intermediate shell forging and the core region weld metal), those data will be used to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions."

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

5.3.1 of SSER25 reads:

"5.3.1 Reactor Vessel Materials

Open Item 14

In Enclosure 1 of the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) letter dated July 31, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML102290258), TVA responded to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's Request for Additional Information (RAI) 5.3.1-1, Question 1, and proposed changes to the pressure-temperature limits report (PTLR), including the addition of the reactor vessel (RV) surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule and a description of the RV surveillance program. In addition, TVA stated that the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 PTLR is included in the WBN Unit 2 "System Description for the Reactor Coolant System" (WBN2-68-4001), which would be revised to reflect required revisions to the PTLR by September 17, 2010 (Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 22, Section 5.3.1, p 5-8). The staff identified Open Item 14 to verify that TVA had revised the PTLR to include the RV surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule and RV surveillance program description.

In a letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), TVA stated that Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) of WBN2-68-4001 reflected the required revisions to the PTLR.

The staff concludes that TVA's response to Open Item 14 is acceptable because it confirms that TVA has revised the PTLR to include the RV surveillance program information. Therefore, Open Item 14 is closed.

Open Item 44

In response to RAI 5.3.1-1, Question 2, contained in Enclosure 1 to TVA's letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102290258), TVA stated that the material test requirements and the acceptance standard use the nil-ductility reference temperature, RTNDT, which is determined in accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E208, "Standard Test Method for Conducting Drop-Weight Test to Determine Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature of Ferritic Steels." Since ASTM E208 is the standard for drop-weight testing, while NRC requirements for determination of RTNDT require a combination of drop-weight and Charpy V-notch (Cv) tests, the NRC staff required, in Open Item 44, that TVA provide additional information to clarify how it determined the initial and irradiated RTNDT (SSER 22, Section 5.3.1, pp 5-9, 5-11, 5-13, 5-17, 5-28, 5-29, 5-31, 5-32).

In a letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), in response to Open Item 44, TVA explained that the WBN Unit 2 RV fabricator used a combination of drop-weight and Cv tests to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT for the RV materials. The Cv specimens were oriented in the tangential (strong) direction rather than the axial (weak) direction, as is required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, which is referenced in Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements," to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," with respect to the method for determining the unirradiated RTNDT. TVA explained that it designed the WBN Unit 2 RV in accordance with the ASME Code, Section II, 1971, addenda, which predate the current requirements for determining the unirradiated RTNDT. However, it used the guidance in NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) MTEB 5-2 to adjust the Cv results to determine the equivalent properties in the weak direction, which it then used to determine the initial RTNDT. In addition, it performed unirradiated Cv tests on WBN Unit 2 RV surveillance program materials in both the weak and strong directions, and in conjunction with the drop-



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

weight tests, to determine the unirradiated RTNDT. These Cv results showed that the initial RTNDT determination based on the Cv tests in the strong direction, adjusted using BTP MTEB 5-2, are conservative.

TVA also stated that it determined the effects of irradiation on the WBN Unit 2 RV materials using Cv specimens in the surveillance capsules, and that it only used drop-weight testing to determine the unirradiated RTNDT.

The staff concludes that TVA's response to Open Item 44 is acceptable because it clarifies how it determined the initial (unirradiated) and irradiated RTNDT, and because the methods TVA used are consistent with the guidance of BTP MTEB 5-2, which the staff finds acceptable for determining the fracture toughness properties of RVs fabricated before the current ASME Code, Section III, requirements for determining RTNDT came into effect. Therefore, Open Item 44 is closed."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

5.3.2	25	<b>C</b> 08	OUTSTANDING ISSUE - P-T limits for Unit 2 not provided. Staff will review as part of Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
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In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the review of the Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part of the review of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. In SSER16, the staff found the pressure temperature limits methodology and the pressure temperature limits report for Unit 1 acceptable.

Unit 2 action: Submit P-T limits.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

WCAP-17035-NP "Watts Bar Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation" was submitted with the TS.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

The Conclusions portion of Section 5.3.2 in SSER22 states:

"The NRC staff concludes, pending resolution of Open Items 44, 45, and 46, that the P-T limits imposed on the RCS for operating and testing conditions to ensure adequate safety margins against nonductile or rapidly propagating failure conform to the fracture toughness criteria of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The use of operating limits, as determined by the criteria defined in Section 5.3.2 of the SRP, provides reasonable assurance that nonductile or rapidly propagating failure will not occur. This is an acceptable basis for satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a; Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50; and GDC 1, 14, 31, and 32. Therefore, WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.3 is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following responses to Open Items 44, 45, and 46:

Open Item 44:

"This response clarifies how the initial and irradiated RTNDT values were determined for the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel beltline materials. Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.1 established that the vessel was designed to 1971 Addenda of the ASME Code, an edition that predates the requirements to determine the unirradiated RTNDT. (Those requirements were established in the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, whereas the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel was designed to an earlier version of

the Code.) Because the tests performed to assess the adequacy of the fracture toughness predated the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, it was necessary to use the methods described in NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB) 5-2, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Older Plants." For the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel, the vessel shell materials were tested by the vessel fabricator using both drop-weight and Charpy impact test specimens. The drop-weight specimens were tested to determine the unirradiated nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT) in accordance with ASTM E 208. In the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, the NDTT is used with axial (weak) orientation Charpy test data to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT. For Watts Bar Unit 2, the orientation of the Charpy impact test specimens was in the tangential (strong) orientation rather than in the axial (weak) orientation currently required in NB-2300 to determine the initial RTNDT. BTP MTEB 5-2 provides methods to determine the initial RTNDT using the drop-weight and Charpy impact test results generated for the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel shell forgings and welds. In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens in the tangential (strong) orientation were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2.

In addition to those tests performed by the vessel fabricator, unirradiated tests were performed on the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program materials. Tests consisted of Charpy impact specimens from the intermediate shell forging and the core region metal that were oriented in both the tangential (strong) and axial (weak) orientations. When the surveillance program Charpy impact specimens are used with the drop-weight NDTT values obtained by the vessel fabricator, the initial RTNDT values obtained using NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 are found to be conservative.

The irradiated RTNDT, termed the Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART), is used to establish the pressure-Temperature (P-T) limit curves for the vessel as documented in the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR). The PTLR for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.3. The initial P-T limit curves are based on predictions of the effects of irradiation using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials." As post-irradiation test results become available from the evaluation of test specimens from the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program, ASTM E 185-82, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels", uses those test results to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions based on the methods of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The reactor vessel irradiation surveillance program for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.4.3.6. The effect of irradiation is measured using the Charpy impact specimens. Note that there are no drop-weight test specimens irradiated as part of the Watts Bar Unit 2 surveillance program. The drop-weight specimens are used only for tests on the unirradiated material to determine the drop-weight NDTT.

In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens (strong orientation) were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2. Additional tests performed as part of the reactor vessel surveillance program using Charpy impact specimens (weak orientation for the intermediate shell forging), and those data obtained following the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300 demonstrated the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 to be conservative. The irradiated RTNDT, termed the ART, will be determined using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99. As post-irradiation test results become available from the reactor vessel surveillance program materials (the intermediate shell forging and the core region weld metal), those data will be used to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions."

Open Item 45:

"Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, Section 3.2 (Arming Temperature) states, "COMS shall be armed when any RCS cold leg temperature is <225°F."

Open Item 46:

"Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, TABLE 3.1-1 (Watts Bar Unit 2 PORV Setpoints vs Temperature) contains the lift settings."



REVISION 08 UPDATE:

5.3.2 of SSER25 reads:

"5.3.2 Pressure-Temperature Limits

"Open Item 45

TVA stated, in its response to RAI 5.3.2-2, dated July 31, 2010, that it would revise the PTLR to incorporate the cold overpressure mitigation system (COMS) arming temperature (SSER 22, Section 5.3.2, pp 5-28–29, 5-32). The staff identified Open Item 45 to verify incorporation of the COMS arming temperature into the PTLR.

In a letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), in response to Open Item 45, TVA stated that Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to WBN2-68-4001 reflected the required revision to the PTLR. Appendix B, Section 3.2, "Arming Temperature," states, "COMS shall be armed when any RCS [reactor coolant system] cold leg temperature is less than / equal to 225 °F."

The staff concludes that TVA's response to Open Item 45 is acceptable because it confirms that TVA revised the PTLR to specify the COMS arming temperature. Therefore, Open Item 45 is closed.

Open Item 46

TVA did not include the low-temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) lift settings in the PTLR but provided them in its response to RAI 5.3.2-2 in its letter dated July 31, 2010. In its RAI response, TVA stated that it would revise the PTLR to incorporate the LTOP lift settings (SSER 22, Section 5.3.2, pp 5-28–29, 5-32). The staff identified Open Item 46 to verify incorporation of the LTOP settings into the PTLR.

In a letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), in response to Open Item 46, TVA stated that Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to WBN2-68-4001 reflected the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, Table 3.1-1, "Watts Bar Unit 2 PORV [Power-Operated Relief Valve] Setpoints vs. Temperature," contains the LTOP lift settings.

The staff concludes that TVA's response to Open Item 46 is acceptable because it confirms that TVA revised the PTLR to include the LTOP lift settings into the PTLR. Therefore, Open Item 46 is closed."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

5.3.3	27	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE for staff to complete evaluation of Unit 2 after receipt of P-T limits
		<b>13</b>	In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the review of the Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part of the review of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
			Unit 2 action: Submit P-T limits.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

WCAP-17035-NP "Watts Bar Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation" was submitted with the TS.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 5.3.3 in SSER22 includes:

"In summary, the NRC staff concludes that there are no special considerations that make it necessary to consider potential RV failure for WBN Unit 2 because the design, materials, fabrication, inspection, and quality assurance requirements for the plant will continue to conform to applicable NRC regulations and RG, as well as to the provisions of ASME Code, Section III. The stringent fracture toughness requirements of the regulations and ASME Code, Section III, will be met, including requirements for surveillance of vessel material properties throughout service life, in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. TVA will also establish operating limitations on temperature and pressure for WBN Unit 2 in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Appendix G, "Protection Against Nonductile Failure," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G.

Subject to resolution of Open Items 44, 45, and 46 (Appendix HH), the NRC staff concludes that integrity of the WBN Unit 2 RV is assured for the following reasons ..."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following responses to Open Items 44, 45, and 46:

Open Item 44:

"This response clarifies how the initial and irradiated RTNDT values were determined for the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel beltline materials. Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.1 established that the vessel was designed to 1971 Addenda of the ASME Code, an edition that predates the requirements to determine the unirradiated RTNDT. (Those requirements were established in the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, whereas the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel was designed to an earlier version of the Code.) Because the tests performed to assess the adequacy of the fracture toughness predated the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, it was necessary to use the methods described in NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB) 5-2, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Older Plants." For the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel, the vessel shell materials were tested by the vessel fabricator using both drop-weight and Charpy impact test specimens. The drop-weight specimens were tested to determine the unirradiated nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT) in accordance with ASTM E 208. In the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, the NDTT is used with axial (weak) orientation Charpy test data to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT. For Watts Bar Unit 2, the orientation of the Charpy impact test specimens was in the tangential (strong) orientation rather than in the axial (weak) orientation currently required in NB-2300 to determine the initial RTNDT. BTP MTEB 5-2 provides methods to determine the initial RTNDT using the drop-weight and Charpy impact test results generated for the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel shell forgings and welds. In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens in the tangential (strong) orientation were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2.

In addition to those tests performed by the vessel fabricator, unirradiated tests were performed on the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program materials. Tests consisted of Charpy impact specimens from the intermediate shell forging and the core region metal that were oriented in both the tangential (strong) and axial (weak) orientations. When the surveillance program Charpy impact specimens are used with the drop-weight NDTT values obtained by the vessel fabricator, the initial RTNDT values obtained using NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 are found to be conservative.

The irradiated RTNDT, termed the Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART), is used to establish the pressure-Temperature (P-T) limit curves for the vessel as documented in the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR). The PTLR for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.3. The initial P-T limit curves are based on predictions of the effects of irradiation using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials." As post-irradiation test results become available from the evaluation of test specimens from the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program, ASTM E 185-82, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels", uses those test results to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions based on the methods of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The reactor vessel irradiation surveillance program for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.4.3.6. The effect of irradiation is measured using the Charpy impact specimens. Note that there are no drop-weight test specimens irradiated as part of the Watts Bar Unit 2 surveillance program. The

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

drop-weight specimens are used only for tests on the unirradiated material to determine the drop-weight NDTT.

In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens (strong orientation) were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2. Additional tests performed as part of the reactor vessel surveillance program using Charpy impact specimens (weak orientation for the intermediate shell forging), and those data obtained following the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300 demonstrated the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 to be conservative. The irradiated RTNDT, termed the ART, will be determined using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99. As post-irradiation test results become available from the reactor vessel surveillance program materials (the intermediate shell forging and the core region weld metal), those data will be used to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions."

Open Item 45:

"Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, Section 3.2 (Arming Temperature) states, "COMS shall be armed when any RCS cold leg temperature is <225°F."

Open Item 46:

"Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, TABLE 3.1-1 (Watts Bar Unit 2 PORV Setpoints vs Temperature) contains the lift settings."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

5.4.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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5.4.1	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-8 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

Section 5.4.1.1 of SSER22 notes that Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was the one reviewed for this section.

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
5.4.2	22	C — — 06	<p>5.4.2.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for staff to evaluate TVA's proposed resolution to concerns about flow induced vibrations in Model D-3 SGs pre-heat region</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, the staff concluded that because of the generic problem of tube degradation caused by flow induced vibration in Westinghouse model D steam generators, operation would be limited to 50%. In SSER1, the staff continued to monitor activities associated with proposed modifications to the pre-heater region of the SGs to reduce impingement of water on tubes in this area and eliminate the vibration responsible for wear of the SG tubes. TVA's May 27, 1983, letter committed to implement the NUREG-0966 modifications to address this. In SSER4, the staff concluded the modification was acceptable to operate at 100%. In a letter dated December 17, 2008, TVA confirmed that these modifications were performed for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 5.4.2.1 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the steam generator materials will continue to meet the applicable regulatory criteria of GDC 1, 14, 15, and 31 and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
5.4.3	23	C — — 12	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE to verify installation of an RHR flow alarm and proper function of dump valves when actuated manually</p> <p>In the SER, staff accepted TVA's commitment to provide, before startup, an RHR flow alarm to alert the operator to initiate alternate cooling modes in the event of loss of RHR pump suction. SSER2 resolved testing of dump valves. The staff verified that the alarm had been installed in SSER5, resolving the confirmatory issue.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Verify alarm installation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involving natural circulation test to demonstrate ability to cool down and depressurize the plant, and that boron mixing is sufficient under such circumstances; or, if necessary, other applicable tests before startup after first refueling</p> <p>Branch Technical Position requires a natural circulation test with supporting analysis to demonstrate the ability to cool down and depressurize the plant and that boron mixing is sufficient. Comparison with performance of previously tested plants of similar design is acceptable, if justified. July 11, 1991, TVA letter, for both units, provided an assessment of the acceptability of the Diablo Canyon natural circulation tests to WBN. In SSER10, the NRC found the methods and conclusions acceptable. The staff corrected the wording in SSER10 in SSER11 and stated that this did not alter the conclusion reached.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>5.4.3.3 (Conclusion) of SSER23 reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses related to the RHR system and concludes that TVA has shown that the RHR system will adequately cool the RCS following shutdown and will remove decay heat.</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the RHR system complies with the requirements of GDC 4, 5, and 34 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA has verified that the RHR flow alarm to alert the operator to initiate alternate cooling modes in the event of loss of RHR pump suction has been installed

5.4.4	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>06</b>	

## REVISION UPDATE:

Section 5.4.4 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA and its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER and its supplements, the NRC staff concludes that the failure of the pressurizer relief tank does not affect the integrity of the RCPB or the capability to shut down the plant safely. WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.5.11 is, therefore, acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

5.4.5	27	<b>CO</b>	LICENSE CONDITION - NUREG-0737, II.B.1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents" - In the original SER, the NRC found TVA's commitment to install reactor coolant vents acceptable pending verification. In SSER2, the staff found venting guidelines acceptable. Installation was completed for Unit 1 only in SSER5 (IR 390/84-37) and the staff stated that the LC was no longer necessary. In SSER12, the staff included the safety evaluation for the RCSV system. The staff concluded that the high point vent system was acceptable subject to satisfactory completion of seven items that were described as on-going or planned activities associated with completion of the WB licensing process. They stated that none required additional review with respect to the SER nor would they change the SER, provided they were satisfactorily completed. TVA was asked to submit a letter prior to receipt of an OL stating how and when these items were completed. The staff stated that when these items were satisfactorily implemented, the RCSV system would be acceptable.
		<b>13</b>	

Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of reactor coolant vents.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is "Open (Inspection)."

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

5.4.5 of SSER23 reads as follows:

"As stated in Section 5.4.5 of NUREG-0847, Item II.B.1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents," of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," issued November 1980, requires the installation of RCS and reactor vessel head high point vents that are remotely operated from the control room. Section 5.5.6, "Reactor Vessel Head Vent System," of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR describes the RCS and reactor vessel head high point vent system. The NRC previously approved the system, as documented in

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

NUREG-0847 and its supplements, particularly, Supplement 12, issued October 1993.

In its submittal dated September 14, 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073521447), TVA committed to providing the same RCS vent system for WBN as approved by the NRC for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant in NUREG-01 11, "Evaluation of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Particle Coating Failure Models and Data," Supplement 5, issued June 1981, and to using the venting guidelines developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group. The NRC staff concludes that TVA's commitments are acceptable, pending completion of the staff's generic review. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the guidelines are acceptable for implementation, as documented in Generic Letter 83-22, "Safety Evaluation of Emergency Response Guidelines," dated June 3, 1983. Therefore, the staff's conclusions, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, remain valid, and the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 RCS vent system is acceptable, pending verification of the installation of the RCS vent system. This is Open Item 69 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

Open Item 69 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The WBN Unit 2 RCS vent system is acceptable, pending verification that the RCS vent system is installed. "(Section 5.4.5)

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 69 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014.

NOTE: This Open item has not been closed in an SSER.

Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed it, TVA has remaining action.

6.0.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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6.1.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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6.1.1	27	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[All stated portions below are from SSER23]

6.1.1.4 (Technical Evaluation) includes:

"In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA modified Section 6.1.1.1, "Materials Selection and Fabrication," to add the following sentence to the paragraph discussing the compatibility of the ESF system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a LOCA:

Note that qualified coatings inside primary containment located within the zone of influence are assumed to fail for the analysis in the event of a loss-of coolant accident. The zone of influence for qualified coatings is defined as a spherical zone with a radius of 10 times the break diameter.

The staff's evaluation of the above information is Open Item 59 (Appendix HH), pending resolution of Generic Safety Issue 191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR) Sump Performance" (for background, see NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated September 13, 2004) for WBN Unit 2."

6.1.1.5 (Conclusions) reads as follows:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the controls on pH and chemistry of the reactor containment sprays and the emergency core cooling water following a loss-of-coolant or design-basis accident are adequate to reduce the probability of stress-corrosion cracking of the austenitic stainless steel components and welds of the ESF systems in containment throughout the duration of the postulated accident, from accident initiation to cleanup completion. Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA complies with the requirements of GDC 4, 35, and 41 and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 with respect to the compatibility of ESF components with environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including LOCAs.

The staff also concludes that control of the sprays and cooling water pH, in conjunction with controls on selection of containment materials, is consistent with RG 1.7 and provides assurance that the sprays and cooling water will not yield excessive hydrogen gas evolution from corrosion of containment metal or cause serious deterioration of the materials in containment."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 59 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The staff's evaluation of the compatibility of the ESF system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a LOCA is incomplete pending resolution of GSI-1 91 for WBN Unit 2. (Section 6.1.1.4)"

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#### REVISION 10 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated March 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110680248) provided response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Item 3.o.1 included the following:

#### "3.o. Chemical Effects

The objective of the chemical effects section is to evaluate the effect that chemical precipitates have on head loss and core cooling.

3.o.1. Provide a summary of evaluation results that show that chemical precipitates formed in the post-LOCA containment environment, either by themselves or combined with debris, do not deposit at the sump screen to the extent that an unacceptable head loss results, or deposit downstream of the sump screen to the extent that long-term core cooling is unacceptably impeded.

Content guidance for chemical effects is provided in Enclosure 3 to a letter from the NRC to NEI dated September 27, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072600425).

#### TVA Response

The purpose of this analysis is to determine the type and quantity of chemical precipitates which may form post-LOCA. This input is intended to be used for screen performance testing and may be used in the evaluation of chemical effects on downstream equipment. TVA has calculated the quantities of precipitates expected to form post-LOCA using the chemical model/methodology developed in WCAP-16530-NP, prior to release of the accompanying NRC SER. Based on the relatively limited quantities of precipitate material predicted by the calculation and the large strainer surface area to debris loading ratio, the WBN replacement sump screen was tested with chemical precipitate surrogates during certification testing only in the



maximum coating inventory test.

Excel Spreadsheet: "WOG Chemical Effects Calculator 19 WBN corrected 4.1 pH Cold.xls"

This calculation determines the type and expected quantity of chemical products that would be expected to form in the recirculation fluid specifically for WBN. No deviations were taken to the WCAP-16530-NP methods.

Input assumptions (and their basis) used to determine chemical effects loading: pH range, temperature profile, duration of containment spray, and materials expected to contribute to chemical effects are listed in the input tabs of the spreadsheet.

The materials expected to contribute to the formation of chemical precipitates are: submerged aluminum, non-submerged aluminum, Aluminum Silicate, and concrete. The buffering agent, NaTB, is used to buffer the sump pH from a minimum pH of 4.1 to a maximum pH of 8.2 post-LOCA. A sensitivity case was performed with the recirculation water volume of 54,907 ft<sup>3</sup>.

Table 1 shows the recirculation water volume, the inputs for the amount of materials, and the buffering agent used in the chemical effects evaluation for WBN."

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TVA to NRC letter dated May 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12143A345) provided additional information for Generic Letter 2004-02. See letter for details.

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REVISION 11 UPDATE:

The information provided in TVA to NRC letter dated September 16, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13262A270) provided the technical information that addresses Open Item 59.

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 6.1.1:

"6.1.1.1 Materials Selection and Fabrication

Open Item 59

Open Item 59 states, "The staff's evaluation of the compatibility of the ESF [engineered safety features] system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a LOCA is incomplete pending resolution of GSI-191 for WBN Unit 2."

NRC Letter dated September 18, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14163A658), concluded that TVA's response to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors" (ADAMS Accession No. ML042360586) dated September 13, 2004, requesting that licensees address the issues raised by Generic Safety Issue 191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance," for WBN Unit 2 was acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 59 is closed."

SSER27 change the status to "Resolved."

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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
6.1.2	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.1.2 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed Amendments 92 through 99 to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 final safety analysis report (FSAR). TVA made only minor changes to wording and format and maintained its commitment to meet the positions of RG 1.54, with the acceptable alternative to ANSI N101.4-1972 and the testing requirements of ANSI N101.2-1972.</p> <p>Based on the NRC staff's review of the information provided by TVA in its amendments to the FSAR, the staff concludes that the changes are acceptable. The staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
6.1.3	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.1.3 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"In FSAR Amendments 92 through 99, TVA revised the final postaccident pH value from 8.1 to 7.5 and also made minor wording and format changes. TVA stated that the sump pH after a loss-of-cooling accident (LOCA) remains within the range of 7.5 to 10.0 for the duration of the event. Since the revised pH value remains within the acceptance criterion (greater than 7.0), the NRC staff concludes that the changes are acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
6.2.0	0	<b>C</b> <b>— —</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
6.2.1	27	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>6.2.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involves reviewing analysis that ensures that containment external pressure will not exceed design value of 2.0 psi</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated it would confirm the contention that containment external pressure transients could not exceed the design value of 2.0 psig. TVA submitted the information June 4, 1982. In SSER3, NRC concluded that the design provided adequate protection against damage from external pressure transients.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff reviewed a revised long term containment analysis for the design basis LOCA in support of a proposed reduction in the limit for minimum allowable weight of ice in the condenser and found it acceptable. Additionally, the staff verified that containment pressure and water level monitors were installed in Unit 1. Thus, License Conditions 6d and 6e were resolved (these are discussed with the other NUREG-0737 issues).</p> <p>In SSER7, the staff resolved their concerns regarding local temperatures near MSLBs inside containment and their impact on equipment qualification.</p> <p>In SSER12, the staff reviewed TVA's basis for deleting requirements for a 20,000 ppm boron concentration in the boron injection tank and determined that this would not significantly affect the environmental response of the containment or the safe shutdown equipment therein.</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In SSER14, the staff reviewed revisions to a number of containment design parameters and concluded that none affect conclusions reached in the SER or supplements.

In SSER15, the staff reviewed the containment barrier seals and associated surveillance requirements and concluded that a revised divider barrier seal surveillance program was appropriate for Unit 1.

Unit 2 Action:

Review Unit 2 Technical Specifications with respect to divider barrier seal surveillance program.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

TS 3.6.13 provides the Limiting Condition for Operation for Divider Barrier Integrity.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.2.1 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97, and its previous evaluation as documented in the SER and WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 33, the NRC staff concludes that the Unit 2 containment functional design meets the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, 16, 50, 38, 39, 40, 13, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 with respect to protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, containment design, and monitoring radioactivity releases and that the design is consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 6.2.1."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

6.2.2	22	C — — 06	In SSER7, the staff determined that hot standby was an acceptable mode following a main steamline break and the containment cooling system modifications were acceptable.
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## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Containment Cooling Special Program .

In SSER21, the Containment Cooling SP was resolved. Completion of the Containment Cooling SP is tracked under 23.3.2.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.2.2 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97 and its previous review, as documented in the SER, the NRC staff concludes that the design of the containment heat removal system meets the relevant requirements of GDC 38, 39, and 40 and is consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 6.2.2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed the Containment Cooling SP.

6.2.3	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>06</b>	In SSER16, the staff reviewed Amendment 89 to the FSAR and deletion of the high-radiation signal from the auxiliary building exhaust vent monitors and found it acceptable.
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.2.3 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97 and its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER, the NRC staff concludes that the secondary containment functional design meets the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, 5, 16, 60, and 61, and Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 and is consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 6.2.3."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

6.2.4	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE to install safety grade isolation valves on 1" chemical feed lines joining feedwater lines to main steam line.
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LICENSE CONDITION – Modification of chemical feedlines

In the original 1982 SER, the containment isolation provisions for the main and auxiliary feedwater lines, feedwater bypass lines and the chemical feedlines to the steam generators did not meet GDC 57. This was resolved by FSAR Amendment 55. In SSER5, the NRC concluded that the containment isolation provisions for the main and auxiliary feedwater lines, feedwater bypass lines and the chemical feedlines were acceptable.

OUTSTANDING ISSUE for NRC to complete review of information provided by TVA to address Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation

LICENSE CONDITION - Containment isolation dependability

In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that WBN met all the requirements of NUREG-0737, item II.E.4.2 except subsection (6) concerning containment purging during normal operation. In SSER3, the outstanding issue was closed and the LICENSE CONDITION was left open. NRC completed the review and issued a TER for both units on July 12, 1990. NRC concluded that the isolation valves can close against the buildup of pressure in the event of a design basis accident if the lower containment isolation valves are physically blocked to an opening angle of 50 degrees or less. (SSER5)

Unit 2 Action: Reflect valve opening restriction in the Technical Specifications.

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OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving containment isolation using closed systems

This outstanding issue was opened in SSER7. In SSER12, the NRC concluded that the systems in question were "closed loops outside containment" and reaffirmed the previous conclusion of acceptability.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.7 requires verification that the valves are "blocked to restrict the valve from opening > 50 degrees."

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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.2.4 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as discussed above, and its previous review as documented in the SER, the NRC staff concludes that the containment isolation systems meet the relevant requirements of GDC 16, 54, 55, 56, and 57 and the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 6.2.4 and are, therefore, acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed NUREG-0737, II.E.4.2.

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6.2.5	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE for review of TVA provided additional information relative to discussion added to FSAR to address analysis of the production and accumulation of hydrogen within containment following onset of a LOCA</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that additional information was required concerning the analysis of the production and accumulation of hydrogen within the containment during a design basis LOCA. This information was provided in FSAR amendments and evaluated by NRC in SSER4. In SSER4, the NRC concluded that the design of the combustible gas control system was acceptable and the outstanding issue closed.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>The hydrogen recombiners will be removed from the Unit 2 design and licensing basis based on 10 CFR 50.44 (final rule September 16, 2003) and abandoned in place.</p> <p>This portion has a status of Open.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>LICENSE CONDITION – (6f) Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 – containment hydrogen</p>
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## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In SSER5, NRC closed the LICENSE CONDITION for Unit 1 only (IR 390/84-85).

Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of containment hydrogen accident monitoring instrumentation.

This portion has a status of Closed/Implementation only per NRC May 28, 2008, letter.

### LICENSE CONDITION – (9) Hydrogen control measures

In the original 1982 SER, an LC was raised to track resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-48, "Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment." In SSER8, the NRC reviewed the hydrogen mitigation system (igniters) and concluded it met the requirements of the final rule {10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)}.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009. This amendment deleted the hydrogen recombiners from the Unit 2 FSAR.

### REVISION 04 UPDATE:

EDCR 52329 was initiated to abandon in place Unit 2 hydrogen recombiners.

Technical Specifications (TS) / TS BASES 3.6.7 (Hydrogen Recombiners) were deleted in Developmental Revision B which was submitted on February 2, 2010.

### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.2.5 of SSER22 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that the design of the combustible gas control system meets the requirements of GDC 5; GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup"; GDC 42, "Inspection of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems"; and GDC 43 and 10 CFR 50.44 and is, therefore, acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

EDCR 52329 has been closed completing TVA actions. This in conjunction with the NRC's status of "Resolved" in SSER results in a STATUS of CLOSED for this item.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
6.2.6	27	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER4, the staff approved exemption from certain requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 for both units. In SSER19, the staff found a revised schedule for the exemption approved in SSER4 acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff found there was no radiological consequence to an increase in the bypass leakage rate for the emergency gas treatment system and found the increase acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.2.6 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff noted that TVA's changes to Section 6.2.6 in FSAR Amendment 97, regarding the implementation of Option B of Appendix J, were incomplete, because several statements remained regarding performing water-sealed valve leakage tests "as specified in 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix J." With the adoption of Option B, the specified testing requirements are no longer applicable; Option A to Appendix J retains these requirements. The NRC discussed this discrepancy with TVA in a telephone conference on September 28, 2010. TVA stated that it would remove the inaccurate reference to Appendix J for specific water testing requirements in a future FSAR amendment. This is Open Item 47 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 47:</p> <p>"TVA provided an update to FSAR Section 6.2.6 in Amendment 104."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26, Section 6.2.6 included the following for Open Item 71:</p> <p>"TVA updated the FSAR in Amendments 104 and 105 to correct the discrepancy. The NRC staff verified the correction. Therefore, Open Item 47 is closed."</p> <p>The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
6.2.7	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for TVA to confirm that the lowest temperatures which will be experienced by the limiting materials of the reactor containment pressure boundary under the conditions cited by GDC 51 will be in compliance with the temperatures identified in the staff's analysis of fracture toughness requirements for load bearing component of the containment system</p> <p>In SSER4, NRC reviewed the confirmatory information submitted and concluded for both units that the reactor containment pressure boundary materials will behave in a non-brittle manner and the requirements of GDC 51 were satisfied. NRC provided the technical basis in Appendix H of SSER4.</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

6.2.7 of SSER23 reads as follows:

"The NRC staff reviewed the changes made by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97 to FSAR Section 3.1.2.4, "Fluid Systems," Criterion 31, and determined that the information related to fracture prevention of the containment pressure boundary had not been substantively changed. Therefore, based on its review of FSAR Amendment 97 and previous evaluations documented in the original NUREG-0847 and NUREG-0847, Supplement 4, dated March 1985, the staff concludes that measures taken by TVA to prevent fracture of the containment boundary continue to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 31 and are therefore acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

6.3.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>01</b>	

6.3.1	11	<b>S</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE - involving removal of upper head injection system
		<b>09</b>	The Upper Head Injection (UHI) system design was approved in the original 1982 SER. TVA letter dated September 19, 1985, informed NRC that UHI would not be installed on Unit 2. The staff stated in SSER6 that they were continuing to review TVA's submittal. In SSER7, NRC concluded it was acceptable to delete UHI from both units. In SSER11, the staff stated that the revision of the design code for ECCS piping from B31.1 to ASME Section III did not change the conclusions made in the SER and previous SSERs.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

This amendment revised the FSAR to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

6.3.2	24	C 09	In SSER5, the staff reviewed TVA's approach to maintaining ECCS effectiveness by ensuring that no single failure would be able to energize the coils of the valve operators and found it acceptable. The staff also reviewed TVA's response to Issue 4 of NUREG-0138, Resequencing of ECCS loads following SI signal reset followed by a loss of offsite power.
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Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

This amendment revised the FSAR to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

Page 1-11 of SSER24 has "1" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 1 reads, "In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA identified minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the staff. The staff has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are administrative/typographical and do not impact the staff's conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is necessary and this section remains Resolved."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of



Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

6.3.3	9	<b>S</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE - involving containment sump screen design
		<b>09</b>	In the original 1982 SER, the staff approved the proposed sump design in the FSAR. A deviation between the installed and proposed design was discovered during an NRC inspection. In SSER9, the staff concluded that the as-installed sump screen was acceptable.

CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - provide a detailed survey of insulation material that could be debris post-LOCA

In the original 1982 SER, NRC found the design of the containment sump against debris acceptable subject to the acceptability of a detailed survey of insulation materials. In SSER2, the NRC review of the survey confirmed the staff's initial conclusion that the design to provide protection against sump debris was acceptable.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

#### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

This amendment revised the FSAR to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

#### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
6.3.4	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
6.3.5	0	O 01	Closure based on 6.3.1 to 6.3.3.
6.4.0	22	C 06	<p>In SSER5, the staff concluded that removal of the main control room air intake chlorine detector was acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER11, they stated that FSAR Amendment 69 on control room isolation did not change previous conclusions.</p> <p>In SSER16, the staff concluded that the control room design satisfied the requirements of GDC 19 and the guidelines of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4.</p> <p>In SSER18, the staff reviewed updated control room air flow rate data and dose analysis, as provided in Amendment 90, and determined that the changes did not affect conclusions reached in the SER or its supplements.</p> <p>See 18.1.0 also.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.4 of SSER22 included, "On this basis of the NRC staff's safety evaluation for WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 70 and its previous evaluation as documented in the SER, the staff concludes that the control room habitability systems meet the relevant requirements of TMI Action Plan Item III.D.3.4 and GDC 2, 4, and 19 and the guidance of RGs 1.52 and 1.78 and are, therefore, acceptable for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
6.5.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
6.5.1	22	C 06	<p>In SSER5, the staff found the Reactor Building Purge Ventilation System acceptable.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.5.1 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97 and concludes that the engineered safety feature atmosphere cleanup systems meet the guidance of SRP Section 6.5.1, Revision 2. The design conforms to the guidelines of RG 1.52, Revision 2,</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			and is, therefore, acceptable."
			SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
6.5.2	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
6.5.3	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		13	
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			Section 6.5.3 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff should verify that its conclusions in the review of FSAR Section 15.4.1 do not affect the conclusions of the staff regarding the acceptability of Section 6.5.3. This is Open Item 48 (Appendix HH)."
			SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."
			TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to this item:
			"No TVA action is required for this item."
			REVISION 10 UPDATE:
			SSER 26, Section 6.5.3 included the following for Open Item 48:
			"The NRC staff reviewed FSAR Section 15.4.1 in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 25 and concluded that it is acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 48 is closed."
			The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."
6.5.4	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
6.6.0	27	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE on additional information required on preservice inspection program and identification of plant specific areas where ASME Code Section XI requirements cannot be met and supporting technical justification
		13	
			NRC reviewed the preservice inspection program (PSI) for Unit 1 only in SSER10 and on the basis of a TVA commitment to submit an inservice inspection program within 6 months after receiving an operating license, considered a proposed LC for an ISI no longer required. In SSER15, the staff reviewed Revisions 24 and 25 to the preservice inspection program and concluded that the changes included therein were acceptable.
			Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 PSI program.

REVISION 03 UPDATE:

Preservice Inspection Plan, Program No. WBN-2 PSI, Revision 3 was submitted to the NRC on June 17, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101680561).

REVISION 05 UPDATE:

Corrected status from "O" to "S."

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER23]

6.6 reads as follows:

"By letter dated June 17, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML101680561), TVA provided Revision 3 of its Preservice Inspection Program Plan to the NRC for review, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for WBN Unit 2.

Appendix Z to this supplemental safety evaluation report includes the NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan."

Appendix Z to this SSER includes the NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan."

4.0 (Conclusions) of Appendix Z reads as follows:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's submittal and concluded that IVA has addressed all of the regulatory requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a and, based the staff's review of the documents listed in Section 6 of this report, no deviations from applicable regulatory requirements or TVA's commitments were identified in the PSI Program Plan, Revision 3, for WBN Unit 2. Open Item 70 (Appendix HH of SSER 23), as noted in Section 3.2.3 of this report, remains open pending NRC staff verification of the populations and the number of required examinations in accordance with the reference code."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated November 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12311A296) contained the following:

"TVA hereby provides Revision 7 of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN 2) Preservice Inspection Program Plan. The Preservice Inspection Program Plan has been updated to reflect additional numbers of welds based on the issuance of design change documents. SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70 noted that Section 7 on support welds contained only "To Be Determined". The number of support welds for several but not all applicable plant systems has been added in Revision 7. It is TVA's position that the amount of information available in Section 7 is sufficient to permit the NRC Staff to complete their programmatic review of the WBN 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Should additional validation be required to support the closure of SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70, completion of the Preservice Inspection Program can be addressed as a validation activity."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14133A296) contained the following:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100.006, Revision 1, "Inservice Testing Program," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2, including Relief Requests (10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5)(iii)).

The TI is a combined Unit 1/Unit 2 program document and is being submitted for staff review for the licensing of Unit 2. This TI addresses the initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program for pumps, valves, dynamic restraints (snubbers), and pressure-relief devices. The previously submitted Unit 2, "Preservice Test (PST) Plan," (Reference 3) is superseded in its entirety by the TI provided in Enclosure 1." Reference 3 was TVA to NRC letter dated March 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML110830677).

TVA to NRC letter dated August 5, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14224A597) provided response to RAIs that resulted from NRC's review of the TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014.

Appendix Z of SSER27 contained the following:

"Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

3.0 EVALUATION OF PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM PLAN

3.2 Review of ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code and OM [Operation and Maintenance] Code Requirements.

3.2.3 Acceptability of the Examination Sample

Open Item 70

Open Item 70 states, 'TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI [preservice inspection] program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports 'Summary Tables,' to include numbers of components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code.'

By letter dated November 1, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12311A296), TVA submitted Revision 7 to the Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Revision 7 included new tables for Class 1, 2 and 3 non-exempt piping support distribution by system and type. In these new tables the licensee identified the number of supports in the population and the number of examinations required to complete the preservice examinations. The staff has reviewed these tables, and the supports identified for examination, and find that they meet the requirements of the 2001 Edition through the 2003 Addenda of ASME Code, Section XI. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that Open Item 70 has satisfactorily been completed and is closed."

The Status for 6.6 in SSER27 is "Resolved."

7.0.0	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
7.1.0	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
7.1.1	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.

Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.

By letter dated August 21, 1995 for both units, TVA provided additional justification for a deviation from Position C.6(a) of RG 1.118 "Periodic Testing of Electrical Power and Protection Systems" Revision 2. In SSER16, the NRC found the deviation acceptable.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.1.1 of SSER23 includes:

"Therefore, based on the staff's previous evaluation, as documented in the SER and its supplements, and the staff's evaluation of TVA's amendments to the FSAR, the staff concludes that the information provided in FSAR Section 7.1.1 meets the relevant requirements of the SRP and is acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.1.2	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-10 of SSER22 has "1" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 1 reads, "In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA identified minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the staff. The staff has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are administrative/typographical and do not impact the staff's conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is necessary and this section remains Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.1.2 of SSER23 reads:

"TVA's comparison of WBN Unit 2 with other plants is referenced in FSAR Section 7.1.1.4. TVA states in the FSAR that "System functions for all systems discussed in Chapter 7 are similar to those of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Detailed comparison is provided in Section 1.3." TVA made no changes to the discussion in FSAR Section 7.1.1.4 from those previously reviewed and approved by the staff. Therefore, no staff review is required for this section."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.1.3	27	C — — 13	<p>In the SER, NRC indicated that a review of the setpoint methodology would be performed with a review of the Technical Specifications. In SSER4, NRC reviewed the methodology used to determine setpoints for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 and determined that it was acceptable.</p> <p>By letter dated July 29, 1994, for both units, TVA submitted a topical report titled "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2, Eagle 21 Version" (WCAP-12096, Revision 6). In SSER15, the NRC concluded the setpoint methodology was acceptable based on (1) previous acceptance of Westinghouse setpoint methodology at other plants, (2) the similarity between the Watts Bar and previously approved designs such as Sequoyah, and (3) the Watts Bar setpoint methodology is in compliance with RG 1.105 and ISA S6704.</p> <p>Staff requested discussion of methodology for determining, setting, and evaluating as-found setpoints for drift susceptible instruments.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Resolve this issue using the BFN TS-453 precedent (see NRC ML061680008).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) and TS Bases was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>As part of the submittal, TVA incorporated TSTF-493, Revision 4, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," into Section 3.3 of the TS and TS Bases.</p> <p>TVA submitted WCAP-17044, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems" on February 5, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.1.3 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.8 describes the functional diversity of the design of the reactor protection system (RPS). TVA added a new reference to Westinghouse topical report WCAP-13869, 'Reactor Protection System Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors,' Revision 2, September 1994, to the section. Revision 1 of the topical report was reviewed and approved by the staff for Unit 1 in Section 7.2.1.2, 'Watts Bar Specific Issues, of SSER 13, issued April 1994. It is unclear to the staff why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced for the two units. TVA should provide justification to the staff for why different revisions of WCAP-13869 are referenced for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. This is Open Item 65 (Appendix HH), as discussed in Section 7.2, 'Reactor Trip System,' of this SSER."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved." It appears that this should be "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 65 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. (Section 7.2.1.1)</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The REVISION 10 UPDATE for section 7.1.3 documents the closure of Open Item 65.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.2.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
7.2.1	27	C — — 13	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. In SSER15, the NRC reviewed the WBN Unit 1 EMI/RFI report and concluded that the EMI/RFI issue was resolved for WBN Unit 1. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.1.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"By letter dated December 5, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073440022), TVA informed the NRC staff that it had made one design change to the WBN Unit 1 Eagle 21 system under 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests and Experiments," after initial licensing. This change involved the installation of an external communication interface that included a serial-to-Ethernet controller (SEC) board in each of the multiple-bus chassis in the Eagle 21 system. The SEC uses the multiple-bus chassis to obtain power only. The SEC receives a datalink message in parallel with the test sequence processor and feeds the message to the integrated computer system (ICS). The link is designed such that a nonsafety-related signal cannot feed back to the safety-related Eagle 21 system. However, TVA did not confirm that testing demonstrated that two-way communication is impossible. This was an open item in the NRC audit at the Westinghouse facility (open item number 3 of ADAMS Accession No. ML102240630). By letter dated October 21, 2010 (letter open item number 171; ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03140661), TVA stated that "The external Eagle 21 unidirectional communications interface will be tested prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load." This is Open Item 63 (Appendix HH) until TVA confirms that testing has demonstrated that two-way communication is impossible with the Eagle 21 communications interface."</p> <p>AND</p> <p>"By letter dated June 18, 2010 (letter open item number 127), TVA stated that the Eagle 21 system factory acceptance test of Rack 2 revealed that the temperature inputs to the narrow-range resistance temperature detector (RTD) were consistently reading about 0.2 degrees Fahrenheit higher than expected. Westinghouse determined that it had incorrectly configured the inputs as a shared RTD in the LCP software. Westinghouse initiated Corrective Action Item 10-140-M021 and performed an evaluation of a potential nuclear safety issue. It determined that this issue does not represent a substantial safety hazard even if it is left uncorrected. By letter dated October 29, 2010 (letter open item number 128; ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03120711), TVA described the final resolution proposed by Westinghouse. In accordance with the proposed resolution, the spare input available on the RTD input board will be wired to the active channels. The spare input will provide the parallel resistance to resolve the problem. Jumpers will be installed at the Eagle 21 termination frame to provide a parallel connection from each existing narrow-range RTD input to an existing spare input, thus simulating the hardware connection for shared RTDs. Therefore, as configured, the LCP will provide the correct temperature calculation for the narrow-range RTDs. TVA stated that "Post modification testing will be performed to verify that the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load." This is Open Item 64 (Appendix HH) pending NRC staff review of the testing results."</p> <p>AND</p>



"In Section 7.2 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 96, TVA references Revision 2 of WCAP-13869, but the Unit 1 FSAR references Revision 1. Revision 1 was reviewed and approved by the staff for Unit 1 in Section 7.2.1.2 of SSER 13, issued April 1994. The staff asked TVA to justify the different reference for Unit 2. In Attachment 12 to its response (letter open item number 323) to the staff dated October 29, 2010, TVA identified that the differences between Revisions 1 and 2 are based on TVA's decision to not insulate the steam generator level transmitter reference leg on Unit 2. As the WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 designs for the steam generator reference leg are the same, it is unclear to the staff why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced for the two units. TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-13869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. This is Open Item 65 (Appendix HH).

The NRC staff reviewed the additional changes made by TVA to WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.2 and concluded that the changes were editorial or administrative in nature or were made to improve consistency with other FSAR sections. Because the additional changes are nonsubstantive, they were acceptable to the staff."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 63 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that testing prior to Unit 2 fuel load has demonstrated that two-way communications is impossible with the Eagle 21 communications interface. (Section 7.2.1.1)"

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Open Item 64 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA stated that, "Post modification testing will be performed to verify that the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load." This issue is open pending NRC staff review of the testing results. (Section 7.2.1.1)"

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Open Item 65 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. (Section 7.2.1.1)"

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REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 7.2.1.1 included the following for Open Item 65:

"Open Item 65 states, 'TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-13869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2.' WBN Unit 1 FSAR sections 7.1 and 7.2 referenced WCAP-13869, 'Reactor Protection System Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors,' Revision 1, while the WBN Unit 2 FSAR referenced Revision 2.

In its letter dated October 29, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103120711), Item 36, TVA provided a section entitled 'WCAP-13869 Revision 1 to Revision 2 Change Analysis.' TVA stated that the design bases for the response to a feedwater break inside containment accident, as documented in Chapter 15 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, is the same as that for Unit 1. In its letter dated March 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110950331), Item 14, TVA stated that, because WBN Unit 2 is required to match the Unit 1 licensing basis to the extent practical, it would revise the WBN Unit 2 FSAR to agree with the WBN Unit 1 FSAR, which references Revision 1.

The NRC staff reviewed Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 104, submitted on June 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111780527), and verified that WCAP-13869, Revision 1, is

referenced instead of Revision 2. Therefore, Open Item 65 is closed.”

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

Westinghouse FCN-WBTM-10809 was implemented, and post-modification-testing was performed to verify that the connections were made correctly and that the temperature bias error has been eliminated.

SSER Open Item 64 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 7.2.1:

“7.2.1.1 System Description

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 63 states, “TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that testing prior to Unit 2 fuel load has demonstrated that two-way communications is impossible with the Eagle 21 communications interface.”

Open Item 93 (Section 7.9.3.2 “Separation of Protection and Control Systems”) states, “TVA should confirm to the staff that testing of the Eagle 21 system has sufficiently demonstrated that two-way communication to the ICS is precluded with the described configurations.”

By letter dated October 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14295A520), TVA provided Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 to its letter describing its response to these action items. In this response, TVA provided a description of the test it performed on one of the Eagle 21 chassis to demonstrate that two-way communication was precluded by the specific configuration employed at WBN Unit 2. Their description included a copy of its test plan, a summary of the test steps performed, including sketches of the test setup employed, and a high level summary of the test and its results. The purpose of this test was to verify that the External Communications Interface for WBN Unit 2 Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System only allows data flow in one direction (i.e., data out to the plant computer and no data into the Eagle 21 system).

Under normal operating conditions, the Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) (which performs safety related functions) of each of the Eagle 21 chassis generates status information at a rate of ten times per second. This information travels on the internal Eagle 21 high-level data link control (HDLC) serial bus where it is received in parallel by the Eagle 21 Test Sequence Processor (TSP) and by a Serial-to-Ethernet converter (SEC). The SEC then passes this status information on to the plant Integrated Computer System (ICS) through a fiber optic device to the Ethernet network connection. (As described above, each of the 14 Eagle 21 chassis sends such status information via a fiber optic Ethernet connection to a personal computer (PC) located in the process computer room. This PC then aggregates the data from the 14 Eagle 21 chassis and sends the aggregated data to the ICS over a separate network connection.) To ensure that no data traffic on the internal HDLC serial link of each Eagle 21 chassis can adversely impact the LCPs of each chassis, internal unidirectional communication between these sections is enforced to be from the LCP to the TSP and SEC by removing the “receive communications” integrated circuit chips from the sockets in the LCP data link handler board section and removing the “transmit communications” integrated circuit chips from their respective sockets in the TSP data link handler board and the SEC board. In addition, the installation of jumpers as described in Section 7.9.3.2 of the staff’s SER (SSER 23) prevents the SEC from transmitting data onto the HDLC serial port. Therefore, the LCP has no ability to receive data from any source nor does the TSP or SEC have the ability to transmit data to the LCP.

To demonstrate the unidirectional communications, the Ethernet port external to one of the Eagle 21 chassis (which has a Serial-to-Ethernet communications configuration typical of each of the 14 Eagle 21 chassis) coming from the ICS PC was temporarily disconnected and an Ethernet hub was connected in its place. A laptop with an Ethernet communications port was connected to one side of the Ethernet port. The laptop computer was configured to generate a data storm pattern to the Eagle 21 by targeting the Eagle 21 chassis’ Internet Protocol (IP) address. A second laptop was connected to the Ethernet hub to analyze and record the network data traffic to verify that the Eagle 21 rack did not respond to any of the data storm traffic

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

and that it continued to send out the appropriate LCP status information. Oscilloscope probes were also connected to the LCP Data Link Handler serial "receive" lines and the SEC serial "transmit" lines to verify that no serial data traffic was present, which was as expected since the SEC has no transmit capability.

The test demonstrated that when the data storm pattern information was generated by the first laptop, no change in response of the LCP was evident on the second laptop. Further, the oscilloscope traces showed no serial information present at the LCP "receive" portion of the HDLC. This testing was witnessed by NRC staff inspection team members. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure, Eagle 21 vendor manual, and associated drawings to verify that the described test configuration and acceptance criteria was valid for the Open Items in question. The inspection team member noted that the test procedure involved injecting data packets through the cable normally attached to the fiber optic converter and reading any return data packets. Additionally, the inspection team witnessed the performance of the test and observed the oscilloscope traces monitoring the SEC controller's (i.e., the communications interface) transmit and receive lines, as well as the loop controller processor's (the safety-related processor board) receive lines. The inspectors also reviewed the drawings to verify that they were in the same configuration described in Open Item 93. The inspectors observed the testing and reviewed the test results to verify the test setup and to determine whether the acceptance criteria were met.

Based on the staff evaluation that there appears to have been an appropriate test setup and successful performance of the licensee's Eagle 21 digital communications test, and on the staff's evaluation of the licensee's responses in the enclosures to their October 22, 2014, letter, and the observations noted in the inspection report prepared by the NRC Region II staff, the NRC staff finds that Open Items 63 and 93 have been adequately addressed and are closed.

Open Item 64

Open Item 64 states, "TVA stated that, 'Post modification testing will be performed to verify that the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load.' This issue is open pending NRC staff review of the testing results."

The inspectors reviewed the test in work order (WO) 11347100 and the change package to verify that a 0.2 degree Fahrenheit (°F) bias, which had been discovered during factory acceptance testing, was corrected. The inspectors also reviewed the WO to verify that the test equipment was properly calibrated. Based on a review of the final closure package as documented in the Inspection Report 2014-602 dated March 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14086A063), Open Item 64 is closed."

SSER27 change the status to "Resolved."

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Open Item 63 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-607, dated September 30, 2014.

7.2.2	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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**07**

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-10 of SSER22 has "1" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 1 reads, "In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA identified minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the staff. The staff has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are administrative/typographical and do not impact the staff's conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is necessary and this section remains Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.2 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>“The NRC staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 96 through 101 and concluded that TVA made no substantive changes to FSAR Section 7.2.2. Therefore, the staff’s conclusions as documented in the SER remain valid.”</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p>
7.2.3	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-10 of SSER22 has “1” in the “Note” column for this item.</p> <p>Note 1 reads, “In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA identified minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the staff. The staff has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are administrative/typographical and do not impact the staff’s conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is necessary and this section remains Resolved.”</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.3 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>“The NRC staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 96 through 101 and concluded that TVA made no substantive changes to FSAR Section 7.2.3. Therefore, the staff’s conclusions as documented in the SER remain valid.”</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p>
7.2.4	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.4 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>“The NRC staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 96 and concluded that TVA made no substantive changes to Section 7.2.1.1.2(6), ‘Reactor Trip on a Turbine Trip.’ Therefore, the staff’s conclusions as documented in the SER remain valid.”</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.2.5	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - address IEB 79-21 to alleviate temperature dependence problem associated with measuring SG water level</p> <p>In SSER2, NRC accepted TVA's commitment to insulate the steam generator water level reference legs to alleviate the temperature dependence problem. By letter dated July 27, 1994, TVA submitted an evaluation for both units and determined that it was not necessary to insulate the SG reference legs at WBN. In SSER14, NRC concurred with TVA's assessment to not insulate the steam generator water level instrument reference leg.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Update accident calculation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.5 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>"By letter to the NRC dated July 27, 1994 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073230681), TVA withdrew its commitment to insulate the reference leg of the steam generator water level transmitters. TVA provided an analysis to justify its action, WCAP-1 3869, 'Reactor Protection System Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized-Water Reactor,' Revision 1, November 1993, which was accepted by the staff as documented in SSER 13, issued April 1994. The staff asked TVA to confirm whether the reference leg of the steam generator water level transmitters is insulated and, if not, to confirm that the analysis that was submitted for WBN Unit 1 is also applicable to Unit 2. In its response (letter open item number 292) to the staff by letter dated October 21, 2010, TVA informed the staff that the reference leg is not insulated and that the analysis provided for WBN Unit 1 is also applicable to Unit 2. TVA's analysis for feedwater line break inside the containment credits the high containment pressure safety injection (SI) signal. The staff verified that TVA revised FSAR Section 15.4.2.2 to reflect that information. Therefore, based on the previous acceptance of the analysis documented in SSER 13, the staff considers TVA's response to be acceptable."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The Revision 06 update for Bulletin 1979-21 stated, "The calculations were updated."</p> <p>Updating this to match the Bulletin update and status.</p>
7.2.6	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.</p> <p>"CONCLUSIONS" left open until all actions in subsection are closed.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.2.6 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's prior evaluation, as documented in the SER and its supplements, in particular SSER 2 (issued January 1984), SSER 13, SSER 14 (issued December 1994), and SSER 15, and the staff's review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 96 through 102, the staff concludes that the information in FSAR Section 7.2 continues to comply with applicable regulatory requirements and that the staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.3.0	27	<b>C</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.
		<b>13</b>	

Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

7.3.1	23	<b>C</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.
		<b>07</b>	

Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.

In SSER14, NRC reviewed TVA's FSAR amendment 81 section 7.3.2.2.6, with respect to a deviation from IEEE Standard 279-1971. Manual initiation of both steamline isolation and switchover from injection to recirculation following a loss-of-primary-coolant accident are performed at the component level only. In SSER14, NRC agreed with TVA's justification.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

August 25, 2008.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.3.1 of SSER23 includes:

"These changes to the FSAR do not involve any physical modifications to the plant or modify the safety function of any equipment. The changes do not affect setpoints or safety limits and thus do not reduce any margins of safety as defined in the TS. Therefore, the NRC staff finds them to be acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.3.2	23	<b>C</b>	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE is commitment to make a design change to provide protection that prevents debris from entering containment sump level sensors
		<b>07</b>	

In the original SER, staff identified a concern that debris in the containment sump could block the inlets to the differential pressure transmitters and result in a loss of the permissive signal to the initiation logic for the automatic switchover from the injection to the recirculation mode of the emergency core cooling system. In a September 15, 1983, letter TVA notified NRC that the level sensors had been moved from inside the sump wall to outside the sump wall with the sense line opening protected by a cap with small holes. Staff closed the issue in SSER2.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.3.2 of SSER23 includes:

"By letter dated October 18, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073240682), TVA informed the NRC staff that it had replaced the containment sump level transmitters in WBN Unit 1 under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. DCN-39608 states that the old transmitters had problems with the capillary tubing leaking fill fluid and with maintaining the transmitter within calibration. The new transmitters are Class 1E qualified, do not have capillary tubing, and can be submersed during a LOCA. TVA stated that functional performance and protective logic are not affected. The same replacement has been performed for WBN Unit 2 under EDCR-52419. The staff has reviewed DCN-39608 and EDCR-52419 and, because the functional performance and protective logic are not affected, the staff concludes that the approach is acceptable for WBN Unit 2.

WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 95 addresses changes to Section 6.3.5.4, 'Level Indication.' All of the changes made by TVA were editorial or administrative in nature or were made to improve consistency with other FSAR sections. Therefore, based on its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER and SSER 2, and on its evaluation of subsequent changes, as described above, the staff concludes that the information provided by TVA meets the relevant requirements identified in the SRP and that the staff's conclusions in the SER and SSER 2 remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.3.3	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-11 of SSER22 has "1" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 1 reads, "In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA identified



## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the staff. The staff has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are administrative/typographical and do not impact the staff's conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is necessary and this section remains Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.3.3 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on the staff's prior evaluation documented in the SER and on its evaluation of submitted changes, the information provided by TVA meets the relevant requirements identified in the SRP, and the staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.3.4	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.3.4 of SSER23 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 103 and concluded that TVA made no functional changes to Section 7.3.2.1, 'System Reliability/Availability and Failure Mode and Effects Analyses.' All of the changes were editorial or administrative in nature or were made to improve consistency with other FSAR sections. Therefore, based on the staff's prior evaluation, as documented in the SER, and on the staff's evaluation of submitted changes, the information provided in FSAR Section 7.3.4 continues to meet the relevant requirements identified in the SRP, and the staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.3.5	23	<b>CO</b>	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - perform confirmatory tests to satisfy IEB 80-06 (to ensure that no device will change position solely due to reset action) and staff review of electrical schematics for modifications that ensure that valves remain in emergency mode after ESF reset
		<b>13</b>	

In the original SER, staff concluded that the design modifications for Bulletin 80-06 were acceptable subject to review of the electrical schematics that were not available at the time. In SSER3, the staff found the modifications acceptable and closed the confirmatory issue.

Unit 2 Action: Perform verification during preoperational testing.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.3.5 of SSER23 includes:



"In its letter to the NRC staff dated March 11, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073530129), TVA provided a list of all the safety-related equipment that does not remain in its emergency mode after an ESF reset. TVA evaluated this equipment and determined that it does not impact the safety of the plant or the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The NRC staff concluded in SSER 3 that TVA's justification was acceptable.

In response to NRC staff Request for Additional Information (RAI) 7.3-6, TVA confirmed in its letter dated November 9, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03200146) that the feedwater isolation valves, the main feedwater check valve bypass valves, the upper tap main feedwater isolation valves, the steam generator blowdown isolation valves, and the RHR heat exchanger outlet flow control valves will remain in the emergency mode after an ESF reset.

In response to a staff question, TVA stated in its letter dated November 24, 2010 (item number 330; ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03330501) that subsequent design changes have impacted the March 11, 1982, response such that some equipment that originally changed state no longer does so and some equipment has been deleted. TVA stated that no additions have been made to its original list dated March 11, 1982. Therefore, based on the staff's prior evaluation, as documented in the SER and SSER 3, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in response to staff questions, the conclusions in the SER and SSER 3 remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct the Status above to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.

7.3.6	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.
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Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.

"CONCLUSIONS" left open until all actions in subsection are closed.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.3.6 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on the staff's previous evaluations, as documented in the SER and SSER 2, SSER 3, and SSER 14, and on its review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 103, the information provided in FSAR Section 7.3 meets the relevant requirements identified in the SRP, and the staff's conclusions in the SER and its supplements remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.4.0	0	C — —	Approved for both units in SER.
7.4.1	23	C — — 07	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.4.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"In response to staff questions, TVA stated in its letter to the NRC staff dated July 30, 2010 (letter item number 12; ADAMS Accession No. ML102160349, not publicly available), that there are no technical differences between the WBN Unit 1 and WBN Unit 2 FSAR Sections 7.4.</p> <p>The NRC staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 103 and concluded that the changes made by TVA to Section 7.4 were editorial or administrative in nature or were made to improve consistency with other FSAR sections. Therefore, the staff's conclusions as documented in the SER remain valid."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
7.4.2	23	C — — 07	<p>By letter dated September 26, 1985, TVA requested a deviation from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.2.d for use of the SG saturation temperatures to approximate reactor coolant system cold leg temperatures. This was approved for both units by SE dated May 17, 1991. The SE was discussed in SSER7. The staff concluded that this was an acceptable deviation.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.4.2 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>"The staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 103 and concluded that TVA's changes were editorial or administrative in nature or were made to improve consistency with other FSAR sections. Therefore, the staff's conclusions as documented in the SER and SSER 7, dated September 1991, remain valid."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
7.4.3	23	C — — 07	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.4.3 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>"Based on the its prior evaluation, as documented in the SER and SSER 7, and on its review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 103, the staff concludes that the information provided in FSAR Section 7.4 continues to meet the relevant requirements identified in the SRP, and that the staff's conclusions in the SER and SSER 7 remain valid."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION										
			SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."										
7.5.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.										
7.5.1	23	C	Approved for both units in SER.										
		07											
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:										
			7.5.1.1.4 (Conclusions) of SSER23 reads:										
			"The NRC staff reviewed the proposed ICS system for WBN Unit 2. The ICS is a nonsafety-related computer network that acquires, processes, and displays data to support the plant assessment capabilities of the MCR, TSC, EOF, and NDL. In addition to providing the data links needed to support the TSC, EOF, and NDL, the ICS also provides the functions of the SPDS and the BISI system. The staff evaluated the system designs against the applicable regulatory criteria and concluded that, for those aspects of the design that were not substantially different from WBN Unit 1, the staff's previous conclusions, as documented in the SER and SSERs, remain valid. Further, where the WBN Unit 2 design was substantively different from that of WBN Unit 1, the staff concluded that TVA's design appropriately addresses the staff's regulatory criteria for quality (GDC I and 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1)), control and protection system separation (GDC 24 and IEEE 279-1971, Clause 4.7), and the specific requirements for each display system (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, or RG 1.47), as described above, and, therefore, is acceptable.										
			SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."										
7.5.2	27	OI	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving RG 1.97 instruments following course of an accident										
		13	In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that WBN did not use RG 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plants and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," for the design because the design predated the RG. In SSER7, an outstanding issue was opened. TVA provided NRC information on exceptions to RG 1.97. A detailed review was performed for both units (Appendix V of SSER9). The staff concluded that WBN conforms to or has adequately justified deviations from the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 2. TVA submitted additional deviations for both units in letters dated May 9, 1994, and April 21, 1995. In SSER14 and SSER15, the additional deviations to RG 1.97 were reviewed and accepted by NRC.										
			NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" – Reviewed in SSER9.										
			Unit 2 Actions: Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors.										
			CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.										
			This item has approximately 24 Open Items (OIs) cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 09:										
			<table><tr><th>OI</th><th>STATUS</th></tr><tr><td>72</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>77</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>78</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>79</td><td>Last discussed in Revision 07 portion.</td></tr></table>	OI	STATUS	72	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	77	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.	78	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	79	Last discussed in Revision 07 portion.
OI	STATUS												
72	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.												
77	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.												
78	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.												
79	Last discussed in Revision 07 portion.												

80	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.
81	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
94	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
95	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
96	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
97	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
98	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
99	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
100	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
101	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
102	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
103	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
104	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
105	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
106	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
107	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
108	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
109	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
110	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
111	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER23]

7.5.2.2.3 includes:

"SRP Section 7.5, Revision 5 identifies IEEE Std. 603-1991 as being applicable to accident monitoring instrumentation. Based on its review of this item, the staff has the following open items:

- \* TVA should provide to the staff either information that demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS meets the applicable requirements in IEEE Std. 603-1991, or justification for why the Common Q PAMS should not meet those requirements. This is Open Item 94 (Appendix HH).

- \* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide Conformance,' to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 95 (Appendix HH).

AND

"The NRC staff's detailed evaluation of the Common Q PAMS equipment against the environmental criteria is addressed in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3.5. RG 1.100, Revision 1 is used, in part, to address WBN Unit 2 Design Criterion 2. Based on its review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include RG 1.100, Revision 3 for the Common Q PAMS, or (2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or (3) provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 96 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Based on the reasoning quoted above, the staff concludes that TVA did not evaluate the Common Q PAMS against the criteria of RG 1.153, Revision 1; therefore, the staff has the following open item (see also Open Items 94 and 95 above):

- \* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.153, Revision 1 or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 97 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Based on the review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 98 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"The WBN Unit 2 FSAR references IEEE 7-4.3.2-1982, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' as endorsed by RG 1.152, Revision 0 for the Eagle 21 system. The current staff position is documented in RG 1.152, Revision 2, which endorses IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' as an acceptable method for using digital computers to meet IEEE Std.603-1991. Based on the review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 99 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"The current staff positions are documented in RG 1.168, Revision 1, IEEE 1012-1998; and IEEE 1028-1997. Based on its review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.168, Revision 1, IEEE Std. 1012-1998, and IEEE 1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 100 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"The Common Q PAMS was designed and implemented in accordance with the SPM, which was found by the NRC staff to meet the requirements of RG 1.168, Revision 0, issued September 1997; IEEE Std. 1012-1986, 'IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans'; and IEEE Std. 1028-1988, 'IEEE Standard Software Reviews and Audits.' (See NRC reports (1) 'Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation CE Nuclear Power Topical Report CENPD-396-P 'Common Qualified Platform' Project No. 692,' issued August 2000, Section 4.3.1 .j, 'Software Verification and Validation Plan' (ADAMS Accession No. ML003740165), and (2) WCAP-16096-NP-A, 'Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems,' Revision 1A, NRC safety evaluation incorporated into the document, Section 2, 'Regulatory Evaluation' (ADAMS Accession No. ML050350234)). Based on its review of this item, the staff has the following open item:

\* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS application software is in conformance with RG 1.168, Revision 1 or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 101 (Appendix HH).

AND

"The WBN Unit 2 FSAR does not reference Regulatory Guide 1.209, which endorses IEEE Std. 323-2003, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.' TVA did not perform a comparison evaluation of the Common Q PAMS with the criteria in RG 1.209. Based on its review, the NRC staff has the following open items:

\* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 102 (Appendix HH).

\* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 103 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"TVA did not provide a comparison evaluation of Common Q PAMS to the criteria in IEEE Std. 323-2003. (See Open Item 103 above.)"

7.5.2.2.3.4.1 includes:

"The NRC revised RG 1.152 and 1.168 after the staff's approval of the SPM. Open Item Nos. 98 and 101 address the acceptability of the SPM for complying with the guidance of RGs 1.152 and 1.168, respectively (Appendix HH). The remaining RGs used to determine the acceptability of the SPM have not changed, and the processes described in the SPM have not changed; therefore, the staff considers the SPM to be acceptable for these unchanged aspects."

7.5.2.2.3.4.2 includes:

"The NRC staff will review the WEC self-assessment to verify that the WBN Unit 2 PAMS complies with the V&V requirements in the SPM or that deviations from the requirements are adequately justified. This is Open Item 104 (Appendix HH)."

7.5.2.2.3.4.2.2 includes:

"During its audit from February 28 to March 4, 2011, of the WEC CGD activities, the NRC staff examined implementation of the vendor's SWP, as specified in SPM Section 5, for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. The staff concluded that only some aspects of the SWP were followed, and that the QA oversight of the SPM did not identify the discrepancies. As described above in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.2, 'Software Implementation Documentation,' TVA/WEC took project-specific and generic action items to address the discrepancies. The NRC staff's verification of these actions is included in Open Item 104 (Appendix HH). Pending closure of Open Item 104, the NRC staff concludes that implementation of V&V for the Common Q PAMS is acceptable."

7.5.2.2.3.4.2.4 includes:

"The SPM describes the software testing and documents that TVA will create (e.g., SPM Section 5.8, 'V&V Test Documentation Requirements,' Section 8.8, 'Test Documentation'). The SPM also describes the testing tasks that TVA is to carry out. The acceptance criterion for software test implementation is that the tasks in the SPM have been carried out in their entirety. The three subsections below address the three different testing activities evaluated by the NRC staff. Other aspects regarding the acceptability of testing activities are addressed in Open Items Nos. 101 and 104 (Appendix HH)."

7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1 includes:

"The audit report (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 10691232, not publicly available) stated the following:

For the WBN2 PAMS project, Westinghouse will provide documentation in their Rockville MD offices demonstrating that each document requiring independent review was in fact independently reviewed. CAPs No. 11-061-M047 will contain a commitment to provided documented evidence of appropriate independent reviews.

This is included in Open Item 104 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Based on (1) the review of the SysRS and SRS, (2) the audit of the RTMs, and (3) the review of the traceability analysis in the LTR, the staff has the following open items (Appendix HH):

- \* Open Item 105: TVA should provide to the NRC staff an acceptable description of how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS and SRS implement the design-basis requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 4.
- \* Open Item 106: TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SRS is independently reviewed."

7.5.2.2.3.4.3.2 includes:

"The SDDs do not include any documented evidence that they were independently reviewed. As a result, the NRC staff has the following open item (Appendix HH):

- \* Open Item 107: TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SDDs are independently reviewed."

7.5.2.2.3.5.2 includes:

"Table 5.3-1 of the qualification summary report provides the test environmental conditions from the various test programs. Based on the NRC staff's review of the test program results, the staff concluded that the required environmental test conditions satisfy the WBN Unit 2 plant-specific environmental requirements, including a heat rise inside the PAMS cabinet. The tested conditions from the various test programs envelop the required environmental test conditions at WBN Unit 2. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental qualification of the Common Q PAMS meets the acceptance criteria of RG 1.209. The staff had two open items. Based on its review of the environmental qualification reports, the staff could not determine whether or not TVA had considered in the equipment testing any potential synergistic effects between temperature and humidity. This is Open Item 108 (Appendix HH). Because the staff used the criteria of RG 1.209, Open Item 102 (SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3; Appendix HH) also applies to this SSER subsection.

Open Item 108: TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff that there are no synergistic effects between temperature and humidity for the Common Q PAMS equipment."

7.5.2.2.3.5.3 includes:

"The seismic qualification testing of the AC160/Common Q equipment was performed to both IEEE Std. 344-1975 and IEEE Std. 344-1987. However, as noted in the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS, the PAMS must be seismically qualified to IEEE Std. 344-1975. The seismic testing on the AC160/Common Q equipment that was performed in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1987 bounds the requirements specified in IEEE Std. 344-1975. Therefore, the staff concludes that all of the AC160/Common Q seismic qualification testing was performed in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1975, and that the seismic



qualification is acceptable. Open Item 96 (Appendix HH; SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3) also applies to this SSER subsection because RG 1.100, Revision 3 references IEEE Std. 344-1987.”

7.5.2.2.3.7 includes:

“There is no communication between PAMS divisions. The divisions are physically separate, with no interconnection between divisions throughout the system architecture (i.e., from the input to the displays). The communications isolation between the safety-related Common Q PAMS and the plant computer are unidirectional via the MTP software and a nonsafety-related data diode. The MTP is presumed to fail during certain postulated failures of the connected nonsafety-related equipment. These failures have been demonstrated (i.e., via data storm testing) to not affect the connected AC160 components or the OM (see Open Item 109 below; Appendix HH). Data storm testing along with the DI&C-ISG-04 compliance analysis (documented in the subsection below) provide reasonable assurance that the independence criteria (i.e., IEEE Std. 603, Clause 5.5 and IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2, Clause 5.6) are met; therefore, the Common Q PAMS communications independence is acceptable to the NRC staff.”

7.5.2.2.3.7.1.8 includes:

“No data are exchanged between safety divisions in the PAMS, but data are communicated through a one-way data link to the nonsafety-related plant computer. The one-way aspects of this nonsafety-related data link are not credited because the MTP is the credited isolation device. The MTP is postulated to fail during a data storm, but this failure was demonstrated by testing not to affect the AC160 processor or the OM (i.e., to not affect the safety function). Based on the testing results, the use of the MTP in this manner is acceptable. Therefore, the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS communications meet the staff position and are acceptable. The staff had one open item (Appendix HH) for followup.

\* Open Item 109: TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q PAMS.”

7.5.2.2.3.9 includes:

“TVA has not provided an analysis demonstrating that the criteria of IEEE Std. 603-1991 have been met (see Open Item 94, Appendix HH). However, the NRC staff performed its own analysis, as documented in the subsections below, and concluded, pending the resolution of Open Item 94, that there is reasonable assurance that the regulatory criteria in IEEE Std. 603-1991 have been met, and that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS system is acceptable.”

7.5.2.2.3.9.2.6 includes:

“Each of the PAMS channels is designed to permit periodic software testing of the CET and saturation margin algorithms on demand; however, there appeared to be no description of how the RVLIS algorithm is periodically tested. This is Open Item 110 (Appendix HH).

\* Open Item 110: TVA should provide information to the NRC staff describing how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS design supports periodic testing of the RVLIS function.”

7.5.2.2.3.11 includes:

“TVA should confirm to the staff that there are no changes required to the technical specifications as a result of the modification installing the Common Q PAMS. If any changes to the technical specifications are required, TVA should provide the changes to the NRC staff for review. This is Open Item 111 (Appendix HH).”



7.5.2.2.3.12 includes:

“TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2 or provide justification for not conforming. As noted in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3, this is Open Item 98 (Appendix HH).”

7.5.2.2.4 reads:

“Based on the review of the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS design, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the system fully conforms to the design, quality, functional and TMI-related criteria summarized above in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.2, with the open items (Appendix HH) noted in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.”

7.5.2.3.4 includes:

“It is unclear to the NRC staff which software V&V documents are applicable to the HRCAR monitors. TVA should clarify which software V&V documents are applicable in order for the staff to complete its evaluation. This is Open Item 77 (Appendix HH).”

AND

“The staff asked TVA to address the radiation qualification of the HRCAR monitors. In its response dated February 25, 2011 (item number 349; ADAMS Accession No. MLI 10620219), TVA stated, in part, the following:

Calculation WBNAPS3-126 will be revised to add the control room to the calculation with a dose of less than  $1 \times 10^3$  RAD by July 1, 2011. Since the control room TID will be documented in calculation WBNAPS3-126 to be less than  $1 \times 10^3$  RAD, radiation qualification of the RM-1000 is not required.

This is Open Item 78 (Appendix HH) until TVA issues its revised calculation reflecting that the total integrated dose (TID) in the control room is less than  $1 \times 10^3$  rads, and the staff completes its review.

The staff evaluated TVA's testing for EMI/RFI, as discussed in this section below with regard to compliance with RG 1.180. However, TVA specified no exclusion distances for the HRCAR monitors. TVA should perform a radiated susceptibility survey, after the installation of the hardware but before the RM-1 000 is placed in service, to establish the need for exclusion distance for the HRCAR monitors while using handheld portable devices (e.g., walkie-talkie) in the control room, as documented in Attachment 23 to TVA's letter dated February 25, 2011, and item number 355 of TVA's letter dated April 15, 2011. This is Open Item 79 (Appendix HH). The seismic qualification of the monitors is enveloped by the staff's evaluation of electrical equipment in Section 3.10 of this SSER. Pending closure of Open Items 78 and 79, the staff concludes that the HRCAR monitors have been qualified by test and analysis and meet the applicable seismic and environmental requirements. This satisfies Clause 5.4 of IEEE Std. 603-1991.

AND

“TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180 and should address any deviations from the guidance of the RG. This is Open Item 80 (Appendix HH).”

AND

“As noted above, this is Open Item 78 (Appendix HH) until TVA issues its revised calculation reflecting that the TID in the control room is less than  $1 \times 10^3$  rads, and the staff completes its review.”

AND

“As documented (item number 353) in the NRC/TVA open item master list status report dated April 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 11050009), TVA stated that GA's commercial dedication program did not require multiple dedication methods in accordance with the guidance of EPRI TR-1 06439, but that GA has

taken additional measures to assure quality. TA should provide information about the extent to which GA complies with EPRI TR-1 06439 and the methods that GA used for its commercial dedication process to the NRC staff for review. This is Open Item 81 (Appendix HH)."

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7.5.2.3.5 reads:

"Based on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA as described above, the NRC staff concludes that the digital HRCAR monitors comply with the applicable regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(h), Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xix), GDC 13, GDC 19, GDC 24, GDC 64, and IEEE Std. 603-1991, and with the regulatory guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 2, RG 1.180, Revision 1, and RG 1.209. Therefore, the HRCAR monitors are acceptable, pending closure of the open items in SSER Section 7.5.2.3."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

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Open Item 77 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"It is unclear to the NRC staff which software V&V documents are applicable to the HRCAR monitors. TVA should clarify which software V&V documents are applicable, in order for the staff to complete its evaluation. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

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Open Item 78 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA intends to issue a revised calculation reflecting that the TID in the control room is less than 1 x 10E3 rads, which will be evaluated by the NRC staff. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

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Open Item 79 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should perform a radiated susceptibility survey, after the installation of the hardware but prior to the RM-1000 being placed in service, to establish the need for exclusion distance for the HRCAR monitors while using handheld portable devices (e.g., walkietalkie) in the control room, as documented in Attachment 23 to TVA's letter dated February 25, 2011, and item number 355 of TVA's letter dated April 15, 2011. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

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Open Item 80 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180, and should address any deviations from the guidance of the RG. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

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Open Item 81 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The extent to which TVA's supplier, General Atomics (GA), complies with EPRI TR-106439 and the methods that GA used for its commercial dedication process should be provided by TVA to the NRC staff for review. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

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Open Item 94 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide to the staff either information that demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS meets the applicable requirements in IEEE Std. 603-1991, or justification for why the Common Q PAMS should not meet those requirements. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 95 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide Conformance," to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 96 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include RG 1.100, Revision 3, for the Common Q PAMS, or (2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 97 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.153, Revision 1, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 98 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 99 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 100 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.168, Revision 1; IEEE 1012-1998; and IEEE 1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 101 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS application software is in conformance with RG 1.168, Revision 1, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 102 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 103 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

Open Item 104 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“The NRC staff will review the WEC self assessment to verify that it the WBN Unit 2 PAMS is compliant to the V&V requirements in the SPM or that deviations from the requirements are adequately justified. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.2)”

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Open Item 105 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should produce an acceptable description of how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS and SRS implement the design basis requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clause 4. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1)”

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Open Item 106 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should produce a final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SRS that is independently reviewed. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1)”

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Open Item 107 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SDDs that are independently reviewed. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.2)”

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Open Item 108 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff that there are no synergistic effects between temperature and humidity for the Common Q PAMS equipment. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.5.2)”

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Open Item 109 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.7.1.8)”

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Open Item 110 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide information to the NRC staff describing how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS design supports periodic testing of the RVLIS function. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.9.2.6)”

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Open Item 111 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should confirm to the staff that there are no changes required to the technical specifications as a result of the modification installing the Common Q PAMS. If any changes to the technical specifications are required, TVA should provide the changes to the NRC staff for review. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.11)”

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REVISION 08 UPDATE:

7.5.2 of SSER25 reads:

“7.5.2 Postaccident Monitoring System

#### 7.5.2.2 Common Qualified Platform—Postaccident Monitoring System

##### Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

##### Open Item 72

Open Item 72 states, 'The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC [inadequate core cooling] instrumentation.' The item was generated during the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's review of the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) reactor in Section 4.4.8 of Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 23, issued July 2011.

The NRC staff documented its review of the Common Q postaccident monitoring system (PAMS) and ICC in Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23. The staff generated Open Items 94–111 (Appendix HH) during its review. Therefore, Open Item 72 is closed, because it is subsumed by Open Items 94–111.

##### Open Item 95

Open Item 95 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide Conformance,' to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

In Table 7.1-1 of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 105, dated August 12, 2011, TVA stated the following:

IEEE Std. 603-1991, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' (See Note 13).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised wording in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 95 is closed.

##### Open Item 96

Open Item 96 states, 'TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include RG 1.100, Revision 3 for the Common Q PAMS, or (2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or (3) provide justification for not conforming.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to the open item, stating that it will add Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100, 'Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,' Revision 3, issued September 2009, to Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 3, September 2009, 'Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants' (See Notes 13, 14, and 16).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Note 16 Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 3 and IEEE 344-2004

The Common Q new design modules used in the PAMS; and the RM-1000 radiation monitors comply with IEEE 344-2004 and with Regulatory Guide 1.100 Revision 3 with the exception of issues associated with testing above 33Hz.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 96 is closed.

##### Open Item 97

Open Item 97 states, 'TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.153, Revision 1 or provide justification for not conforming.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item, stating that it will add RG 1.153, 'Criteria for Safety Systems,' Revision 1, issued June 1996, to FSAR Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.153, Revision 1, June 1996, 'Criteria for Safety Systems' (See Note 13).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 97 is closed.

Open Item 99

Open Item 99 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this action item, stating that it would add Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard (Std.) 7-4.3.2, 'Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' to Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105 states the following:

IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003 'Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations' (See Notes 13 and 18).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

...

Note 18 Conformance to IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003

The Common Q PAMS meets the applicable requirements of IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003, except as noted below:

1. The quality program is in accordance with WCAP-16096-NP-1A 'Software Program Manual' (SPM).
2. The commercial item dedication program is in accordance with the Westinghouse 10CFR50.54 Appendix B program.'

However, in its audit report dated April 27, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980761), the NRC staff identified several examples of practices that do not comply with the software program manual, or where Westinghouse no longer followed the software program manual. The software program manual also contains criteria for commercial-grade dedication. Based on the revised wording in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concluded that TVA did not adequately address the item.

By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11286A037, Enclosure 1, Item 17), TVA stated the following:

The inclusion of Note 18 was caused by a misinterpretation of the requirements of RG 1.152 Revision 3 as it applied to IEEE 7-4.3.2 2003 by the TVA reviewer. Discussion with the NRC reviewer determined that the note was not required. Note 18 was removed in FSAR Amendment 106.

Since TVA updated the FSAR to include reference IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003 as applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS, Open Item 99 is closed.

Open Item 100

Open Item 100 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.168, Revision 1, IEEE Std. 1012-1998, and IEEE 1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item,



stating that it would add RG 1.168, 'Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,' Revision 1, issued February 2004; IEEE Std. 1012-1998, 'IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation'; and IEEE Std. 1028-1997, 'IEEE Standard for Software Reviews,' to Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.168, Revision 1, February 2004, 'Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants' (See Note 13) ... IEEE Std. 1012-1998, 'IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation' (See Note 13). IEEE Std. 1028-1997, 'IEEE Standard for Software Reviews' (See Note 13).

...  
Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability  
These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 100 is closed.

Open Item 102

Open Item 102 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item, stating that it would add RG 1.209, 'Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants,' issued March 2007, and IEEE Std. 323-2003, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' to Table 7.1-1. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.209, Revision 0, March 2007, 'Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants' (See Note 13)...IEEE Std. 323-2003, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' (See Note 13).

...  
Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability  
These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 102 is closed.

Open Item 103

Open Item 103 states, 'TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 or provide justification for not conforming.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item; Attachment 3 to the letter included the requested evaluation.

Based on its review of the information submitted by TVA, the staff concluded that TVA provided an adequate evaluation of conformance with RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003. therefore, Open Item 103 is closed.

Open Item 104

Open Item 104 states, 'The NRC staff will review the WEC [Westinghouse Electric Corporation] self-assessment to verify that the WBN Unit 2 PAMS complies with the V&V [verification and validation] requirements in the SPM or that deviations from the requirements are adequately justified.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA provided information to address this item (see letter item 15, 'NRC Common Q PAMS Audit Action Items Response'). The information provided and the information subsequently reviewed demonstrate that Westinghouse did not consistently follow the software program manual and that Westinghouse did not plan and document these deviations beforehand; however, TVA did provide sufficient information to allow the NRC staff to determine, with reasonable assurance, that the Common Q PAMS does not pose a threat to public health and safety.

Therefore, Open Item 104 is closed.

Open Item 106

Open Item 106 states, 'TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SRS [system requirements specification] is independently reviewed.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA responded to 'NRC Request (Item Number 372),' documenting why it concluded that the reviews were independent. The information provided was essentially an affirmation that the documents were independently reviewed. The Westinghouse internal guidance (reviewed during the NRC audit documented at ADAMS Accession No. ML110980761) is inconsistent on how to document that a review was an 'independent review - satisfying Appendix B' versus a more informal review. However, the NRC staff considers that the affirmation provided by TVA in its letter dated June 10, 2011, is sufficient; therefore, Open Item 106 is closed.

Open Item 107

Open Item 107 states, 'TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SDDs [software design documents] are independently reviewed.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA responded to 'NRC Request (Item Number 373),' documenting why it concluded that the reviews were independent. The information provided was essentially an affirmation that the documents were independently reviewed. The Westinghouse internal guidance (reviewed during the NRC audit documented at ADAMS Accession No. ML110980761) is inconsistent on how to document that a review was an 'independent review - satisfying Appendix B' versus a more informal review. However, the NRC staff considers the affirmation provided by TVA in its letter dated June 10, 2011, to be sufficient; therefore, Open Item 107 is closed.

Open Item 109

Open Item 109 states, 'TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA responded to '18. NRC Verbal Request,' which stated the following:

Watts Bar Unit 2 Post Accident Monitoring System went through a Data Storm Test to verify that the safety related functions of the system driven by the Advant Controller 160 (AC 160) and the safety related indications monitored on the Operator Module (OM) located in the Main Control Room (MCR) are not affected when the Ethernet network interface of the Maintenance and Test Panel (MTP) is under data storm conditions. This test was requested by TVA.

The purpose of the data storm test was to test the ability of the MTP to handle the possible volume of traffic generated by a broadcast storm without impacting the safety functions. A broadcast storm occurs when a large number of broadcast packets are received. Forwarding these packets can cause the network to slow down or to time out.

Another objective of the data storm test was to test the ability of the MTP to handle malformed packets possibly generated by a data storm without impacting the safety functions.

TVA also described the pass/fail criteria and associated results. The PAMS continued to perform its safety function during the data storm testing, as demonstrated by its meeting the acceptance criteria.

Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the open item was acceptably addressed. Therefore, Open Item 109 is closed.

7.5.2.2.3.9.2.5 IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 5.6, Independence

In Section 7.5.2.2.3.9.2.5 of SSER 23, issued July 2011, the NRC staff concluded that the Common Q PAMS meets the acceptance criteria for independence and the requirements of Clause 5.6; therefore, the PAMS is acceptable.

Core exit thermocouples (CETs) are bundled together with the non-Class 1E self-powered neutron detectors in the mineral insulated cable and thus do not meet the separation requirements between safety- and



nonsafety-related equipment in IEEE Std. 384-1981, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The NRC staff documented its separation/isolation evaluation for the CETs in Section 7.7.1.9 of SSER 24, issued September 2011.

## 7.5.2.3 High-Range Containment Area Radiation Monitors

### Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

#### Open Item 78

Open Item 78 states, 'TVA intends to issue a revised calculation reflecting that the TID [total integrated dose] in the control room is less than 1×10<sup>3</sup> rads, which will be evaluated by the NRC staff.'

TVA's letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), responded to the open item, and Enclosure 1 to the letter provided TVA's supporting calculation (Calculation No. WBNAPS3-127, Revision 0). TVA stated that the TID for the main control room, where the radiation monitors are located, is 362.76 rads. This radiation dose is acceptable to the NRC staff for mild environments according to the guidance in RG 1.209. Based on its review of the information provided in TVA's letter dated August 4, 2011, and the calculation summary, the staff concluded that TVA provided an adequate response. Therefore, Open Item 78 is closed."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

The following is provided for Open Item 77:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11257A048), contained:

"The RM-1000 High Range Containment Area Radiation (HRCAR) monitors used by WBN Unit 2 use version 1.2 of the software. The applicable Verification and Validation (V&V) documents are:

#### a) Software Version 1.0 (initial issue):

General Atomics Electronic Systems, Inc. (GA-ESI) document 04507007-1TR, 'RM-1000 System Verification Test Results Engineering Report Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,' Original Release: July, 1999 (verified to be applicable to WBN Unit 2). This version of the software was never used in any installed monitors and was verified by test. GA-ESI provided the following clarification: '... the requirements (test cases) in document 04507006 are covered in document 04507007-1TR. It is on this basis that we've concluded that the version 1.0 software version was validated.' Based on review of the document, TVA agrees with the GA-ESI position.

#### b) Software Version 1.1

GA-ESI document 04508005, 'RM-1000 Version 1.1 Software Verification Report,' January 2002

#### c) Software Version 1.2

GA-ESI document 04508006, 'RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification Report,' Revision A, April 2008"

The NRC requested copies of the documents. TVA responded as follows in TVA to NRC letter dated November 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11322A099):

"TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (Reference 5 ADAMS), identified the following Verification and Validation (V&V) documents as applicable to the High Range Containment Accident Radiation (HRCAR) monitors:

- Software Version 1.0: (initial issue) General Atomics Electronic Systems, Inc. (GA-ESI) document 04507007-1TR, 'RM-1000 System Verification Test Results Engineering Report Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,' Original Release: July, 1999.

- b) Software Version 1.1: GA-ESI document 04508005, 'RM-1000 Version 1.1 Software Verification Report,' January 2002
- c) Software Version 1.2: GA-ESI document 04508006, 'RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification Report,' Revision A, April 2008.

The engineering approved proprietary versions of these documents were submitted in TVA to NRC letter dated October 13, 2011 (Reference 1). The non proprietary versions and affidavit for withholding were submitted in TVA to NRC letter dated July 15, 2010 (Reference 2)."

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The following is provided for Open Item 80:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12249A195), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) Open Item 80," contained the following:

From the cover letter:

"The purpose of this letter is to respond to a commitment made in Reference 1 to perform current to frequency (I/F) testing of an I/F converter in a radiation monitoring device supplied by General Atomics Electronics Systems Inc. (GA-ESI). Enclosure 1 provides additional information to the NRC follow-up question, which was the source for this commitment. Enclosure 2 provides the new regulatory commitment."

From Enclosure 1:

"TVA Response to NRC Follow-up Request

The previous response to this item in the April 23, 2012, TVA letter was based on an incorrect understanding of the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1, and the question being asked. The following is the revised response to this question.

Regulatory Guide 1.180, Revision 1, requires EMC low frequency conducted susceptibility testing be performed in accordance with MIL-STD-461E which requires testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz for DC supplied equipment and from the second harmonic 120 Hz (for 60 Hz equipment) to 150 kHz for AC supplied equipment. The GA-ESI RM-1000 monitors used in WBN Unit 2 (with I/F converters) are AC supplied; therefore, the conducted susceptibility testing lower limit is 120 Hz.

GA-ESI performed low frequency conducted susceptibility testing for the I/F converter as part of RM-1000 testing performed in 1999. The documented test range is 100 Hz to 150 kHz. The GA-ESI proprietary test report, 04038800, dated November 11, 1999, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report, TVA,' containing this information was provided as part of Attachment 1, 'Browns Ferry High Range Radiation Monitor,' of TVA to NRC letter dated April 15, 2011. The specific location of the test data is, Appendix B, TÜV Test Report 58569-02, dated December 11, 1998, 'RM-1000 Radiation Monitor Two Channel,' page TD8 of TD34 or page 273 of the overall attachment.

The testing was performed in accordance with MIL-STD-461D while Regulatory Guide 1.180 Revision 1 requires testing to Revision E. TVA has reviewed the data against the requirements of MIL-STD-461E and confirms that the test meets the current requirements. The applicability of this testing to the current I/F converter is documented in 04038800-1SP, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report Supplement 1,' Revision A, submitted as Attachment 25 on TVA to NRC letter dated November 30, 2011.

The confusion over this issue stems from incorrect information contained in 04038800-1SP on page 29. The Conducted Susceptibility table entry states:

Low Frequencies (Power Conductors Only)

- Frequency: 30 Hz to 50 kHz
- Amplitude: 6.3 volts rms average
- Alternate procedures MIL-STD-461C (CS-01, CS-02, and RS-02 Part II Class A3) or MILSTD-461D (CS-101)

However, TÜV Test Report 58569-02 shows that the low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was actually performed from 100 Hz to 150 kHz which envelopes the MIL-STD-461E required test range of 120 Hz to 150 kHz.

A review of the April 15, 2011 letter found that it stated proprietary and non-proprietary versions of 04038800 along with an affidavit for withholding would be provided. However, this information was not included in the letter commitments and these documents were not submitted. A new commitment to submit these documents is included in this letter.

This completes the response to this request."

From Enclosure 2:

"Proprietary and non-proprietary versions of GA-ESI document GA-ESI test report, 04038800, dated November 11, 1999, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report, TVA,' along with an affidavit for withholding will be provided within three weeks of receipt from GA-ESI."

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TVA to NRC letter dated December 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12349A379), "Instrumentation and Controls Staff Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) Open Item 80," submitted the proprietary and non-proprietary versions of General Atomics-Electronic Systems Inc. (GA-ESI) test report 04038800, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report,' dated November 11, 1999, and the associated affidavit for withholding from public disclosure.

This satisfies the above commitment.

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The following is provided for Open Item 98:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11222A113) contained the following:

"NRC Request (I&C RAI Matrix Item Number 368) (SSER 23 Table HH Item Number 98)

On 5/6/2010 (See Open Item No. 81) the NRC Staff requested an evaluation of the Common Q PAMS against the current staff position.

By letter dated 2/25/11 (ML110620219), TVA docketed a response.

The WBN2 FSAR (Amendment 103) references RG 1.152 Rev. 0, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." The Common Q PAMS was designed to meet the requirements of RG 1.152 Rev. 1. RG 1.152 Rev. 2 is the current revision of this guide and is endorsed by the NRC. By letter dated February 25, 2010 (ML110620219), TVA stated:

"RG 1.152 rev 2 endorses ANSI/IEEE-ANS-7-4.3.2-2003, but also provides extra regulatory guidance concerning computer based cyber security. Since this revision was not part of the design basis of WBN2 or Common Q PAMS, the project makes no commitment to the compliance of RG 1.152 rev 2."

Based upon the review of this item, the staff finds the following open item:

1 TVA to evaluate Common Q PAMS for conformance with RG 1.152 Rev. 2.

Follow-up NRC Request

Submit FSAR Amendment to update table 7.1-1.

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request

Attachment 2 contains the proposed FSAR change which adds RG 1.152, Revision 2 to Table 7.1-1 which will be included in a future amendment."

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## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA to NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11236A158) submitted Amendment 105 of the Unit 2 FSAR. This submittal added RG 1.152, Revision 2 to Table 7.1-1

TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11257A048) contained the following:

"NRC Request

Based on FSAR Amendment 105, TVA changed its commitment from Regulatory Guide 1.152, Revision 2 to Revision 3. Based on this change, TVA to demonstrate how the Common Q PAMS meets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.152, Revision 3 for a secure Development and Operational Environment.

TVA Response to NRC Request

The secure development environment is addressed in WCAP-17427-P, Revision 1. Attachment 6 contains Westinghouse Electric Company WCAP-17427-P, Revision 1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment," (Proprietary). Attachment 7 contains Westinghouse Electric Company WCAP-17427-NP, Revision 1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment," (Non-Proprietary). Attachment 8 contains Westinghouse Electric Company CAW-11-3241, Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, WCAP-17427-P, Revision 1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment," (Proprietary).

Attachment 9 contains TVA document "Common Q PAMS Secure Operational Environment per Regulatory Guide 1.152 Revision 3."

TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML12018A213) contained the following:

"NRC Request (SSER 23 Appendix HH Item Number 98)

TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)

Follow-up NRC Request

The following RAIs are regarding the Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment. The action associated with this review area is captured in SSER 23 Appendix HH, Action Item 98 (ML11270A306). TVA submitted documents (reference below) on September 1, 2011 to address this item.

[Request and response are many pages long; see letter for these details.]

TVA to NRC letter dated March 2, 2012 (ADAMS Accession number ML12073A224) contained the following:

"TVA Partial Response to Follow-up NRC Request

Note: The response to 'Draft Request for Additional Information Regarding Open Item 98,' sent December 12, 2011, Item 3, was provided in TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 (Reference 1). With the exception of item 2.h, items 1 and 2 are addressed below.

The responses to items 1 and 2 are provided in WEC proprietary document WBT-D-3769 P-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information.'

Attachment 1 contains WEC proprietary document WBT-D-3769 P-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information,' dated February 2012. Attachment 2 contains WEC non-proprietary document

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

WBT-D-3769 NP-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information,' dated February 2012. Attachment 3 contains WEC non-proprietary document CAW-12-3385, 'Application for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure WBT-D-3769 P-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information, (Proprietary),' dated February 6, 2012.

Item 2.h will be addressed by submittal of WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report,' which will be submitted within three weeks of receipt from WEC.'

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TVA to NRC letter dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession number ML12073A391) contained the following:

""TVA Response to NRC Follow-up Request

WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P is the appropriate IV&V Phase Summary Report Record; however, the Software Release Record (SRR) listing provided in revision 4 was not complete.

In response to item 2.h, a review was performed of WNA-LI-00058-WNA, Revision 3, 'Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report,' and WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 6, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System.' The review determined that no single complete listing of SRRs existed and the listings in the two documents were inconsistent. As a result, the decision was made to revise both documents. The complete listing of SRRs was incorporated into WEC proprietary document WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P (Attachment 1), Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' dated February 2012 as Tables 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3. The partial listing in WNA-LI-00058-WNA was replaced by a reference to WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P.

Attachment 2 contains WEC non-proprietary document WNA-VR-00283-WBT-NP, Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' dated February 2012. Attachment 3 contains WEC non-proprietary document CAW 12-3425, 'Application for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' (Proprietary),' dated March 1, 2012."

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The following is provided for Open Item 108:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11257A048), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests," provided the following response to item 4 on page E1-3:

"Based on an analysis of TVA calculations EPM-MCP-071689, 'Cooling/Heating Load & Equipment/Component Performance Analysis For The Control Building Electrical Board Room Areas (EL. 692.0 & 708.0),' Revision 19 and EPM-LCP-072489, 'Cooling And Heating Load Analysis, Main Control Room HVAC,' Revision 13, the Common Q PAMS hardware is not located in an environment where it is simultaneously exposed to high temperature and high humidity. The following tables summarize the results of the analysis."

[Tables are not provided herein.]

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TVA letter dated December 22, 2011, (ADAMS Accession Number ML12018A213), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests," provided the following answer to this item (pages E1-11 through E1-14):

"Upon review of the response to Action Item Number 94, it was noticed that TVA's response to these two action items provided different environmental conditions in each response (see Action Item Number 94 Clauses 4.5.3 and 4.7). It is no longer clear, in what environment the Common Q PAMS is required to operate or how qualification to this environment is demonstrated.

- a. Please provide EPM-MCP-071689, 'Cooling/Heating Load & Equipment/Component Performance Analysis for the Control Building Electrical Board Room Areas (EL. 692.0 and 708.0),' Revision 19.

- b. Please provide EPM-LCP-072489, 'Cooling and Heating Load Analysis, Main Control Room HVAC [Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning],' Revision 13.
- c. Please provide the maximum temperature and the associated maximum relative humidity in which the Common Q PAMS is required to be operable.
- d. Please provide the minimum temperature and the associated minimum relative humidity in which the Common Q PAMS is required to be operable.
- e. Please explain why the relative humidity during a loss of coolant accident event is lower than the humidity during summer or winter."

[NOTE: Item "f." is addressed in January 19, 2012, letter below]

"TVA Partial Response to Follow-up NRC Request

It is not possible to state whether or not there are any synergistic effects between temperature and humidity on the Common Q PAMS equipment. The NRC-approved qualification methods in WCAP-16097-P-A, 'Common Qualified Platform Topical Report,' Revision 0, do not perform or require such testing. What can be shown is that the WBN Unit 2 operating conditions are bounded by the Common Q PAMS hardware qualification testing.

- a. The requested calculation has been revised. The current revision is 21. Attachment 3 contains TVA calculation EPM-MCP-071689, 'Cooling/Heating Load & Equipment/ Component Performance Analysis for the Control Building Electrical Board Room Areas (EL. 692.0 & 708.0),' Revision 21.
- b. The requested calculation has been revised. The current revision is 14. Attachment 4 contains TVA calculation EPM-LCP-072489, 'Cooling and Heating Load Analysis, Main Control Room HVAC,' Revision 14.
- c. The tables below summarize the calculated temperature and humidity conditions for the MCR (from EPM-LCP-072489) and Auxiliary Instrument Room (AIR) (from EPM-MCP-071689). Where the calculations do not include relative humidity during abnormal or accident conditions, an online humidity calculator (Reference 7) was used to convert the humidity ratio and dry bulb temperature from the calculations to a relative humidity (RH) value. The values were independently verified by Bechtel Mechanical Engineering using a psychrometric chart."

[NOTE: See letter for tables.]

"Based on the above tables, the following are the maximum temperature and maximum relative humidity conditions for PAMS operation:"

[NOTE: See letter for table.]

- "d. To protect the PAMS Flat Panel Displays (FPD) from damage caused by electro-static discharge (ESD), there is a requirement in EQ-QR-68-WBT-P, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0, (Attachment 5) that requires the Common Q PAMS FPDs to be installed in an environment with a relative humidity no less than 20% or else anti-static flooring material must be installed in the area where the FPDs will be installed or grounded ESD wrist straps must be worn when touching/handling the FPDs. The 20% RH limit is independent of temperature. Based on the tables in response c. above, the following are the minimum temperature and minimum RH conditions for PAMS Operation:"

[NOTE: See letter for table.]

"While the WBN Unit 2 design shows that the AIR will not go below 20%, it is not necessary to maintain the 20% RH limit for the PAMS to perform its safety-related function. The limit applies to the FPD on the MTP. The MTP FPD is for the PC Node Box in the MTP. The MTP PC Node Box is the qualified isolation device and as such cannot be credited as a safety-related display device. In addition, the MTP FPD is located behind a locked cabinet door, where it cannot be inadvertently touched, and is therefore protected from inadvertent ESD damage during potential low humidity conditions in the AIR. Based on the above, it is not required to maintain the AIR humidity greater than or equal to 20% to protect the MTP FPD from damage due to ESD.



Attachment 5 contains WEC proprietary document EQ-QR-68-WBT-P, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0. Attachment 6 contains WEC non-proprietary document EQ-QR-68-WBT-NP, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0. Attachment 7 contains WEC document CAW-11-3118, 'Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure EQ-QR-68-WBT-P, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0, (proprietary),' dated February 28, 2011.

- e. During a LOCA, the humidifiers are assumed to be out of service. This results in a lower RH during a LOCA."

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TVA letter dated January 19, 2012, (ADAMS Accession Number ML12069A330), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests," provided the following answer to this item (pages E1-2 and E1-3):

"Follow-up NRC Request

Upon review of the response to Action Item Number 94, it was noticed that TVA's response to these two action items provided different environmental conditions in each response (see Action Item Number 94 Clauses 4.5.3 and 4.7). It is no longer clear, in what environment the Common Q PAMS is required to operate or how qualification to this environment is demonstrated."

[NOTE "a." through "e." were previously responded to and are not repeated here.]

- "f. Please describe how it is demonstrated that the Common Q PAMS equipment is qualified to the environments in which that equipment is required to operate. Please pay particular attention to the potential synergistic effects of temperature and humidity.

TVA Partial Response to Follow-up NRC Request

Responses to 'Draft Request for Additional Information Regarding Open Item 108,' items a through e were provided in TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 (Reference 1). Item f is addressed as follows:

- f. It is not possible to state whether or not there are any synergistic effects between temperature and humidity on the Common Q PAMS equipment. The NRC-approved qualification methods in WCAP-16097-P-A, 'Common Qualified Platform Topical Report,' Revision 0, do not perform or require such testing. What can be shown is that the WBN Unit 2 operating conditions are bounded by the Common Q PAMS hardware qualification testing.

Attachment 1 describes how the Common Q PAMS equipment is qualified for the environments in which it is required to operate.

[See the letter for the attachments.]

Attachment 1 contains WEC proprietary document WBT-D-3711 P-Enclosure, 'Westinghouse's Revised Response to Follow up NRC Request (SSER 24 Appendix HH Item Number 108),' dated January 2012. Attachment 2 contains WEC nonproprietary document WBT-D-3711 NP-Enclosure, 'Westinghouse's Revised Response to Follow up NRC Request (SSER 24 Appendix HH Item Number 108),' dated January 2012. Attachment 3 contains WEC nonproprietary document CWA-12-3349, 'Application for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure WBT-D-3711 P Enclosure, 'Westinghouse's Revised Response to Follow up NRC Request (SSER 24 Appendix HH Item Number 108),' (Proprietary),' dated January 5, 2011."

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REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2 included the following for the noted Open Items:

Open Item 94

"By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff requested additional information regarding this open item. By letter dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12073A391), TVA responded (See Letter Enclosure 1, Item No. 1 and Attachment 4). In Attachment 4, TVA documented the evaluation of conformance with each requirement of Clauses 5 and 6 (Clause 4 is addressed under Open Item 105). TVA stated that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS does not automatically perform any protection or control functions; therefore, the clauses applicable to these functions are not applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. The NRC staff reviewed TVA's explanation and agreed that IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clauses 5.2, 5.8.3, 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 are not applicable. The NRC staff confirmed TVA's explanations for the remaining clauses by a review of the design documentation for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS; therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS meets the regulatory requirements in these clauses. Open Item 94 is closed."

#### Open Item 101

"In its letter dated December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A213; letter Item 9 and Attachment 9), TVA provided the following regulatory commitment to revise the FSAR as follows:

"The changes to FSAR Table 7.1-1 for RG 1.168, IEEE 1012 and IEEE 1028 shown in Attachment 9 will be incorporated into Amendment 108 of the FSAR. (See Letter Item 9)

TVA's commitment to update the FSAR to identify that the Common Q PAMS is required to be in conformance with RG 1.168, "Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 0, issued September 1997; IEEE Std. 1012-1986, "IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans"; and IEEE Std. 1028-1988, "IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits," is acceptable to the NRC staff, because the Common Q PAMS was developed in accordance with the NRC-approved "Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems" (ADAMS Accession No. ML050350234). Therefore, Open Item 101 is closed."

#### Open Item 105

By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff requested additional information regarding this open item. By letter dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12073A391), TVA responded (See Letter Enclosure 1, Item No. 5 and Attachment 4).

The WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is functionally equivalent to the Unit 1 Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM-86); therefore, the WBN Unit 2 design uses the Unit 1 ICCM-86 specification as a basis. In addition, the placement of displays and associated controls for Unit 2 was subjected to a human factors engineering review during the design process for EDCR 52351, "Common Q PAMS and the Control Room Design Review (CRDR)." The NRC staff did not intend for its technical review to be a re-evaluation of these aspects; however, compliance of the WBN Unit 2 design with these aspects, as well as the design basis events, was addressed. Because the ICCM-86 specification was part of the contractual requirements, assessment of compliance was addressed primarily through the assessment of the verification and validation (V&V) activities. However, the design bases events, were not explicitly addressed in the V&V documentation; therefore the NRC staff used Open Item 105 to explicitly address documentation with respect to the design basis events.

To address Clause 4 of IEEE Std. 603-1991(i.e., the adequacy of the design basis event documentation), TVA evaluated the emergency operating instructions (EOIs) and the abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) to ensure that the CQ PAMS equipment could fulfill the requirements of these documents. In addition, TVA mapped the limiting design basis events (i.e., those documented in Chapter 15 of the FSAR) to the EOIs and AOPs to ensure that all of the events were properly addressed. Together, these two analyses demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS has the appropriate features and performance to address the documented design basis events.

Clause 4 of IEEE 603-1991 requires that the design bases event documentation include:

- \* the identification of applicable modes of operation of the generating station, the design basis event applicable to each mode, the initial conditions for each event and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each event.
- \* the safety functions and corresponding protective actions for each design basis event.
- \* the variables that must be monitored for each manually controlled protective action, and the associated



analytical limits, ranges, and rates of change of these variables.

\* the following minimum criteria for each protective action whose operation may be controlled by manual means initially or subsequent to initiation:

- the points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed.
- the justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means.
- the variables that shall be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.

TVA's analysis demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS addresses the events described in the design basis by tracing the limiting design basis events to the EOIs and AOPs; however, the mapping is not a one-to-one mapping. The EOIs and AOPs are symptom-based rather than event-based. In some cases, more than one event may be addressed by an EOI or AOP, but in other cases more than one EOI or AOP is required to address a single event.

The TVA analysis also demonstrates that Common Q PAMS meets the requirements of the EOIs and AOPs by identifying the requirements in the Common Q PAMS specifications that envelop the performance assumed by the EOIs and AOPs. Based on these analyses, the NRC staff concludes that the design basis documentation for the Common Q PAMS includes the material required by Clause 4 of IEEE 603-1991, and that the Common Q PAMS implements the associated requirements; therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Common Q PAMS conforms to the regulatory requirements. Open Item 105 is closed.

Open Item 108

TVA provided a response to the item by letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112440576; Enclosure 1, Item 4), as supplemented by letters dated December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A213; Enclosure 1, Item 4, and Attachments 3 and 4), and January 19, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12023A191; Item 1 and Attachment 1). The NRC staff reviewed the calculations and analyses provided by TVA and confirmed that the qualification environment includes both temperature and humidity that synergistically bounds the worst case environment in which the equipment is required to operate. Therefore, Open Item 108 is closed.

Open Item 110

TVA responded to the item by letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048; Enclosure 1, Item 5).

TVA stated that the Common Q PAMS includes a common set of tests to confirm that the equipment is working properly (e.g., annunciator test, analog output test, and input/output simulator connection). The Common Q PAMS also includes self-checks to ensure that the software has not changed. In addition to these built-in capabilities, the RVILIS can be tested by the normal channel calibration methodologies. Based on these capabilities, the NRC staff finds that the Common Q PAMS RVILIS meets the requirements in Clause 5.7, "Capability for Test and Calibration" of IEEE Std. 603-1991. Therefore, Open Item 110 is closed.

Open Item 111

The NRC staff reviewed the Unit 2 technical specifications (TSs), Developmental Revision F (Enclosure 1 to TVA's letter dated August 10, 2011; ADAMS Accession No. ML11228A046), and concluded that changes from the Unit 1 TSs are acceptable, because they comply with 10 CFR 50.36. Therefore, Open Item 111 is closed.

SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.3 included the following for Open Item 98:

"Based upon its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that a Secure Development and Operational Environment has been established for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS which is consistent with the regulatory positions found in RG 1.152, Revision 3. This conclusion is based upon the controls placed on the pre-developed Common Q platform, the controls on the development of the PAMS application and the WBN Unit 2 facility and PAMS design features, including the controls to preclude two-way communication to other systems. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the PAMS has been

designed and will be operated with provisions for ensuring its high functional reliability and therefore meets the requirements 10 CFR 50.55a(h), GDC 21 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and Criterion II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

This safety evaluation closes Open Item 98, as identified in Section 7.5.2.2.3.12 of SSER 23 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11206A499)."

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SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.4 included the following for the noted Open Items:

Open Item 77

"By letters dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), and November 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099), TVA responded to Open Item 77. In these letters TVA clarified the document number and the version of each of the software V&V test documents (Versions V 1.0, V 1.1, and V 1.2) that are applicable to the WBN Unit 2 HRCAR monitors.

By letter dated October 13, 2011 letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA responded to a followup question regarding the quality control of the V&V procedures. The NRC staff wanted to confirm that the procedures used for V&V testing were prepared in accordance with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. In its October 13, 2011, letter, TVA responded that the procedures were prepared in accordance with Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and that they contained appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria to assure that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Based on the review of the information provided by this TVA letter and other RAI responses, the NRC staff concludes that the TVA response is satisfactory.

Based on the review of TVA's October 13, 2011, and other RAI responses, the NRC staff concludes that TVA provided sufficient information to confirm which versions of the software V&V documents apply to WBN Unit 2. Based on the satisfactory review of the TVA responses, the NRC staff has closed Open Item 77.

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Open Item 81

"TVA has provided sufficient information with its response to confirm that the test machine for the AC filter is indeed a pass/fail type of test device. Furthermore, TVA provided a complete commercial grade dedication package for an alternate component (a power supply) to confirm that the commercial grade dedication was carried out in accordance with the GA procedure. Based on the TVA response, NRC staff considers Open Item 81 closed."

The SSER status remains as "Open (Inspection)."

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 7.5.2:

"7.5.2.3 High-Range Containment Area Radiation Monitors

7.5.2.3.4 Technical Evaluation

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 80

Open Item 80 states, "TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180, and should address any deviations from the guidance of the RG."

By letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205), TVA responded to SSER,

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appendix HH Open Item 80. In Attachment 1 to this letter, TVA provided a white paper entitled, "Comparison of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180, "Guidelines For Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference In Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems," Revision 1, and TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1, "Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Testing Requirements for Electronic Devices," Revision 3." Attachment 1 to the TVA letter provided the history and program description of the subject standard, along with any differences between the subject standard and the guidance contained in RG 1.180. It further provided specific comparison for each test along with the conclusion statement. TVA also stated, in "30 years of evaluating equipment TVA has not seen a failure from susceptibility testing."

The NRC staff reviewed the TVA white paper and evaluated the differences and the specific comparisons. One of the cited differences is that TVA applies the Standard Specification to all electronic equipment, not just digital safety systems. The NRC staff has no concern with regards to this requirement because it covers a broader scope of equipment or testing than required by RG 1.180. The other difference is in the area of magnetic field testing. TVA has stated this requirement is typically not tested because their electronic equipment is not located in areas with strong magnetic fields. This exemption is permitted by RG 1.180.

The NRC staff further reviewed TVA's response for each test item and found the tests met or exceeded the test requirements. TVA used alternate tests and followed the guidance in Electric Power Research Institute TR-102323, the use of which was approved by NRC on April 17, 1996. TVA also provided justifications or an explanation for any differences. The NRC staff noted a difference in the area of low frequency susceptibility testing. In a letter dated September 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112590046), NRC requested TVA to justify why the low frequency conducted susceptibility test covered the frequency range from 30 Hz to 50 kHz when RG 1.180 required testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz. TVA responded in a letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254), that the Nemko test report included test frequencies from 30 Hz to 50 kHz, however, 30 Hz to 150 kHz tests were performed as part of TUV test report S7439-03. By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff stated that it had reviewed the TUV test report and indicated that it was conducted on the older model RM-1000 radiation monitors. By letter dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA provided the similarity analysis between the old and the new model and justified any changes. Some of the changes included electromagnetic shielding to improve the electro-magnetic compatibility performance; a few new and improved components replaced the old obsolete components resulting in an improved accuracy.

By letter dated August 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12249A195), TVA further clarified that the low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was conducted in accordance with Military Standard MIL-STD-461E, which requires testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz for DC powered equipment and from 120 Hz to 150 kHz for 60 Hz AC powered equipment (i.e. from the second harmonic of supply frequency). The test was carried out using MIL-STD-461D whereas RG 1.180 requires testing to MIL-STD-461E but TVA reviewed and confirmed the testing met the guidance of MIL-STD-461E and RG 1.180, Revision 1.

The NRC staff reviewed the information TVA provided as well as the test data. The NRC staff confirmed the testing was done for the required range and the differences between the old and new model of I/F converter were documented and justified. TVA letter dated December 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12349A379) provided the formal test data as Enclosures 1 and 2.

The last open issue regarding low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was resolved based on the NRC staff's evaluation of TVA's comparison and analysis of the applicability of old test data to the new I/F converters, provided in TVA's letters dated May 6, 2011, August 30, 2012, and December 10, 2012.

TVA has provided sufficient information in its responses to confirm that TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180. The staff's requests for clarification of various items including the frequency range for the low frequency conducted susceptibility were satisfactorily resolved by the referenced TVA letters and documents as detailed above. Therefore based on the above, Open Item 80 is closed."

7.5.3	27	CO — — 13	B 79-27, "Loss of Non-class 1E I&C Power System Bus During Operation" – TVA responded to the Bulletin on March 1, 1982. Reviewed in 7.5.3 of the original 1982 SER.  Unit 2 Action: Issue appropriate emergency procedures.
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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.5.3 of SSER23 includes:

"By letter dated October 21, 2010 (letter open item 315; ADAMS Accession No. ML103140661), TVA responded that

While the WBN Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have not been written, they will be written the same as the Unit 1 EOPs. WBN Unit 1 personnel will perform validations to ensure that WBN Unit 2 EOPs will perform the required actions. The WBN Unit 2 EOPs will be written and validated prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

TVA's response is acceptable to the staff, because it will assure that the WBN Unit 2 procedures are the same as those for WBN Unit 1. The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs before fuel load. This is Open Item 73 (Appendix HH).

Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated October 21, 2010, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's response to IE Bulletin 79-27 is acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

Open Item 73 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs prior to fuel load. (Section 7.5.3)"

REVISION 11 UPDATE:

Inspection Report 391/2013-608 (November 8, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1979-27.

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

SSER Open Item 73 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 7.5.3:

"Open Item 73

Open Item 73 (Appendix HH) states, "The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs [emergency operating procedures] prior to fuel load."

Per NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2014604, dated June 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14177A214), the list of WBN Unit 2 emergency procedures is complete. Those procedures reviewed

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

were written in accordance with TI-12.06, "Writer's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions," and are complete and ready for approval and use. The NRC inspectors determined that the Watts Bar emergency, abnormal and annunciator response procedures are prepared to adequately control and correct safety-related functions in the event of a system or component malfunction indication. Therefore, Open Item 73 is closed."

SSER27 changed the status to "Resolved."

7.5.4	21	<b>OI</b>	"CONCLUSIONS" left CI until all items in subsection are closed.
		<b>13</b>	

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected the Status above to "OI" to agree with the SSER.

7.6.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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7.6.1	24	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.6.1.5 (Conclusion) of SSER23 reads:

"Based on its evaluation as described above, the NRC staff concludes that the new digital LPMS at WBN Unit 2 complies with the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(h), and GDC 13 and meets the guidance of SRP BTP 7-19, Revision 5, RG 1.133, Revision 1, and DI&C-ISG-02, Revision 2."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.6.1 of SSER24 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in letters dated May 6 and June 10, 2011, the NRC staff concludes that the LPMS meets the guidelines of RG 1.133, Revision 1. Therefore, Open Item 82 is closed."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.6.2	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.6.2 of SSER23 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 96 and concluded that TVA's changes to FSAR Section 7.6.2 were either editorial or administrative in nature and did not change the design of the system. Therefore, based on its previous evaluation as documented in the SER and its review of the changes made in FSAR Amendment 96, the NRC staff concludes that the information provided in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.6.2 meets the relevant guidance of the SRP, and that the staff's conclusion in the SER remains valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.6.3	23	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		07	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.6.3 of SSER23 reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed the WBN upper head injection system manual control system in SER Section 7.6.3 and concluded that it was acceptable.

By FSAR Amendment 63, dated June 26, 1990, TVA removed the system to increase operational flexibility and also deleted the description of the system from the FSAR. The staff reviewed TVA's justification for the removal of the system and concluded that it was acceptable, as documented in Section 6.3.1.1 of SSER 7. The staff's conclusion in SSER 7 remains valid, and no further review of the system is required."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.6.4	23	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		07	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.6.4 of SSER23 includes:

"The remainder of TVA's changes in FSAR Amendment 96 were editorial, administrative, or for clarification. Therefore, based on its previous evaluation as documented in the SER, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA as documented above, the staff concludes that TVA's design to protect against the spurious actuation of motor-operated valves, as discussed in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.6.6, meets the guidance in the SRP."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.6.5	23	C	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - install switches on the main control board for the operator to manually arm this system (overpressure protection provided by pressurizer PORVs)
		07	

In the original 1982 SER, the staff found the design of the overpressure protection during low temperature features acceptable pending review of the drawings and FSAR description. In SSER4, the staff documented completion of the review and closed the confirmatory issue.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.6.5 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER and SSER 4, and its review of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendments 96 and 101 and by letter dated November 24, 2010, the NRC staff

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			concludes that TVA's interlock system continues to meet the guidance provided in the SRP and BTP RSB 5-2."
			SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
7.6.6	23	<u>C</u> <u>07</u>	Approved for both units in SER.  REVISION 07 UPDATE:  7.6.6 of SSER23 includes:  "Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER and SSER 5, and on its review of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated March 31, 2010, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's approach meets the guidance provided in the SRP and BTP ICSB-18 (PSB)."  SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
7.6.7	23	<u>C</u> <u>07</u>	Approved for both units in SER.  REVISION 07 UPDATE:  7.6.7 of SSER23 includes:  "Therefore, based on its previous evaluation as documented in the SER, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 96 and the letter dated September 9, 2010, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's design for the cold-leg accumulator valve interlock and position indication meets the guidance provided in the SRP and, therefore, is acceptable."  SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
7.6.8	23	<u>C</u> <u>07</u>	Approved for both units in SER.  REVISION 07 UPDATE:  7.6.8 of SSER23 includes:  "Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in SER Section 7.6.8, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated October 21, 2010, the staff concludes that TVA's interlock system for automatic switchover from injection to recirculation mode meets the guidance provided in the SRP."  SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
7.6.9	4	<u>C</u>	Approved for both units SER subject to completion of Confirmatory Issue in 7.6.5.
7.7.0	0	<u>C</u>	Approved for both units in SER.



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.7.1	27	<b>O</b> <b>13</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>[portions from SSER23]</p> <p>7.7.1.4.4.1 includes:</p> <p>“One aspect of the analysis that has not yet been confirmed by TVA is the ability of the network to sustain a data storm event without experiencing a plant upset, as necessary to verify compliance with Clause 6.3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991. In Enclosure 2 of its letter dated August 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102240384), TVA stated the following:</p> <p>A network data storm test will be performed with the system installed and prior to final commissioning. The test will confirm that the system will continue to function with a failed communication network without any plant upset. TVA should confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the data storm test on the DCS. This is Open Item 83 (Appendix HH).”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>7.7.1.4.5 (Conclusion) reads:</p> <p>The NRC staff reviewed the WBN Unit 2 DCS as described in FSAR Amendments 96 through 103. Based on its review, the staff concludes that the information provided in FSAR Section 7.7.1.11 meets the relevant regulatory requirements identified in SRP Section 7.7, Revision 5, including 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), GDC 1, and GDC 13. The staff also concludes that TVA's analysis shows that the new DCS is consistent with Clause 6.3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and does not introduce any new failures, or change the probability or consequences of existing failures, not already addressed in the FSAR safety analyses.</p> <p>Additional evaluation by the NRC staff regarding conformance with Clause 5.6.3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and GDC 24 is contained in Section 7.9 of this SSER.</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Open (NRR).”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 83 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the data storm test on the DCS. (Section 7.7.1.4)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>[portions from SSER24]</p> <p>7.7.1.9.2 includes:</p> <p>“The WINCISE system uses Optimized Proportional Axis Region Signal Separation Extended Life (OPARSSEL™) IITAs, containing five vanadium SPNDs and one CET. The individual vanadium emitter generates a signal proportional to the neutron flux activation at its specific location. Within an IITA, each vanadium emitter has a different length to allow the IITA to measure the axial power distribution in five segments (i.e., each segment of detector has a different length that permits measurement of a different axial core segment). If an individual SPND were to fail, the BEACON system will continue to perform, but with a decreased axial resolution of the core power measurement within the assembly. The other vanadium detectors within the IITA would still be deemed operable. TVA should provide to the NRC staff a description of how the other vanadium detectors within the IITA would be operable following the failure of an SPND. This is Open Item 118 (Appendix HH). The extension member for each detector within the IITA ensures that all five vanadium detectors and the CET have an appropriate length to correctly locate them within the IITA.”</p> <p>-----</p>



7.7.1.9.5 includes:

“Westinghouse document WNA-DS-01811-WBT, Revision 0, ‘WINCISE Signal Processing System Design Requirements,’ which the NRC staff reviewed during audits conducted on June 28–29 and July 15, 2011, at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation office in Rockville, MD (audit report at ADAMS Accession No. ML112092667; not publicly available), required a power supply of 120 volts alternating current (VAC)  $\pm 10$  percent for the SPS cabinet. Based on this requirement, Westinghouse determined the maximum overvoltage or surge voltage to be 264 VAC based on the information provided for the Quint power supplies to be installed in the SPS cabinet, as well as taking into account the maximum supply voltage of 220 VAC, even though the 120-VAC, Class 1E bus feeding the SPS cabinet is employed. The NRC staff evaluated the Westinghouse analysis performed to demonstrate how the SPS design meets the isolation requirements. Calculation Note WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, ‘Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements,’ summarizes this analysis. The NRC staff reviewed this calculation note during audits conducted on June 28–29 and July 15, 2011, at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation office in Rockville, MD (audit report at ADAMS Accession No. ML112092667; not publicly available). TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT to the NRC by letter to establish the record of the NRC staff’s basis and its conclusions. This is Open Item 119 (Appendix HH).

The analysis showed that a surge voltage or overvoltage could originate from the SPS cabinet power supply, the 120-VAC, Class 1E power supply bus, ethernet communication, or cable voltage buildup. The analysis stated that the maximum overvoltage or surge voltage that could affect the system was 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC. TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that the maximum overvoltage or surge voltage that could affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC. This is Open Item 120 (Appendix HH).

The analysis assumed that testing was performed for the IITA assembly, and the MI cable could withstand an overvoltage or surge voltage not greater than 600 volts direct current (Vdc). The analysis showed that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. The NRC staff should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. Open Item 119 (Appendix HH) includes this issue.

As mentioned above, WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, requires that the IITA assemblies and MI cable be tested for overvoltage and surge voltage of up to 600 Vdc. In a letter from R.W. Morris to D. Menard (LTR-ME-10-3, ‘Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Dielectric Characteristics of Completed MI Cable Assemblies,’ dated January 11, 2010), which the NRC staff reviewed during audits conducted on June 28–29 and July 15, 2011, at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation office in Rockville, MD (audit report at ADAMS Accession No. ML112092667; not publicly available), Westinghouse summarized the evaluation performed to determine whether the MI cable could withstand an overvoltage and surge voltage of up to 600 Vdc. The NRC staff reviewed LTR-ME-10-3 and confirmed that all 58 1-to-2 transition cable assemblies were subjected to and successfully passed a 600-Vdc dielectric strength test. Since Westinghouse has only tested the MI cable, the same evaluation should be performed for the IITA assembly. This is Open Item 121 (Appendix HH), pending TVA submittal of the test results for the IITA assembly for NRC staff review.

Assuming satisfactory completion of the open items described above, the NRC staff concludes that the TVA analysis of the maximum credible overvoltage or surge voltage that can propagate from the non-Class 1E power supplies in the SPS cabinets to the SPND input signals is adequate. TVA also demonstrated that the MI cable and the IITA assembly can withstand overvoltage and surge voltage equal to 600 Vdc. Thus, the MI cable design allows for the isolation of the Class 1E CETs and non-Class 1E SPND signals. This hardware analysis requirement satisfies the requirements for testing or analysis of associated circuit interaction with Class 1E circuits contained in IEEE Std. 384-1981 for overvoltage conditions.

To further mitigate the possibility of a transient surge voltage condition in the SPS cabinet’s input power supply in excess of the identified maximum overvoltage value that might disable both divisions of the CET signals used by the PAMS, different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. Specifically, the power supply routed to PAMS train A is the same as that routed to SPS cabinet 1, and the power supply routed to PAMS train B is the same as that routed to SPS cabinet 2. TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. This is Open Item 122 (Appendix HH).”

AND

“Further, after the seal table, the MI cable configuration is a Y split, and the SPND signals are routed to SPS

cabinets 1 and 2. The Y split separates the Class 1E CET signal from the associated SPND cabling. The SPS cabinet digitizes the SPND signal. The system performs periodic automatic diagnostic testing to confirm SPND signal quality. One of these tests is a leakage resistance determination. If the SPND does not pass this test, the system will assign a data quality value to notify the power distribution calculation software to disregard data from this SPND. TVA should explain to the NRC staff how the system will assign a data quality value to notify the power distribution calculation software to disregard data from a failed SPND. This is Open Item 123 (Appendix HH).

The digitized SPND signal is then transferred to the WINCISE application servers, integrated computer system (ICS), and BEACON. The SPS transfers digitized SPND signals to the BEACON ovation data highway, where the BEACON datalink collects the data. The ICS provides plant conditions for the BEACON to use in calculating core power distribution. The WINCISE nonsafety-related internet protocol switches provide the main hub for traffic flow from the SPS cabinets, BEACON servers, WINCISE application servers, and the ICS. In its letter dated April 15, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11136A053), TVA explained that transmission of information from BEACON or SPS cabinets to the ICS is only done via the WINCISE application servers. While the BEACON datalink on the application server can connect to either BEACON machine, only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic switchover to the other server is permitted. This is Open Item 124 (Appendix HH)."

AND

## "Equipment Qualification

The WINCISE is a nonsafety-related system; only the IITA assembly and the MI cable are safety related. The SPND signals are considered quality related, and the CETs are safety related. Because these signals are bundled together in the IITA, as previously described, all MI cables and IITA connectors provided are environmentally qualified and Class 1E qualified. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff the type of connector used with the MI cable in WBN Unit 2 and which environmental qualification test is applicable. This is Open Item 125 (Appendix HH). To enable the NRC staff to evaluate and review the IITA environmental qualification, TVA should also provide the summary report of the environmental qualification for the IITA. This is Open Item 126 (Appendix HH).

In Attachment 8 to its letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205), TVA submitted the Westinghouse report, DAR-ME-09-10, Revision 0, 'Qualification Summary Report for the WINCISE Cable and Connector Upgrade at Watts Bar Unit 2.' This report summarizes the environmental and seismic/structural qualification of the MI cable, in accordance with IEEE Std. 323-1974, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' and IEEE Std. 344-1975, 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' including NUREG-0588, Revision 1, 'Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment.' This report identifies similarity analysis as the method of qualification. The report shows that the tested MI cable fulfilled the electrical operability acceptance criteria throughout all phases of testing and met the specified WBN Unit 2 environmental parameters and inputs. In addition, the MI cable is qualified for the Class 1E application. TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the electromagnetic interference/radiofrequency interference testing for the MI cable electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) qualification test results. This is Open Item 127 (Appendix HH).

The thermocouple cables, connectors, and cables outside the containment are part of the Westinghouse Common Q PAMS cabinet qualification. Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23 discusses this qualification.

As previously described, the SPS cabinets are used for conditioning and processing of low-current signals from in-containment neutron flux monitors. The SPS cabinets do not perform any direct Class 1E function and are classified as non-Class 1E. However, because the SPS cabinets are being installed in the reactor building (a seismic Category I structure), the SPS must be qualified in accordance with RG 1.100, Revision 3, 'Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,' issued September 2009; IEEE Std. 344-1975; and IEEE Std. 344-1987, 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.' Specifically, the SPS cabinet must be able to withstand the effects of five operational basis earthquakes and one safe-shutdown earthquake without the loss of physical integrity or creation of missile hazards. The NRC staff reviewed the summary description provided in Attachment 5 of TVA's letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110). TVA stated that the cabinet maintained structural integrity without any component detachment throughout the test program and thus complies with the WBN Unit 2 seismic qualification specification, WB-DC-40-31.2, Revision 8, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Seismic Qualification of Category 1 Fluid System Components and Electrical or Mechanical Equipment,' with testing performed in accordance with RG 1.100, IEEE Std. 344-1975, and IEEE Std. 344-1987. TVA should submit the seismic qualification

test report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets to the NRC staff for review. This is Open Item 128 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Specifically, WNA-CN-00157-WBT requires the analysis to demonstrate that surge events up to 4 kilovolts (Kv) on the WINCISE SPS alternating current (ac) power feed into the cabinet could not propagate through the cabinet. Westinghouse performed an analysis to evaluate this fault. WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, summarizes the results of the Westinghouse analysis. This analysis demonstrated that no credible source of faulting of a 600-Vdc limit can negatively affect the PAMS. This analysis identified a Westinghouse open item requiring the Quint power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to undergo EMC testing of 4 Kv to validate the assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. TVA should verify to the NRC staff resolution of the open item in WNA-CN-00157-WBT, which requires the Quint power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to undergo EMC testing of 4 Kv to validate the assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. This is Open Item 129 (Appendix HH). For additional information about the Westinghouse analysis, refer to the evaluation of IEEE Std. 384 described above in this SSER section entitled "Separation/Isolation Evaluation."

The acceptance criteria for the surge tests require that the 24-Vdc cabinet electronics do not suffer damage during surge events. As long as this requirement is maintained, any surge propagation into the cabinet will remain far less than the 600-Vdc limit. In Attachment 5 of its letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA provided a summary of the environmental qualification. This summary states that the SPS cabinet successfully complied with the emissions requirements of RG 1.180, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems," issued October 2003. TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the EMC qualification test results of the SPS cabinets. This is Open Item 130 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"RG 1.97 identifies the necessary range of the CETs as 200 to 2,300 degrees F, which is the same range described in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. However, as described previously, because of the new CET location and IITA configuration, the CETs in WBN Unit 2 can differ from the CETs in WBN Unit 1 by up to 15 degrees F under certain accident scenarios. In its letter dated June 23, 2011, TVA explained that, during accident conditions in which the reactor coolant pumps are operating, the water mixing and travelling through the fuel element channels in which the IITA guides (and thus the CETs) are located will cause the temperature seen by WBN Unit 2 to be lower than the temperature indicated for WBN Unit 1. The emergency operating procedure (EOP) for WBN Unit 2 should consider this difference in temperature. As a result, TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for this difference between core exit temperature readings for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC staff. This is Open Item 131 (Appendix HH)."

7.7.1.9.6 (Conclusion) reads:

"Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the IIS complies with the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 7.7, Revision 5; BTP 7-19, Revision 5; RG 1.97, Revision 2; and RG 1.75, Revision 2, and therefore meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(h), GDC 13, and GDC 24. Therefore, the WBN Unit 2 IIS is acceptable."

7.7.1 ends with:

"Conclusion

Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as described above, the NRC staff concluded that TVA adequately addressed the aging degradation of the materials used in the IITAs. Since aging degradation due to wear does not occur in IITAs, and any breach of the IITAs does not result in loss of RCS pressure boundary, the NRC staff concludes that the IITAs do not require routine inspections under TVA's plant maintenance program. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has adequately addressed the issue of aging degradation of the materials used in IITAs in the WINCISE system and meets the requirements of GDC 10."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 118 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide to the NRC staff a description of how the other vanadium detectors within the IITA would be operable following the failure of an SPND. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.2)”

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Open Item 119 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, to the NRC by letter. The NRC staff should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

-----

Open Item 120 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that the maximum over-voltage or surge voltage that could affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 121 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should submit the results to the NRC staff of a 600 VDC dielectric strength test performed on the IITA assembly. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 122 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 123 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide an explanation to the NRC staff of how the system will assign a data quality value to notify the power distribution calculation software to disregard data from a failed SPND. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 124 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“While the BEACON datalink on the Application server can connect to either BEACON machine, only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic switchover to the other server is not permitted. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 125 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide clarification to the NRC staff of the type of connector used with the MI cable in Unit 2, and which EQ test is applicable. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 126 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"To enable the NRC staff to evaluate and review the IITA environmental qualification, TVA should provide the summary report of the environmental qualification for the IITA. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 127 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the electro-magnetic interference/radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) testing for the MI cable electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC) qualification test results. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 128 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should submit the seismic qualification test report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets to the NRC staff for review. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 129 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should verify to the NRC staff resolution of the open item in WNA-CN-00157-WBT for the Quint power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to undergo EMC testing of 4 Kv to validate the assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 130 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the EMC qualification test results of the SPS cabinets. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 131 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for the difference between core exit temperature readings for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC staff. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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REVISION 08 UPDATE:

7.7.1.9 of SSER25 reads:

"7.7.1.9 In-Core Instrumentation System

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 119

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Open Item 119 states, 'TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, to the NRC by letter. The NRC staff should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachment 2 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. Attachment 2 included a copy of Westinghouse analysis WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, 'Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrument System (IIS) Signal Processing System (SPS) Isolation Requirements.' The analysis shows the following:



## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. No fault originating either within the WINCISE (Westinghouse INCore Information, Surveillance, and Engineering system) signal processing system (SPS) cabinet or electrical surges on the input power lines or output communications link can result in fault voltage affecting CET signals.
2. Inadvertent disconnection or failures of any IITA (in-core instrumentation thimble assembly) emitter wire or wires at the WINCISE SPS cabinet, or anywhere in the cabling between the IITA seal table connector and the WINCISE SPS cabinet, will not cause voltage charge-up on the emitter wire to exceed 600 volts direct current during worst case (full-power) plant operation, thus preventing the fault voltage from affecting the associated CET.
3. For large input overvoltage conditions on the 120-volt alternating current (Vac) input instrument bus used in both the SPS cabinet and associated PAMS train, the SPS will not cause any failure within the PAMS train that would not otherwise occur as a direct result of the overvoltage condition within the PAMS power supply.

The impact of a failed CET on a PAMS channel is addressed in Westinghouse analysis WNA-AR-00180-WBT-P, Revision 2, 'Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' page 3-6, in TVA's letter dated March 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110620411).

Based on the analysis results, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 119 is closed.

### Open Item 120

Open Item 120 states, 'TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that the maximum over-voltage or surge voltage that could affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachments 2 and 5 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. The information provided by TVA confirms that 264 Vac is the estimated maximum voltage, or surge-voltage, that could affect WINCISE. Furthermore, the equipment qualification for the WINCISE SPS, provided in Attachment 5, shows that the SPS cabinets can withstand a maximum surge of 4,000 volts with no loss of function after the surge.

However, TVA's response did not confirm that the power supply cable to the WINCISE SPS cabinet would not be routed with other cables carrying greater than 264 Vac. TVA must confirm that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables with voltage greater than 264 Vac. Open Item 120 remains open.

### Open Item 122

Open Item 122 states, 'TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits.'

In Enclosure 1 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA confirmed that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 122 is closed.

### Open Item 124

Open Item 124 states, 'While the BEACON datalink on the Application server can connect to either BEACON machine, only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic switchover to the other server is not permitted.'

In Enclosure 1 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA explained that the feature to automatically switch over to BEACON B is not configured for WBN Unit 2, and the BEACON datalink on the application server can only connect to BEACON A. TVA provided further information in Attachment 3 to its letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110). The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in TVA's letters dated June 10 and September 1, 2011, and concluded that its response was acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 124 is closed.

Open Item 128

Open Item 128 states, 'TVA should submit the seismic qualification test report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets to the NRC staff for review.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachment 5 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. Attachment 5 includes a copy of the Westinghouse report EQ-QR-39-WBT, Revision 0, 'Equipment Qualification Summary Report for WINCISE Signal Processing System.' This summary report describes the seismic qualification test performed and the results obtained. The WINCISE SPS cabinet maintained structural integrity without any component detachment throughout the test program and thus complied with WBN Unit 2 seismic qualification specification WB-DC-40-31.2, with testing performed in accordance with NRC RG 1.100, IEEE Std. 344-1975, and IEEE Std. 344-1987, 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.' Based on the information in the summary report, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 128 is closed.

Open Item 130

Open Item 130 states, 'TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the EMC [electromagnetic compatibility] qualification test results of the SPS cabinets.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachment 5 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. Attachment 5 includes a copy of the Westinghouse report EQ-QR-39-WBT, Revision 0, 'Equipment Qualification Summary Report for WINCISE Signal Processing System.' This summary report describes the EMC qualification test performed and the results obtained. The report states that the WINCISE SPS cabinet successfully complied with the emissions requirements of NRC RG 1.180, Revision 1, 'Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems,' and the supplemental-surge-withstand testing required in WNA-CN-00157-WBT. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 130 is closed."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 7.7.1.9 included the following for the noted Open Items:

Open Item 118

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 2 of Enclosure 1), TVA provided a response to this action item. In its response, TVA explained that each SPND element contains its own Mineral Insulated (MI) cable, which physically and electrically isolates each detector element from all the other elements inside the IITA. Therefore, there is no direct link between the measured signals from individual detectors inside an IITA. Consequently, there is no reason for the failure of one detector element to affect the operability of any of the other elements within the same IITA.

In its letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095, Item No. 3 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 6), TVA forwarded a copy of a letter from Westinghouse Electric Corporation providing additional detail regarding how the BEACON software uses the data from SPNDs in an IITA in which one or more SPND elements have failed. The Westinghouse letter explained that the approved Westinghouse WCAP-12472, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operation Support System," Addendums 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003678190) and 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML021270086) describe the uncertainty and methodology used to establish the number and distribution of required SPND sensors and how the system identifies data associated with a failed SPND. In particular, Westinghouse explained that the WINCISE system is considered operable provided that the total number of operable SPNDs is greater than a particular parameter specified in the model. For example, the WINCISE system is considered to be operable when the outputs of the SPNDs read are above certain percentage signal value and the number of operable

SPNDs in the top and bottom halves of each quadrant exceeds a certain limit, and the total number of operable SPNDs in every quadrant meets the criteria established for that quadrant. Furthermore, the IITA design features five SPNDs of sequentially increasing length that overlap the measurement range. Thus, the BEACON system is able to adequately function using information from all available sensors, but with different uncertainty depending on which sensors have failed. Based on these responses, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 118 closed."

Open Item 120

"By letter dated September 1, 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048, Item No. 7 of Enclosure 1) TVA responded to this action item. By letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA provided additional information and confirmed that the power supply cable to the WINCISE Signal Processing System (SPS) cabinet is not routed with any cables with greater than the maximum steady-state voltage allowed in Westinghouse technical note WNA-CN-00157-WBT-P, Revision 0, "Watts Bar 2 IIS [in-core instrumentation system] Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements." In this letter, TVA committed to "lock" cable routing in the Integrated Cable and Raceway Design System (ICRDS) to prevent cables greater than the maximum steady voltage allowed in WNA-CN-00157-WBT-P from being routed in the future with the SPS cabinet power supply cables. TVA confirmed in its December 22, 2011 letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A213, Item No. 7), that the cable routing has been locked within the ICRDS. Further, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed Westinghouse letter WBT-TVA-1060. This letter describes the power supply requirements for the WINCISE SPS cabinet and includes an external power supply diagram, which showed the planned cable routing. Based on this information, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 120 closed."

Open Item 121

"Westinghouse report WNA-CN-00157-WBT, "Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements," Revision 0 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), requires the IITA assembly and MI connecting cabling from the IITA to the point where the core exit thermocouple (CET) cabling is separated to be at a certain voltage level. This MI portion is identified as the WINCISE "1 to 2 Transition Cable Assemblies."

In a letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA submitted a copy of Westinghouse Report WBT-D-3518 P, "Partial Response to Item 9 SSER Item 121 Testing of Completed WINCISE 1 to 2 Transition MI Cable Assemblies - Watts Bar 2," dated October 2011 (Item No. 5 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 9). This report summarized the results of the dielectric testing performed to all WINCISE 1 to 2 Transition Cable Assemblies, which demonstrated that the WINCISE 1 to 2 Transition MI Cable Assemblies passed the identified testing program. Furthermore, to evaluate the WINCISE system, during an audit, the NRC staff reviewed the letter from R. W. Morris to D. Menard, LTR-ME-10-3, "Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Dielectric Characteristics of Completed MI Cable Assemblies," dated January 11, 2010. This letter summarized the evaluation performed for the MI cable to be capable of withstanding a specific over-voltage and surge voltage level. Based on this information, the NRC staff concluded that the information submitted to document the testing and evaluation for the MI cable assembly is acceptable. The NRC staff requested that TVA provide the results of the testing performed on the IITA for NRC review and verification.

By letters dated November 14 and 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099 and ML11341A156, respectively), TVA forwarded a copy of a Westinghouse letter explaining that the cable manufacturer performed type-testing of the IITA. The result from this testing is reported in IST Report #021-8557. This result was reflected in Revision 1 of Westinghouse's technical note WNA-CN-00157-WBT, "Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements," submitted to the NRC as Attachment 6 of TVA's letter dated November 30, 2011. In addition, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed a copy of the Westinghouse test report and confirmed that the IITA assembly did not exhibit unacceptable resistance breakdown during testing and passed the resistance test.

In Attachment 2 of TVA's letter dated November 14, 2011, TVA explained Westinghouse's approach to estimate the maximum IITA cable leakage resistance at the minimum temperature for criticality. Further, in TVA's letter dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA submitted a copy of Revision 1 of Westinghouse's WNA-CN-00157-WBT, which included a summary of the IITA cable leakage resistance. In addition, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed Westinghouse and TVA documents that confirmed the resistance for the IITA cable at the minimum temperature for criticality. Based on this information, the NRC staff found that the core exit thermocouples



have a dielectric voltage rating of at least 600 V, and that the estimated cable leakage resistance met the acceptance criteria established in the Design Specification for the IITA cable. Therefore, TVA and Westinghouse have demonstrated the ability of the IITA assembly to maintain insulation dielectric integrity and withstand potential brief overvoltage. This supports the NRC staff's ability to make a determination that the proposed design meets the requirements for isolation discussed in RG 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electric Systems," which endorses IEEE 384-1981, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits" for ensuring sufficient independence between safety and non-safety components. Based on the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 121 closed."

## Open Item 123

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 3 of Enclosure 1), TVA responded to this action item by explaining how the WINCISE system performs data validation. In particular, TVA explained that the BEACON Data Processing (BDP) application software continuously reviews detector signal measurements; performs on-demand checks of signal cable leakage resistance; and performs validity checks of this information relative to the defined maximum change in the measured signal between two measurement intervals, high and low current limits, and minimum acceptable cable leakage resistance measurement limits. If any of these criteria are violated, the BDP application sets a data quality bit contained in the digital representation of the current value to "BAD." The BEACON System Plant Interface function automatically disregards the "BAD" data. Also, as described above in Open Item 118, the BEACON system would use information from only "available" sensors. Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 123 closed."

## Open Item 125

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 4 of Enclosure 1), TVA responded to this action item by explaining that the electrical connectors used with the WBN Unit 2 WINCISE MI Cable Assemblies are glass-to-metal seal technology connectors fabricated for Westinghouse by Meggitt Safety Systems.

Furthermore, TVA noted that Westinghouse summarized the environmental qualifications for the MI cable and its connectors in Westinghouse Proprietary Report DAR-ME-09-10, "Qualification Summary Report for the WINCISE Cable and Connector Upgrade at Watts Bar Unit 2," which TVA submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205). Also, in TVA's November 14, 2011, letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099), TVA explained the manufacturer performed a voltage breakdown test per MIL-STD-202, Method 301, "Dielectric Withstand Voltage." In TVA's letter dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA submitted a copy of Revision 1 of Westinghouse's WNA-CN-00157-WBT, which includes a reference to the test summary of the voltage breakdown test. Furthermore, during a teleconference held in December with the NRC staff, which is summarized in TVA's letter dated February 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12034A164), TVA and Westinghouse clarified that the 600 V dielectric testing was performed for the entire IITA assembly, and that this test was performed successfully. In addition, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed a Westinghouse letter that confirmed that all 58 WINCISE 1-to-2 cable were subjected and passed successfully the dielectric strength test (conductor to conductor and conductor to sheath basis). Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 125 closed."

## Open Item 126

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 5 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 2), TVA responded to this action item by summarizing the Westinghouse qualification for the Ex-Vessel Portion of the WINCISE IITA for WBN Unit 2. This report summarizes the environmental and seismic qualification for the WBN Unit 2 ex-vessel portion of the IITA, and explains how the IITA meets the requirements in IEEE 323 and IEEE 344.

The IITA contains two portions, an in-vessel and ex-vessel portion. The in-vessel portion of the IITA consists of self-powered vanadium detectors and thermocouple and is considered from the Swagelok nut to the end of the IITA (bullet nose). The ex-vessel portion of the IITA is considered to be the hermetically sealed portion of the assembly which extends from the Swagelok assembly to the weldable Electronic Resources Division (ERD) multipin electrical connector.

In the qualification summary report, Westinghouse explained that they qualified the IITA using similarity analysis. For each qualification testing, Westinghouse described how the ERD multipin electric connector

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

met the requirement. Furthermore, Westinghouse explained that the tested ex-vessel portion of the IITA in Westinghouse (ABB CE [Combustion Engineering]) Report Number CE-NPSD-240-P, "Summary Report: Class 1E Qualification Test of the Incore Instrument (Core Exit Thermocouple Portion) and Mineral Insulated Cable Assembly," and ERD multipin electrical connector in Westinghouse (ABB CE) Report Number CE-NPSD-275-P, "Summary Report: Class 1E Qualification Test of the Electronic Resources Division (ERD) Electrical Connectors and Mineral Insulated Cable," both fulfill the electrical operability acceptance criteria throughout all phases of testing. The NRC staff reviewed these two Westinghouse documents during an audit.

The CE-NPSD-275-P summary report showed that the qualification testing meets or exceeds the Watts Bar Unit 2 requirements. Therefore, the WBN Unit 2 ex-vessel portion of the IITA with ERD multipin electrical connector is qualified for Class 1E application in accordance with the methodology and guidance of IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. Based on this information, the NRC staff finds that the qualification summary reports adequately address the qualification requirements for the ex-vessel portion of the IITA.

In its letter dated November 30 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA provided an overview of the analysis of the environmental and seismic/structural qualification methodology and results contained in the report CE-NPSD-240-P, "Summary Report: Class 1E Qualification of the Incore Instrument (Core Exit Thermocouple Portion) and Mineral Insulated Cable Assembly" seismic qualification testing performed on the core exit thermocouple portion of the assembly. In addition, during an NRC staff audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed CE-NPSD-240. This document summarizes how the incore instrument (core exit thermocouple portion) and MI cable assembly meets their Class 1E qualification requirements. The IITA was tested as a complete assembly during the EQ testing. In TVA's letter March 2, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12065A142), TVA confirmed that the ex-vessel portion is representative of the IITA that will be installed at WBN Unit 2. The in-vessel portion used the same CET to be installed at WBN Unit 2. Because the CET is the only portion of the IITA that is safety related, the results reviewed by the NRC staff showed that the IITA met the specified acceptance criteria. Based on this, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 126 closed."

### Open Item 127

"By letters dated September 30, 2011, November 14, 2011, and December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11287A254, ML11322A099, and ML12018A213, respectively), TVA responded to this action item (Item No. 6 of Enclosure to the September 30, 2011, and November 14, 2011, letters, and Item No. 5 of Enclosure 1 to the December 22, 2011, letter) by explaining that the MI cable assemblies to be supplied for the WBN Unit 2 IIS were not subjected to a product-specific EMI/EMC test program, but rather were qualified by analysis of the design. Within the IITA, the CET is insulated with crushed Alumina (synthetically produced aluminum oxide, Al<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>) contained in an overall stainless steel tubular sheath. Each individual SPND consists of a Vanadium emitter wire, surrounded by crushed Alumina, which is surrounded by a grounded stainless steel tubular sheath. The thermocouple sheath, the SPND sheaths, and the overall IITA sheath are all electrically grounded at the reactor vessel providing a path to effectively divert EMI/RFI. The combination of the stainless steel sheath material joined to the stainless steel connectors provides for 100 percent shielding coverage.

The ex-vessel MI cable assembly consists of silicon dioxide (SiO<sub>2</sub>) insulation, enclosing the SPND signal leads and core exit thermocouple lead wires, each one surrounded by a separate grounded stainless steel tubular sheath. The combination of the stainless steel sheath material joined to the stainless steel connectors provides for 100 percent shielding coverage. The exterior surfaces of the Lis MI Cable Assemblies are post-accident qualified, and as such, are required to be 100 percent hermetically sealed. This hermeticity of the

MI Cable Assembly design and construction also demonstrates the absence of any apertures or seams that would compromise the shielding effectiveness of the assemblies, and thus providing the necessary protection against EMI/RFI interferences. To provide the necessary grounding of the MI cable, the cable assemblies are to be directly secured to seismically qualified in-containment cable supports at regular intervals along the length of the cable run. The frequency of this support arrangement provides multiple low impedance paths to ground for the cable assemblies to effectively divert EMI/RFI.

As an additional layer of protection, the Lis MI Cable Assemblies for WBN Unit 2 include an interlocked stainless steel material hose assembly that is brazed and seal welded to the electrical connector backshell at each end of the cable assemblies. This hose assembly provides supplemental EMC shielding protection for the signals. "

In TVA's letters dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048, Attachment 2), and November 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099), Westinghouse explained that the maximum

current from a Vanadium detector is sufficiently low which, in the event of a short circuit from emitter to sheath within the cable, restricts the energy available to an amount that will preclude melting or other damage to the protective sheath. In case of breakage to the sheath, the detector leakage current will be shunted to common (plant ground) via the detector sheath. Further, the design maximum emitter current is sufficiently low that any short within the IITA will so restrict the energy available that further damage is precluded. Confirmation of electrical separation was important since the CET and SPDNs share the same IITA. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the dual barrier design combined with the low detector current provides inherent EMI/RFI protection for the MI cable, and that there is no credible fault originating within the non-1E portion of the MI cable can negatively impact the CET. This conclusion supports the NRC staff's ability to make a determination that the proposed design meets the requirements for isolation discussed in RG 1.75, which endorses IEEE 384-1981 for ensuring sufficient independence between safety and non-safety components. Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 127 closed.

## Open Item 129

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 7 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 10), TVA responded to this action item by explaining that the power supply to be installed in the SPS cabinet was tested as part of the WINCISE SPS. TVA submitted a copy of the Westinghouse Electric Company EQ-QR-39-WBT-NP, "Equipment Qualification Summary Report for WINCISE Signal Processing System," in Attachment 10. The test results provided in this summary report showed the WINCISE SPS cabinet, and thus the power supply, successfully complied with the emissions requirements of RG 1.180, 'Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems,' Revision 1, issued 2003. Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 129 closed."

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The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

7.7.1 has approximately 15 Open Items (OIs) cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
83	Remains OPEN.
118	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
119	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
120	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
121	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
122	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
123	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
124	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
125	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
126	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
127	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
128	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.

129 CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.

130 CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.

131 CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.

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SER27 contains the following under 7.7.1:

“7.7.1.9 Incore Instrumentation System

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 131

Open Item 131 states, ‘TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for the difference between core exit temperature readings for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC staff.’

By letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA explained that change in the EOP action level setpoint due to the difference between core exit temperature readings caused by the location change of the core exit thermocouples (CETs) was evaluated in TVA calculation WBNOSG4188, ‘EOP Setpoints Verification Document, Appendix 1: Standard Setpoints Table,’ Revision 21. TVA states that this calculation shows that the Unit 1 EOP CET setpoint is higher than the Unit 2 EOP CET setpoint. TVA submitted copies of the relevant pages from this calculation in Attachment 12 to TVA’s October 14, 2011, letter. This attachment shows that there is a difference in EOP action level setpoints between Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The NRC staff has reviewed the calculations in Attachment 12 which contains the environmental allowances that are added to the core exit thermocouple readings. They’re different between WBN Units 1 and 2. For indication of an uncovered core that is more conservative, the staff has considered a lower G03 (core uncovered) value than a higher value.

Setpoint G03:

Core Exit Temperature (CET) = 670 degrees F + normal channel inaccuracy and post-accident transmitter errors

Unit 1: CET = 670 degrees F + 57 degrees F = 727 degrees F

Unit 2: CET = 670 degrees F + 30.7 degrees F is approximately equal to 700 degrees F

The nominal G03 setpoint (core uncovered) value of 670 degrees F is the same for both WBN Units 1 and 2. The difference between the G03 setpoints, in Units 1 and 2, is due to different values for the normal channel inaccuracy and post-accident transmitter errors. Based upon this information, the staff infers the following basis:

1. If there is no LOCA, and the CET is reading 670 degrees F, then it would be expected that the pressurizer safety valves would be open (the saturation pressure, at 670 degrees F, is about 2531 pounds per square inch absolute, which is a little higher than the safety valve opening setpressure).
2. If the core is not already uncovered, then it will eventually become uncovered if the RCS inventory loss through the safety valves is not replaced by charging flow.
3. Since the open safety valves will prevent RCS pressure from rising, CET readings of 670 degrees F or higher would be indicative of superheated steam; attributed to an uncovered core.
4. If there is a LOCA, and RCS pressure is lower, then a CET reading of 670 degrees F or greater would indicate that the CET is measuring superheated steam, coming from an uncovered core.
5. Adding uncertainties to the 670 degrees F value rules out other situations that could produce lower CET readings, in which the core is not uncovered.

It is not uncommon to have different EOP parameter values for different units at a site, particularly those whose construction completion wasn't concurrent. Some parameters can be standardized, while others cannot.

By letter dated February 18, 2014, TVA submitted Revision 103XX of Appendix C to its Radiological Emergency Plan. Revision 103XX has been updated to include the different EOP CET setpoints for WBN Units 1 and 2. Based on the NRC staff's review of the differences between the EOP CET setpoints for the two units, and TVA's inclusion of the different setpoints in Appendix C to the Radiological Emergency Plan, the NRC staff considers Open Item 131 closed."

Status remains "Open (NRR)" in SSER27.

7.7.2	23	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Status monitoring system, Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication (BISI)
		<b>07</b>	In the original 1982 SER, the staff requested TVA address RG 1.47, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indications for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems." TVA addressed RG 1.47 by letters for both units dated January 29, 1987, and October 22, 1990. In SSER7, the staff documented completion of the review and closed the issue. By letter dated February 18, 1994, for both units, TVA submitted a re-evaluation of BISI that excluded components that would not be rendered inoperable more than once a year in accordance with RG 1.47 position C.3(b). In SSER13, NRC reviewed the revision and concluded that it was acceptable.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.7.2 of SSER23 reads:

"In Section 7.7.2 of the SER, and in SSER 7 and SSER 13, the NRC staff evaluated WBN FSAR Section 7.7.1.3.6, 'Safety System Status Monitoring System.' TVA restructured the WBN Unit 2 FSAR in Amendment 96, such that Section 7.7.1.3.6 now references Section 7.5, which provides a description of the BISIS system in FSAR Section 7.5.2.2. The NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 BISI is in Section 7.5.1.1.2 of this SSER."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.7.3	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.7.3 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 103, the staff concludes that there were no substantive changes to the information provided by TVA in FSAR Section 9.3.4.2.1.C(1), and that the staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.7.4	23	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>07</b>	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.7.4.4 (Conclusion) of SSER23 reads:

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>"The NRC staff reviewed the pressurizer water level controls and the steam generator water level controls to prevent vessel overfill conditions provided by TVA in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 96 through 103 and in TVA's letter dated October 29, 2010. The staff verified that these systems are functionally the same as those of WBN Unit 1, which was previously reviewed and accepted by the staff, as documented in the SER. Based on the NRC staffs prior evaluation in the SER and the similarity of the WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, the staff concludes that the information provided in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Sections 7.7.1.6 and 7.7.1.7 is acceptable and that the staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
7.7.5	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.7.5 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER, and on its review of the information provided in TVA's letter dated July 30, 2010, the staff concludes that TVA's assessment of IE Information Notice 79-22 is acceptable, and that the staff's conclusions in the SER remain valid."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
7.7.6	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.7.6 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Therefore, based on the staff's previous evaluation, as documented in the SER, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in its response to staff questions, the conclusions in the SER remain valid."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
7.7.7	0	<b>C</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
7.7.8	23	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>ATWS Mitigation design was reviewed and approved for both units by a Safety Evaluation Report issued December 28, 1989. This SER is also in Appendix W of SSER9. Outstanding Issue was Technical Specifications requirements. In SSER14, NRC reviewed the revision of FSAR Figure 7.3-3 for the AMSAC automatic initiation signal to start the turbine driven and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and considered the issue resolved.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Address in Technical Specifications as appropriate.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>ATWS is not addressed in either the Unit 1 TS or the Unit 2 TS; nor is it addressed in the Standard TS</p>



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			(NUREG-1431).
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:
			7.7.8 of SSER23 includes:
			"Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in SSER 9 and SSER 14, and on its review of FSAR Amendments 92 through 103 and the information provided by TVA in its letter dated July 30, 2010, the NRC staff determines that its conclusions in the SSERs regarding the AMSAC system remain valid for WBN Unit 2."
			SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			Correct Status to "C." TVA action has been completed, and SSER shows status for this item as "Resolved."
7.8	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	REVISION 07 UPDATE:
			7.8 of SSER23 reads:
			"NUREG-0737 forwarded post-TMI accident requirements, which the NRC approved for implementation, to licensees of operating power reactors and applicants for operating licenses. Following the accident at TMI Unit 2, the NRC staff developed an action plan (NUREG-0660) to provide a comprehensive and integrated plan to improve safety at power reactors. Specific items from NUREG-0660 were approved by the Commission for implementation at reactors. In NUREG-0737, those specific items were gathered into a single document that includes additional information about schedules, applicability, method of implementation review, submittal dates, and clarification of technical positions. The total set of TMI-related actions were collected in NUREG-0660, but only those items that the Commission approved for implementation were included in NUREG-0737. The NRC staff reviewed the status of TMI action items for WBN Unit 2, as documented below."
			SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."
7.8.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
7.8.1	23	<b>OI</b> <b>13</b>	NUREG-0737, II.D.3, "Valve Position Indication" – The design was reviewed in the original 1982 SER and found acceptable pending confirmation of installation of the acoustic monitoring system. In SSER5 (IR 390/84-35), the staff closed the LICENSE CONDITION for Unit 1 only.
			By letter dated November 7, 1994, for both units, TVA provided a revised response for NUREG-0737 Item II.D.3. TVA revised the design by relocating the accelerometers for valve position indication to downstream of the relief valves. This change was reviewed in SSER14. The revision did not change the function of the position indication hardware and did not alter the previous review.
			Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.
			CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:



The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.8.1 of SSER23 includes:

"As documented in the NRC letter to TVA dated May 28, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081490093), the staff concluded that there is no change at WBN Unit 2 to the approved design. The NRC staff will verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system for the PORV position indication in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. This is Open Item 74 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

Open Item 74 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The NRC staff will verify installation of the acoustic-monitoring system for the power-operated relief valve (PORV) position indication in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. (Section 7.8.1)"

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

The required acoustic monitoring, indication and alarm annunciation to detect lifting and / or leaking of Reactor Coolant downstream of the Pressurizer PORV's and safety valves has been installed.

Corrected the Status above to "OI" to agree with the SSER.

7.8.2	23	<b>OI</b>	NUREG-0737, II.E.1.2, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Initiation and Flow Indication"
		<b>13</b>	Unit 2 Action: Complete procedures and qualification testing.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.8.2 of SSER23 includes:

"As documented in the NRC letter to TVA dated May 28, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081490093), the staff concluded that there is no change at WBN Unit 2 to the approved design. The NRC staff will verify that the test procedures and qualification testing are completed in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. This is Open Item 75 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Open Item 75 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“The NRC staff will verify that the test procedures and qualification testing for auxiliary feedwater initiation and control and flow indication are completed in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. (Section 7.8.2)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected the Status above to “OI” to agree with the SSER.</p>
7.8.3	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	<p>NUREG-0737, II.K.3.9, “Proportional Integral Derivative Controller Modification” – Reviewed in original 1982 SER.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Set the derivative time constant to zero.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.8.3 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“In its letter to the NRC dated July 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 02170077), TVA committed to setting the derivative time constant equal to zero in WBN Unit 2. The NRC staff concluded that this action satisfies the NUREG-0737 item. The NRC staff will verify that the derivative time constant is set to zero in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. This is Open Item 76 (Appendix HH).”</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Open (Inspection).”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 76 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“The NRC staff will verify that the derivative time constant is set to zero in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. (Section 7.8.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed NUREG-0737, II.K.3.9.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-607 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 76.</p>
7.8.4	23	<b>C</b> — — <b>12</b>	<p>NUREG-0737, II.K.3.10, "Anticipatory Trip At High Power"</p> <p>In SSER4, NRC concluded that TVA had adequately addressed the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.10 for removal of the anticipatory reactor trip on turbine trip at or below 50% power.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Unit 2 Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures will address this issue.</p> <p>-----</p>

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

Items 14.a. (Turbine Trip - Low Fluid Oil Pressure) and 14.b. (Turbine Trip - Turbine Stop Valve Closure) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 are the trips of interest. The table and the Bases for these items state that below the P-9 setpoint, these trips do not actuate a reactor trip.

Per item 16.d. (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9) of TS Table 3.3.1-1, the Nominal Trip Setpoint for P-9 is "50% RTP" and the Allowable Value is "< 52.4% RTP."

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.8.4 of SSER23 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed the associated proposed WBN Unit 2 TS and surveillance requirements and concludes that there are no changes from the design approved in SSER 4 or from the WBN Unit 1 TS. Therefore, TVA's proposed actions for WBN Unit 2 are acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

Surveillance procedures to address this issue have been developed and issued.

NUREG-0737 item II.K.3.10 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-603, dated May 9, 2014.

7.8.5	23	<b>C</b>	NUREG-0737, II.K.3.12, "Confirm Existence of Anticipatory Reactor Trip Upon Turbine Trip"
		<b>07</b>	Approved for both units in the SER

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.8.5 of SSER23 includes:

"As documented in the NRC letter to TVA dated May 28, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081490093), the staff concluded that there is no change at WBN Unit 2 to the approved design. Therefore, it is acceptable to the staff."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

7.9.0	23	<b>C</b>	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
		<b>13</b>	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.9.4 (Conclusion) of SSER23 reads:

"Based on the NRC staff's review of the interfaces between the data communication systems and plant systems described in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 103, as supplemented by the TVA documents referenced above, the staff concludes that the data communication systems meet the relevant acceptance criteria identified in SRP Section 7.9, Revision 5, including the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 5.6.3, and GDC 24 with regard to control and protection system interactions."

SSER23 DID NOT PROVIDE A STATUS; VERBIAGE SUGGESTS THE STATUS WOULD BE "RESOLVED."

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

7.9.3.2 of SSER23 includes:

"However, the NRC staff was not able to confirm that sufficient testing was performed to demonstrate that two-way communication was precluded by the specific configuration changes described above. TVA should confirm to the staff that testing has sufficiently demonstrated that two-way communication is precluded with the described configurations. This is Open Item 93 (Appendix HH)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

The Revision 13 UPDATE to section 7.2.1 delineates how Open Item 93 was closed in SSER27.

Open Item 93 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-607, dated September 30, 2014.

8.0.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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8.1.0	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		13	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.1 of SSER22 included the following:

"For the scenario in which an accident occurs in one unit and a concurrent shutdown of the second unit occurs with offsite power available, TVA determined that the auxiliary power system (APS) could adequately support the scenario for two-unit operation. The voltage recovery times were within the time limits so that the 6.9-kV shutdown board degraded voltage relays (DVRs) reset and would not separate the 6.9-kV shutdown boards from the offsite power source. For the scenario in which an accident occurs in one unit and a concurrent shutdown of the second unit occurs without offsite power, TVA stated that preoperational testing for WBN Unit 2 will validate the diesel response to load sequencing on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The staff noted that TVA did not provide a summary of the worst-case EDG loading analysis under this scenario for staff's review. The NRC staff will evaluate the status of this issue and will update the status of the EDG loading and load response in a future SSER. This is Open Item 26 (Appendix HH)."

"The NRC staff reviewed the FSAR for this section against the relevant NRC regulations, guidance in SRP Section 8.1, and applicable RGs and, except for the open item discussed above, concludes that TVA is in compliance with the relevant NRC regulations.

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Before issuing an operating license, the NRC staff intends to conduct an onsite review of the installation and arrangement of electrical equipment and cables, confirmatory electric drawings, and verification of test results for the purpose of confirming the adequacy of the design and proper implementation of the design criteria. The NRC will address any issues identified during the onsite review in a supplement to the SER."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to this Open Item 26:

"There are four diesel generators (DGs) which supply onsite power to both Units 1 and 2 at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Each DG is dedicated to supply power to shutdown boards as follows:

- DG 1A-A feeds power into Unit 1, 6.9 kV shutdown board 1A-A
- DG 2A-A feeds power into Unit 2, 6.9 kV shutdown board 2A-A
- DG 1B-B feeds power into Unit 1, 6.9 kV shutdown board 1B-B
- DG 2B-B feeds power into Unit 2, 6.9 kV shutdown board 2B-B

Redundant trains of ESF loads for each unit are powered from each shutdown board. If offsite power is lost (LOOP), one train in each unit is capable of powering the loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or safely shut down the unit.

The following loading tables provide the blackout loading plus the common accident loads (load rejection, with an accident on the opposite unit and a loss of offsite power) for the safe shutdown of the non-accident unit. As discussed previously, these loadings are bounded by the accident loading."

[See letter for Tables.]

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER24]

8.1 includes:

"The NRC staff verified that TVA revised WBN 2 FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.1 to require any conduit exceeding 40 percent cable fill to be evaluated and justified by TVA engineering. Based on this information, Open Item 3 is closed."

AND

"In NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2011604, dated June 29, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111810890), NRC Region II documented its inspection and review of Open Item 18. Based on the results documented in the inspection report, Open Item 18 is closed."

AND

"In NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2011604, dated June 29, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111810890), NRC Region II documented its inspection and review of Open Item 19. Based on the results documented in the inspection report, Open Item 19 is closed."

AND

"The NRC staff performed an inspection to verify the qualification pedigree of the subject motors, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2011605, dated August 5, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112201418). Based on the inspection results, Open Item 20 is closed."

AND

"Based on this response, the NRC staff concluded that TVA adequately clarified the use of the term "equivalent" as it relates to the replacement of terminal blocks; and therefore, Open Item 22 is closed."

AND

"Open Item 23 required the NRC staff to resolve whether or not TVA's reasoning for not upgrading the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoids to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(l).

In its letter dated April 6, 2011, TVA provided additional information regarding Open Item 23. TVA stated that it will qualify the MSIV solenoids to the Category I criteria.

Based on this information, the NRC staff finds Open Item 23 remains open until NRC inspection can be performed to verify that the MSIV solenoids have been qualified to the Category I criteria."

AND

"Based on its review of this calculation, the staff concludes that TVA has provided adequate justification for establishment of a mild environment threshold for the electronic components identified in the calculation for WBN Unit 2. Specifically, the staff concludes that the calculation demonstrates that the mild environment threshold ensures continued operation of electronic equipment under postulated conditions. Therefore, Open Item 24 is closed."

AND

"In its letter dated April 6, 2011, TVA stated that, 'A separate load flow was performed for a dual unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operational occurrence with and without offsite power.' TVA provided a summary of resulting loading on CSSTs. The staff reviewed the loading and margins available and concluded that the CSSTs are adequately rated for postulated conditions. Therefore, Open Item 27 is closed."

AND

"The NRC staff reviewed the summary of analyses provided and concluded that TVA's approach to evaluate the capability of the LTCs as acceptable because it meets the requirements of GDC 17. Therefore, Open Item 28 is closed."

AND

"Based on the results of the TSS report and grid operating parameters provided by TVA in its letter dated June 7, 2011, the NRC staff concludes that the offsite source operating range meets the requirements of GDC 17 and is acceptable for WBN Units 1 and 2 operations. Therefore, Open Item 29 is closed."

AND

"The NRC staff concludes that TVA's clarification is adequate, since it provides the necessary information regarding the sequencing of loads in case of a non-simultaneous LOOP-LOCA event, and that such an event is considered as a beyond design basis event. Therefore, Open Item 31 is closed."

AND

"TVA stated in Attachment 9 of its letter dated July 31, 2010, that certain design change notices (DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2, and that these DCNs were unverified assumptions used in its analysis of the 125 Vdc vital battery system. Open Item 33 required the NRC staff to verify completion of these DCNs prior to issuance of the operating license. The applicable DCNs are as follows:

- \* DCN 53421: removal/abandonment of Reciprocating Charging Pump 2-MTR-62-101, supplied from 480V SHDN BD 2B1-B, Compt. 3B.
- \* DCN 54636: cable modifications for Unit 2 AFWP Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve and Turbine Controls.

In its letter dated April 6, 2011, TVA stated that the above DCNs have been issued and that the NRC will be notified when the physical work has been completed for these two DCNs. Open Item 33 remains open until the NRC staff has verified by inspection that the DCNs have been incorporated into the WBN Unit 2 design."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 23 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"Resolve whether or not TVA's reasoning for not upgrading the MSIV solenoid valves to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(l). (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1; SSER 24, Section 8.1)"

Open Item 33 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA stated in Attachment 9 of its letter dated July 31, 2010, that certain design change notices (DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2, and that these DCNs were unverified assumptions used in its analysis of the 125 Vdc vital battery system. Verification of completion of these DCNs to the NRC staff is necessary prior to issuance of the operating license. (SSER 22, Section 8.3.2.3; SSER 24, Section 8.1)"

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 20.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 23 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-608, dated November 14, 2014.

Open item 33 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated March 24, 2015.

TVA to NRC letter dated April 7, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15097A421) notified the NRC of the completion of field work for plant modifications made per DCN 53421 and DCN 54636.

8.1.0 has approximately 13 Open Items cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
3	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
18	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
19	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
20	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
22	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
23	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion of 3.11.0.
24	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
26	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.



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| 27 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 28 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 29 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 31 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 33 | CLOSED in IR 391/2015-602; remains OPEN in the SSER. |

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SER27 contains the following under 8.1 Introduction:

“Open Item 26

Open Item 26 states, ‘For the scenario with an accident in one unit and concurrent shutdown of the second unit without offsite power, TVA stated that Unit 2 pre-operational testing will validate the diesel response to sequencing of loads on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The NRC staff will evaluate the status of this issue and will update the status of the EDG load response in a future SSER.’

By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113120438), the NRC staff requested additional details on Open Item 26. TVA updated its response by letter dated June 7, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12160A351). The questions were related to EDG rating and loading criteria. Specifically the staff requested TVA to:

- Explain the variations in the worst case loading provided in different responses and provide a summary of current calculations depicting DG loading, including procedurally required loads that may be manually connected, and
- Provide verification or test documents from the manufacturer or Appendix B qualified supplier of the DG engine and DG generator certifying the “hot”, “cold” and “step load” capabilities.

In response to staff questions, TVA stated that the ongoing plant modifications and validation of calculation accuracies through the inspection process had resulted in adjustments to the EDG loading calculations. TVA attached excerpts from Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, “Diesel Generator Loading Analysis,” Revision 16, summarizing the results from the last update.

The licensee has evaluated the load carrying capability (steady-state running load) and margin available for the worst case EDG loading for two separate events. As stated in the FSAR, load carrying capability is based on a 2-hour rating of 4840 kilowatt (Kw) from 0 to 2 hours and on a continuous rating of 4400 Kw from 2 hours to the end of the event. Attachment 1 to Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, Revision 16, depicts worst case EDG loading with available margin when serving loads during a loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) concurrent with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This table indicates that EDG 2B-B has the highest loading of 4237.20 kilowatt (Kw), which is less than the 2 hour rating of 4840 Kw. The maximum steady state running load (2 hours to the end of event) is calculated to be 4093.66 Kw for EDG 1A-A compared to nominal rating of 4400 Kw. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

Attachment 2 to Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, Revision 16, provides details on each EDG loading with one unit in LOOP plus LOCA and the second unit in LOOP only. For the case of Unit 1 in a LOOP/LOCA event and Unit 2 in a LOOP only condition, TVA has concluded that EDG 1A-A has the maximum loading of 4220.51 Kw for the first 2 hours and 4093.66 Kw for the remaining duration. These loadings are below the corresponding nominal and 2 hour ratings of the EDGs, as stated above. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

For the case of Unit 2 in a LOOP/LOCA event and Unit 1 in a LOOP only condition, the licensee has concluded that EDG 2B-B has the maximum loading of 4237.2 Kw for the first 2 hours and EDG 2A-A has 3975.57 Kw for steady state operation beyond 2 hours. These loadings are below the corresponding nominal and 2 hour ratings of the EDGs, as stated above. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

The licensee has also performed a sensitivity analyses for transient loading of the EDGs during motor starts. Based on the details provided in the referenced calculation, the staff finds that the EDGs at WBN Units 1 and 2 are adequately rated to support safe shutdown of both units following an accident in

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

one unit coupled with a LOOP at both units.

The licensee has indicated that the "hot," "cold," and "step load" capabilities of the EDGs were reviewed and concurred by MKW Power Systems, Inc., the Appendix B qualified supplier of the EDG engine and generator for WBN. The licensee has used the higher rating(s) for motor starting analyses. The staff did not consider the additional spare margin available with these ratings as the nameplate ratings envelope the postulated steady state loadings.

Based on the responses provided by the applicant, the NRC staff finds the responses acceptable and therefore considers Open Item 26 to be closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

8.2.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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8.2.1	27	C 13	Approved for both units in SER. In SSER13, NRC reviewed TVA's analysis of grid stability on loss of both units. The NRC conclusions in the SER remained valid.
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### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.2.1 of SSER22 included, "TVA has not evaluated the capability of the CSSTs for a dual-unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operating occurrence. This is discussed in section 8.2.2 as Open Item 27 (Appendix HH) discussed in section 8.2.2. Pending resolution of the open item, the staff concludes that design of WBN Unit 2 meets intent of GDC 5."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 27:

"TVA to NRC letter dated December 6, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information,' (ADAMS accession number ML103420569) included the response to RAI 8.2.2 - 1. That response stated, 'The loading for a dual unit trip (item a) is slightly less than the loading with one unit in accident and a spurious accident signal in the other unit. Therefore, a separate load flow was not performed.'

A separate load flow was performed for a dual unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operational occurrence with and without offsite power. The resulting loading on CSSTs is provided in the following table:

[See letter for Table.]

The worst case margin for CSSTs C and D is 70% (X, Y winding) and 55% for primary winding. The worst case margin for CSSTs A and B is 27% (X, Y winding) and 18% for primary winding.

This additional analysis will be included in the next revision of AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002."

### REVISION 11 UPDATE:

AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002 was revised to add Appendix 10.2 which provides analyses of loading on CSSTs A, B C and D postulating an accident in one unit and a spurious engineered safe features (ESF) actuation in the other unit

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

8.2.2	27	CO — — 13	8.2.2.1 CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - document additional information in FSAR on control power supplies and distribution system for the Watts Bar Hydro Plant Switchyard
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In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the offsite power system circuits at the Watts Bar Hydro Plant Switchyard met GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue. In SSER13, the staff reviewed revised information incorporated into FSAR amendment 71 for both units and concluded that it supported the original conclusion in SSER2.

8.2.2.2 OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving compliance of design changes to the offsite power system with GDC 17 and 18.

In SSER2 and 3, NRC continued the review of the offsite electrical power system. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the design changes to minimize the probability of losing all AC power, compliance with GDC 17 and minimizing the probability of a two unit trip following a one unit trip. These issues were resolved in SSER13. Additional review was done in SSER14, but the conclusions remained valid.

8.2.2.3 Compliance with GDC 17 for the Duration of the Offsite System Contingencies

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC reviewed the load shed scheme described in FSAR amendment 71 that reduces loads from common station service transformers A and B including contingency for both units trip and a 161-kV supply contingency. In SSER15, NRC determined that entering the LCO for one offsite circuit inoperable was appropriate. No open items were identified.

8.2.2.4 Minimizing the Probability of a Two-Unit Trip Following a One-Unit Trip

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In FSAR amendment 71, TVA described the transfer of power sources on trip of a unit's main generator. In SSER13, NRC evaluated the design and determined that the concern was resolved.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.2.2 of SSER22 includes:

"TVA should provide a summary of similar margin studies based on a dual-unit trip as a result of an abnormal operational occurrence and an accident in one unit concurrent with a spurious ESF actuation. These should be based on the completed analysis for uprating CSSTs A and B. This is Open Item 27 (Appendix HH)."

"TVA should provide to the staff a detailed discussion showing that the LTC is able to maintain the 6.9-Kv bus voltage control band given the normal and post contingency transmission operating voltage band, bounding voltage drop on the grid, and plant conditions. This is Open Item 28 (Appendix HH)."

"In its December 6, 2010, letter, TVA stated that the grid stability analyses addressed the loss of the largest electric supply to the grid, loss of the largest load from the grid, loss of the most critical transmission line, loss of both units, all of which did not result in grid instability. NRC staff considers the stability analysis portion of the grid studies acceptable. However, TVA did not provide information about the operating characteristics of the offsite power supply and other information as discussed above. This is Open Item 29 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 27:

"TVA to NRC letter dated December 6, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information,' (ADAMS accession number ML103420569) included the response to RAI 8.2.2 - 1. That response stated, 'The loading for a dual unit trip (item a) is slightly less than the loading with one unit in accident and a spurious accident signal in the other unit. Therefore, a separate load flow was not performed.'

A separate load flow was performed for a dual unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operational occurrence with and without offsite power. The resulting loading on CSSTs is provided in the following table:

[See letter for Table.]

The worst case margin for CSSTs C and D is 70% (X, Y winding) and 55% for primary winding. The worst case margin for CSSTs A and B is 27% (X, Y winding) and 18% for primary winding.

This additional analysis will be included in the next revision of AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 28:

"For CSSTs C and D, the load tap changer (LTC) is set to regulate 6.9kV shutdown board voltage at 7,071V (102.5%). For CSSTs A and B, the LTC is set to regulate the voltage at the 6.9kV start buses (which can power the 6.9kV shutdown boards through the 6.9kV unit boards) at 7,071V (102.5%). The upper and lower setpoints of the dead bands are 7,132V (103.4%) and 7,010V (101.6%), respectively. The dead band considered is ±82.2V equivalent to the operating tolerances identified for these setpoints. The LTCs have the following parameters:

CSST C and D: Taps ±10%, Tap Step 1.25%, Total No of Taps 17, Initial Time Delay 2 seconds, Operating Time 1 second. Taps are provided on each secondary winding.

CSST A and B: Taps ±16.8%, Tap Step 1.05%, Total No of Taps 33, Initial Time Delay 1 second, Operating Time 2 seconds. Taps are provided on the primary winding.

The analysis evaluates the 6.9-Kv shutdown board minimum voltage requirements considering a maximum (bounding) grid voltage drop of 9 Kv and a minimum grid voltage of 153kV and all plant conditions. Although the calculated shutdown board voltage falls below the degraded voltage relay dropout setpoint due to block start of ESF motors, it recovers above the degraded voltage relay reset setpoint in ≤5 seconds. The minimum time for the degraded voltage relays to isolate the offsite power from the 6.9kV Shutdown Boards is 8.5 seconds.

Attachment 3 [See letter for this.] provides the Electrical Transient Analysis Program (ETAP) voltage recovery plots following a DBE on one unit while the other unit is in simultaneous orderly shutdown. These plots pictorially depict the LTC function at different times following a DBE.

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

During normal operation and post-accident with bounding grid voltage (153kV), the voltage on the 6.9kV shutdown boards is maintained within the LTC control band. As shown in the ETAP plots, the voltage on the shutdown boards falls below the degraded voltage relay setpoint due to block start of ESF motors but recovers to a value above the degraded voltage relay reset value before the degraded voltage relay timer times out so as not to isolate the shutdown boards from the offsite power. The source is therefore in compliance with GDC 17 and is able to supply offsite power to 1E loads with an accident in one unit, safe shutdown of the opposite unit, and the worst case single failure."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 29:

"The operating characteristics of the offsite power supply were delineated in TVA letter to the NRC dated November 09, 2010 (ML103200146). However, they are provided below for the staff convenience. In addition TVA has issued Revision 3 of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Transmission System Study (TSS) - Grid Voltage Study of the WBN Offsite Power System. This revision has evaluated the adequacy of the offsite power system postulating an accident in one unit and a spurious accident signal in the second unit. The results show that the WBN offsite power system has adequate capacity to cope with this scenario (i.e., an accident in one unit and a spurious accident signal in the second unit)

The preferred offsite power system at WBN is normally supplied from TVA's 161-Kv transmission grid at the Watts Bar Hydro Plant switchyard. Normally, the frequency of the grid is 60 Hz, with very small perturbations above and below this value. The TVA Under Frequency Load Shed scheme is compliant with NERC/SERC standards, and the first step will begin tripping transmission system load at 59.5 Hz. The final step in the program trips load at 58.7 Hz. Current studies show that the frequency will not drop below 57.5 Hz during any credible extreme contingencies.

The criteria used in the planning of the transmission system state that the 161-Kv voltage should not drop below 95% of nominal voltage for NERC Category B or C events. Normally, the 161-Kv grid at the WBN offsite power buses operates at 166 Kv, with ranges from 161 Kv to 170 Kv occasionally observed.

Two Transmission System Studies (TSSs), a Planning TSS and an Operations TSS, are performed by Power System Operations (PSO) tri-annually or as needed. The Planning TSS is a 5-year look-ahead study to ensure the transmission network will meet the WBN voltage criteria. Transmission enhancements are made if needed. The Operations TSS is used to ensure the network can meet the grid criteria during real time operation. In extreme cases, if the grid is unable to meet voltage criteria, the Transmission Operator will immediately notify the WBN Generator Operator that offsite power is disqualified.

A. Operating characteristics of the preferred offsite power supply (at Watts Bar Hydro Plant Grid): 164 Kv nominal

- b. Voltage criteria for WBN for dual-unit analysis:
- 161 Kv Switchyard: > 153 Kv and < 9 Kv drop (post-event)
  - 24 Kv Generator Buses\*: > 23 Kv and < 24.8 Kv

\* Applicable only when utilizing Unit Board feeders as offsite power (the Unit Station Service Transformers [USSTs] supply offsite power until they transfer to the Common Station Service Transformers [CSSTs] A and B).

C. Post-contingency voltage drops (dual-unit operation): 9 Kv Maximum (The grid studies show that under the worst case scenario the maximum voltage drop will not exceed 6.5 Kv. The auxiliary power system analysis for two-unit operation has been performed using a 161 Kv grid voltage drop of 11 Kv when powered from CSSTs C and D and 9 Kv when powered from CSSTs A and B. CSSTs A and B will be used to substitute for CSSTs D and C, respectively, in case of CSST C or D outage.)

d. Bounding value & Post unit trip value: 153 Kv (Minimum)

(The grid studies establish that there are no voltage criteria violations under all grid operating conditions.)

e. Operating frequency range (dual-unit operation): Normally the frequency of the grid is 60Hz with very small perturbations and is compliant with NERC/SERC standards and the first step begins tripping transmission system load at 59.5 Hz.

F. Design operating voltage range of the shutdown boards: 7,260 V max; 6,570 V min

g. How low the WBHS voltage can drop: 153 Kv"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

Open Items 27, 28, and 29 were closed in SSER 24 as delineated in the Revision 07 Update portion of 8.1.0.

REVISION 11 UPDATE:

AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002 was revised to add Appendix 10.2 which provides analyses of loading on CSSTs A, B C and D postulating an accident in one unit and a spurious engineered safe features (ESF) actuation in the other unit.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 8.2.2 Analysis:

"NRC Bulletin 2012-01

The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System,' dated July 27, 2012, to notify licensees that the NRC staff is requesting information about the facilities' electric power system designs to determine if further regulatory action is warranted. Bulletin 2012-01 requires addressees to comprehensively verify compliance with the regulatory requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, 'Electric Power Systems,' and the design criteria for protection systems under 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2).

TVA provided its response for WBN Unit 2 in Enclosure 3 of letter dated October 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12312A167). Based on review of the response, NRC staff determined that the design vulnerability exists at WBN Unit 2 electric power system and no design features have been provided to enable functioning of electric power system with an open phase condition (OPC) with offsite power circuits. In response to NRC staff's RAI (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A314) concerning status and schedule for completion of plant design changes and modifications to resolve the open phase design vulnerability, TVA provided its response in letter dated February 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14038A075). TVA stated that it is fully engaged in the development of accurate detection and protection equipment without compromising nuclear safety or increasing plant risk, this new OPC technology is being thoroughly evaluated, will be tested, and will be fully analyzed before installation. In addition, based on the operating experience to-date, the OPC of concern is a loss of one or two of the three phases of a nuclear power plant's offsite electrical power circuit due to any component failure on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a qualified offsite electrical power circuit to the transmission system with and without a high impedance ground under all operating electrical system configurations and loading conditions. In supplemental letter dated September 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14247A231), TVA submitted additional text to be added to the FSAR and proposed a license condition associated with actions for resolving NRC Bulletin 2012-01.

The proposed text that would be added to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 8.2.2 'Analysis,' as part of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 113 states:

The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power Systems,' describing a condition resulting from the loss of a single phase between the transmission network and the onsite power distribution system at an operating nuclear plant in the United States. TVA has taken the short term actions described in the bulletin and the nuclear industry is developing a long term resolution. TVA has added the following license condition for the long term actions:



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Actions to resolve the issues identified in the Bulletin will be implemented on or before December 31, 2017.

The NRC staff is proposing the following License Condition:

By December 31, 2017, TVA will report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System' have been implemented.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that OPC design vulnerability with the WBN Unit 2 electric power system will be addressed by TVA when license conditions and regulatory commitments are met. The staff will close Bulletin 2012-01 for WBN Unit 2 when TVA notifies the NRC with a close-out letter when full compliance is achieved."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed it, TVA has remaining action.

8.2.3	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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**13**

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected STATUS to "C."

8.2.4	27	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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**13**

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.2.4 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff reviewed the offsite power system for WBN Unit 2 as described in FSAR Section 8.2, including the single-line diagrams, station layout drawings, schematic diagrams, and descriptive information. The staff concluded that the offsite power system conforms to the requirements of GDC 17 and 18 and is, therefore, acceptable, pending resolution of the open items noted above."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

8.3.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
8.3.1	27	<b>S</b>	8.3 Fifth Diesel Generator
		<b>13</b>	<p>In SSER10, NRC reviewed the design of the fifth diesel generator. In SSER19, NRC accepted TVA's commitment to perform modifications and surveillances including preoperational testing before declaring the fifth diesel generator operable as a replacement for one of the four diesel generators. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - incorporate new design that provides dedicated transformer for each preferred offsite circuit in FSAR</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the offsite power system with a dedicated transformer for each preferred offsite circuit met GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue. In SSER13, NRC reviewed additional changes though FSAR amendment 75 and concluded that the design was acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1 DG Starting and Control Circuit Logic</p> <p>In SSER10, NRC reviewed the DG starting and control circuit logic. No open items were identified.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.2 Low and Degraded Grid Voltage Condition</p> <p>In the SER, NRC stated they would verify the adequacy of TVA's analysis regarding Branch Technical Position PSB-1 once preoperational testing was completed. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed information on the load shed and diesel start relays. In SSER14 NRC clarified the requirements. In SSER20, NRC reviewed the preoperational test for Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Include the setpoint in the Technical Specifications for the load shed relays and similar minimum limits for the diesel start relays.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.6: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - provide diesel generator reliability qualification test report</p> <p>In SSER2, NRC indicated that it would verify DG qualification testing. TVA provided a copy of the DG qualification test report. In SSER7, the NRC concluded that the DGs had been satisfactorily tested in accordance with IEEE 387-1977.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.6: LICENSE CONDITION (12) - Diesel generator reliability qualification testing at normal operating temperature</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC required that the capability of the DGs to start at normal temperature be demonstrated. TVA's August 31, 1983, letter confirmed tests had been performed on a DG identical to those at WBN. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.7 Possible Interconnection Between Redundant Divisions Through Normal and Alternate Power to the Battery Charger</p> <p>By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the use of alternate feeders to the battery chargers and inverters and concluded a Technical Specification surveillance for monitoring the position of these supply breakers resolved the item.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Include the surveillance requirement in the Technical Specifications.</p>

## 8.3.1.10 No-load Operation of the Diesel Generator

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the information provided and concluded the issue was resolved. In SSER14, NRC added additional clarification but did not change the conclusions.

## 8.3.1.11 Test and Inspection of the Vital Power System

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed TVA's plan for test and inspection of the vital ac system and concluded the issue was resolved.

## 8.3.1.12 The Capability and Independence of Offsite and Onsite Sources When Paralleling During Testing

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the Emergency Diesel Generators response to a loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP). TVA submitted additional information for both units by letters dated February 7, 1994 and June 29, 1994. In SSER14, NRC concluded that the issue was resolved.

## 8.3.1.13 Use of an Idle Start Switch for Diesel Generators

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the information presented on the local idle start switch and concluded the issue was resolved.

## 8.3.1.14 Master Fuse List Program

In SSER9, NRC provided a safety evaluation of the Master Fuse List Special Program (SP) for Unit 1 (Appendix U). In SSER13, NRC referenced the evaluation.

Unit 2 Action: Resolve the SP for WBN Unit 2 with the Unit 1 approach.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

Revised "SSER18" to "SSER19" item 8.3 above to fix typographical error in Regulatory Framework.

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

8.3.1.2: TS Table 3.3.5-1 provides Diesel Generator start and load shed relay trip setpoints and allowable values.

8.3.1.7: TS surveillance requirements SR 3.8.4.3 and SR 3.8.7.1 provide surveillances to check the

alignment of battery charger alternate feeder breakers and inverters.

8.3.1.14: TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Master Fuse List Special Program.

In SSER21 the Containment Cooling SP was resolved. Completion of the Master Fuse List SP is tracked under 23.3.5.

#### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.1.2 of SSER22 included, "TVA should confirm that all safety-related equipment (in addition to the Class 1E motors) will have adequate starting and running voltage at the most limiting safety-related components (such as motor-operated valves (MOVs), contactors, solenoid valves or relays) at the DVR setpoint dropout setting. TVA should also confirm that (1) the motorstarting transient studies are based on the dropout voltage value of DVR and time delay, (2) the steady-state voltage drop studies are carried out by maximizing running loads on the Class 1E distribution system (bounding combination of safety systems loads), with the voltage at 6.9-kV Class 1E buses (monitored by the DVRs) at or just above the DVR dropout setting, and (3) the DVR settings do not credit any equipment operation (such as LTC transformers) upstream of the 6.9-kV Class 1E buses. TVA should also confirm that the final technical specifications (TSS) are properly derived from these analytical values for the degraded voltage settings. This is Open Item 30 (Appendix HH)."

Section 8.3.1.11 of SSER22 included, "If the FSAR description is correct, TVA should explain how the EDG and logic sequencing circuitry will respond to a LOCA followed by a LOOP scenario. This is Open Item 31 (Appendix HH)."

Section 8.3.1.12 of SSER22 included, "In its letter dated December 6, 2010, TVA stated that Amendment 103 to the Unit 2 FSAR will revise the Equipment Capacities portion of Section 8.3.1.1 to match the information in Tables 8.3-4 through 8.3-7. The staff finds the TVA response acceptable."

Section 8.3.1.14 of SSER22 included, "TVA should provide to the NRC staff the details of the administrative limits of EDG voltage and speed range, along with the basis for its conclusion that the impact is negligible. TVA should also describe how it accounts for the administrative limits in the TS surveillance requirements for EDG voltage and frequency. This is Open Item 32 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 31:

"LOCA followed by LOOP

TVA to NRC letter dated December 6, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information,' (ADAMS accession number ML103420569) included the response to RAI 8.3.1.11. That response stated, 'A LOCA followed by a delayed LOOP is not a Design Basis Event for WBN.'

The design basis for WBN assumes a simultaneous LOOP - LOCA. The Hydraulic Analysis does not support a LOCA with a delayed LOOP event; however, the logic is designed to ensure that loads are re-sequenced during a LOCA with a delayed LOOP, to prevent a block start on a diesel generator. This logic does not impact the sequencing for the design bases event, simultaneous LOOP - LOCA.

LOOP - Delayed LOCA.

When the LOOP occurs, the diesel will start, based on detection by the Loss of Voltage relay. Loads which sequence on due to a blackout signal (Charging Pump, Auxiliary Feedwater, Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump, Closed Cooling, etc.) will begin sequencing on.

When a subsequent LOCA signal occurs, the diesel will remain running and connected to the Shutdown Board. Loads which are required for accident mitigation and which have previously sequenced on to the Shutdown Board, due to the LOOP, will remain running. Loads which are not required for accident mitigation will be tripped. Remaining loads required for accident mitigation, which have not been sequenced on at the time of the LOCA, will have their timers reset to 0 and will sequence on at the appropriate time for the LOCA signal.

#### LOCA - Delayed LOOP

When the LOCA occurs, the loads which are not running in normal operation will block start. At the same time, the diesels will start on the LOCA signal, but will not tie to the Shutdown Board.

When a subsequent LOOP occurs, all sequenced loads will be stripped from the board from a Loss of Voltage (approximately 86%) signal. Once the loss of voltage relay has reached its set point and the diesel is available, the diesel breaker will close and the sequence timers will begin to time. The first large motor (Centrifugal Charging Pump) connects at 5 seconds and is followed by the remaining accident required loads. This provides assurance that the voltage has decayed on the boards and no residual out of phase reconnection occurs."

#### REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated February 3, 2014 responded to SSER Open Item 32. The cover letter included the following:

"This letter provides TVA's response to NRC's information request contained in SSER 22, Appendix HH, Item 32 (Reference 1).

Enclosure 1 provides a description of and the basis for the diesel generator (DG) steady state frequency and voltage range. The evaluation demonstrates that the frequency and voltage range selected has a negligible impact on equipment powered by the DGs.

Enclosure 2 provides a description of the proposed changes to the WBN Unit 2 Developmental Technical Specifications (TS) to modify the acceptance criteria for the DG steady state frequency range provided in applicable Surveillance Requirements (SR). The current SR 3.8.1.2 frequency is greater than or equal to (~) 58.8 Hz and less than or equal to (~) 61.2 Hz. The proposed change to SR 3.8.1.2 will result in a 60.0 Hz nominal frequency. The frequency will be changed from ~ 58.8 Hz and ~ 61.2 Hz to ~ 59.8 Hz and ~ 60.1 Hz for SRs 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, 3.8.1.19, and 3.8.1.21. ..."

Enclosure 2 of the letter then provides marked-up pages to show the proposed revisions.

TVA to NRC letter dated June 13, 2014, provided a response to NRC's RAIs. The letter included the following:

TVA addressed a non-cited violation (NCV) identified in Reference 6 by performing a motor starting analysis in the calculation of record at the DVR dropout analytical limit as opposed to the DVR reset. The analysis is provided in Appendix H of Enclosure 2. [Reference 6 is NRC to TVA letter dated January 28, 2011: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2010005.]

Enclosure 1 to this letter also provides the TVA response to the information requested at the April 24, 2014 public meeting, including responses to the RAIs received in Reference 4. Enclosure 2 provides a copy of the Sensitivity Study of Degraded Voltage Relay (DVR) Protection During Motor Starting, Revision 2, performed by TVA to address the additional concerns with the DVR protection scheme at WBN. [Reference 4 was an e-mail from the NRC to TVA]

#### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TI 2512/037 (Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program) was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated March 24, 2015.

-----  
TVA to NRC letter dated January 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15030A511) provided responses to the staff's for request for additional information regarding "Chapter 8, 'Electrical Power' – Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 22, OPEN ITEM 30)."  
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TVA to NRC letter dated February 3, 2014 contained the following commitment:

"The TVA WBN Unit 2, NPG System Description Document, NPG-SDD-WBN2-82-4002, "Standby Diesel Generator System" shall be revised to describe the DG frequency and voltage governor setting methodology. The DG will be set within a speed band which is equivalent to a frequency band of 59.95 Hz± 0.05 Hz. Likewise the DG will be set within a voltage band of 6950 V, +50 V and -25 V. These frequency and voltage bands are the Acceptable As Found Tolerance (AAF). In the event that the speed (frequency) or voltage is found outside of their setting band (i.e., AAF), the 'as-found' values will be reset within the setting band, and the 'as-found' values will be entered into the WBN corrective action programs (CAP) for evaluation of performance and trending. Prior to WBN Unit 2 receiving an operating license."

The system description has been revised in accordance with the commitment.

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8.3.1 has 3 Open Items cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
30	Remains OPEN.
31	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion of 8.1.0.
32	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.

SSER27 contains the following under 8.3.1 AC Power System:

"8.3.1.1 Description

Open Item 32

Open Item 32 states, 'TVA should provide to the NRC staff the details of the administrative limits of EDG voltage and speed range, and the basis for its conclusion that the impact is negligible, and describe how it accounts for the administrative limits in the Technical Specification [TS] surveillance requirements for EDG voltage and frequency.'

By letter dated February 13, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14038A079), TVA proposed modifying the WBN Unit 2 TS Surveillance Requirements (SRs) related to surveillance, operation and testing of the EDGs when not connected in parallel with the offsite sources. Specifically, TVA proposed to modify the frequency range from greater than or equal to ( $\geq$ ) 58.8 Hz and less than or equal to ( $\leq$ ) 61.2 Hz to  $\geq 59.8$  Hz and  $\leq 60.1$  Hz for SRs 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, 3.8.1.19, and 3.8.1.21. With respect to the monthly surveillance performed on the EDG, TVA proposes to revise this surveillance (i.e., SR 3.8.1.2) to confirm that the nominal frequency value of 60 Hz is achieved. The letter states that the EDG voltage limits of 6800 V to 7260 V, as described in the TS, are correct as validated by the analyses.

The WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 3.1 details conformance with the Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs as set forth in 10 CFR Section 50.36. GDC 17, 'Electric Power Systems,' of Appendix A, 'General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,' to 10 CFR Part 50, requires, in part, that an onsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The onsite electric power supplies and the onsite electric distribution system shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single

failure. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of the loss of power from the unit, the transmission network, or the onsite electric power supplies.

GDC 18, 'Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems,' requires that electric power systems important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to demonstrate operability and functional performance.

It states in 10 CFR Section 50.36 that each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in 10 CFR 50.21 or 50.22 will include TSs. As described in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) - (8), TSs will include items in the following categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; (5) administrative controls; (6) decommissioning; (7) initial notification; (8) written reports.

NRC RG 1.9, Revision 3, dated July 1993, 'Selection, Design, Qualification and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants,' describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regulations with regard to design and testing of onsite EDGs.

The staff has reviewed TVA's regulatory and technical analyses in support of its proposed changes, which is described in Enclosure 1 of the TVA's letter dated February 13, 2014.

The offsite and onsite power systems at the WBN Unit 2 are designed to comply with the requirements of GDC 17 and 18 respectively. The WBN Unit 2 FSAR states that the offsite sources are two independent 161-Kv transmission lines terminating at the 161-Kv switchyard, providing power to the plant, on demand, via the common station service transformers to the onsite Class 1E distribution system

The standby Alternating Current (AC) power system (onsite electrical power system) serves the two nuclear power units (WBN Unit 1 and WBN Unit 2) and certain common plant equipment. It consists of two independent EDG systems, each system containing two EDG units, two redundant Class 1E electric power distribution trains, and four redundant vital instrument and control power channels, each provided with an uninterruptible ac power supply and distribution panel. Each EDG consists of two 16-cylinder engines directly connected to a 6.9 Kv generator. The continuous rating of each EDG is 4400 kilowatt (Kw) at 0.8 power factor, 6.9 Kv, 3-phase, and 60 Hz. Each EDG also has an additional rating of 4840 Kw for 2 hours out of 24 hours. Ratings for the EDGs satisfy the requirements of RG 1.9 Rev. 3. The continuous service rating of each EDG is 4400 Kw with 10 percent overload permissible for up to 2 hours in any 24 hour period.

Any variation in steady state voltage and/or frequency affects the operating characteristics of motor driven loads such as pumps, fans and valves. If variation in both voltage and frequency occurs simultaneously, the effect will be superimposed and compounded such that the available margin in EDG capacity may be eroded. TVA has proposed to narrow the existing allowable range of frequency for the acceptance criteria during EDG surveillance testing to assure that safe shutdown equipment will perform as required by accident analyses.

TVA has stated that the changes in frequency from the nominal rating of 60 Hz to the proposed range were evaluated for the following equipment with consideration to a LOOP or a LOCA coupled with a LOOP:

1. Pump flow, Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) availability and horsepower requirements,
2. Fan flow and horsepower requirements,
3. Motor operated valves (MOV) opening/closing speed and horsepower requirements,
4. Air compressor flow and horsepower requirements, and
5. Chiller horsepower requirements

TVA stated that only major pumps in safety significant systems were evaluated in detail, because, the speed, load, flow, and NPSH are only slightly impacted (i.e., 0.3%). The results of the evaluations are tabulated in Tables 3 and 4 of Enclosure 1 of the TVA's letter dated February 13, 2014. TVA has concluded that the brake horsepower of motors due to a speed variation of  $\pm 0.3\%$  will vary by 1.0%. Table 5 of Enclosure 1 provides a summary of the major pump brake horsepower (BHP) as a result of frequency variation. TVA has concluded that the change in BHP of large motors is acceptable due to the rating of the equipment, the margin in nameplate rating or specific analyses performed by the vendor indicating that any temperature increase will not adversely impact the motor windings.

For the long term mitigation of a LOCA/LOOP, TVA evaluated major fans and air handling units



(Section 1.2.7 of Enclosure 1) supplied by the EDGs. The evaluation concluded that all of the fans affected by diesel generator frequency variation will provide adequate flow to maintain safe shutdown equipment environment.

TVA stated that MOV stroke time will be approximately 0.8% longer as a result of the change in the frequency and voltage. The evaluation concluded that the longer stroke time does not exceed the time for MOV operation assumed in the safety analyses for accident mitigation requirements. Hence the longer stroke time is acceptable. The shorter stroke time due to higher frequency does not impact assumptions in safety analyses. TVA has concluded that there are no concerns with MOV operation due to the variation in EDG frequency and voltage.

Enclosure 1 also provided a summary of evaluations performed for voltage and frequency variations on air compressor and chiller flows, power transformers, battery chargers, hydrogen igniters and pertinent small motors. TVA has concluded that the impact on these components is minor and acceptable.

TVA also evaluated the impact of the proposed change on EDG1-1A, the heaviest loaded EDG, under postulated accident conditions and concluded that:

1. The calculated total load of 4116 Kw is below the nominal rating of 4400 Kw and therefore acceptable for the EDGs.
2. There is no impact on TS-required fuel oil volume. The current calculation assumes that the EDGs operate at the 2-hour overload rating of 4840 Kw for the first 2 hours of the seven-day period and at 4400 Kw for the remaining 166 hours of the seven-day period.

TVA has evaluated the impact of frequency and voltage variation in the ranges of 59.8 to 60.1 Hz and 6800 V to 7260 V, respectively for WBN Unit 2 equipment fed by the EDGs during a LOOP or LOCA/LOOP and proposed TSs. The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's proposed TSs and supporting documentation. Based on the evaluation discussed above, the staff determined that the proposed TSs related to the allowable steady state operating voltage and frequency band of the EDGs is consistent with the recommendations of the NRC guidance in RG 1.9 Rev. 3. The NRC staff also concludes that the proposed TSs will meet the intent of GDC 17 and 18 governing the design and operation of the onsite electrical power systems and provides adequate assurance of system operability. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes acceptable and consistent with the NRC regulations and the regulatory guidance, and considers Open Item 32 to be closed."

Status remains as 'Open (NRR)' in SSER27.

8.3.2	27	<b>S</b>	8.3.2.2: LICENSE CONDITION – DC monitoring and annunciation system
		<b>13</b>	In SSER3, the staff determined that some items were omitted from the design of the DG DC monitoring and annunciation system. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

#### 8.3.2.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - include diesel generator design analysis in FSAR

In the original 1982 SER, staff indicated the design analysis for demonstrating compliance of the DGs with regulatory requirements and guidelines was acceptable pending incorporation of the analysis in the FSAR. The analysis was incorporated in the FSAR, and the issue closed in SSER2. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

#### 8.3.2.5 Non-safety Loads Powered from the DC Distribution System and Vital Inverters

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.



## 8.3.2.5.1 Transfer of Loads Between Power Supplies Associated with the Same Load Group but Different Units

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC reviewed the information provided. Additional information was requested for both units by letter dated March 28, 1994. TVA responded for both units by letter dated June 29, 1994. In SSER14, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

## 8.3.2.7 The Fifth Vital Battery System

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

## 8.3.2.8 Reenergizing the Battery Charger from the Onsite Power Sources Versus Automatically Immediately Following a Loss of Offsite Power

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.2.3 of SSER22 included, "TVA stated that the design change notices (DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2, and that these were unverified assumptions used in its analysis of the 125-V dc vital battery system. Verification of the completion of these DCNs must be provided to the NRC staff before issuance of the operating license. This is Open Item 33 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 33:

"The applicable DCNs are as follow:

- DCN 53421 for the removal/abandonment of Reciprocating Charging Pump 2-MTR-62-101, supplied from 480V SHDN BD 2B1-B, Compt. 3B, has been issued.
- DCN 54636 for the cable modifications for Unit 2 AFWP Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve and Turbine Controls has been issued.

NRC will be notified when the physical work has been completed for these two DCNs."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open item 33 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated March 24, 2015.

TVA to NRC letter dated April 7, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15097A421) notified the NRC of the

completion of field work for plant modifications made per DCN 53421 and DCN 54636.

8.3.3	22	CO	8.3.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involving submergence of electrical equipment as result of a LOCA
		13	In the original 1982 SER and SSER3, staff stated that the design for the automatic deenergizing of loads as a result of a LOCA would be verified as part of the site visit. During the August 1991, visit and in a letter for both units dated September 13, 1991, TVA committed to revise the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR in amendment 71. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

#### 8.3.3.1.3 Failure Analysis of Circuits Associated with Cables and Cable Splices Unqualified for Submergence

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC reviewed the submergence calculation and closed the issue.

Unit 2 Action: Revise calculation for WBN Unit 2.

#### 8.3.3.1.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - verify design for bypass of thermal overload protective device

In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the design for bypass of thermal overload protective devices on safety-related motor operated valves would be verified during the electrical drawing review. The staff subsequently reviewed the drawings and closed the issue in SSER2.

#### 8.3.3.1.4 Use of Waterproof Splices in Potentially Submersible Sections of Underground Duct Runs

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13 and 14, NRC raised a concern on splice usage in raceways. TVA submitted additional information for both units by letters dated November 18, 1994, and January 5, 1995. In SSER15, NRC found that TVA had adequately justified the acceptability of the installed splices at Watts Bar.

#### 8.3.3.1.5 Dow Corning RTV-3140 Used to Repair Damaged Kapton Insulated Conductors

In SSER15, NRC reviewed the use of RTV-3140. TVA submitted the technical basis for use in a December 6, 1994, letter for both units. TVA completed additional testing and told the NRC of the limited use of this repair method for both units by letter dated February 10, 1995. In SSER15, NRC found the use of RTV-3140 acceptable for the limited use described.

#### 8.3.3.1.6 Cable Damage Near Splices and Terminations

In SSER16, NRC reviewed TVA's corrective action plan for Construction Deficiency Report 390/95-02 and found the limited inspections for damaged Class 1E cables to 10 CFR 50.49 installations acceptable. This was a WBN Unit 1 only CDR.

#### 8.3.3.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - revise FSAR to reflect requirements of shared safety systems

In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that the description and analysis of shared onsite AC and DC systems was under review but was acceptable pending revision of the FSAR. In SSER3, the confirmatory issue was left open to track additional information to be incorporated in the FSAR. In a letter dated September 13, 1991, TVA provided the additional information. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue. In

SSER14, NRC added additional clarification.

#### 8.3.3.2.2 Sharing of AC Distribution Systems and Standby Power Supplies Between Units 1 and 2

In the SER and SSER3, NRC reviewed the design to the guidelines of RG 1.81 and determined it was acceptable pending revision to the FSAR. NRC noted discrepancies in the FSAR. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

#### 8.3.3.2.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for design of sharing raceway systems between units

In the original SER, NRC indicated that the design for sharing of raceway systems between units would be verified during the electrical drawing review. The staff confirmed that cable routing was in accordance with accepted separation criteria and closed the issue in SSER2.

#### 8.3.3.2.4: LICENSE CONDITION – Possible sharing of DC control power to AC switchgear

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that all possible interconnections between redundant divisions through normal and alternate power sources to various loads be identified in the FSAR. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

#### 8.3.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION – Testing of associated circuits

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective devices used to isolate non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

#### 8.3.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION – Testing of non-class 1E cables

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective devices used to isolate non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided additional information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

#### 8.3.3.3 Physical Independence (Compliance with GDC 17)

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. The information was incorporated into the FSAR by amendment 71. Surveillance requirements for the testing of protective devices used to protect Class 1E circuits from failure of non-Class 1E circuits were incorporated into the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). This issue was closed based on review of the TRM in SSER13.

Unit 2 Action:

Incorporate testing requirements into the Unit 2 TRM.

#### 8.3.3.3 Physical Independence (Compliance with GDC 17)

In SSER13, NRC cited differences between RG 1.75 and the WBN design criteria (WB-DC-30-4). In SSER14, NRC continued the review. NRC requested additional information for both WBN units by letter dated March 28, 1994. TVA responded for both WBN units by letters dated July 29, 1994, January 11,

1995, and June 5, 1995. In SSER16, NRC found separation between open cable trays (including cables in free air) adequate.

#### 8.3.3.5.1 Compliance with Regulatory Guides 1.108 and 1.118

In SSERs 13, 14 and 15, NRC reviewed WBN compliance with RGs 1.108 and 1.118. In SSER13, NRC reviewed WBN's use of temporary jumper wires when portable test equipment is used during testing. The justification was documented in the FSAR. In SSER14 and 15, NRC reviewed Class 1E standby power system testing, testing DG full load rejection capability and non-class 1E circuitry for transmitting signals needed for starting DGs. NRC concluded that the features were appropriately tested.

#### 8.3.3.5.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - incorporate commitment to test only one of four diesel generators at one time

In the original 1982 SER, the NRC found the commitment to test DGs one at a time acceptable pending its incorporation into the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC reviewed the documentation and closed the issue.

#### 8.3.3.5.3 Time Constraints for Stability of EDG During No-Load Startup Testing

In SSER16, NRC reviewed and approved changes to the no load emergency diesel generator testing surveillance requirements.

#### Unit 2 Action:

Incorporate into WBN Unit 2 TS surveillances.

#### 8.3.3.6: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involving evaluation of penetrations' ability to withstand failure of overcurrent protection device

In the original 1982 SER, staff required a reevaluation of the penetrations' capability to withstand, without seal failure, the total range of available time-current characteristics assuming a single failure of any overcurrent protective device. In SSER3, staff found the results of the evaluation acceptable pending the information being incorporated in the FSAR. The staff reviewed the FSAR and closed the issue for both units in SSER7.

#### 8.3.3.6: LICENSE CONDITION – Testing of reactor coolant pump breakers

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that the redundant fault current protective devices for the reactor coolant pump circuits meet RG 1.63. In SSER2, staff reviewed the design and concluded it met RG 1.63.

#### 8.3.3.6 Compliance with GDC 50

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. The information was incorporated into the FSAR in amendment 70. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

8.3.3.3: TRM TR 3.8.1 specifies testing of circuit breakers that are used as isolation devices protecting 1E busses from non-qualified loads.

8.3.3.5.3: TS Sections 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15 and 3.8.1.21 require that voltage and frequency remain within specified limits following a fast start.

#### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.3.1.1 of SSER22 included, "Therefore, the NRC staff considers the issue of submerged electrical equipment as a result of a LOCA to be resolved."

Section 8.3.3.1.2 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff concludes that the above clarification by TVA is acceptable, and the issue of thermal overload protective bypass is resolved."

Section 8.3.3.2 of SSER22 included, "In its December 6, 2010, letter, TVA stated that the adequacy of selective tripping has been verified to assure protection of safety-related dc systems from failure in the non-Class 1E circuits and common or safety/nonsafety-related circuits. All cascaded fuses were tested for selective coordination with the upstream protective devices."

Section 8.3.3.2.1 of SSER22 included, "Based on the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the sharing of the dc system will not significantly impair the ability of the system to perform its intended safety functions, including the scenario encompassing an accident in one unit and the orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining unit while considering the effects of a single failure. Therefore, the staff considers this issue resolved."

Section 8.3.3.2.2 of SSER22 included, "The electrical ac and dc systems have common buses and nonsafety loads supplied from train A or train B power supplies. In its letter dated August 30, 2010, TVA stated that separation is provided by selective coordination of protective devices for all ac (including 480 V) and dc circuits with molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) combinations or MCCB and fuse combinations or fuse/fuse combinations. Since selective coordination exists between the non-Class 1E and Class 1E circuits, the NRC staff concludes that this is acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.2.3 of SSER22 included, "Verification of the shared raceway design's conformance with GDC 5 through reviews of plant drawings and installation inspections is subject to the NRC construction inspection program."

Section 8.3.3.2.4 of SSER22 included, "In its response letter dated December 6, 2010, TVA stated that Section 8.3.2.1.1, "Physical Arrangements of Components," in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR discusses that the interconnection between redundant divisions of normal and alternate power sources for the components listed in FSAR Table 8.3-10 is arranged to provide adequate physical isolation and electrical separation to prevent a common mode failure. The listed components in FSAR Table 8.3-10 also meet the staff's positions identified in Section 8.3.1.7 of the staff SER. TVA has reviewed the components listed in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Table 8.3-10 and verified that their normal and alternate power supplies are physically and electrically separated. TVA has indicated that the Integrated Safeguards Test conducted in accordance with RG 1.41, "Preoperational Testing of Redundant Onsite Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments," will demonstrate the independence of the divisions and furthermore, these components are energized to support Unit 1 operation and no design change is required for their normal and alternate power supplies in support of two unit operation. Since the arrangement meets the staff's positions in the SER, the staff finds this response acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.3 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff finds the information provided by TVA regarding isolation of non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits to be acceptable. The NRC staff requested TVA confirm that, for those circuit breakers that are required to be tested periodically as discussed above, the TRM includes the surveillance requirements for both items 8.3.3.2 and 8.3.3.3. In a letter dated

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

December 6, 2010, TVA stated that the breaker testing requirements are provided in Technical Requirement (TR) 3.8.1 of the WBN Unit 2 TRM. This section of the TRM was originally provided in accordance with a TVA to NRC letter dated March 4, 2009. It was updated in a TVA letter dated February 2, 2010. The NRC staff's review confirmed that necessary circuit breaker testing requirements have been included in Section TR 3.8.1 of the TRM submitted by TVA for Unit 2."

Section 8.3.3.4(1) of SSER22 included, "The staff finds the TVA response as acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.4(2) of SSER22 included, "The staff finds the TVA response acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.5 of SSER22 included, "Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has met the requirements of GDC 18 with respect to the onsite ac and dc power system."

Section 8.3.3.5.1 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff reviewed the exceptions to RG 1.9, Revision 3, and concludes that they are not significant to safety and are, therefore, acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.5.2 of SSER22 included, "Since TVA has updated the FSAR to reflect that tests will be performed on only one of the four power trains at any one time, the SER item is resolved for WBN Unit 2."

Section 8.3.3.6 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff concludes that TVA continues to meet the requirements of GDC 50 with respect to electrical penetrations containing circuits of the safety and nonsafety onsite power system."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct Status to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.

8.3.4	22	O
		06

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.4 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff concludes that the plant design meets the requirements of GDC 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, and 50 and conforms to the guidance of applicable RGs and NUREG reports, and is, therefore, acceptable, pending resolution of the open items noted in Section 8.3 above."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

8.4.0	22	CI
		13

Station Blackout (SBO) - SE for both units - March 18, 1993; SSE for both units - September 9, 1993.

Unit 2 Action: Implement SBO requirements.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.4.8 of SSER22 (Summary and Conclusions) stated:

"Based on the information provided by TVA regarding meeting the requirements of the SBO rule, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's completed and proposed actions, processes, and procedures to address an SBO event are acceptable, pending resolution before WBN Unit 2 startup of the open items noted above in Section 8 of this SSER."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

NPG calculation EPMMA041592, "Station Blackout Coping Evaluation" evaluated the existing electrical and mechanical systems at Watts Bar using the NUMARC 87-00 methodology and guidance. The purpose of the calculation was to determine the systems capabilities and capacities to cope with the required four hour SBO duration using battery capacity only and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Modifications and procedural changes that must be made in order to ensure the systems' capability for coping were recommended in the conclusion section of the calculation.

Physical modifications have been implemented by providing Nitrogen bottles to the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) which will provide adequate supply of control pressure to remotely modulate the AFW Level Control Valves (LCVs) from outside the South Valve Room.

Quality Assurance requirements for components required for coping with an SBO event are already in place for Unit 1, the same requirements will apply to Unit 2 once an operating license is issued.

The following procedures which were delineated in the calculation conclusion are in Independent Qualified Review (IQR) status for Unit 2:

- \* 2-ECA-0.0, "Loss of Shutdown Power"
- \* 2-ECA-0.1, "Recovery from Loss of Shutdown Power Without SI Required"
- \* O-AOI-35, "Loss of Offsite Power"
- \* O-AOI-08, "Abnormal Operating Instruction for Tornado Watch or Warning"

2-ECA-0.0, "Loss of Shutdown Power" added steps to address an extended loss of AC power, including initiating O-FSI-4, "DC Bus Management/Load Shed and 480V FLEX DG Alignment/Loading", and O-FSI-5.01, "Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging". The requirements of Station Blackout (SBO) and FLEX are implemented by 2-ECA-0.0 (including the load shedding of the 250V Station Batteries). At the point where the Shutdown Boards are aligned to the 6.9KV Flex Diesels, a recovery of Offsite Power and/or Onsite Emergency Power is no longer viable under SBO guidance (See Caution 2 prior step 18 in 2-ECA-0.0). At this point the plant is no longer in a Station Blackout Event and the procedure proceeds in only a FLEX strategy.

8.5.0		<b>NA</b>	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
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8.5.1		<b>NA</b>	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
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9.0.0	10	<b>C</b> <b>01</b>	In SSER10, the staff completed its review of the additional DG building and that review is documented in Sections 9.2.1, 9.4.5, 9.5, 9.5.1, 9.5.4, 9.5.6, 9.5.7 and 9.5.8 of SSER10.
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9.1.0	5	<b>C</b> <b>01</b>	In response to TVA letters requesting relief from the requirement of 10 CFR 70.24 to have a criticality monitor installed in the fuel storage area until irradiated fuel is placed in the area, the staff granted an exemption from the requirement in SSER5.
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9.1.1	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9.1.2	22	C — — 06	<p>In SSER5, the staff acknowledged notification by TVA of a contract with DOE for DOE to accept spent fuel from WB and stated that they had no more concerns about this issue.</p> <p>In SSER15, the staff reviewed TVA's proposed resolution of the Boraflex degradation issue and found it acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER16, the staff reviewed changes in design basis with respect to placement of fuel assembly, and structural aspects of rack fabrication deficiencies, considering that TVA planned to replace the racks by the first scheduled refueling outage. The staff noted that the replacement racks have approximately the same capacity as the original WB racks. The staff concluded that the proposed changes were acceptable provided that no single rack load exceeded 80% of its original capacity.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 9.1.2 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed the description of the spent fuel storage pit in Amendment 100 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR and compared it with the description in Amendment 8 to the WBN Unit 1 FSAR. The staff found the descriptions to be essentially identical. Based on prior staff evaluation documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, the staff's review and acceptance of amendments to the WBN Unit 1 operating license, and the staff's comparison of the WBN Unit 1 FSAR with Amendment 100 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, the staff concluded that the spent fuel storage pool conforms to the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, 5, 61, and 63 for protection against natural phenomena, missiles, pipe break effects, radiation protection, and monitoring provisions. Therefore, the design of the shared spent fuel storage pool described in Section 9.1.2 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
9.1.3	27	C — — 13	<p>In SSER11, the staff reviewed TVA's revised commitment regarding testing of spent fuel pool cooling pumps and found it acceptable.</p> <p>As a result of a submittal filed as a petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 regarding spent fuel storage safety issues, the staff reevaluated the spent fuel cooling capability at WB considering the identified issues and concluded that the spent fuel cooling system satisfied the requirements of GDC 44 with regard to transferring heat from the spent fuel to an ultimate heat sink under normal operating and accident conditions in SSER15.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>9.1.3 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"The staff reviewed the changes proposed by TVA to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR in its letter dated December 21, 2010, and compared the changes to the spent fuel pool cooling acceptance criteria applied to</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

WBN Unit 1 and the FSAR content requirements of 10 CFR 50.34. The staff found that the design of the SFPCCS is unchanged and remains acceptable, consistent with the conclusions of the staff as documented in the SER and its supplements. Based on its review, the staff concluded that TVA demonstrated that the cooling capability of the existing SFPCCS was adequate for the increased heat load imposed by alternating fuel discharges from WBN Units 1 and 2 under normal operating conditions, as required by GDC 44 and 61. The staff concludes that the proposed description of the design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 adequately supports operation of WBN Unit 2 and is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34, and is, therefore, acceptable. Amendment of the FSAR description of the design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 as proposed by TVA in its December 21, 2010, letter to the NRC, is Open Item 60 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 60 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should amend the FSAR description of the design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 as proposed in its December 21, 2010, letter to the NRC. (Section 9.1.3)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 9.1.3 included the following for Open Item 60:

"The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR in Amendment 103 to add the description of the system as proposed in its letter dated December 21, 2010. Therefore, Open Item 60 is closed."

The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER shows Status as "Resolved."

9.1.4	24	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Control of heavy loads (NUREG-0612)
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		<b>11</b>	The staff noted in SSER3 that they were reviewing TVA's submittals regarding NUREG-0612 and concluded in SSER13 that the license condition was no longer necessary based on their review of TVA's response to NUREG-0612 guidelines for Phase I in TVA letter dated July 28, 1993.
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Unit 2 Action: Implement NEI guidance on heavy loads.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.1.4 includes:

"In Enclosure 1 to its letter dated August 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102510580), TVA described Unit 2 conformance with guidelines for control of heavy loads. TVA stated that WBN Unit 2 would comply with the Phase I guidelines of NUREG-0612 and qualify the Unit 2 polar crane as equivalent to single-failure-proof for reactor vessel head lifts, consistent with the guidelines of NEI 08-05. TVA stated that the method of compliance with Phase I guidelines would be substantially similar to the current Unit 1 program and that a new Section 3.12 will be added to the Unit 2 FSAR that will be materially equivalent to Section 3.12 of the current Unit 1 FSAR. This is Open Item 34 (Appendix HH).

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the design and proposed operation of the WBN Unit 2 fuel handling system is acceptable. The descriptions of equipment and operating procedures used for the handling of fuel within the reactor, refueling canal, and shared spent fuel storage facilities included in Section 9.1.4 of Amendment 100 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR were approved by the NRC staff in the SER. Also, the NRC staff accepted the WBN Unit 1 heavy load handling program based on conformance with the Phase I guidelines of NUREG-0612, as documented in SSER 13 to NUREG-0847, and TVA enhanced the WBN Unit 1 program through implementation of the NEI 08-05 guidelines. Therefore, implementation of a materially equivalent program at WBN Unit 2 and incorporation of the program information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is acceptable for fuel and heavy load handling activities associated with the operation of WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 34:

"Amendment 103 to the Unit 2 FSAR added new Section 3.12 (Control of Heavy Loads). This new section is materially equivalent to Section 3.12 of the Unit 1 UFSAR.

Amendment 103 was submitted via TVA to NRC letter dated March 15, 2011, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) – Unit 2 – Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Amendment 103.'"

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.1.4 of SSER24 includes:

"The NRC staff verified that, in Amendment 103, dated March 15, 2011, to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 final safety analysis report (FSAR), TVA added Section 3.12, 'Control of Heavy Loads,' that is materially equivalent to Section 3.12 of the current WBN Unit 1 FSAR. Since TVA's method of compliance with the Phase I guidelines of NUREG-0612, 'Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants: Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36,' issued July 1980, for WBN Unit 2 is substantially similar to the current WBN Unit 1 program, the NRC staff finds TVA's response acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 34 is closed."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 11 UPDATE:

TVA calculation WCG-1-2010 (175 Ton Reactor Building Cranes - Single Failure Proof Equivalence) demonstrated that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Building Cranes are considered single-failure-proof equivalent for the lifting of the reactor vessel pressure head.

This, in conjunction with the actions previously stated, complete the implementation of the NEI 08-05 guidance.

9.1.5	NA	Addressed in 9.1.4.
9.2.0	0	C
		Approved for both units in SER.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9.2.1	27	CO — — 13	<p>In SSER9, the staff noted that Amendment 65 indicated that ERCW provided cooling to the instrument room chillers, instead of room coolers and stated that conclusions in the SER and supplements were still valid. In SSER10, the staff reviewed discrepancies between FSAR figures pertaining to the raw cooling water system and its valving and TVA's clarification of these discrepancies, and considered them resolved.</p> <p>In SSER18, the staff concluded that ERCW does not conform to GDC 5 for two-unit operation.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that the ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design requirements for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>9.2.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“The staff should verify that the ERCW dual unit flow balance confirms that the ERCW pumps meet all specified performance requirements and have sufficient capability to supply all required ERCW normal and accident flows for dual unit operation and accident response, in order to verify that the ERCW pumps meet GDC 5 requirements for two-unit operation. This is Open Item 90 (Appendix HH).”</p> <p>AND</p> <p>“In its response by letter dated April 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11 104A059), TVA stated that the most limiting cooldown analysis to verify compliance with GDC 5 is a LOCA in Unit 2 with a complete loss of ERCW train A equipment as the single failure with a loss of offsite power (LOOP). All ERCW train B equipment is available, including CCS heat exchanger C and two of four ERCW train B pumps. Core decay heat for the accident unit is conservatively held constant. TVA's analysis determined that ERCW train B has sufficient capability, approximately 19 hours after the nonaccident unit enters hot standby, to remove decay heat from both the accident unit and the nonaccident unit. The time to reach cold shutdown for the nonaccident unit is 46 hours after the nonaccident unit is shut down to hot standby. Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated April 13, 2011, the staff concludes that the ERCW system is able to support a cold shutdown of the nonaccident unit within 46 hours of a LOCA in the other unit and hot standby in the nonaccident unit, coincident with a single failure and a LOOP. Therefore, the staff concludes that the ERCW system meets the requirements of GDC 5, which requires that sharing of systems that are important to safety will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the nonaccident unit. TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011, and as described above. This is Open Item 91 (Appendix HH).”</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Open (NRR).”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 90 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“The NRC staff should verify that the ERCW dual unit flow balance confirms that the ERCW pumps meet all specified performance requirements and have sufficient capability to supply all required ERCW normal and accident flows for dual unit operation and accident response, in order to verify that the ERCW pumps meet GDC 5 requirements for two-unit operation. (Section 9.2.1)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 91 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011. (Section 9.2.1)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p>

For Open Item 91:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014, submitted Amendment 112 to the Unit 2 FSAR.

A portion of this amendment revised Section 9.2.1 to provide information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011. FSAR portions revised were 9.2.1.3 and 9.2.2.4.

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TVA to NRC letter dated June 12, 2014, provided response to an NRC RAI. The letter contained the following:

"The RAI requests information on alignment of pumps and heat exchangers in the Component Cooling Water System (CCS) for certain combinations of design basis events and design basis accidents. TVA's response is provided in the enclosure. Changes required for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant WBN) Unit 2 FSAR, Section 9.2 were provided by the above reference." [The "above reference" was TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014]

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

The flow balance was approached to assure that Unit 1 and 2 loads would be satisfied for all design conditions and provide assurance that Unit 1 would receive required flow during the dual unit flow balance effort. All components meet or exceed their design basis flows or are justified in the calculation provided that the 2B CCS Heat Exchanger (Hx) is cleaned.

The 2B CCS Hx was cleaned, and testing was performed to get flow, pressure, and valve position readings. A PER was initiated to address the list of components which failed to meet the dual unit flow rate acceptance criteria, Engineering was tasked to evaluate the test data and provide final disposition. Design Engineering evaluated the results determining that the intermediate position of 2-FCV-67-146 produced satisfactory results, and the required intermediate position has been established. The flows and pressure are within acceptable tolerance and the restrictions of calculation MDQ00006720080341, Appendix 11, Dual Unit Operation ERCW System Flow Balance Test Results, were met.

The Unit 2 ERCW System Pressure Drop Calculation ensures that the ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design requirements for two unit operation by meeting or exceeding the design basis flow or justified by evaluation.

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9.2.1 has 2 Open Items (OIs) cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
90	Remains OPEN.
91	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.

SSER27 contains the following under 9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water System

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 91

Open Item 91 states, "TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011."

In FSAR Amendment 112 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14160A901), TVA updated the FSAR describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5. The NRC staff has reviewed these changes and found them to be acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 91 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

Status of this item was changed to "CO" above because Open Item 90 remains OPEN; TVA action remains.

9.2.2	27	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - relocate component cooling thermal barrier booster pumps above probable maximum flood (PMF) level before receipt of an OL</p> <p>TVA committed to relocate the pumps above PMF level and the staff found this acceptable. Implementation for this issue was resolved for Unit 1 in SSER5 when the staff verified in IR 390/84-20 that the pumps had been relocated. Additionally, IR 390/83-06 and 391/83-05 verified that the 4 booster pumps had been relocated and the construction deficiency reports identifying this issue for both units were closed.</p>
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Unit 2 Action: Verify relocation of pumps for Unit 2.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.2.2 of SSER23 includes:

"In the SER, the NRC staff stated that TVA committed to relocating the component cooling booster pumps above the probable maximum flood (PMF) level. The staff found this commitment acceptable pending verification that the modifications were completed before loading fuel into the reactor. In SSER 5, dated November 1990, the staff verified that these pumps for Unit 1 had been relocated above PMF level. TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF level. This is Open Item 67 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 67 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF level. (Section 9.2.2)"

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

NRC to TVA letter dated March 20, 2014, contained the following:

However, since the initiation of the WBN Unit 2 completion project, the WBN PMF level has further increased.

As a result, TVA has determined that rather than relocating the CCS Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps to above the later PMF level, it would prefer to implement flood barrier modifications to prevent water damage to both units pumps in the event of a PMF. ... with WBN Unit 2 implementation of these modifications to be completed prior to Unit 2 licensing ...

... Therefore, this letter supersedes the previous commitment by implementing barrier modifications rather than relocating the pumps.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 67 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-615, dated February 13, 2015.

Flood barrier modifications for the CCS Thermal Barrier Booster pumps have been implemented.

SSER27 contains the following under 9.2.2 Component Cooling System (Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling Water System)

"Open Item 67

Open Item 67 states, 'TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF [probable maximum flood] level.'

By letter dated March 20, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14085A009), TVA stated that rather than relocating the component cooling system thermal barrier booster pumps above the PMF level, it is implementing a flood barrier modification to prevent water damage to both Unit 1 and Unit 2 pumps in the event of a PMF. The flooding barriers around the Unit 1 pumps have been installed and inspected by the NRC staff (Inspection Report 05000390/2014003), verifying that the height of the barriers are greater than the proposed PMF level for WBN. The Unit 2 barriers are the same design as the Unit 1 barriers and have been verified to be partially installed. For Unit 2, a section of the barrier has been left open allowing access to the pump for pre-operational testing. The Unit 2 barrier will be fully installed prior to fuel load. The NRC staff considers Open Item 67 closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

9.2.3	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.2.3 includes:

"Therefore, the design of the demineralized water makeup system described in Section 9.2.3 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.2.4	22	C	In SSER9, the staff noted that potable water requirements were incorrectly stated in the SER, but this change did not affect the conclusions reached in the SER.
		06	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.2.4 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the changes to the potable and sanitary water systems described above are acceptable. Based on the above information and the staff's previous evaluation documented in the SER and its supplements, the staff concludes that the potable and sanitary water systems meet the requirements of GDC 2 for protection against natural phenomena and meet the guidance of RGs 1.26 and 1.29 on seismic and quality group classifications and are, therefore, acceptable."



SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.2.5	27	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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**13**

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.2.5 of SSER23 includes:

"The NRC staff considers the ability to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours to meet "the orderly shutdown and cool down" requirement of GDC-5. Since the minimum available flow from the Tennessee River is well in excess of the ERCW flow requirements, the staff considers the UHS to meet the requirements of GDC 5. TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours. This is Open Item 66 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 66 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours. (Section 9.2.5)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 12, 2011, submitted Amendment 105 to the Unit 2 FSAR. This clarified FSAR Section 9.2.5 as needed.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink

"Open Item 66

Open Item 66 states, 'TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS [ultimate heat sink] to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 105, to add clarification that the UHS is capable of bringing the nonaccident unit to cold shut down within 72 hours. Therefore, Open Item 66 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

9.2.6	22	<b>C</b>	In SSER12, the staff noted that FSAR Amendment 72 revised the reserved amount of condensate for each units auxiliary feedwater system from 2000,000 gallons to 210,000 gallons and that this did not change the conclusions reached in the SER or supplements.
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**06**

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.2.6 includes:

"In SSER 21, issued February 2009, the NRC staff reviewed existing license review topics to determine whether any topics remained open or were resolved for each section of the FSAR. No open topics were identified for FSAR Section 9.2.6, "Condensate Storage Facilities." The staff reviewed proposed changes to FSAR Section 9.2.6 in recent Amendments 95 through 100 and found no proposed changes that would challenge the system design or major changes to the system description that would change the staff's conclusion in the SER.

Therefore, the staff finds that the conclusions of the SER remain valid, and that WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.2.6 is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.3.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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9.3.1	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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06

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-14 of SSER22 has "1" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 1 reads, "In the process of further validating the information in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA identified minor administrative/typographical changes to sections previously considered Resolved. TVA addressed these changes to the applicable sections in their submittals and clearly indicated them to the staff. The staff has reviewed and confirmed that the changes made are administrative/typographical and do not impact the staff's conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Based on this review, no additional review is necessary and this section remains Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

Section 9.3.1 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed proposed changes to Section 9.3.1 in FSAR Amendments 95 through 100 and found no proposed changes to the system description or design that would change the staff's conclusion in the original SER.

Based on the NRC staff's review of the compressed air system for compliance with the applicable GDC, RGs, and Branch Technical Positions (BTPs), the staff concludes that the compressed air system meets the requirements of (1) GDC 2 for against natural phenomena, and (2) GDC 5 for sharing of systems and components. Additionally, the system complies with the guidelines of RG 1.26 regarding its quality group and RG 1.29 regarding seismic classification. Therefore, the staff finds that the conclusions of the original SER remain valid, and FSAR Section 9.3.1 is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.3.2	24	C	LICENSE CONDITION – Post-Accident Sampling System
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07

In SSER3, the staff identified the criteria from Item II.B.3 in NUREG-0737 that were unresolved in the SER and reviewed TVA responses for these items. The staff stated that the post-accident sampling system met all of the criteria and was acceptable. They also stated that the proposed procedure for estimating the degree of reactor core damage was acceptable on an interim basis and that TVA would be required to provide a final procedure for estimating the degree of core damage before start-up following the first refueling outage. In SSER5, the staff stated that due to the 5 year delay in WB licensing, TVA should commit to submitting the procedure at an earlier date.

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA submitted a final procedure for estimating degree of core damage by letter dated June 10, 1994, and the license condition was deleted in SSER14.

In SSER16, the staff reviewed TVA's revised emergency plan implementing procedure governing the use of the methodology provided in the June 10, 1994, submittal, and other plant data, for addressing degree of reactor core damage and found the methodology and implementing procedure acceptable.

Unit 2 Action:

Eliminate requirement for Post-Accident Sampling System in Technical Specifications (Identified as CT in NRC letter dated May 28, 2008).

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

Rev. 0 of the Unit 1 TS contained 5.7.2.6, "Post Accident Sampling."

Amendment 34 to the Unit 1 TS (approved by the NRC on January 14, 2002) deleted 5.7.2.6, "Post Accident Sampling."

The markup for Unit 2 Developmental Revision A noted that Unit 2 had deleted 5.7.2.6, "Post Accident Sampling" also.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.3.2 of SSER24 includes:

"On the basis of its review of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated April 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110960407), the NRC staff concludes that TVA's responses to the actions required by the NRC staff's safety evaluation of WCAP-14986, Revision 1, are satisfactory. The staff further concludes that it is acceptable for TVA to remove the PASS from WBN Unit 2. Because the WBN Unit 2 design is otherwise substantially the same as the NRC approved WBN Unit 1 design, the WBN Unit 2 process and postaccident sampling system designs are acceptable."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.3.3	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>06</b>	

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-15 of SSER22 has "3" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 3 reads, "In SSER 21, this issue was identified as 'Resolved.' However, TVA made changes to the Unit 2 FSAR affecting the previous staff conclusions. The staff evaluated the changes and the results are documented in this SSER."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9.3.4	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-15 of SSER22 has "3" in the "Note" column for this item.</p> <p>Note 3 reads, "In SSER 21, this issue was identified as 'Resolved.' However, TVA made changes to the Unit 2 FSAR affecting the previous staff conclusions. The staff evaluated the changes and the results are documented in this SSER."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
9.3.8	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>9.3.8 stated:</p> <p>"In SSER 21, the NRC staff reviewed existing license review topics to determine whether items remained open or were resolved for each section of the FSAR. The original SER, NUREG-0847, did not include a Section 9.3.8. As a result, SSER 21 did not include a reference to FSAR Section 9.3.8.</p> <p>The heat tracing system is not explicitly covered in the SER; therefore, TVA proposed to describe the system in FSAR Section 9.3.8, "Heat Tracing." The proposed FSAR section for heat tracing includes the purpose of the system and a list of the systems that use heat tracing. TVA does not take credit for heat tracing to maintain the reactor in a safe-shutdown condition or to mitigate the consequences of accidents. The system components were designed as nonseismic, nonsafety-related. In its letter dated February 8, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080770242, non-publicly available), TVA proposed no significant changes to the heat tracing system.</p> <p>The NRC staff reviewed proposed changes to Section 9.3 in FSAR Amendments 95 through 100. No changes to the heat tracing system were proposed.</p> <p>Based on its review of the heat tracing system as described in Section 9.3.8 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 through 100, the NRC staff concluded that the section conforms to the guidance in RG 1.151, Revision 1, "Instrument Sensing Lines," issued July 2010, on the relevant requirements to install heat tracing for freeze protection and to prevent boric acid from precipitating out of the fluid. Therefore, the staff concludes that FSAR Section 9.3.8 is acceptable."</p>
9.4.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
9.4.1	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>In SSER9, the staff clarified control room isolation after activation of SI signal from either unit, or upon detection of high radiation or smoke concentration in outside air supply stream and stated that conclusions reached in SER and supplements were still valid.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 9.4.1 includes:</p> <p>"Based on the NRC staff's previous evaluation, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, and on the staff's evaluation of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97, the staff concludes that the control room area ventilation system continues to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, 19,</p>

and 60 with respect to (1) protection against natural phenomena and environmental effects, (2) adequate access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions, and (3) control of the release of gaseous radioactive effluents to the environment. It also meets the requirements of Item III.D.3.4 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980, and continues to meet the guidelines of RG 1.26, RG 1.29, RG 1.78, Revision 1, "Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," and BTP ASB 3-1 for (1) the quality group and seismic classification, (2) protection against chlorine release, and (3) high- and moderate-energy pipe breaks. Therefore, the system is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.4.2	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.2 includes:

"Based on the above and on the NRC staff's previous evaluation, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, the staff concludes that the fuel handling area ventilation system continues to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, 60, and 61 for (1) protection against natural phenomena, (2) environmental effects, (3) control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment, and (4) appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems. The staff also concludes that the system continues to meet the guidelines of RGs 1.13, 1.26, 1.29, and 1.117, "Tornado Design Classification," for design of the ventilation system for the spent fuel storage facility, quality group and seismic classification, and the effects against tornado missiles. Therefore, the system is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.4.3	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.3 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's previous evaluation, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, and on the staff's evaluation of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendments 92 and 97, the staff concludes that the auxiliary building and radwaste area ventilation system continues to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 60 for (1) protection against natural phenomena, (2) environmental effects, and (3) control of the release of radioactive materials to the environment. It also continues to meet the guidelines of RGs 1.26, 1.29, and 1.117 on quality group and seismic classification and the effects against tornado missiles. Therefore, the system is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.4.4	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.4 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's previous evaluation, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, and on the staff's evaluation of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 94, the staff concludes

that the turbine building area ventilation system continues to meet the relevant requirements of GDC 2 for protection against natural phenomena and continues to meet the guidelines of RGs 1.26 and 1.29 on quality group and seismic classification. Therefore, the system is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.4.5	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	In SSER9, the staff reviewed the design of the additional DG building ventilation system (FSAR Amendment 66 submittal dated May 20, 1991, for both units) and determined that conclusion reached in SER was still valid and design was acceptable.
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In SSER10, the staff had concerns regarding periodic testing of the ventilation system for the additional DG building; muffler room exhaust fan failure or exhaust blockage; missile protection for the muffler fan exhaust structure; and potential for blockage and turbine missile damage of air intake structures. These were all resolved in SSER10, with the exception of the potential for external blockage of the air intake structure by missile impact. In SSER11 the staff found TVA's response and procedural change to address potential blockage of the air intake structure by missile impact acceptable. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.

In SSER14, the staff clarified statements made in the SER by stating that none of the ventilation systems for the ERCW pumping station was safety related, but the failure of both mechanical equipment room ventilation fans would not prevent operation of any safety related equipment. Thus, the conclusions reached in the SER were still valid, and the systems were still acceptable.

In SSER16, the staff reviewed design changes to the DG building ventilation system, since the original design was reviewed, and concluded that the judgments made in the SER and supplements did not change and the system was still acceptable.

In SSER19, the staff clarified their statements about the diesel engine room exhaust fans, stating that since the fans automatically start when the DG starts, DG testing results in operation of the diesel engine room exhaust fans.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.5 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's previous evaluation, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, and on the staff's evaluation of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97, the staff concludes that the ESF ventilation system meets the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 60 for protection against natural phenomena and missiles and continues to meet the guidance of RGs 1.26 and 1.29 for quality group and seismic classification and the effects against tornado missiles. Therefore, the system is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.4.6	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.6 includes:

"TVA clarified the FSAR description of the CVI and ABI following an FHA in the auxiliary building or containment during refueling operations. Also, TVA added a description of the containment vent air cleanup

units, which filter the containment vent air before it is released into the annulus. The NRC staff reviewed TVA's changes to the FSAR and concludes that the changes are acceptable because the RBPVS operations during various FHA scenarios continue to meet the requirements of GDC 2, 4, 60, and 61 for protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, and control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment."

SSER22 did not provide a status for this item.

9.4.7	22	C
		06

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.7 includes:

"Based on its review of FSAR Amendment 97 and the staff's previous evaluation, as documented in the SER and its supplements, the NRC staff concludes that the containment air cooling system is acceptable because the system continues to meet the requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 60 for protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, and control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment."

SSER22 did not provide a status for this item.

9.4.8	22	C
		06

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 9.4.8 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's previous evaluation, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, and on the staff's evaluation of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 94, as supplemented by letter dated June 3, 2010, the staff concludes that the CDWE building ECS meets the relevant requirements of GDC 2 and 4 for protection against natural phenomena and environmental effects and missiles and continues to meet the guidelines of RGs 1.26, 1.29, and 1.117 on quality group and seismic classification and the effects against tornado missiles. Therefore, FSAR Section 9.4.8 is acceptable."

SSER22 did not provide a status for this item.

9.5.0	10	C
		01

In SSER10, the staff reviewed 55 questions previously asked concerning the 4 original DGs for applicability to the additional DG and additional responses from TVA and had no concerns.

9.5.1	26	C
		10

9.5.1.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for Fire Protection Program

9.5.1.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE – Electrical penetrations documentation

9.5.1.3: LICENSE CONDITION – Fire protection program

In SSER10, the staff noted that the fire hazard analysis for the additional DG building would be included in the WB Fire Protection report. The staff reviewed the building design for compliance with BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A and found it in conformance with the BTP. They also asked TVA to verify that the fire fighting systems installed in the DG building meet GDC 3 and stated that TVA's response satisfied their concerns.

In SSER18, the staff concluded that the Fire Protection program for Watts Bar conformed to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and was acceptable except for the fire barrier seal program and emergency lighting inside the Reactor Building. Additionally, the staff considered the confirmatory issue involving electrical penetration documentation resolved in SSER18 on the basis of the safety evaluation of the revised Fire Protection program included in Appendix FF of SSER18. In Appendix FF of SSER19, a safety evaluation of the Fire Protection program contains a detailed evaluation of fire barrier penetration seals. The staff concluded that TVA's penetration seal program adequately demonstrates the fire resistive rating



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

of the penetrations, and that they conform to the guidelines of Positions D.1.j and D.3.d of Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 and were acceptable. The safety evaluation also includes TVA's revised position on emergency lighting, which was found to be acceptable.

## REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 9.1.5 included the following:

"On the basis of its review of TVA's as-designed FPR and TVA's supplemental information as referenced by this evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the fire protection program for WBN, with the exception of Unit 1 specific OMAs, meets 10 CFR 50.48(a) and GDC 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and is consistent with Sections III.G, III.J, III.L, and III.O of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix A to BTP (APCSB) 9.5-1, May 1976, with properly justified deviations and exceptions. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the as-designed FPR acceptable, contingent on the completion of the confirmatory items identified in Section 8.0 of this evaluation (Open items 140, 141, 142, and 143, Appendix HH). NRC approval of the Unit 1 OMAs is documented in SSER 18, October 1995, of NUREG-0847, 'Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.'"

8.0 (CONFIRMATORY ITEMS) of Appendix FF (FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2) contained these open items as follow:

#	Item Description
140	TVA to confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the Unit 2 OMA feasibility walkdowns.
141	TVA to confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the Multiple spurious operation scenario resolution actions for scenarios which only affect Unit 2.
142	TVA to confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the electrical coordination modifications.
143	TVA to confirm the as-built FPR aligns with as-designed FPR. Gaps to be submitted to the NRC for approval."

SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.5.2	27	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Performance testing of communications system
		<b>13</b>	The staff resolved this license condition in SSER5 based on TVA's letter of March 18, 1985 for both units, which described its testing of communications systems.
			Unit 2 Action: Perform testing of communication systems on Unit 2.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9.5.3	22	<b>C</b>  <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <hr/> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 9.5.3 includes:</p> <p>"Based on the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the illuminance levels for emergency lighting in the MCR, safety-related panels in the MCR, and remote shutdown consoles conform to the guidance given in the 1993 edition of the IESNA Lighting Handbook and NUREG-0700 and are, therefore, acceptable.</p> <p>Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that (1) the plant lighting systems described in Section 9.5.3 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR conform to the industry standard IESNA Lighting Handbook, NUREG-0700, and the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 9.5.3, and (2) the systems can perform their safety-related functions. Therefore, the plant lighting systems are acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
9.5.4	22	<b>C</b>  <b>06</b>	<p>9.5.4.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - include required language in operating instruction to ensure no-load and low-load operation is minimized and revise operating procedures to address increased diesel generator load after it has run for an extended period of time at low or no load</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff verified that plant operating procedures had been revised to incorporate requirements that ensure that operational no-load and low-load conditions will not harm the diesel generators.</p> <hr/> <p>9.5.4.1: LICENSE CONDITION – Diesel Generator reliability</p> <p>The staff verified that the modifications necessary to comply with NUREG/CR-0660 had been completed and, as stated above, requirements had been incorporated into operating procedures. Thus, this license condition was resolved in SSER5.</p> <hr/> <p>9.5.4.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for staff to complete review to determine if diesel generator auxiliary support systems can perform their design safety functions under all conditions, after receipt of all requested information.</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff resolved the issue of the completeness of its review of the emergency diesel engine lubrication oil system.</p> <hr/> <p>9.5.4.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to design skid-mounted piping and components from the day tank to the diesel engine as seismic Category I and to ASME Section III, Class 3</p> <p>The staff reviewed standards to which emergency diesel engine skid mounted auxiliary system piping and associated components were designed, as well as the testing and inspections to be performed on these systems, as provided in TVA letters dated February 15, 1985, March 18, 1985, and August 30, 1985, and concluded that they were acceptable in SSER5. The staff considered this issue resolved. They stated that this resolution applied to the fuel oil, cooling water, air starting, lubrication, and combustion air intake and exhaust systems (9.5.4.2, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7 and 9.5.8).</p> <hr/> <p>9.5.4.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - provide missile protection for fuel oil storage tank vent lines</p> <p>The staff found TVA's commitment to provide missile protection for the fuel oil storage tank vent lines acceptable and verified that the protection had been installed and considered this issue resolved in SSER5.</p>

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In SSER9, the staff stated that the conclusions reached in the SER, SSER3 and SSER5 regarding the EDG auxiliary supports systems applied to the additional EDG. This conclusion applied to sections 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7 and 9.5.8, as well.

In SSER10, the staff questioned tornado missile protection and seismic requirements for the additional DG fuel oil storage tank fill lines and found TVA's response acceptable. The staff questioned the difference between the design of the fuel oil transfer pump for the additional DG and the design of the DG building storage pumps, and found TVA's explanation and proposed clarification to the FSAR acceptable. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.

In SSER11, the staff noted the revised capacity of the 7-day fuel oil storage tank identified in FSAR Amendment 69 and stated that it still exceeded the amount needed for a 7-day supply and, therefore, did not affect the staff's conclusions reached in the SER or supplements.

In SSER12, the staff determined that the fire watch required when routing a hose from a fuel oil delivery vehicle to the DG tank manway openings in the DG building was no longer required based on TVA actions in response to other fire protection requirements.

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The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-16 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.5.5	11	<b>C</b> — — <b>01</b>	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE to design engine cooling water system piping and components for all engines up to the engine interface, including auxiliary skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3</p> <p>The staff reviewed standards to which emergency diesel engine skid mounted auxiliary system piping and associated components were designed, as well as the testing and inspections to be performed on these systems, and concluded that they were acceptable in SSER5. The staff considered this issue resolved. This resolution applies to the fuel oil, cooling water, air starting, lubrication, and combustion air intake and exhaust systems.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff also resolved concerns regarding ambient DG room temperature and its impact on pre-heating DG units, the time period the DG is capable of operating fully loaded without secondary cooling, and the possibility of the cooling water system becoming air bound due to the expansion tank location.</p> <p>In SSER11, the staff noted that FSAR Amendment 70 stated that coolant temperature would be maintained between 125 and 155 degrees F, not the 115 and 125 stated in the SER. They stated that this clarification did not alter the staff's conclusions previously reached in the SER or its supplements.</p> <p>-----</p>
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9.5.6	22	<b>C</b>  <b>06</b>	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE to design engine air-starting system piping components for all engines up to the engine interface, including auxiliary skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3</p> <p>The staff reviewed standards to which emergency diesel engine skid mounted auxiliary system piping and associated components were designed, as well as the testing and inspections to be performed on these systems, and concluded that they were acceptable in SSER5. The staff considered this issue resolved. This resolution applies to the fuel oil, cooling water, air starting, lubrication, and combustion air intake and exhaust systems.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER10, the staff questioned protection of the additional DG electrical starting system components from water spray, and whether diesel engine control functions supplied by the air starting system could interfere with the engines' ability to perform its safety function once it has started. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-16 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.</p> <p>Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
9.5.7	22	<b>C</b>  <b>06</b>	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE to perform additional modification, or provide justification for acceptability of proposed modification, to ensure lubrication of all wearing parts of the diesel engine either on an interim or continuous basis and to provide a more detailed description of the lubricating oil system and a description of the diesel engine crankcase explosion protection features</p> <p>In response to a staff concern regarding dry diesel engine starting, TVA proposed using the manufacturers' modification and provided justification for its ability to ensure lubrication of all parts of the diesel engine. The staff found this acceptable in SSER3.</p> <p>TVA submittal of March 18, 1985, responded to a staff request to describe the features that protect the diesel engine crankcase from exploding. In SSER5, on the basis of this submittal, the staff concluded that the emergency diesel engine lubrication oil system can perform its safety function and is acceptable. This issue was resolved.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE to design standby diesel engine lube oil system piping and components up to the engine interface, including skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3</p> <p>The staff reviewed standards to which emergency diesel engine skid mounted auxiliary system piping and associated components were designed, as well as the testing and inspections to be performed on these systems, and concluded that they were acceptable in SSER5. The staff considered this issue resolved. This resolution applies to the fuel oil, cooling water, air starting, lubrication, and combustion air intake and</p>

exhaust systems.

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In SSER10, the staff questioned the ability to replenish the additional DG lube oil system without interrupting operation of the DG and found TVA's provision to replenish lube oil acceptable. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Page 1-16 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

9.5.8	22	<b>C</b> ----- <b>06</b>	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE to design standby diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system piping and components up to the engine interface to ASME Section III, Class 3 and recommendations of RG 1.26</p> <p>The staff reviewed standards to which emergency diesel engine skid mounted auxiliary system piping and associated components were designed, as well as the testing and inspections to be performed on these systems, and concluded that they were acceptable in SSER5. The staff considered this issue resolved. This resolution applies to the fuel oil, cooling water, air starting, lubrication, and combustion air intake and exhaust systems.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER10, the staff expressed a concern regarding products of combustion from a fire in the air intake/muffler room, or from the DG exhaust gases, impacting the additional DG or the other DGs. TVA's response addressed the concern. The staff also questioned inspection, surveillance and testing of the DG exhaust system and found the system design adequate to address their concern. In addition, the staff questioned pressure losses through the DG air intake and exhaust systems and determined that their designs were acceptable. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.</p> <p>-----</p>
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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Page 1-16 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.0.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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10.1.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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10.2.0	27	C	In SSER5, the staff agreed that the interval between periodic turbine valve testing could be increased for WB from weekly to monthly.
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13

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

10.2.1	22	C	In SSER12, the staff reviewed the revised description of the 3 independent overspeed turbine trip systems, consistent with FSAR Amendment 77, and stated that this review did not alter the conclusions reached in the SER and the system remained acceptable.
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06

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.2.1 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed changes that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) made to Section 10.2.1 of the SER in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendments 95 through 100. TVA made no changes that would affect the staff's conclusions in the SER.

Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the description of the turbine generator system in FSAR Section 10.2.1 continues to conform to the above requirements and guidance, and that the system can perform its function as designed. Therefore, the staff finds the conclusions of the SER to remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.2.1 is acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
10.2.2	23	<b>C</b> <b>07</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>10.2.2 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"In summary, the NRC staff concludes that FSAR Amendment 99, Section 10.2.3, is acceptable, because it demonstrated that the WBN Unit 2 turbine disks have met the five acceptance criteria of SRP Section 10.2.3. Meeting these top-level criteria of SRP Section 10.2.3 ensures that the SRP Section 3.5.1.3-related turbine missile analysis will generate acceptable results."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
10.3.0	0	<b>C</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
10.3.1	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>In SSER12, the staff described changes to the MSIV closing signals as a result of changes to the Eagle-21 process protection system. They stated that the conclusions reached in the SER were still valid and the main steam system remained acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER19, the staff evaluated a revision in FSAR Amendment 91 to the closure time of the MSIVs from 5 seconds after receiving a closure signal to 6 seconds and concluded it was acceptable.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 10.3.1 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed changes to Section 10.3.1 that TVA made in FSAR Amendments 95 through 100. TVA did not identify any significant changes to the main steam system up to the isolation valves and did not make any changes to the safety function provided by the main steam system up to the isolation valves that would change the staff's conclusion in the SER.</p> <p>Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that FSAR Section 10.3.1 continues to comply with the applicable GDC, RGs, and BTPs as evaluated in SER, and that the conclusions of the SER remain valid."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
10.3.2	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-16 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.</p> <p>Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section.</p>



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.3.3	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		06	

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.3.3 includes:

"Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the steam and feedwater system materials requirements in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 95 are consistent with the staff-approved steam and feedwater system materials controls used in WBN Unit 1. Based on its previous evaluation documented in the SER and SSERs, and on its evaluation of FSAR Amendment 95, the NRC staff concludes that the steam and feedwater system materials controls meet the relevant requirements identified in GDC 1 and Section 10.3.6 of NUREG-0800, and are acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.3.4	22	C	LICENSE CONDITION – Secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program
		13	The staff determined that the secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program was being included in the administrative section of the Technical Specifications and resolved this for Unit 1 in SSER5.

Unit 2 Action: Take same action for Unit 2.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

Section 5.7.2.13 provides information about the Secondary Water Chemistry Program.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.3.4 includes:

"Based on the NRC staff's review of FSAR Amendments 92 through 99, and because the applicable proposed TS for WBN Unit 2 is the same as that already approved by the staff for Unit 1, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 secondary water chemistry program is acceptable, and that Section 10.3.4 is resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected STATUS to "C."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
10.4.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
10.4.1	22	C — — 06	<p>In SSER9, the staff clarified the description of the main condenser and stated that this clarification did not affect the conclusion reached in the SER.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 10.4.1 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review of the FSAR and the information provided by TVA in its letter dated July 31, 2010, the NRC staff concludes that the Unit 2 main condenser design and performance will meet the acceptance criteria established for the Unit 1 main condenser. Therefore, the conclusions of the SER remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.4.1, "Main Condenser," is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
10.4.2	22	C — — 06	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 10.4.2 includes:</p> <p>"In reviewing the Unit 2 MCES, the NRC staff compared TVA's Unit 1 analysis to its Unit 2 analysis and reviewed the system using the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 10.4.2. Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the staff concluded that the MCES analysis for Unit 2 is consistent with the MCES analysis for Unit 1, which was previously approved by the staff. Therefore, the conclusions of the SER remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.4.2 is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
10.4.3	22	C — — 06	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 10.4.3 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the description of the TGSS, design criteria, and design bases provided in FSAR Section 10.4.3 remains consistent with the criteria given in RG 1.26. Therefore, the conclusions of the SER remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.4.3 is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
10.4.4	22	C — — 06	<p>In SSER5, the staff concluded that periodic stroking of the turbine bypass system valves may be performed according to plant operating procedures and no Technical Specification was necessary to ensure this testing.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.4 includes:

"In SSER 21, the staff reviewed existing license review topics to determine whether the topics remained open or were resolved for each section of the FSAR. No open topics were identified for FSAR Section 10.4.4. The staff reviewed TVA's proposed changes to FSAR Section 10.4.4 in recent Amendments 95 through 100 and found no changes to the design or description of the system that would change the staff's conclusion in the SER. Therefore, the conclusions of the SER remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.4.4 is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.4.5	22	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>06</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.5 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed the CCW system for compliance with the applicable GDC, RGs, and BTPs and concluded that the CCW system conforms to the requirements of GDC 2 and 4 for protection against natural phenomena and environmental effects due to pipe breaks, and to the guidelines of RG 1.26 and Regulatory Position C.2 of RG 1.29 for the quality group classification and the protection of safety-related systems from failures in nonsafety-related systems. The staff also reviewed TVA's proposed changes to the system in FSAR Amendments 92 through 99 and found no changes that affect the conclusions made by the staff in the SER. Therefore, the conclusions of the original SER remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.4.5, "Condenser Circulating Cooling Water System," is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.4.6	27	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>13</b>	

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.6 includes:

"In WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 99, TVA made changes to the wording and format of Section 10.4.6, which is now titled "Condensate Polishing Demineralizer System." The NRC staff found that changes to the condensate cleanup system (CCS) instrumentation do not affect the staff's conclusion in the SER that the instrumentation and sampling equipment provided is adequate to monitor and control process parameters in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3.

However, the staff notes that the reference to Table 10.3.2, "Feedwater Chemistry Specification," and the table itself have been removed. As a result, the staff can no longer conclude that the CCS is capable of producing feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3.

TVA should provide information to the NRC staff that the CCS will produce feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3 or, alternatively, provide justification for producing feedwater purity to another acceptable standard. This is Open Item 35 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 35:

"TVA provided an update to FSAR Section 10.4.6 in Amendment 104."

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014, submitted Amendment 112 to the Unit 2 FSAR.

A portion of this amendment revised the first paragraph of 10.3.5.2 (to address Open Item 35) to read as follows:

"The plant chemistry program establishes the steam generator steam side and feedwater chemistry specifications for normal power operations. This program is based on EPRI PWR secondary water chemistry guidelines as detailed in the plant chemistry program."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 10.4 Other Features

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

10.4.6 Condensate Cleanup System

Open Item 35

Open Item 35 states, 'TVA should provide information to the NRC staff that the CCS [condensate cleanup system] will produce feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3 or, alternatively, provide justification for producing feedwater purity to another acceptable standard.'

TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 112, to include the statement 'The plant chemistry program establishes the steam generator steam side and feedwater chemistry specifications for normal power operations. This program is based on EPRI [Electric Power Research Institute] PWR secondary water chemistry guidelines as detailed in the plant chemistry program.' The NRC staff finds this to be consistent with staff expectations for secondary water chemistry, as described in BTP MTEB 5-3. Therefore, Open Item 35 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

10.4.7	22	<b>C</b> <b>— —</b> <b>06</b>	In SSER14, the staff evaluated changes that TVA made in Amendment 82 to the FSAR adding a new feedwater isolation signal and clarifying the isolation signal generated by a reactor trip, and stated that the revisions did not affect the conclusions reached in the SER. The staff also corrected an unrelated error they made in the SER regarding the time for the main feedwater regulation valves to close after receipt of a feedwater isolation signal and stated that the conclusions reached in the SER remained valid.
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.7 includes:

"Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the description of the condensate and feedwater systems, design criteria, and design bases in FSAR Section 10.4.7 is consistent with the criteria given in RG 1.26 and complies with the regulatory requirements noted above. Therefore, the conclusions of the SER

remain valid, and FSAR Section 10.4.7 is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.4.8	24	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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**07**

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.8 includes:

"TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to enable verification that the SGBS meets the requirements and guidance specified in the SER or provide justification that the SGBS meets other standards that demonstrate conformance to GDC 1 and GDC 14. This is Open Item 36 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 36:

"Section 2.1.1, Safety Functions, of the SGB System Description Documents N3-15-4002 (Unit 1) and WBN2-15-4002 (Unit 2), state the following:

'The SGB piping downstream of the containment isolation valves and located in the main stream valve vault room shall be TVA Class G. This piping is seismically supported to maintain the pressure boundary.

The SGB piping located in the turbine building shall be TVA Class H.'

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGB flow diagrams, 1, 2-47W801-2, also recognize the same TVA Class G and Class H class breaks located downstream of the safety-related SGB containment isolation valves.

The SGB flow diagrams and System Description document that TVA Class G and Class H classifications located downstream of the safety-related containment isolation valves are consistent with the data that was deleted in FSAR Section 10.4.8.1, Steam Generator Blowdown System - Design Basis, Item 6 Component and Code listings described above. It is also noted that NRC Quality Group D classification is equivalent to TVA Class G and H classifications as stated in the NUREG 0847 Section 3.2.2, System Quality Group Classification. Therefore, the design requirements in NRC GDC-1, Quality Standards and Records, and NRC GDC-14, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary are not challenged.

Amendment 104 to the Unit 2 FSAR will revise Table 3.2-2 to note that TVA Class G and H piping within the SGB System exists downstream of the safety-related containment isolation valves."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 3, 2011, submitted Amendment 104 to the Unit 2 FSAR. The cover letter included the following:

"In Reference 2 (Enclosure 1, Item 36), TVA committed to update Table 3.2-2 'to note that TVA Class G and H piping within the SGB System exists downstream of the safety-related containment isolation valves.' TVA later discovered that the same information intended to be placed into Table 3.2-2 was already provided in Table 3.2-2a. Therefore, this change to Table 3.2-2 is no longer needed and thus this letter closes the commitment in Reference 2."

Reference 2 is the TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

10.4.8 of SSER24 includes:

"The information provided by TVA is sufficient to demonstrate that the SGBS conforms to GDC 1 and GDC 14. In its letter to the NRC dated June 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11178A155), TVA stated that 'the same information intended to be placed into Table 3.2-2 was already provided in Table 3.2-2a. Therefore, this change to Table 3.2-2 is no longer needed...' The staff verified that Table 3.2-2a, 'Classification of Systems Having Major Design Concerns Related to a Primary Safety Function,' contained the appropriate information. Since the SGBS conforms to GDC 1 and GDC 14, TVA's response is acceptable to the NRC staff, and Open Item 36 is closed."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.4.9	24	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	In SSER14, the staff discussed reductions in auxiliary feedwater pump design-basis flow rates and new minimum flow requirements. They reviewed TVA's reanalysis of design-basis events and concluded that the revised flow rates were acceptable and the conclusions reached in the SER remained valid.
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REVISION 07 UPDATE (FOR SSER23):

10.4.9 of SSER23 includes:

"TVA's proposed clarification to the FSAR is acceptable to the NRC staff. Because the CSTs are credited only for the SBO event under 10 CFR 50.63, and TVA does not plan to share CSTs between the units during plant operation, the staff concludes that TVA satisfies GDC 5 regarding the CSTs. Confirmation by the staff of TVA's change to FSAR Section 10.4.9 to reflect TVA's intention to operate with each CST isolated from the other is Open Item 62 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 62 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"Confirm TVA's change to FSAR Section 10.4.9 to reflect its intention to operate with each CST isolated from the other. (Section 10.4.9)"

10.4.9 of SSER24 includes:

"The staff verified that in WBN Unit 2 FSAR, Amendment 103, dated March 15, 2011, TVA revised the wording in Section 10.4.9 to state that each CST is intended to operate independently in support on one unit, and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the ability to crosstie the CSTs. Therefore, Open Item 62 is closed."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

10.4.10	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>06</b>	
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.10 includes:

"There are no regulatory requirements or guidance in RG 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)," or in the SER for the licensee to provide a description of the heater drain and vent system in the FSAR; therefore, the NRC staff finds the omission of this section from the FSAR to be acceptable."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			SSER22 did not provide a status for this item.
10.4.11	22	C 06	<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 10.4.11 includes:</p> <p>"Because the steam generator wet layup system is not used at WBN, the NRC staff did not review FSAR Section 10.4.11."</p> <p>SSER22 did not provide a status for this item.</p>
11.0.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
11.1.0	24	C 07	<p>This item remains open pending closure of 11.4.0 and 11.5.0</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>11.1 of SSER24 reads:</p> <p>"In Amendments 92 and 95 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, TVA revised the text to several subsections of Section 11.1, "Source Terms." These changes are editorial in nature and do not affect the technical information presented in FSAR Tables 11.1-1–11.1-7. Therefore, these changes did not affect the staff's original safety conclusions and are acceptable."</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
11.2.0	24	C 07	<p>In SSER4, the staff evaluated the revised description contained in FSAR Revision 49 and 54 and determined that the conclusions reached in the original SER were not affected by the revisions.</p> <p>In SSER16, the staff superseded its previous review of the liquid waste management system. The staff concluded that TVA had submitted sufficient design information for both Units 1 and 2 liquid waste management system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34a requirements and that the LWMS for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 met the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.2 and was, therefore, acceptable.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>11.2 of SSER24 reads:</p> <p>"In FSAR Amendment 95, TVA updated the estimated year 2040 population within a 50-mile radius as listed in Table 11.2-6, 'Tennessee River Reaches within 50-Mile Radius Downstream of WBN.' In addition, FSAR Amendment 104 revised FSAR Section 11.2.9.1 to clarify the basis for the population growth factor of 1.24 used in TVA's analysis of doses from public water supplies. These changes did not impact the staff's prior safety conclusion and, therefore, are acceptable.</p> <p>In FSAR Amendments 95 and 100, TVA updated the whole body and organ doses for the maximum exposed individual in each critical age group listed in Table 11.2-7, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Doses from Liquid Effluents for Year 2040,' based on the expected liquid effluent releases from normal operation of WBN Unit 2 (Column 8 of Table 11.2-5). These updates resulted in minor changes to the calculated doses for individual organs and individual age groups. However, the maximum annual total body dose is to the adult (0.72 millirem (mrem)), and the maximum exposed organ is the teen liver (1.00 mrem); both are</p>



unchanged. The revised doses are still well within the Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 design objectives of 3 mrem to the total body and 10 mrem to any organ. Therefore, these changes did not impact the staff's prior safety conclusion that WBN Unit 2 meets the design criteria for liquid effluent releases in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and RM 50-2, and, therefore, are acceptable."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

11.3.0	27	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	In the SER, the staff identified that the hydrogen and oxygen monitoring system did not meet the acceptance criteria because redundant monitors had not been provided and because the system was not designed to automatically initiate action to mitigate the potential for explosion in the event of high oxygen content. This issue was addressed by Technical Specifications discussed in the original SER and in SSER8 but was later resolved in SSER16. Based upon NRC review of TVA's February 17, 1995, letter (submitted on both dockets), the staff accepted the WBN's system approach of preclusive of gas buildup, as allowed by SRP Section 11.3 guidelines, if TVA submitted an administrative program to satisfy administrative controls for TS 5.7.2.15, "Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program." As stated in TVA's letter dated July 21, 1995, the program would provide for monitoring and control of potential explosive mixtures, limit the concentration of oxygen, and surveillance to ensure that the limits are not exceeded. As a result of an SSER16 review, the staff concluded that the GWMS for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 met the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.3 and was acceptable.
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#### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

11.3 of SSER24 reads:

"Both TVA's and the staff's calculations indicate that the design objectives in Sections II.A, II.B, and II.C of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 are met. However, the calculations do not support a conclusion that the criteria for gaseous effluents in RM 50-2, and thus Section II.D of Appendix I, are met. As noted in SSER Section 11.0 above, TVA has committed to demonstrating compliance with the dose-based criteria in RM 50-2, in lieu of providing a WBN liquid and gaseous effluent systems cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, Table 11.3-3 of this SSER indicates that the calculated maxim organ dose from the operation of two reactor units at the WBN site would be in excess of 18 mrem. This result does not meet Criterion C.1 in RM 50-2 for gaseous effluent releases of 15 mrem per year to the maximally exposed organ 'from all light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors at a site.' Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 states, 'In addition to the provisions of paragraphs A, B, and C above, the applicant shall include in the radwaste system all items of reasonably demonstrated technology that, when added to the system sequentially and in order of diminishing cost-benefit return, can for a favorable cost-benefit ratio effect reductions in dose to the population reasonably expected to be within 50 miles of the reactor.' TVA has not provided the analysis required by Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. TVA must demonstrate through a cost-benefit analysis that reasonable changes to the design of the WBN gaseous effluent processing systems would not sufficiently reduce the collective dose to the public within a 50-mile radius. Therefore, the staff cannot conclude that the doses to members of the public from effluent releases during the normal operation of WBN will be ALARA. This is Open Item 135 (Appendix HH)."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 135 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA has not provided the analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D. TVA must demonstrate with a cost-benefit analysis that a sufficient reduction in the collective dose to the public within a 50-mile radius would not be achieved by reasonable changes to the design of the WBN gaseous effluent processing systems. (SSER 24, Section 11.3)"

TVA to NRC letter dated July 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11213A261), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Results from Cost-Benefit Analysis of Radwaste System Enhancements," included the following:

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

"The purpose of this letter is to provide a summary of the results of a cost-benefit study of enhancements to the WBN Unit 2 radwaste systems as committed to Reference 1.

Reference 2 Section II.D requires the preparation of a cost-benefit analysis to determine if enhancements to a plant's radwaste system should be incorporated into the plant design as part of applying the as low as reasonably achievable philosophy to normal plant releases of radiation. The cost-benefit analysis was prepared in accordance with the regulatory positions in Reference 3.

The analysis concluded that none of the enhancements evaluated were cost-beneficial and should be added to the WBN Unit 2 design. The enclosure provides the details from the cost-benefit analysis."

See the letter for the References.

### REVISION 08 UPDATE:

The Conclusions portion of 11.3 of SSER25 included:

"Based on the NRC staff's evaluation, as documented in SSER 24, and the results of the cost-benefit analysis, the staff concludes that the WBN effluent systems can maintain gaseous releases within the design objectives in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Sections II.A, II.B, and II.C, and are as low as is reasonably achievable, as required in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Section II.D. Therefore, Open Item 135 is closed. The results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, should be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that the update has been made by TVA. This is Open Item 139 (Appendix HH)."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; it included the following for Open Item 139:

"Item No. 139 regarding the results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, has been addressed by revisions to Sections 11.2.9.2 and 11.3.10.2 within A109."

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 11.3 Gaseous Waster Management

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 139

Open Item 139 states, 'The results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, should be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that the update has been made by TVA.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the results of the cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, Open Item 139 is closed.

Status remains "Resolved" in SSER27.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
11.4.0	24	<b>C</b>  <b>07</b>	<p>On the basis of its review in SSER16, the staff found the process control program for Watts Bar acceptable and concluded that the solid waste management system for Watts Bar Unit 1 conformed to the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.4 and was, therefore, acceptable.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Provide system description and information on QA provisions for Unit 2 Solid Waste Management System and information on the Process Control Program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>11.4 of SSER24 reads:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed Section 11.5, 'Solid Waste Management System,' of Amendment 101 to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR and compared it to WBN Unit 1 updated FSAR Amendment 8. The staff concluded that no substantive differences between the two units exist in regard to the design and operation of the solid waste management system. WBN Units 1 and 2 share the solid waste management system for WBN.</p> <p>The NRC staff previously documented its review and acceptance of the solid waste management system at WBN Unit 1 in Section 11.4 of both the SER and SSER 16. Because no substantive differences between the two units exist in regard to the design and operation of the solid waste management system, the staff concludes that the solid waste management system at WBN Unit 2 is acceptable."</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
11.5.0	24	<b>C</b>  <b>08</b>	<p>In SSER16, the staff updated its review to Amendment 89, and TVA's submittal dated February 17, 1995. The staff concluded that the process and effluent radiological monitoring and sampling system for Watts Bar Unit 1 complied with 10 CFR 20.1302 and GDCs 60, 63, and 64. The staff also concluded that the system design conformed to the guidelines of NUREG-0737, RGs 1.21 and 4.15, and applicable guidelines of RG 1.97 (Rev. 2). Thus, the system met the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.5 and was, therefore, acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER20, the staff agreed that TVA did not commit to RG-4.15, Revision 1 as reflected in TVA's July 21, 1995 letter. In that letter, TVA had stated that the radiation monitoring system generally agrees with and satisfies the intent of the RG 4.15 except for specific calibration techniques and frequencies. The staff then reiterated its earlier finding stated in SSER16, Section 11.5.1, that the radiation monitoring system for Watts Bar Unit 1 meets the intent and purpose of RG 4.15, with respect to quality assurance provisions for the system. The staff modified one sentence from SSER16 and then concluded by stating that the other conclusions given in SSER16 continued to be valid.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Provide system description and information on QA provisions for the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>11.5 of SSER24 reads:</p> <p>"Because no substantive differences between the two units exist in regard to the design and operation of the process and effluent radiological monitoring and sampling system, the NRC staff concludes that the system at WBN Unit 2 meets the requirements in GDC 60, GDC 63, and GDC 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the guidelines in RG 1.21, Revision 1; RG 1.97, Revision 2; and the intent and purpose of RG 4.15, Revision 1, and that it is therefore acceptable."</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

"TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 provided response to Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests. The response to item 6 read as follows:

'TVA Response

TVA does not publish a system description document for the Radiation Monitoring system. The information requested is contained in TVA design criteria document WB-DC-40-24, 'Radiation Monitoring (Unit 1/Unit 2).' The document was recently revised to reflect the Unit 2 design. Attachment 8 contains TVA design criteria document WB-DC-40-24, 'Radiation Monitoring (Unit 1/Unit 2),' Revision 24, dated November 30, 2011."

11.6.0	27	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	In SSER8, the staff reviewed the preoperational REMP program provided by letter dated June 14, 1991 (submitted for both dockets) The staff concluded in SSER Section 1.6.1, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring Program," that the Watts Bar preoperational REMP as proposed was adequate to provide baseline data which will assist in verifying radioactivity concentrations and related public exposures during plant operation, and was therefore acceptable. The staff provided a safety evaluation for both units via a September 10, 1991 letter.
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In SSER16, the staff superseded previous evaluations provided in this section by Sections 11.1 through 11.5 of this supplement, except for the material in Section 11.6.1 of SSER8, which was unaffected by supplement 16.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

11.7.0	0	<b>OT</b> — — <b>01</b>	This item will remain open pending resolution of Item 11.7.2.
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11.7.1	21	<b>OI</b> — — <b>13</b>	LICENSE CONDITION (6a) - Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 – Noble Gas monitor  In SSER5, TVA submitted letter dated April 26, 1985, on the Unit 1 docket which stated that the Unit 2 shield building vent monitor could not be installed by the time Unit 1 fuel load was scheduled in 1985 because of procurement problems. Since the 1985 fuel load was delayed, TVA subsequently committed in letter dated October 11, 1990, that this monitor and its sampler would be operational before fuel was loaded in Unit 1. This commitment eliminated the staff's concern and resolved the proposed License Condition 6a.
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Also, in SSER5, TVA letter dated November 8, 1983 (submitted on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 dockets) requested an exception to the requirement to monitor pressurized-water reactor steam safety valve discharge and atmospheric steam dump valve discharge to be monitored by high-range noble gas effluent monitors by stating that adequate instrumentation was provided to detect a steam generator tube rupture. The staff disagreed with this approach which resulted in TVA subsequently committing in a letter dated October 11, 1990 (submitted on both dockets) that the required high range noble gas effluent monitor would be operational before fuel load. This commitment resolved the staff's concern and eliminated the need for License Condition 6a.

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LICENSE CONDITION (6b) - Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 – Iodine particulate sampling

See 7.5.2.

In addition, in SSER5, by letter dated April 26, 1985, submitted on the Unit 1 docket, TVA committed to have the capability for continuous collection in place (i.e., procedures and any minor system modifications necessary) before exceeding 5-percent power. The staff evaluated this commitment and found it acceptable. Since 1985 licensing of Watts Bar was delayed, TVA subsequently committed via letter dated January 3, 1991, as discussed in SSER6 that the procedural revision and upgrade of the radiation monitors would be done by Unit 1 fuel load. Thus License Condition 6b was resolved in SSER6.

In SSER6, TVA via letter dated January 3, 1991, committed to have the procedural revision and upgrade of the radiation monitors by fuel load. This commitment ensured the plant would have the capability for continuous collection of post accident gaseous effluents by fuel load.

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In SSER5, the staff noted that the WBN design did not include a high-range noble gas effluent monitor as described in NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 1, for the auxiliary building vent because the release is diverted to the shield building vent for design-basis accidents. A low-range to high-range radiation monitor is provided in the shield building ventilation stack. By letter dated November 22, 1983, TVA requested an exception to NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, concerning the installation of high-range noble gas monitors on the auxiliary building vent at Watts Bar. TVA provided the staff additional information at a meeting on December 20, 1983, and subsequently in a submittal dated January 24, 1984. The staff concluded that the auxiliary building vent was not considered to be a potential accident release pathway and, therefore, the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant design, as described above, does not need to be changed to provide for the addition of a high-range noble gas effluent monitor, as described in NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 1, for the auxiliary building vent.

The above items were identified as CI by NRC in May 28, 2008, letter.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected the Status above to "OI" to agree with the SSER.

11.7.2	16	<b>S</b> — — <b>02</b>	<p>NUREG-0737, III.D.1.1, "Primary Coolant Outside Containment" - Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER10; reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>Include the waste gas disposal system in the leakage reduction program and incorporate in Unit 2 Technical Specifications.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER5, TVA by letter dated October 4, 1984, submitted a justification for excluding the waste gas system from the leak reduction program under NUREG-0737, Item III.D.1.1. The staff has evaluated the TVA's submittal and found that sufficient information had not been submitted to provide assurance that significant quantities of radioactive materials would not enter the waste gas system in the event of an accident.</p>
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On this basis, the staff concluded that the leakage reduction program was acceptable if the following systems were to be included leakage reduction program: (1) residual heat removal, (2) containment spray, (3) safety injection, (4) chemical and volume control, (5) sampling, and (6) waste gas. The staff proposed License Condition 24 and would be resolved if TVA accepted the change as stated above. In SSER6, the staff reviewed TVA's letter dated March 27, 1986, and agreed that TVA had justified excluding the WGDS from the program. In SSER10, the staff resolved Condition 24, when upon review of TVA letter dated August 27, 1992, they noted that WGDS specification was included in the draft TS Section 5.7.2.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

TS 5.7.2.4 is the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment program. This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. This program includes the "Waste Gas" system.

12.0.0	14	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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12.1.0	24	C	In SSER10, the staff updated its evaluation based upon review of FSAR Amendments 65 through 71 and TVA letter dated January 3, 1991 submitted on U1 docket only. The staff acknowledged that TVA would soon revise FSAR again due to reflect recent changes to 10 CFR Part 20.
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In SSER14, the staff reviewed the revised FSAR to reflect the 10 CFR Part 20 changes. Details of the staff's review are delineated in the sections that follow.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.1 of SSER24 reads:

"In Amendments 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, and 104 to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 final safety analysis report (FSAR), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) revised the FSAR principally to conform the WBN Unit 2 design basis to the design basis of WBN Unit 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviewed these amendments against the criteria in Chapter 12, 'Radiation Protection,' of NUREG-0800, 'Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition' (SRP); Item II.B.2, 'Plant Shielding,' of NUREG-0737, 'Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,' issued November 1980; and the staff's conclusions in NUREG-0847, 'Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,' issued June 1982, as modified by supplemental safety evaluation reports (SSERs) 5, 10, 14, and 18.

Shielding is provided to reduce levels of radiation. Ventilation is arranged to control the flow of potentially contaminated air. Radiation monitoring systems are employed to measure levels of radiation in potentially occupied areas and to measure airborne radioactivity throughout the plant. A health physics program is provided for plant personnel and visitors during reactor operation, maintenance, refueling, radioactive waste (radwaste) handling, and inservice inspection. The basis for staff acceptance of the WBN Radiation Protection Program is that doses to personnel will be maintained within the limits of Title 10 of the Code of

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Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 20, 'Standards for Protection against Radiation,' and that TVA's radiation protection designs and program features are consistent with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide (RG) 8.8, Revision 3, 'Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable,' issued June 1978,"

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

12.2.0	24	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	In SSER14, the staff reviewed the revised FSAR discussion of ALARA design and operational considerations in this section that were made to clarify that the total effective dose equivalent for each individual would be maintained ALARA. As revised, FSAR Section 12.1 was consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 20.1101 and 20.1702 and was, therefore, acceptable to the staff.
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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.2 of SSER24 reads:

"In FSAR Amendment 92, dated December 18, 2008, TVA made minor editorial changes to the description of policies and procedures in Section 12.1.3, 'ALARA Operational Considerations.' These changes did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusions in the safety evaluation report (SER) and SSERs and are therefore acceptable."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

12.3.0	24	<b>C</b> — — <b>07</b>	In SSER14, the staff reviewed the revised FSAR descriptions of the radioactive sources expected to result from normal plant operations, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident conditions. The staff concluded that the descriptions of plant radioactive sources, as revised, conformed to the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 12.2 and were, therefore, acceptable to the staff.
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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.3 of SSER24 includes:

"These recalculations did not significantly change the expected overall airborne concentrations in their respective plant areas. The sum of the derived air concentration (DAC) fractions for the lower containment indicates that the expected airborne concentration still exceeds the NRC's definition in 10 CFR Part 20 of an 'airborne radioactivity area,' requiring controls over personnel access consistent with the requirements in Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 20. The total DAC fractions for the upper containment and the instrument room are still each expected to be a fraction of the concentrations that would require controlling them as an airborne radioactivity area. Therefore, these changes did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusion in the SER and SSERs and are therefore acceptable."



FSAR Amendment 95 and Amendment 104, dated June 3, 2011, revised Section 12.2.1.3, 'Sources During Refueling,' and Table 12.2-13, 'Irradiated In-Core Detector Drive Wire Sources (MEV/CM-SEC),' to include a description of the in-core instrumentation thimble assemblies (IITAs) as important radioactive sources during refueling operations, replacing the previous discussion of the in-core detector bottom-mounted instrumentation (BMI) thimble tubes. In its letter dated June 3, 2010, which responded to NRC's Request for Additional Information (RAI) 12-1, TVA stated that the IITAs and BMI thimble tubes would be exposed to the same neutron flux during power operations and therefore would exhibit radiation dose rates of similar magnitude. The radiological hazards posed by this source term change should be no greater than previously described. Therefore, these changes did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusion in the SER and SSERs and they are acceptable.

In FSAR Amendment 100, dated September 1, 2010, TVA revised the description of the control rods in Section 12.2.1.3 by deleting any reference to boron carbide (B4C). As revised, the FSAR indicates that the reactor control rod absorber material is silver-indium-cadmium, with the radiation source strength listed in Table 12.2-14, 'Irradiated Ag-In-Cd Control Rod Sources.' Because, as indicated in the original FSAR text, B4C is not a significant source of gamma radiation, this change did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusions in the SER and SSERs and it is therefore acceptable."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

12.4.0	27	<b>C</b>	In SSER10, the staff reviewed revised operational test frequency of area radiation monitors from monthly to quarterly and found that TVA's program met the provisions of 10 CFR 20.1601(c) and the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 12.3 and was, therefore, acceptable.
		<b>13</b>	

In SSER14, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 84 in light of the revised requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The staff found these sections, as amended, complied with the acceptance criteria in the SRP and was acceptable to the staff. In addition, the staff reviewed revised FSAR Section which specified the radiation dose rate design criteria for the placement and configuration of plant system valves. This section as amended was consistent with the staff's conclusion that Watts Bar can be operated within the dose limits and that radiation doses can be maintained ALARA. Therefore, these changes were acceptable to the staff.

In SSER18, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendments 89 and 90 in which TVA had revised the discussions of the installed area radiation monitoring and the fixed airborne radiation monitoring systems. In addition, Amendment 90 revised the estimated maximum radiation dose rates depicted on the radiation zone maps for several areas in the plant. The staff also reviewed FSAR text changes that clarified the distinctions between a monitor calibration, a monitor channel operational test, and a check source functional test and deleted discussions of fixed airborne radiation monitors in the Unit 2 hot sample room and the Unit 1 control room and were replaced with portable continuous air monitors (CAMs). The staff found this acceptable since it did not change the staff's conclusion documented in SSER14.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.4 of SSER24 includes:

"In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA deleted FSAR Figures 12.3-18 and 12.3-19. These figures contained the drawings of WBN radiation protection design features, including controlled access areas, decontamination areas, and onsite laboratories and counting rooms. In lieu of providing drawings depicting these radiation protection design features, TVA provided a description of each. In response to RAI 12-7 regarding the FSAR changes, TVA provided clarifying information in its letters dated June 3 and October 4, 2010. In its October 4, 2010, letter, TVA stated that the WBN Unit 2 access controls to radiological areas (including contaminated areas), personnel and equipment decontamination facilities, onsite laboratories and counting

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rooms, and health physics facilities (including dosimetry issue, respiratory protection bioassay, and radiation protection management and technical staff) are all common to WBN Unit 1. Furthermore, TVA stated that these facilities are sized and situated properly to support two operating units. Based on TVA's response, the staff concluded that the FSAR changes did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusion, as documented in SSER 18, issued October 1995. Therefore, the changes are acceptable. TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the radiation protection design features descriptive information provided in its letter dated October 4, 2010. This is Open Item 112 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"In response to a staff RAI, TVA provided a calculation in a letter dated June 3, 2010, that purported to provide a statistical basis for setting the COT frequency for several in-plant area radiation monitors based on the operational maintenance history of WBN Unit 1. Although the NRC staff agrees that actual maintenance history can be used as a basis for establishing the frequency of routine maintenance, the staff identified several deficiencies in the calculations provided by TVA. In a July 25, 2011, meeting, TVA stated that it will revise the FSAR to indicate that the COT frequency for WBN nonsafety-related area radiation monitors will be performed quarterly or periodically at a frequency consistent with monitor operational maintenance history. This alternate frequency will be based on test data from monitors of the same type and model as the WBN Unit 2 monitors, operated under similar environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, humidity). A statistical analysis of these data will establish that, at the COT frequency selected, there is at least a 95-percent probability at a 95-percent confidence level (i.e., less than or equal to a 5-percent Type I error (false alarm) and a 5-percent Type II error (failed alarm), respectively) that each monitor will be found within the established 'as found' acceptance criteria in subsequent tests. TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the justification for the periodicity of the COT frequency for WBN nonsafety-related area radiation monitors described in this paragraph. This is Open Item 113 (Appendix HH).

In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA added two area radiation monitors to the list of monitors for the spent fuel pit area (0-RE-90-102 and 103) in Table 12.3-4, 'Location of Plant Area Radiation Monitors.' Each monitor uses a Geiger-Mueller type gamma detector, with its own independent high-voltage power supply and a range of 1×10<sup>-1</sup> to 1×10<sup>4</sup> milliroentgen per hour. Visual and audible alarms are provided in the control room upon detection of high radiation or instrument malfunction. In addition, visual and audible alarms are provided that annunciate locally upon detection of high radiation. These two monitors are located on opposite sides of the 757-foot elevation of the auxiliary building and, with the existing area monitors (1-RE-90-1 and 2-RE-90-1), alert personnel in the vicinity of the fuel storage areas of excessive radiation for personnel protection and to initiate safety actions. The staff concludes that WBN meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.68, 'Criticality Accident Requirements,' and is therefore acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to state that WBN meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.68. This is Open Item 114 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"These changes to the auxiliary building airborne monitoring reflect the current operational configuration of WBN Unit 1. They do not alter the staff's conclusion in SSER 18 that use of portable continuous airborne monitors is acceptable and that the licensee meets the monitoring requirements in 10 CFR 20.1501, 'General.'"

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 112 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the radiation protection design features descriptive information provided in its letter dated October 4, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.4)"

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Open Item 113 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the justification for the periodicity of the COT frequency for WBN non-safety related area radiation monitors. (SSER 24, Section 12.4)"

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Open Item 114 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect that WBN meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.68. (SSER 24, Section 12.4)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 12.4 included the following for Open Items 112, 113, and 114:

"TVA provided the requested updates in FSAR Amendment 105, and the NRC staff verified that the updates were acceptable. Therefore, Open Items 112, 113, and 114 are closed."

SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

12.5.0	27	C — — 13	In SSER14, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 88 which revised the discussion of the estimate of personnel internal exposures to address the new 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The staff concluded that this section as amended provided reasonable assurance that the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1502 and 20.1703 would be met. In addition, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 84 which updated the predicted maximum annual doses resulting from plan operation and determined that this section as amended provides reasonable assurance that the radiation doses resulting from plant operations would not exceed the limits in 10 CFR 20.1301.
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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.5 of SSER24 includes:

"Based on the information provided by TVA in its letter to the NRC dated June 3, 2010, and because historical experience has demonstrated that the average annual collective dose to operate WBN Unit 1 was less than 100 person-rem, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that WBN Unit 2 can be operated at or below 100 person-rem average annual collective dose. Therefore, FSAR Section 12.4 is acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design changes to be implemented to lower radiation levels, as provided in its letter to the NRC dated June 3, 2010. This is Open Item 115 (Appendix HH)."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 115 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design changes to be implemented to

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

lower radiation levels as provided in its letter the NRC dated June 3, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.5)"

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; it included the following for Open Item 115:

"For Item No. 115, FSAR A109, Section 12.4 has been updated to reflect the design changes implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in TVA's letter dated June 3, 2010 ..."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 12.5 Dose Assessment

"Open Item 115

Open Item 115 states, 'TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design changes to be implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in its letter [to] the NRC dated June 3, 2010.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendments 105 and 109, to include the information previously provided in its letter dated June 3, 2010. Therefore, Open Item 115 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

12.6.0	27	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving Health Physics Program
		<b>13</b>	The staff reviewed TVA's RADCON program (formerly the HP program) and found that the WBN organizational structure can provide adequate support for the RADCON program and that organizational changes described in the FSAR amendments met the staff's acceptance criteria. They considered this issue resolved in SSER10. In SSER14, the staff reviewed the revised FSAR sections (through Amendment 88), and found them acceptable.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.6 of SSER24 includes:

"In FSAR Amendment 95, TVA made several editorial changes to FSAR Section 12.5 resulting from organizational changes at WBN. With the exception of the following two issues, these did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusion, as documented in SSER 14, issued December 1994, and are therefore acceptable. The remaining two issues are related to the qualifications of the radiation protection manager (RPM). FSAR Section 12.5.1 states that, 'The minimum qualification requirements for the Radiation Protection Manager are stated in Section 13.1.3.' FSAR Section 13.1.3 states that, 'Nuclear Power (NP) personnel at the Watts Bar plant will meet the qualification and training requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8 with the alternatives as outlined in the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A.' Specifically, TVA modified its commitment to the personnel qualification standards in RG 1.8, 'Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants,' by adding the caveat, 'with the alternatives as outlined

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

in the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.' It was unclear to the staff whether or not TVA was committed to (1) the requirement that the RPM have 5 years of 'professional experience' and (2) the 3-month time limit on 'temporarily' assigning an RPM who does not meet the RPM qualifications (ANSI/ANS-3.1-1981, 'Selection, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants,' as referenced in RG 1.8). In response to RAIs 12-13 and 12-14, TVA clarified in its letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010, that it will meet the requirements of RG 1.8, Revision 2, and ANSI/ANS-3.1-1981 for all new personnel qualifying on positions identified in RG 1.8, Regulatory Position C.1, after January 1, 1990. These changes are consistent with the staff's acceptance criteria 12.5.A of SRP Section 12.5 as they pertain to staff qualifications and are, therefore, acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the qualification standards of the RPM as provided in its letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010. This is Open Item 116 (Appendix HH)."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 116 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the qualification standards of the RPM as provided in its letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.6)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 12.6 included the following for Open Item 116:

"TVA provided the requested update in FSAR Amendment 105, and the NRC staff verified that the update was acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 116 is closed."

SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

12.7.0	27	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>13</b>	

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.7 of SSER24 includes:

"In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA revised the list in FSAR Section 12.3.2.2, 'Design Description,' of postaccident activities that require personnel access to vital areas of the plant, adding three and deleting the activities at the postaccident sampling facility. TVA added activities regarding (1) control or verification functions in the motor-generator set room or the 480-volt shutdown board room, or both, (2) installing the component cooling system/essential raw cooling water spool piece, and (3) refilling the refueling water storage tank following a loss-of-coolant accident. Operation of the postaccident sampling system (PASS) was deleted, since emergency operating procedures no longer rely on the results of a primary coolant sample during an accident, and technical specifications no longer require the operability of the PASS. The staff requested information on the dose consequences of the vital missions discussed in Section 12.3.2.2, including plant layout drawings depicting radiation zones during accident conditions and access/egress routes. By letters dated June 3 and December 10, 2010, TVA provided dose calculations and plant layout drawings depicting the access to, and egress from, WBN vital areas. TVA supplemented this information in a letter to the NRC dated February 25, 2011. TVA's commitments to clarify the calculational basis and establish corresponding implementing procedures for access to these vital areas, as stated in its

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

February 25, 2011, letter, are subject to verification by NRC inspection. The staff concludes that TVA has demonstrated, by design calculations, that the actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of a design-basis accident at WBN Unit 2 can be performed such that occupational doses to plant operators are maintained within the dose criteria of GDC 19, as required by NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2. Therefore, the staff concludes that the shielding design for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. This is Open Item 117 (Appendix HH)."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 117 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. (SSER 24, Section 12.7.1)"

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; it included the following for Open Item 117:

"For Item No. 117, FSAR A109, Section 12.3 has been updated to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in TVA's letter dated February 25, 2011 ... The additional analyses cases were made using the Iodine spike source term in conformance with Commitment 9 made in Enclosure 4 of Reference 2. The results provided represent the limiting results and are well below the regulatory limits. The commitment is considered closed."

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 12.7.1 Plant Shielding (TMI Action Item II.B.2)

"Open Item 117

Open Item 117 states, 'TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the information previously provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. Therefore, Open Item 117 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

12.7.1	27	<b>C</b>	NUREG-0737, II.B.2, "Plant Shielding" - NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.
		<b>13</b>	In SSER14, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 88 which revised the discussion of shielding for accident conditions. The staff stated that this change did not affect the staff's previous conclusion that Watts Bar conformed to the positions in NUREG-0737 Item II.B.2, and was therefore, acceptable to the staff. Identified as CI in NRC letter dated May 28, 2008.
			Unit 2 Action:
			Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations. CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

The necessary mission dose calculations have been revised and apply to Unit 2. Completion of the radiation qualification of Unit 2 safety related equipment, as addressed under the Equipment Environmental Qualification programs for Electrical Equipment (10CFR50.49) and Mechanical Equipment qualification programs will be accomplished via licensing commitments for the Equipment Qualification Special Program and Mechanical Equipment Qualification Special Program, respectively.

NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014 issued URI 391/2014-604-01 to Evaluate the Methodology for Calculating Mission Doses.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014, closed URI 391/2014-604-01.

SSER27 contains the following under 12.7.1 Plant Shielding (TMI Action Item II.B.2)

“Open Item 117

Open Item 117 states, ‘TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011.’

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the information previously provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. Therefore, Open Item 117 is closed.”

Status was changed to “Resolved” in SSER27.

12.7.2	21	<b>O</b>	NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.C., "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" - In SSER5, the staff resolved this license condition for Unit 1 (IR 390/84-09 & IR 390/84-28) due to verification that TVA's commitments regarding the high range in-containment monitor were satisfactory and that it was installed. Identified as CI in NRC letter dated May 28, 2008.
		<b>02</b>	

Unit 2 Action: Install high range in-containment monitor for Unit 2.

CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
12.7.3	21	<b>C</b> — — <b>09</b>	<p>NUREG-0737, III.D.3.3, "In-plant Monitoring of I2 radiation monitoring" - NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16. Identified as CI in NRC letter dated May 28, 2008.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete modifications for Unit 2.</p> <p>CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-605 (08/07/2012 letter) closed NUREG-0737, III.D.3.3.</p>
13.0.0	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
13.1.0	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>06</b>	<p>In SSER16, NRC reviewed the organizational information presented in TVA Topical Report TVA-NPOD89. NRC approval of the topical report and its revisions superseded the staff review in the SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.1 includes:</p> <p>"In the safety evaluation report (SER), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff found the organizational structure of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) acceptable. Since then, TVA has revised Section 13.1.1 of the final safety analysis report (FSAR) to state that organizational information is as presented in TVA Topical Report TVA-NPOD89-A, "TVA Nuclear Power Group Organization Description." In Section 13.1 of Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 16, the staff found TVA's organizational structure acceptable based on the staff's approval of TVA Topical Report TVA-NPOD89 and annual updates to the topical report through Revision 6. The staff's approval of the topical report and its updates supersedes the approval given by the staff in the SER. The revision reviewed by the staff in this SSER of TVA-NPOD89-A is Revision 18, issued August 31, 2009."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
13.1.1	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
13.1.2	0	<b>C</b> — —	Approved for both units in SER.
13.1.3	27	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>LICENSE CONDITION – Use of experienced personnel during startup</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC provided a LICENSE CONDITION to ensure TVA augmented the shift staff with individuals that had prior experience with large pressurized water reactor operations. In SSER8, NRC reviewed TVA's commitment in the FSAR and the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan to comply with RG 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training,". NRC staff considered that this provided adequate assurance, and eliminated the LICENSE CONDITION.</p>

Unit 2 Action: Submit staffing and NQAP for two unit operation.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 13.1.3 includes:

"In order to complete its evaluation of TVA's plant staff organization, TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to allow the staff to confirm that:

- 1) The education and experience of management and principal supervisory positions down through the shift supervisory level conform to RG 1.8. The staff will review the resumes to confirm this.
- 2) TVA has an adequate number of licensed and non-licensed operators in the training pipeline to support the preoperational test program, fuel loading, and dual unit operation.
- 3) The plant administrative procedures clearly state that when the Assistant Shift Engineer assumes his duties as Fire Brigade Leader, his control room duties are temporarily assumed by the Shift Supervisor (Shift Engineer), or by another SRO, if one is available. The staff will confirm that the plant administrative procedures clearly describe this transfer of control room duties.

These are Open Items 9, 10, and 11 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, Open Items 9 and 11 are for NRC Inspection / Review.

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

13.1.3 of SSER25 reads:

"13.1.3 Plant Staff Organization

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 11 (Appendix HH) states the following:

The plant administrative procedures should clearly state that, when the Assistant Shift Engineer assumes his duties as Fire Brigade Leader, his control room duties are temporarily assumed by the Shift Supervisor (Shift Engineer), or by another SRO [senior reactor operator], if one is available. The plant administrative procedures should clearly describe this transfer of control room duties.

In Enclosure 1 of its letter dated August 15, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML11230A385), the Tennessee Valley Authority provided its revised Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1/Unit 2 as-designed fire protection report. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff reviewed Section 9.1, 'Fire Brigade Staffing,' of the fire protection report and concluded that, because it ensures that the fire brigade will not use members of the minimum shift crew, there is no need for an administrative procedure to describe a transfer of control room duties. Therefore, Open Item 11 is closed. "

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

SSER Open Items 9 and 10 were closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-603, dated May 9, 2014.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 13.1.3 Plant Staff Organization

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 9

Open Item 9 states, 'Confirm that education and experience of management and principal supervisory positions down through the shift supervisory level conform to Regulatory Guide 1.8.'

Per NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14129A381), the education and experience of management at Watts Bar were confirmed to conform to the requirements of RG 1.8, regarding the management of Unit 2 post-construction. Therefore, Open Item 9 is closed.

Open Item 10

Open Item 10 states, 'Confirm that TVA has an adequate number of licensed and non-licensed operators in the training pipeline to support the preoperational test program, fuel loading, and dual unit operation.'

Per NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14129A381), the applicant had enough qualified personnel to staff for dual unit operation. The applicant had enough reactor operators in the training pipeline to be able to staff the reactor operator position with reactor operators (rather than with senior reactor operators) after the June 2016 License Class. Therefore, Open Item 10 is closed."

Status remains "Resolved" in SSER27.

13.2.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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13.2.1	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	In SSER9, NRC reviewed TVA's certification for licensed operator training programs and FSAR Chapter 13 revision to reflect the training program . NRC determined that these were acceptable. In SSER10, NRC reviewed changes to the initial test program for TMI Item I.G.1, "Training During Low Power Testing." NRC found the training requirement satisfied.
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## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 13.2.1 includes:

"Based on (1) its review of the information provided by TVA in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 97 and the staff's previous review as documented in the SER and supplements, (2) the industry accreditation, as described in RG 1.8, of the TVA training programs, and (3) the results of the NRC's periodic examinations of TVA licensed operators and inspections of the training program at WBN Unit 1, the NRC staff finds that TVA's plant staff training program continues to be acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

13.2.2	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
13.3.0	13	<b>S</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan submitted February 12, 1993. This review superseded the review in the SER.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.</p>
13.3.1	22	<b>S</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan submitted February 12, 1993. This review superseded the review in the SER. In SSER20, NRC completed the review including the findings of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section includes:</p> <p>"The objective of the NRC staff review documented here is to determine whether the proposed extension of the existing WBN REP to incorporate Unit 2 has adequately addressed the differences between the two units and any dual-unit issues that arise from the licensing and operation of Unit 2. The NRC will use the results from this review to make its finding, under 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(i), that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency at Unit 2. TVA should evaluate the impact of Unit 2 related changes on the effectiveness of the WBN REP, as it applies to Unit 1, under 10 CFR 50.54(q)."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.</p>
13.3.2	27	<b>S</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan submitted February 12, 1993. This review superseded the review in the SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness. In SSER20, NRC completed the review and found that the REP complied with NRC requirements and was acceptable for the full-power license of WBN Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.3.2.18 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Section V of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires TVA to submit its detailed implementing procedures for</p>

its emergency plan no less than 180 days before the scheduled issuance of an OL. Completion of this requirement is an open item that must be resolved before the issuance of an OL. This is Open Item 43 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

13.3.2 of SSER22 includes:

"The NRC staff review documented in this SSER used Revision 92 of the NP-REP and the WBN Unit 1/2 version of Appendix C, designated as Revision 92xx. Unless otherwise stated, "WBN REP," as used in this supplement, refers to Revision 92 of the NP-REP and the WBN Unit 1/2 version of Appendix C, Revision 92xx. The staff has identified an open item to review the combined WBN Appendix C before issuance of the Unit 2 OL to confirm (1) that the proposed Unit 2 changes were incorporated into Appendix C and (2) that changes made to Appendix C for Unit 1 since Revision 92 and the changes made to the NP-REP since Revision 92 do not affect the bases of the staff's findings in this SER supplement. This is Open Item 37 (Appendix HH)."

and

"In its April 27, 2010, response to RAI 6, TVA stated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a common control room, TSC, and OSC and that the Unit 1 communication facilities were originally designed and built to serve both units. As described in SSER 13, TVA's Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in Chattanooga, TN, serves as the EOF for Unit 1 and will serve as the EOF for Unit 2. TVA also stated in its response to RAI 7 that the Unit 2 design would provide plant data to the NRC's Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as is currently done for Unit 1. The staff finds that no dual-unit or unit-specific changes are necessary to reflect Unit 2, in that the communication capabilities were originally designed and built to serve both units. The staff plans to confirm the availability and operability of the ERDS for Unit 2 before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 38 (Appendix HH). The staff also plans to confirm the adequacy of the communications capability to support dual-unit operations before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 39 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.6]

and

"In its April 27, 2010, response to RAI 8, TVA stated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a common control room, TSC, OSC, and a local recovery center and that the Unit 1 facilities in place were originally designed and built to serve both units. As described in SSER 13, TVA's CECC, located in Chattanooga, TN, serves as the EOF for Unit 1 and will serve as the EOF for Unit 2. No dual-unit or unit-specific changes are necessary to reflect Unit 2, because that the facilities and equipment were originally designed and built to serve both units. The staff should confirm the adequacy of the emergency facilities and equipment to support dual-unit operations before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 40 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.8]

and

"In its April 27, 2010, response to RAI 9, TVA stated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a common control room, TSC, and OSC and that the Unit 1 facilities in place were originally designed and built to serve both units. As described in SSER 13, TVA's CECC, located in Chattanooga, TN, serves as the EOF for Unit 1 and will serve as the EOF for Unit 2. TVA also committed to (1) updating plant data displays as necessary to include Unit 2 and (2) updating dose assessment models to provide capabilities for assessing releases from both WBN units. The staff plans to confirm the adequacy of these items before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 41 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.9]

and

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

"Since these actions are currently in progress, the staff will confirm the adequacy of these assessment capabilities to support dual unit operations before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 42 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.9]

## REVISION 08 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-609 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Items Number 39 and 42.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Items 38 and 40 were closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014.

Open Item 41 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-603, dated May 1, 2015.

NOTE: These Open items have not been closed in an SSER.

TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.

13.3.3	22	<b>S</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Emergency Preparedness (NUREG-0737, III.A.1, III.A.2, III.A.2)
		<b>13</b>	The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in SSER13 superseded the review in the original 1982 SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LICENSE CONDITION was deleted. In SSER20, NRC completed the review and found that the REP complied with NRC requirements and was acceptable for the full-power license of WBN Unit 1.

Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 13.3.3 includes:

"Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(i), and subject to the satisfactory completion of the confirmatory items identified above, there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency at either WBN Unit 1 or Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
13.4.0	27	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>LICENSE CONDITION - Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) (NUREG-0737, I.B.1.2)</p> <p>In SSER8, NRC indicated that the ISEG would be established as part of the Technical Specifications. Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER8.</p> <p>Unit 2 action:</p> <p>Implement the alternate ISEG that was approved for the rest of the TVA units including WBN Unit 1 by NRC on August 26, 1999. The function will be performed by the site engineering organizations.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.4.0 includes:</p> <p>"TVA's review and audit administrative requirements conform to the applicable guidelines of ANSI N18.7-1976, as endorsed by RG 1.33, Revision 2. The plant review process is consistent with the applicable regulatory guidelines . The NRC staff concludes that the plant review process described in FSAR Section 13.4 and the TVA NQA Plan is consistent with applicable regulatory guidelines, will continue to satisfy the criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and therefore is acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
13.5.0	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
13.5.1	22	<b>C</b> — — <b>06</b>	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.5.1 includes:</p> <p>"In 2010, TVA submitted FSAR Amendment 97 for WBN Unit 2. The structure of the section of the report pertaining to administrative procedures has been updated subsequent to the NRC SER, which determined that administrative procedures were acceptable for Unit 1. The portion of the report pertaining to issuance of</p>



procedures continues to follow the guidance of RG 1.33, with the updated language referring directly to the guide instead of to the ANSI standard it endorses. The NRC staff concludes that the administrative procedures information presented in FSAR Amendment 97 continues to be in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34. The staff also finds that the changes meet the applicable parts of the NUREG-0737, TMI Action Plan Requirements by including administrative procedural provisions in FSAR Section 13.5.1.3. Based on its review of FSAR Amendment 97, and the previous staff evaluation documented in the SER and its supplements, the NRC staff concludes that the administrative procedures meet the relevant requirements of NUREG-0737 and 10 CFR 50.34 and the guidance of the relevant regulatory guides and is therefore acceptable."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

13.5.2	22	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving operating, maintenance and emergency procedures
		<b>13</b>	<p>In the original 1982 SER, this issue was used to track the staff's review of the emergency operating procedures generation package. In SSER9, the staff concluded that the outstanding issue was no longer needed as the staff no longer performed such reviews. The emergency operating procedure development program review is performed under IP 42000, "Emergency Operating Procedures." This inspection will be performed before issuance of an operating license. In SSER10, NRC reviewed TVA's plan for vendor review of the power ascension test procedures and the Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs). Based on the Watts Bar plant specific simulator, NRC determined that a License Condition to ensure consistency with the Sequoyah EOIs was no longer necessary.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Issue operating, maintenance and emergency procedures.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.5.2 includes:</p> <p>"In 2010, TVA submitted FSAR Amendment 97 for WBN Unit 2. The section of the report pertaining to operating and maintenance procedures has been updated in structure. The content of this section satisfies the relevant portions of RG 1.33 and the TMI Action Plan Requirements. This section of the FSAR describes the different classifications of procedures that the operators will use in the control room and locally in the plant for plant operations. As with the administrative procedures, the FSAR describes TVA's program for developing the operating and emergency procedures in the section of the FSAR that follows the guidance of RG 1.33. The FSAR identified the individuals responsible for maintaining the procedures and the general format and content of the operating and maintenance procedures including emergency operating procedures. The different classifications of procedures and maintenance activities were also described. The FSAR addressed the following categories of procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• general</li> <li>• system</li> <li>• operating</li> <li>• abnormal</li> <li>• emergency</li> <li>• fuel handling</li> <li>• maintenance</li> <li>• modification</li> </ul> <p>The identification of the individuals responsible and the descriptions of the content of the operating and maintenance procedures were in accordance with NUREG-0800. Based on this and the previous staff evaluation documented in the SER and its supplements, the NRC staff concludes that the operating and maintenance procedures are acceptable for WBN Unit 2."</p>

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct the Status to "C."

13.5.3	22	<b>C</b> <b>06</b>	<p>LICENSE CONDITION – Report on outage of emergency core cooling system (NUREG-0737, II.K.3.17)</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, the NRC accepted TVA's commitment to develop and implement a plan to collect emergency core cooling system outage information. In SSER3, the staff accepted a revised commitment from an October 28, 1983, letter to participate in the nuclear power reliability data system and comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.</p> <p>Reporting of Safety Valve and Relief Valve Failures and Challenges (II.K.3.3)</p> <p>In SSER16, NRC reviewed TVA revised commitment to report failures and challenges to PORVs and safety valves in accordance with the Technical Specifications.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Include, as necessary, in the Technical Specifications.</p> <p>CT in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.</p> <p>Rev. 0 of the Unit 1 TS contained 5.9.4 (Monthly Operating Reports) which implemented the above commitment for Unit 1.</p> <p>Amendment 57 to the Unit 1 TS (approved by the NRC on March 21, 2005) deleted this section of the TS.</p> <p>The markup for Unit 2 Developmental Revision A noted that Unit 2 will apply this change, and the Unit 2 TS will contain no requirement for Monthly Operating Reports.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.5.3 includes:</p> <p>"By letter dated April 29, 2010, TVA stated that Amendment 57 to the Unit 1 TS removed Section 5.9.4 relating to monthly operating reports. The NRC staff approved this amendment by letter dated March 21, 2005. TVA further stated that the Unit 2 TS will also contain no such requirement and listed this item as "submitted," based on its March 4, 2009, submittal of Developmental Revision A of the WBN Unit 2 TS. ..."</p>
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"In SSER 21, the NRC staff listed Section 13.5.3 as "Open (Inspection)." Based on the above evaluations, the staff concludes that no inspection is required for items II.K.3.3 and II.K.17, and Section 13.5.3 is resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

13.6.0	22	<b>C</b>	OUTSTANDING ISSUE to file appropriate revision to the Physical Security Plan
		<b>06</b>	In the original 1982 SER, the staff identified certain outstanding issues with TVA's Physical Security Plan. In SSER1 NRC evaluated revisions to the plan submitted July 29, 1982. In SSER15, NRC provided a safety evaluation that concluded that WBN conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

LICENSE CONDITION – Physical security of fuel in containment

In SSER1, part of the Physical Security Plan (PSP) was not in accordance with the regulation. TVA submitted a new PSP on June 17, 1992. In SSER10, the staff concluded that the provisions for protection of the containment during major refueling and maintenance met the intent of the regulation.

LICENSE CONDITION - Land Vehicle Bomb Control Program

In SSER20, NRC added a license condition for WBN Unit 1 to fully implement the Surface Vehicle Bomb Rule by February 17, 1996. TVA letter to NRC dated February 15, 1996, (submitted for both units) notified NRC that Watts Bar had fully implemented the program.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 13.6.5 (Conclusions) includes:

"The NRC staff's review of the WBN Unit 2 PSP, T&QP, and SCP, Revision 11, dated July 23, 2010, and TVA's letter, "Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Target Set Development," dated November 18, 2010, focused on ensuring that these plans contain the programmatic elements necessary to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that these plans include the necessary programmatic elements that, when effectively implemented, will provide the required high assurance demanded by the regulation. The burden to effectively implement these plans remains with TVA. Effective implementation depends on the procedures and practices that TVA develops to satisfy the programmatic elements of its PSP, T&QP, and SCP."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.
13.6.6	24	C
		07

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

13.6.6.3.22 of SSER24 includes:

"In its June 10, 2011, submittal, the applicant proposed two license conditions. Each one requested the grant of an operating license, noting that the Security Computer system and relevant EP systems will be implemented to the NEI 08-09 standards described in the CSP by the WBN Unit 1 full implementation date. The staff reviewed the proposed license condition(s) and found them acceptable for the following reasons:

- \* The assessment measures taken by the applicant to determine the effectiveness of cyber security protections were based on the NEI 04-04 self assessment criteria. However, this guidance was used by other licensees in the interim period as they moved from their existing cyber security programs towards compliance with 10 CFR 73.54. Furthermore, the applicant addressed the remediation of vulnerabilities discovered during its assessment.
- \* The interim measures used to protect the applicant's CDAs provide reasonable assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the design-basis threat. As with other licensees, this interim approach is considered adequate until the applicant's CSP is fully implemented.
- \* The EP systems and the Security Computer (for both WBN Unit 1 and WBN Unit 2) will be fully compliant with 10 CFR 73.54 by the full implementation date provided in the WBN Unit 1 CSP implementation schedule. All other portions of the WBN Unit 2 CSP are scheduled to be implemented prior to the WBN Unit 2 start-up date.

The documented license conditions should be viewed as a full-faith effort on the applicant's part to attain full compliance with the criteria specified in its CSP and to provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the design-basis threat. If full compliance is not met by the date stipulated in the proposed license conditions, the NRC should proceed with a review of the applicant's operating license. Based on the above discussion, the NRC staff proposes the following two license conditions:

Cyber Security Proposed License Condition 1:

The licensee shall implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1)(ii) as they relate to the security computer. Completion of these actions will occur consistent with the full implementation date of September 30, 2014, as established in the licensee's letter dated April 7, 2011, 'Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan License Amendment Request, Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1.'

Cyber Security Proposed License Condition 2:

The licensee shall implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1)(iii) as they relate to the corporate based systems that support emergency preparedness. Completion of these actions will occur consistent with the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 implementation schedule established in the licensee's letter dated April 7, 2011, 'Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Cyber Security Plan License Amendment Request, Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1.' Based on the above and the provided schedule ensuring timely implementation of those protective measures that provide a higher degree of protection against cyber attack, the NRC staff finds the Cyber Security Program implementation schedule is satisfactory."

13.6.6.5 (Conclusion) of SSER24 reads:

"The NRC staff's review and evaluation of the applicant's CSP was conducted using the staff positions established in the relevant sections of RG 5.71. Based on the NRC staff's review, the NRC finds that the applicant addressed the information necessary to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54, 10 CFR 73.55(a)(1), 10 CFR 73.55(b)(8), and 10 CFR 73.55(m), and that the applicant's Cyber Security Program provides high assurance that CDAs are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the design basis threat as described in 10 CFR 73.1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

information contained in this CSP to be acceptable and upon successful implementation of this program, operation of WBN Unit 2 will not be inimical to the common defense and security."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

14.0.0	23	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Report changes to Initial Test Program
		<b>13</b>	In the original 1982 SER, this LICENSE CONDITION was intended to require TVA report to NRC within 30 days of modifying an approved initial test. In SSER7, the NRC accepted a commitment in TVA's July 1, 1991, letter to notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

Unit 2 Action:

Notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

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In SSER3, the staff reviewed additional information and FSAR amendments through 46 addressing concerns identified by the staff in the FSAR. They concluded in SSER3 that the Initial Test Program (ITP), with the exception of open items as a result of modifications made to the program in subsequent amendments (through 53) for which the staff requested additional information, would meet the acceptance criteria of SRP section 14.2 and successful completion of the program would demonstrate functional adequacy of structures, systems and components.

In SSER5, the staff reviewed TVA submittals to address the open items from SSER3 and FSAR amendments through 55, and concluded that the program met the acceptance criteria of the SRP and was acceptable.

In SSER9, the staff stated that TVA commitments to reinstate the loss-of-offsite-power test for Unit 2 and revise the acceptance criteria for the reactor building purge system air flow rate (TVA letter dated July 10, 1991, for both units) were found acceptable to address two issues identified by the staff during their review of the FSAR through Amendment 67.

In SSER10, the staff agreed with TVA that there was no need to perform any natural recirculation test for Units 1 and 2 (See subsection 5.4.3.)

In SSER12, the staff evaluated the ITP based on Amendment 74 to the FSAR, which addressed most of the staff's concerns raised during review of Amendment 69, in which the ITP was completely revised. The staff found that Chapter 14, as revised by Amendment 74, was generally adequate and in accordance with review criteria with the exception of 7 items, which would be evaluated in later supplements.

In SSER14, the staff evaluated changes made by TVA in Amendments 84 and 86, as well as 5 TVA letters submitted during 1994 to resolve the issues identified by the staff in SSER12, and changes made in FSAR Amendment 88 to address concerns still open prior to that amendment. The staff found that, with the exception of open items that remained open pending receipt and review of TVA's responses, the WB Units 1 and 2 ITP description contained in FSAR Chapter 14, updated through Amendment 88, was generally comprehensive and encompassed the major phases of the program requirements.

In SSER16, SSER18 and SSER19, the staff evaluated the ITP through amendments 89, 90 and 91 respectively and stated each time that it found the program to be comprehensive and encompassing the major phases of the testing program guidance presented in the SRP.

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A Unit 2 issue to verify capability of each common station service transformer to carry load required to supply ESF loads of 1 unit under LOCA condition in addition to power required for shutdown of non-accident unit was raised in SSER14, and the NRC stated that before an OL can be issued for Unit 2, TVA would have to demonstrate the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit. TVA agreed with the NRC position in a January 5, 1995, letter and the issue was resolved in SSER16.

Unit 2 Action:

Amend FSAR Chapter 14 to reflect the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100191421) .

Table 14.2-1 was revised to clarify the testing requirement.

REVISION 05 UPDATE:

As a result of the response to NRC RAI 14 - 1, item 6. of Table 14.2-1 was revised again as part of Amendment 100 to the Unit 2 FSAR. Amendment 100 was submitted on September 1, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102500171).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

14.2.3 (Conclusions) of SSER23 includes:

"Section 1.7 of SSER 21 lists FSAR Section 14.0.0 as "Open (Inspection)." The staff performed its review for WBN Unit 2 using the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendments 97 through 102. Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as described above, and its previous review, as documented in the SER and its supplements, the staff concludes that the ITP description contained in Chapter 14 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, as updated through Amendment 102, is comprehensive and encompasses the major phases of the testing program requirements prescribed by various guidance documents, including the SRP and RG 1.70, Revision 3."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Section 4.3.3 (Power Ascension Test Manger) of WBN Unit 2 Technical Instruction 2-TI-438, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Power Ascension Test Program, states:

"EVALUATE the change for submittal to the NRC within 30 days under the provisions of 10CFR50.59 program."

15.0.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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15.0.1		<b>NA</b>	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
15.0.2		NA --	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
15.1.0	0	C --	Approved for both units in SER.
15.1.1		NA --	Addressed in 15.2.1
15.1.2		NA --	Addressed in 15.2.1
15.1.3		NA --	Addressed in 15.2.1
15.1.4		NA --	Addressed in 15.2.1
15.1.5		NA --	Addressed in 15.2.1 and 15.4.2.
15.2.0	0	C 09	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p>



Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.2.1	24	C — — 07	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed TVA's use of the FACTRAN computer code for LOCA temperature distribution. NRC concluded that the transient analysis was acceptable. In SSER14, NRC approved the trip time delay functional upgrade as part of the Eagle 21 process protection system for low-low steam generator reactor trip. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.</p>
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Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER24]

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.1.1 (Partial Loss-of-Coolant-Flow Accident) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of the event involving a decrease in reactor coolant flow and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of this event. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 meets the requirements of GDC 10, 15, and 26."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.1.2 (Loss of External Electrical Load and/or Turbine Trip) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of an event involving the loss of external electrical load or turbine trip, or both, and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of this event. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 meets the requirements of GDC 10, 15, and 26."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.1.3 (Loss of Normal Feedwater) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of the LONF event and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of the LONF flow. Results of the LONF analysis show that the AFW system capacity is such that RCS water is not relieved from the pressurizer relief or safety valves. Therefore, fuel damage is not predicted. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 meets the requirements of GDC 10, 15, and 26."

15.2.1.4 (Coincident Loss of Onsite and External (Offsite) AC Power to the Station - Loss of Offsite Power to the Station Auxiliaries) includes:

"The regulatory requirements for SBO appear in 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating Current Power." TVA proposed actions for WBN to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, and the NRC staff

accepted them in safety evaluations in 1993. The conclusions in the staff's 1993 safety evaluations remain valid for WBN Unit 2."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.2.2	24	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		07	

#### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER24]

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.2.1 (Startup of an Inactive Loop at an Incorrect Temperature) reads:

"Evaluation of the startup of an inactive loop at an incorrect temperature pertains only to plants that are authorized to operate with a loop out of service. Since WBN Unit 2 is not authorized to operate with a loop out of service, the staff did not evaluate the event."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.2.2 (Excessive Heat Removal Due to Feedwater System Malfunctions) reads:

"The results of TVA's analysis show that the DNBRs calculated for an excessive feedwater addition at power are above the SAL values. Therefore, no fuel or clad damage is predicted. The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of the events involving excessive heat removal caused by feedwater system malfunctions described above and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of these events. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the plant will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 15, 20, and 26."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.2.3 (Excessive Load Increase Incident) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of the excessive load increase incident and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of these events. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 meets the requirements of GDC 10, 15, 20, and 26."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.2.4 (Accidental Depressurization of the Main Steam System) includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's evaluation of the accidental depressurization of the main steam system and concludes that TVA's evaluation has been performed using the results of a series of NRC-accepted, and applicable analyses. The NRC staff further concludes that the accidental depressurization of the main steam system will not cause the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits to be exceeded. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDCs 10, 15, 20, and 26, in the event of an accidental depressurization of the main steam system. The staff also concludes that the accidental depressurization of the main steam system meets the acceptance criteria for ANS Condition II events, since the limiting steam line break event, the MSLB, also meets the acceptance criteria for ANS Condition II events, as shown by TVA's analysis in FSAR Section 15.4.2 and as evaluated by the NRC staff in Section 15.3.2 of this SSER."

The Conclusion at the end of 15.2.2 reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's evaluation of minor secondary system pipe breaks as provided in FSAR Section 15.3.2, and concludes that TVA's evaluation has been performed using the results of a series of NRC-accepted, and applicable analyses. The NRC staff further concludes that the minor secondary system pipe breaks will not cause the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits to be exceeded. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDCs 10, 15, 20, and 26, in the event of a minor secondary system pipe break. The staff also concludes that the minor secondary system pipe breaks meet the acceptance criteria for ANS Condition II events, since the limiting steamline break event, the MSLB, also meets the acceptance criteria for ANS Condition II events, as shown by TVA's analysis in FSAR Section 15.4.2 and as evaluated by the NRC staff in Section 15.3.2 of this SSER."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.2.3	24	<b>C</b>	In SSER18, NRC reviewed FSAR amendment 90. In FSAR amendment 90, TVA revised for the transient event of inadvertent ECCS actuation for both Units. TVA provided additional information for both units by letter dated October 12, 1995. In SSER18, NRC found the reanalysis acceptable.
		<b>07</b>	

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.3 of SSER 24 reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the two mass addition events, the inadvertent operation of ECCS and the CVCS malfunction, and concludes that TVA's analyses used acceptable analytical assumptions and models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of these events. The staff concludes that TVA has shown that neither of these events could escalate into a more serious event. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's analyses show that the requirements of GDC 10, 15, and 26 are met for the WBN Unit 2 inadvertent operation of ECCS and CVCS malfunction events."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.2.4	27	<b>C</b>	15.2.4.1 Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Assembly Bank Withdrawal from Zero-Power Condition
		<b>13</b>	In SSER7, NRC reviewed additional analysis submitted for both units for a two pump, zero power, rod withdrawal. The NRC concluded the revision was acceptable. In SSER13, NRC accepted a change to a limiting condition for operation and bases changes to include a requirement that two reactor coolant pumps should be running whenever rods are capable of withdrawal in Mode 4.

Unit 2 Action: Submit Technical Specifications.

15.2.4.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for evaluation of Boron dilution and single failure criteria

In a letter dated November 2, 1984, TVA stated that the boron dilution alarm system receives signals from two independent channels which are independently powered. Additionally, testing of these circuits was

described. The staff concluded in SSER4 that the system is adequately protected from single failure and closed this item. In SSER14, NRC reviewed a reanalysis of the accident associated with uncontrolled boron dilution and accepted the analysis.

#### 15.2.4.6 Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection

In SSER14, NRC accepted a change to the maximum cladding temperature for the rod ejection accident made in FSAR amendment 80.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

#### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.6 requires two RCS loops with both loops in operation when the rod control system is capable of rod withdrawal.

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

#### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER24]

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.1 (Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analysis of the RWFS event and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure the SAFDLs are not exceeded. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.2 (Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the Rwap event and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. TVA has shown that the high neutron flux and overtemperature  $\Delta T$  trip channels provide adequate protection over the entire range of possible reactivity insertion rates (i.e., the minimum value of DNBR is higher than the DNBR SAL for all the analyzed cases). Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure the SAFDLs are not exceeded. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.3 (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment) reads:

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of control rod misalignment events and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure the SAFDLs will not be exceeded during normal or anticipated operational transients. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25."

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The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.4 (Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant caused by a CVCS malfunction and concludes that the applicant's analyses used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems and operator actions will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of this event, for Modes 1, 2, and 6. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the plant will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 15, and 26, in the event of a decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant caused by a CVCS malfunction occurring in Modes 1, 2, and 6. The staff did not evaluate B dilution events occurring in Modes 3, 4, and 5 (Open Item 132, Appendix HH)."

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The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.5 (Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into an Improper Position) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of the inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly into an improper position and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure that the Condition III acceptance criteria will be satisfied. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 13 and 10 CFR Part 100 in the event of an inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly into an improper position."

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The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.6 (Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the single RCCA withdrawal at full power and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the Condition III acceptance criteria will be satisfied. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25, in the event of a single RCCA withdrawal at full power."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 132 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA must provide the NRC staff with analyses of the boron dilution event that meet the criteria of SRP Section 15.4.6, including a description of the methods and procedures used by the operators to identify the dilution path(s) and terminate the dilution, in order for the staff to determine that the analyses comply with GDC 10. (SSER 24, Section 15.2.4.4)"

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REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (Rals) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other

type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

## REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 15.2.4.4 included the following for Open Item 132:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant due to a CVCS malfunction and concludes that TVA performed the analyses using acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems, and operator action will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of this event, for all modes of plant operation. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the plant will meet the requirements in GDCs 10, 15, and 26 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 in the event of a decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant due to a CVCS malfunction. Therefore, Open Item 132 is closed."

SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated June 30, 2014 provided the information to address SSER Open Item 132 as follows:

Information was added via FSAR Amendment 108 to meet commitment from TVA to NRC letter dated March 5, 2012.

A high level alarm was added to the volume control tank (VCT) that alarms and illuminates an unused main control room annunciator panel.

Annunciator Response Instruction (ARI) 2-Arl-109-115, CVCS & RHR - RPS & ESF was revised to include the new annunciator window and to identify inadvertent boron dilution event as a possible cause for the alarm. The ARI also identified Abnormal Response Instruction (AOI) 2-Aol-34, Immediate Boration as a response instruction. General Operating Instruction 2-GO-06, "Unit Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown", has been prepared and approved. This instruction includes the specific actions to limit the use of primary water pumps when the plant is in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown with a reactor coolant pump (RCP) in service, and to isolate the potential boron dilution paths, either by closing valves or placing pumps in pull-to-lock, after the last RCP is removed from service. This procedure will not be active for use until shortly before Unit 2 receives the Operating License.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."
15.2.5	4	C	Approved for both units in SER subject to completion of Outstanding Issue in 15.2.4.4.
15.2.6		NA	Addressed in 15.2.1.
15.2.7		NA	Addressed in 15.2.1.
15.3.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
15.3.1	24	C 09	<p>In SSER12, NRC reviewed the reanalysis of small break loss of coolant analysis (SBLOCA) for Units 1 and 2. NRC found the analysis acceptable. In SSER15, NRC reviewed additional changes to the SBLOCA for Units 1 and 2.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>The Conclusion portion of 15.3.1 of SSER24 reads:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed the large-break LOCA, small-break LOCA, and boric acid precipitation analyses performed by TVA for Watts Bar Unit 2 and concluded that the analyses demonstrate acceptable ECCS performance. Evaluation of boric acid precipitation timing for all break sizes demonstrates that prevention of precipitation is assured, and the EOPs reflect the analysis timing for operator action to align the ECCS for hot and cold side injection to preclude the precipitation. Based on these results, the staff concludes that, for WBN Unit 2 at the power level of 3,479.8 MWt (including a 0.5-percent uncertainty) and a peak linear heat generation rate of 13.89 kilowatt per foot, acceptable ECCS performance is assured for all break sizes and locations. Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA demonstrates compliance for WBN Unit 2 with the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.46; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K; and GDC 4, 27, and 35."</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p>



Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

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Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

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Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.3.2	24	<b>C</b> <b>09</b>	In SSER3, NRC reviewed proposed changes to the boron concentration requirement in the Boron Injection Tank and found them acceptable. In SSER14, NRC reviewed TVA application of the new steamline protection feature associated with the Eagle 21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1. The model resulted in the reanalysis of two ruptures: the main feedline and a steamline break outside of containment.
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Unit 2 Action: Perform analysis.

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Unit 2 Action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

WCAP-13462, "Summary Report Process Protection System Eagle 21 Upgrade, NSLB, MSS and TTD Implementation Watts Bar Units 1 and 2" Revision 2 is applicable to WBN Unit 2. The main feedline and steam line break outside of containment are analyzed in WCAP-13462. NRC has previously reviewed and accepted this analysis for Unit 1 in SSER14.

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Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

The Conclusion portion of 15.3.2 of SSER24 reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analysis of the MSLB for WBN Unit 2, focusing on the Westinghouse MSLB methodology (WCAP-9226-P-A) and on the need to document the subsequent changes to the methodology. TVA's analysis, with respect to the WBN Unit 2 MSLB analysis, mutatis mutandis, is consistent with the approved, generic methodology (WCAP-9226).

The NRC staff concludes that TVA performed its analyses using acceptable analytical models and that it has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will meet the requirements of GDC 27, 28, 31, and 35."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

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REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.3.3	24	<b>C</b> <b>09</b>	In SSER14, NRC reviewed TVA application of the new steamline protection feature associated with the Eagle 21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1. The model resulted in the reanalysis of two ruptures: the main feedline and a steamline break outside of containment.
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Unit 2 Action: Perform analysis.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

WCAP-13462, "Summary Report Process Protection System Eagle 21 Upgrade, NSLB, MSS and TTD Implementation Watts Bar Units 1 and 2" Revision 2 is applicable to WBN Unit 2. The main feedline and steam line break outside of containment are analyzed in WCAP-13462. NRC has previously reviewed and accepted this analysis for Unit 1 in SSER14.

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

The Conclusion portion of 15.3.3 of SSER24 reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of FLB and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models and that it has demonstrated that the RPS and safety systems will ensure that the ability to insert control rods is maintained, the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded, the RCPB will behave in a nonbrittle manner, the probability of a propagating fracture of the RCPB is minimized, and abundant core cooling will be provided. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 meets the requirements of GDC 27, 28, 31, and 35. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's evaluation is acceptable with

respect to feedwater system pipe breaks."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.3.4	24	<b>C</b>	In SSER14, NRC reviewed this section based on VANTAGE 5H fuel and found it acceptable.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

The Conclusion portion of 15.3.4/15.3.5 of SSER24 reads:

"Based on its review of TVA's analyses of the RCP rotor seizure and RCP shaft break, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's analyses adequately model the operation of WBN Unit 2 at the proposed power level and were performed using acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that (1) the RPS will continue to ensure that the ability to insert control rods is maintained, (2) the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded, (3) the RCPB will behave in a nonbrittle manner, (4) the probability of a propagating fracture of the RCPB is minimized, and (5) adequate core cooling will be provided. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will continue to meet the requirements of GDC 27, 28, and 31 during its proposed operation, and the FSAR is acceptable with respect to the analysis of events caused by a sudden decrease in core coolant flow."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

### Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.3.5	24	<b>C</b>	In SSER14, NRC reviewed this section based on VANTAGE 5H fuel and found it acceptable.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

The Conclusion portion of 15.3.4/15.3.5 of SSER24 reads:

"Based on its review of TVA's analyses of the RCP rotor seizure and RCP shaft break, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's analyses adequately model the operation of WBN Unit 2 at the proposed power level and were performed using acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that (1) the RPS will continue to ensure that the ability to insert control rods is maintained, (2) the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded, (3) the RCPB will behave in a nonbrittle manner, (4) the probability of a propagating fracture of the RCPB is minimized, and (5) adequate core cooling will be provided. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will continue to meet the requirements of GDC 27, 28, and 31 during its proposed operation, and the FSAR is acceptable with respect to the analysis of events caused by a sudden decrease in core coolant flow."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.3.6	24	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION - Anticipated Transients Without Scram (Generic Letter 83-28 Item 4.3)
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**07** In SSER3, NRC performed an initial review of Generic Letter 83-28 for the Salem anticipated transients without scram events. A new license condition was established for GL 83-28 Item 4.3. In SSER5, the staff found TVA's response to a number of items in GL 83-28 acceptable, including Item 4.3, and thus eliminated this license condition. In a letter dated June 18, 1990, for both units, NRC confirmed that all issues under Item 4.3 were fully resolved. In SSER6, NRC continued the review. In SSER10, NRC completed the review of TVA's submittals for GL 83-28 and found them acceptable. In SSER11, a reference to Item 4.3 that was omitted in SSER10 was added. In SSER12, NRC provided additional information on Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3. NRC noted that TVA reported that there would be no post maintenance test requirements in the Technical Specifications for either the reactor trip system or other safety related components which could degrade safety. The NRC had no further concerns.

CI in May 28, 2008, NRC letter.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

The Conclusion portion of 15.3.6 of SSER24 reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided by TVA related to ATWS and concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the AMSAC will meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. Additionally, TVA has demonstrated that the peak RCS pressure following an ATWS event will not exceed the ASME Service Level C acceptance limit (3,200 psig). Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA's analysis of ATWS for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.3.7	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
15.4.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
15.4.1	25	C — — 09	<p>In SSER5, NRC reviewed a change to the estimated fractions in leakage pathways for the release of radioactive material following a LOCA. In SSER9, NRC corrected the filter efficiency for organic iodine. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged. In SSER15, NRC reviewed revised short term atmospheric relative concentration factors. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged. In FSAR amendment 90, TVA increased the amount of leakage that enters the auxiliary building following a LOCA. In SSER18, NRC confirmed this was within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>15.4.1 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>“The NRC staff review concluded that the aforementioned unit-specific changes used to evaluate the WBN Unit 2 LOCA analysis are based on physical differences in the units, unit-specific operational differences, or updated information that has been accepted by the NRC staff for use in dose consequence analyses. The TVA evaluation concluded that the radiological consequences resulting from a postulated LOCA at the EAB, LPZ, and CR comply with the reference values and the CR dose criterion provided in 10 CFR 100.11, ‘Determination of Exclusion Area, Low-Population Zone, and Population Center Distance,’ and in 10 CFR Part 50, ‘Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,’ Appendix A, ‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,’ General Design Criterion (GDC) 19, ‘Control Room,’ as well as with the accident-specific dose guidelines specified in the SRP. The NRC staff’s review concluded that TVA used analyses, assumptions, and inputs consistent with those described in the SRP. The NRC staff concluded that the assumptions presented in Table 15.2 and TVA’s calculated dose results in Table 15.1 of this SSER were acceptable. The NRC staff concludes that TVA’s estimates of the dose consequences of a design-basis LOCA are in accordance with the SRP acceptance criteria.”</p> <p>SSER25 shows the status for this item as “Resolved.”</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p>

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.4.2	25	<b>C</b> <b>09</b>	In SSER15, NRC reviewed revised short term atmospheric relative concentration factors. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged.
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Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

### REVISION 08 UPDATE:

15.4.2 of SSER25 includes:

#### "Iodine Spike Assumptions

For Unit 2, the short-term maximum allowable dose equivalent iodine-131 (DEI) value is 14 microcuries/gram ( $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ). TVA has informed the NRC staff (reference Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11252A530) that it will submit a license amendment request to revise the Unit 1 technical specification (TS) short-term maximum allowable DEI from 21  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$  to 14  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ . This change is necessary, since the dose conversion factors (DCF) were changed from International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)-2, 'Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation,' 1959, values to the values in RG 1.109, 'Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I,' Revision 1, issued October 1977. The Unit 1 TS require that RG 1.109 be used to determine the DEI. With this change, the short-term maximum allowable DEI value of 14  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$  will be consistent for both WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. The NRC staff has endorsed the use of the DCFs from RG 1.109 in dose consequence analyses."

and

"The NRC staff review found that the aforementioned unit-specific changes used to evaluate the WBN Unit 2 MSLB analysis are based on physical differences in the units, unit-specific operational differences, or updated information that has been accepted by the NRC staff for use in dose consequence analyses. The TVA evaluation concluded that the radiological consequences resulting from the postulated MSLB at the EAB, LPZ, and CR comply with the reference values and the CR dose criterion provided in 10 CFR 100.11 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, as well as with the accident-specific dose guidelines specified in the SRP. The NRC staff concluded that TVA used analyses, assumptions, and inputs consistent with those described in the SRP. The NRC staff concluded that the assumptions presented in Table 15.3 and TVA's calculated dose results given in Table 15.1 of this SSER were acceptable. The NRC staff concluded that TVA's estimates of the dose consequences of a design-basis MSLB are in accordance with the SRP acceptance criteria."



SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.4.3	25	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Steam Generator tube rupture
		<b>13</b>	In SSER2, NRC performed an initial evaluation of an actual Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) that occurred at Ginna. As part of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), WBN committed to implement all corrective actions recommended by the WOG. In SSER5, NRC reviewed the WOG SGTR analysis and determined that plant specific information was required. In SSER12, the staff identified 5 items that required resolution involving 1) operator action times; 2) radiation offsite consequence analysis; 3) systems, 4) associated components credited for accident mitigation in SG tube rupture emergency operating procedures; and 5) system compatibility with bounding analysis. Items 2-5 were resolved in SSER12. In SSER14, the staff stated that a revised SG tube rupture analysis was more conservative and did not alter the conclusions of their Original safety evaluation. With regard to operator response times, TVA letters dated April 21, 1994, and August 15, 1994, and NRC letter dated June 28, 1994, dealt with simulator runs to address response times and operator performance during simulated SG tube ruptures. The staff concluded, after review of the TVA letters, that the times assumed in the tube rupture analysis were satisfactorily verified and deleted this condition. In SSER15, NRC reviewed revised short term atmospheric relative concentration factors. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

15.4.3 of SSER25 includes:

"The NRC staff review concluded that the aforementioned unit-specific changes used to evaluate the WBN Unit 2 SGTR analysis are based on physical differences in the units, unit-specific operational differences, or updated information that has been accepted by the NRC staff for use in dose consequence analyses. The TVA evaluation concluded that the radiological consequences resulting from the postulated SGTR at the EAB, LPZ, and CR comply with the reference values and the CR dose criterion provided in 10 CFR 100.11 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, as well as with the accident-specific dose guidelines specified in the SRP. The NRC staff's review found that TVA used analysis, assumptions, and inputs consistent with those described in the SRP. The NRC staff concluded that the assumptions presented in Table 15.4 and the TVA's calculated dose results given in Table 15.1 of this SSER were acceptable. The NRC staff concludes that TVA's estimates of the dose consequences of a design-basis SGTR are in accordance with the SRP acceptance criteria."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct Status to "C." TVA action has been completed, and SSER shows status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

REVISION 11 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated April 13, 1993, contained the following commitment: "Prior to fuel load for Unit 2, a similar structural analysis will be performed to confirm the adequacy of the Unit 2 main steam lines."

Structural analysis has been completed to confirm the adequacy of the Unit 2 Main Steam lines and associated supports under water-filled conditions that could result from a steam generator tube rupture.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			Design for the required support modifications has been issued.
15.4.4	25	C — — 09	<p>In SSER15, NRC reviewed revised short term atmospheric relative concentration factors. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>15.4.4 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff evaluated the control rod ejection accident in Section 15.4.4 of the SER (NUREG-0847), and there have been no supplements to this section. The current WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 15.5, 'Environmental Consequences of Accidents,' does not include a detailed evaluation of this accident except to state that it is bounded by the LOCA. The LOCA dose consequence results for WBN Unit 2 are less than 25 percent of the reference values in 10 CFR 100.11. Since the source term for a control rod ejection accident is considerably less than for a LOCA, and the dose consequence results for the WBN Unit 2 LOCA are less than the SRP acceptance criteria for a rod ejection accident (25 percent of the reference values in 10 CFR 100.11), the staff concludes that the dose consequence for the rod ejection accident will be bounded by the LOCA for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 fuel has been received.</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
15.4.5	25	<b>C</b>  <b>09</b>	<p>In SSER4, NRC reevaluated the consequences of a fuel handling accident inside primary containment. NRC concluded WBN met the relevant requirements of GDC 61. In SSER15, NRC reviewed revised short term atmospheric relative concentration factors. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>15.4.5 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>15.4.5.1</p> <p>“The NRC staff reviewed the unit-specific changes used to evaluate the RG 1.25 WBN Unit 2 FHA analysis and finds that these changes are based on physical differences in the units, unit-specific operational differences, or updated information that has been accepted by the NRC staff for use in dose consequence analyses. The TVA evaluation concluded that the radiological consequences at the EAB, LPZ, and CR resulting from the postulated FHA inside containment, with the containment closed and the RBPVS operating, comply with the reference values and the CR dose criterion provided in 10 CFR 100.11 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, as well as with the accident-specific dose guidelines specified in the SRP. The NRC staff’s review concluded that TVA used analyses, assumptions, and inputs consistent with those described in the SRP. The NRC staff concluded that the assumptions presented in Table 15.5 and TVA’s calculated dose results given in Table 15.1 of this SSER were acceptable. The NRC staff concludes that TVA’s estimates of the dose consequences of a design-basis FHA inside containment with the containment isolated and the RBPVS operating are in accordance with the SRP acceptance criteria.”</p> <p>15.4.5.2</p> <p>“TVA considered the analysis of the FHA both within the containment and within the auxiliary building. The dropped fuel assembly inside the containment is assumed to occur with the equipment maintenance hatch fully open, and the fuel assembly drop inside the auxiliary building credits no filtration of the exhaust. A minimum water level of 23 feet above the damaged fuel assembly is maintained for release locations both inside containment and the auxiliary building. This minimum water covering acts as a barrier to many of the radionuclides released from the dropped assembly. TVA assumed retention of all noniodine particulates in the pool, while the iodine releases from the fuel gap into the pool are assumed to be decontaminated by an overall factor of 200. This DF results in 0.5 percent (i.e., 99.5 percent of the iodine is retained in the pool) of the radioiodine escaping the overlying water with a composition of 70-percent elemental and 30-percent organic iodine. In accordance with Regulatory Position 3 of RG 1.183, the applicant assumed that 100 percent of the noble gas activity is released from the pool. All fission products released to the environment are assumed to release over a 2-hour period. In the subject RG 1.183 FHA analysis, TVA does not credit dilution within the surrounding structures before release to the atmosphere. These assumptions follow the guidance of RG 1.183 and are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.”</p> <p>15.4.5.3</p> <p>“TVA evaluated an FHA in the SFP area and in an open containment with no credit taken for the ABGTS or containment purge system filters and concluded that the radiological consequences at the EAB, outer boundary of the LPZ, and CR are within the reference values and the CR dose criterion provided in 10 CFR 50.67, ‘Accident Source Term,’ as well as the accident-specific dose guidelines specified in SRP Section 15.0.1. The staff’s review concluded that TVA used analyses, assumptions, and inputs consistent with the regulatory guidance specified in RG 1.183 for the evaluation of an FHA using the AST. The staff</p>

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

concluded that the assumptions by TVA presented in Table 15.6 of this SSER were acceptable. Table 15.1 of this SSER gives TVA's calculated dose results. The staff concludes that the doses estimated by TVA for the WBN Unit 2 FHA will meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.67 and the guidelines of RG 1.183 and are, therefore, acceptable."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

### Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.4.6	25	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

### REVISION 08 UPDATE:

15.4.6 of SSER25 states:

"The NRC staff previously evaluated the failure of small lines carrying coolant outside containment in Section 15.4.6 of the SER (NUREG-0847). There have been no supplements to this section. The current WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 15.5, 'Environmental Consequences of Accidents,' does not include an evaluation of this accident. In the analysis reviewed in the SER, the primary coolant maximum equilibrium fission product concentration was evaluated at 1.0  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$  DEI. The current WBN Unit 2 TS limit for the primary coolant maximum equilibrium fission product concentration of DEI is 0.265  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ . Therefore, the analysis reviewed in the SER would be bounding for WBN Unit 2."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.4.7	25	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
		<b>09</b>	Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

15.4.7 of SSER25 includes:

"NUREG-0847 does not include an NRC staff review for the radiological dose consequences of a postulated loss of ac power to the plant auxiliaries. For the completion of this SSER, the NRC staff used the CLB assumptions for Unit 1 loss of ac power as a benchmark for acceptability of the Unit 2 analysis and only addressed the following revised Unit 1 parameters and assumptions that are different for Unit 2. "

and

"Table 15.1 of this SSER shows TVA's calculated gamma and thyroid doses for the loss of ac power to the plant auxiliaries at the EAB and LPZ for both the realistic and conservative analyses. The doses for this accident are well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.11. Table 15.1 presents TVA's estimated whole body and thyroid dose to CR personnel from the radiation sources discussed above. Table 15.9 of this SSER

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

includes parameters for the CR analysis. The whole body dose is below the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 limit of 5 rem for CR personnel, and the thyroid dose is below the 30-rem acceptance criteria stated in SRP Section 6.4, 'Control Room Habitability System,' Revision 3, issued March 2007; therefore, they are acceptable."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

Unit 2 fuel has been received.

15.4.8	25	<b>C</b>	REVISION 08 UPDATE:
		<b>08</b>	15.4.7 of SSER25 includes:

"There are no revised Unit 2 parameters for this accident analysis because the waste gas system is common to Units 1 and 2. Therefore, the licensing basis for the proposed Unit 2 analysis is the same as the licensing basis for Unit 1 regarding the environmental consequences of a postulated waste gas decay tank rupture. Since the NRC staff has approved the analysis for Unit 1, it is also acceptable for Unit 2. "

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.5.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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15.5.1	24	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Effect of high pressure injection for small beak LOCA with no auxiliary feedwater (NUREG-0737, II.K.2.13)
		<b>07</b>	

In SSER4, the staff concluded that there was reasonable assurance that vessel integrity would be maintained for small breaks with an extended loss of all feedwater and that the USI A-49, "Pressurized Thermal Shock," review did not have to be completed to support the full-power license. NRC considered this condition resolved. C in NRC May 28, 2008 letter.



REVISION 07 UPDATE:

15.5.1 of SSER24 includes:

"As stated in the SER, 'In a submittal dated September 14, 1981, [TVA] committed to the Westinghouse Owners Group generic resolution of this issue.' As stated in SSER 4, 'The staff has completed its review of the WOG submittal for this item, and has concluded that there is reasonable assurance that vessel integrity will be maintained for this type of event. Review of this item will continue under Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-49, 'Pressurized Thermal Shock.'"

The NRC resolved USI A-49 by issuing 10 CFR 50.61, 'Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.' The NRC staff provided regulatory guidance on the issue in Regulatory Guide 1.99, 'Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials,' and GL 88-11, 'NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations,' dated July 12, 1988; and GL 92-01, 'Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity,' Revision 1. The USI was resolved for WBN by a letter from S. Black (NRC) to O.D. Kingsley (TVA) dated June 29, 1989 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082320531), as further documented in SSER 11, Section 5.3.1, 'Reactor Vessel Materials,' issued April 1993, and SSER 14, Section 5.3.1, issued December 1994, which specifically addressed Appendix G, 'Fracture Toughness Requirements,' to 10 CFR Part 50 and GL 92-01. The staff concludes that there are no changes to the acceptance criteria and resolution for WBN Unit 2 from that previously approved and implemented for Unit 1, as documented in the SER and its supplements."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.5.2	24	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Voiding in the reactor coolant system (NUREG-0737, II.K.2.17)
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<b>07</b>	The staff reviewed the generic resolution of this license condition in SSER4 and approved the study in question, thereby resolving this license condition.
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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

15.5.2 of SSER24 includes:

"As documented in SSER 4, 'The staff has reviewed and approved the [WOG] study and has determined that no further action needs to be taken by [TVA].' The staff concludes that there are no changes to the acceptance criteria and resolution for WBN Unit 2 from those previously approved and implemented for Unit 1, as documented in the SER and in SSER 4."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

15.5.3	5	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – PORV isolation system (NUREG-0737, II.K.3.1, II.K.3.2)
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NUREG-0737, II.K.3.1, II.K.3.2, "Auto PORV isolation/Report on PORV Failures" - Reviewed in SSER5 and resolved based on NRC conclusion that there is no need for an automatic PORV isolation system (NRC letter dated June 29, 1990). C in NRC May 28, 2008 letter.

15.5.4	24	<b>CO</b>	"Implementation of TMI Item II.K.3.5 (Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps" – Reviewed in 15.5.4 of original 1982 SER; became License Condition 35. The staff determined that their review of Item II.K.3.5 did not have to be completed to support the full power license and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4. The item was further reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16. CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.
<b>11</b>			

Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications as required.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

15.5.4 of SSER24 includes:

"As noted in Section 15.5.4 of the SER, in its letter to the NRC dated September 14, 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073521447), TVA referenced the WOG generic resolution of this issue, which was progressing on a schedule consistent with the intent of NUREG-0737 requirements.

As documented in SSER 4, the NRC, in sending GL 83-10c, 'Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., 'Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps,' dated February 8, 1983, to TVA (1) reaffirmed the conformance of small-break LOCA evaluation models with Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 for the case of limited RCP operation after a reactor trip and (2) approved the use of these models for determining the preferred RCP trip strategy (automatic trip, manual trip, or no trip). By letter dated April 22, 1983 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073530315), TVA responded to GL 83-10c. By letter dated June 8, 1990 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073541207), the NRC staff informed TVA that its WBN response to TMI Action Item II.K.3.5 was acceptable. The staff confirmed, in SSER 16, dated September 1995, that TMI Action Item II.K.3.5 is closed for WBN. The staff concludes that there are no changes to the acceptance criteria and resolution for WBN Unit 2 from those previously approved and implemented for Unit 1, as documented in the SER and its supplements."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 11 UPDATE:

Inspection Report 391/2013-608 (November 8, 2013 ) closed NUREG 0737 II.K.3.5.

15.5.5	21	<b>S</b>	NUREG-0737, II.K.3.30, "Small Break LOCA Methods" and NUREG-0737, II.K.3.31, "Plant Specific Analysis" – The staff determined that their review of Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 did not have to be completed to support the full-power license and considered this LICENSE CONDITION resolved in SSER4. In SSER5, the staff further reviewed responses to these items, and concluded that the Units 1 and 2 FSAR methods and analysis met the requirements of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. This item was further reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16. Both of these items were CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.
		<b>02</b>	

Unit 2 Action: Complete analysis for Unit 2.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 97 was submitted on January 11, 2010.

It documents SBLOCA analysis being performed using the NOTRUMP computer code. Use of the NOTRUMP evaluation model meets the requirements of II.K.3.31.

15.6.0	0	<b>C</b>	Approved for both units in SER.
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SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
15.6.1	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
16.0.0		S	Unit 2 Action: Submit Technical Specifications.
		02	<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications was submitted on March 4, 2009.</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p>
16.1.0		NA	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
17.0.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER.
17.1.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER. See 17.3.
		01	
17.2.0	0	C	Approved for both units in SER. See 17.3.
		01	
17.3.0	22	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE - QA program
		06	<p>The staff reviewed the description of the QA program in SSER2 and stated that they had resolved the list of open items for which the QA program for the operations phase applies with TVA and concluded that the description was in compliance with NRC regulations. The staff reviewed the organization for the QA program and the NQA Plan, and presented their conclusions in SSER5. They concluded that the program was acceptable for the operations phase of Watts Bar. It was noted, however, that Amendment 63 stated that identification of safety related features would be addressed later and the staff left the outstanding issue unresolved. In SSER10, the staff reviewed additional revisions to the QA program and stated that they did not change the staff's conclusions reached in SSER5. In SSER13, the staff concluded that TVA had established appropriate programmatic controls for identification of safety related features and considered this issue resolved. In SSER15, the staff listed additional revisions to the QA program without comment.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 17.3 includes:</p> <p>"For this operating license application, the NRC staff reviewed the revisions listed above to TVA-NQA-PLN89-A that TVA has made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3), since the NRC staff's last safety evaluation of TVA's corporate nuclear QA plan in 2004, to determine if TVA made any reductions in commitment. The staff did not identify any unreviewed reductions in commitment made by TVA since the staff's previous review in 2004. Since the staff previously approved the TVA corporate nuclear QA plan in 2004, and there have been no unreviewed reductions in commitment since the staff's approval, the staff concluded that TVA's QA program is in compliance with applicable NRC regulations and is acceptable for the design, construction, and operation of WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
17.4.0	0	<b>C</b> <b>01</b>	Approved for both units in SER. See 17.3.
17.5.0		<b>NA</b>	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
17.6.0		<b>S</b> <b>12</b>	<p>10 CFR 50.65 – Maintenance Rule</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Implement Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 systems 1 month prior to fuel load</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 05 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA letter to NRC dated November 17, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103210644) revised this commitment to read "Implement Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 systems by October 31, 2011."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA letter to NRC dated October 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11292A199) revised this commitment to read "Implement Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 systems by October 21, 2012."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated October 4, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12284A514) contained the following:</p> <p>"The purpose of this letter is to revise the due date for the Maintenance Rule implementation for Unit 2 systems from 'October 31, 2012' (Reference 1) to 'June 20, 2014.' This change is the result of Unit 2 schedule changes."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>The Maintenance Rule for the Unit 2 systems is implemented by the following two procedures: NPG-SPP-03.4, "Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending and Reporting - 10CFR50.65" [Revision 0002; Effective Date: 07/12/2013]; and Technical Instruction 0-TI-119, "Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting - 10CFR50.65" [Revision 0000; Effective Date: 03/03/2014].</p> <p>The implementation of the Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 systems is considered to have begun when the second of the two above procedures was effective (i.e., 03/03/2014).</p>
18.0.0	0	<b>NA</b>	See 18.1.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
18.1.0	22	CO — — 12	<p>NUREG-0737, I.D.1, "Control Room Design Review" - NRC reviewed in SSER5, SSER6, SSER15, and Appendix EE of SSER16. In SSER6, the staff concluded that the DCRDR program implemented for Unit 1 satisfied the programmatic requirements of Supplement 1, NUREG-0737. In SSER15, the staff conducted a final onsite audit of the Unit 1 DCRDR and concluded that the product implemented conformed to the DCRDR requirements of Supplement 1, NUREG-0737 and that the DCRDR special program had been effectively implemented. In SSER16, the staff reviewed a TVA reclassification of a human engineering deficiency and concluded that it was satisfactory.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>Complete the CRDR process. Perform rewiring in accordance with ECN 5982. Take advantage of the completed Human Engineering reviews to ensure appropriate configuration for Unit 2 control panels. See CRDR Special Program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the CRDR SP.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER21, the Detailed Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Special Program was resolved. Completion of CRDR is tracked under 23.3.3.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 18.1 includes:</p> <p>"In SSER 21, dated February 2009, the NRC staff stated that it had "reviewed the information provided by TVA and concluded that, based on the TVA description and the staff's review (documented in NUREG-1232, Volume 4, and the applicable supplements of NUREG-0847), there is reasonable assurance that, when implemented as described, certain [special program] issues can be designated as acceptable for implementation at WBN Unit 2." In SSER 21, Section 1.13.2, the staff identified the DCRDR as a resolved special program issue. The NRC staff also reviewed WBN Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report Amendment 99, dated May 27, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101610290), and determined that there were no changes to the TVA DCRDR special program."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NUREG-0737, I.D.1 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.</p>
18.2.0	22	C — — 13	<p>"CONCLUSIONS" left open until all items in subsection are closed.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p>

TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the CRDR SP.

In SSER21, the Detailed Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Special Program was resolved.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 18.2 includes:

"Since the NRC staff has approved the DCRDR special program approach for WBN Unit 1, and TVA proposed to use the same approach for WBN Unit 2, there is reasonable assurance that, when implemented as described by TVA, the DCRDR TMI task action (Item I.D.1 of NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737) will be appropriately resolved for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

NUREG-0737, I.D.1 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct Status to "C."

22.3.0	22	<b>S</b>
		<b>10</b>

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 22.3 includes:

"Before the issuance of an operating license under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is required to provide satisfactory documentation that it has obtained the financial protection required by 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), and not less than the amount required by 10 CFR 50.54(w) with respect to insurance from private sources or an equivalent amount of protection covering the licensee's obligation. This is Open Item 25 (Appendix HH) until TVA provides the necessary documentation and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has reviewed and approved it."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated January 24, 2013 (ADAMS Accession NO. ML13030A032) provided the requested Certificate of Insurance for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2.

SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

25.9.0	27	C 13
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 25.9 includes:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's program to preserve the licensing basis for WBN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with SRM-SECY-07-0096 and using the assessment methodology documented in the staff's letter to TVA dated May 8, 2008. The staff concludes that TVA's program for maintenance and preservation of the licensing basis for WBN, if properly implemented, provides reasonable assurance that any effects on previously reviewed and resolved safety evaluation report topics will be evaluated for WBN Unit 2. TVA's implementation of NGDC PP-20 and EDCR Appendix J will be audited or inspected by the NRC. This is Open Item 12 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, this action item is for NRC Inspection / Review.

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated June 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11186A552) contained the following:

From the cover letter:

"The purpose of this letter is to transmit the enclosed report (Enclosure 1) that contains the results of the QA assessment of effectiveness of the WBN Unit 2 Licensing Basis Preservation self-assessment, as requested by NRC during the daily WBN Unit 2 Project Status telecom. The assessment results indicate the Licensing Basis self-assessment was effective and performed in accordance with governing procedures."

From Enclosure 2:

- "1. Licensing will do a periodic review of licensing written corrective action plans (CAP)
2. Licensing will schedule a focused self-assessment to ensure that the CAP specified in PER 239111 is implemented effectively as recommended in the assessment report."

The focused self assessment was performed during February 16 through February 22, 2012. The report (number LIC-2012-001) was approved on August 29, 2012.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Licensing reviewed all licensing written PER CAPs for period of January 1, 2013 through June 11, 2014. This review concluded that the no problems were identified with the CAPs as written or the resultant actions taken. The individual assigned responsibility for oversight of closure of all Licensing-written PER CAPs continues to perform that function on an ongoing basis. These actions satisfy the commitment for periodic reviews of licensing written CAPs.

SSER27 contains the following under 25.9 Program for Maintenance and Preservation of the Licensing Basis for Units 1 and 2:



"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 12

Open Item 12 (Appendix HH) states, 'TVA's implementation of NGDC PP-20 and EDCR [Engineering Document Construction Release] Appendix J is subject to future NRC audit and inspection.'

The NRC staff performed the audit at TVA from August 12 to August 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14323A562), to review the implementation of the licensing basis preservation program (NGDC PP-20) and EDCR Appendix J. Overall the NRC staff found that the licensing basis preservation program was being adequately implemented such that the program was providing its intended function. Therefore, Open Item 12 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

### **STATUS CODE DEFINITIONS**

- C:** CLOSED: Previous staff review of NUREG-0847 and/or supplements has closed the item either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2.
- CI:** CLOSED/IMPLEMENTATION: Staff has approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; there is no change to the approved design; and implementation is recommended through Regional Inspection.
- CO:** CLOSED - OPEN: Staff has approved closure of the item; however, TVA actions remain to be completed.
- CT:** CLOSED/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: Item has been approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; however, a change to the original approval requires submittal of the Technical Specifications and staff review.
- NA:** NOT APPLICABLE: Justification as to why a section / subsection is not applicable is provided in the ADDITIONAL INFORMATION column.
- O:** OPEN: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2.
- OI:** OPEN / INSPECTION: Staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2; inspection is required to complete review / close the item.
- OT:** OPEN/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is through submittal of a Technical Specification.
- OV:** OPEN/VALIDATION: The proposed approach has been approved for Watts Bar Unit 1; the same approach is proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 without change.
- S:** SUBMITTED: Information has been submitted, and is under review by NRC staff.

**Enclosure 2**

**SER and Supplements Review Matrix - Revision 13 Changes**

# SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTS (NUREG-0847) REVIEW MATRIX: REVISION 13 CHANGES

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.3.4	25	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>TVA updated information on portions of the metrology program in FSAR amendment 83. This was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER14.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.3.4 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff previously addressed this section in SSER 15. TVA revised the reference number for Table 2.3-64a to Table 2.3-65. The NRC staff finds this change to be editorial and, therefore, acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.3.4 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>"In its letter dated September 15, 2011, TVA stated that it would revise FSAR Section 15.5 in a future amendment to reflect the <math>\chi/Q</math> values presented in that letter. TVA reflected the EAB and LPZ <math>\chi/Q</math> values from its letter dated June 27, 2011, in FSAR Amendment 105, dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11236A158). The NRC staff will confirm, upon receipt, that TVA integrated the updated CR <math>\chi/Q</math> values from its letter dated September 15, 2011, into a future amendment of the FSAR. This is Open Item 137 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26, Section 2.3.4 included the following for Open Item 137:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed Amendment 107 to the FSAR and verified that it included the updated values. Therefore, Open Item 137 is closed."</p> <p>The SSER status remains as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Correct Status to "C."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.3.5	25	C ----- 13	<p>TVA updated information on portions of the metrology program in FSAR amendment 83. This was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER14.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.3.5 of SSER25 includes:</p> <p>"The updated annual average <math>\chi/Q</math> and D/Q values associated with the specific receptor locations appear in Table 11.3-8, and the sets of values for the 16 radial sectors are in Tables 2.3-75A and 2.3-75B, of FSAR Amendment 104, dated June 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11178A155). In addition, in FSAR Section 2.3.5, TVA stated that it discussed this topic in the WBN Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). FSAR Section 11.3 also discusses this topic. Upon receipt of the updated ODCM, the NRC staff will confirm that TVA made the corresponding revisions related to the updated annual average <math>\chi/Q</math> and D/Q values. This is Open Item 138 (Appendix HH). "</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; this letter included the following for Open Item 138:</p> <p>"Item No. 138 regarding an updated Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) to reflect annual average <math>\chi/Q</math> and D/Q values has been addressed by Revision 20 of the current station ODCM. A copy of the current ODCM has been provided via CD to the NRR Project Manager for NRC review."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26, Section 2.3.4 included the following for Open Item 138:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed the updated ODCM and Amendment 109 to the FSAR, and verified that the updated values had been included. Therefore, Open Item 138 is closed."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "CLOSED." SSER26 showed the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
2.4.3	27	C ----- 13	<p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
2.4.8	27	<b>C</b>	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for design basis groundwater level for ERCW pipeline</p>
		<b>13</b>	<p>Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a description of the analysis used to determine the 25-year groundwater level for the ERCW pipeline. Staff closed issue in SSER3.</p>
			<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status in SSER21 is "Open (NRR)."</p>
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
2.4.10	24	<b>O</b>	<p>Staff found flood emergency plan and draft Technical Specifications acceptable in original 1982 SER.</p>
		<b>13</b>	<p>Unit 2 Action: Address in Technical Specifications as appropriate.</p>
			<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>Amendment B of the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>TRM TLCO 3.7.2 provides the Flood Protection Plan.</p>
			<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>2.4.10 of SSER24 includes:</p> <p>"As described above, the staff reviewed TVA's response to EMC-B-RAI-1 and the revised Figure 2.4-72 and found them acceptable. In order to confirm the stability analysis of the sand baskets used by TVA in the WBN Unit 2 licensing basis, TVA will perform either a hydrology analysis without crediting the use of the sand baskets at the Fort Loudoun dam for the seismic dam failure and flood combination, or TVA will perform a seismic test of the sand baskets, as stated in TVA's letter dated April 20, 2011. TVA will report the results of this analysis or test to the NRC by October 31, 2011. This is Open Item 133 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>AND</p> <p>"TVA should provide the NRC staff with supporting technical justification for the statements in Amendment 104 of FSAR Section 2.4.4.1, 'Dam Failure Permutations,' page 2.4-32 (in the section 'Multiple Failures') that, 'Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar have previously been judged not to fail for the OBE (0.09 g). Postulation of Tellico failure in this combination has not been evaluated but is bounded by the SSE failure of Norris, Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico.' This is Open Item 134 (Appendix HH).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>As discussed above, the NRC staff verified that TVA's changes in FSAR Section 2.4 are acceptable because</p>

they are consistent with the latest available information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Hydrologic Engineering Center; the National Weather Service document, 'Probable Maximum and TVA Precipitation Estimates with Areal Distribution for Tennessee River Drainages Less Than 3,000 Square Miles in Area,' and the U.S. Geological Survey, National Water Information System.

Based on the staff's review of Amendment 104 to WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 2.4.3 and the information provided by TVA in its letters dated April 20 and May 20, 2011, TVA adequately addressed the staff's questions regarding the dependence of the predicted PMF on the temporary modifications (sand baskets) currently in place at the dams in the vicinity of WBN. As discussed above, the staff proposes two license conditions related to the flooding protection at Watts Bar Unit 2.

Flooding Protection Proposed License Condition No. 1:

TVA will submit to the NRC staff by August 31, 2012, for review and approval, a summary of the results of the finite element analysis, which demonstrates that the Cherokee and Douglas dams are fully stable under design basis probable maximum flood loading conditions for the long-term stability analysis, including how the preestablished acceptance criteria were met.

Flooding Protection Proposed License Condition No. 2:

TVA will submit to the NRC staff, before completion of the first operating cycle, its longterm modification plan to raise the height of the embankments associated with the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar dams. The submittal shall include analyses to demonstrate that, when the modifications are complete, the embankments will meet the applicable structural loading conditions, stability requirements, and functionality considerations to ensure that the design basis probable maximum flood limits are not exceeded at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. All modifications to raise the height of the embankments shall be completed within 3 years from the date of issuance of the operating license."

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Open Item 134 Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide to the NRC staff supporting technical justification for the statements in Amendment 104 of FSAR Section 2.4.4.1, 'Dam Failure Permutations,' page 2.4-32 (in the section 'Multiple Failures') that, 'Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar have previously been judged not to fail for the OBE (0.09 g). Postulation of Tellico failure in this combination has not been evaluated but is bounded by the SSE failure of Norris, Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico.' (SSER 24, Section 2.4.10)"

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REVISION 09 UPDATE:

For Open Item 133:

TVA to NRC letter dated October 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11306A193) provided the results of the analysis. Enclosure 1 to this letter included:

"In the Reference letter, TVA committed to perform either a hydrology analysis without crediting the use of the sand baskets at Fort Loudoun dam for the seismic dam failure and flood combination or perform a seismic test of the sand baskets. This commitment was made because Fort Loudoun dam was the only location where credit for sand baskets was taken during a seismic event.

To address the commitment, TVA re-performed the hydrological analysis (Calculation CDQ000020080080) for the seismic failure combinations which utilized sand baskets to increase the elevation of embankments at the dams. In this reanalysis, the sand baskets were not credited to increase the height of the Fort Loudoun embankment. As a result of this reanalysis, the flood elevation at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) increased from 731.11 feet to 731.17 feet, and the flow discharge past the plant increased from 977,618 cubic feet per second to 979,385 cubic feet per second. The flood wave warning time decreased from 36 hours to 35 hours, which is still greater than the controlling warning time of 28 hours. These elevation, flow, and warning time changes will be provided in the next update of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR."

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The committed change was implemented via Amendment 107 to the Unit 2 FSAR. TVA to NRC letter dated November 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11333A054) submitted this revision to the NRC.

For Open Item 134:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 6, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12255A200) contained the following:

From the cover letter:

"Enclosure 1 provides a summary of the long-term stability analysis methodology. Enclosure 2 provides the list of regulatory commitments contained within this letter."

From Enclosure 2:

"TVA is committed to prudently pursuing a dam safety improvement project. The modifications for Cherokee and Douglas Dams will be designed and implemented prior to WBN Unit 2 startup."

#### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 included the following under 2.4.10 (page 2-1):

"Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 133

Open Item 133 states, "In order to confirm the stability analysis of the sand baskets used by TVA in the WBN Unit 2 licensing basis, TVA will perform either a hydrology analysis without crediting the use of the sand baskets at the Fort Loudoun Dam for the seismic dam failure and flood combination, or TVA will perform a seismic test of the sand baskets, as stated in TVA's letter dated April 20, 2011. TVA will report the results of this analysis or test to the NRC by October 31, 2011."

By letter dated October 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11306A193), TVA informed NRC that TVA performed the hydrology analysis without use of the sand baskets under TVA Calculation CSQ000020080080, "Flood Levels at WBN and SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear Plant] from Seismic Dam Failures." The hydrology analysis confirms the sand baskets are not required to be in place during and following the seismic events defined in Section 2.4.4 of the WBN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

By letter dated July 19, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13205A173), TVA notified the NRC staff that a permanent modification to replace the sand baskets located at the four dams had been chosen. The permanent modification consists of a combination of concrete floodwalls and raised earthen embankments or earthen berms. Heights of these modifications would range from 2.3 feet to 6.6 feet depending on the location. By letter dated April 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14122A219), TVA committed to removing the sand baskets (HESCO barriers) and completing the installation of the permanent modifications by October 31, 2015, except for 1900 feet at the Fort Loudoun Dam that will be completed by February 1, 2017.

Based on TVA's description of the permanent modifications, and the commitment to remove the sand baskets (HESCO barriers) and complete the permanent modifications in a reasonable timeframe, the NRC staff considers Open Item 133 to be closed."

SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.2.2	21	C ----- 13	<p>Section 3.2.2 of SSER3 discusses confirmatory issues for seismic classification and upgrade of ERCW that are already included in 3.2.1.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Staff accepted implementation of Heat Code Traceability CAP for Unit 1 in SSER7.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete CAP using Unit 1 approach.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Staff reviewed updated information in Amendment 68 on use of codes and standards in SSER9 and stated that prior conclusions were unchanged.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Heat Code Traceability CAP.</p> <p>In SSER21, the Heat Code Traceability CAP was resolved. Completion of Heat Code Traceability CAP is tracked under 23.2.9.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>IPS Item 010 (Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Heat Code Traceability CAP Plan) was closed in Inspection Report 391/2012-602.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The Heat Code Traceability CAP has been completed.</p>
3.6.0	21	CO ----- 13	<p>In SSER6, the staff accepted TVA approaches involving arbitrary intermediate breaks, determination of intermediate break locations and analysis of jet impingement loads.</p> <p>In SSER11, the staff reviewed results of the MELB Special Program and determined that the conclusion in the SER finding plant design for protection against piping failures outside containment was still valid.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete Special Program using the Unit 1 approach.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the MELB SP.</p> <p>In SSER21, the MELB Special Program was resolved. Completion of MELB SP is tracked under 23.3.8.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved." Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.

3.8.0	22	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving load combinations and stress allowables
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13 In response to staff concerns regarding use of ductility ratio when considering thermally induced stresses, TVA stated in a letter dated April 6, 1992, for both units, that they would use a methodology consistent with SRP 3.8.4 for the design of steel members and use the linear elastic provision of DG-C 1.6.12, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Steel Structures with Thermal Restraint," except for the energy balance provision of Section C.2.3.1. The staff found this acceptable. TVA also agreed, in its May 8, 1991, letter for both units, that any further sampling of structural welds after the issuance of NCIG-2, Rev. 2 would be to that revision. This issue was resolved in SSER9.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Page 1-5 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.

Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

Corrected STATUS to "C."

3.9.5	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

3.9.5 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA as discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that the RVI components in WBN Unit 2 are consistent with the previously NRC-approved components in WBN Unit 1. Therefore, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 RVI components listed in Section 4.2.2 of FSAR Amendment 95 are acceptable, pending the resolution of Open Item 71. Additionally, TVA's compliance with the ASME Code requirements for design and inspection provides adequate assurance that the licensee will maintain the level of quality and safety for the RVI components during the current license period."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open."

Open Item 71 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"By letter dated April 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI 11110513), TVA withdrew its commitment to replace the Unit 2 clevis insert bolts. TVA should provide further justification for the decision to not replace the bolts to the NRC staff. (Section 3.9.5)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 3.9.5 included the following for Open Item 71:

"TVA provided additional information supporting the withdrawal of the commitment by letter dated October 24, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11299A130).

The NRC staff reviewed TVA's justification for withdrawal of the commitment to replace the Alloy X-750 clevis insert bolts. The following summary lists the NRC staff's understanding of TVA's justification for retaining the existing bolts:

- \* Only one documented failure of clevis insert bolts has occurred, this failure was discovered at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (D.C. Cook, Unit 1) in 2010. The root cause of this failure remains indeterminate.
- \* The D.C. Cook, Unit 1 failure has not been definitively attributed to SCC.
- \* Clevis insert bolt failures would be detected through the normal American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), Section XI in service inspections conducted during each 10-year inspection interval.
- \* Industry experience from inservice inspections does not support the existence of a widespread problem with clevis insert bolt failures. In its letter dated October 24, 2011, TVA cited information from eight plants indicating that inservice inspections within the last 5 years found no evidence of clevis insert bolt failures, and cited 12 more plants that should have performed inservice inspections within this time period with no reports of clevis insert bolt failures. In its previous letter dated April 21, 2011, TVA cited approximately 15 years of operating experience at WBN Unit 1, with no evidence of degradation of the clevis insert bolts.

The NRC staff reviewed TVA's justification for withdrawal of the commitment, as summarized above. The NRC staff agrees with TVA's assessment of operating experience related to clevis insert bolts, however, it notes that other Alloy X-750 components in RVI have experienced failures caused by SCC, most notably control rod guide tube support pins (split pins) in RVIs designed by Westinghouse. Alloy X-750 baffle-to-former bolts in a German PWR (Biblis-A) also experienced cracking attributed to SCC. Most of the failed split pins and the baffle-to-former bolts were in the AH3 or a similar heat treatment condition; however, even some split pins in the HTH condition experienced SCC, which was attributed to poor surface condition. Furthermore, information from the Electric Power Research Institute Materials Reliability Program indicates that SSC is the most likely cause of the D.C. Cook, Unit 1 clevis insert bolt failure. Therefore, the NRC staff recommends that TVA closely monitor operating experience related to RVI components fabricated from Alloy X-750, including both clevis insert bolts and other components, to determine whether it will need to replace the clevis insert bolts in the future.

Based on the foregoing, the NRC staff concludes that TVA may withdraw its commitment to replace the existing clevis insert bolts before plant startup. Therefore, Open Item 71 is closed. The NRC staff recommends that TVA monitor relevant industry experience and that it replace the bolts in the future, if necessary, based on operating experience.

The SSER status remains as "Open."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

3.9.6	22	C	LICENSE CONDITION on inservice testing of pumps and valves
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13 The staff stated that they were reviewing TVA's response to GL 89-04, addressing acceptable IST programs and the license condition on inservice testing of pumps and valves remained open in SSER5. TVA committed to submit a revised ASME Section XI Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program six months before the projected date of operating license issuance in an August 21, 1989, letter. On this basis, the staff considered that the proposed license condition was no longer required in SSER12.

OUTSTANDING ISSUE required that Technical Specifications include limiting condition for operation that requires plant shutdown or system isolation when leak limits are not met. Staff had not reviewed Technical Specifications.

The safety evaluation in SSER14 states that the staff did not find any IST issues that would prevent issuance of an operating license for Unit 1. The item was resolved in SSER14.

Unit 2 Action: Submit Technical Specifications.

In SSER18, the staff approved a proposed alternative for set pressure testing of the three pressurizer safety relief valves that provide overpressure protection for the reactor coolant system.

In SSER20, the staff discussed 13 issues that remained to be resolved for the pump and valve inservice testing program and stated that they had been addressed in a manner that complies with the staff's position and they granted relief for an additional relief request.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

TS LCO 3.4.13 provides the requirements for RCS Operational Leakage. Included in this is a requirement to shutdown the unit if leakage can not be reduced to within limits within the specified time frame.

TS LCO 3.4.14 provides the requirements for RCS Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage. Included in this is a requirement to shutdown the unit if leakage can not be reduced to within limits within the specified time frame.

TS 5.7.2.11 provides the Inservice Testing Program.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 3.9.6 of SSER22 includes:

"Currently, the development and submittal of an acceptable IST program for the WBN Unit 2 is Open Item 13 (Appendix HH). The NRC will include its evaluation of the IST program in a future supplement to the SER before it issues an OL for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 11 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated December 12, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13358A066) provided the NRC with a copy of TVA Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100-006, "Inservice Testing Program" for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2. The TI addresses both the updated Unit 1 and initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program.

Additionally, the letter contained, "The submittal of the WBN IST Program document, including the WBN2 PST Program (Enclosure 1), the exemption request (Enclosure 2), and the relief requests (Enclosure 3), described above, will also satisfy SSER 22, Appendix HH, Open Item No. 13.

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

NRC requested TVA to re-issue with 1 letter for each unit.

TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014, provided the NRC with TVA Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100.006, Revision 1, "Inservice Testing Program," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2, including Relief Requests (10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5)(iii)).

The letter noted, "The TI is a combined Unit 1/Unit 2 program document and is being submitted for staff review for the licensing of Unit 2. This TI addresses the initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program for pumps, valves, dynamic restraints (snubbers), and pressure-relief devices. The previously submitted Unit 2, "Preservice Test (PST) Plan," (Reference 3) is superseded in its entirety by the TI provided in Enclosure 1."

This letter also provided the following new commitment:

"Item B of Reference 1 requested clarification of FSAR Section 3.9.6. This clarification will be included in FSAR Amendment 112 scheduled for late May." Note that Reference 1 was NRC to TVA letter dated April 18, 2014.

TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014, submitted Amendment 112 to the Unit 2 FSAR to the NRC. The second paragraph of the second page of the cover letter reads as follows: "In addition, FSAR Change Package 2-112-10 addresses a clarification to the IST Program code of record as committed to in Reference 2." Note that this Reference 2 was the TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 included the following under 3.9.6 (page 3-1):

"Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 13

"Open Item 13 states, 'TVA is expected to submit an IST [inservice testing] program and specific relief requests for WBN Unit 2 nine months before the projected date of OL issuance.'

TVA submitted the IST program on May 12, 2014 for WBN Unit 2. By letter dated October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14289A222), NRC approved the program. Therefore, the staff considers Open Item 13 to be closed."

SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.10.0	23	CO ----- 13	<p>In SSER1 the staff discussed their evaluation of the TVA program for qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment for seismic and other loads, and opened the OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving adequacy of frequency test, peak broadening of response spectra, reconciling actual field mounting by welding vs. testing configuration mounted by bolting and need for surveillance and maintenance programs to address aging.</p> <p>The staff provided a status of these issues in SSER3 and closed peak broadening of response spectra, use of damping values, consideration of nozzle loads, and status of seismic qualification. Other specific issues were closed in this supplement as well.</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff stated that this issue remained open.</p> <p>In a letter dated December 1, 1982, TVA provided justification for single-frequency tests to seismically qualify the Reactor Protection System cabinet. This showed that test response spectra (TRS) were substantially higher than broadened required response spectra (RRS) throughout the required frequency range. The staff evaluated test results and building seismic behavior and considered this aspect of the testing issue closed in SSER6.</p> <p>Staff concerns on the impact of aging on seismic performance were resolved in SSER6 based on discussions with TVA technical personnel and review of maintenance and surveillance instruction manuals.</p> <p>There was a specific issue on installing spacers for the 125V DC vital batteries as was done during qualification testing and required by the manufacturer. The issue was closed in SSER6 when it was determined that spacers had been installed.</p> <p>With regard to the overall issue on adequacy of testing, the staff performed an audit as part of Appendix S of SSER9. This included a review of the TVA approach, criteria and action plan to address effect of directional coupling and verification that acceleration at each device location is less than .95g because relay chatter at higher acceleration levels is expected. TRS enveloped RRS for all directions. The staff found the above to be in accordance with SRP 3.10 and IEEE 344-1975 and closed the issue.</p> <p>For reconciling the impact for equipment actually mounted using welding but tested with mounting by bolting, in-situ test results were provided to NRC (in letters dated April 30, 1985, and January 30, 1986) along with Westinghouse report on seismic qualification by analysis and testing for the main control board. The staff reviewed these results and on the basis of the consistency of all results provided, concluded that the issue was resolved in SSER6.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP using the Unit 1 approach.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER4, the staff reviewed an issue on the vibration of deep draft pumps and found it acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER8, the staff accepted a proposed revision to FSAR Section 3.7.3.16 to indicate that the alternative seismic qualification method is to follow the requirements of IEEE Standard 344-1971 and address the guidelines of SRP Section 3.10.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP .</p> <p>In SSER21, the Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP was resolved. Completion of the Equipment Seismic Qualification CAP is tracked under 23.2.6.</p> <p>-----</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>3.10 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Summary and Conclusions</p> <p>Based on its review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 95 and the information provided by TVA in its letter dated July 31, 2010, the staff concludes that TVA did not make any substantive changes to Section 3.10 of the FSAR, as reviewed and approved by the NRC staff in NUREG-0847 and its Supplements 1-9. Therefore, the staff concludes that Section 3.10 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR is acceptable."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>IPS Item 007 (Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Equipment Seismic Corrective Action Program) was closed in Inspection Report 391/2014-615, dated February 13, 2015.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Changed Status to "CO." The NRC has closed the item; however, TVA has remaining action.</p>
3.11.0	27	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE - TVA program not submitted at time of SER
		13	<p>The EQ program was submitted after issuance of the SER. It was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER15.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete EQ Special Program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the EQ SP.</p> <p>In SSER21, the Environmental Qualification Special Program was resolved. The EQ program is tracked under 23.3.4.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 3.11.3 of SSER22 included, "The staff will update this SSER upon satisfactory closure of the open items identified in Appendix HH, consistent with the staff's approach to the review and acceptance of the WBN Unit 1 EQ program."</p> <p>The following Open Items of Appendix HH are applicable to this item: 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24.</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "OPEN (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p>



## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, the action for Open Item 16 is for NRC Inspection / Review.

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Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, the action for Open Item 17 is for NRC Inspection / Review.

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 18:

"Addressed in the response to RAI 3.11 - EQ - 1. in TVA to NRC letter dated December 17, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information' (ADAMS Accession No. ML103540560)."

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TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 19:

"WBN Unit 2 Environmental Qualification procedures were provided to the NRC Regional Inspectors for the Environmental Qualification Inspection the week of April 18, 2011 for closure of this action item."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 20:

"The refurbishment of the 6.9 kV motors for Unit 2 involved routine maintenance activities. These maintenance activities did not modify or repair the motor insulation system originally supplied by Westinghouse. However, review of the original qualification report indicates that the testing performed meets the requirements for a Category I qualification. Motors which only require routine maintenance will have their binders revised and will be re-classified as Category I.

In one case (Containment Spray Pump Motor), the maintenance activities determined the need to rewind the motor. The rewind motor insulation system is qualified in accordance with the EPRI motor rewind program which meets Category I criteria."

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TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 21:

"The closure package has been provided to the WBN Unit 2 Resident Inspectors."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 22:

"This item was addressed in the response to RAI 3.11 - EQ - 3.b. in TVA to NRC letter dated December 17, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information' (ADAMS Accession No. ML103540560). The response stated, "For EQ applications, the replacement terminal blocks will be new GE CR151B terminal blocks certified to test reports that document qualification to NUREG-0588, Category I criteria.

TVA discussed this issue with the NRC during the ACRS meeting on February 24, 2011. The NRC staff accepted TVA's explanation of the term "equivalent" as provided above. Therefore, TVA considers this item to be closed."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 23:

"TVA will qualify the MSIV solenoids to the Category I criteria."

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## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 24:

"Calculation 'A Review of Electronic Components in a Radiation Environment of  $\leq 5 \times 10^4$  RADS' is provided as Attachment 2."

[Since ACCESS does not use exponents, it is clarified that " $\leq 5 \times 10^4$ " is equal to " $\leq 5 \times 10^4$ ."] ]

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NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed SSER22 (Appendix HH) Open Items 18 and 19.

### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 20.

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-607 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 21.

### REVISION 12 UPDATE:

For Open Item 23:

TVA has issued Environmental Qualification Documentation Package Binder WBNEQ-SOL-010 qualifying the MSIV solenoids to the criteria of 10CFR50.49 and/or NUREG-0588 Category I. The binder includes the qualification test report.

-----  
TVA to NRC letter dated January 28, 2014, the letter contains the following:

"During verification and validation of Unit 2 Environmental Qualification (EQ) cables, TVA determined that procurement and installation dates of some Unit 2 EQ cables did not meet the cutoff dates for procurement (May 23, 1980, as specified in IE Bulletin 79-01B, Supplement 2) and installation (February 22, 1983, as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision 1). One population of such cables was discussed in Reference 1 (TVA to NRC letter dated March 18, 2013), and the acceptance for their use was documented in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 22."

The letter updates the information provided for the population of Category II electrical cables installed in Unit 2.

### REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 17 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-615, dated February 13, 2015.

Open Item 23 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-608, dated November 14, 2014.

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This section contains 9 SSER Open Items (Ois). As an aide to track them, the following has been added:

OI	STATUS
16	This item remains OPEN for NRC Inspection / Review.

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- 17 This item remains OPEN in the SSER. It has been closed in an Inspection Report.
- 18 This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1. Revision 06 of this document documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
- 19 This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1. Revision 06 of this document documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
- 20 This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1. Revision 07 of this document documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
- 21 This item was CLOSED in SSER25; however, it was only in the SSER Open Item Closure Table. Revision 07 of this section documented closure of this item in an Inspection Report.
- 22 This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1.
- 23 This item was CLOSED in SSER27 as delineated in the current section.
- 24 This item was CLOSED in SSER24 as delineated in Section 8.1.

-----  
SSER27 included the following under 3.11 (pages 3-1 and 3-2):

### "3.11.2 Evaluation

#### 3.11.2.2.1 Electrical Equipment in a Harsh Environment

In SSER 22, published in January 2011, the NRC staff documented its review of Section 3.11 of the FSAR. During its review, the NRC staff communicated to TVA a concern regarding the qualification of cables purchased under Contract 81K5-830078 for construction of WBN Unit 2. NRC staff sent TVA a Request for Additional Information on July 30, 2010, asking for additional information related to the cables in question. TVA responded to the NRC in a letter dated September 1, 2010, that these particular cables were properly qualified.

By letter dated August 3, 2011, as supplemented by letters dated June 13, 2012, and March 18, 2013, TVA identified additional cables similar to those discussed in the September 1, 2010, letter. Since 10 CFR 50.49(l) states "Replacement equipment must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of this section unless there are sound reasons to the contrary," the NRC staff questioned the origin of these additional cables.

TVA's letter dated March 18, 2013, clearly identifies the origin of the cables installed at WBN Unit 2, and states that they meet the qualification criteria of NUREG-0588, Category II, using the guidelines established in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 323-1971, "IEEE Trial Use Standard; General Guide for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." TVA stated that these cables were purchased prior to May 23, 1980, and were in the utility's stock prior to February 22, 1983. TVA also states that some of the cables were installed in WBN Unit 2, between 1980 and 1983, and another portion was installed between 1983 and 1985 (when construction was halted).

10 CFR 50.49(k) states "Applicants for and holders of operating licenses are not required to requalify electric equipment important to safety in accordance with the provisions of this section if the Commission has previously required qualification of that equipment in accordance with "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors," November 1979 (DOR Guidelines), or NUREG-0588 (For Comment version), "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment."

Since these cables were purchased and in the utility's stock prior to February 22, 1983; installed as new equipment rather than replacement equipment; and that the cables meet the qualification criteria of NUREG-0588, Category II, the NRC staff finds that these additional cables meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49(k). Because the cables are not replacement equipment, 50.49(l) is inapplicable.

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Open Item 23</p> <p>Open Item 23 states, "Resolve whether or not TVA's reasoning for not upgrading the MSIV [main steam isolation valve] solenoid valves to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(i)."</p> <p>TVA stated that the original WBN Unit 2 MSIVs are qualified to NUREG-0588, Category II. TVA is refurbishing the MSIVs by replacing the missing subcomponents, including the solenoid valves, terminal blocks, and manufacturing wiring, with components of the same make, model, and type as supplied on the original purchase order. With the exception of the solenoid valves, the subcomponents will be qualified to NUREG-0588, Category I requirements. According to TVA, the solenoid valves cannot be upgraded because equivalent subcomponents qualified to NUREG-0588, Category I, requirements are not available. The NRC staff does not consider TVA's justification for not upgrading the MSIV solenoid valves to Category I, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(i), to be a sound reason.</p> <p>By letter dated April 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980637), TVA stated that the MSIV solenoid valves would be upgraded to Category I. In inspection report 05000391/2014608 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182), the NRC staff documented where it reviewed TVA's Environmental Qualification Documentation Package binder as well as the qualification test reports and found that TVA had successfully qualified the MSIV solenoid valves to the Category I criteria as committed.</p> <p>Based on this response, the staff considers Open Item 23 to be closed."</p> <p>SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
4.2.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.2 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in the proposed WBN Unit 2 FSAR, the NRC staff concludes that no substantive differences exist between the fuel system designs for WBN Unit 1 and WBN, Unit 2. In the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) associated with SECY-07-0096, "Possible Reactivation of Construction and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2," dated July 25, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072060688), the Commission stated that it supports a licensing review approach that employs the current licensing basis for WBN Unit 1 as the reference basis for the review and licensing of WBN, Unit 2. Since no substantive differences exist between the design for WBN Unit 2 and the previously reviewed and approved fuel system design for WBN Unit 1, the staff concludes that the fuel system design for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
4.2.2	27	C ----- 13	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE on cladding collapse calculations</p> <p>The staff reviewed the calculation for the predicted cladding collapse for the most limiting Watts Bar fuel and found it acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER2.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p>

Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009.

FSAR Chapter 4 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

4.2.2 of SSER23 includes:

"Based on its review, as documented in the safety evaluation for WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 46, the NRC staff determined that TVA used the appropriate methodology and acceptance criteria for evaluating the fuel rod performance of RFA-2 fuel. Because the acceptance criteria were satisfied, the NRC staff concludes that the RFA-2 fuel design is acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

AND

"The NRC staff is unclear whether the use of a thermal conductivity model that does not account for burnup degradation remains conservative, given the expected time in life of the maximum stored energy in the fuel. The NRC staff needs additional information from TVA to demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model. This is Open Item 61 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 61 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model. (Section 4.2.2)"

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Unit 2 fuel has been received.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA To NRC Letter Dated August 6, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13225A024) provided The Required Information.</p> <p>The cover letter included, "The information provided in Enclosures 1 and 4 completes TVA's response to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) Appendix HH, Open Item 61."</p> <p>The letter also provided mark-ups of Unit 2 FSAR 15.4.1 and a commitment that the changes will be incorporated in Amendment 110.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated August 14, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13254A310) submitted Amendment 110 to the Unit 2 FSAR. This amendment included the changes to Unit 2 FSAR 15.4.1 as committed above.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated May 22, 2014, provided computer code input data that the NRC can use to perform a confirmatory evaluation of the Thermal Conductivity Degradation (TCD) effect on the Large-Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 contains the following under 4.4.2:</p> <p>"Open Item 61</p> <p>Open Item 61 states "TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to demonstrate that PAD 4.0 can conservatively calculate the fuel temperature and other impacted variables, such as stored energy, given the lack of a fuel thermal conductivity degradation model."</p> <p>By letter dated August 6, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13225A024), TVA submitted new PAD fuel performance data generated for WBN Unit 2 with an updated PAD model (PAD4TCD) that includes explicit modeling of thermal conductivity degradation.</p> <p>By letter dated May 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A250), TVA submitted computer code input data requested by the NRC staff in order to perform a confirmatory analysis.</p> <p>Based upon (1) comparison of the PAD4TCD model predictions against Halden high burnup fuel temperature measurements and (2) good agreement of the temperature dependent and exposure dependent coefficients between PAD4TCD and FRAPCON-3.4 thermal conductivity models, the NRC staff has previously found the PAD4TCD thermal conductivity model acceptable during the review of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) (ADAMS Accession No. ML11293A365). Using the information supplied in the May 22, 2014, letter, the NRC staff performed a confirmatory analysis similar to that performed in the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 EPU, which demonstrated that there is good agreement between PAD4TCD and FRAPCON-3.5 for the fuel design planned for WBN Unit 2. Based upon the previous review of PAD4TCD done for the Turkey Point 3 and 4 EPU and the confirmatory analysis performed by the NRC staff on the Watts Bar fuel, the NRC staff finds that this open item has been satisfied and considers Open Item 61 to be closed.</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Similar to other interim uses of PAD4TCD, the NRC staff is proposing a license condition on PAD4TCD. The proposed license condition is as follows:</p> <p>PAD TCD Proposed License Condition:</p> <p>PAD4TCD may be used to establish core operating limits prior to the initial cycle, and prior to any remaining portion of the initial cycle. PAD4TCD may not be used to establish core operating limits prior to any reload cycle, and prior to any remaining portion of any reload cycle."</p> <p>SSER27 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
4.2.4	26	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		13	<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.2.4 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Since the proposed WBN Unit 2 TS 3.4.16 SRs are the same as those previously approved for WBN Unit 1 and they are consistent with NUREG-1431, the staff concludes that the proposed WBN Unit 2 TS 3.4.16 SRs are acceptable."</p> <p>SSER23 does NOT show a status for this item.</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-7 of SSER26 shows a status of "Resolved" for this item [line item "(82)"].</p>
4.4.8	27	CO	LICENSE CONDITION - Detectors for Inadequate core cooling (II.F.2)
		13	<p>GL 82-28 / NUREG-0737, II.F.2, "Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System" – In the original SER, the review of the ICC instrumentation was incomplete. The January 24, 1992, letter superseded the previous responses on this issue. TVA letter for Units 1 and 2 dated January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware. NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER10. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4.8 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review, the staff asked TVA several questions regarding the ICC instrumentation. TVA responded to these questions by letter dated October 26, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103020322). Enclosure 1 to this letter provided a Westinghouse document entitled, "Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), Licensing Technical Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P," issued October 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103020324; not publicly available). The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. This is Open Item 72 (Appendix HH)."</p>



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 72 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. (Section 4.4.8)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-608 closed GL 82-028 and NUREG-0737, II.F.2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER, Section 7.5.2.2 included the following for Open Item 72: "The NRC staff documented its review of the Common Q postaccident monitoring system (PAMS) and ICC in Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23. The staff generated Open Items 94–111 (Appendix HH) during its review. Therefore, Open Item 72 is closed, because it is subsumed by Open Items 94–111."</p> <p>The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 changed the status to "Resolved." Status above was changed to CO because TVA has remaining action.</p>
4.4.9	27	<b>C</b>	"CONCLUSION" left open until all items in subsection are closed.
		<b>13</b>	<p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>4.4.9 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review of the analyses of the core thermal-hydraulic performance provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the core has been designed with appropriate margin to ensure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during steady-state operation and anticipated operational occurrences. The thermal-hydraulic design of the core, therefore, meets the requirements of GDC 10 and is acceptable for preliminary design approval, pending completion of Open Item 72 (Appendix HH).</p> <p>In Section 4.4.9 of the SER, the staff documented that TVA has committed to a preoperational and initial startup test program in accordance with RG 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," to measure and confirm the thermal-hydraulic design aspects."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 72 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. (Section 4.4.8)"</p> <p>-----</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER, Section 7.5.2.2 included the following for Open Item 72: "The NRC staff documented its review of the Common Q postaccident monitoring system (PAMS) and ICC in Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23. The staff generated Open Items 94–111 (Appendix HH) during its review. Therefore, Open Item 72 is closed, because it is subsumed by Open Items 94–111."</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
5.1.0	22	C ----- 13	<p>The staff stated that the Eagle 21 microprocessor system was an acceptable replacement of the resistance temperature detector (RTD) bypass system for monitoring reactor cooling temperature in SSER5. In SSER6, the staff noted that TVA had incorporated the information for this new design into the FSAR and said they would track results of the review of this design change as an outstanding issue - Removal of RTD Bypass System (See 4.4.3).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide additional information for NRC review per 7.2.1.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-7 of SSER22 has "2" in the "Note" column for this item.</p> <p>Note 2 reads, "During the assessment of the regulatory framework for completion of the project, the staff characterized certain topics as "Open" pending TVA's validation of the information contained in the section. TVA has determined that the information presented in the FSAR remained valid and only identified minor administrative or typographical changes to the section. TVA addressed the changes in their submittals and clearly indicated the changes. The staff reviewed and confirmed that the changes made to the section are administrative/typographical and do not impact its conclusions as stated in previous SSERs. Therefore, no additional review is necessary and the staff considers this section Resolved."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>Corrected STATUS to "C."</p>
5.2.4	27	C ----- 13	<p>LICENSE CONDITION – Inservice inspection (ISI) program</p> <p>The ISI program is required to be submitted within 6 months of the date of issuance of the operating license. The applicable ASME Code edition and addenda are determined by reference to 50.55a(b) 12 months preceding the date of issuance of the OL. The staff reiterated this in SSER10. In SSER12, the LICENSE CONDITION was resolved by a TVA commitment to submit the program within six months after receiving the operating license.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 ISI program.</p>

OUTSTANDING ISSUE - Unit 2 PSI program submitted April 30, 1990, with a partial listing of relief requests. This item tracked the staff review.

In the SER, the preservice inspection program was still under review. NRC reviewed the Unit 1 PSI program in SSERs 10, 12, and 16.

Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 PSI program.

## REVISION 03 UPDATE:

Preservice Inspection Plan, Program No. WBN-2 PSI, Revision 3 was submitted to the NRC on June 17, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101680561).

## REVISION 05 UPDATE:

Corrected status from "O" to "S."

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

5.2.4 of SSER23 includes:

"By letter dated June 17, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML101680561), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the applicant) submitted Revision 3 to its Preservice Inspection Program Plan to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff for review in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 2.

Appendix Z to this SSER includes the NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan."

4.0 (Conclusions) of Appendix Z reads as follows:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's submittal and concluded that TVA has addressed all of the regulatory requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a and, based the staff's review of the documents listed in Section 6 of this report, no deviations from applicable regulatory requirements or TVA's commitments were identified in the PSI Program Plan, Revision 3, for WBN Unit 2. Open Item 70 (Appendix HH of SSER 23), as noted in Section 3.2.3 of this report, remains open pending NRC staff verification of the populations and the number of required examinations in accordance with the reference code."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 70 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports "Summary Tables," to include numbers of components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code. (Section 3.2.3 of Appendix Z of SSER 23)"

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated November 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12311A296) contained the following:

“TVA hereby provides Revision 7 of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN 2) Preservice Inspection Program Plan. The Preservice Inspection Program Plan has been updated to reflect additional numbers of welds based on the issuance of design change documents. SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70 noted that Section 7 on support welds contained only “To Be Determined”. The number of support welds for several but not all applicable plant systems has been added in Revision 7. It is TVA’s position that the amount of information available in Section 7 is sufficient to permit the NRC Staff to complete their programmatic review of the WBN 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Should additional validation be required to support the closure of SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70, completion of the Preservice Inspection Program can be addressed as a validation activity.”

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14133A296) contained the following:

“The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100.006, Revision 1, “Inservice Testing Program,” for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2, including Relief Requests (10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5)(iii)).

The TI is a combined Unit 1/Unit 2 program document and is being submitted for staff review for the licensing of Unit 2. This TI addresses the initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program for pumps, valves, dynamic restraints (snubbers), and pressure-relief devices. The previously submitted Unit 2, “Preservice Test (PST) Plan,” (Reference 3) is superseded in its entirety by the TI provided in Enclosure 1.” Reference 3 was TVA to NRC letter dated March 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML110830677).

TVA to NRC letter dated August 5, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14224A597) provided response to RAIs that resulted from NRC’s review of the TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014.

Appendix Z of SSER27 contained the following:

“Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

### 3.0 EVALUATION OF PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM PLAN

#### 3.2 Review of ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code and OM [Operation and Maintenance] Code Requirements.

##### 3.2.3 Acceptability of the Examination Sample

##### Open Item 70

Open Item 70 states, ‘TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI [preservice inspection] program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports ‘Summary Tables,’ to include numbers of components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code.’

By letter dated November 1, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12311A296), TVA submitted Revision 7 to the Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Revision 7 included new tables for Class 1, 2 and 3 non-exempt piping support distribution by system and type. In these new tables the licensee identified the number of supports in the population and the number of examinations required to complete the preservice examinations. The staff has reviewed these tables, and the supports identified for examination, and find that they meet the requirements of the 2001 Edition through the 2003 Addenda of ASME Code, Section XI. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that Open Item 70 has

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			satisfactorily been completed and is closed."
			The Status for 5.2.4 in SSER27 is "Resolved."
5.3.3	27	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE for staff to complete evaluation of Unit 2 after receipt of P-T limits
		13	<p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the review of the Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part of the review of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Submit P-T limits.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>WCAP-17035-NP "Watts Bar Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation" was submitted with the TS.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 5.3.3 in SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"In summary, the NRC staff concludes that there are no special considerations that make it necessary to consider potential RV failure for WBN Unit 2 because the design, materials, fabrication, inspection, and quality assurance requirements for the plant will continue to conform to applicable NRC regulations and RG, as well as to the provisions of ASME Code, Section III. The stringent fracture toughness requirements of the regulations and ASME Code, Section III, will be met, including requirements for surveillance of vessel material properties throughout service life, in accordance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. TVA will also establish operating limitations on temperature and pressure for WBN Unit 2 in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Appendix G, "Protection Against Nonductile Failure," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G.</p> <p>Subject to resolution of Open Items 44, 45, and 46 (Appendix HH), the NRC staff concludes that integrity of the WBN Unit 2 RV is assured for the following reasons ..."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following responses to Open Items 44, 45, and 46:</p> <p>Open Item 44:</p> <p>"This response clarifies how the initial and irradiated RTNDT values were determined for the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel beltline materials. Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.1 established that the vessel was designed to 1971 Addenda of the ASME Code, an edition that predates the requirements to determine the unirradiated RTNDT. (Those requirements were established in the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, whereas the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel was designed to an earlier version of the Code.) Because the tests performed to assess the adequacy of the fracture toughness predated the Summer 1972 Addenda to the Code, it was necessary to use the methods described in NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB) 5-2, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Older Plants." For the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel, the vessel shell materials were tested by the vessel fabricator using both drop-weight and Charpy impact test specimens. The drop-weight specimens were tested to determine the unirradiated nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT) in accordance with ASTM E 208. In the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300, the NDTT is used with axial (weak) orientation Charpy test data to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT. For Watts Bar</p>

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unit 2, the orientation of the Charpy impact test specimens was in the tangential (strong) orientation rather than in the axial (weak) orientation currently required in NB-2300 to determine the initial RTNDT. BTP MTEB 5-2 provides methods to determine the initial RTNDT using the drop-weight and Charpy impact test results generated for the Watts Bar Unit 2 vessel shell forgings and welds. In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens in the tangential (strong) orientation were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2.

In addition to those tests performed by the vessel fabricator, unirradiated tests were performed on the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program materials. Tests consisted of Charpy impact specimens from the intermediate shell forging and the core region metal that were oriented in both the tangential (strong) and axial (weak) orientations. When the surveillance program Charpy impact specimens are used with the drop-weight NDTT values obtained by the vessel fabricator, the initial RTNDT values obtained using NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 are found to be conservative.

The irradiated RTNDT, termed the Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART), is used to establish the pressure-Temperature (P-T) limit curves for the vessel as documented in the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR). The PTLR for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.2.4.3. The initial P-T limit curves are based on predictions of the effects of irradiation using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials." As post-irradiation test results become available from the evaluation of test specimens from the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor vessel surveillance program, ASTM E 185-82, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels", uses those test results to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions based on the methods of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The reactor vessel irradiation surveillance program for Watts Bar Unit 2 is discussed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 5.4.3.6. The effect of irradiation is measured using the Charpy impact specimens. Note that there are no drop-weight test specimens irradiated as part of the Watts Bar Unit 2 surveillance program. The drop-weight specimens are used only for tests on the unirradiated material to determine the drop-weight NDTT.

In summary, both drop-weight and Charpy impact specimens (strong orientation) were tested and the results were evaluated to determine the initial (unirradiated) RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2. Additional tests performed as part of the reactor vessel surveillance program using Charpy impact specimens (weak orientation for the intermediate shell forging), and those data obtained following the ASME Code, Section III, Subarticle NB-2300 demonstrated the initial RTNDT following the methods in NRC BTP MTEB 5-2 to be conservative. The irradiated RTNDT, termed the ART, will be determined using the methods in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99. As post-irradiation test results become available from the reactor vessel surveillance program materials (the intermediate shell forging and the core region weld metal), those data will be used to assess the accuracy and conservatism of the predictions."

Open Item 45:

"Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, Section 3.2 (Arming Temperature) states, "COMS shall be armed when any RCS cold leg temperature is <225°F."

Open Item 46:

"Revision 1 (effective August 12, 2010) to the Unit 2 System Description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001) was revised to reflect the required revisions to the PTLR. Appendix B, TABLE 3.1-1 (Watts Bar Unit 2 PORV Setpoints vs Temperature) contains the lift settings."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
5.4.5	27	CO ----- 13	<p>LICENSE CONDITION - NUREG-0737, II.B.1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents" - In the original SER, the NRC found TVA's commitment to install reactor coolant vents acceptable pending verification. In SSER2, the staff found venting guidelines acceptable. Installation was completed for Unit 1 only in SSER5 (IR 390/84-37) and the staff stated that the LC was no longer necessary. In SSER12, the staff included the safety evaluation for the RCSV system. The staff concluded that the high point vent system was acceptable subject to satisfactory completion of seven items that were described as on-going or planned activities associated with completion of the WB licensing process. They stated that none required additional review with respect to the SER nor would they change the SER, provided they were satisfactorily completed. TVA was asked to submit a letter prior to receipt of an OL stating how and when these items were completed. The staff stated that when these items were satisfactorily implemented, the RCSV system would be acceptable.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of reactor coolant vents.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is "Open (Inspection)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>5.4.5 of SSER23 reads as follows:</p> <p>"As stated in Section 5.4.5 of NUREG-0847, Item II.B.1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents," of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," issued November 1980, requires the installation of RCS and reactor vessel head high point vents that are remotely operated from the control room. Section 5.5.6, "Reactor Vessel Head Vent System," of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR describes the RCS and reactor vessel head high point vent system. The NRC previously approved the system, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, particularly, Supplement 12, issued October 1993.</p> <p>In its submittal dated September 14, 1981 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073521447), TVA committed to providing the same RCS vent system for WBN as approved by the NRC for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant in NUREG-01 11, "Evaluation of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Particle Coating Failure Models and Data," Supplement 5, issued June 1981, and to using the venting guidelines developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group. The NRC staff concludes that TVA's commitments are acceptable, pending completion of the staff's generic review. Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the guidelines are acceptable for implementation, as documented in Generic Letter 83-22, "Safety Evaluation of Emergency Response Guidelines," dated June 3, 1983. Therefore, the staff's conclusions, as documented in NUREG-0847 and its supplements, remain valid, and the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 RCS vent system is acceptable, pending verification of the installation of the RCS vent system. This is Open Item 69 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 69 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"The WBN Unit 2 RCS vent system is acceptable, pending verification that the RCS vent system is installed. (Section 5.4.5)</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Open Item 69 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014.</p>



# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

NOTE: This Open item has not been closed in an SSER.

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Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed it, TVA has remaining action.

6.1.1	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[All stated portions below are from SSER23]

6.1.1.4 (Technical Evaluation) includes:

"In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA modified Section 6.1.1.1, "Materials Selection and Fabrication," to add the following sentence to the paragraph discussing the compatibility of the ESF system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a LOCA:

Note that qualified coatings inside primary containment located within the zone of influence are assumed to fail for the analysis in the event of a loss-of coolant accident. The zone of influence for qualified coatings is defined as a spherical zone with a radius of 10 times the break diameter.

The staff's evaluation of the above information is Open Item 59 (Appendix HH), pending resolution of Generic Safety Issue 191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor (PWR) Sump Performance" (for background, see NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated September 13, 2004) for WBN Unit 2."

6.1.1.5 (Conclusions) reads as follows:

"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the controls on pH and chemistry of the reactor containment sprays and the emergency core cooling water following a loss-of-coolant or design-basis accident are adequate to reduce the probability of stress-corrosion cracking of the austenitic stainless steel components and welds of the ESF systems in containment throughout the duration of the postulated accident, from accident initiation to cleanup completion. Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA complies with the requirements of GDC 4, 35, and 41 and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 with respect to the compatibility of ESF components with environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including LOCAs.

The staff also concludes that control of the sprays and cooling water pH, in conjunction with controls on selection of containment materials, is consistent with RG 1.7 and provides assurance that the sprays and cooling water will not yield excessive hydrogen gas evolution from corrosion of containment metal or cause serious deterioration of the materials in containment."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 59 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The staff's evaluation of the compatibility of the ESF system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a LOCA is incomplete pending resolution of GSI-1 91 for WBN Unit 2. (Section 6.1.1.4)"

## REVISION 10 UPDATE:

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

TVA to NRC letter dated March 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110680248) provided response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Item 3.o.1 included the following:

### “3.o. Chemical Effects

The objective of the chemical effects section is to evaluate the effect that chemical precipitates have on head loss and core cooling.

3.o.1. Provide a summary of evaluation results that show that chemical precipitates formed in the post-LOCA containment environment, either by themselves or combined with debris, do not deposit at the sump screen to the extent that an unacceptable head loss results, or deposit downstream of the sump screen to the extent that long-term core cooling is unacceptably impeded.

Content guidance for chemical effects is provided in Enclosure 3 to a letter from the NRC to NEI dated September 27, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072600425).

### TVA Response

The purpose of this analysis is to determine the type and quantity of chemical precipitates which may form post-LOCA. This input is intended to be used for screen performance testing and may be used in the evaluation of chemical effects on downstream equipment. TVA has calculated the quantities of precipitates expected to form post-LOCA using the chemical model/methodology developed in WCAP-16530-NP, prior to release of the accompanying NRC SER. Based on the relatively limited quantities of precipitate material predicted by the calculation and the large strainer surface area to debris loading ratio, the WBN replacement sump screen was tested with chemical precipitate surrogates during certification testing only in the maximum coating inventory test.

Excel Spreadsheet: “WOG Chemical Effects Calculator 19 WBN corrected 4.1 pH Cold.xls”

This calculation determines the type and expected quantity of chemical products that would be expected to form in the recirculation fluid specifically for WBN. No deviations were taken to the WCAP-16530-NP methods.

Input assumptions (and their basis) used to determine chemical effects loading: pH range, temperature profile, duration of containment spray, and materials expected to contribute to chemical effects are listed in the input tabs of the spreadsheet.

The materials expected to contribute to the formation of chemical precipitates are: submerged aluminum, non-submerged aluminum, Aluminum Silicate, and concrete. The buffering agent, NaTB, is used to buffer the sump pH from a minimum pH of 4.1 to a maximum pH of 8.2 post-LOCA. A sensitivity case was performed with the recirculation water volume of 54,907 ft<sup>3</sup>.

Table 1 shows the recirculation water volume, the inputs for the amount of materials, and the buffering agent used in the chemical effects evaluation for WBN.”

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TVA to NRC letter dated May 17, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12143A345) provided additional information for Generic Letter 2004-02. See letter for details.

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### REVISION 11 UPDATE:

The information provided in TVA to NRC letter dated September 16, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13262A270) provided the technical information that addresses Open Item 59.

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SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 contains the following under 6.1.1:</p> <p>“6.1.1.1 Materials Selection and Fabrication</p> <p>Open Item 59</p> <p>Open Item 59 states, “The staff’s evaluation of the compatibility of the ESF [engineered safety features] system materials with containment sprays and core cooling water in the event of a LOCA is incomplete pending resolution of GSI-191 for WBN Unit 2.”</p> <p>NRC Letter dated September 18, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14163A658), concluded that TVA’s response to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors” (ADAMS Accession No. ML042360586) dated September 13, 2004, requesting that licensees address the issues raised by Generic Safety Issue 191, “Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,” for WBN Unit 2 was acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 59 is closed.”</p> <p>SSER27 change the status to “Resolved.”</p>
6.2.1	27	C ----- 13	<p>6.2.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involves reviewing analysis that ensures that containment external pressure will not exceed design value of 2.0 psi</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated it would confirm the contention that containment external pressure transients could not exceed the design value of 2.0 psig. TVA submitted the information June 4, 1982. In SSER3, NRC concluded that the design provided adequate protection against damage from external pressure transients.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff reviewed a revised long term containment analysis for the design basis LOCA in support of a proposed reduction in the limit for minimum allowable weight of ice in the condenser and found it acceptable. Additionally, the staff verified that containment pressure and water level monitors were installed in Unit 1. Thus, License Conditions 6d and 6e were resolved (these are discussed with the other NUREG-0737 issues).</p> <p>In SSER7, the staff resolved their concerns regarding local temperatures near MSLBs inside containment and their impact on equipment qualification.</p> <p>In SSER12, the staff reviewed TVA's basis for deleting requirements for a 20,000 ppm boron concentration in the boron injection tank and determined that this would not significantly affect the environmental response of the containment or the safe shutdown equipment therein.</p> <p>In SSER14, the staff reviewed revisions to a number of containment design parameters and concluded that none affect conclusions reached in the SER or supplements.</p> <p>In SSER15, the staff reviewed the containment barrier seals and associated surveillance requirements and concluded that a revised divider barrier seal surveillance program was appropriate for Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Review Unit 2 Technical Specifications with respect to divider barrier seal surveillance program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>
			<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.</p> <p>TS 3.6.13 provides the Limiting Condition for Operation for Divider Barrier Integrity.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.2.1 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendment 97, and its previous evaluation as documented in the SER and WBN Unit 1 License Amendment No. 33, the NRC staff concludes that the Unit 2 containment functional design meets the relevant requirements of GDC 2, 4, 16, 50, 38, 39, 40, 13, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 with respect to protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, containment design, and monitoring radioactivity releases and that the design is consistent with the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 6.2.1."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
6.2.5	22	C ----- 13	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE for review of TVA provided additional information relative to discussion added to FSAR to address analysis of the production and accumulation of hydrogen within containment following onset of a LOCA</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that additional information was required concerning the analysis of the production and accumulation of hydrogen within the containment during a design basis LOCA. This information was provided in FSAR amendments and evaluated by NRC in SSER4. In SSER4, the NRC concluded that the design of the combustible gas control system was acceptable and the outstanding issue closed.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>The hydrogen recombiners will be removed from the Unit 2 design and licensing basis based on 10 CFR 50.44 (final rule September 16, 2003) and abandoned in place.</p> <p>This portion has a status of Open.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>LICENSE CONDITION – (6f) Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 – containment hydrogen</p> <p>In SSER5, NRC closed the LICENSE CONDITION for Unit 1 only (IR 390/84-85).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of containment hydrogen accident monitoring instrumentation.</p> <p>This portion has a status of Closed/Implementation only per NRC May 28, 2008, letter.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>LICENSE CONDITION – (9) Hydrogen control measures</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, an LC was raised to track resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-48, "Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment." In SSER8, the NRC reviewed the</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>hydrogen mitigation system (igniters) and concluded it met the requirements of the final rule {10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)}.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>Amendment 95 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on November 24, 2009. This amendment deleted the hydrogen recombiners from the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>EDCR 52329 was initiated to abandon in place Unit 2 hydrogen recombiners.</p> <p>Technical Specifications (TS) / TS BASES 3.6.7 (Hydrogen Recombiners) were deleted in Developmental Revision B which was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 6.2.5 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that the design of the combustible gas control system meets the requirements of GDC 5; GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup"; GDC 42, "Inspection of Containment Atmosphere Cleanup Systems"; and GDC 43 and 10 CFR 50.44 and is, therefore, acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>EDCR 52329 has been closed completing TVA actions. This in conjunction with the NRC's status of "Resolved" in SSER results in a STATUS of CLOSED for this item.</p>
6.2.6	27	C ----- 13	<p>In SSER4, the staff approved exemption from certain requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 for both units. In SSER19, the staff found a revised schedule for the exemption approved in SSER4 acceptable.</p> <p>In SSER5, the staff found there was no radiological consequence to an increase in the bypass leakage rate for the emergency gas treatment system and found the increase acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.2.6 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff noted that TVA's changes to Section 6.2.6 in FSAR Amendment 97, regarding the implementation of Option B of Appendix J, were incomplete, because several statements remained regarding performing water-sealed valve leakage tests "as specified in 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix J." With the adoption of Option B, the specified testing requirements are no longer applicable; Option A to Appendix J retains these requirements. The NRC discussed this discrepancy with TVA in a telephone conference on September 28, 2010. TVA stated that it would remove the inaccurate reference to Appendix J for specific water testing requirements in a future FSAR amendment. This is Open Item 47 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 47:

"TVA provided an update to FSAR Section 6.2.6 in Amendment 104."

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 6.2.6 included the following for Open Item 71:

"TVA updated the FSAR in Amendments 104 and 105 to correct the discrepancy. The NRC staff verified the correction. Therefore, Open Item 47 is closed."

The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

6.5.3	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 6.5.3 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff should verify that its conclusions in the review of FSAR Section 15.4.1 do not affect the conclusions of the staff regarding the acceptability of Section 6.5.3. This is Open Item 48 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to this item:

"No TVA action is required for this item."

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>SSER 26, Section 6.5.3 included the following for Open Item 48:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed FSAR Section 15.4.1 in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 25 and concluded that it is acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 48 is closed."</p> <p>The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
6.6.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE on additional information required on preservice inspection program and identification of plant specific areas where ASME Code Section XI requirements cannot be met and supporting technical justification</p> <p>NRC reviewed the preservice inspection program (PSI) for Unit 1 only in SSER10 and on the basis of a TVA commitment to submit an inservice inspection program within 6 months after receiving an operating license, considered a proposed LC for an ISI no longer required. In SSER15, the staff reviewed Revisions 24 and 25 to the preservice inspection program and concluded that the changes included therein were acceptable.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 PSI program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>Preservice Inspection Plan, Program No. WBN-2 PSI, Revision 3 was submitted to the NRC on June 17, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101680561).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 05 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "O" to "S."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>[all portions are from SSER23]</p> <p>6.6 reads as follows:</p> <p>"By letter dated June 17, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML101680561), TVA provided Revision 3 of its Preservice Inspection Program Plan to the NRC for review, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>Appendix Z to this supplemental safety evaluation report includes the NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan."</p> <p>Appendix Z to this SSER includes the NRC staff's evaluation of the WBN Unit 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan."</p> <p>4.0 (Conclusions) of Appendix Z reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's submittal and concluded that IVA has addressed all of the regulatory</p>



requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a and, based the staff's review of the documents listed in Section 6 of this report, no deviations from applicable regulatory requirements or TVA's commitments were identified in the PSI Program Plan, Revision 3, for WBN Unit 2. Open Item 70 (Appendix HH of SSER 23), as noted in Section 3.2.3 of this report, remains open pending NRC staff verification of the populations and the number of required examinations in accordance with the reference code."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated November 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12311A296) contained the following:

"TVA hereby provides Revision 7 of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN 2) Preservice Inspection Program Plan. The Preservice Inspection Program Plan has been updated to reflect additional numbers of welds based on the issuance of design change documents. SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70 noted that Section 7 on support welds contained only "To Be Determined". The number of support welds for several but not all applicable plant systems has been added in Revision 7. It is TVA's position that the amount of information available in Section 7 is sufficient to permit the NRC Staff to complete their programmatic review of the WBN 2 Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Should additional validation be required to support the closure of SSER Appendix HH Open Item 70, completion of the Preservice Inspection Program can be addressed as a validation activity."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14133A296) contained the following:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100.006, Revision 1, "Inservice Testing Program," for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2, including Relief Requests (10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(5)(iii)).

The TI is a combined Unit 1/Unit 2 program document and is being submitted for staff review for the licensing of Unit 2. This TI addresses the initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (IST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program for pumps, valves, dynamic restraints (snubbers), and pressure-relief devices. The previously submitted Unit 2, "Preservice Test (PST) Plan," (Reference 3) is superseded in its entirety by the TI provided in Enclosure 1." Reference 3 was TVA to NRC letter dated March 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML110830677).

TVA to NRC letter dated August 5, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14224A597) provided response to RAIs that resulted from NRC's review of the TVA to NRC letter dated May 8, 2014.

Appendix Z of SSER27 contained the following:

"Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

### 3.0 EVALUATION OF PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM PLAN

3.2 Review of ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code and OM [Operation and Maintenance] Code Requirements.

3.2.3 Acceptability of the Examination Sample

Open Item 70

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Open Item 70 states, 'TVA should provide the revised WBN Unit 2 PSI [preservice inspection] program ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Supports 'Summary Tables,' to include numbers of components so that the NRC staff can verify that the numbers meet the reference ASME Code.'

By letter dated November 1, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12311A296), TVA submitted Revision 7 to the Preservice Inspection Program Plan. Revision 7 included new tables for Class 1, 2 and 3 non-exempt piping support distribution by system and type. In these new tables the licensee identified the number of supports in the population and the number of examinations required to complete the preservice examinations. The staff has reviewed these tables, and the supports identified for examination, and find that they meet the requirements of the 2001 Edition through the 2003 Addenda of ASME Code, Section XI. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that Open Item 70 has satisfactorily been completed and is closed."

The Status for 6.6 in SSER27 is "Resolved."

7.1.3	27	C	In the SER, NRC indicated that a review of the setpoint methodology would be performed with a review of the Technical Specifications. In SSER4, NRC reviewed the methodology used to determine setpoints for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 and determined that it was acceptable.
		13	

By letter dated July 29, 1994, for both units, TVA submitted a topical report titled "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2, Eagle 21 Version" (WCAP-12096, Revision 6). In SSER15, the NRC concluded the setpoint methodology was acceptable based on (1) previous acceptance of Westinghouse setpoint methodology at other plants, (2) the similarity between the Watts Bar and previously approved designs such as Sequoyah, and (3) the Watts Bar setpoint methodology is in compliance with RG 1.105 and ISA S6704.

Staff requested discussion of methodology for determining, setting, and evaluating as-found setpoints for drift susceptible instruments.

Unit 2 action: Resolve this issue using the BFN TS-453 precedent (see NRC ML061680008).

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) and TS Bases was submitted on February 2, 2010.

As part of the submittal, TVA incorporated TSTF-493, Revision 4, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions," into Section 3.3 of the TS and TS Bases.

TVA submitted WCAP-17044, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems" on February 5, 2010.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.1.3 of SSER23 includes:

"FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.8 describes the functional diversity of the design of the reactor protection system (RPS). TVA added a new reference to Westinghouse topical report WCAP-13869, 'Reactor Protection System Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors,' Revision 2, September 1994, to the section. Revision 1 of the topical report was reviewed and approved by the staff for Unit 1 in Section 7.2.1.2, 'Watts Bar Specific Issues, of SSER 13, issued April 1994. It is unclear to the staff why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced for the two units. TVA should provide justification to the staff for why different revisions of WCAP-13869 are referenced for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. This is Open Item 65 (Appendix HH), as discussed in Section 7.2, 'Reactor Trip System,' of this SSER."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved." It appears that this should be "Open (NRR)."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 65 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. (Section 7.2.1.1)</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The REVISION 10 UPDATE for section 7.1.3 documents the closure of Open Item 65.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
7.2.1	27	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. In SSER15, the NRC reviewed the WBN Unit 1 EMI/RFI report and concluded that the EMI/RFI issue was resolved for WBN Unit 1. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated August 25, 2008.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.1.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"By letter dated December 5, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073440022), TVA informed the NRC staff that it had made one design change to the WBN Unit 1 Eagle 21 system under 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests and Experiments," after initial licensing. This change involved the installation of an external communication interface that included a serial-to-Ethernet controller (SEC) board in each of the multiple-bus chassis in the Eagle 21 system. The SEC uses the multiple-bus chassis to obtain power only. The SEC receives a datalink message in parallel with the test sequence processor and feeds the message to the integrated computer system (ICS). The link is designed such that a nonsafety-related signal cannot feed back to the safety-related Eagle 21 system. However, TVA did not confirm that testing demonstrated that two-way communication is impossible. This was an open item in the NRC audit at the Westinghouse facility (open item number 3 of ADAMS Accession No. ML102240630). By letter dated October 21, 2010 (letter open item number 171; ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03140661), TVA stated that "The external Eagle 21 unidirectional communications interface will be tested prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load." This is Open Item 63 (Appendix HH) until TVA confirms that testing has demonstrated that two-way communication is impossible with the Eagle 21 communications interface."</p> <p>AND</p> <p>"By letter dated June 18, 2010 (letter open item number 127), TVA stated that the Eagle 21 system factory acceptance test of Rack 2 revealed that the temperature inputs to the narrow-range resistance temperature detector (RTD) were consistently reading about 0.2 degrees Fahrenheit higher than expected.</p>

Westinghouse determined that it had incorrectly configured the inputs as a shared RTD in the LCP software. Westinghouse initiated Corrective Action Item 10-140-M021 and performed an evaluation of a potential nuclear safety issue. It determined that this issue does not represent a substantial safety hazard even if it is left uncorrected. By letter dated October 29, 2010 (letter open item number 128; ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03120711), TVA described the final resolution proposed by Westinghouse. In accordance with the proposed resolution, the spare input available on the RTD input board will be wired to the active channels. The spare input will provide the parallel resistance to resolve the problem. Jumpers will be installed at the Eagle 21 termination frame to provide a parallel connection from each existing narrow-range RTD input to an existing spare input, thus simulating the hardware connection for shared RTDs. Therefore, as configured, the LCP will provide the correct temperature calculation for the narrow-range RTDs. TVA stated that "Post modification testing will be performed to verify that the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load." This is Open Item 64 (Appendix HH) pending NRC staff review of the testing results."

AND

"In Section 7.2 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 96, TVA references Revision 2 of WCAP-13869, but the Unit 1 FSAR references Revision 1. Revision 1 was reviewed and approved by the staff for Unit 1 in Section 7.2.1.2 of SSER 13, issued April 1994. The staff asked TVA to justify the different reference for Unit 2. In Attachment 12 to its response (letter open item number 323) to the staff dated October 29, 2010, TVA identified that the differences between Revisions 1 and 2 are based on TVA's decision to not insulate the steam generator level transmitter reference leg on Unit 2. As the WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 designs for the steam generator reference leg are the same, it is unclear to the staff why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced for the two units. TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-13869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. This is Open Item 65 (Appendix HH).

The NRC staff reviewed the additional changes made by TVA to WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.2 and concluded that the changes were editorial or administrative in nature or were made to improve consistency with other FSAR sections. Because the additional changes are nonsubstantive, they were acceptable to the staff."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 63 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that testing prior to Unit 2 fuel load has demonstrated that two-way communications is impossible with the Eagle 21 communications interface. (Section 7.2.1.1)"

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Open Item 64 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA stated that, "Post modification testing will be performed to verify that the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load." This issue is open pending NRC staff review of the testing results. (Section 7.2.1.1)"

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Open Item 65 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-1 3869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. (Section 7.2.1.1)"

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REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 7.2.1.1 included the following for Open Item 65:

"Open Item 65 states, 'TVA should provide justification to the staff regarding why different revisions of WCAP-13869 are referenced in WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2.' WBN Unit 1 FSAR sections 7.1 and 7.2 referenced WCAP-13869, 'Reactor Protection System Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors,' Revision 1, while the WBN Unit 2 FSAR referenced Revision 2.

In its letter dated October 29, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103120711), Item 36, TVA provided a section entitled 'WCAP-13869 Revision 1 to Revision 2 Change Analysis.' TVA stated that the design bases for the response to a feedwater break inside containment accident, as documented in Chapter 15 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, is the same as that for Unit 1. In its letter dated March 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110950331), Item 14, TVA stated that, because WBN Unit 2 is required to match the Unit 1 licensing basis to the extent practical, it would revise the WBN Unit 2 FSAR to agree with the WBN Unit 1 FSAR, which references Revision 1.

The NRC staff reviewed Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 104, submitted on June 3, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111780527), and verified that WCAP-13869, Revision 1, is referenced instead of Revision 2. Therefore, Open Item 65 is closed."

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

Westinghouse FCN-WBTM-10809 was implemented, and post-modification-testing was performed to verify that the connections were made correctly and that the temperature bias error has been eliminated.

SSER Open Item 64 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 7.2.1:

"7.2.1.1 System Description

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 63 states, "TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that testing prior to Unit 2 fuel load has demonstrated that two-way communications is impossible with the Eagle 21 communications interface."

Open Item 93 (Section 7.9.3.2 "Separation of Protection and Control Systems") states, "TVA should confirm to the staff that testing of the Eagle 21 system has sufficiently demonstrated that two-way communication to the ICS is precluded with the described configurations."

By letter dated October 22, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14295A520), TVA provided Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 to its letter describing its response to these action items. In this response, TVA provided a description of the test it performed on one of the Eagle 21 chassis to demonstrate that two-way communication was precluded by the specific configuration employed at WBN Unit 2. Their description included a copy of its test plan, a summary of the test steps performed, including sketches of the test setup employed, and a high level summary of the test and its results. The purpose of this test was to verify that the External Communications Interface for WBN Unit 2 Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System only allows data flow in one direction (i.e., data out to the plant computer and no data into the Eagle 21 system).

Under normal operating conditions, the Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) (which performs safety related functions) of each of the Eagle 21 chassis generates status information at a rate of ten times per second. This information travels on the internal Eagle 21 high-level data link control (HDLC) serial bus where it is received in parallel by the Eagle 21 Test Sequence Processor (TSP) and by a Serial-to-Ethernet converter (SEC). The SEC then passes this status information on to the plant Integrated Computer System (ICS) through a fiber optic device to the Ethernet network connection. (As described above, each of the 14 Eagle 21 chassis sends such status information via a fiber optic Ethernet connection to a personal computer

(PC) located in the process computer room. This PC then aggregates the data from the 14 Eagle 21 chassis and sends the aggregated data to the ICS over a separate network connection.) To ensure that no data traffic on the internal HDLC serial link of each Eagle 21 chassis can adversely impact the LCPs of each chassis, internal unidirectional communication between these sections is enforced to be from the LCP to the TSP and SEC by removing the "receive communications" integrated circuit chips from the sockets in the LCP data link handler board section and removing the "transmit communications" integrated circuit chips from their respective sockets in the TSP data link handler board and the SEC board. In addition, the installation of jumpers as described in Section 7.9.3.2 of the staff's SER (SSER 23) prevents the SEC from transmitting data onto the HDLC serial port. Therefore, the LCP has no ability to receive data from any source nor does the TSP or SEC have the ability to transmit data to the LCP.

To demonstrate the unidirectional communications, the Ethernet port external to one of the Eagle 21 chassis (which has a Serial-to-Ethernet communications configuration typical of each of the 14 Eagle 21 chassis) coming from the ICS PC was temporarily disconnected and an Ethernet hub was connected in its place. A laptop with an Ethernet communications port was connected to one side of the Ethernet port. The laptop computer was configured to generate a data storm pattern to the Eagle 21 by targeting the Eagle 21 chassis' Internet Protocol (IP) address. A second laptop was connected to the Ethernet hub to analyze and record the network data traffic to verify that the Eagle 21 rack did not respond to any of the data storm traffic and that it continued to send out the appropriate LCP status information. Oscilloscope probes were also connected to the LCP Data Link Handler serial "receive" lines and the SEC serial "transmit" lines to verify that no serial data traffic was present, which was as expected since the SEC has no transmit capability.

The test demonstrated that when the data storm pattern information was generated by the first laptop, no change in response of the LCP was evident on the second laptop. Further, the oscilloscope traces showed no serial information present at the LCP "receive" portion of the HDLC. This testing was witnessed by NRC staff inspection team members. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure, Eagle 21 vendor manual, and associated drawings to verify that the described test configuration and acceptance criteria was valid for the Open Items in question. The inspection team member noted that the test procedure involved injecting data packets through the cable normally attached to the fiber optic converter and reading any return data packets. Additionally, the inspection team witnessed the performance of the test and observed the oscilloscope traces monitoring the SEC controller's (i.e., the communications interface) transmit and receive lines, as well as the loop controller processor's (the safety-related processor board) receive lines. The inspectors also reviewed the drawings to verify that they were in the same configuration described in Open Item 93. The inspectors observed the testing and reviewed the test results to verify the test setup and to determine whether the acceptance criteria were met.

Based on the staff evaluation that there appears to have been an appropriate test setup and successful performance of the licensee's Eagle 21 digital communications test, and on the staff's evaluation of the licensee's responses in the enclosures to their October 22, 2014, letter, and the observations noted in the inspection report prepared by the NRC Region II staff, the NRC staff finds that Open Items 63 and 93 have been adequately addressed and are closed.

## Open Item 64

Open Item 64 states, "TVA stated that, 'Post modification testing will be performed to verify that the design change corrects the Eagle 21, Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load.' This issue is open pending NRC staff review of the testing results."

The inspectors reviewed the test in work order (WO) 11347100 and the change package to verify that a 0.2 degree Fahrenheit (°F) bias, which had been discovered during factory acceptance testing, was corrected. The inspectors also reviewed the WO to verify that the test equipment was properly calibrated. Based on a review of the final closure package as documented in the Inspection Report 2014-602 dated March 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14086A063), Open Item 64 is closed."

SSER27 change the status to "Resolved."

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Open Item 63 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-607, dated September 30, 2014.



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.2.5	23	C ----- 13	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - address IEB 79-21 to alleviate temperature dependence problem associated with measuring SG water level</p> <p>In SSER2, NRC accepted TVA's commitment to insulate the steam generator water level reference legs to alleviate the temperature dependence problem. By letter dated July 27, 1994, TVA submitted an evaluation for both units and determined that it was not necessary to insulate the SG reference legs at WBN. In SSER14, NRC concurred with TVA's assessment to not insulate the steam generator water level instrument reference leg.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Update accident calculation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.2.5 of SSER23 reads:</p> <p>"By letter to the NRC dated July 27, 1994 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073230681), TVA withdrew its commitment to insulate the reference leg of the steam generator water level transmitters. TVA provided an analysis to justify its action, WCAP-1 3869, 'Reactor Protection System Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized-Water Reactor,' Revision 1, November 1993, which was accepted by the staff as documented in SSER 13, issued April 1994. The staff asked TVA to confirm whether the reference leg of the steam generator water level transmitters is insulated and, if not, to confirm that the analysis that was submitted for WBN Unit 1 is also applicable to Unit 2. In its response (letter open item number 292) to the staff by letter dated October 21, 2010, TVA informed the staff that the reference leg is not insulated and that the analysis provided for WBN Unit 1 is also applicable to Unit 2. TVA's analysis for feedwater line break inside the containment credits the high containment pressure safety injection (SI) signal. The staff verified that TVA revised FSAR Section 15.4.2.2 to reflect that information. Therefore, based on the previous acceptance of the analysis documented in SSER 13, the staff considers TVA's response to be acceptable."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The Revision 06 update for Bulletin 1979-21 stated, "The calculations were updated."</p> <p>Updating this to match the Bulletin update and status.</p>
7.3.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Eagle-21 upgrade for WBN Unit 1 only. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. TVA provided the requested information by letter dated February 28, 2008. By letter dated May 7, 2008, NRC provided a list of specific issues to be addressed in a future amendment application for Eagle-21 for WBN Unit 2.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA responded to the NRC request for additional information on Eagle-21 by letter dated</p>



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>August 25, 2008.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
7.3.5	23	CO ----- 13	<p>CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - perform confirmatory tests to satisfy IEB 80-06 (to ensure that no device will change position solely due to reset action) and staff review of electrical schematics for modifications that ensure that valves remain in emergency mode after ESF reset</p> <p>In the original SER, staff concluded that the design modifications for Bulletin 80-06 were acceptable subject to review of the electrical schematics that were not available at the time. In SSER3, the staff found the modifications acceptable and closed the confirmatory issue.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform verification during preoperational testing.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.3.5 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"In its letter to the NRC staff dated March 11, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073530129), TVA provided a list of all the safety-related equipment that does not remain in its emergency mode after an ESF reset. TVA evaluated this equipment and determined that it does not impact the safety of the plant or the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The NRC staff concluded in SSER 3 that TVA's justification was acceptable.</p> <p>In response to NRC staff Request for Additional Information (RAI) 7.3-6, TVA confirmed in its letter dated November 9, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03200146) that the feedwater isolation valves, the main feedwater check valve bypass valves, the upper tap main feedwater isolation valves, the steam generator blowdown isolation valves, and the RHR heat exchanger outlet flow control valves will remain in the emergency mode after an ESF reset.</p> <p>In response to a staff question, TVA stated in its letter dated November 24, 2010 (item number 330; ADAMS Accession No. ML1 03330501) that subsequent design changes have impacted the March 11, 1982, response such that some equipment that originally changed state no longer does so and some equipment has been deleted. TVA stated that no additions have been made to its original list dated March 11, 1982. Therefore, based on the staff's prior evaluation, as documented in the SER and SSER 3, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in response to staff questions, the conclusions in the SER and SSER 3 remain valid."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Correct the Status above to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION																																						
7.5.2	27	OI	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving RG 1.97 instruments following course of an accident																																						
		13	<p>In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that WBN did not use RG 1.97, “Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plants and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident,” for the design because the design predated the RG. In SSER7, an outstanding issue was opened. TVA provided NRC information on exceptions to RG 1.97. A detailed review was performed for both units (Appendix V of SSER9). The staff concluded that WBN conforms to or has adequately justified deviations from the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 2. TVA submitted additional deviations for both units in letters dated May 9, 1994, and April 21, 1995. In SSER14 and SSER15, the additional deviations to RG 1.97 were reviewed and accepted by NRC.</p> <p>NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2, ““Accident Monitoring Instrumentation” – Reviewed in SSER9.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions: Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors.</p> <p>CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>This item has approximately 24 Open Items (OIs) cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 09:</p> <table><tr><th>OI</th><th>STATUS</th></tr><tr><td>72</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>77</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>78</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>79</td><td>Last discussed in Revision 07 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>80</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>81</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>94</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>95</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>96</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>97</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>98</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>99</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>100</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>101</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>102</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>103</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>104</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</td></tr><tr><td>105</td><td>CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</td></tr></table>	OI	STATUS	72	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	77	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.	78	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	79	Last discussed in Revision 07 portion.	80	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.	81	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.	94	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.	95	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	96	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	97	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	98	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.	99	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	100	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	101	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.	102	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	103	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	104	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.	105	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
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			<p>106 CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</p> <p>107 CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</p> <p>108 CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</p> <p>109 CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.</p> <p>110 CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</p> <p>111 CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <hr/> <hr/> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>[all portions are from SSER23]</p> <p>7.5.2.2.3 includes:</p> <p>“SRP Section 7.5, Revision 5 identifies IEEE Std. 603-1991 as being applicable to accident monitoring instrumentation. Based on its review of this item, the staff has the following open items:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* TVA should provide to the staff either information that demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS meets the applicable requirements in IEEE Std. 603-1991, or justification for why the Common Q PAMS should not meet those requirements. This is Open Item 94 (Appendix HH).</li> <li>* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, ‘Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide Conformance,’ to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 95 (Appendix HH).</li> </ul> <p>AND</p> <p>“The NRC staff’s detailed evaluation of the Common Q PAMS equipment against the environmental criteria is addressed in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3.5. RG 1.100, Revision 1 is used, in part, to address WBN Unit 2 Design Criterion 2. Based on its review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include RG 1.100, Revision 3 for the Common Q PAMS, or (2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or (3) provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 96 (Appendix HH).”</li> </ul> <p>AND</p> <p>“Based on the reasoning quoted above, the staff concludes that TVA did not evaluate the Common Q PAMS against the criteria of RG 1.153, Revision 1; therefore, the staff has the following open item (see also Open Items 94 and 95 above):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.153, Revision 1 or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 97 (Appendix HH).”</li> </ul> <p>AND</p> <p>“Based on the review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:</p>

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- \* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 98 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"The WBN Unit 2 FSAR references IEEE 7-4.3.2-1982, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' as endorsed by RG 1.152, Revision 0 for the Eagle 21 system. The current staff position is documented in RG 1.152, Revision 2, which endorses IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' as an acceptable method for using digital computers to meet IEEE Std.603-1991. Based on the review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 99 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"The current staff positions are documented in RG 1.168, Revision 1, IEEE 1012-1998; and IEEE 1028-1997. Based on its review of this item, the NRC staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.168, Revision 1, IEEE Std. 1012-1998, and IEEE 1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 100 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"The Common Q PAMS was designed and implemented in accordance with the SPM, which was found by the NRC staff to meet the requirements of RG 1.168, Revision 0, issued September 1997; IEEE Std. 1012-1986, 'IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans'; and IEEE Std. 1028-1988, 'IEEE Standard Software Reviews and Audits.' (See NRC reports (1) 'Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation CE Nuclear Power Topical Report CENPD-396-P 'Common Qualified Platform' Project No. 692,' issued August 2000, Section 4.3.1 .j, 'Software Verification and Validation Plan' (ADAMS Accession No. ML003740165), and (2) WCAP-16096-NP-A, 'Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems,' Revision 1A, NRC safety evaluation incorporated into the document, Section 2, 'Regulatory Evaluation' (ADAMS Accession No. ML050350234)). Based on its review of this item, the staff has the following open item:

- \* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS application software is in conformance with RG 1.168, Revision 1 or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 101 (Appendix HH).

AND

"The WBN Unit 2 FSAR does not reference Regulatory Guide 1.209, which endorses IEEE Std. 323-2003, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.' TVA did not perform a comparison evaluation of the Common Q PAMS with the criteria in RG 1.209. Based on its review, the NRC staff has the following open items:

- \* TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. This is Open Item 102 (Appendix HH).
- \* TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 or provide justification for not conforming. This is Open Item 103 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"TVA did not provide a comparison evaluation of Common Q PAMS to the criteria in IEEE Std. 323-2003. (See Open Item 103 above.)"

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7.5.2.2.3.4.1 includes:

"The NRC revised RG 1.152 and 1.168 after the staff's approval of the SPM. Open Item Nos. 98 and 101 address the acceptability of the SPM for complying with the guidance of RGs 1.152 and 1.168, respectively (Appendix HH). The remaining RGs used to determine the acceptability of the SPM have not changed, and the processes described in the SPM have not changed; therefore, the staff considers the SPM to be acceptable for these unchanged aspects."

7.5.2.2.3.4.2 includes:

"The NRC staff will review the WEC self-assessment to verify that the WBN Unit 2 PAMS complies with the V&V requirements in the SPM or that deviations from the requirements are adequately justified. This is Open Item 104 (Appendix HH)."

7.5.2.2.3.4.2.2 includes:

"During its audit from February 28 to March 4, 2011, of the WEC CGD activities, the NRC staff examined implementation of the vendor's SWP, as specified in SPM Section 5, for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. The staff concluded that only some aspects of the SWP were followed, and that the QA oversight of the SPM did not identify the discrepancies. As described above in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.2, 'Software Implementation Documentation,' TVA/WEC took project-specific and generic action items to address the discrepancies. The NRC staff's verification of these actions is included in Open Item 104 (Appendix HH). Pending closure of Open Item 104, the NRC staff concludes that implementation of V&V for the Common Q PAMS is acceptable."

7.5.2.2.3.4.2.4 includes:

"The SPM describes the software testing and documents that TVA will create (e.g., SPM Section 5.8, 'V&V Test Documentation Requirements,' Section 8.8, 'Test Documentation'). The SPM also describes the testing tasks that TVA is to carry out. The acceptance criterion for software test implementation is that the tasks in the SPM have been carried out in their entirety. The three subsections below address the three different testing activities evaluated by the NRC staff. Other aspects regarding the acceptability of testing activities are addressed in Open Items Nos. 101 and 104 (Appendix HH)."

7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1 includes:

"The audit report (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 10691232, not publicly available) stated the following:

For the WBN2 PAMS project, Westinghouse will provide documentation in their Rockville MD offices demonstrating that each document requiring independent review was in fact independently reviewed. CAPs No. 11-061-M047 will contain a commitment to provided documented evidence of appropriate independent reviews.

This is included in Open Item 104 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Based on (1) the review of the SysRS and SRS, (2) the audit of the RTMs, and (3) the review of the traceability analysis in the LTR, the staff has the following open items (Appendix HH):

\* Open Item 105: TVA should provide to the NRC staff an acceptable description of how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS and SRS implement the design-basis requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 4.

\* Open Item 106: TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SRS is independently reviewed."

7.5.2.2.3.4.3.2 includes:

"The SDDs do not include any documented evidence that they were independently reviewed. As a result, the NRC staff has the following open item (Appendix HH):

\* Open Item 107: TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SDDs are independently reviewed."

7.5.2.2.3.5.2 includes:

"Table 5.3-1 of the qualification summary report provides the test environmental conditions from the various test programs. Based on the NRC staff's review of the test program results, the staff concluded that the required environmental test conditions satisfy the WBN Unit 2 plant-specific environmental requirements, including a heat rise inside the PAMS cabinet. The tested conditions from the various test programs envelop the required environmental test conditions at WBN Unit 2. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the environmental qualification of the Common Q PAMS meets the acceptance criteria of RG 1.209. The staff had two open items. Based on its review of the environmental qualification reports, the staff could not determine whether or not TVA had considered in the equipment testing any potential synergistic effects between temperature and humidity. This is Open Item 108 (Appendix HH). Because the staff used the criteria of RG 1.209, Open Item 102 (SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3; Appendix HH) also applies to this SSER subsection.

Open Item 108: TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff that there are no synergistic effects between temperature and humidity for the Common Q PAMS equipment."

7.5.2.2.3.5.3 includes:

"The seismic qualification testing of the AC160/Common Q equipment was performed to both IEEE Std. 344-1975 and IEEE Std. 344-1987. However, as noted in the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS, the PAMS must be seismically qualified to IEEE Std. 344-1975. The seismic testing on the AC160/Common Q equipment that was performed in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1987 bounds the requirements specified in IEEE Std. 344-1975. Therefore, the staff concludes that all of the AC160/Common Q seismic qualification testing was performed in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1975, and that the seismic qualification is acceptable. Open Item 96 (Appendix HH; SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3) also applies to this SSER subsection because RG 1.100, Revision 3 references IEEE Std. 344-1987."

7.5.2.2.3.7 includes:

"There is no communication between PAMS divisions. The divisions are physically separate, with no interconnection between divisions throughout the system architecture (i.e., from the input to the displays). The communications isolation between the safety-related Common Q PAMS and the plant computer are unidirectional via the MTP software and a nonsafety-related data diode. The MTP is presumed to fail during certain postulated failures of the connected nonsafety-related equipment. These failures have been demonstrated (i.e., via data storm testing) to not affect the connected AC160 components or the OM (see Open Item 109 below; Appendix HH). Data storm testing along with the DI&C-ISG-04 compliance analysis (documented in the subsection below) provide reasonable assurance that the independence criteria (i.e., IEEE Std. 603, Clause 5.5 and IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2, Clause 5.6) are met; therefore, the Common Q PAMS communications independence is acceptable to the NRC staff."

7.5.2.2.3.7.1.8 includes:

"No data are exchanged between safety divisions in the PAMS, but data are communicated through a one-way data link to the nonsafety-related plant computer. The one-way aspects of this nonsafety-related

data link are not credited because the MTP is the credited isolation device. The MTP is postulated to fail during a data storm, but this failure was demonstrated by testing not to affect the AC160 processor or the OM (i.e., to not affect the safety function). Based on the testing results, the use of the MTP in this manner is acceptable. Therefore, the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS communications meet the staff position and are acceptable. The staff had one open item (Appendix HH) for followup.

\* Open Item 109: TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q PAMS."

7.5.2.2.3.9 includes:

"TVA has not provided an analysis demonstrating that the criteria of IEEE Std. 603-1991 have been met (see Open Item 94, Appendix HH). However, the NRC staff performed its own analysis, as documented in the subsections below, and concluded, pending the resolution of Open Item 94, that there is reasonable assurance that the regulatory criteria in IEEE Std. 603-1991 have been met, and that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS system is acceptable."

7.5.2.2.3.9.2.6 includes:

"Each of the PAMS channels is designed to permit periodic software testing of the CET and saturation margin algorithms on demand; however, there appeared to be no description of how the RVLIS algorithm is periodically tested. This is Open Item 110 (Appendix HH).

\* Open Item 110: TVA should provide information to the NRC staff describing how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS design supports periodic testing of the RVLIS function."

7.5.2.2.3.11 includes:

"TVA should confirm to the staff that there are no changes required to the technical specifications as a result of the modification installing the Common Q PAMS. If any changes to the technical specifications are required, TVA should provide the changes to the NRC staff for review. This is Open Item 111 (Appendix HH)."

7.5.2.2.3.12 includes:

"TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2 or provide justification for not conforming. As noted in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.3, this is Open Item 98 (Appendix HH)."

7.5.2.2.4 reads:

"Based on the review of the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS design, as described above, the NRC staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the system fully conforms to the design, quality, functional and TMI-related criteria summarized above in SSER Section 7.5.2.2.2, with the open items (Appendix HH) noted in SSER Section 7.5.2.2."

7.5.2.3.4 includes:

"It is unclear to the NRC staff which software V&V documents are applicable to the HRCAR monitors. TVA should clarify which software V&V documents are applicable in order for the staff to complete its evaluation. This is Open Item 77 (Appendix HH)."



AND

"The staff asked TVA to address the radiation qualification of the HRCAR monitors. In its response dated February 25, 2011 (item number 349; ADAMS Accession No. MLI 10620219), TVA stated, in part, the following:

Calculation WBNAPS3-126 will be revised to add the control room to the calculation with a dose of less than 1 x 10E3 RAD by July 1, 2011. Since the control room TID will be documented in calculation WBNAPS3-126 to be less than 1 x 10E3 RAD, radiation qualification of the RM-1000 is not required.

This is Open Item 78 (Appendix HH) until TVA issues its revised calculation reflecting that the total integrated dose (TID) in the control room is less than 1 x 10E3 rads, and the staff completes its review.

The staff evaluated TVA's testing for EMI/RFI, as discussed in this section below with regard to compliance with RG 1.180. However, TVA specified no exclusion distances for the HRCAR monitors. TVA should perform a radiated susceptibility survey, after the installation of the hardware but before the RM-1 000 is placed in service, to establish the need for exclusion distance for the HRCAR monitors while using handheld portable devices (e.g., walkie-talkie) in the control room, as documented in Attachment 23 to TVA's letter dated February 25, 2011, and item number 355 of TVA's letter dated April 15, 2011. This is Open Item 79 (Appendix HH). The seismic qualification of the monitors is enveloped by the staff's evaluation of electrical equipment in Section 3.10 of this SSER. Pending closure of Open Items 78 and 79, the staff concludes that the HRCAR monitors have been qualified by test and analysis and meet the applicable seismic and environmental requirements. This satisfies Clause 5.4 of IEEE Std. 603-1991.

AND

"TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180 and should address any deviations from the guidance of the RG. This is Open Item 80 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"As noted above, this is Open Item 78 (Appendix HH) until TVA issues its revised calculation reflecting that the TID in the control room is less than 1 x 10E3 rads, and the staff completes its review."

AND

"As documented (item number 353) in the NRC/TVA open item master list status report dated April 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 11050009), TVA stated that GA's commercial dedication program did not require multiple dedication methods in accordance with the guidance of EPRI TR-1 06439, but that GA has taken additional measures to assure quality. TA should provide information about the extent to which GA complies with EPRI TR-1 06439 and the methods that GA used for its commercial dedication process to the NRC staff for review. This is Open Item 81 (Appendix HH)."

-----  
7.5.2.3.5 reads:

"Based on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA as described above, the NRC staff concludes that the digital HRCAR monitors comply with the applicable regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(h), Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xix), GDC 13, GDC 19, GDC 24, GDC 64, and IEEE Std. 603-1991, and with the regulatory guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 2, RG 1.180, Revision 1, and RG 1.209. Therefore, the HRCAR monitors are acceptable, pending closure of the open items in SSER Section 7.5.2.3."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

-----  
Open Item 77 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"It is unclear to the NRC staff which software V&V documents are applicable to the HRCAR monitors. TVA

should clarify which software V&V documents are applicable, in order for the staff to complete its evaluation. (Section 7.5.2.3)

-----

Open Item 78 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA intends to issue a revised calculation reflecting that the TID in the control room is less than 1 x 10E3 rads, which will be evaluated by the NRC staff. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

-----

Open Item 79 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should perform a radiated susceptibility survey, after the installation of the hardware but prior to the RM-1000 being placed in service, to establish the need for exclusion distance for the HRCAR monitors while using handheld portable devices (e.g., walkietalkie) in the control room, as documented in Attachment 23 to TVA's letter dated February 25, 2011, and item number 355 of TVA's letter dated April 15, 2011. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

-----

Open Item 80 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180, and should address any deviations from the guidance of the RG. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

-----

Open Item 81 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The extent to which TVA's supplier, General Atomics (GA), complies with EPRI TR-106439 and the methods that GA used for its commercial dedication process should be provided by TVA to the NRC staff for review. (Section 7.5.2.3)"

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Open Item 94 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide to the staff either information that demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS meets the applicable requirements in IEEE Std. 603-1991, or justification for why the Common Q PAMS should not meet those requirements. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

-----

Open Item 95 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide Conformance," to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

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Open Item 96 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include RG 1.100, Revision 3, for the Common Q PAMS, or (2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

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Open Item 97 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.153, Revision 1, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)"

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 98 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 99 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 100 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.168, Revision 1; IEEE 1012-1998; and IEEE 1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 101 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS application software is in conformance with RG 1.168, Revision 1, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 102 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 103 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 104 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“The NRC staff will review the WEC self assessment to verify that it the WBN Unit 2 PAMS is compliant to the V&amp;V requirements in the SPM or that deviations from the requirements are adequately justified. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.2)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 105 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should produce an acceptable description of how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SysRS and SRS implement the design basis requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clause 4. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 106 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should produce a final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SRS that is independently reviewed. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.1)”</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 107 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SDDs that are independently reviewed. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.4.3.2)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 108 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff that there are no synergistic effects between temperature and humidity for the Common Q PAMS equipment. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.5.2)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 109 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q PAMS. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.7.1.8)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 110 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should provide information to the NRC staff describing how the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS design supports periodic testing of the RVLIS function. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.9.2.6)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 111 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“TVA should confirm to the staff that there are no changes required to the technical specifications as a result of the modification installing the Common Q PAMS. If any changes to the technical specifications are required, TVA should provide the changes to the NRC staff for review. (Section 7.5.2.2.3.11)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.5.2 of SSER25 reads:</p> <p>“7.5.2 Postaccident Monitoring System</p> <p>7.5.2.2 Common Qualified Platform—Postaccident Monitoring System</p> <p>Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)</p> <p>Open Item 72</p> <p>Open Item 72 states, ‘The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC [inadequate core cooling] instrumentation.’ The item was generated during the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s review of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) reactor in Section 4.4.8 of Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 23, issued July 2011.</p> <p>The NRC staff documented its review of the Common Q postaccident monitoring system (PAMS) and ICC in Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23. The staff generated Open Items 94–111 (Appendix HH) during its review. Therefore, Open Item 72 is closed, because it is subsumed by Open Items 94–111.</p> <p>Open Item 95</p>

Open Item 95 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Guide Conformance,' to reference IEEE Std. 603-1991 for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

In Table 7.1-1 of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 105, dated August 12, 2011, TVA stated the following:

IEEE Std. 603-1991, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' (See Note 13).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised wording in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 95 is closed.

Open Item 96

Open Item 96 states, 'TVA should (1) update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to include RG 1.100, Revision 3 for the Common Q PAMS, or (2) demonstrate that the Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.100, Revision 1, or (3) provide justification for not conforming.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to the open item, stating that it will add Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100, 'Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,' Revision 3, issued September 2009, to Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 3, September 2009, 'Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants' (See Notes 13, 14, and 16).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Note 16 Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 3 and IEEE 344-2004

The Common Q new design modules used in the PAMS; and the RM-1000 radiation monitors comply with IEEE 344-2004 and with Regulatory Guide 1.100 Revision 3 with the exception of issues associated with testing above 33Hz.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 96 is closed.

Open Item 97

Open Item 97 states, 'TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.153, Revision 1 or provide justification for not conforming.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item, stating that it will add RG 1.153, 'Criteria for Safety Systems,' Revision 1, issued June 1996, to FSAR Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.153, Revision 1, June 1996, 'Criteria for Safety Systems' (See Note 13).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 97 is closed.

Open Item 99

Open Item 99 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this action item, stating that it would add Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard (Std.) 7-4.3.2, 'Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' to Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105 states the following:

IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003 'Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations' (See Notes 13 and 18).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

...

Note 18 Conformance to IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003

The Common Q PAMS meets the applicable requirements of IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003, except as noted below:

1. The quality program is in accordance with WCAP-16096-NP-1A 'Software Program Manual' (SPM).
2. The commercial item dedication program is in accordance with the Westinghouse 10CFR50.54 Appendix B program.'

However, in its audit report dated April 27, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980761), the NRC staff identified several examples of practices that do not comply with the software program manual, or where Westinghouse no longer followed the software program manual. The software program manual also contains criteria for commercial-grade dedication. Based on the revised wording in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concluded that TVA did not adequately address the item.

By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11286A037, Enclosure 1, Item 17), TVA stated the following:

The inclusion of Note 18 was caused by a misinterpretation of the requirements of RG 1.152 Revision 3 as it applied to IEEE 7-4.3.2 2003 by the TVA reviewer. Discussion with the NRC reviewer determined that the note was not required. Note 18 was removed in FSAR Amendment 106.

Since TVA updated the FSAR to include reference IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003 as applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS, Open Item 99 is closed.

Open Item 100

Open Item 100 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.168, Revision 1, IEEE Std. 1012-1998, and IEEE 1028-1997 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item, stating that it would add RG 1.168, 'Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,' Revision 1, issued February 2004; IEEE Std. 1012-1998, 'IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation'; and IEEE Std. 1028-1997, 'IEEE Standard for Software Reviews,' to Table 7.1-1 for Common Q PAMS. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.168, Revision 1, February 2004, 'Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants' (See Note 13) ...  
IEEE Std. 1012-1998, 'IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation' (See Note 13).  
IEEE Std. 1028-1997, 'IEEE Standard for Software Reviews'(See Note 13).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 100 is closed.



Open Item 102

Open Item 102 states, 'TVA should update FSAR Table 7.1-1 to reference RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 as being applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item, stating that it would add RG 1.209, 'Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants,' issued March 2007, and IEEE Std. 323-2003, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' to Table 7.1-1. In Table 7.1-1 of FSAR Amendment 105, TVA stated the following:

Regulatory Guide 1.209, Revision 0, March 2007, 'Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants' (See Note 13)...IEEE Std. 323-2003, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' (See Note 13).

...

Note 13 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Applicability

These Rules, Regulations and standards are applicable to the design of the Common Q PAMS system cabinets.

Based on the revised words in FSAR Amendment 105, the NRC staff concludes that the open item has been adequately addressed. Therefore, Open Item 102 is closed.

Open Item 103

Open Item 103 states, 'TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS conforms to RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003 or provide justification for not conforming.'

By letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), TVA responded to this open item; Attachment 3 to the letter included the requested evaluation.

Based on its review of the information submitted by TVA, the staff concluded that TVA provided an adequate evaluation of conformance with RG 1.209 and IEEE Std. 323-2003. therefore, Open Item 103 is closed.

Open Item 104

Open Item 104 states, 'The NRC staff will review the WEC [Westinghouse Electric Corporation] self-assessment to verify that the WBN Unit 2 PAMS complies with the V&V [verification and validation] requirements in the SPM or that deviations from the requirements are adequately justified.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA provided information to address this item (see letter item 15, 'NRC Common Q PAMS Audit Action Items Response'). The information provided and the information subsequently reviewed demonstrate that Westinghouse did not consistently follow the software program manual and that Westinghouse did not plan and document these deviations beforehand; however, TVA did provide sufficient information to allow the NRC staff to determine, with reasonable assurance, that the Common Q PAMS does not pose a threat to public health and safety. Therefore, Open Item 104 is closed.

Open Item 106

Open Item 106 states, 'TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SRS [system requirements specification] is independently reviewed.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA responded to 'NRC Request (Item Number 372),' documenting why it concluded that the reviews were independent. The information provided was essentially an affirmation that the documents were independently reviewed. The Westinghouse internal guidance (reviewed during the NRC audit documented at ADAMS Accession No. ML110980761) is inconsistent on how to document that a review was an 'independent review - satisfying Appendix B' versus a more informal review. However, the NRC staff considers that the affirmation provided by TVA in its letter dated June 10, 2011, is sufficient; therefore, Open Item 106 is closed.

Open Item 107



Open Item 107 states, 'TVA should provide to the NRC staff documentation to confirm that the final WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS SDDs [software design documents] are independently reviewed.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA responded to 'NRC Request (Item Number 373),' documenting why it concluded that the reviews were independent. The information provided was essentially an affirmation that the documents were independently reviewed. The Westinghouse internal guidance (reviewed during the NRC audit documented at ADAMS Accession No. ML110980761) is inconsistent on how to document that a review was an 'independent review - satisfying Appendix B' versus a more informal review. However, the NRC staff considers the affirmation provided by TVA in its letter dated June 10, 2011, to be sufficient; therefore, Open Item 107 is closed.

Open Item 109

Open Item 109 states, 'TVA should demonstrate to the NRC staff acceptable data storm testing of the Common Q PAMS.'

By letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA responded to '18. NRC Verbal Request,' which stated the following:

Watts Bar Unit 2 Post Accident Monitoring System went through a Data Storm Test to verify that the safety related functions of the system driven by the Advant Controller 160 (AC 160) and the safety related indications monitored on the Operator Module (OM) located in the Main Control Room (MCR) are not affected when the Ethernet network interface of the Maintenance and Test Panel (MTP) is under data storm conditions. This test was requested by TVA.

The purpose of the data storm test was to test the ability of the MTP to handle the possible volume of traffic generated by a broadcast storm without impacting the safety functions. A broadcast storm occurs when a large number of broadcast packets are received. Forwarding these packets can cause the network to slow down or to time out.

Another objective of the data storm test was to test the ability of the MTP to handle malformed packets possibly generated by a data storm without impacting the safety functions.

TVA also described the pass/fail criteria and associated results. The PAMS continued to perform its safety function during the data storm testing, as demonstrated by its meeting the acceptance criteria.

Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that the open item was acceptably addressed. Therefore, Open Item 109 is closed.

7.5.2.2.3.9.2.5 IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 5.6, Independence

In Section 7.5.2.2.3.9.2.5 of SSER 23, issued July 2011, the NRC staff concluded that the Common Q PAMS meets the acceptance criteria for independence and the requirements of Clause 5.6; therefore, the PAMS is acceptable.

Core exit thermocouples (CETs) are bundled together with the non-Class 1E self-powered neutron detectors in the mineral insulated cable and thus do not meet the separation requirements between safety- and nonsafety-related equipment in IEEE Std. 384-1981, 'IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The NRC staff documented its separation/isolation evaluation for the CETs in Section 7.7.1.9 of SSER 24, issued September 2011.

7.5.2.3 High-Range Containment Area Radiation Monitors

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 78

Open Item 78 states, 'TVA intends to issue a revised calculation reflecting that the TID [total integrated dose] in the control room is less than 1×10<sup>3</sup> rads, which will be evaluated by the NRC staff.'

TVA's letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11222A113), responded to the open item, and Enclosure 1 to the letter provided TVA's supporting calculation (Calculation No. WBNAPS3-127,

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Revision 0). TVA stated that the TID for the main control room, where the radiation monitors are located, is 362.76 rads. This radiation dose is acceptable to the NRC staff for mild environments according to the guidance in RG 1.209. Based on its review of the information provided in TVA's letter dated August 4, 2011, and the calculation summary, the staff concluded that TVA provided an adequate response. Therefore, Open Item 78 is closed."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

The following is provided for Open Item 77:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11257A048), contained:

"The RM-1000 High Range Containment Area Radiation (HRCAR) monitors used by WBN Unit 2 use version 1.2 of the software. The applicable Verification and Validation (V&V) documents are:

### a) Software Version 1.0 (initial issue):

General Atomics Electronic Systems, Inc. (GA-ESI) document 04507007-1TR, 'RM-1000 System Verification Test Results Engineering Report Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,' Original Release: July, 1999 (verified to be applicable to WBN Unit 2). This version of the software was never used in any installed monitors and was verified by test. GA-ESI provided the following clarification: '... the requirements (test cases) in document 04507006 are covered in document 04507007-1TR. It is on this basis that we've concluded that the version 1.0 software version was validated.' Based on review of the document, TVA agrees with the GA-ESI position.

### b) Software Version 1.1

GA-ESI document 04508005, 'RM-1000 Version 1.1 Software Verification Report,' January 2002

### c) Software Version 1.2

GA-ESI document 04508006, 'RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification Report,' Revision A, April 2008"

The NRC requested copies of the documents. TVA responded as follows in TVA to NRC letter dated November 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11322A099):

"TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (Reference 5 ADAMS), identified the following Verification and Validation (V&V) documents as applicable to the High Range Containment Accident Radiation (HRCAR) monitors:

- a) Software Version 1.0: (initial issue) General Atomics Electronic Systems, Inc. (GA-ESI) document 04507007-1TR, 'RM-1000 System Verification Test Results Engineering Report Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2,' Original Release: July, 1999.
- b) Software Version 1.1: GA-ESI document 04508005, 'RM-1000 Version 1.1 Software Verification Report,' January 2002
- c) Software Version 1.2: GA-ESI document 04508006, 'RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification Report,' Revision A, April 2008.

The engineering approved proprietary versions of these documents were submitted in TVA to NRC letter dated October 13, 2011 (Reference 1). The non proprietary versions and affidavit for withholding were submitted in TVA to NRC letter dated July 15, 2010 (Reference 2)."

The following is provided for Open Item 80:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12249A195), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) Open Item 80," contained the following:

From the cover letter:

"The purpose of this letter is to respond to a commitment made in Reference 1 to perform current to frequency (I/F) testing of an I/F converter in a radiation monitoring device supplied by General Atomics Electronics Systems Inc. (GA-ESI). Enclosure 1 provides additional information to the NRC follow-up question, which was the source for this commitment. Enclosure 2 provides the new regulatory commitment."

From Enclosure 1:

"TVA Response to NRC Follow-up Request

The previous response to this item in the April 23, 2012, TVA letter was based on an incorrect understanding of the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1, and the question being asked. The following is the revised response to this question.

Regulatory Guide 1.180, Revision 1, requires EMC low frequency conducted susceptibility testing be performed in accordance with MIL-STD-461E which requires testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz for DC supplied equipment and from the second harmonic 120 Hz (for 60 Hz equipment) to 150 kHz for AC supplied equipment. The GA-ESI RM-1000 monitors used in WBN Unit 2 (with I/F converters) are AC supplied; therefore, the conducted susceptibility testing lower limit is 120 Hz.

GA-ESI performed low frequency conducted susceptibility testing for the I/F converter as part of RM-1000 testing performed in 1999. The documented test range is 100 Hz to 150 kHz. The GA-ESI proprietary test report, 04038800, dated November 11, 1999, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report, TVA,' containing this information was provided as part of Attachment 1, 'Browns Ferry High Range Radiation Monitor,' of TVA to NRC letter dated April 15, 2011. The specific location of the test data is, Appendix B, TÜV Test Report 58569-02, dated December 11, 1998, 'RM-1000 Radiation Monitor Two Channel,' page TD8 of TD34 or page 273 of the overall attachment.

The testing was performed in accordance with MIL-STD-461D while Regulatory Guide 1.180 Revision 1 requires testing to Revision E. TVA has reviewed the data against the requirements of MIL-STD-461E and confirms that the test meets the current requirements. The applicability of this testing to the current I/F converter is documented in 04038800-1SP, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report Supplement 1,' Revision A, submitted as Attachment 25 on TVA to NRC letter dated November 30, 2011.

The confusion over this issue stems from incorrect information contained in 04038800-1SP on page 29. The Conducted Susceptibility table entry states:

Low Frequencies (Power Conductors Only)

- Frequency: 30 Hz to 50 kHz
- Amplitude: 6.3 volts rms average
- Alternate procedures MIL-STD-461C (CS-01, CS-02, and RS-02 Part II Class A3) or MILSTD-461D (CS-101)

However, TÜV Test Report 58569-02 shows that the low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was actually performed from 100 Hz to 150 kHz which envelopes the MIL-STD-461E required test range of 120 Hz to 150 kHz.

A review of the April 15, 2011 letter found that it stated proprietary and non-proprietary versions of 04038800 along with an affidavit for withholding would be provided. However, this information was not included in the letter commitments and these documents were not submitted. A new commitment to submit these documents is included in this letter.

This completes the response to this request."

From Enclosure 2:

"Proprietary and non-proprietary versions of GA-ESI document GA-ESI test report, 04038800, dated November 11, 1999, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report, TVA,' along with an affidavit for withholding will be provided within three weeks of receipt from GA-ESI."

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TVA to NRC letter dated December 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12349A379), "Instrumentation and Controls Staff Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) Open Item 80," submitted the proprietary and non-proprietary versions of General Atomics-Electronic Systems Inc. (GA-ESI) test report 04038800, 'RM-1000 EMC Test Report,' dated November 11, 1999, and the associated affidavit for withholding from public disclosure.

This satisfies the above commitment.

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The following is provided for Open Item 98:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11222A113) contained the following:

"NRC Request (I&C RAI Matrix Item Number 368) (SSER 23 Table HH Item Number 98)

On 5/6/2010 (See Open Item No. 81) the NRC Staff requested an evaluation of the Common Q PAMS against the current staff position.

By letter dated 2/25/11 (ML110620219), TVA docketed a response.

The WBN2 FSAR (Amendment 103) references RG 1.152 Rev. 0, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." The Common Q PAMS was designed to meet the requirements of RG 1.152 Rev. 1. RG 1.152 Rev. 2 is the current revision of this guide and is endorsed by the NRC. By letter dated February 25, 2010 (ML110620219), TVA stated:

"RG 1.152 rev 2 endorses ANSI/IEEE-ANS-7-4.3.2-2003, but also provides extra regulatory guidance concerning computer based cyber security. Since this revision was not part of the design basis of WBN2 or Common Q PAMS, the project makes no commitment to the compliance of RG 1.152 rev 2."

Based upon the review of this item, the staff finds the following open item:

1 TVA to evaluate Common Q PAMS for conformance with RG 1.152 Rev. 2.

Follow-up NRC Request

Submit FSAR Amendment to update table 7.1-1.

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request

Attachment 2 contains the proposed FSAR change which adds RG 1.152, Revision 2 to Table 7.1-1 which will be included in a future amendment."

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TVA to NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11236A158) submitted Amendment 105 of the Unit 2 FSAR. This submittal added RG 1.152, Revision 2 to Table 7.1-1

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TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML11257A048) contained the following:

"NRC Request

Based on FSAR Amendment 105, TVA changed its commitment from Regulatory Guide 1.152, Revision 2 to

Revision 3. Based on this change, TVA to demonstrate how the Common Q PAMS meets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.152, Revision 3 for a secure Development and Operational Environment.

## TVA Response to NRC Request

The secure development environment is addressed in WCAP-17427-P, Revision 1. Attachment 6 contains Westinghouse Electric Company WCAP-17427-P, Revision 1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment," (Proprietary). Attachment 7 contains Westinghouse Electric Company WCAP-17427-NP, Revision 1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment," (Non-Proprietary). Attachment 8 contains Westinghouse Electric Company CAW-11-3241, Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, WCAP-17427-P, Revision 1, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Computer Security Assessment," (Proprietary).

Attachment 9 contains TVA document "Common Q PAMS Secure Operational Environment per Regulatory Guide 1.152 Revision 3."

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TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession number ML12018A213) contained the following:

"NRC Request (SSER 23 Appendix HH Item Number 98)

TVA should demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is in conformance with RG 1.152, Revision 2, or provide justification for not conforming. (Section 7.5.2.2.3)

## Follow-up NRC Request

The following RAs are regarding the Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment. The action associated with this review area is captured in SSER 23 Appendix HH, Action Item 98 (ML11270A306). TVA submitted documents (reference below) on September 1, 2011 to address this item.

[Request and response are many pages long; see letter for these details.]

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TVA to NRC letter dated March 2, 2012 (ADAMS Accession number ML12073A224) contained the following:

"TVA Partial Response to Follow-up NRC Request

Note: The response to 'Draft Request for Additional Information Regarding Open Item 98,' sent December 12, 2011, Item 3, was provided in TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 (Reference 1). With the exception of item 2.h, items 1 and 2 are addressed below.

The responses to items 1 and 2 are provided in WEC proprietary document WBT-D-3769 P-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information.'

Attachment 1 contains WEC proprietary document WBT-D-3769 P-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information,' dated February 2012. Attachment 2 contains WEC non-proprietary document WBT-D-3769 NP-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information,' dated February 2012. Attachment 3 contains WEC non-proprietary document CAW-12-3385, 'Application for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure WBT-D-3769 P-Enclosure, 'Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS Secure Development and Operational Environment SSER 23 Appendix HH Action Item 98 Requests for Additional Information, (Proprietary),' dated February 6, 2012.

Item 2.h will be addressed by submittal of WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 7, "IV&V Summary Report," which will be submitted within three weeks of receipt from WEC.'

TVA to NRC letter dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession number ML12073A391) contained the following:

“TVA Response to NRC Follow-up Request

WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P is the appropriate IV&V Phase Summary Report Record; however, the Software Release Record (SRR) listing provided in revision 4 was not complete.

In response to item 2.h, a review was performed of WNA-LI-00058-WNA, Revision 3, 'Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report,' and WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 6, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System.' The review determined that no single complete listing of SRRs existed and the listings in the two documents were inconsistent. As a result, the decision was made to revise both documents. The complete listing of SRRs was incorporated into WEC proprietary document WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P (Attachment 1), Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' dated February 2012 as Tables 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3. The partial listing in WNA-LI-00058-WNA was replaced by a reference to WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P.

Attachment 2 contains WEC non-proprietary document WNA-VR-00283-WBT-NP, Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' dated February 2012. Attachment 3 contains WEC non-proprietary document CAW 12-3425, 'Application for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 7, 'IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' (Proprietary),' dated March 1, 2012.”

The following is provided for Open Item 108:

TVA to NRC letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11257A048), “Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests,” provided the following response to item 4 on page E1-3:

“Based on an analysis of TVA calculations EPM-MCP-071689, ‘Cooling/Heating Load & Equipment/Component Performance Analysis For The Control Building Electrical Board Room Areas (EL. 692.0 & 708.0),’ Revision 19 and EPM-LCP-072489, ‘Cooling And Heating Load Analysis, Main Control Room HVAC,’ Revision 13, the Common Q PAMS hardware is not located in an environment where it is simultaneously exposed to high temperature and high humidity. The following tables summarize the results of the analysis.”

[Tables are not provided herein.]

TVA letter dated December 22, 2011, (ADAMS Accession Number ML12018A213), “Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests,” provided the following answer to this item (pages E1-11 through E1-14):

“Upon review of the response to Action Item Number 94, it was noticed that TVA's response to these two action items provided different environmental conditions in each response (see Action Item Number 94 Clauses 4.5.3 and 4.7). It is no longer clear, in what environment the Common Q PAMS is required to operate or how qualification to this environment is demonstrated.

- Please provide EPM-MCP-071689, ‘Cooling/Heating Load & Equipment/Component Performance Analysis for the Control Building Electrical Board Room Areas (EL. 692.0 and 708.0),’ Revision 19.
- Please provide EPM-LCP-072489, ‘Cooling and Heating Load Analysis, Main Control Room HVAC [Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning],’ Revision 13.
- Please provide the maximum temperature and the associated maximum relative humidity in which the Common Q PAMS is required to be operable.
- Please provide the minimum temperature and the associated minimum relative humidity in which the Common Q PAMS is required to be operable.



- e. Please explain why the relative humidity during a loss of coolant accident event is lower than the humidity during summer or winter."

[NOTE: Item "f." is addressed in January 19, 2012, letter below]

"TVA Partial Response to Follow-up NRC Request

It is not possible to state whether or not there are any synergistic effects between temperature and humidity on the Common Q PAMS equipment. The NRC-approved qualification methods in WCAP-16097-P-A, 'Common Qualified Platform Topical Report,' Revision 0, do not perform or require such testing. What can be shown is that the WBN Unit 2 operating conditions are bounded by the Common Q PAMS hardware qualification testing.

- The requested calculation has been revised. The current revision is 21. Attachment 3 contains TVA calculation EPM-MCP-071689, 'Cooling/Heating Load & Equipment/ Component Performance Analysis for the Control Building Electrical Board Room Areas (EL. 692.0 & 708.0),' Revision 21.
- The requested calculation has been revised. The current revision is 14. Attachment 4 contains TVA calculation EPM-LCP-072489, 'Cooling and Heating Load Analysis, Main Control Room HVAC,' Revision 14.
- The tables below summarize the calculated temperature and humidity conditions for the MCR (from EPM-LCP-072489) and Auxiliary Instrument Room (AIR) (from EPMMCP-071689). Where the calculations do not include relative humidity during abnormal or accident conditions, an online humidity calculator (Reference 7) was used to convert the humidity ratio and dry bulb temperature from the calculations to a relative humidity (RH) value. The values were independently verified by Bechtel Mechanical Engineering using a psychometric chart."

[NOTE: See letter for tables.]

"Based on the above tables, the following are the maximum temperature and maximum relative humidity conditions for PAMS operation:"

[NOTE: See letter for table.]

- To protect the PAMS Flat Panel Displays (FPD) from damage caused by electro-static discharge (ESD), there is a requirement in EQ-QR-68-WBT-P, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0, (Attachment 5) that requires the Common Q PAMS FPDs to be installed in an environment with a relative humidity no less than 20% or else anti-static flooring material must be installed in the area where the FPDs will be installed or grounded ESD wrist straps must be worn when touching/handling the FPDs. The 20% RH limit is independent of temperature. Based on the tables in response c. above, the following are the minimum temperature and minimum RH conditions for PAMS Operation:"

[NOTE: See letter for table.]

"While the WBN Unit 2 design shows that the AIR will not go below 20%, it is not necessary to maintain the 20% RH limit for the PAMS to perform its safety-related function. The limit applies to the FPD on the MTP. The MTP FPD is for the PC Node Box in the MTP. The MTP PC Node Box is the qualified isolation device and as such cannot be credited as a safety-related display device. In addition, the MTP FPD is located behind a locked cabinet door, where it cannot be inadvertently touched, and is therefore protected from inadvertent ESD damage during potential low humidity conditions in the AIR. Based on the above, it is not required to maintain the AIR humidity greater than or equal to 20% to protect the MTP FPD from damage due to ESD.

Attachment 5 contains WEC proprietary document EQ-QR-68-WBT-P, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0. Attachment 6 contains WEC non-proprietary document EQ-QR-68-WBT-NP, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0. Attachment 7 contains WEC document CAW-11-3118, 'Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure EQ-QR-68-WBT-P, 'Qualification Summary Report for Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS),' Revision 0, (proprietary),' dated February 28, 2011.



- e. During a LOCA, the humidifiers are assumed to be out of service. This results in a lower RH during a LOCA."

TVA letter dated January 19, 2012, (ADAMS Accession Number ML12069A330), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests," provided the following answer to this item (pages E1-2 and E1-3):

## "Follow-up NRC Request

Upon review of the response to Action Item Number 94, it was noticed that TVA's response to these two action items provided different environmental conditions in each response (see Action Item Number 94 Clauses 4.5.3 and 4.7). It is no longer clear, in what environment the Common Q PAMS is required to operate or how qualification to this environment is demonstrated."

[NOTE "a." through "e." were previously responded to and are not repeated here.]

- "f. Please describe how it is demonstrated that the Common Q PAMS equipment is qualified to the environments in which that equipment is required to operate. Please pay particular attention to the potential synergistic effects of temperature and humidity.

## TVA Partial Response to Follow-up NRC Request

Responses to 'Draft Request for Additional Information Regarding Open Item 108,' items a through e were provided in TVA to NRC letter dated December 22, 2011 (Reference 1). Item f is addressed as follows:

- f. It is not possible to state whether or not there are any synergistic effects between temperature and humidity on the Common Q PAMS equipment. The NRC-approved qualification methods in WCAP-16097-P-A, 'Common Qualified Platform Topical Report,' Revision 0, do not perform or require such testing. What can be shown is that the WBN Unit 2 operating conditions are bounded by the Common Q PAMS hardware qualification testing.

Attachment 1 describes how the Common Q PAMS equipment is qualified for the environments in which it is required to operate.

[See the letter for the attachments.]

Attachment 1 contains WEC proprietary document WBT-D-3711 P-Enclosure, 'Westinghouse's Revised Response to Follow up NRC Request (SSER 24 Appendix HH Item Number 108),' dated January 2012. Attachment 2 contains WEC nonproprietary document WBT-D-3711 NP-Enclosure, 'Westinghouse's Revised Response to Follow up NRC Request (SSER 24 Appendix HH Item Number 108),' dated January 2012. Attachment 3 contains WEC nonproprietary document CWA-12-3349, 'Application for Withholding Information From Public Disclosure WBT-D-3711 P Enclosure, 'Westinghouse's Revised Response to Follow up NRC Request (SSER 24 Appendix HH Item Number 108),' (Proprietary),' dated January 5, 2011."

## REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2 included the following for the noted Open Items:

## Open Item 94

"By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff requested additional information regarding this open item. By letter dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12073A391), TVA responded (See Letter Enclosure 1, Item No. 1 and Attachment 4). In Attachment 4, TVA documented the evaluation of conformance with each requirement of Clauses 5 and 6 (Clause 4 is addressed under Open Item 105). TVA stated that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS does not automatically perform any protection or control functions; therefore, the clauses applicable to these functions are not applicable to the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS. The NRC staff reviewed TVA's explanation and

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

agreed that IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clauses 5.2, 5.8.3, 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 are not applicable. The NRC staff confirmed TVA's explanations for the remaining clauses by a review of the design documentation for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS; therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS meets the regulatory requirements in these clauses. Open Item 94 is closed."

### Open Item 101

"In its letter dated December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A213; letter Item 9 and Attachment 9), TVA provided the following regulatory commitment to revise the FSAR as follows:

"The changes to FSAR Table 7.1-1 for RG 1.168, IEEE 1012 and IEEE 1028 shown in Attachment 9 will be incorporated into Amendment 108 of the FSAR. (See Letter Item 9)

TVA's commitment to update the FSAR to identify that the Common Q PAMS is required to be in conformance with RG 1.168, "Verification, Validation, Reviews, and Audits for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 0, issued September 1997; IEEE Std. 1012-1986, "IEEE Standard for Software Verification and Validation Plans"; and IEEE Std. 1028-1988, "IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits," is acceptable to the NRC staff, because the Common Q PAMS was developed in accordance with the NRC-approved "Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems" (ADAMS Accession No. ML050350234). Therefore, Open Item 101 is closed."

### Open Item 105

By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff requested additional information regarding this open item. By letter dated March 9, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12073A391), TVA responded (See Letter Enclosure 1, Item No. 5 and Attachment 4).

The WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is functionally equivalent to the Unit 1 Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM-86); therefore, the WBN Unit 2 design uses the Unit 1 ICCM-86 specification as a basis. In addition, the placement of displays and associated controls for Unit 2 was subjected to a human factors engineering review during the design process for EDCR 52351, "Common Q PAMS and the Control Room Design Review (CRDR)." The NRC staff did not intend for its technical review to be a re-evaluation of these aspects; however, compliance of the WBN Unit 2 design with these aspects, as well as the design basis events, was addressed. Because the ICCM-86 specification was part of the contractual requirements, assessment of compliance was addressed primarily through the assessment of the verification and validation (V&V) activities. However, the design basis events, were not explicitly addressed in the V&V documentation; therefore the NRC staff used Open Item 105 to explicitly address documentation with respect to the design basis events.

To address Clause 4 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 (i.e., the adequacy of the design basis event documentation), TVA evaluated the emergency operating instructions (EOIs) and the abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) to ensure that the CQ PAMS equipment could fulfill the requirements of these documents. In addition, TVA mapped the limiting design basis events (i.e., those documented in Chapter 15 of the FSAR) to the EOIs and AOPs to ensure that all of the events were properly addressed. Together, these two analyses demonstrate that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS has the appropriate features and performance to address the documented design basis events.

Clause 4 of IEEE 603-1991 requires that the design bases event documentation include:

- \* the identification of applicable modes of operation of the generating station, the design basis event applicable to each mode, the initial conditions for each event and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each event.
- \* the safety functions and corresponding protective actions for each design basis event.
- \* the variables that must be monitored for each manually controlled protective action, and the associated analytical limits, ranges, and rates of change of these variables.
- \* the following minimum criteria for each protective action whose operation may be controlled by manual means initially or subsequent to initiation:
  - the points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed.

- the justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means.
- the variables that shall be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.

TVA's analysis demonstrates that the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS addresses the events described in the design basis by tracing the limiting design basis events to the EOLs and AOPs; however, the mapping is not a one-to-one mapping. The EOLs and AOPs are symptom-based rather than event-based. In some cases, more than one event may be addressed by an EOL or AOP, but in other cases more than one EOL or AOP is required to address a single event.

The TVA analysis also demonstrates that Common Q PAMS meets the requirements of the EOLs and AOPs by identifying the requirements in the Common Q PAMS specifications that envelop the performance assumed by the EOLs and AOPs. Based on these analyses, the NRC staff concludes that the design basis documentation for the Common Q PAMS includes the material required by Clause 4 of IEEE 603-1991, and that the Common Q PAMS implements the associated requirements; therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Common Q PAMS conforms to the regulatory requirements. Open Item 105 is closed.

Open Item 108

TVA provided a response to the item by letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112440576; Enclosure 1, Item 4), as supplemented by letters dated December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A213; Enclosure 1, Item 4, and Attachments 3 and 4), and January 19, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12023A191; Item 1 and Attachment 1). The NRC staff reviewed the calculations and analyses provided by TVA and confirmed that the qualification environment includes both temperature and humidity that synergistically bounds the worst case environment in which the equipment is required to operate. Therefore, Open Item 108 is closed.

Open Item 110

TVA responded to the item by letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048; Enclosure 1, Item 5).

TVA stated that the Common Q PAMS includes a common set of tests to confirm that the equipment is working properly (e.g., annunciator test, analog output test, and input/output simulator connection). The Common Q PAMS also includes self-checks to ensure that the software has not changed. In addition to these built-in capabilities, the RVILIS can be tested by the normal channel calibration methodologies. Based on these capabilities, the NRC staff finds that the Common Q PAMS RVILIS meets the requirements in Clause 5.7, "Capability for Test and Calibration" of IEEE Std. 603-1991. Therefore, Open Item 110 is closed.

Open Item 111

The NRC staff reviewed the Unit 2 technical specifications (TSs), Developmental Revision F (Enclosure 1 to TVA's letter dated August 10, 2011; ADAMS Accession No. ML11228A046), and concluded that changes from the Unit 1 TSs are acceptable, because they comply with 10 CFR 50.36. Therefore, Open Item 111 is closed.

SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.3 included the following for Open Item 98:

"Based upon its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that a Secure Development and Operational Environment has been established for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS which is consistent with the regulatory positions found in RG 1.152, Revision 3. This conclusion is based upon the controls placed on the pre-developed Common Q platform, the controls on the development of the PAMS application and the WBN Unit 2 facility and PAMS design features, including the controls to preclude two-way communication to other systems. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the PAMS has been designed and will be operated with provisions for ensuring its high functional reliability and therefore meets the requirements 10 CFR 50.55a(h), GDC 21 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and Criterion II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

This safety evaluation closes Open Item 98, as identified in Section 7.5.2.2.3.12 of SSER 23 (ADAMS

Accession No. ML11206A499)."

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SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.4 included the following for the noted Open Items:

Open Item 77

"By letters dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), and November 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099), TVA responded to Open Item 77. In these letters TVA clarified the document number and the version of each of the software V&V test documents (Versions V 1.0, V 1.1, and V 1.2) that are applicable to the WBN Unit 2 HRCAR monitors.

By letter dated October 13, 2011 letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA responded to a followup question regarding the quality control of the V&V procedures. The NRC staff wanted to confirm that the procedures used for V&V testing were prepared in accordance with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. In its October 13, 2011, letter, TVA responded that the procedures were prepared in accordance with Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and that they contained appropriate qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria to assure that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Based on the review of the information provided by this TVA letter and other RAI responses, the NRC staff concludes that the TVA response is satisfactory.

Based on the review of TVA's October 13, 2011, and other RAI responses, the NRC staff concludes that TVA provided sufficient information to confirm which versions of the software V&V documents apply to WBN Unit 2. Based on the satisfactory review of the TVA responses, the NRC staff has closed Open Item 77.

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Open Item 81

"TVA has provided sufficient information with its response to confirm that the test machine for the AC filter is indeed a pass/fail type of test device. Furthermore, TVA provided a complete commercial grade dedication package for an alternate component (a power supply) to confirm that the commercial grade dedication was carried out in accordance with the GA procedure. Based on the TVA response, NRC staff considers Open Item 81 closed."

The SSER status remains as "Open (Inspection)."

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 7.5.2:

"7.5.2.3 High-Range Containment Area Radiation Monitors

7.5.2.3.4 Technical Evaluation

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 80

Open Item 80 states, "TVA should provide clarification to the staff on how TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180, and should address any deviations from the guidance of the RG."

By letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205), TVA responded to SSER, Appendix HH Open Item 80. In Attachment 1 to this letter, TVA provided a white paper entitled, "Comparison of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.180, "Guidelines For Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference In Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems," Revision 1, and TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1, "Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Testing Requirements for Electronic

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Devices," Revision 3." Attachment 1 to the TVA letter provided the history and program description of the subject standard, along with any differences between the subject standard and the guidance contained in RG 1.180. It further provided specific comparison for each test along with the conclusion statement. TVA also stated, in "30 years of evaluating equipment TVA has not seen a failure from susceptibility testing."

The NRC staff reviewed the TVA white paper and evaluated the differences and the specific comparisons. One of the cited differences is that TVA applies the Standard Specification to all electronic equipment, not just digital safety systems. The NRC staff has no concern with regards to this requirement because it covers a broader scope of equipment or testing than required by RG 1.180. The other difference is in the area of magnetic field testing. TVA has stated this requirement is typically not tested because their electronic equipment is not located in areas with strong magnetic fields. This exemption is permitted by RG 1.180.

The NRC staff further reviewed TVA's response for each test item and found the tests met or exceeded the test requirements. TVA used alternate tests and followed the guidance in Electric Power Research Institute TR-102323, the use of which was approved by NRC on April 17, 1996. TVA also provided justifications or an explanation for any differences. The NRC staff noted a difference in the area of low frequency susceptibility testing. In a letter dated September 21, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112590046), NRC requested TVA to justify why the low frequency conducted susceptibility test covered the frequency range from 30 Hz to 50 kHz when RG 1.180 required testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz. TVA responded in a letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254), that the Nemko test report included test frequencies from 30 Hz to 50 kHz, however, 30 Hz to 150 kHz tests were performed as part of TUV test report S7439-03. By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113130218), the NRC staff stated that it had reviewed the TUV test report and indicated that it was conducted on the older model RM-1000 radiation monitors. By letter dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA provided the similarity analysis between the old and the new model and justified any changes. Some of the changes included electromagnetic shielding to improve the electro-magnetic compatibility performance; a few new and improved components replaced the old obsolete components resulting in an improved accuracy.

By letter dated August 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12249A195), TVA further clarified that the low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was conducted in accordance with Military Standard MIL-STD-461E, which requires testing from 30 Hz to 150 kHz for DC powered equipment and from 120 Hz to 150 kHz for 60 Hz AC powered equipment (i.e. from the second harmonic of supply frequency). The test was carried out using MIL-STD-461D whereas RG 1.180 requires testing to MIL-STD-461E but TVA reviewed and confirmed the testing met the guidance of MIL-STD-461E and RG 1.180, Revision 1.

The NRC staff reviewed the information TVA provided as well as the test data. The NRC staff confirmed the testing was done for the required range and the differences between the old and new model of I/F converter were documented and justified. TVA letter dated December 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12349A379) provided the formal test data as Enclosures 1 and 2.

The last open issue regarding low frequency conducted susceptibility testing was resolved based on the NRC staff's evaluation of TVA's comparison and analysis of the applicability of old test data to the new I/F converters, provided in TVA's letters dated May 6, 2011, August 30, 2012, and December 10, 2012.

TVA has provided sufficient information in its responses to confirm that TVA Standard Specification SS-E18-14.1 meets the guidance of RG 1.180. The staff's requests for clarification of various items including the frequency range for the low frequency conducted susceptibility were satisfactorily resolved by the referenced TVA letters and documents as detailed above. Therefore based on the above, Open Item 80 is closed."

7.5.3	27	CO	B 79-27, "Loss of Non-class 1E I&C Power System Bus During Operation" – TVA responded to the Bulletin on March 1, 1982. Reviewed in 7.5.3 of the original 1982 SER.
		13	Unit 2 Action: Issue appropriate emergency procedures.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

7.5.3 of SSER23 includes:

"By letter dated October 21, 2010 (letter open item 315; ADAMS Accession No. ML103140661), TVA responded that

While the WBN Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have not been written, they will be written the same as the Unit 1 EOPs. WBN Unit 1 personnel will perform validations to ensure that WBN Unit 2 EOPs will perform the required actions. The WBN Unit 2 EOPs will be written and validated prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

TVA's response is acceptable to the staff, because it will assure that the WBN Unit 2 procedures are the same as those for WBN Unit 1. The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs before fuel load. This is Open Item 73 (Appendix HH).

Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in the SER, and on its evaluation of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated October 21, 2010, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's response to IE Bulletin 79-27 is acceptable."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."

Open Item 73 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs prior to fuel load. (Section 7.5.3)"

REVISION 11 UPDATE:

Inspection Report 391/2013-608 (November 8, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1979-27.

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

SSER Open Item 73 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 7.5.3:

"Open Item 73

Open Item 73 (Appendix HH) states, "The NRC staff will inspect to confirm that TVA has completed the WBN Unit 2 EOPs [emergency operating procedures] prior to fuel load."

Per NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2014604, dated June 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14177A214), the list of WBN Unit 2 emergency procedures is complete. Those procedures reviewed were written in accordance with TI-12.06, "Writer's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions," and are complete and ready for approval and use. The NRC inspectors determined that the Watts Bar emergency, abnormal and annunciator response procedures are prepared to adequately control and correct



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>safety-related functions in the event of a system or component malfunction indication. Therefore, Open Item 73 is closed."</p> <p>SSER27 changed the status to "Resolved."</p>
7.5.4	21	OI	<p>"CONCLUSIONS" left CI until all items in subsection are closed.</p>
		13	<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected the Status above to "OI" to agree with the SSER.</p>
7.7.1	27	O	<p>Approved for both units in SER.</p>
		13	<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>[portions from SSER23]</p> <p>7.7.1.4.4.1 includes:</p> <p>"One aspect of the analysis that has not yet been confirmed by TVA is the ability of the network to sustain a data storm event without experiencing a plant upset, as necessary to verify compliance with Clause 6.3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991. In Enclosure 2 of its letter dated August 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102240384), TVA stated the following:</p> <p>A network data storm test will be performed with the system installed and prior to final commissioning. The test will confirm that the system will continue to function with a failed communication network without any plant upset. TVA should confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the data storm test on the DCS. This is Open Item 83 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>7.7.1.4.5 (Conclusion) reads:</p> <p>The NRC staff reviewed the WBN Unit 2 DCS as described in FSAR Amendments 96 through 103. Based on its review, the staff concludes that the information provided in FSAR Section 7.7.1.11 meets the relevant regulatory requirements identified in SRP Section 7.7, Revision 5, including 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), GDC 1, and GDC 13. The staff also concludes that TVA's analysis shows that the new DCS is consistent with Clause 6.3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and does not introduce any new failures, or change the probability or consequences of existing failures, not already addressed in the FSAR safety analyses.</p> <p>Additional evaluation by the NRC staff regarding conformance with Clause 5.6.3 of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and GDC 24 is contained in Section 7.9 of this SSER.</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>Open Item 83 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p>



"TVA should confirm to the NRC staff the completion of the data storm test on the DCS. (Section 7.7.1.4)"

[portions from SSER24]

7.7.1.9.2 includes:

"The WINCISE system uses Optimized Proportional Axis Region Signal Separation Extended Life (OPARSEL™) IITAs, containing five vanadium SPNDs and one CET. The individual vanadium emitter generates a signal proportional to the neutron flux activation at its specific location. Within an IITA, each vanadium emitter has a different length to allow the IITA to measure the axial power distribution in five segments (i.e., each segment of detector has a different length that permits measurement of a different axial core segment). If an individual SPND were to fail, the BEACON system will continue to perform, but with a decreased axial resolution of the core power measurement within the assembly. The other vanadium detectors within the IITA would still be deemed operable. TVA should provide to the NRC staff a description of how the other vanadium detectors within the IITA would be operable following the failure of an SPND. This is Open Item 118 (Appendix HH). The extension member for each detector within the IITA ensures that all five vanadium detectors and the CET have an appropriate length to correctly locate them within the IITA."

7.7.1.9.5 includes:

"Westinghouse document WNA-DS-01811-WBT, Revision 0, 'WINCISE Signal Processing System Design Requirements,' which the NRC staff reviewed during audits conducted on June 28–29 and July 15, 2011, at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation office in Rockville, MD (audit report at ADAMS Accession No. ML112092667; not publicly available), required a power supply of 120 volts alternating current (VAC) ±10 percent for the SPS cabinet. Based on this requirement, Westinghouse determined the maximum overvoltage or surge voltage to be 264 VAC based on the information provided for the Quint power supplies to be installed in the SPS cabinet, as well as taking into account the maximum supply voltage of 220 VAC, even though the 120-VAC, Class 1E bus feeding the SPS cabinet is employed. The NRC staff evaluated the Westinghouse analysis performed to demonstrate how the SPS design meets the isolation requirements. Calculation Note WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, 'Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements,' summarizes this analysis. The NRC staff reviewed this calculation note during audits conducted on June 28–29 and July 15, 2011, at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation office in Rockville, MD (audit report at ADAMS Accession No. ML112092667; not publicly available). TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT to the NRC by letter to establish the record of the NRC staff's basis and its conclusions. This is Open Item 119 (Appendix HH).

The analysis showed that a surge voltage or overvoltage could originate from the SPS cabinet power supply, the 120-VAC, Class 1E power supply bus, ethernet communication, or cable voltage buildup. The analysis stated that the maximum overvoltage or surge voltage that could affect the system was 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC. TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that the maximum overvoltage or surge voltage that could affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC. This is Open Item 120 (Appendix HH).

The analysis assumed that testing was performed for the IITA assembly, and the MI cable could withstand an overvoltage or surge voltage not greater than 600 volts direct current (Vdc). The analysis showed that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. The NRC staff should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. Open Item 119 (Appendix HH) includes this issue.

As mentioned above, WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, requires that the IITA assemblies and MI cable be tested for overvoltage and surge voltage of up to 600 Vdc. In a letter from R.W. Morris to D. Menard (LTR-ME-10-3, 'Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Dielectric Characteristics of Completed MI Cable Assemblies,' dated January 11, 2010), which the NRC staff reviewed during audits conducted on June 28–29 and July 15, 2011, at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation office in Rockville, MD (audit report at ADAMS Accession No. ML112092667; not publicly available), Westinghouse summarized the evaluation performed to determine whether the MI cable could withstand an overvoltage and surge voltage of up to 600 Vdc. The NRC staff reviewed LTR-ME-10-3 and confirmed that all 58 1-to-2 transition cable assemblies

were subjected to and successfully passed a 600-Vdc dielectric strength test. Since Westinghouse has only tested the MI cable, the same evaluation should be performed for the IITA assembly. This is Open Item 121 (Appendix HH), pending TVA submittal of the test results for the IITA assembly for NRC staff review.

Assuming satisfactory completion of the open items described above, the NRC staff concludes that the TVA analysis of the maximum credible overvoltage or surge voltage that can propagate from the non-Class 1E power supplies in the SPS cabinets to the SPND input signals is adequate. TVA also demonstrated that the MI cable and the IITA assembly can withstand overvoltage and surge voltage equal to 600 Vdc. Thus, the MI cable design allows for the isolation of the Class 1E CETs and non-Class 1E SPND signals. This hardware analysis requirement satisfies the requirements for testing or analysis of associated circuit interaction with Class 1E circuits contained in IEEE Std. 384-1981 for overvoltage conditions.

To further mitigate the possibility of a transient surge voltage condition in the SPS cabinet's input power supply in excess of the identified maximum overvoltage value that might disable both divisions of the CET signals used by the PAMS, different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. Specifically, the power supply routed to PAMS train A is the same as that routed to SPS cabinet 1, and the power supply routed to PAMS train B is the same as that routed to SPS cabinet 2. TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. This is Open Item 122 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Further, after the seal table, the MI cable configuration is a Y split, and the SPND signals are routed to SPS cabinets 1 and 2. The Y split separates the Class 1E CET signal from the associated SPND cabling. The SPS cabinet digitizes the SPND signal. The system performs periodic automatic diagnostic testing to confirm SPND signal quality. One of these tests is a leakage resistance determination. If the SPND does not pass this test, the system will assign a data quality value to notify the power distribution calculation software to disregard data from this SPND. TVA should explain to the NRC staff how the system will assign a data quality value to notify the power distribution calculation software to disregard data from a failed SPND. This is Open Item 123 (Appendix HH).

The digitized SPND signal is then transferred to the WINCISE application servers, integrated computer system (ICS), and BEACON. The SPS transfers digitized SPND signals to the BEACON ovation data highway, where the BEACON datalink collects the data. The ICS provides plant conditions for the BEACON to use in calculating core power distribution. The WINCISE nonsafety-related internet protocol switches provide the main hub for traffic flow from the SPS cabinets, BEACON servers, WINCISE application servers, and the ICS. In its letter dated April 15, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11136A053), TVA explained that transmission of information from BEACON or SPS cabinets to the ICS is only done via the WINCISE application servers. While the BEACON datalink on the application server can connect to either BEACON machine, only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic switchover to the other server is permitted. This is Open Item 124 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Equipment Qualification

The WINCISE is a nonsafety-related system; only the IITA assembly and the MI cable are safety related. The SPND signals are considered quality related, and the CETs are safety related. Because these signals are bundled together in the IITA, as previously described, all MI cables and IITA connectors provided are environmentally qualified and Class 1E qualified. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff the type of connector used with the MI cable in WBN Unit 2 and which environmental qualification test is applicable. This is Open Item 125 (Appendix HH). To enable the NRC staff to evaluate and review the IITA environmental qualification, TVA should also provide the summary report of the environmental qualification for the IITA. This is Open Item 126 (Appendix HH).

In Attachment 8 to its letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205), TVA submitted the Westinghouse report, DAR-ME-09-10, Revision 0, 'Qualification Summary Report for the WINCISE Cable and Connector Upgrade at Watts Bar Unit 2.' This report summarizes the environmental and seismic/structural qualification of the MI cable, in accordance with IEEE Std. 323-1974, 'IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' and IEEE Std. 344-1975, 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' including NUREG-0588, Revision 1, 'Interim Staff Position on Environmental

Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment.' This report identifies similarity analysis as the method of qualification. The report shows that the tested MI cable fulfilled the electrical operability acceptance criteria throughout all phases of testing and met the specified WBN Unit 2 environmental parameters and inputs. In addition, the MI cable is qualified for the Class 1E application. TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the electromagnetic interference/radiofrequency interference testing for the MI cable electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) qualification test results. This is Open Item 127 (Appendix HH).

The thermocouple cables, connectors, and cables outside the containment are part of the Westinghouse Common Q PAMS cabinet qualification. Section 7.5.2.2 of SSER 23 discusses this qualification.

As previously described, the SPS cabinets are used for conditioning and processing of low-current signals from in-containment neutron flux monitors. The SPS cabinets do not perform any direct Class 1E function and are classified as non-Class 1E. However, because the SPS cabinets are being installed in the reactor building (a seismic Category I structure), the SPS must be qualified in accordance with RG 1.100, Revision 3, 'Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,' issued September 2009; IEEE Std. 344-1975; and IEEE Std. 344-1987, 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.' Specifically, the SPS cabinet must be able to withstand the effects of five operational basis earthquakes and one safe-shutdown earthquake without the loss of physical integrity or creation of missile hazards. The NRC staff reviewed the summary description provided in Attachment 5 of TVA's letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110). TVA stated that the cabinet maintained structural integrity without any component detachment throughout the test program and thus complies with the WBN Unit 2 seismic qualification specification, WB-DC-40-31.2, Revision 8, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Seismic Qualification of Category 1 Fluid System Components and Electrical or Mechanical Equipment,' with testing performed in accordance with RG 1.100, IEEE Std. 344-1975, and IEEE Std. 344-1987. TVA should submit the seismic qualification test report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets to the NRC staff for review. This is Open Item 128 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"Specifically, WNA-CN-00157-WBT requires the analysis to demonstrate that surge events up to 4 kilovolts (Kv) on the WINCISE SPS alternating current (ac) power feed into the cabinet could not propagate through the cabinet. Westinghouse performed an analysis to evaluate this fault. WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, summarizes the results of the Westinghouse analysis. This analysis demonstrated that no credible source of faulting of a 600-Vdc limit can negatively affect the PAMS. This analysis identified a Westinghouse open item requiring the Quint power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to undergo EMC testing of 4 Kv to validate the assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. TVA should verify to the NRC staff resolution of the open item in WNA-CN-00157-WBT, which requires the Quint power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to undergo EMC testing of 4 Kv to validate the assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. This is Open Item 129 (Appendix HH). For additional information about the Westinghouse analysis, refer to the evaluation of IEEE Std. 384 described above in this SSER section entitled "Separation/Isolation Evaluation."

The acceptance criteria for the surge tests require that the 24-Vdc cabinet electronics do not suffer damage during surge events. As long as this requirement is maintained, any surge propagation into the cabinet will remain far less than the 600-Vdc limit. In Attachment 5 of its letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110), TVA provided a summary of the environmental qualification. This summary states that the SPS cabinet successfully complied with the emissions requirements of RG 1.180, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems," issued October 2003. TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the EMC qualification test results of the SPS cabinets. This is Open Item 130 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"RG 1.97 identifies the necessary range of the CETs as 200 to 2,300 degrees F, which is the same range described in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. However, as described previously, because of the new CET location and IITA configuration, the CETs in WBN Unit 2 can differ from the CETs in WBN Unit 1 by up to 15 degrees F under certain accident scenarios. In its letter dated June 23, 2011, TVA explained that, during accident conditions in which the reactor coolant pumps are operating, the water mixing and travelling through the fuel element channels in which the IITA guides (and thus the CETs) are located will cause the temperature seen by WBN Unit 2 to be lower than the temperature indicated for WBN Unit 1. The emergency operating procedure (EOP) for WBN Unit 2 should consider this difference in temperature. As a result, TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for this difference between core exit

temperature readings for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC staff. This is Open Item 131 (Appendix HH)."

7.7.1.9.6 (Conclusion) reads:

"Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the IIS complies with the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 7.7, Revision 5; BTP 7-19, Revision 5; RG 1.97, Revision 2; and RG 1.75, Revision 2, and therefore meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(h), GDC 13, and GDC 24. Therefore, the WBN Unit 2 IIS is acceptable."

7.7.1 ends with:

"Conclusion

Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as described above, the NRC staff concluded that TVA adequately addressed the aging degradation of the materials used in the IITAs. Since aging degradation due to wear does not occur in IITAs, and any breach of the IITAs does not result in loss of RCS pressure boundary, the NRC staff concludes that the IITAs do not require routine inspections under TVA's plant maintenance program. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has adequately addressed the issue of aging degradation of the materials used in IITAs in the WINCISE system and meets the requirements of GDC 10."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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Open Item 118 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should provide to the NRC staff a description of how the other vanadium detectors within the IITA would be operable following the failure of an SPND. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.2)"

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Open Item 119 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, to the NRC by letter. The NRC staff should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 120 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that the maximum over-voltage or surge voltage that could affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 121 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should submit the results to the NRC staff of a 600 VDC dielectric strength test performed on the IITA assembly. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 122 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

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Open Item 123 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide an explanation to the NRC staff of how the system will assign a data quality value to notify the power distribution calculation software to disregard data from a failed SPND. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 124 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“While the BEACON datalink on the Application server can connect to either BEACON machine, only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic switchover to the other server is not permitted. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 125 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide clarification to the NRC staff of the type of connector used with the MI cable in Unit 2, and which EQ test is applicable. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 126 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“To enable the NRC staff to evaluate and review the IITA environmental qualification, TVA should provide the summary report of the environmental qualification for the IITA. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 127 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the electro-magnetic interference/radio-frequency interference (EMI/RFI) testing for the MI cable electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC) qualification test results. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 128 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should submit the seismic qualification test report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets to the NRC staff for review. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 129 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should verify to the NRC staff resolution of the open item in WNA-CN-00157-WBT for the Quint power supply (to be installed in the SPS cabinet) to undergo EMC testing of 4 Kv to validate the assumptions made in the Westinghouse analysis. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 130 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

“TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the EMC qualification test results of the SPS cabinets. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)”

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Open Item 131 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:



"TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for the difference between core exit temperature readings for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC staff. (SSER 24, Section 7.7.1.9.5)"

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

7.7.1.9 of SSER25 reads:

"7.7.1.9 In-Core Instrumentation System

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 119

Open Item 119 states, 'TVA should submit WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, to the NRC by letter. The NRC staff should confirm by review of WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, that no credible source of faulting can negatively impact the CETs or PAMS train.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachment 2 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. Attachment 2 included a copy of Westinghouse analysis WNA-CN-00157-WBT, Revision 0, 'Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrument System (IIS) Signal Processing System (SPS) Isolation Requirements.' The analysis shows the following:

1. No fault originating either within the WINCISE (Westinghouse INCore Information, Surveillance, and Engineering system) signal processing system (SPS) cabinet or electrical surges on the input power lines or output communications link can result in fault voltage affecting CET signals.
2. Inadvertent disconnection or failures of any IITA (in-core instrumentation thimble assembly) emitter wire or wires at the WINCISE SPS cabinet, or anywhere in the cabling between the IITA seal table connector and the WINCISE SPS cabinet, will not cause voltage charge-up on the emitter wire to exceed 600 volts direct current during worst case (full-power) plant operation, thus preventing the fault voltage from affecting the associated CET.
3. For large input overvoltage conditions on the 120-volt alternating current (Vac) input instrument bus used in both the SPS cabinet and associated PAMS train, the SPS will not cause any failure within the PAMS train that would not otherwise occur as a direct result of the overvoltage condition within the PAMS power supply.

The impact of a failed CET on a PAMS channel is addressed in Westinghouse analysis WNA-AR-00180-WBT-P, Revision 2, 'Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Post Accident Monitoring System,' page 3-6, in TVA's letter dated March 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110620411).

Based on the analysis results, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 119 is closed.

Open Item 120

Open Item 120 states, 'TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that the maximum over-voltage or surge voltage that could affect the system is 264 VAC, assuming that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables greater than 264 VAC.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachments 2 and 5 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. The information provided by TVA confirms that 264 Vac is the estimated maximum voltage, or surge-voltage, that could affect WINCISE. Furthermore, the equipment qualification for the WINCISE SPS, provided in Attachment 5, shows that the SPS cabinets can withstand a maximum surge of 4,000 volts with no loss of function after the surge.

However, TVA's response did not confirm that the power supply cable to the WINCISE SPS cabinet would not be routed with other cables carrying greater than 264 Vac. TVA must confirm that the power supply cable to the SPS cabinet is not routed with other cables with voltage greater than 264 Vac. Open Item 120 remains open.

Open Item 122

Open Item 122 states, 'TVA should confirm to the NRC staff that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits.'

In Enclosure 1 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA confirmed that different divisions of safety power are supplied to the IIS SPS cabinets, with the power cables routed in separate shielded conduits. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 122 is closed.

Open Item 124

Open Item 124 states, 'While the BEACON datalink on the Application server can connect to either BEACON machine, only BEACON A is used for communication. TVA should clarify to the NRC staff whether automatic switchover to the other server is not permitted.'

In Enclosure 1 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA explained that the feature to automatically switch over to BEACON B is not configured for WBN Unit 2, and the BEACON datalink on the application server can only connect to BEACON A. TVA provided further information in Attachment 3 to its letter dated June 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11167A110). The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in TVA's letters dated June 10 and September 1, 2011, and concluded that its response was acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 124 is closed.

Open Item 128

Open Item 128 states, 'TVA should submit the seismic qualification test report procedures and results for the SPS cabinets to the NRC staff for review.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachment 5 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. Attachment 5 includes a copy of the Westinghouse report EQ-QR-39-WBT, Revision 0, 'Equipment Qualification Summary Report for WINCISE Signal Processing System.' This summary report describes the seismic qualification test performed and the results obtained. The WINCISE SPS cabinet maintained structural integrity without any component detachment throughout the test program and thus complied with WBN Unit 2 seismic qualification specification WB-DC-40-31.2, with testing performed in accordance with NRC RG 1.100, IEEE Std. 344-1975, and IEEE Std. 344-1987, 'IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.' Based on the information in the summary report, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 128 is closed.

Open Item 130

Open Item 130 states, 'TVA should provide a summary to the NRC staff of the EMC [electromagnetic compatibility] qualification test results of the SPS cabinets.'

In Enclosure 1 and in Attachment 5 to its letter dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), TVA responded to this open item. Attachment 5 includes a copy of the Westinghouse report EQ-QR-39-WBT, Revision 0, 'Equipment Qualification Summary Report for WINCISE Signal Processing System.' This summary report describes the EMC qualification test performed and the results obtained. The report states that the WINCISE SPS cabinet successfully complied with the emissions requirements of NRC RG 1.180, Revision 1, 'Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems,' and the supplemental-surge-withstand testing required in WNA-CN-00157-WBT. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA adequately addressed the issue, and Open Item 130 is closed."



SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 7.7.1.9 included the following for the noted Open Items:

Open Item 118

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 2 of Enclosure 1), TVA provided a response to this action item. In its response, TVA explained that each SPND element contains its own Mineral Insulated (MI) cable, which physically and electrically isolates each detector element from all the other elements inside the IITA. Therefore, there is no direct link between the measured signals from individual detectors inside an IITA. Consequently, there is no reason for the failure of one detector element to affect the operability of any of the other elements within the same IITA.

In its letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095, Item No. 3 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 6), TVA forwarded a copy of a letter from Westinghouse Electric Corporation providing additional detail regarding how the BEACON software uses the data from SPNDs in an IITA in which one or more SPND elements have failed. The Westinghouse letter explained that the approved Westinghouse WCAP-12472, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operation Support System," Addendums 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003678190) and 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML021270086) describe the uncertainty and methodology used to establish the number and distribution of required SPND sensors and how the system identifies data associated with a failed SPND. In particular, Westinghouse explained that the WINCISE system is considered operable provided that the total number of operable SPNDs is greater than a particular parameter specified in the model. For example, the WINCISE system is considered to be operable when the outputs of the SPNDs read are above certain percentage signal value and the number of operable SPNDs in the top and bottom halves of each quadrant exceeds a certain limit, and the total number of operable SPNDs in every quadrant meets the criteria established for that quadrant. Furthermore, the IITA design features five SPNDs of sequentially increasing length that overlap the measurement range. Thus, the BEACON system is able to adequately function using information from all available sensors, but with different uncertainty depending on which sensors have failed. Based on these responses, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 118 closed."

Open Item 120

"By letter dated September 1, 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048, Item No. 7 of Enclosure 1) TVA responded to this action item. By letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA provided additional information and confirmed that the power supply cable to the WINCISE Signal Processing System (SPS) cabinet is not routed with any cables with greater than the maximum steady-state voltage allowed in Westinghouse technical note WNA-CN-00157-WBT-P, Revision 0, "Watts Bar 2 IIS [in-core instrumentation system] Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements." In this letter, TVA committed to "lock" cable routing in the Integrated Cable and Raceway Design System (ICRDS) to prevent cables greater than the maximum steady voltage allowed in WNA-CN-00157-WBT-P from being routed in the future with the SPS cabinet power supply cables. TVA confirmed in its December 22, 2011 letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A213, Item No. 7), that the cable routing has been locked within the ICRDS. Further, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed Westinghouse letter WBT-TVA-1060. This letter describes the power supply requirements for the WINCISE SPS cabinet and includes an external power supply diagram, which showed the planned cable routing. Based on this information, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 120 closed."

Open Item 121

"Westinghouse report WNA-CN-00157-WBT, "Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements," Revision 0 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048), requires the IITA assembly and MI connecting cabling from the IITA to the point where the core exit thermocouple (CET) cabling is separated to be at a certain voltage level. This MI portion is identified as the WINCISE "1 to 2 Transition Cable Assemblies."

In a letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA submitted a copy of Westinghouse Report WBT-D-3518 P, "Partial Response to Item 9 SSER Item 121 Testing of Completed WINCISE 1 to 2 Transition MI Cable Assemblies - Watts Bar 2," dated October 2011 (Item No. 5 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 9). This report summarized the results of the dielectric testing performed to all WINCISE 1 to 2 Transition Cable Assemblies, which demonstrated that the WINCISE 1 to 2 Transition MI Cable Assemblies passed the identified testing program. Furthermore, to evaluate the WINCISE system, during an audit, the NRC staff reviewed the letter from R. W. Morris to D. Menard, LTR-ME-10-3, "Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Dielectric Characteristics of Completed MI Cable Assemblies," dated January 11, 2010. This letter summarized the evaluation performed for the MI cable to be capable of withstanding a specific over-voltage and surge voltage level. Based on this information, the NRC staff concluded that the information submitted to document the testing and evaluation for the MI cable assembly is acceptable. The NRC staff requested that TVA provide the results of the testing performed on the IITA for NRC review and verification.

By letters dated November 14 and 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099 and ML11341A156, respectively), TVA forwarded a copy of a Westinghouse letter explaining that the cable manufacturer performed type-testing of the IITA. The result from this testing is reported in IST Report #021-8557. This result was reflected in Revision 1 of Westinghouse's technical note WNA-CN-00157-WBT, "Watts Bar 2 Incore Instrumentation System Signal Processing System Isolation Requirements," submitted to the NRC as Attachment 6 of TVA's letter dated November 30, 2011. In addition, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed a copy of the Westinghouse test report and confirmed that the IITA assembly did not exhibit unacceptable resistance breakdown during testing and passed the resistance test.

In Attachment 2 of TVA's letter dated November 14, 2011, TVA explained Westinghouse's approach to estimate the maximum IITA cable leakage resistance at the minimum temperature for criticality. Further, in TVA's letter dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA submitted a copy of Revision 1 of Westinghouse's WNA-CN-00157-WBT, which included a summary of the IITA cable leakage resistance. In addition, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed Westinghouse and TVA documents that confirmed the resistance for the IITA cable at the minimum temperature for criticality. Based on this information, the NRC staff found that the core exit thermocouples have a dielectric voltage rating of at least 600 V, and that the estimated cable leakage resistance met the acceptance criteria established in the Design Specification for the IITA cable. Therefore, TVA and Westinghouse have demonstrated the ability of the IITA assembly to maintain insulation dielectric integrity and withstand potential brief overvoltage. This supports the NRC staff's ability to make a determination that the proposed design meets the requirements for isolation discussed in RG 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electric Systems," which endorses IEEE 384-1981, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits" for ensuring sufficient independence between safety and non-safety components. Based on the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 121 closed."

#### Open Item 123

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 3 of Enclosure 1), TVA responded to this action item by explaining how the WINCISE system performs data validation. In particular, TVA explained that the BEACON Data Processing (BDP) application software continuously reviews detector signal measurements; performs on-demand checks of signal cable leakage resistance; and performs validity checks of this information relative to the defined maximum change in the measured signal between two measurement intervals, high and low current limits, and minimum acceptable cable leakage resistance measurement limits. If any of these criteria are violated, the BDP application sets a data quality bit contained in the digital representation of the current value to "BAD." The BEACON System Plant Interface function automatically disregards the "BAD" data. Also, as described above in Open Item 118, the BEACON system would use information from only "available" sensors. Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 123 closed."

#### Open Item 125

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 4 of Enclosure 1), TVA responded to this action item by explaining that the electrical connectors used with the WBN Unit 2 WINCISE MI Cable Assemblies are glass-to-metal seal technology connectors fabricated for Westinghouse by Meggitt Safety Systems.

Furthermore, TVA noted that Westinghouse summarized the environmental qualifications for the MI cable

and its connectors in Westinghouse Proprietary Report DAR-ME-09-10, "Qualification Summary Report for the WINCISE Cable and Connector Upgrade at Watts Bar Unit 2," which TVA submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 6, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11129A205). Also, in TVA's November 14, 2011, letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099), TVA explained the manufacturer performed a voltage breakdown test per MIL-STD-202, Method 301, "Dielectric Withstand Voltage." In TVA's letter dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA submitted a copy of Revision 1 of Westinghouse's WNA-CN-00157-WBT, which includes a reference to the test summary of the voltage breakdown test. Furthermore, during a teleconference held in December with the NRC staff, which is summarized in TVA's letter dated February 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12034A164), TVA and Westinghouse clarified that the 600 V dielectric testing was performed for the entire IITA assembly, and that this test was performed successfully. In addition, during an audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed a Westinghouse letter that confirmed that all 58 WINCISE 1-to-2 cable were subjected and passed successfully the dielectric strength test (conductor to conductor and conductor to sheath basis). Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 125 closed."

#### Open Item 126

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 5 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 2), TVA responded to this action item by summarizing the Westinghouse qualification for the Ex-Vessel Portion of the WINCISE IITA for WBN Unit 2. This report summarizes the environmental and seismic qualification for the WBN Unit 2 ex-vessel portion of the IITA, and explains how the IITA meets the requirements in IEEE 323 and IEEE 344.

The IITA contains two portions, an in-vessel and ex-vessel portion. The in-vessel portion of the IITA consists of self-powered vanadium detectors and thermocouple and is considered from the Swagelok nut to the end of the IITA (bullet nose). The ex-vessel portion of the IITA is considered to be the hermetically sealed portion of the assembly which extends from the Swagelok assembly to the weldable Electronic Resources Division (ERD) multipin electrical connector.

In the qualification summary report, Westinghouse explained that they qualified the IITA using similarity analysis. For each qualification testing, Westinghouse described how the ERD multipin electric connector met the requirement. Furthermore, Westinghouse explained that the tested ex-vessel portion of the IITA in Westinghouse (ABB CE [Combustion Engineering]) Report Number CE-NPSD-240-P, "Summary Report: Class 1E Qualification Test of the Incore Instrument (Core Exit Thermocouple Portion) and Mineral Insulated Cable Assembly," and ERD multipin electrical connector in Westinghouse (ABB CE) Report Number CE-NPSD-275-P, "Summary Report: Class 1E Qualification Test of the Electronic Resources Division (ERD) Electrical Connectors and Mineral Insulated Cable," both fulfill the electrical operability acceptance criteria throughout all phases of testing. The NRC staff reviewed these two Westinghouse documents during an audit.

The CE-NPSD-275-P summary report showed that the qualification testing meets or exceeds the Watts Bar Unit 2 requirements. Therefore, the WBN Unit 2 ex-vessel portion of the IITA with ERD multipin electrical connector is qualified for Class 1E application in accordance with the methodology and guidance of IEEE 323 and IEEE 344. Based on this information, the NRC staff finds that the qualification summary reports adequately address the qualification requirements for the ex-vessel portion of the IITA.

In its letter dated November 30 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11341A156), TVA provided an overview of the analysis of the environmental and seismic/structural qualification methodology and results contained in the report CE-NPSD-240-P, "Summary Report: Class 1E Qualification of the Incore Instrument (Core Exit Thermocouple Portion) and Mineral Insulated Cable Assembly" seismic qualification testing performed on the core exit thermocouple portion of the assembly. In addition, during an NRC staff audit to review Westinghouse documents, the NRC staff reviewed CE-NPSD-240. This document summarizes how the incore instrument (core exit thermocouple portion) and MI cable assembly meets their Class 1E qualification requirements. The IITA was tested as a complete assembly during the EQ testing. In TVA's letter March 2, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12065A142), TVA confirmed that the ex-vessel portion is representative of the IITA that will be installed at WBN Unit 2. The in-vessel portion used the same CET to be installed at WBN Unit 2. Because the CET is the only portion of the IITA that is safety related, the results reviewed by the NRC staff showed that the IITA met the specified acceptance criteria. Based on this, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 126 closed."

#### Open Item 127

"By letters dated September 30, 2011, November 14, 2011, and December 22, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11287A254, ML11322A099, and ML12018A213, respectively), TVA responded to this action item (Item No. 6 of Enclosure to the September 30, 2011, and November 14, 2011, letters, and Item No. 5 of Enclosure 1 to the December 22, 2011, letter) by explaining that the MI cable assemblies to be supplied for the WBN Unit 2 IIS were not subjected to a product-specific EMI/EMC test program, but rather were qualified by analysis of the design. Within the IITA, the CET is insulated with crushed Alumina (synthetically produced aluminum oxide, Al<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>) contained in an overall stainless steel tubular sheath. Each individual SPND consists of a Vanadium emitter wire, surrounded by crushed Alumina, which is surrounded by a grounded stainless steel tubular sheath. The thermocouple sheath, the SPND sheaths, and the overall IITA sheath are all electrically grounded at the reactor vessel providing a path to effectively divert EMI/RFI. The combination of the stainless steel sheath material joined to the stainless steel connectors provides for 100 percent shielding coverage.

The ex-vessel MI cable assembly consists of silicon dioxide (SiO<sub>2</sub>) insulation, enclosing the SPND signal leads and core exit thermocouple lead wires, each one surrounded by a separate grounded stainless steel tubular sheath. The combination of the stainless steel sheath material joined to the stainless steel connectors provides for 100 percent shielding coverage. The exterior surfaces of the Lis MI Cable Assemblies are post-accident qualified, and as such, are required to be 100 percent hermetically sealed. This hermeticity of the MI Cable Assembly design and construction also demonstrates the absence of any apertures or seams that would compromise the shielding effectiveness of the assemblies, and thus providing the necessary protection against EMI/RFI interferences. To provide the necessary grounding of the MI cable, the cable assemblies are to be directly secured to seismically qualified in-containment cable supports at regular intervals along the length of the cable run. The frequency of this support arrangement provides multiple low impedance paths to ground for the cable assemblies to effectively divert EMI/RFI.

As an additional layer of protection, the Lis MI Cable Assemblies for WBN Unit 2 include an interlocked stainless steel material hose assembly that is brazed and seal welded to the electrical connector backshell at each end of the cable assemblies. This hose assembly provides supplemental EMC shielding protection for the signals. "

In TVA's letters dated September 1, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11257A048, Attachment 2), and November 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11322A099), Westinghouse explained that the maximum current from a Vanadium detector is sufficiently low which, in the event of a short circuit from emitter to sheath within the cable, restricts the energy available to an amount that will preclude melting or other damage to the protective sheath. In case of breakage to the sheath, the detector leakage current will be shunted to common (plant ground) via the detector sheath. Further, the design maximum emitter current is sufficiently low that any short within the IITA will so restrict the energy available that further damage is precluded. Confirmation of electrical separation was important since the CET and SPDNs share the same IITA. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the dual barrier design combined with the low detector current provides inherent EMI/RFI protection for the MI cable, and that there is no credible fault originating within the non-1E portion of the MI cable can negatively impact the CET. This conclusion supports the NRC staff's ability to make a determination that the proposed design meets the requirements for isolation discussed in RG 1.75, which endorses IEEE 384-1981 for ensuring sufficient independence between safety and non-safety components. Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 127 closed.

Open Item 129

"By letter dated September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A254, Item No. 7 of Enclosure 1, and Attachment 10), TVA responded to this action item by explaining that the power supply to be installed in the SPS cabinet was tested as part of the WINCISE SPS. TVA submitted a copy of the Westinghouse Electric Company EQ-QR-39-WBT-NP, "Equipment Qualification Summary Report for WINCISE Signal Processing System," in Attachment 10. The test results provided in this summary report showed the WINCISE SPS cabinet, and thus the power supply, successfully complied with the emissions requirements of RG 1.180, 'Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems,' Revision 1, issued 2003. Based on this response, the NRC staff finds that this action item has been adequately addressed, and considers Open Item 129 closed. "

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The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

7.7.1 has approximately 15 Open Items (OIs) cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
83	Remains OPEN.
118	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
119	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
120	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
121	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
122	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
123	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
124	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
125	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
126	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
127	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
128	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
129	CLOSED in Revision 10 portion.
130	CLOSED in Revision 08 portion.
131	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.

SER27 contains the following under 7.7.1:

"7.7.1.9 Incore Instrumentation System

Disposition of Open Item (Appendix HH)

Open Item 131

Open Item 131 states, 'TVA should review the EOP action level setpoint to account for the difference between core exit temperature readings for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and confirm the EOP action level setpoint to the NRC staff.'

By letter dated October 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11291A095), TVA explained that change in the EOP action level setpoint due to the difference between core exit temperature readings caused by the location change of the core exit thermocouples (CETs) was evaluated in TVA calculation WBNOSG4188, 'EOP Setpoints Verification Document, Appendix 1: Standard Setpoints Table,' Revision 21. TVA states that this calculation shows that the Unit 1 EOP CET setpoint is higher than the Unit 2 EOP CET setpoint. TVA submitted copies of the relevant pages from this calculation in Attachment 12 to TVA's October 14, 2011, letter. This attachment shows that there is a difference in EOP action level setpoints



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>between Unit 1 and Unit 2.</p> <p>The NRC staff has reviewed the calculations in Attachment 12 which contains the environmental allowances that are added to the core exit thermocouple readings. They're different between WBN Units 1 and 2. For indication of an uncovered core that is more conservative, the staff has considered a lower G03 (core uncovered) value than a higher value.</p> <p>Setpoint G03:</p> <p>Core Exit Temperature (CET) = 670 degrees F + normal channel inaccuracy and post-accident transmitter errors</p> <p>Unit 1: CET = 670 degrees F + 57 degrees F = 727 degrees F</p> <p>Unit 2: CET = 670 degrees F + 30.7 degrees F is approximately equal to 700 degrees F</p> <p>The nominal G03 setpoint (core uncovered) value of 670 degrees F is the same for both WBN Units 1 and 2. The difference between the G03 setpoints, in Units 1 and 2, is due to different values for the normal channel inaccuracy and post-accident transmitter errors. Based upon this information, the staff infers the following basis:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If there is no LOCA, and the CET is reading 670 degrees F, then it would be expected that the pressurizer safety valves would be open (the saturation pressure, at 670 degrees F, is about 2531 pounds per square inch absolute, which is a little higher than the safety valve opening setpressure).</li> <li>2. If the core is not already uncovered, then it will eventually become uncovered if the RCS inventory loss through the safety valves is not replaced by charging flow.</li> <li>3. Since the open safety valves will prevent RCS pressure from rising, CET readings of 670 degrees F or higher would be indicative of superheated steam; attributed to an uncovered core.</li> <li>4. If there is a LOCA, and RCS pressure is lower, then a CET reading of 670 degrees F or greater would indicate that the CET is measuring superheated steam, coming from an uncovered core.</li> <li>5. Adding uncertainties to the 670 degrees F value rules out other situations that could produce lower CET readings, in which the core is not uncovered.</li> </ol> <p>It is not uncommon to have different EOP parameter values for different units at a site, particularly those whose construction completion wasn't concurrent. Some parameters can be standardized, while others cannot.</p> <p>By letter dated February 18, 2014, TVA submitted Revision 103XX of Appendix C to its Radiological Emergency Plan. Revision 103XX has been updated to include the different EOP CET setpoints for WBN Units 1 and 2. Based on the NRC staff's review of the differences between the EOP CET setpoints for the two units, and TVA's inclusion of the different setpoints in Appendix C to the Radiological Emergency Plan, the NRC staff considers Open Item 131 closed."</p> <p>Status remains "Open (NRR)" in SSER27.</p>
7.7.8	23	C ----- 13	<p>ATWS Mitigation design was reviewed and approved for both units by a Safety Evaluation Report issued December 28, 1989. This SER is also in Appendix W of SSER9. Outstanding Issue was Technical Specifications requirements. In SSER14, NRC reviewed the revision of FSAR Figure 7.3-3 for the AMSAC automatic initiation signal to start the turbine driven and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and considered the issue resolved.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Address in Technical Specifications as appropriate.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>ATWS is not addressed in either the Unit 1 TS or the Unit 2 TS; nor is it addressed in the Standard TS (NUREG-1431).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.7.8 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"Based on its previous evaluation, as documented in SSER 9 and SSER 14, and on its review of FSAR Amendments 92 through 103 and the information provided by TVA in its letter dated July 30, 2010, the NRC staff determines that its conclusions in the SSERs regarding the AMSAC system remain valid for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Correct Status to "C." TVA action has been completed, and SSER shows status for this item as "Resolved."</p>
7.8.1	23	<b>OI</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NUREG-0737, II.D.3, "Valve Position Indication" – The design was reviewed in the original 1982 SER and found acceptable pending confirmation of installation of the acoustic monitoring system. In SSER5 (IR 390/84-35), the staff closed the LICENSE CONDITION for Unit 1 only.</p> <p>By letter dated November 7, 1994, for both units, TVA provided a revised response for NUREG-0737 Item II.D.3. TVA revised the design by relocating the accelerometers for valve position indication to downstream of the relief valves. This change was reviewed in SSER14. The revision did not change the function of the position indication hardware and did not alter the previous review.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.</p> <p>CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.8.1 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"As documented in the NRC letter to TVA dated May 28, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081490093), the staff concluded that there is no change at WBN Unit 2 to the approved design. The NRC staff will verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system for the PORV position indication in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. This is Open Item 74 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (Inspection)."</p>



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 74 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“The NRC staff will verify installation of the acoustic-monitoring system for the power-operated relief valve (PORV) position indication in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. (Section 7.8.1)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The required acoustic monitoring, indication and alarm annunciation to detect lifting and / or leaking of Reactor Coolant downstream of the Pressurizer PORV's and safety valves has been installed.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Corrected the Status above to “OI” to agree with the SSER.</p>
7.8.2	23	<b>OI</b>	NUREG-0737, II.E.1.2, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Initiation and Flow Indication"
		<b>13</b>	<p>Unit 2 Action: Complete procedures and qualification testing.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>7.8.2 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>“As documented in the NRC letter to TVA dated May 28, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081490093), the staff concluded that there is no change at WBN Unit 2 to the approved design. The NRC staff will verify that the test procedures and qualification testing are completed in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. This is Open Item 75 (Appendix HH).”</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as “Open (Inspection).”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 75 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>“The NRC staff will verify that the test procedures and qualification testing for auxiliary feedwater initiation and control and flow indication are completed in WBN Unit 2 before fuel load. (Section 7.8.2)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected the Status above to “OI” to agree with the SSER.</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
7.9.0	23	C	Area not addressed in 1981 Standard Review Plan.
		13	
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:
			7.9.4 (Conclusion) of SSER23 reads:
			“Based on the NRC staff’s review of the interfaces between the data communication systems and plant systems described in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 103, as supplemented by the TVA documents referenced above, the staff concludes that the data communication systems meet the relevant acceptance criteria identified in SRP Section 7.9, Revision 5, including the requirements of IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 5.6.3, and GDC 24 with regard to control and protection system interactions.”
			SSER23 DID NOT PROVIDE A STATUS; VERBIAGE SUGGESTS THE STATUS WOULD BE "RESOLVED."
			REVISION 08 UPDATE:
			7.9.3.2 of SSER23 includes:
			“However, the NRC staff was not able to confirm that sufficient testing was performed to demonstrate that two-way communication was precluded by the specific configuration changes described above. TVA should confirm to the staff that testing has sufficiently demonstrated that two-way communication is precluded with the described configurations. This is Open Item 93 (Appendix HH).”
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			The Revision 13 UPDATE to section 7.2.1 delineates how Open Item 93 was closed in SSER27.
			Open Item 93 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-607, dated September 30, 2014.
8.1.0	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		13	
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			Section 8.1 of SSER22 included the following:
			"For the scenario in which an accident occurs in one unit and a concurrent shutdown of the second unit occurs with offsite power available, TVA determined that the auxiliary power system (APS) could adequately support the scenario for two-unit operation. The voltage recovery times were within the time limits so that the 6.9-kV shutdown board degraded voltage relays (DVRs) reset and would not separate the 6.9-kV shutdown boards from the offsite power source. For the scenario in which an accident occurs in one unit and a concurrent shutdown of the second unit occurs without offsite power, TVA stated that preoperational testing for WBN Unit 2 will validate the diesel response to load sequencing on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The staff noted that TVA did not provide a summary of the worst-case EDG loading analysis under this scenario for staff’s review. The NRC staff will evaluate the status of this issue and will update the status of the EDG loading and load response in a future SSER. This is Open Item 26 (Appendix HH)."

"The NRC staff reviewed the FSAR for this section against the relevant NRC regulations, guidance in SRP Section 8.1, and applicable RGs and, except for the open item discussed above, concludes that TVA is in compliance with the relevant NRC regulations.

Before issuing an operating license, the NRC staff intends to conduct an onsite review of the installation and arrangement of electrical equipment and cables, confirmatory electric drawings, and verification of test results for the purpose of confirming the adequacy of the design and proper implementation of the design criteria. The NRC will address any issues identified during the onsite review in a supplement to the SER."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to this Open Item 26:

"There are four diesel generators (DGs) which supply onsite power to both Units 1 and 2 at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Each DG is dedicated to supply power to shutdown boards as follows:

- DG 1A-A feeds power into Unit 1, 6.9 kV shutdown board 1A-A
- DG 2A-A feeds power into Unit 2, 6.9 kV shutdown board 2A-A
- DG 1B-B feeds power into Unit 1, 6.9 kV shutdown board 1B-B
- DG 2B-B feeds power into Unit 2, 6.9 kV shutdown board 2B-B

Redundant trains of ESF loads for each unit are powered from each shutdown board. If offsite power is lost (LOOP), one train in each unit is capable of powering the loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or safely shut down the unit.

The following loading tables provide the blackout loading plus the common accident loads (load rejection, with an accident on the opposite unit and a loss of offsite power) for the safe shutdown of the non-accident unit. As discussed previously, these loadings are bounded by the accident loading."

[See letter for Tables.]

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER24]

8.1 includes:

"The NRC staff verified that TVA revised WBN 2 FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.1 to require any conduit exceeding 40 percent cable fill to be evaluated and justified by TVA engineering. Based on this information, Open Item 3 is closed."

AND

"In NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2011604, dated June 29, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111810890), NRC Region II documented its inspection and review of Open Item 18. Based on the results documented in the inspection report, Open Item 18 is closed."

AND

"In NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2011604, dated June 29, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111810890), NRC Region II documented its inspection and review of Open Item 19. Based on the results documented in the inspection report, Open Item 19 is closed."

AND

"The NRC staff performed an inspection to verify the qualification pedigree of the subject motors, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2011605, dated August 5, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112201418). Based on the inspection results, Open Item 20 is closed."

AND

"Based on this response, the NRC staff concluded that TVA adequately clarified the use of the term "equivalent" as it relates to the replacement of terminal blocks; and therefore, Open Item 22 is closed."

AND

"Open Item 23 required the NRC staff to resolve whether or not TVA's reasoning for not upgrading the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoids to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(l).

In its letter dated April 6, 2011, TVA provided additional information regarding Open Item 23. TVA stated that it will qualify the MSIV solenoids to the Category I criteria.

Based on this information, the NRC staff finds Open Item 23 remains open until NRC inspection can be performed to verify that the MSIV solenoids have been qualified to the Category I criteria."

AND

"Based on its review of this calculation, the staff concludes that TVA has provided adequate justification for establishment of a mild environment threshold for the electronic components identified in the calculation for WBN Unit 2. Specifically, the staff concludes that the calculation demonstrates that the mild environment threshold ensures continued operation of electronic equipment under postulated conditions. Therefore, Open Item 24 is closed."

AND

"In its letter dated April 6, 2011, TVA stated that, 'A separate load flow was performed for a dual unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operational occurrence with and without offsite power.' TVA provided a summary of resulting loading on CSSTs. The staff reviewed the loading and margins available and concluded that the CSSTs are adequately rated for postulated conditions. Therefore, Open Item 27 is closed."

AND

"The NRC staff reviewed the summary of analyses provided and concluded that TVA's approach to evaluate the capability of the LTCs as acceptable because it meets the requirements of GDC 17. Therefore, Open Item 28 is closed."

AND

"Based on the results of the TSS report and grid operating parameters provided by TVA in its letter dated June 7, 2011, the NRC staff concludes that the offsite source operating range meets the requirements of GDC 17 and is acceptable for WBN Units 1 and 2 operations. Therefore, Open Item 29 is closed."

AND

"The NRC staff concludes that TVA's clarification is adequate, since it provides the necessary information regarding the sequencing of loads in case of a non-simultaneous LOOP-LOCA event, and that such an event is considered as a beyond design basis event. Therefore, Open Item 31 is closed."

AND

"TVA stated in Attachment 9 of its letter dated July 31, 2010, that certain design change notices (DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2, and that these DCNs were unverified assumptions used in its analysis of the 125 Vdc vital battery system. Open Item 33 required the NRC staff to verify completion of these DCNs prior to issuance of the operating license. The applicable DCNs are as follows:

\* DCN 53421: removal/abandonment of Reciprocating Charging Pump 2-MTR-62-101, supplied from 480V SHDN BD 2B1-B, Compt. 3B.

\* DCN 54636: cable modifications for Unit 2 AFWP Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve and Turbine

Controls.

In its letter dated April 6, 2011, TVA stated that the above DCNs have been issued and that the NRC will be notified when the physical work has been completed for these two DCNs. Open Item 33 remains open until the NRC staff has verified by inspection that the DCNs have been incorporated into the WBN Unit 2 design."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 23 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"Resolve whether or not TVA's reasoning for not upgrading the MSIV solenoid valves to Category I is a sound reason to the contrary, as specified in 10 CFR 50.49(l). (SSER 22, Section 3.11.2.2.1; SSER 24, Section 8.1)"

Open Item 33 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA stated in Attachment 9 of its letter dated July 31, 2010, that certain design change notices (DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2, and that these DCNs were unverified assumptions used in its analysis of the 125 Vdc vital battery system. Verification of completion of these DCNs to the NRC staff is necessary prior to issuance of the operating license. (SSER 22, Section 8.3.2.3; SSER 24, Section 8.1)"

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Item Number 20.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 23 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-608, dated November 14, 2014.

Open item 33 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated March 24, 2015.

TVA to NRC letter dated April 7, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15097A421) notified the NRC of the completion of field work for plant modifications made per DCN 53421 and DCN 54636.

8.1.0 has approximately 13 Open Items cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
3	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
18	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
19	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.
20	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.

- |    |  |
|----|--|
| 22 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 23 | CLOSED in Revision 13 portion of 3.11.0.             |
| 24 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 26 | CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.                       |
| 27 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 28 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 29 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 31 | CLOSED in Revision 07 portion.                       |
| 33 | CLOSED in IR 391/2015-602; remains OPEN in the SSER. |

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SER27 contains the following under 8.1 Introduction:

"Open Item 26

Open Item 26 states, 'For the scenario with an accident in one unit and concurrent shutdown of the second unit without offsite power, TVA stated that Unit 2 pre-operational testing will validate the diesel response to sequencing of loads on the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The NRC staff will evaluate the status of this issue and will update the status of the EDG load response in a future SSER.'

By letter dated November 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113120438), the NRC staff requested additional details on Open Item 26. TVA updated its response by letter dated June 7, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12160A351). The questions were related to EDG rating and loading criteria. Specifically the staff requested TVA to:

- Explain the variations in the worst case loading provided in different responses and provide a summary of current calculations depicting DG loading, including procedurally required loads that may be manually connected, and
- Provide verification or test documents from the manufacturer or Appendix B qualified supplier of the DG engine and DG generator certifying the "hot", "cold" and "step load" capabilities.

In response to staff questions, TVA stated that the ongoing plant modifications and validation of calculation accuracies through the inspection process had resulted in adjustments to the EDG loading calculations. TVA attached excerpts from Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, "Diesel Generator Loading Analysis," Revision 16, summarizing the results from the last update.

The licensee has evaluated the load carrying capability (steady-state running load) and margin available for the worst case EDG loading for two separate events. As stated in the FSAR, load carrying capability is based on a 2-hour rating of 4840 kilowatt (Kw) from 0 to 2 hours and on a continuous rating of 4400 Kw from 2 hours to the end of the event. Attachment 1 to Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, Revision 16, depicts worst case EDG loading with available margin when serving loads during a loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) concurrent with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This table indicates that EDG 2B-B has the highest loading of 4237.20 kilowatt (Kw), which is less than the 2 hour rating of 4840 Kw. The maximum steady state running load (2 hours to the end of event) is calculated to be 4093.66 Kw for EDG 1A-A compared to nominal rating of 4400 Kw. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

Attachment 2 to Calculation EDQ 00099920080014, Revision 16, provides details on each EDG loading with one unit in LOOP plus LOCA and the second unit in LOOP only. For the case of Unit 1 in a LOOP/LOCA event and Unit 2 in a LOOP only condition, TVA has concluded that EDG 1A-A has the maximum loading of 4220.51 Kw for the first 2 hours and 4093.66 Kw for the remaining duration. These loadings are below the corresponding nominal and 2 hour ratings of the EDGs, as stated above. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

For the case of Unit 2 in a LOOP/LOCA event and Unit 1 in a LOOP only condition, the licensee has concluded that EDG 2B-B has the maximum loading of 4237.2 Kw for the first 2 hours and EDG 2A-A has 3975.57 Kw for steady state operation beyond 2 hours. These loadings are below the corresponding nominal and 2 hour ratings of the EDGs, as stated above. The other EDGs have lower loading for this event.

The licensee has also performed a sensitivity analyses for transient loading of the EDGs during motor starts. Based on the details provided in the referenced calculation, the staff finds that the EDGs at WBN Units 1 and 2 are adequately rated to support safe shutdown of both units following an accident in one unit coupled with a LOOP at both units.

The licensee has indicated that the "hot," "cold," and "step load" capabilities of the EDGs were reviewed and concurred by MKW Power Systems, Inc., the Appendix B qualified supplier of the EDG engine and generator for WBN. The licensee has used the higher rating(s) for motor starting analyses. The staff did not consider the additional spare margin available with these ratings as the nameplate ratings envelope the postulated steady state loadings.

Based on the responses provided by the applicant, the NRC staff finds the responses acceptable and therefore considers Open Item 26 to be closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

8.2.1	27	C	Approved for both units in SER. In SSER13, NRC reviewed TVA's analysis of grid stability on loss of both units. The NRC conclusions in the SER remained valid.
		13	

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.2.1 of SSER22 included, "TVA has not evaluated the capability of the CSSTs for a dual-unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operating occurrence. This is discussed in section 8.2.2 as Open Item 27 (Appendix HH) discussed in section 8.2.2. Pending resolution of the open item, the staff concludes that design of WBN Unit 2 meets intent of GDC 5."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 27:

"TVA to NRC letter dated December 6, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information,' (ADAMS accession number ML103420569) included the response to RAI 8.2.2 - 1. That response stated, 'The loading for a dual unit trip (item a) is slightly less than the loading with one unit in accident and a spurious accident signal in the other unit. Therefore, a separate load flow was not performed.'

A separate load flow was performed for a dual unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operational occurrence with and without offsite power. The resulting loading on CSSTs is provided in the following table:

[See letter for Table.]

The worst case margin for CSSTs C and D is 70% (X, Y winding) and 55% for primary winding. The worst case margin for CSSTs A and B is 27% (X, Y winding) and 18% for primary winding.

This additional analysis will be included in the next revision of AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002."

## REVISION 11 UPDATE:



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002 was revised to add Appendix 10.2 which provides analyses of loading on CSSTs A, B C and D postulating an accident in one unit and a spurious engineered safe features (ESF) actuation in the other unit</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
8.2.2	27	CO ----- 13	<p>8.2.2.1 CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - document additional information in FSAR on control power supplies and distribution system for the Watts Bar Hydro Plant Switchyard</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the offsite power system circuits at the Watts Bar Hydro Plant Switchyard met GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue. In SSER13, the staff reviewed revised information incorporated into FSAR amendment 71 for both units and concluded that it supported the original conclusion in SSER2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.2.2.2 OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving compliance of design changes to the offsite power system with GDC 17 and 18.</p> <p>In SSER2 and 3, NRC continued the review of the offsite electrical power system. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the design changes to minimize the probability of losing all AC power, compliance with GDC 17 and minimizing the probability of a two unit trip following a one unit trip. These issues were resolved in SSER13. Additional review was done in SSER14, but the conclusions remained valid.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.2.2.3 Compliance with GDC 17 for the Duration of the Offsite System Contingencies</p> <p>By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC reviewed the load shed scheme described in FSAR amendment 71 that reduces loads from common station service transformers A and B including contingency for both units trip and a 161-kV supply contingency. In SSER15, NRC determined that entering the LCO for one offsite circuit inoperable was appropriate. No open items were identified.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.2.2.4 Minimizing the Probability of a Two-Unit Trip Following a One-Unit Trip</p> <p>By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In FSAR amendment 71, TVA described the transfer of power sources on trip of a unit's main generator. In SSER13, NRC evaluated the design and determined that the concern was resolved.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p>

Section 8.2.2 of SSER22 includes:

"TVA should provide a summary of similar margin studies based on a dual-unit trip as a result of an abnormal operational occurrence and an accident in one unit concurrent with a spurious ESF actuation. These should be based on the completed analysis for uprating CSSTs A and B. This is Open Item 27 (Appendix HH)."

"TVA should provide to the staff a detailed discussion showing that the LTC is able to maintain the 6.9-Kv bus voltage control band given the normal and post contingency transmission operating voltage band, bounding voltage drop on the grid, and plant conditions. This is Open Item 28 (Appendix HH)."

"In its December 6, 2010, letter, TVA stated that the grid stability analyses addressed the loss of the largest electric supply to the grid, loss of the largest load from the grid, loss of the most critical transmission line, loss of both units, all of which did not result in grid instability. NRC staff considers the stability analysis portion of the grid studies acceptable. However, TVA did not provide information about the operating characteristics of the offsite power supply and other information as discussed above. This is Open Item 29 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 27:

"TVA to NRC letter dated December 6, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information,' (ADAMS accession number ML103420569) included the response to RAI 8.2.2 - 1. That response stated, 'The loading for a dual unit trip (item a) is slightly less than the loading with one unit in accident and a spurious accident signal in the other unit. Therefore, a separate load flow was not performed.'

A separate load flow was performed for a dual unit shutdown resulting from an abnormal operational occurrence with and without offsite power. The resulting loading on CSSTs is provided in the following table:

[See letter for Table.]

The worst case margin for CSSTs C and D is 70% (X, Y winding) and 55% for primary winding. The worst case margin for CSSTs A and B is 27% (X, Y winding) and 18% for primary winding.

This additional analysis will be included in the next revision of AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002."

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TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 28:

"For CSSTs C and D, the load tap changer (LTC) is set to regulate 6.9kV shutdown board voltage at 7,071V (102.5%). For CSSTs A and B, the LTC is set to regulate the voltage at the 6.9kV start buses (which can power the 6.9kV shutdown boards through the 6.9kV unit boards) at 7,071V (102.5%). The upper and lower setpoints of the dead bands are 7,132V (103.4%) and 7,010V (101.6%), respectively. The dead band considered is ±82.2V equivalent to the operating tolerances identified for these setpoints. The LTCs have the following parameters:

CSST C and D: Taps ±10%, Tap Step 1.25%, Total No of Taps 17, Initial Time Delay 2 seconds, Operating Time 1 second. Taps are provided on each secondary winding.

CSST A and B: Taps ±16.8%, Tap Step 1.05%, Total No of Taps 33, Initial Time Delay 1 second, Operating Time 2 seconds. Taps are provided on the primary winding.

The analysis evaluates the 6.9-Kv shutdown board minimum voltage requirements considering a maximum (bounding) grid voltage drop of 9 Kv and a minimum grid voltage of 153kV and all plant conditions. Although the calculated shutdown board voltage falls below the degraded voltage relay dropout setpoint due to block start of ESF motors, it recovers above the degraded voltage relay reset setpoint in ≤5 seconds. The minimum time for the degraded voltage relays to isolate the offsite power from the 6.9kV Shutdown Boards is

8.5 seconds.

Attachment 3 [See letter for this.] provides the Electrical Transient Analysis Program (ETAP) voltage recovery plots following a DBE on one unit while the other unit is in simultaneous orderly shutdown. These plots pictorially depict the LTC function at different times following a DBE.

During normal operation and post-accident with bounding grid voltage (153kV), the voltage on the 6.9kV shutdown boards is maintained within the LTC control band. As shown in the ETAP plots, the voltage on the shutdown boards falls below the degraded voltage relay setpoint due to block start of ESF motors but recovers to a value above the degraded voltage relay reset value before the degraded voltage relay timer times out so as not to isolate the shutdown boards from the offsite power. The source is therefore in compliance with GDC 17 and is able to supply offsite power to 1E loads with an accident in one unit, safe shutdown of the opposite unit, and the worst case single failure."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 29:

"The operating characteristics of the offsite power supply were delineated in TVA letter to the NRC dated November 09, 2010 (ML103200146). However, they are provided below for the staff convenience. In addition TVA has issued Revision 3 of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Transmission System Study (TSS) - Grid Voltage Study of the WBN Offsite Power System. This revision has evaluated the adequacy of the offsite power system postulating an accident in one unit and a spurious accident signal in the second unit. The results show that the WBN offsite power system has adequate capacity to cope with this scenario (i.e., an accident in one unit and a spurious accident signal in the second unit)

The preferred offsite power system at WBN is normally supplied from TVA's 161-Kv transmission grid at the Watts Bar Hydro Plant switchyard. Normally, the frequency of the grid is 60 Hz, with very small perturbations above and below this value. The TVA Under Frequency Load Shed scheme is compliant with NERC/SERC standards, and the first step will begin tripping transmission system load at 59.5 Hz. The final step in the program trips load at 58.7 Hz. Current studies show that the frequency will not drop below 57.5 Hz during any credible extreme contingencies.

The criteria used in the planning of the transmission system state that the 161-Kv voltage should not drop below 95% of nominal voltage for NERC Category B or C events. Normally, the 161-Kv grid at the WBN offsite power buses operates at 166 Kv, with ranges from 161 Kv to 170 Kv occasionally observed.

Two Transmission System Studies (TSSs), a Planning TSS and an Operations TSS, are performed by Power System Operations (PSO) tri-annually or as needed. The Planning TSS is a 5-year look-ahead study to ensure the transmission network will meet the WBN voltage criteria. Transmission enhancements are made if needed. The Operations TSS is used to ensure the network can meet the grid criteria during real time operation. In extreme cases, if the grid is unable to meet voltage criteria, the Transmission Operator will immediately notify the WBN Generator Operator that offsite power is disqualified.

A. Operating characteristics of the preferred offsite power supply (at Watts Bar Hydro Plant Grid): 164 Kv nominal

b. Voltage criteria for WBN for dual-unit analysis:

- 161 Kv Switchyard: > 153 Kv and < 9 Kv drop (post-event)
- 24 Kv Generator Buses\*: > 23 Kv and < 24.8 Kv

\* Applicable only when utilizing Unit Board feeders as offsite power (the Unit Station Service Transformers [USSTs] supply offsite power until they transfer to the Common Station Service Transformers [CSSTs] A and B).

C. Post-contingency voltage drops (dual-unit operation): 9 Kv Maximum (The grid studies show that under the worst case scenario the maximum voltage drop will not exceed 6.5 Kv. The auxiliary power system analysis for two-unit operation has been performed using a 161 Kv grid voltage drop of 11 Kv when powered from CSSTs C and D and 9 Kv when powered from CSSTs A and B. CSSTs A and B will be used to substitute for CSSTs D and C, respectively, in case of CSST C or D outage.)

d. Bounding value & Post unit trip value: 153 Kv (Minimum)

(The grid studies establish that there are no voltage criteria violations under all grid operating conditions.)

- e. Operating frequency range (dual-unit operation): Normally the frequency of the grid is 60Hz with very small perturbations and is compliant with NERC/SERC standards and the first step begins tripping transmission system load at 59.5 Hz.

F. Design operating voltage range of the shutdown boards: 7,260 V max; 6,570 V min

g. How low the WBHS voltage can drop: 153 Kv"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

Open Items 27, 28, and 29 were closed in SSER 24 as delineated in the Revision 07 Update portion of 8.1.0.

REVISION 11 UPDATE:

AC Auxiliary Power System Analysis Calculation EDQ00099920070002 was revised to add Appendix 10.2 which provides analyses of loading on CSSTs A, B C and D postulating an accident in one unit and a spurious engineered safe features (ESF) actuation in the other unit.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 8.2.2 Analysis:

"NRC Bulletin 2012-01

The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System,' dated July 27, 2012, to notify licensees that the NRC staff is requesting information about the facilities' electric power system designs to determine if further regulatory action is warranted. Bulletin 2012-01 requires addressees to comprehensively verify compliance with the regulatory requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, 'Electric Power Systems,' and the design criteria for protection systems under 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2).

TVA provided its response for WBN Unit 2 in Enclosure 3 of letter dated October 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12312A167). Based on review of the response, NRC staff determined that the design vulnerability exists at WBN Unit 2 electric power system and no design features have been provided to enable functioning of electric power system with an open phase condition (OPC) with offsite power circuits. In response to NRC staff's RAI (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A314) concerning status and schedule for completion of plant design changes and modifications to resolve the open phase design vulnerability, TVA provided its response in letter dated February 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14038A075). TVA stated that it is fully engaged in the development of accurate detection and protection equipment without compromising nuclear safety or increasing plant risk, this new OPC technology is being thoroughly evaluated, will be tested, and will be fully analyzed before installation. In addition, based on the operating experience to-date, the OPC of concern is a loss of one or two of the three phases of a nuclear power plant's offsite electrical power circuit due to any component failure on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a qualified offsite electrical power circuit to the transmission system with and without a high impedance ground under all operating electrical system configurations and loading conditions. In supplemental letter dated September 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14247A231), TVA submitted additional text to be added to the FSAR and proposed a license condition associated with actions for resolving NRC Bulletin 2012-01.

The proposed text that would be added to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 8.2.2 'Analysis,' as part of

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 113 states:

The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power Systems,' describing a condition resulting from the loss of a single phase between the transmission network and the onsite power distribution system at an operating nuclear plant in the United States. TVA has taken the short term actions described in the bulletin and the nuclear industry is developing a long term resolution. TVA has added the following license condition for the long term actions:

Actions to resolve the issues identified in the Bulletin will be implemented on or before December 31, 2017.

The NRC staff is proposing the following License Condition:

By December 31, 2017, TVA will report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System' have been implemented.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that OPC design vulnerability with the WBN Unit 2 electric power system will be addressed by TVA when license conditions and regulatory commitments are met. The staff will close Bulletin 2012-01 for WBN Unit 2 when TVA notifies the NRC with a close-out letter when full compliance is achieved."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed it, TVA has remaining action.

8.2.3	22	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected STATUS to "C."

8.2.4	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.2.4 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff reviewed the offsite power system for WBN Unit 2 as described in FSAR Section 8.2, including the single-line diagrams, station layout drawings, schematic diagrams, and descriptive information. The staff concluded that the offsite power system conforms to the requirements of GDC 17 and 18 and is, therefore, acceptable, pending resolution of the open items noted above."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
8.3.1	27	S	8.3 Fifth Diesel Generator
		13	<p>In SSER10, NRC reviewed the design of the fifth diesel generator. In SSER19, NRC accepted TVA's commitment to perform modifications and surveillances including preoperational testing before declaring the fifth diesel generator operable as a replacement for one of the four diesel generators. TVA stated in a submittal dated July 28, 1993, that they did not plan to place the additional diesel generator in service.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - incorporate new design that provides dedicated transformer for each preferred offsite circuit in FSAR</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the offsite power system with a dedicated transformer for each preferred offsite circuit met GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue. In SSER13, NRC reviewed additional changes though FSAR amendment 75 and concluded that the design was acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1 DG Starting and Control Circuit Logic</p> <p>In SSER10, NRC reviewed the DG starting and control circuit logic. No open items were identified.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.2 Low and Degraded Grid Voltage Condition</p> <p>In the SER, NRC stated they would verify the adequacy of TVA's analysis regarding Branch Technical Position PSB-1 once preoperational testing was completed. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed information on the load shed and diesel start relays. In SSER14 NRC clarified the requirements. In SSER20, NRC reviewed the preoperational test for Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Include the setpoint in the Technical Specifications for the load shed relays and similar minimum limits for the diesel start relays.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.6: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - provide diesel generator reliability qualification test report</p> <p>In SSER2, NRC indicated that it would verify DG qualification testing. TVA provided a copy of the DG qualification test report. In SSER7, the NRC concluded that the DGs had been satisfactorily tested in accordance with IEEE 387-1977.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.6: LICENSE CONDITION (12) - Diesel generator reliability qualification testing at normal operating temperature</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, NRC required that the capability of the DGs to start at normal temperature be demonstrated. TVA's August 31, 1983, letter confirmed tests had been performed on a DG identical to those at WBN. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.1.7 Possible Interconnection Between Redundant Divisions Through Normal and Alternate Power to the Battery Charger</p> <p>By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the use of alternate feeders to the battery chargers and inverters and concluded a Technical Specification surveillance for monitoring the position of these supply breakers resolved the item.</p>

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unit 2 Action: Include the surveillance requirement in the Technical Specifications.

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### 8.3.1.10 No-load Operation of the Diesel Generator

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the information provided and concluded the issue was resolved. In SSER14, NRC added additional clarification but did not change the conclusions.

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### 8.3.1.11 Test and Inspection of the Vital Power System

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed TVA's plan for test and inspection of the vital ac system and concluded the issue was resolved.

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### 8.3.1.12 The Capability and Independence of Offsite and Onsite Sources When Paralleling During Testing

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the Emergency Diesel Generators response to a loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP). TVA submitted additional information for both units by letters dated February 7, 1994 and June 29, 1994. In SSER14, NRC concluded that the issue was resolved.

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### 8.3.1.13 Use of an Idle Start Switch for Diesel Generators

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, the NRC reviewed the information presented on the local idle start switch and concluded the issue was resolved.

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### 8.3.1.14 Master Fuse List Program

In SSER9, NRC provided a safety evaluation of the Master Fuse List Special Program (SP) for Unit 1 (Appendix U). In SSER13, NRC referenced the evaluation.

Unit 2 Action: Resolve the SP for WBN Unit 2 with the Unit 1 approach.

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### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

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Revised "SSER18" to "SSER19" item 8.3 above to fix typographical error in Regulatory Framework.

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Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.

8.3.1.2: TS Table 3.3.5-1 provides Diesel Generator start and load shed relay trip setpoints and



allowable values.

8.3.1.7: TS surveillance requirements SR 3.8.4.3 and SR 3.8.7.1 provide surveillances to check the alignment of battery charger alternate feeder breakers and inverters.

8.3.1.14: TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the Master Fuse List Special Program.

In SSER21 the Containment Cooling SP was resolved. Completion of the Master Fuse List SP is tracked under 23.3.5.

#### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.1.2 of SSER22 included, "TVA should confirm that all safety-related equipment (in addition to the Class 1E motors) will have adequate starting and running voltage at the most limiting safety-related components (such as motor-operated valves (MOVs), contactors, solenoid valves or relays) at the DVR setpoint dropout setting. TVA should also confirm that (1) the motorstarting transient studies are based on the dropout voltage value of DVR and time delay, (2) the steady-state voltage drop studies are carried out by maximizing running loads on the Class 1E distribution system (bounding combination of safety systems loads), with the voltage at 6.9-kV Class 1E buses (monitored by the DVRs) at or just above the DVR dropout setting, and (3) the DVR settings do not credit any equipment operation (such as LTC transformers) upstream of the 6.9-kV Class 1E buses. TVA should also confirm that the final technical specifications (TSs) are properly derived from these analytical values for the degraded voltage settings. This is Open Item 30 (Appendix HH)."

Section 8.3.1.11 of SSER22 included, "If the FSAR description is correct, TVA should explain how the EDG and logic sequencing circuitry will respond to a LOCA followed by a LOOP scenario. This is Open Item 31 (Appendix HH)."

Section 8.3.1.12 of SSER22 included, "In its letter dated December 6, 2010, TVA stated that Amendment 103 to the Unit 2 FSAR will revise the Equipment Capacities portion of Section 8.3.1.1 to match the information in Tables 8.3-4 through 8.3-7. The staff finds the TVA response acceptable."

Section 8.3.1.14 of SSER22 included, "TVA should provide to the NRC staff the details of the administrative limits of EDG voltage and speed range, along with the basis for its conclusion that the impact is negligible. TVA should also describe how it accounts for the administrative limits in the TS surveillance requirements for EDG voltage and frequency. This is Open Item 32 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 31:

"LOCA followed by LOOP

TVA to NRC letter dated December 6, 2010, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22 (SSER22) – Response to Requests for Additional Information,' (ADAMS accession number ML103420569) included the response to RAI 8.3.1.11. That response stated, 'A LOCA followed by a delayed LOOP is not a Design Basis Event for WBN.'

The design basis for WBN assumes a simultaneous LOOP - LOCA. The Hydraulic Analysis does not support a LOCA with a delayed LOOP event; however, the logic is designed to ensure that loads are re-sequenced during a LOCA with a delayed LOOP, to prevent a block start on a diesel generator. This logic does not impact the sequencing for the design bases event, simultaneous LOOP - LOCA.

LOOP - Delayed LOCA.

When the LOOP occurs, the diesel will start, based on detection by the Loss of Voltage relay. Loads which sequence on due to a blackout signal (Charging Pump, Auxiliary Feedwater, Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump, Closed Cooling, etc.) will begin sequencing on.

When a subsequent LOCA signal occurs, the diesel will remain running and connected to the Shutdown Board. Loads which are required for accident mitigation and which have previously sequenced on to the Shutdown Board, due to the LOOP, will remain running. Loads which are not required for accident mitigation will be tripped. Remaining loads required for accident mitigation, which have not been sequenced on at the time of the LOCA, will have their timers reset to 0 and will sequence on at the appropriate time for the LOCA signal.

## LOCA - Delayed LOOP

When the LOCA occurs, the loads which are not running in normal operation will block start. At the same time, the diesels will start on the LOCA signal, but will not tie to the Shutdown Board.

When a subsequent LOOP occurs, all sequenced loads will be stripped from the board from a Loss of Voltage (approximately 86%) signal. Once the loss of voltage relay has reached its set point and the diesel is available, the diesel breaker will close and the sequence timers will begin to time. The first large motor (Centrifugal Charging Pump) connects at 5 seconds and is followed by the remaining accident required loads. This provides assurance that the voltage has decayed on the boards and no residual out of phase reconnection occurs."

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated February 3, 2014 responded to SSER Open Item 32. The cover letter included the following:

"This letter provides TVA's response to NRC's information request contained in SSER 22, Appendix HH, Item 32 (Reference 1).

Enclosure 1 provides a description of and the basis for the diesel generator (DG) steady state frequency and voltage range. The evaluation demonstrates that the frequency and voltage range selected has a negligible impact on equipment powered by the DGs.

Enclosure 2 provides a description of the proposed changes to the WBN Unit 2 Developmental Technical Specifications (TS) to modify the acceptance criteria for the DG steady state frequency range provided in applicable Surveillance Requirements (SR). The current SR 3.8.1.2 frequency is greater than or equal to (~) 58.8 Hz and less than or equal to (~) 61.2 Hz. The proposed change to SR 3.8.1.2 will result in a 60.0 Hz nominal frequency. The frequency will be changed from ~ 58.8 Hz and ~ 61.2 Hz to ~ 59.8 Hz and ~ 60.1 Hz for SRs 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, 3.8.1.19, and 3.8.1.21. ..."

Enclosure 2 of the letter then provides marked-up pages to show the proposed revisions.

TVA to NRC letter dated June 13, 2014, provided a response to NRC's RAIs. The letter included the following:

TVA addressed a non-cited violation (NCV) identified in Reference 6 by performing a motor starting analysis in the calculation of record at the DVR dropout analytical limit as opposed to the DVR reset. The analysis is provided in Appendix H of Enclosure 2. [Reference 6 is NRC to TVA letter dated January 28, 2011: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2010005.]

Enclosure 1 to this letter also provides the TVA response to the information requested at the April 24, 2014 public meeting, including responses to the RAIs received in Reference 4. Enclosure 2 provides a copy of the Sensitivity Study of Degraded Voltage Relay (DVR) Protection During Motor Starting, Revision 2, performed by TVA to address the additional concerns with the DVR protection scheme at WBN. [Reference 4 was an e-mail from the NRC to TVA]

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

TI 2512/037 (Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program) was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated March 24, 2015.

TVA to NRC letter dated January 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15030A511) provided responses to the staff's for request for additional information regarding "Chapter 8, 'Electrical Power' – Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 22, OPEN ITEM 30)."

TVA to NRC letter dated February 3, 2014 contained the following commitment:

"The TVA WBN Unit 2, NPG System Description Document, NPG-SDD-WBN2-82-4002, "Standby Diesel Generator System" shall be revised to describe the DG frequency and voltage governor setting methodology. The DG will be set within a speed band which is equivalent to a frequency band of 59.95 Hz± 0.05 Hz. Likewise the DG will be set within a voltage band of 6950 V, +50 V and -25 V. These frequency and voltage bands are the Acceptable As Found Tolerance (AAF). In the event that the speed (frequency) or voltage is found outside of their setting band (i.e., AAF), the 'as-found' values will be reset within the setting band, and the 'as-found' values will be entered into the WBN corrective action programs (CAP) for evaluation of performance and trending. Prior to WBN Unit 2 receiving an operating license."

The system description has been revised in accordance with the commitment.

8.3.1 has 3 Open Items cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
----	--------

30	Remains OPEN.
31	CLOSED in Revision 07 portion of 8.1.0.
32	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.

SSER27 contains the following under 8.3.1 AC Power System:

## "8.3.1.1 Description

### Open Item 32

Open Item 32 states, 'TVA should provide to the NRC staff the details of the administrative limits of EDG voltage and speed range, and the basis for its conclusion that the impact is negligible, and describe how it accounts for the administrative limits in the Technical Specification [TS] surveillance requirements for EDG voltage and frequency.'

By letter dated February 13, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14038A079), TVA proposed modifying the WBN Unit 2 TS Surveillance Requirements (SRs) related to surveillance, operation and testing of the EDGs when not connected in parallel with the offsite sources. Specifically, TVA proposed to modify the frequency range from greater than or equal to ( $\geq$ ) 58.8 Hz and less than or equal to ( $\leq$ ) 61.2 Hz to  $\geq$  59.8 Hz and  $\leq$  60.1 Hz for SRs 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, 3.8.1.19, and 3.8.1.21. With respect to the monthly surveillance performed on the EDG, TVA proposes to revise this surveillance (i.e., SR 3.8.1.2) to confirm that the nominal frequency value of 60 Hz is achieved. The letter states that the EDG voltage limits of 6800 V to 7260 V, as described in the TS, are correct as validated by the analyses.

The WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 3.1 details conformance with the Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs as set forth in 10 CFR Section 50.36. GDC 17, 'Electric Power Systems,' of Appendix A, 'General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,' to 10 CFR Part 50, requires, in part, that an onsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The onsite electric power supplies and the onsite electric distribution system shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of the loss of power from the unit, the transmission network, or the onsite electric power supplies.

GDC 18, 'Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems,' requires that electric power systems important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to demonstrate operability and functional performance.

It states in 10 CFR Section 50.36 that each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in 10 CFR 50.21 or 50.22 will include TSs. As described in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) - (8), TSs will include items in the following categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; (5) administrative controls; (6) decommissioning; (7) initial notification; (8) written reports.

NRC RG 1.9, Revision 3, dated July 1993, 'Selection, Design, Qualification and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants,' describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regulations with regard to design and testing of onsite EDGs.

The staff has reviewed TVA's regulatory and technical analyses in support of its proposed changes, which is described in Enclosure 1 of the TVA's letter dated February 13, 2014.

The offsite and onsite power systems at the WBN Unit 2 are designed to comply with the requirements of GDC 17 and 18 respectively. The WBN Unit 2 FSAR states that the offsite sources are two independent 161-Kv transmission lines terminating at the 161-Kv switchyard, providing power to the plant, on demand, via the common station service transformers to the onsite Class 1E distribution system

The standby Alternating Current (AC) power system (onsite electrical power system) serves the two nuclear power units (WBN Unit 1 and WBN Unit 2) and certain common plant equipment. It consists of two independent EDG systems, each system containing two EDG units, two redundant Class 1E electric power distribution trains, and four redundant vital instrument and control power channels, each provided with an uninterruptible ac power supply and distribution panel. Each EDG consists of two 16-cylinder engines directly connected to a 6.9 Kv generator. The continuous rating of each EDG is 4400 kilowatt (Kw) at 0.8 power factor, 6.9 Kv, 3-phase, and 60 Hz. Each EDG also has an additional rating of 4840 Kw for 2 hours out of

24 hours. Ratings for the EDGs satisfy the requirements of RG 1.9 Rev. 3. The continuous service rating of each EDG is 4400 Kw with 10 percent overload permissible for up to 2 hours in any 24 hour period.

Any variation in steady state voltage and/or frequency affects the operating characteristics of motor driven loads such as pumps, fans and valves. If variation in both voltage and frequency occurs simultaneously, the effect will be superimposed and compounded such that the available margin in EDG capacity may be eroded. TVA has proposed to narrow the existing allowable range of frequency for the acceptance criteria during EDG surveillance testing to assure that safe shutdown equipment will perform as required by accident analyses.

TVA has stated that the changes in frequency from the nominal rating of 60 Hz to the proposed range were evaluated for the following equipment with consideration to a LOOP or a LOCA coupled with a LOOP:

1. Pump flow, Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) availability and horsepower requirements,
2. Fan flow and horsepower requirements,
3. Motor operated valves (MOV) opening/closing speed and horsepower requirements,
4. Air compressor flow and horsepower requirements, and
5. Chiller horsepower requirements

TVA stated that only major pumps in safety significant systems were evaluated in detail, because, the speed, load, flow, and NPSH are only slightly impacted (i.e., 0.3%). The results of the evaluations are tabulated in

Tables 3 and 4 of Enclosure 1 of the TVA's letter dated February 13, 2014. TVA has concluded that the brake horsepower of motors due to a speed variation of  $\pm 0.3\%$  will vary by 1.0%. Table 5 of Enclosure 1 provides a summary of the major pump brake horsepower (BHP) as a result of frequency variation. TVA has concluded that the change in BHP of large motors is acceptable due to the rating of the equipment, the margin in nameplate rating or specific analyses performed by the vendor indicating that any temperature increase will not adversely impact the motor windings.

For the long term mitigation of a LOCA/LOOP, TVA evaluated major fans and air handling units (Section 1.2.7 of Enclosure 1) supplied by the EDGs. The evaluation concluded that all of the fans affected by diesel generator frequency variation will provide adequate flow to maintain safe shutdown equipment environment.

TVA stated that MOV stroke time will be approximately 0.8% longer as a result of the change in the frequency and voltage. The evaluation concluded that the longer stroke time does not exceed the time for MOV operation assumed in the safety analyses for accident mitigation requirements. Hence the longer stroke time is acceptable. The shorter stroke time due to higher frequency does not impact assumptions in safety analyses. TVA has concluded that there are no concerns with MOV operation due to the variation in EDG frequency and voltage.

Enclosure 1 also provided a summary of evaluations performed for voltage and frequency variations on air compressor and chiller flows, power transformers, battery chargers, hydrogen igniters and pertinent small motors. TVA has concluded that the impact on these components is minor and acceptable.

TVA also evaluated the impact of the proposed change on EDG1-1A, the heaviest loaded EDG, under postulated accident conditions and concluded that:

1. The calculated total load of 4116 Kw is below the nominal rating of 4400 Kw and therefore acceptable for the EDGs.
2. There is no impact on TS-required fuel oil volume. The current calculation assumes that the EDGs operate at the 2-hour overload rating of 4840 Kw for the first 2 hours of the seven-day period and at 4400 Kw for the remaining 166 hours of the seven-day period.

TVA has evaluated the impact of frequency and voltage variation in the ranges of 59.8 to 60.1 Hz and 6800 V to 7260 V, respectively for WBN Unit 2 equipment fed by the EDGs during a LOOP or LOCA/LOOP and proposed TSs. The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's proposed TSs and supporting documentation. Based on the evaluation discussed above, the staff determined that the proposed TSs related to the allowable steady state operating voltage and frequency band of the EDGs is consistent with the recommendations of the NRC guidance in RG 1.9 Rev. 3. The NRC staff also concludes that the proposed TSs will meet the intent of GDC 17 and 18 governing the design and operation of the onsite electrical power systems and provides adequate assurance of system operability. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed changes acceptable and consistent with the NRC regulations and the regulatory guidance, and considers Open Item 32 to be closed."

Status remains as 'Open (NRR)' in SSER27.

8.3.2	27	<b>S</b>	8.3.2.2: LICENSE CONDITION – DC monitoring and annunciation system
		<b>13</b>	<p>In SSER3, the staff determined that some items were omitted from the design of the DG DC monitoring and annunciation system. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>8.3.2.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - include diesel generator design analysis in FSAR</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, staff indicated the design analysis for demonstrating compliance of the DGs with regulatory requirements and guidelines was acceptable pending incorporation of the analysis in the FSAR. The analysis was incorporated in the FSAR, and the issue closed in SSER2. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.</p> <p>-----</p>

## 8.3.2.5 Non-safety Loads Powered from the DC Distribution System and Vital Inverters

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

### 8.3.2.5.1 Transfer of Loads Between Power Supplies Associated with the Same Load Group but Different Units

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC reviewed the information provided. Additional information was requested for both units by letter dated March 28, 1994. TVA responded for both units by letter dated June 29, 1994. In SSER14, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

### 8.3.2.7 The Fifth Vital Battery System

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

### 8.3.2.8 Reenergizing the Battery Charger from the Onsite Power Sources Versus Automatically Immediately Following a Loss of Offsite Power

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.2.3 of SSER22 included, "TVA stated that the design change notices (DCNs) are required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2, and that these were unverified assumptions used in its analysis of the 125-V dc vital battery system. Verification of the completion of these DCNs must be provided to the NRC staff before issuance of the operating license. This is Open Item 33 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 33:

"The applicable DCNs are as follow:

- DCN 53421 for the removal/abandonment of Reciprocating Charging Pump 2-MTR-62-101, supplied from 480V SHDN BD 2B1-B, Compt. 3B, has been issued.
- DCN 54636 for the cable modifications for Unit 2 AFWP Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve and Turbine Controls has been issued.

NRC will be notified when the physical work has been completed for these two DCNs."



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			----- -----
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			Open item 33 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated March 24, 2015.
			-----
			TVA to NRC letter dated April 7, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15097A421) notified the NRC of the completion of field work for plant modifications made per DCN 53421 and DCN 54636.
			-----
8.3.3	22	CO	8.3.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involving submergence of electrical equipment as result of a LOCA
		13	In the original 1982 SER and SSER3, staff stated that the design for the automatic deenergizing of loads as a result of a LOCA would be verified as part of the site visit. During the August 1991, visit and in a letter for both units dated September 13, 1991, TVA committed to revise the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR in amendment 71. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.
			-----
			8.3.3.1.3 Failure Analysis of Circuits Associated with Cables and Cable Splices Unqualified for Submergence
			By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC reviewed the submergence calculation and closed the issue.
			Unit 2 Action: Revise calculation for WBN Unit 2.
			-----
			8.3.3.1.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - verify design for bypass of thermal overload protective device
			In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the design for bypass of thermal overload protective devices on safety-related motor operated valves would be verified during the electrical drawing review. The staff subsequently reviewed the drawings and closed the issue in SSER2.
			-----
			8.3.3.1.4 Use of Waterproof Splices in Potentially Submersible Sections of Underground Duct Runs
			By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13 and 14, NRC raised a concern on splice usage in raceways. TVA submitted additional information for both units by letters dated November 18, 1994, and January 5, 1995. In SSER15, NRC found that TVA had adequately justified the acceptability of the installed splices at Watts Bar.
			-----
			8.3.3.1.5 Dow Corning RTV-3140 Used to Repair Damaged Kapton Insulated Conductors
			In SSER15, NRC reviewed the use of RTV-3140. TVA submitted the technical basis for use in a December 6, 1994, letter for both units. TVA completed additional testing and told the NRC of the limited use of this repair method for both units by letter dated February 10, 1995. In SSER15, NRC found the use of RTV-3140 acceptable for the limited use described.
			-----
			8.3.3.1.6 Cable Damage Near Splices and Terminations
			In SSER16, NRC reviewed TVA's corrective action plan for Construction Deficiency Report 390/95-02 and found the limited inspections for damaged Class 1E cables to 10 CFR 50.49 installations acceptable. This



was a WBN Unit 1 only CDR.

## 8.3.3.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - revise FSAR to reflect requirements of shared safety systems

In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that the description and analysis of shared onsite AC and DC systems was under review but was acceptable pending revision of the FSAR. In SSER3, the confirmatory issue was left open to track additional information to be incorporated in the FSAR. In a letter dated September 13, 1991, TVA provided the additional information. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue. In SSER14, NRC added additional clarification.

## 8.3.3.2.2 Sharing of AC Distribution Systems and Standby Power Supplies Between Units 1 and 2

In the SER and SSER3, NRC reviewed the design to the guidelines of RG 1.81 and determined it was acceptable pending revision to the FSAR. NRC noted discrepancies in the FSAR. By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

## 8.3.3.2.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for design of sharing raceway systems between units

In the original SER, NRC indicated that the design for sharing of raceway systems between units would be verified during the electrical drawing review. The staff confirmed that cable routing was in accordance with accepted separation criteria and closed the issue in SSER2.

## 8.3.3.2.4: LICENSE CONDITION – Possible sharing of DC control power to AC switchgear

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that all possible interconnections between redundant divisions through normal and alternate power sources to various loads be identified in the FSAR. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

## 8.3.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION – Testing of associated circuits

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective devices used to isolate non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

## 8.3.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION – Testing of non-class 1E cables

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective devices used to isolate non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided additional information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

## 8.3.3.3 Physical Independence (Compliance with GDC 17)

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. The information was incorporated into the FSAR by amendment 71. Surveillance requirements for the testing of protective devices used to protect Class 1E circuits from failure of non-Class 1E circuits were incorporated into the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). This issue was closed based on review of the TRM in SSER13.

Unit 2 Action:

Incorporate testing requirements into the Unit 2 TRM.

### 8.3.3.3 Physical Independence (Compliance with GDC 17)

In SSER13, NRC cited differences between RG 1.75 and the WBN design criteria (WB-DC-30-4). In SSER14, NRC continued the review. NRC requested additional information for both WBN units by letter dated March 28, 1994. TVA responded for both WBN units by letters dated July 29, 1994, January 11, 1995, and June 5, 1995. In SSER16, NRC found separation between open cable trays (including cables in free air) adequate.

### 8.3.3.5.1 Compliance with Regulatory Guides 1.108 and 1.118

In SSERs 13, 14 and 15, NRC reviewed WBN compliance with RGs 1.108 and 1.118. In SSER13, NRC reviewed WBN's use of temporary jumper wires when portable test equipment is used during testing. The justification was documented in the FSAR. In SSER14 and 15, NRC reviewed Class 1E standby power system testing, testing DG full load rejection capability and non-class 1E circuitry for transmitting signals needed for starting DGs. NRC concluded that the features were appropriately tested.

### 8.3.3.5.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - incorporate commitment to test only one of four diesel generators at one time

In the original 1982 SER, the NRC found the commitment to test DGs one at a time acceptable pending its incorporation into the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC reviewed the documentation and closed the issue.

### 8.3.3.5.3 Time Constraints for Stability of EDG During No-Load Startup Testing

In SSER16, NRC reviewed and approved changes to the no load emergency diesel generator testing surveillance requirements.

Unit 2 Action:

Incorporate into WBN Unit 2 TS surveillances.

### 8.3.3.6: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE involving evaluation of penetrations' ability to withstand failure of overcurrent protection device

In the original 1982 SER, staff required a reevaluation of the penetrations' capability to withstand, without seal failure, the total range of available time-current characteristics assuming a single failure of any overcurrent protective device. In SSER3, staff found the results of the evaluation acceptable pending the information being incorporated in the FSAR. The staff reviewed the FSAR and closed the issue for both units in SSER7.

### 8.3.3.6: LICENSE CONDITION - Testing of reactor coolant pump breakers

In the original 1982 SER, staff required that the redundant fault current protective devices for the reactor coolant pump circuits meet RG 1.63. In SSER2, staff reviewed the design and concluded it met RG 1.63.

### 8.3.3.6 Compliance with GDC 50

By letter dated June 20, 1991, for both units, NRC requested additional information on Section 8 of the FSAR. TVA responded for both units by letter dated September 13, 1991. The information was incorporated into the FSAR in amendment 70. In SSER13, NRC indicated that the issue was resolved.

#### REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) was submitted on February 2, 2010.

8.3.3.3: TRM TR 3.8.1 specifies testing of circuit breakers that are used as isolation devices protecting 1E busses from non-qualified loads.

8.3.3.5.3: TS Sections 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15 and 3.8.1.21 require that voltage and frequency remain within specified limits following a fast start.

#### REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.3.3.1.1 of SSER22 included, "Therefore, the NRC staff considers the issue of submerged electrical equipment as a result of a LOCA to be resolved."

Section 8.3.3.1.2 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff concludes that the above clarification by TVA is acceptable, and the issue of thermal overload protective bypass is resolved."

Section 8.3.3.2 of SSER22 included, "In its December 6, 2010, letter, TVA stated that the adequacy of selective tripping has been verified to assure protection of safety-related dc systems from failure in the non-Class 1E circuits and common or safety/nonsafety-related circuits. All cascaded fuses were tested for selective coordination with the upstream protective devices."

Section 8.3.3.2.1 of SSER22 included, "Based on the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the sharing of the dc system will not significantly impair the ability of the system to perform its intended safety functions, including the scenario encompassing an accident in one unit and the orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining unit while considering the effects of a single failure. Therefore, the staff considers this issue resolved."

Section 8.3.3.2.2 of SSER22 included, "The electrical ac and dc systems have common buses and nonsafety loads supplied from train A or train B power supplies. In its letter dated August 30, 2010, TVA stated that separation is provided by selective coordination of protective devices for all ac (including 480 V) and dc circuits with molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) combinations or MCCB and fuse combinations or fuse/fuse combinations. Since selective coordination exists between the non-Class 1E and Class 1E circuits, the NRC staff concludes that this is acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.2.3 of SSER22 included, "Verification of the shared raceway design's conformance with GDC 5 through reviews of plant drawings and installation inspections is subject to the NRC construction inspection program."

Section 8.3.3.2.4 of SSER22 included, "In its response letter dated December 6, 2010, TVA stated that Section 8.3.2.1.1, "Physical Arrangements of Components," in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR discusses that the interconnection between redundant divisions of normal and alternate power sources for the components listed in FSAR Table 8.3-10 is arranged to provide adequate physical isolation and electrical separation to prevent a common mode failure. The listed components in FSAR Table 8.3-10 also meet the staff's positions

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

identified in Section 8.3.1.7 of the staff SER. TVA has reviewed the components listed in WBN Unit 2 FSAR Table 8.3-10 and verified that their normal and alternate power supplies are physically and electrically separated. TVA has indicated that the Integrated Safeguards Test conducted in accordance with RG 1.41, "Preoperational Testing of Redundant Onsite Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignments," will demonstrate the independence of the divisions and furthermore, these components are energized to support Unit 1 operation and no design change is required for their normal and alternate power supplies in support of two unit operation. Since the arrangement meets the staff's positions in the SER, the staff finds this response acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.3 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff finds the information provided by TVA regarding isolation of non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits to be acceptable. The NRC staff requested TVA confirm that, for those circuit breakers that are required to be tested periodically as discussed above, the TRM includes the surveillance requirements for both items 8.3.3.2 and 8.3.3.3. In a letter dated December 6, 2010, TVA stated that the breaker testing requirements are provided in Technical Requirement (TR) 3.8.1 of the WBN Unit 2 TRM. This section of the TRM was originally provided in accordance with a TVA to NRC letter dated March 4, 2009. It was updated in a TVA letter dated February 2, 2010. The NRC staff's review confirmed that necessary circuit breaker testing requirements have been included in Section TR 3.8.1 of the TRM submitted by TVA for Unit 2."

Section 8.3.3.4(1) of SSER22 included, "The staff finds the TVA response as acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.4(2) of SSER22 included, "The staff finds the TVA response acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.5 of SSER22 included, "Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has met the requirements of GDC 18 with respect to the onsite ac and dc power system."

Section 8.3.3.5.1 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff reviewed the exceptions to RG 1.9, Revision 3, and concludes that they are not significant to safety and are, therefore, acceptable."

Section 8.3.3.5.2 of SSER22 included, "Since TVA has updated the FSAR to reflect that tests will be performed on only one of the four power trains at any one time, the SER item is resolved for WBN Unit 2."

Section 8.3.3.6 of SSER22 included, "The NRC staff concludes that TVA continues to meet the requirements of GDC 50 with respect to electrical penetrations containing circuits of the safety and nonsafety onsite power system."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct Status to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.

8.4.0	22	CI	Station Blackout (SBO) - SE for both units – March 18, 1993; SSE for both units – September 9, 1993.
		13	Unit 2 Action: Implement SBO requirements.

## REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 8.4.8 of SSER22 (Summary and Conclusions) stated:

"Based on the information provided by TVA regarding meeting the requirements of the SBO rule, the NRC staff concludes that TVA's completed and proposed actions, processes, and procedures to address an SBO event are acceptable, pending resolution before WBN Unit 2 startup of the open items noted above in Section 8 of this SSER."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>NPG calculation EPMMA041592, "Station Blackout Coping Evaluation" evaluated the existing electrical and mechanical systems at Watts Bar using the NUMARC 87-00 methodology and guidance. The purpose of the calculation was to determine the systems capabilities and capacities to cope with the required four hour SBO duration using battery capacity only and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Modifications and procedural changes that must be made in order to ensure the systems' capability for coping were recommended in the conclusion section of the calculation.</p> <p>Physical modifications have been implemented by providing Nitrogen bottles to the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) which will provide adequate supply of control pressure to remotely modulate the AFW Level Control Valves (LCVs) from outside the South Valve Room.</p> <p>Quality Assurance requirements for components required for coping with an SBO event are already in place for Unit 1, the same requirements will apply to Unit 2 once an operating license is issued.</p> <p>The following procedures which were delineated in the calculation conclusion are in Independent Qualified Review (IQR) status for Unit 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* 2-ECA-0.0, "Loss of Shutdown Power"</li> <li>* 2-ECA-0.1, "Recovery from Loss of Shutdown Power Without SI Required"</li> <li>* O-AOI-35, "Loss of Offsite Power"</li> <li>* O-AOI-08, "Abnormal Operating Instruction for Tornado Watch or Warning"</li> </ul> <p>2-ECA-0.0, "Loss of Shutdown Power" added steps to address an extended loss of AC power, including initiating O-FSI-4, "DC Bus Management/Load Shed and 480V FLEX DG Alignment/Loading", and O-FSI-5.01, "Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging". The requirements of Station Blackout (SBO) and FLEX are implemented by 2-ECA-0.0 (including the load shedding of the 250V Station Batteries). At the point where the Shutdown Boards are aligned to the 6.9KV Flex Diesels, a recovery of Offsite Power and/or Onsite Emergency Power is no longer viable under SBO guidance (See Caution 2 prior step 18 in 2-ECA-0.0). At this point the plant is no longer in a Station Blackout Event and the procedure proceeds in only a FLEX strategy.</p>
9.1.3	27	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER11, the staff reviewed TVA's revised commitment regarding testing of spent fuel pool cooling pumps and found it acceptable.</p> <p>As a result of a submittal filed as a petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 regarding spent fuel storage safety issues, the staff reevaluated the spent fuel cooling capability at WB considering the identified issues and concluded that the spent fuel cooling system satisfied the requirements of GDC 44 with regard to transferring heat from the spent fuel to an ultimate heat sink under normal operating and accident conditions in SSER15.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>9.1.3 of SSER23 includes:</p> <p>"The staff reviewed the changes proposed by TVA to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR in its letter dated December 21, 2010, and compared the changes to the spent fuel pool cooling acceptance criteria applied to</p>

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

WBN Unit 1 and the FSAR content requirements of 10 CFR 50.34. The staff found that the design of the SFPCCS is unchanged and remains acceptable, consistent with the conclusions of the staff as documented in the SER and its supplements. Based on its review, the staff concluded that TVA demonstrated that the cooling capability of the existing SFPCCS was adequate for the increased heat load imposed by alternating fuel discharges from WBN Units 1 and 2 under normal operating conditions, as required by GDC 44 and 61. The staff concludes that the proposed description of the design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 adequately supports operation of WBN Unit 2 and is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34, and is, therefore, acceptable. Amendment of the FSAR description of the design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 as proposed by TVA in its December 21, 2010, letter to the NRC, is Open Item 60 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 60 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should amend the FSAR description of the design and operation of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system in FSAR Section 9.1.3 as proposed in its December 21, 2010, letter to the NRC. (Section 9.1.3)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 9.1.3 included the following for Open Item 60:

"The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR in Amendment 103 to add the description of the system as proposed in its letter dated December 21, 2010. Therefore, Open Item 60 is closed."

The SSER status remains as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER shows Status as "Resolved."

9.2.1	27	CO	In SSER9, the staff noted that Amendment 65 indicated that ERCW provided cooling to the instrument room chillers, instead of room coolers and stated that conclusions in the SER and supplements were still valid. In SSER10, the staff reviewed discrepancies between FSAR figures pertaining to the raw cooling water system and its valving and TVA's clarification of these discrepancies, and considered them resolved.
		13	

In SSER18, the staff concluded that ERCW does not conform to GDC 5 for two-unit operation.

Unit 2 Action: Appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that the ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design requirements for two unit operation.

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.2.1 of SSER23 includes:

"The staff should verify that the ERCW dual unit flow balance confirms that the ERCW pumps meet all specified performance requirements and have sufficient capability to supply all required ERCW normal and accident flows for dual unit operation and accident response, in order to verify that the ERCW pumps meet GDC 5 requirements for two-unit operation. This is Open Item 90 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"In its response by letter dated April 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11 104A059), TVA stated that the most limiting cooldown analysis to verify compliance with GDC 5 is a LOCA in Unit 2 with a complete loss of ERCW train A equipment as the single failure with a loss of offsite power (LOOP). All ERCW train B equipment is available, including CCS heat exchanger C and two of four ERCW train B pumps. Core decay heat for the accident unit is conservatively held constant. TVA's analysis determined that ERCW train B has sufficient capability, approximately 19 hours after the nonaccident unit enters hot standby, to remove decay heat from both the accident unit and the nonaccident unit. The time to reach cold shutdown for the nonaccident unit is 46 hours after the nonaccident unit is shut down to hot standby. Based on its review of the information provided by TVA in its letter dated April 13, 2011, the staff concludes that the ERCW system is able to support a cold shutdown of the nonaccident unit within 46 hours of a LOCA in the other unit and hot standby in the nonaccident unit, coincident with a single failure and a LOOP. Therefore, the staff concludes that the ERCW system meets the requirements of GDC 5, which requires that sharing of systems that are important to safety will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the nonaccident unit. TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011, and as described above. This is Open Item 91 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 90 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"The NRC staff should verify that the ERCW dual unit flow balance confirms that the ERCW pumps meet all specified performance requirements and have sufficient capability to supply all required ERCW normal and accident flows for dual unit operation and accident response, in order to verify that the ERCW pumps meet GDC 5 requirements for two-unit operation. (Section 9.2.1)"

Open Item 91 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011. (Section 9.2.1)"

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

For Open Item 91:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014, submitted Amendment 112 to the Unit 2 FSAR.

A portion of this amendment revised Section 9.2.1 to provide information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011. FSAR portions revised were 9.2.1.3 and 9.2.2.4.

TVA to NRC letter dated June 12, 2014, provided response to an NRC RAI. The letter contained the following:

"The RAI requests information on alignment of pumps and heat exchangers in the Component Cooling Water System (CCS) for certain combinations of design basis events and design basis accidents. TVA's response is provided in the enclosure. Changes required for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant WBN) Unit 2 FSAR, Section 9.2 were provided by the above reference." [The "above reference" was TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014]



REVISION 13 UPDATE:

The flow balance was approached to assure that Unit 1 and 2 loads would be satisfied for all design conditions and provide assurance that Unit 1 would receive required flow during the dual unit flow balance effort. All components meet or exceed their design basis flows or are justified in the calculation provided that the 2B CCS Heat Exchanger (Hx) is cleaned.

The 2B CCS Hx was cleaned, and testing was performed to get flow, pressure, and valve position readings. A PER was initiated to address the list of components which failed to meet the dual unit flow rate acceptance criteria, Engineering was tasked to evaluate the test data and provide final disposition. Design Engineering evaluated the results determining that the intermediate position of 2-FCV-67-146 produced satisfactory results, and the required intermediate position has been established. The flows and pressure are within acceptable tolerance and the restrictions of calculation MDQ00006720080341, Appendix 11, Dual Unit Operation ERCW System Flow Balance Test Results, were met.

The Unit 2 ERCW System Pressure Drop Calculation ensures that the ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design requirements for two unit operation by meeting or exceeding the design basis flow or justified by evaluation.

9.2.1 has 2 Open Items (OIs) cited in it. To make it easier to track them, the following status table was added during Revision 13:

OI	STATUS
90	Remains OPEN.
91	CLOSED in Revision 13 portion.

SSER27 contains the following under 9.2.1 Essential Raw Cooling Water System

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 91

Open Item 91 states, "TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a LOOP, as provided in TVA's letter dated April 13, 2011."

In FSAR Amendment 112 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14160A901), TVA updated the FSAR describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5. The NRC staff has reviewed these changes and found them to be acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 91 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

Status of this item was changed to "CO" above because Open Item 90 remains OPEN; TVA action remains.

9.2.2	27	C	CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - relocate component cooling thermal barrier booster pumps above probable maximum flood (PMF) level before receipt of an OL
		13	TVA committed to relocate the pumps above PMF level and the staff found this acceptable. Implementation for this issue was resolved for Unit 1 in SSER5 when the staff verified in IR 390/84-20 that the pumps had been relocated. Additionally, IR 390/83-06 and 391/83-05 verified that the 4 booster pumps had been relocated and the construction deficiency reports identifying this issue for both units were closed.
			Unit 2 Action: Verify relocation of pumps for Unit 2.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.2.2 of SSER23 includes:

"In the SER, the NRC staff stated that TVA committed to relocating the component cooling booster pumps above the probable maximum flood (PMF) level. The staff found this commitment acceptable pending verification that the modifications were completed before loading fuel into the reactor. In SSER 5, dated November 1990, the staff verified that these pumps for Unit 1 had been relocated above PMF level. TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF level. This is Open Item 67 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 67 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF level. (Section 9.2.2)"

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

NRC to TVA letter dated March 20, 2014, contained the following:

However, since the initiation of the WBN Unit 2 completion project, the WBN PMF level has further increased.

As a result, TVA has determined that rather than relocating the CCS Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps to above the later PMF level, it would prefer to implement flood barrier modifications to prevent water damage to both units pumps in the event of a PMF. ... with WBN Unit 2 implementation of these modifications to be completed prior to Unit 2 licensing ...

... Therefore, this letter supersedes the previous commitment by implementing barrier modifications rather than relocating the pumps.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Open Item 67 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-615, dated February13, 2015.

Flood barrier modifications for the CCS Thermal Barrier Booster pumps have been implemented.

SSER27 contains the following under 9.2.2 Component Cooling System (Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling Water System)

"Open Item 67

Open Item 67 states, 'TVA should confirm, and the NRC staff should verify, that the component cooling booster pumps for Unit 2 are above PMF [probable maximum flood] level.'

By letter dated March 20, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14085A009), TVA stated that rather than relocating the component cooling system thermal barrier booster pumps above the PMF level, it is implementing a flood barrier modification to prevent water damage to both Unit 1 and Unit 2 pumps in the event of a PMF. The flooding barriers around the Unit 1 pumps have been installed and inspected by the NRC staff (Inspection Report 05000390/2014003), verifying that the height of the barriers are greater than the proposed PMF level for WBN. The Unit 2 barriers are the same design as the Unit 1 barriers and have been verified to be partially installed. For Unit 2, a section of the barrier has been left open allowing access to the pump for pre-operational testing. The Unit 2 barrier will be fully installed prior to fuel load. The NRC staff considers Open Item 67 closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

9.2.5	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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13

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

9.2.5 of SSER23 includes:

"The NRC staff considers the ability to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours to meet "the orderly shutdown and cool down" requirement of GDC-5. Since the minimum available flow from the Tennessee River is well in excess of the ERCW flow requirements, the staff considers the UHS to meet the requirements of GDC 5. TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours. This is Open Item 66 (Appendix HH)."

SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 66 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours. (Section 9.2.5)"

REVISION 10 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 12, 2011, submitted Amendment 105 to the Unit 2 FSAR. This clarified FSAR Section 9.2.5 as needed.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink

"Open Item 66

Open Item 66 states, 'TVA should clarify FSAR Section 9.2.5 to add the capability of the UHS [ultimate heat sink] to bring the nonaccident unit to cold shutdown within 72 hours.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 105, to add clarification that the UHS is capable of bringing the nonaccident unit to cold shut down within 72 hours. Therefore, Open Item 66 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9.5.2	27	C	LICENSE CONDITION – Performance testing of communications system
		13	The staff resolved this license condition in SSER5 based on TVA's letter of March 18, 1985 for both units, which described its testing of communications systems.
			Unit 2 Action: Perform testing of communication systems on Unit 2.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."
10.2.0	27	C	In SSER5, the staff agreed that the interval between periodic turbine valve testing could be increased for WB from weekly to monthly.
		13	
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).
			REVISION 13 UPDATE:
			SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."
10.3.4	22	C	LICENSE CONDITION – Secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program
		13	The staff determined that the secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program was being included in the administrative section of the Technical Specifications and resolved this for Unit 1 in SSER5.
			Unit 2 Action: Take same action for Unit 2.
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:
			Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.
			Section 5.7.2.13 provides information about the Secondary Water Chemistry Program.
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			Section 10.3.4 includes:

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

"Based on the NRC staff's review of FSAR Amendments 92 through 99, and because the applicable proposed TS for WBN Unit 2 is the same as that already approved by the staff for Unit 1, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 secondary water chemistry program is acceptable, and that Section 10.3.4 is resolved."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected STATUS to "C."

10.4.6	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
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13

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 10.4.6 includes:

"In WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 92 through 99, TVA made changes to the wording and format of Section 10.4.6, which is now titled "Condensate Polishing Demineralizer System." The NRC staff found that changes to the condensate cleanup system (CCS) instrumentation do not affect the staff's conclusion in the SER that the instrumentation and sampling equipment provided is adequate to monitor and control process parameters in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3.

However, the staff notes that the reference to Table 10.3.2, "Feedwater Chemistry Specification," and the table itself have been removed. As a result, the staff can no longer conclude that the CCS is capable of producing feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3.

TVA should provide information to the NRC staff that the CCS will produce feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3 or, alternatively, provide justification for producing feedwater purity to another acceptable standard. This is Open Item 35 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

TVA to NRC letter dated June 7, 2011, provided the following response to Open Item 35:

"TVA provided an update to FSAR Section 10.4.6 in Amendment 104."

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated May 30, 2014, submitted Amendment 112 to the Unit 2 FSAR.

A portion of this amendment revised the first paragraph of 10.3.5.2 (to address Open Item 35) to read as follows:

"The plant chemistry program establishes the steam generator steam side and feedwater chemistry specifications for normal power operations. This program is based on EPRI PWR secondary water chemistry guidelines as detailed in the plant chemistry program."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 10.4 Other Features

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

10.4.6 Condensate Cleanup System

Open Item 35

Open Item 35 states, 'TVA should provide information to the NRC staff that the CCS [condensate cleanup system] will produce feedwater purity in accordance with BTP MTEB 5-3 or, alternatively, provide justification for producing feedwater purity to another acceptable standard.'

TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 112, to include the statement 'The plant chemistry program establishes the steam generator steam side and feedwater chemistry specifications for normal power operations. This program is based on EPRI [Electric Power Research Institute] PWR secondary water chemistry guidelines as detailed in the plant chemistry program.' The NRC staff finds this to be consistent with staff expectations for secondary water chemistry, as described in BTP MTEB 5-3. Therefore, Open Item 35 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

11.3.0	27	C	In the SER, the staff identified that the hydrogen and oxygen monitoring system did not meet the acceptance criteria because redundant monitors had not been provided and because the system was not designed to automatically initiate action to mitigate the potential for explosion in the event of high oxygen content. This issue was addressed by Technical Specifications discussed in the original SER and in SSER8 but was later resolved in SSER16. Based upon NRC review of TVA's February 17, 1995, letter (submitted on both dockets), the staff accepted the WBN's system approach of preclusive of gas buildup, as allowed by SRP Section 11.3 guidelines, if TVA submitted an administrative program to satisfy administrative controls for TS 5.7.2.15, "Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program." As stated in TVA's letter dated July 21, 1995, the program would provide for monitoring and control of potential explosive mixtures, limit the concentration of oxygen, and surveillance to ensure that the limits are not exceeded. As a result of an SSER16 review, the staff concluded that the GWMS for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 met the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.3 and was acceptable.
		13	

#### REVISION 07 UPDATE:

11.3 of SSER24 reads:

"Both TVA's and the staff's calculations indicate that the design objectives in Sections II.A, II.B, and II.C of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 are met. However, the calculations do not support a conclusion that the criteria for gaseous effluents in RM 50-2, and thus Section II.D of Appendix I, are met. As noted in SSER Section 11.0 above, TVA has committed to demonstrating compliance with the dose-based criteria in RM 50-2, in lieu of providing a WBN liquid and gaseous effluent systems cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, Table 11.3-3 of this SSER indicates that the calculated maxim organ dose from the operation of two reactor units at the WBN site would be in excess of 18 mrem. This result does not meet Criterion C.1 in RM 50-2 for gaseous effluent releases of 15 mrem per year to the maximally exposed organ 'from all light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors at a site.' Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 states, 'In addition to the provisions of paragraphs A, B, and C above, the applicant shall include in the radwaste system all items of reasonably demonstrated technology that, when added to the system sequentially and in order of diminishing cost-benefit return, can for a favorable cost-benefit ratio effect reductions in dose to the population reasonably expected to be within 50 miles of the reactor.' TVA has not provided the analysis required by Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. TVA must demonstrate through a cost-benefit analysis that reasonable changes to the design of the WBN gaseous effluent processing systems would not sufficiently reduce the collective dose to the public within a 50-mile radius. Therefore, the staff cannot conclude that the doses to members of the public from effluent releases during the normal operation of WBN will be ALARA. This is Open Item 135 (Appendix HH)."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 135 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA has not provided the analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D. TVA must demonstrate with a cost-benefit analysis that a sufficient reduction in the collective dose to the public within a 50-mile radius would not be achieved by reasonable changes to the design of the WBN gaseous effluent processing systems. (SSER 24, Section 11.3)"

TVA to NRC letter dated July 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11213A261), "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 – Results from Cost-Benefit Analysis of Radwaste System Enhancements," included the following:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide a summary of the results of a cost-benefit study of enhancements to the WBN Unit 2 radwaste systems as committed to Reference 1.

Reference 2 Section II.D requires the preparation of a cost-benefit analysis to determine if enhancements to a plant's radwaste system should be incorporated into the plant design as part of applying the as low as reasonably achievable philosophy to normal plant releases of radiation. The cost-benefit analysis was prepared in accordance with the regulatory positions in Reference 3.

The analysis concluded that none of the enhancements evaluated were cost-beneficial and should be added to the WBN Unit 2 design. The enclosure provides the details from the cost-benefit analysis."

See the letter for the References.

#### REVISION 08 UPDATE:

The Conclusions portion of 11.3 of SSER25 included:

"Based on the NRC staff's evaluation, as documented in SSER 24, and the results of the cost-benefit analysis, the staff concludes that the WBN effluent systems can maintain gaseous releases within the design objectives in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Sections II.A, II.B, and II.C, and are as low as is reasonably achievable, as required in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Section II.D. Therefore, Open Item 135 is closed. The results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, should be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that the update has been made by TVA. This is Open Item 139 (Appendix HH)."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

#### REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; it included the following for Open Item 139:

"Item No. 139 regarding the results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, has been addressed by revisions to Sections 11.2.9.2 and 11.3.10.2 within A109."



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 contains the following under 11.3 Gaseous Waster Management</p> <p>“Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)</p> <p>Open Item 139</p> <p>Open Item 139 states, ‘The results of the cost-benefit analysis required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, subsection II.D, should be provided in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR. Upon receipt of the updated FSAR, the NRC staff will confirm that the update has been made by TVA.’</p> <p>The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the results of the cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, Open Item 139 is closed.</p> <p>Status remains “Resolved” in SSER27.</p>
11.6.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>In SSER8, the staff reviewed the preoperational REMP program provided by letter dated June 14, 1991 (submitted for both dockets) The staff concluded in SSER Section 1.6.1, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring Program," that the Watts Bar preoperational REMP as proposed was adequate to provide baseline data which will assist in verifying radioactivity concentrations and related public exposures during plant operation, and was therefore acceptable. The staff provided a safety evaluation for both units via a September 10, 1991 letter.</p> <p>In SSER16, the staff superseded previous evaluations provided in this section by Sections 11.1 through 11.5 of this supplement, except for the material in Section 11.6.1 of SSER8, which was unaffected by supplement 16.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as “Resolved.”</p>
11.7.1	21	OI ----- 13	<p>LICENSE CONDITION (6a) - Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 – Noble Gas monitor</p> <p>In SSER5, TVA submitted letter dated April 26, 1985, on the Unit 1 docket which stated that the Unit 2 shield building vent monitor could not be installed by the time Unit 1 fuel load was scheduled in 1985 because of procurement problems. Since the 1985 fuel load was delayed, TVA subsequently committed in letter dated October 11, 1990, that this monitor and its sampler would be operational before fuel was loaded in Unit 1. This commitment eliminated the staff’s concern and resolved the proposed License Condition 6a.</p> <p>Also, in SSER5, TVA letter dated November 8, 1983 (submitted on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 dockets) requested an exception to the requirement to monitor pressurized-water reactor steam safety valve discharge and atmospheric steam dump valve discharge to be monitored by high-range noble gas effluent monitors by stating that adequate instrumentation was provided to detect a steam generator tube rupture. The staff disagreed with this approach which resulted in TVA subsequently committing in a letter dated October 11, 1990 (submitted on both dockets) that the required high range noble gas effluent monitor would be operational before fuel load. This commitment resolved the staff’s concern and eliminated the need for License Condition 6a.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>LICENSE CONDITION (6b) - Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 – Iodine particulate sampling</p>

See 7.5.2.

In addition, in SSER5, by letter dated April 26, 1985, submitted on the Unit 1 docket, TVA committed to have the capability for continuous collection in place (i.e., procedures and any minor system modifications necessary) before exceeding 5-percent power. The staff evaluated this commitment and found it acceptable. Since 1985 licensing of Watts Bar was delayed, TVA subsequently committed via letter dated January 3, 1991, as discussed in SSER6 that the procedural revision and upgrade of the radiation monitors would be done by Unit 1 fuel load. Thus License Condition 6b was resolved in SSER6.

In SSER6, TVA via letter dated January 3, 1991, committed to have the procedural revision and upgrade of the radiation monitors by fuel load. This commitment ensured the plant would have the capability for continuous collection of post accident gaseous effluents by fuel load.

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In SSER5, the staff noted that the WBN design did not include a high-range noble gas effluent monitor as described in NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 1, for the auxiliary building vent because the release is diverted to the shield building vent for design-basis accidents. A low-range to high-range radiation monitor is provided in the shield building ventilation stack. By letter dated November 22, 1983, TVA requested an exception to NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, concerning the installation of high-range noble gas monitors on the auxiliary building vent at Watts Bar. TVA provided the staff additional information at a meeting on December 20, 1983, and subsequently in a submittal dated January 24, 1984. The staff concluded that the auxiliary building vent was not considered to be a potential accident release pathway and, therefore, the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant design, as described above, does not need to be changed to provide for the addition of a high-range noble gas effluent monitor, as described in NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 1, for the auxiliary building vent.

The above items were identified as CI by NRC in May 28, 2008, letter.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

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REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Corrected the Status above to "OI" to agree with the SSER.

12.4.0	27	C	In SSER10, the staff reviewed revised operational test frequency of area radiation monitors from monthly to quarterly and found that TVA's program met the provisions of 10 CFR 20.1601(c) and the acceptance criteria in SRP Section 12.3 and was, therefore, acceptable.
		-----	
		13	In SSER14, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 84 in light of the revised requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The staff found these sections, as amended, complied with the acceptance criteria in the SRP and was acceptable to the staff. In addition, the staff reviewed revised FSAR Section which specified the radiation dose rate design criteria for the placement and configuration of plant system valves. This section as amended was consistent with the staff's conclusion that Watts Bar can be operated within the dose limits and that radiation doses can be maintained ALARA. Therefore, these changes were acceptable to the staff.
			In SSER18, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendments 89 and 90 in which TVA had revised the discussions of the installed area radiation monitoring and the fixed airborne radiation monitoring systems. In addition, Amendment 90 revised the estimated maximum radiation dose rates depicted on the radiation zone maps for several areas in the plant. The staff also reviewed FSAR text changes that clarified the distinctions between a monitor calibration, a monitor channel operational test, and a check source functional test and deleted

discussions of fixed airborne radiation monitors in the Unit 2 hot sample room and the Unit 1 control room and were replaced with portable continuous air monitors (CAMs). The staff found this acceptable since it did not change the staff's conclusion documented in SSER14.

## REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.4 of SSER24 includes:

"In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA deleted FSAR Figures 12.3-18 and 12.3-19. These figures contained the drawings of WBN radiation protection design features, including controlled access areas, decontamination areas, and onsite laboratories and counting rooms. In lieu of providing drawings depicting these radiation protection design features, TVA provided a description of each. In response to RAI 12-7 regarding the FSAR changes, TVA provided clarifying information in its letters dated June 3 and October 4, 2010. In its October 4, 2010, letter, TVA stated that the WBN Unit 2 access controls to radiological areas (including contaminated areas), personnel and equipment decontamination facilities, onsite laboratories and counting rooms, and health physics facilities (including dosimetry issue, respiratory protection bioassay, and radiation protection management and technical staff) are all common to WBN Unit 1. Furthermore, TVA stated that these facilities are sized and situated properly to support two operating units. Based on TVA's response, the staff concluded that the FSAR changes did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusion, as documented in SSER 18, issued October 1995. Therefore, the changes are acceptable. TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the radiation protection design features descriptive information provided in its letter dated October 4, 2010. This is Open Item 112 (Appendix HH)."

AND

"In response to a staff RAI, TVA provided a calculation in a letter dated June 3, 2010, that purported to provide a statistical basis for setting the COT frequency for several in-plant area radiation monitors based on the operational maintenance history of WBN Unit 1. Although the NRC staff agrees that actual maintenance history can be used as a basis for establishing the frequency of routine maintenance, the staff identified several deficiencies in the calculations provided by TVA. In a July 25, 2011, meeting, TVA stated that it will revise the FSAR to indicate that the COT frequency for WBN nonsafety-related area radiation monitors will be performed quarterly or periodically at a frequency consistent with monitor operational maintenance history. This alternate frequency will be based on test data from monitors of the same type and model as the WBN Unit 2 monitors, operated under similar environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, humidity). A statistical analysis of these data will establish that, at the COT frequency selected, there is at least a 95-percent probability at a 95-percent confidence level (i.e., less than or equal to a 5-percent Type I error (false alarm) and a 5-percent Type II error (failed alarm), respectively) that each monitor will be found within the established 'as found' acceptance criteria in subsequent tests. TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the justification for the periodicity of the COT frequency for WBN nonsafety-related area radiation monitors described in this paragraph. This is Open Item 113 (Appendix HH).

In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA added two area radiation monitors to the list of monitors for the spent fuel pit area (0-RE-90-102 and 103) in Table 12.3-4, 'Location of Plant Area Radiation Monitors.' Each monitor uses a Geiger-Mueller type gamma detector, with its own independent high-voltage power supply and a range of 1×10<sup>-1</sup> to 1×10<sup>4</sup> milliroentgen per hour. Visual and audible alarms are provided in the control room upon detection of high radiation or instrument malfunction. In addition, visual and audible alarms are provided that annunciate locally upon detection of high radiation. These two monitors are located on opposite sides of the 757-foot elevation of the auxiliary building and, with the existing area monitors (1-RE-90-1 and 2-RE-90-1), alert personnel in the vicinity of the fuel storage areas of excessive radiation for personnel protection and to initiate safety actions. The staff concludes that WBN meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.68, 'Criticality Accident Requirements,' and is therefore acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to state that WBN meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.68. This is Open Item 114 (Appendix HH)."

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>AND</p> <p>"These changes to the auxiliary building airborne monitoring reflect the current operational configuration of WBN Unit 1. They do not alter the staff's conclusion in SSER 18 that use of portable continuous airborne monitors is acceptable and that the licensee meets the monitoring requirements in 10 CFR 20.1501, 'General.'"</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 112 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the radiation protection design features descriptive information provided in its letter dated October 4, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.4)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 113 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should provide an update to the FSAR reflecting the justification for the periodicity of the COT frequency for WBN non-safety related area radiation monitors. (SSER 24, Section 12.4)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 114 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect that WBN meets the radiation monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 50.68. (SSER 24, Section 12.4)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26, Section 12.4 included the following for Open Items 112, 113, and 114:</p> <p>"TVA provided the requested updates in FSAR Amendment 105, and the NRC staff verified that the updates were acceptable. Therefore, Open Items 112, 113, and 114 are closed."</p> <p>SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
12.5.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>In SSER14, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 88 which revised the discussion of the estimate of personnel internal exposures to address the new 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The staff concluded that this section as amended provided reasonable assurance that the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1502 and 20.1703 would be met. In addition, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 84 which updated the predicted maximum annual doses resulting from plan operation and determined that this section as amended provides reasonable assurance that the radiation doses resulting from plant operations would not exceed the limits in 10 CFR 20.1301.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 07 UPDATE:

12.5 of SSER24 includes:

"Based on the information provided by TVA in its letter to the NRC dated June 3, 2010, and because historical experience has demonstrated that the average annual collective dose to operate WBN Unit 1 was less than 100 person-rem, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that WBN Unit 2 can be operated at or below 100 person-rem average annual collective dose. Therefore, FSAR Section 12.4 is acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design changes to be implemented to lower radiation levels, as provided in its letter to the NRC dated June 3, 2010. This is Open Item 115 (Appendix HH)."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Open Item 115 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design changes to be implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in its letter the NRC dated June 3, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.5)"

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; it included the following for Open Item 115:

"For Item No. 115, FSAR A109, Section 12.4 has been updated to reflect the design changes implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in TVA's letter dated June 3, 2010 ..."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 12.5 Dose Assessment

"Open Item 115

Open Item 115 states, 'TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the information regarding design changes to be implemented to lower radiation levels as provided in its letter [to] the NRC dated June 3, 2010.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendments 105 and 109, to include the information previously provided in its letter dated June 3, 2010. Therefore, Open Item 115 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
12.6.0	27	C	OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving Health Physics Program
		13	<p>The staff reviewed TVA's RADCON program (formerly the HP program) and found that the WBN organizational structure can provide adequate support for the RADCON program and that organizational changes described in the FSAR amendments met the staff's acceptance criteria. They considered this issue resolved in SSER10. In SSER14, the staff reviewed the revised FSAR sections (through Amendment 88), and found them acceptable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>12.6 of SSER24 includes:</p> <p>"In FSAR Amendment 95, TVA made several editorial changes to FSAR Section 12.5 resulting from organizational changes at WBN. With the exception of the following two issues, these did not impact the staff's previous safety conclusion, as documented in SSER 14, issued December 1994, and are therefore acceptable. The remaining two issues are related to the qualifications of the radiation protection manager (RPM). FSAR Section 12.5.1 states that, 'The minimum qualification requirements for the Radiation Protection Manager are stated in Section 13.1.3.' FSAR Section 13.1.3 states that, 'Nuclear Power (NP) personnel at the Watts Bar plant will meet the qualification and training requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8 with the alternatives as outlined in the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A.' Specifically, TVA modified its commitment to the personnel qualification standards in RG 1.8, 'Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants,' by adding the caveat, 'with the alternatives as outlined in the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.' It was unclear to the staff whether or not TVA was committed to (1) the requirement that the RPM have 5 years of 'professional experience' and (2) the 3-month time limit on 'temporarily' assigning an RPM who does not meet the RPM qualifications (ANSI/ANS-3.1-1981, 'Selection, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants,' as referenced in RG 1.8). In response to RAIs 12-13 and 12-14, TVA clarified in its letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010, that it will meet the requirements of RG 1.8, Revision 2, and ANSI/ANS-3.1-1981 for all new personnel qualifying on positions identified in RG 1.8, Regulatory Position C.1, after January 1, 1990. These changes are consistent with the staff's acceptance criteria 12.5.A of SRP Section 12.5 as they pertain to staff qualifications and are, therefore, acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the qualification standards of the RPM as provided in its letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010. This is Open Item 116 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 116 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the qualification standards of the RPM as provided in its letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2010. (SSER 24, Section 12.6)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26, Section 12.6 included the following for Open Item 116:</p> <p>"TVA provided the requested update in FSAR Amendment 105, and the NRC staff verified that the update was acceptable. Therefore, Open Item 116 is closed."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
12.7.0	27	C	Approved for both units in SER.
		13	<p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>12.7 of SSER24 includes:</p> <p>"In FSAR Amendment 97, TVA revised the list in FSAR Section 12.3.2.2, 'Design Description,' of postaccident activities that require personnel access to vital areas of the plant, adding three and deleting the activities at the postaccident sampling facility. TVA added activities regarding (1) control or verification functions in the motor-generator set room or the 480-volt shutdown board room, or both, (2) installing the component cooling system/essential raw cooling water spool piece, and (3) refilling the refueling water storage tank following a loss-of-coolant accident. Operation of the postaccident sampling system (PASS) was deleted, since emergency operating procedures no longer rely on the results of a primary coolant sample during an accident, and technical specifications no longer require the operability of the PASS. The staff requested information on the dose consequences of the vital missions discussed in Section 12.3.2.2, including plant layout drawings depicting radiation zones during accident conditions and access/egress routes. By letters dated June 3 and December 10, 2010, TVA provided dose calculations and plant layout drawings depicting the access to, and egress from, WBN vital areas. TVA supplemented this information in a letter to the NRC dated February 25, 2011. TVA's commitments to clarify the calculational basis and establish corresponding implementing procedures for access to these vital areas, as stated in its February 25, 2011, letter, are subject to verification by NRC inspection. The staff concludes that TVA has demonstrated, by design calculations, that the actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of a design-basis accident at WBN Unit 2 can be performed such that occupational doses to plant operators are maintained within the dose criteria of GDC 19, as required by NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2. Therefore, the staff concludes that the shielding design for WBN Unit 2 is acceptable. TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. This is Open Item 117 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 117 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. (SSER 24, Section 12.7.1)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated August 23, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12244A018) submitted Amendment 109 to the Unit 2 FSAR; it included the following for Open Item 117:</p> <p>"For Item No. 117, FSAR A109, Section 12.3 has been updated to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in TVA's letter dated February 25, 2011 ... The additional analyses cases were made using the Iodine spike source term in conformance with Commitment 9 made in Enclosure 4 of Reference 2. The results provided represent the limiting results and are well below the regulatory limits. The commitment is considered closed."</p>



REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 12.7.1 Plant Shielding (TMI Action Item II.B.2)

"Open Item 117

Open Item 117 states, 'TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the information previously provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. Therefore, Open Item 117 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

12.7.1	27	C	NUREG-0737, II.B.2, "Plant Shielding" - NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.
		13	In SSER14, the staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 88 which revised the discussion of shielding for accident conditions. The staff stated that this change did not affect the staff's previous conclusion that Watts Bar conformed to the positions in NUREG-0737 Item II.B.2, and was therefore, acceptable to the staff. Identified as CI in NRC letter dated May 28, 2008.

Unit 2 Action:

Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations. CI in NRC May 28, 2008, letter.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).

REVISION 12 UPDATE:

The necessary mission dose calculations have been revised and apply to Unit 2. Completion of the radiation qualification of Unit 2 safety related equipment, as addressed under the Equipment Environmental Qualification programs for Electrical Equipment (10CFR50.49) and Mechanical Equipment qualification programs will be accomplished via licensing commitments for the Equipment Qualification Special Program and Mechanical Equipment Qualification Special Program, respectively.

NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014 issued URI 391/2014-604-01 to Evaluate the Methodology for Calculating Mission Doses.

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014, closed URI 391/2014-604-01.

SSER27 contains the following under 12.7.1 Plant Shielding (TMI Action Item II.B.2)

"Open Item 117

Open Item 117 states, 'TVA should update the FSAR to reflect the calculational basis for access to vital areas as provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011.'

The NRC staff confirmed that TVA updated the FSAR, in Amendment 109, to include the information previously provided in its letter dated February 25, 2011. Therefore, Open Item 117 is closed."

Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.

13.1.3	27	<b>C</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Use of experienced personnel during startup
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**13** In the original 1982 SER, NRC provided a LICENSE CONDITION to ensure TVA augmented the shift staff with individuals that had prior experience with large pressurized water reactor operations. In SSER8, NRC reviewed TVA's commitment in the FSAR and the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan to comply with RG 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training,". NRC staff considered that this provided adequate assurance, and eliminated the LICENSE CONDITION.

Unit 2 Action: Submit staffing and NQAP for two unit operation.

REVISION 06 UPDATE:

Section 13.1.3 includes:

"In order to complete its evaluation of TVA's plant staff organization, TVA should provide information to the NRC staff to allow the staff to confirm that:

- 1) The education and experience of management and principal supervisory positions down through the shift supervisory level conform to RG 1.8. The staff will review the resumes to confirm this.
- 2) TVA has an adequate number of licensed and non-licensed operators in the training pipeline to support the preoperational test program, fuel loading, and dual unit operation.
- 3) The plant administrative procedures clearly state that when the Assistant Shift Engineer assumes his duties as Fire Brigade Leader, his control room duties are temporarily assumed by the Shift Supervisor (Shift Engineer), or by another SRO, if one is available. The staff will confirm that the plant administrative procedures clearly describe this transfer of control room duties.

These are Open Items 9, 10, and 11 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, Open Items 9 and 11 are for NRC Inspection / Review.

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

13.1.3 of SSER25 reads:

"13.1.3 Plant Staff Organization

Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 11 (Appendix HH) states the following:

The plant administrative procedures should clearly state that, when the Assistant Shift Engineer assumes his duties as Fire Brigade Leader, his control room duties are temporarily assumed by the Shift Supervisor (Shift Engineer), or by another SRO [senior reactor operator], if one is available. The plant administrative procedures should clearly describe this transfer of control room duties.

In Enclosure 1 of its letter dated August 15, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML11230A385), the Tennessee Valley Authority provided its revised Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1/Unit 2 as-designed fire protection report. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff reviewed Section 9.1, 'Fire Brigade Staffing,' of the fire protection report and concluded that, because it ensures that the fire brigade will not use members of the minimum shift crew, there is no need for an administrative procedure to describe a transfer of control room duties. Therefore, Open Item 11 is closed. "

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

SSER Open Items 9 and 10 were closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-603, dated May 9, 2014.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 contains the following under 13.1.3 Plant Staff Organization

"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)

Open Item 9

Open Item 9 states, 'Confirm that education and experience of management and principal supervisory positions down through the shift supervisory level conform to Regulatory Guide 1.8.'

Per NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14129A381), the education and experience of management at Watts Bar were confirmed to conform to the requirements of RG 1.8, regarding the management of Unit 2 post-construction. Therefore, Open Item 9 is closed.

Open Item 10

Open Item 10 states, 'Confirm that TVA has an adequate number of licensed and non-licensed operators in the training pipeline to support the preoperational test program, fuel loading, and dual unit operation.'

Per NRC Inspection Report 0500391/2014603, dated May 9, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14129A381), the applicant had enough qualified personnel to staff for dual unit operation. The applicant had enough reactor operators in the training pipeline to be able to staff the reactor operator position with reactor operators (rather than with senior reactor operators) after the June 2016 License Class. Therefore, Open Item 10 is closed."

Status remains "Resolved" in SSER27.

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
13.3.0	13	<b>S</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan submitted February 12, 1993. This review superseded the review in the SER.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.</p>
13.3.1	22	<b>S</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan submitted February 12, 1993. This review superseded the review in the SER. In SSER20, NRC completed the review including the findings of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section includes:</p> <p>"The objective of the NRC staff review documented here is to determine whether the proposed extension of the existing WBN REP to incorporate Unit 2 has adequately addressed the differences between the two units and any dual-unit issues that arise from the licensing and operation of Unit 2. The NRC will use the results from this review to make its finding, under 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(i), that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency at Unit 2. TVA should evaluate the impact of Unit 2 related changes on the effectiveness of the WBN REP, as it applies to Unit 1, under 10 CFR 50.54(q)."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.</p>
13.3.2	27	<b>S</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>In SSER13, NRC reviewed the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Plan submitted February 12, 1993. This review superseded the review in the SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness. In SSER20, NRC completed the review and found that the REP complied with NRC requirements and was acceptable for the full-power license of WBN Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.3.2.18 of SSER22 includes:</p> <p>"Section V of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires TVA to submit its detailed implementing procedures for its emergency plan no less than 180 days before the scheduled issuance of an OL. Completion of this</p>

requirement is an open item that must be resolved before the issuance of an OL. This is Open Item 43 (Appendix HH)."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

13.3.2 of SSER22 includes:

"The NRC staff review documented in this SSER used Revision 92 of the NP-REP and the WBN Unit 1/2 version of Appendix C, designated as Revision 92xx. Unless otherwise stated, "WBN REP," as used in this supplement, refers to Revision 92 of the NP-REP and the WBN Unit 1/2 version of Appendix C, Revision 92xx. The staff has identified an open item to review the combined WBN Appendix C before issuance of the Unit 2 OL to confirm (1) that the proposed Unit 2 changes were incorporated into Appendix C and (2) that changes made to Appendix C for Unit 1 since Revision 92 and the changes made to the NP-REP since Revision 92 do not affect the bases of the staff's findings in this SER supplement. This is Open Item 37 (Appendix HH)."

and

"In its April 27, 2010, response to RAI 6, TVA stated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a common control room, TSC, and OSC and that the Unit 1 communication facilities were originally designed and built to serve both units. As described in SSER 13, TVA's Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in Chattanooga, TN, serves as the EOF for Unit 1 and will serve as the EOF for Unit 2. TVA also stated in its response to RAI 7 that the Unit 2 design would provide plant data to the NRC's Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as is currently done for Unit 1. The staff finds that no dual-unit or unit-specific changes are necessary to reflect Unit 2, in that the communication capabilities were originally designed and built to serve both units. The staff plans to confirm the availability and operability of the ERDS for Unit 2 before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 38 (Appendix HH). The staff also plans to confirm the adequacy of the communications capability to support dual-unit operations before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 39 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.6]

and

"In its April 27, 2010, response to RAI 8, TVA stated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a common control room, TSC, OSC, and a local recovery center and that the Unit 1 facilities in place were originally designed and built to serve both units. As described in SSER 13, TVA's CECC, located in Chattanooga, TN, serves as the EOF for Unit 1 and will serve as the EOF for Unit 2. No dual-unit or unit-specific changes are necessary to reflect Unit 2, because that the facilities and equipment were originally designed and built to serve both units. The staff should confirm the adequacy of the emergency facilities and equipment to support dual-unit operations before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 40 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.8]

and

"In its April 27, 2010, response to RAI 9, TVA stated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a common control room, TSC, and OSC and that the Unit 1 facilities in place were originally designed and built to serve both units. As described in SSER 13, TVA's CECC, located in Chattanooga, TN, serves as the EOF for Unit 1 and will serve as the EOF for Unit 2. TVA also committed to (1) updating plant data displays as necessary to include Unit 2 and (2) updating dose assessment models to provide capabilities for assessing releases from both WBN units. The staff plans to confirm the adequacy of these items before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 41 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.9]

and

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>"Since these actions are currently in progress, the staff will confirm the adequacy of these assessment capabilities to support dual unit operations before issuance of the Unit 2 OL. This is Open Item 42 (Appendix HH)." [13.3.2.9]</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-609 closed SSER (Appendix H) Open Items Number 39 and 42.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Open Items 38 and 40 were closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014.</p> <p>Open Item 41 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-603, dated May 1, 2015.</p> <p>NOTE: These Open items have not been closed in an SSER.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.</p>
13.3.3	22	<b>S</b>	LICENSE CONDITION – Emergency Preparedness (NUREG-0737, III.A.1, III.A.2, III.A.2)
		<b>13</b>	<p>The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in SSER13 superseded the review in the original 1982 SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LICENSE CONDITION was deleted. In SSER20, NRC completed the review and found that the REP complied with NRC requirements and was acceptable for the full-power license of WBN Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit WBN REP for two unit operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.3.3 includes:</p> <p>"Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1)(i), and subject to the satisfactory completion of the confirmatory items identified above, there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency at either WBN Unit 1 or Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated September 12, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Submittal of Revision to the Radiological Emergency Plan and On-Shift Staffing Analysis," submitted dual-unit revisions for the generic part of the TVA REP (NP-REP) and Appendix C, the Watts Bar-specific part of the REP.</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
13.4.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>LICENSE CONDITION - Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) (NUREG-0737, I.B.1.2)</p> <p>In SSER8, NRC indicated that the ISEG would be established as part of the Technical Specifications. Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER8.</p> <p>Unit 2 action:</p> <p>Implement the alternate ISEG that was approved for the rest of the TVA units including WBN Unit 1 by NRC on August 26, 1999. The function will be performed by the site engineering organizations.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.4.0 includes:</p> <p>"TVA's review and audit administrative requirements conform to the applicable guidelines of ANSI N18.7-1976, as endorsed by RG 1.33, Revision 2. The plant review process is consistent with the applicable regulatory guidelines. The NRC staff concludes that the plant review process described in FSAR Section 13.4 and the TVA NQA Plan is consistent with applicable regulatory guidelines, will continue to satisfy the criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and therefore is acceptable."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."</p>
13.5.2	22	C ----- 13	<p>OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving operating, maintenance and emergency procedures</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, this issue was used to track the staff's review of the emergency operating procedures generation package. In SSER9, the staff concluded that the outstanding issue was no longer needed as the staff no longer performed such reviews. The emergency operating procedure development program review is performed under IP 42000, "Emergency Operating Procedures." This inspection will be performed before issuance of an operating license. In SSER10, NRC reviewed TVA's plan for vendor review of the power ascension test procedures and the Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs). Based on the Watts Bar plant specific simulator, NRC determined that a License Condition to ensure consistency with the Sequoyah EOIs was no longer necessary.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Issue operating, maintenance and emergency procedures.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 13.5.2 includes:</p> <p>"In 2010, TVA submitted FSAR Amendment 97 for WBN Unit 2. The section of the report pertaining to operating and maintenance procedures has been updated in structure. The content of this section satisfies</p>



the relevant portions of RG 1.33 and the TMI Action Plan Requirements. This section of the FSAR describes the different classifications of procedures that the operators will use in the control room and locally in the plant for plant operations. As with the administrative procedures, the FSAR describes TVA's program for developing the operating and emergency procedures in the section of the FSAR that follows the guidance of RG 1.33. The FSAR identified the individuals responsible for maintaining the procedures and the general format and content of the operating and maintenance procedures including emergency operating procedures. The different classifications of procedures and maintenance activities were also described. The FSAR addressed the following categories of procedures:

- general
- system
- operating
- abnormal
- emergency
- fuel handling
- maintenance
- modification

The identification of the individuals responsible and the descriptions of the content of the operating and maintenance procedures were in accordance with NUREG-0800. Based on this and the previous staff evaluation documented in the SER and its supplements, the NRC staff concludes that the operating and maintenance procedures are acceptable for WBN Unit 2."

SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct the Status to "C."

14.0.0	23	C	LICENSE CONDITION – Report changes to Initial Test Program
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13 In the original 1982 SER, this LICENSE CONDITION was intended to require TVA report to NRC within 30 days of modifying an approved initial test. In SSER7, the NRC accepted a commitment in TVA's July 1, 1991, letter to notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

Unit 2 Action:

Notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

In SSER3, the staff reviewed additional information and FSAR amendments through 46 addressing concerns identified by the staff in the FSAR. They concluded in SSER3 that the Initial Test Program (ITP), with the exception of open items as a result of modifications made to the program in subsequent amendments (through 53) for which the staff requested additional information, would meet the acceptance criteria of SRP section 14.2 and successful completion of the program would demonstrate functional adequacy of structures, systems and components.

In SSER5, the staff reviewed TVA submittals to address the open items from SSER3 and FSAR amendments through 55, and concluded that the program met the acceptance criteria of the SRP and was acceptable.

In SSER9, the staff stated that TVA commitments to reinstate the loss-of-offsite-power test for Unit 2 and revise the acceptance criteria for the reactor building purge system air flow rate (TVA letter dated July 10, 1991, for both units) were found acceptable to address two issues identified by the staff during their review of the FSAR through Amendment 67.

In SSER10, the staff agreed with TVA that there was no need to perform any natural recirculation test for

Units 1 and 2 (See subsection 5.4.3.)

In SSER12, the staff evaluated the ITP based on Amendment 74 to the FSAR, which addressed most of the staff's concerns raised during review of Amendment 69, in which the ITP was completely revised. The staff found that Chapter 14, as revised by Amendment 74, was generally adequate and in accordance with review criteria with the exception of 7 items, which would be evaluated in later supplements.

In SSER14, the staff evaluated changes made by TVA in Amendments 84 and 86, as well as 5 TVA letters submitted during 1994 to resolve the issues identified by the staff in SSER12, and changes made in FSAR Amendment 88 to address concerns still open prior to that amendment. The staff found that, with the exception of open items that remained open pending receipt and review of TVA's responses, the WB Units 1 and 2 ITP description contained in FSAR Chapter 14, updated through Amendment 88, was generally comprehensive and encompassed the major phases of the program requirements.

In SSER16, SSER18 and SSER19, the staff evaluated the ITP through amendments 89, 90 and 91 respectively and stated each time that it found the program to be comprehensive and encompassing the major phases of the testing program guidance presented in the SRP.

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A Unit 2 issue to verify capability of each common station service transformer to carry load required to supply ESF loads of 1 unit under LOCA condition in addition to power required for shutdown of non-accident unit was raised in SSER14, and the NRC stated that before an OL can be issued for Unit 2, TVA would have to demonstrate the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit. TVA agreed with the NRC position in a January 5, 1995, letter and the issue was resolved in SSER16.

Unit 2 Action:

Amend FSAR Chapter 14 to reflect the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit.

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REVISION 02 UPDATE:

The status in SSER21 is Open (Inspection).

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Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100191421).

Table 14.2-1 was revised to clarify the testing requirement.

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REVISION 05 UPDATE:

As a result of the response to NRC RAI 14 - 1, item 6. of Table 14.2-1 was revised again as part of Amendment 100 to the Unit 2 FSAR. Amendment 100 was submitted on September 1, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102500171).

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REVISION 07 UPDATE:

14.2.3 (Conclusions) of SSER23 includes:

"Section 1.7 of SSER 21 lists FSAR Section 14.0.0 as "Open (Inspection)." The staff performed its review for

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>WBN Unit 2 using the information provided by TVA in FSAR Amendments 97 through 102. Based on its review of the information provided by TVA, as described above, and its previous review, as documented in the SER and its supplements, the staff concludes that the ITP description contained in Chapter 14 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR, as updated through Amendment 102, is comprehensive and encompasses the major phases of the testing program requirements prescribed by various guidance documents, including the SRP and RG 1.70, Revision 3."</p> <p>SSER23 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 4.3.3 (Power Ascension Test Manger) of WBN Unit 2 Technical Instruction 2-TI-438, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Power Ascension Test Program, states:</p> <p>"EVALUATE the change for submittal to the NRC within 30 days under the provisions of 10CFR50.59 program."</p>
15.2.4	27	C	15.2.4.1 Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Assembly Bank Withdrawal from Zero-Power Condition
		13	<p>In SSER7, NRC reviewed additional analysis submitted for both units for a two pump, zero power, rod withdrawal. The NRC concluded the revision was acceptable. In SSER13, NRC accepted a change to a limiting condition for operation and bases changes to include a requirement that two reactor coolant pumps should be running whenever rods are capable of withdrawal in Mode 4.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Submit Technical Specifications.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>15.2.4.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for evaluation of Boron dilution and single failure criteria</p> <p>In a letter dated November 2, 1984, TVA stated that the boron dilution alarm system receives signals from two independent channels which are independently powered. Additionally, testing of these circuits was described. The staff concluded in SSER4 that the system is adequately protected from single failure and closed this item. In SSER14, NRC reviewed a reanalysis of the accident associated with uncontrolled boron dilution and accepted the analysis.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>15.2.4.6 Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection</p> <p>In SSER14, NRC accepted a change to the maximum cladding temperature for the rod ejection accident made in FSAR amendment 80.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.6 requires two RCS loops with both loops in operation when the rod control system is capable of rod withdrawal.</p>

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

## REVISION 07 UPDATE:

[all portions are from SSER24]

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.1 (Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analysis of the RWFS event and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure the SAFDLs are not exceeded. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.2 (Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the Rwap event and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. TVA has shown that the high neutron flux and overtemperature  $\Delta T$  trip channels provide adequate protection over the entire range of possible reactivity insertion rates (i.e., the minimum value of DNBR is higher than the DNBR SAL for all the analyzed cases). Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure the SAFDLs are not exceeded. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.3 (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of control rod misalignment events and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure the SAFDLs will not be exceeded during normal or anticipated operational transients. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.4 (Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant caused by a CVCS malfunction and concludes that the applicant's analyses used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems and operator actions will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of this event, for Modes 1, 2, and 6. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the plant will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 15, and 26, in the event of a decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant caused by a CVCS malfunction occurring in Modes 1, 2, and 6. The staff did not evaluate B dilution events occurring in Modes 3, 4, and 5 (Open Item 132, Appendix HH)."

The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.5 (Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into an Improper Position) reads:

"The NRC staff has reviewed TVA's analyses of the inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly into an improper

position and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems will ensure that the Condition III acceptance criteria will be satisfied. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 13 and 10 CFR Part 100 in the event of an inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly into an improper position."

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The Conclusion portion of 15.2.4.6 (Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power) reads:

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the single RCCA withdrawal at full power and concludes that it used acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the Condition III acceptance criteria will be satisfied. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that WBN Unit 2 will meet the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25, in the event of a single RCCA withdrawal at full power."

SSER24 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR).

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Open Item 132 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:

"TVA must provide the NRC staff with analyses of the boron dilution event that meet the criteria of SRP Section 15.4.6, including a description of the methods and procedures used by the operators to identify the dilution path(s) and terminate the dilution, in order for the staff to determine that the analyses comply with GDC 10. (SSER 24, Section 15.2.4.4)"

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## REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (Rals) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

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Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.

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Unit 2 fuel has been received.

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## REVISION 10 UPDATE:

SSER 26, Section 15.2.4.4 included the following for Open Item 132:

# ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's analyses of the decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant due to a CVCS malfunction and concludes that TVA performed the analyses using acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that TVA has demonstrated that the reactor protection and safety systems, and operator action will ensure that the SAFDLs and the RCPB pressure limits will not be exceeded as a result of this event, for all modes of plant operation. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the plant will meet the requirements in GDCs 10, 15, and 26 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 in the event of a decrease in boron concentration in the reactor coolant due to a CVCS malfunction. Therefore, Open Item 132 is closed. "

SSER 26 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."

## REVISION 12 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated June 30, 2014 provided the information to address SSER Open Item 132 as follows:

Information was added via FSAR Amendment 108 to meet commitment from TVA to NRC letter dated March 5, 2012.

A high level alarm was added to the volume control tank (VCT) that alarms and illuminates an unused main control room annunciator panel.

Annunciator Response Instruction (ARI) 2-Arl-109-115, CVCS & RHR - RPS & ESF was revised to include the new annunciator window and to identify inadvertent boron dilution event as a possible cause for the alarm. The ARI also identified Abnormal Response Instruction (AOI) 2-Aol-34, Immediate Boration as a response instruction. General Operating Instruction 2-G0-06, "Unit Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown", has been prepared and approved. This instruction includes the specific actions to limit the use of primary water pumps when the plant is in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown with a reactor coolant pump (RCP) in service, and to isolate the potential boron dilution paths, either by closing valves or placing pumps in pull-to-lock, after the last RCP is removed from service. This procedure will not be active for use until shortly before Unit 2 receives the Operating License.

## REVISION 13 UPDATE:

SSER27 shows status as "Resolved."

15.4.3	25	C	LICENSE CONDITION – Steam Generator tube rupture
		13	In SSER2, NRC performed an initial evaluation of an actual Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) that occurred at Ginna. As part of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), WBN committed to implement all corrective actions recommended by the WOG. In SSER5, NRC reviewed the WOG SGTR analysis and determined that plant specific information was required. In SSER12, the staff identified 5 items that required resolution involving 1) operator action times; 2) radiation offsite consequence analysis; 3) systems, 4) associated components credited for accident mitigation in SG tube rupture emergency operating procedures; and 5) system compatibility with bounding analysis. Items 2-5 were resolved in SSER12. In SSER14, the staff stated that a revised SG tube rupture analysis was more conservative and did not alter the conclusions of their Original safety evaluation. With regard to operator response times, TVA letters dated April 21, 1994, and August 15, 1994, and NRC letter dated June 28, 1994, dealt with simulator runs to address response times and operator performance during simulated SG tube ruptures. The staff concluded, after review of the TVA letters, that the times assumed in the tube rupture analysis were satisfactorily verified and deleted this condition. In SSER15, NRC reviewed revised short term atmospheric relative concentration factors. The conclusions reached in the SER and supplements remained unchanged.

Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

REVISION 02 UPDATE:

Amendment 97 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted on January 21, 2010.

Chapter 15 was updated to address the application of RFA-2 fuel.

REVISION 08 UPDATE:

15.4.3 of SSER25 includes:

"The NRC staff review concluded that the aforementioned unit-specific changes used to evaluate the WBN Unit 2 SGTR analysis are based on physical differences in the units, unit-specific operational differences, or updated information that has been accepted by the NRC staff for use in dose consequence analyses. The TVA evaluation concluded that the radiological consequences resulting from the postulated SGTR at the EAB, LPZ, and CR comply with the reference values and the CR dose criterion provided in 10 CFR 100.11 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, as well as with the accident-specific dose guidelines specified in the SRP. The NRC staff's review found that TVA used analysis, assumptions, and inputs consistent with those described in the SRP. The NRC staff concluded that the assumptions presented in Table 15.4 and the TVA's calculated dose results given in Table 15.1 of this SSER were acceptable. The NRC staff concludes that TVA's estimates of the dose consequences of a design-basis SGTR are in accordance with the SRP acceptance criteria."

SSER25 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 13 UPDATE:

Correct Status to "C." TVA action has been completed, and SSER shows status for this item as "Resolved."

REVISION 09 UPDATE:

TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.

RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:

"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.

Response:

The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."

Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.



SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Unit 2 fuel has been received.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated April 13, 1993, contained the following commitment: "Prior to fuel load for Unit 2, a similar structural analysis will be performed to confirm the adequacy of the Unit 2 main steam lines."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Structural analysis has been completed to confirm the adequacy of the Unit 2 Main Steam lines and associated supports under water-filled conditions that could result from a steam generator tube rupture. Design for the required support modifications has been issued.</p>
18.2.0	22	C	"CONCLUSIONS" left open until all items in subsection are closed.
		13	<p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>The status in SSER21 is Open (NRR).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>TVA's September 26, 2008, letter proposed the use of the Unit 1 approach to resolve the CRDR SP.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>In SSER21, the Detailed Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Special Program was resolved.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 18.2 includes:</p> <p>"Since the NRC staff has approved the DCRDR special program approach for WBN Unit 1, and TVA proposed to use the same approach for WBN Unit 2, there is reasonable assurance that, when implemented as described by TVA, the DCRDR TMI task action (Item I.D.1 of NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737) will be appropriately resolved for WBN Unit 2."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Resolved."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NUREG-0737, I.D.1 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Correct Status to "C."</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
25.9.0	27	C ----- 13	<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Section 25.9 includes:</p> <p>"The NRC staff reviewed TVA's program to preserve the licensing basis for WBN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with SRM-SECY-07-0096 and using the assessment methodology documented in the staff's letter to TVA dated May 8, 2008. The staff concludes that TVA's program for maintenance and preservation of the licensing basis for WBN, if properly implemented, provides reasonable assurance that any effects on previously reviewed and resolved safety evaluation report topics will be evaluated for WBN Unit 2. TVA's implementation of NGDC PP-20 and EDCR Appendix J will be audited or inspected by the NRC. This is Open Item 12 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>SSER22 shows the status for this item as "Open (NRR)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Per TVA letter to NRC dated April 6, 2011, this action item is for NRC Inspection / Review.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated June 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11186A552) contained the following:</p> <p>From the cover letter:</p> <p>"The purpose of this letter is to transmit the enclosed report (Enclosure 1) that contains the results of the QA assessment of effectiveness of the WBN Unit 2 Licensing Basis Preservation self-assessment, as requested by NRC during the daily WBN Unit 2 Project Status telecom. The assessment results indicate the Licensing Basis self-assessment was effective and performed in accordance with governing procedures."</p> <p>From Enclosure 2:</p> <p>"1. Licensing will do a periodic review of licensing written corrective action plans (CAP)</p> <p>2. Licensing will schedule a focused self-assessment to ensure that the CAP specified in PER 239111 is implemented effectively as recommended in the assessment report."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The focused self assessment was performed during February 16 through February 22, 2012. The report (number LIC-2012-001) was approved on August 29, 2012.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Licensing reviewed all licensing written PER CAPs for period of January 1, 2013 through June 11, 2014. This review concluded that the no problems were identified with the CAPs as written or the resultant actions taken. The individual assigned responsibility for oversight of closure of all Licensing-written PER CAPs continues to perform that function on an ongoing basis. These actions satisfy the commitment for periodic reviews of licensing written CAPs.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER27 contains the following under 25.9 Program for Maintenance and Preservation of the Licensing Basis for Units 1 and 2:</p>

SER SECTION	SSER #	* — — REV.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>"Disposition of Open Items (Appendix HH)</p> <p>Open Item 12</p> <p>Open Item 12 (Appendix HH) states, 'TVA's implementation of NGDC PP-20 and EDCR [Engineering Document Construction Release] Appendix J is subject to future NRC audit and inspection.'</p> <p>The NRC staff performed the audit at TVA from August 12 to August 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14323A562), to review the implementation of the licensing basis preservation program (NGDC PP-20) and EDCR Appendix J. Overall the NRC staff found that the licensing basis preservation program was being adequately implemented such that the program was providing its intended function. Therefore, Open Item 12 is closed."</p> <p>Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.</p>

### **STATUS CODE DEFINITIONS**

- C:** CLOSED: Previous staff review of NUREG-0847 and/or supplements has closed the item either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2.
- CI:** CLOSED/IMPLEMENTATION: Staff has approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; there is no change to the approved design; and implementation is recommended through Regional Inspection.
- CO:** CLOSED - OPEN: Staff has approved closure of the item; however, TVA actions remain to be completed.
- CT:** CLOSED/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: Item has been approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; however, a change to the original approval requires submittal of the Technical Specifications and staff review.
- NA:** NOT APPLICABLE: Justification as to why a section / subsection is not applicable is provided in the ADDITIONAL INFORMATION column.
- O:** OPEN: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2.
- OI:** OPEN / INSPECTION: Staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2; inspection is required to complete review / close the item.
- OT:** OPEN/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is through submittal of a Technical Specification.
- OV:** OPEN/VALIDATION: The proposed approach has been approved for Watts Bar Unit 1; the same approach is proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 without change.
- S:** SUBMITTED: Information has been submitted, and is under review by NRC staff.

**Enclosure 3**

**Generic Communications - Master Table**

# GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS: MASTER TABLE

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
B 1971-02	PWR Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers	NA		Addressed to specific plant(s).
B 1971-03	Catastrophic Failure of Main Steam Line Relief Valve Headers	NA		Addressed to specific plant(s).
B 1972-01	Failed Hangers for Emergency Core Cooling System Suction Header	NA		Addressed to specific plant(s).
B 1972-02	Simultaneous Actuation of a Safety Injection Signal on Both Units of a Dual Unit Facility	NA		Addressed to specific plant(s).
B 1972-03	Limitorque Valve Operator Failures	NA		Addressed to specific plant(s).
B 1973-01	Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems	C		TVA: letter dated April 4, 1973 NRC: IR 390/391 75-5
B 1973-02	Malfunction of Containment Purge Supply Valve Switch	C		TVA: letter dated August 22, 1973 NRC: IR 390/391 75-5
B 1973-03	Defective Hydraulic Snubbers and Restraints	C		TVA: letter dated February 7, 1985 NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1973-04	Defective Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Shock Absorbers	C		TVA: memo dated February 7, 1985 NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1973-05	Manufacturing Defect in BWR Control Rods	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1973-06	Inadvertent Criticality in a BWR	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1974-01	Valve Deficiencies	C		TVA: letter dated April 15, 1974 NRC: IR 390/391 75-5
B 1974-02	Truck Strike Possibility	NA		Info

		-----*	
ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1974-03	Failure of Structural or Seismic Support Bolts on Class I Components	C	TVA: memo dated January 22, 1985
		12	NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
			-----
			Approach accepted in IR 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08 (March 29, 1985).
			Unit 2 Action: Implement per NUREG-0577 as was done for Unit 1.
			-----
			-----
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			Corrective action for this item consisted of a bolting reheat treatment program for both units; it has been completed.
			-----
B 1974-04	Malfunction of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1974-05	Shipment of an Improperly Shielded Source	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1974-06	Defective Westinghouse Type W-2 Control Switch Component	C	TVA: letter dated October 18, 1974
			NRC: IR 390/391 75-6
B 1974-07	Personnel Exposure – Irradiation Facility	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1974-08	Deficiency in the ITE Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Type HE-3	C	TVA: letter dated August 21, 1974
			NRC: IR 390/391 75-5
B 1974-09	Deficiency in GE Model 4KV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers	C	TVA: letter dated September 20, 1974
			NRC: IR 390/391 76-6
B 1974-10	Failures in 4-Inch Bypass Pipe at Dresden 2	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1974-11	Improper Wiring of Safety Injection Logic at Zion 1 & 2	C	NRC: IR 390/391 75-6

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1974-12	Incorrect Coils in Westinghouse Type SG Relays at Trojan	C — —	NRC: IR 390/391 75-5
B 1974-13	Improper Factory Wiring on GE Motor Control Centers at Fort Calhoun	C — —	TVA: letter dated December 24, 1974  NRC: IR 390/391 75-5
B 1974-14	BWR Relief Valve Discharge to Suppression Pool	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1974-15	Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position Maintained Switch Model No. 10250T	C — —	TVA: letter dated May 5, 1975  NRC: IR 390/391 75-5  -----  Unit 2 Action: Install modified A3 Cutler-Hammer 10250T switches.  -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  It has been confirmed that WBN Unit 2 never had the faulty switches.  -----  NRC Inspection Report 391/2010-605 closed B 74-015.
B 1974-16	Improper Machining of Pistons in Colt Industries (Fairbanks-Morse) Diesel-Generators	C — —	TVA: letter dated January 2, 1975  NRC: IR 390/391 75-3
B 1975-01	Through-Wall Cracks in Core Spray Piping at Dresden-2	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1975-02	Defective Radionics Radiograph Exposure Devices and Source Changers	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1975-03	Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves	CO — —	TVA: letter dated May 16, 1975  NRC: IR 390/391 75-6  -----  NRC accepted in IR 50-390/75-6 and 50-391/75-6 (August 21, 1975).  Unit 2 Action: Modify valves not modified at factory.  -----  REVISION 08 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.



		*	
ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1975-04	Cable Fire at BFNPP	CI	NRC: IR 390/391 85-08 Closed to Fire Protection CAP
			-----
			Part of Fire Protection CAP
-----			
B 1975-05	Operability of Category I Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors	CO	TVA: letter dated June 16, 1975
			-----
			08 NRC: IR 390/391 75-6
			-----
			NRC accepted in IR 50-390/75-6 and 50-391/75-6 (August 21, 1975).
			Unit 2 Action: Install proper suppressors.
			-----
			-----
			REVISION 08 UPDATE:
			NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.
-----			
B 1975-06	Defective Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control Switches	C	TVA: letter dated July 31, 1975
			-----
			07 NRC: IR 390/85-25 and 391/85-20
			-----
			Unit 2 Action: Inspect Westinghouse Type OT-2 control switches.
			[WAS "NOTE 3."]
			-----
			-----
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			All Unit 2 Type OT-2 switches procured or refurbished are inspected and tested.
			-----
			-----
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:
			NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed B 75-006.
-----			
B 1975-07	Exothermic Reaction in Radwaste Shipment	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.
			-----

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1975-08	PWR Pressure Instrumentation	<b>S</b>		NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
		<b>02</b>		Unit 2 Action:  Ensure that Technical Specifications and Site Operating Instructions address importance of maintaining temperature and pressure within prescribed limits.  ----- -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.  Adherence to Pressure and Temperature limits is required by the following portions of the Unit 2 TS: 1.1 [definition of "PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)"]; 3.4.3 ["RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits"]; 3.4.12 ["Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)"]; and 5.9.6 ["Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)"].
B 1976-01	BWR Isolation Condenser Tube Failure	<b>NA</b>		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1976-02	Relay Coil Failures – GE Types HFA, HGA, HKA, HMA Relays	<b>CO</b>		Unit 2 Action:
		<b>12</b>		Repair or replace relays before preoperational tests.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Bulletin 1976-02 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.
B 1976-03	Relay Malfunctions – GE Type STD Relays	<b>C</b>		TVA: letter dated May 17, 1976  NRC: IR 390/391 76-6
B 1976-04	Cracks in Cold Worked Piping at BWRs	<b>NA</b>		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1976-05	Relay Failures – Westinghouse BFD Relays	<b>C</b>		TVA: letter dated June 7, 1976  NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1976-06	Diaphragm Failures in Air Operated Auxiliary Actuators for Safety/Relief Valves	<b>C</b>		TVA: memo dated January 25, 1985  NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1976-07	Crane Hoist Control Circuit Modifications	<b>C</b>		TVA: letter dated October 29, 1976  NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1976-08	Teletherapy Units	<b>NA</b>		Does not apply to power reactor.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1977-01	Pneumatic Time Delay Relay Setpoint Drift	C	TVA: letter dated July 1, 1977 NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1977-02	Potential Failure Mechanism in Certain Westinghouse AR Relays with Latch Attachments	C	TVA: letter dated November 11, 1977 NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1977-03	On-Line Testing of the Westinghouse Solid State Protection System	CI 12	Unit 2 Action: Include necessary periodic testing in test procedures.  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  TVA has issued procedures 2-SI-99-10-A and 2-SI-99-10-B. They source note the commitment, and contain the corrective actions proposed by Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD TB-77-11.
B 1977-04	Calculation Error Affecting The Design Performance of a System for Controlling pH of Containment Sump Water Following a LOCA	S 02	TVA: letter dated January 23, 1978 NRC: IR 390/78-11 and 391/78-09 Unit 2 Action: Ensure Technical Specifications includes limit on Boron concentration.  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.  TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.11.5 requires verification that the boron concentration is within a specified range.
B 1977-05 and B 1977-05 A	Electrical Connector Assemblies	C	TVA: letter dated January 17, 1978 NRC: IR 390/78-11 and 391/78-09
B 1977-06	Potential Problems with Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies	C	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1977-07	Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies at Nuclear Power Plants Under Construction	C	TVA: letter dated January 20, 1978 NRC: IR 390/78-11 and 391/78-09

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
B 1977-08	Assurance of Safety and Safeguards During an Emergency – Locking Systems	C	---	Item concerns a multi-unit issue that was completed for both units.  -----  TVA: letter dated March 1, 1978  NRC: IR 390/78-11 and 391/78-09
B 1978-01	Flammable Contact – Arm Retainers in GE CR120A Relays	C	---	TVA: letter dated March 20, 1978  NRC: IR 390/78-11 and 391/78-09
B 1978-02	Terminal Block Qualification	C	---	TVA: letter dated March 1, 1978  NRC: IR 390/78-11 and 391/78-09
B 1978-03	Potential Explosive Gas Mixture Accumulations Associated with BWR Offgas System Operations	NA	---	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1978-04	Environmental Qualification of Certain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment	C	---	TVA: letter dated December 19, 1978
		08	---	NRC: IR 390/82-13 and 391/82-10 Closed to EQ Program  -----  IR 50-390/82-13 and 50-391/82-10 (April 22, 1982) accepted approach.  Unit 2 Action: Ensure NAMCO switches have been replaced.  ----- -----  REVISION 08 UPDATE:  The NAMCO switches were replaced.  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-605 closed this item.
B 1978-05	Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism – GE Model CR105X	C	---	TVA: letter dated June 12, 1978  NRC: IR 390/78-17 and 391/78-15
B 1978-06	Defective Cutler-Hammer Type M Relays With DC Coils	C	---	NRC: IR 390/78-22 and 391/78-19
B 1978-07	Protection Afforded by Air-Line Respirators and Supplied-Air Hoods	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
B 1978-08	Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  -----  NRC: IR 390/391 85-08

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1978-09	BWR Drywell Leakage Paths Associated with Inadequate Drywell Closures	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1978-10	Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils	C — —	TVA: letter dated August 14, 1978 NRC: IR 390/78-22 and 391/78-19
B 1978-11	Examination of Mark I Containment Torus Welds	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1978-12	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	C — —	TVA: Westinghouse letter dated October 29, 1979 NRC: IR 390/391 81-04
B 1978-13	Failures in Source Heads Kay Ray, Inc. Gauges Models 7050, 7050B, 7051, 7051B, 7060, 7060B, 7061 and 7061B	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1978-14	Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1979-01	Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment	C — —	NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-02	Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts	C — —	NRC review of HAAUP Program in NUREG-1232, SSER6, and SSER8.  Unit 2 Actions:  * Addressed in CAP/SP.  * Conduct a complete review of affected support calculations, and perform the necessary revisions to design documents and field modifications to achieve compliance.  ----- -----  REVISION 09 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-608 closed this item.
B 1979-03	Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 SS Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding & Engineering	C — —	TVA: letter dated July 16, 1981 NRC: IRs 390/82-21 and 391/82-17; 390/84-35 and 391/84-33
B 1979-04	Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation	C — —	TVA: letter dated October 20, 1980 NRC: IR 390/83-15 and 391/83-11
B 1979-05	Nuclear Incident at TMI	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
B 1979-06	Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident	<b>C</b>	---	NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-07	Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping	<b>C</b>	---	TVA: letter dated May 31, 1979 NRC: IR 390/79-30 and 391/79-25
B 1979-08	Events Relevant to BWRs Identified During TMI Incident	<b>NA</b>	---	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1979-09	Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems	<b>CI</b>	---	TVA: letter dated June 20, 1979
		<b>06</b>	-----	Unit 2 Action: Complete preservice preventive maintenance on AK-2 Circuit Breakers. [WAS "NOTE 3."] ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  It has been confirmed that AK-2 Circuit Breakers are not used on Unit 2.
B 1979-10	Requalification Training Program Statistics	<b>NA</b>	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
B 1979-11	Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineering Safety Systems	<b>C</b>	---	TVA: letter dated July 20, 1979 NRC: IR 390/79-30 and 391/79-25
B 1979-12	Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities	<b>NA</b>	---	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1979-13	Cracking in Feedwater Piping	<b>C</b>	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued. ----- TVA: letter dated December 1, 1983 NRC: IR 390/391 85-08

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1979-14	Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems	CO	NRC review of HAAUP Program in NUREG-1232, SSER6, and SSER8.
		09	Unit 2 Actions:  * Addressed in CAP/SP.  * Initiate a Unit 2 hanger walkdown and hanger analysis program similar to the program for Unit 1.  * Complete re-analysis of piping and associated supports as necessary.  * Perform modifications as required by re-analysis.  ----- -----  REVISION 09 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-608 closed this item.
B 1979-15	Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies	C	TVA: letter dated January 24, 1992  NRC: IR 390/391 95-70
B 1979-16	Vital Area Access Controls	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  -----  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-17	Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at PWR Plants	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05; NUREG/ CR 5286
B 1979-18	Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from High-Noise Areas	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  -----  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-19	Packaging of Low-Level Radioactive Waste for Transport and Burial	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  -----  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-20	Packaging, Transport and Burial of Low-Level Radioactive Waste	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.  -----  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05



ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1979-21	Temperature Effects on Level Measurements	C 06	Reviewed in 7.2.5 of both the original 1982 SER and SSER14.  Unit 2 Action: Update accident calculation.  CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - address IEB 79-21 to alleviate temperature dependence problem associated with measuring SG water level  In SSER14, NRC concurred with TVA's assessment to not insulate the steam generator water level instrument reference leg.  Unit 2 Action: Update accident calculation.  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The calculations were updated.  NRC Inspection Report 391/2010-605 closed B 79-021.
B 1979-22	Possible Leakage of Tubes of Tritium Gas Used in Time Pieces for Luminosity	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-23	Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transformer	C	TVA: letter dated October 29, 1979  NRC: IR 390/80-06 and 391/80-05
B 1979-24	Frozen Lines	CI	Unit 2 Actions:  * Insulate the section of piping in the containment spray full-flow test line that is exposed to outside air.  * Confirm installation of heat tracing on the sensing lines off the feedwater flow elements.
B 1979-25	Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems	C	TVA: letter dated January 4, 1980  NRC: IR 390/80-03 and 391/80-02
B 1979-26	Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades	NA	Boiling Water Reactor

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
B 1979-27	Loss of Non-Class 1E I & C Power System Bus During Operation	<b>CO</b> ---	<b>11</b>	TVA responded to the Bulletin on March 1, 1982. Reviewed in 7.5.3 of the original 1982 SER.  Unit 2 Action: Issue appropriate emergency procedures.  ----- -----  REVISION 11 UPDATE:  Inspection Report 391/2013-608 (November 8, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1979-27.
B 1979-28	Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures	<b>C</b> ---		TVA: letter dated April 1, 1993  NRC: IR 390/391 93-32
B 1980-01	Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply	<b>NA</b> ---		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1980-02	Inadequate QA for Nuclear Supplied Equipment	<b>NA</b> ---		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1980-03	Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Adsorber Cells	<b>C</b> ---		TVA: letter dated March 21, 1980  NRC: IR 390/80-15 and 391/80-12
B 1980-04	Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition	<b>CI</b> ---	<b>06</b>	IR 50-390/85-60 and 50-391/85-49 (December 6, 1985) required completion of actions that included determination of temperature profiles inside and outside of containment following a MSLB for Unit 1.  Unit 2 Action: Complete analysis for Unit 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The analysis for Unit 2 was completed.
B 1980-05	Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System Holdup Tanks	<b>CI</b> ---	<b>12</b>	Closed in IR 50-390/84-59 and 50-391/84-45.  Unit 2 Action: Complete surveillance procedures for Unit 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Surveillance procedure 2-SI-0-902, which addresses inservice testing of the Unit 2 CVCS HUT Vacuum Relief Valve 2-RFV-62-1079, is active.
B 1980-06	Engineered Safety Feature Reset Control	<b>CI</b> ---		TVA response dated March 11, 1982. Reviewed in 7.3.5 of the original 1982 SER.  Unit 2 Action: Perform verification during the preoperational testing.
B 1980-07	BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure	<b>NA</b> ---		Boiling Water Reactor

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1980-08	Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds	<b>C</b> --- ---	TVA: letter dated July 8, 1980  NRC: IR 390/391 81-19
B 1980-09	Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies	<b>C</b> --- ---	TVA: letter dated January 15, 1981  NRC: NUREG/ CR 5291; IR 390/391 85-08; IR 390/85-60 and 391/85-49
B 1980-10	Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment	<b>CI</b> --- <b>06</b>	Unit 2 Actions:  1) Correct deficiencies involving monitoring of systems.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  Chemistry procedure CM-3.01 (System Chemistry Specification) includes a radiation monitoring system for non-radioactive systems and provides appropriate surveillance limits. Additionally, it provides required actions if the surveillance limits are not met.
B 1980-10	Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment	<b>CI</b> --- <b>06</b>	Unit 2 Actions:  2) Include proper monitoring of non-radioactive systems in procedures.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  Chemistry procedure CM-3.01 (System Chemistry Specification) includes a radiation monitoring system for non-radioactive systems and provides appropriate surveillance limits. Additionally, it provides required actions if the surveillance limits are not met.
B 1980-11	Masonry Wall Design	<b>CO</b> --- <b>13</b>	NRC accepted all but completion of corrective actions in IR 50-390/93-01 and 50-391/93-01(February 25, 1993) and closed for Unit 1 in IR 50-390/95-46 (August 1, 1995).  Unit 2 Action: Complete implementation for Unit 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 08 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-610 closed this item.  ----- -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Corrected Status to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1980-12	Decay Heat Removal System Operability	CI — —	NRC: IR 390/391 85-08; NUREG/CR 4005  -----  Unit 2 Action:  Implement operating instructions and abnormal operating instructions (AOIs) for RHR.  [WAS "NOTE 3."]
B 1980-13	Cracking in Core Spray Spargers	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1980-14	Degradation of Scram Discharge Volume Capability	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1980-15	Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System with Loss of Offsite Power	C — —	Item concerns a multi-unit issue that was completed for both units.  -----  NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1980-16	Potential Misapplication of Rosemount, Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters With Either "A" or "D" Output Codes	C — —	TVA: letter dated August 29, 1980  NRC: IR 390/391 81-17
B 1980-17	Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1980-18	Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side High Energy Rupture	CO — — 12	IR 50-390/85-60 and 50-391/85-49 (Unit 1)  Unit 2 Action: Implement design and procedure changes.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed B 80-018.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Design changes have been implemented.
B 1980-19	Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relay in Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by CE	C — —	TVA: letter dated September 4, 1980  NRC: NUREG/CR 4933; IR 390/391 81-17

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1980-20	Failure of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches	<b>C</b>	Unit 2 Action: Modify switches.
		<b>08</b>	----- -----
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			The switches were modified.  -----
			NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed B 80-020.  ----- -----
			REVISION 08 UPDATE:
			Changed status from "CI" to "C."
B 1980-21	Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Co., Inc.	<b>C</b>	TVA: letter dated May 6, 1981
			NRC: 390/391 85-08
B 1980-21	Automation Industries, Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source Connectors	<b>NA</b> — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1980-23	Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation	<b>C</b>	TVA: letter dated March 31, 1981
			NRC: IR 390/391 81-17; NUREG/CR 5292
B 1980-24	Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment (10/17/80 Indian Point 2 Event)	<b>CI</b>	Unit 2 Action:
		<b>06</b>	Confirm that the reactor cavity can not be flooded, resulting in the partial or total submergence of the reactor vessel unnoticed by the reactor operators.  ----- -----
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			It was confirmed that the reactor cavity can not be flooded, resulting in the partial or total submergence of the reactor vessel unnoticed by the reactor operators.
B 1980-25	Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWRs	<b>NA</b> — —	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1981-01	Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers	<b>NA</b> — —	NRC: IR 390/391 81-17
B 1981-02	Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure	<b>C</b>	TVA: letter dated September 30, 1983
			NRC: IR 390/391 84-03

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 1981-03	Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by Asiatic Clams and Mussels	C	---	TVA: letters dated July 21, 1981 and March 21, 1983 NRC: IR 390/391 81-17
B 1982-01	Alteration of Radiographs of Welds in Piping Subassemblies	C	---	NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
B 1982-02	Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants	C	---	TVA: memo dated February 6, 1985
		11	---	NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
				-----  Approach accepted in IR 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08 (March 29, 1985).  Unit 2 Action: Implement same approach as Unit 1.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The boric acid corrosion program applies to both units.  ----- -----  REVISION 10 UPDATE:  WBN has a boric acid corrosion program that addresses Bulletin 82-02 and Information Notice 86-108 issues. The boric acid corrosion program for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 is contained in NPG-SPP-06.8 (Leak Reduction Program), NPG-SPP-09.7 (Corrosion Control Program), specifically Attachment D (Technical Requirements for the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program," and TI-31.032 (Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program)."  The program provides for a systematic approach to leakage detection and walk downs for boric acid Issues.  The use of molybdenum disulfide is prohibited by TVA General Engineering Specifications P.S.4.M.1.1 (Material Fabrication and Handling Requirements for Austenitic Stainless Steel) and P.S.4.M.1.5 (Classification, Procurement, Receipt, and Use of Lubricants).  ----- -----  REVISION 11 UPDATE:  Inspection Report 391/2013-607 (September 30, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1982-02.
B 1982-03	Stress Corrosion Cracking in Thick-Wall, Large Diameter, Stainless Steel, Recirculation System Piping at BWR Plants	NA	---	Boiling Water Reactor

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 1982-04	Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies	C	---	TVA: letter dated January 24, 1983 NRC: IR 390/83-10 and 391/83-08
B 1983-01	Failure of Trip Breakers (Westinghouse DB-50) to Open on Automatic Trip Signal	C	---	NRC: IRs 390/391 85-08 and 390/391 92-13
B 1983-02	Stress Corrosion Cracking in Large-Diameter Stainless Steel Recirculation System Piping at BWR Plants	NA	---	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1983-03	Check Valve Failures in Raw Water Cooling Systems of Diesel Generators	NA	---	Addressed by Inservice Testing for Construction Permit holders
B 1983-04	Failure of the Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip Breakers	C	---	NRC: IR 390/391 85-08
		06	-----	Unit 2 Action:  Install new undervoltage attachment with wider grooves on the reactor trip breakers.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  New breakers have been installed on Unit 2.  -----  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed B 83-004.
B 1983-05	ASME Nuclear Code Pumps and Spare Parts Manufactured by the Hayward Tyler Pump Company	C	---	TVA: letter dated September 7, 1983 NRC: IR 390/85-03 and 391/85-04; NUREG/CR 5297
B 1983-06	Nonconforming Material Supplied by Tube-Line Facilities	C	---	TVA: letter dated February 2, 1984
		08	-----	NRC: IR 390/391 84-03; NUREG/CR 4934  -----  NRC SER for both units dated September 23, 1991, provided an alternate acceptance for fittings supplied by Tube-Line.  Unit 2 Action: Implement as necessary.  ----- -----  REVISION 04 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-390/90-02 and 50-391/90-02 found the proposed alternative to ASME code paragraph NA-3451 (a) to be



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			acceptable. It noted that TVA must revise the FSAR to document this deviation from ASME Section III requirements.  TVA letter to NRC dated October 11, 2007, stated the Unit 1 exemption is applicable to Unit 2 and was submitted to the NRC as being required for Unit 2 construction.  Final action was to incorporate the exemption in the Unit 2 FSAR. This exemption is documented in Unit 2 FSAR Section 3.2 in paragraph 3.2.3.2 and Table 3.2-2a as explained in Note 4. of the table.  ----- -----  REVISION 08 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-603 closed this item.
B 1983-07	Apparently Fraudulent Products Sold by Ray Miller, Inc.	<b>C</b> ---	TVA: letter dated March 22, 1984  NRC: IR 390/85-03 and 391/85-04
B 1983-08	Electrical Circuit Breakers With an Undervoltage Trip Feature in Safety-Related Applications Other Than the Reactor Trip System	<b>C</b> ---	TVA: letter dated March 29, 1984  NRC: IR 390/84-35 and 391/84-33
B 1984-01	Cracks in BWR Mark 1 Containment Vent Headers	<b>NA</b> ---	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1984-02	Failure of GE Type HFA Relays In Use In Class 1E Safety Systems	<b>C</b> --- <b>12</b>	TVA: letter dated July 10, 1984  NRC: IR 390/391 84-42 and IR 390/84-77 and 391/84-54  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Bulletin 1984-02 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.
B 1984-03	Refueling Cavity Water Seal	<b>CI</b> ---	Reviewed in IR 390/93-11.  Unit 2 Action: Ensure appropriate abnormal operating instructions (AOIs) are used for Unit 2.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 1985-01	Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	<b>CO</b>		TVA: letter dated January 27, 1986
		<b>12</b>		NRC: IR 390/391 90-20  -----  NRC accepted approach in letter dated July 20, 1988, and reviewed response in Appendix EE of SSER16.  Unit 2 Action:  Procedures and hardware will be in place to ensure recognition of indications of steam binding and maintenance of system operability until check valves are repaired and back leakage stopped.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Bulletin 1985-01 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.
B 1985-02	Undervoltage Trip Attachment of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers	<b>C</b>		Unit 2 Action:
		<b>06</b>		Install automatic shunt trip on the Westinghouse DS-416 reactor trip breakers on Unit 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  New breakers (including an automatic shunt trip) have been installed on Unit 2.  -----  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed B 85-002.
B 1985-03	Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings	<b>C</b>		Superseded by GL 89-10
B 1986-01	Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps	<b>NA</b>		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1986-02	Static "O" Ring Differential Pressure Switches	<b>C</b>		TVA: letter dated November 20, 1986
				NRC: IR 390/391/90-24
B 1986-03	Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line	<b>C</b>		TVA: letter dated November 14, 1986
				NRC: IR 390/391/87-03

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 1986-04	Defective Teletherapy Timer That May Not Terminate Treatment Dose	NA	-----	Does not apply to power reactor.
-----				
B 1987-01	Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants	C	-----	TVA: letter dated September 18, 1987
				NRC: NUREG/CR 5287
				-----
				Closed to GL 89-08
-----				
B 1987-02	Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications	C	-----	TVA: letters dated April 15, 1988, July 6, 1988, September 12, 1988, and January 27, 1989
		13		NRC: letter dated August 18, 1989
				-----
				NRC closed in letter dated August 18, 1989.
				Unit 2 Action:
				Complete for Unit 2, using information used for Unit 1, as applicable.
				-----
				-----
				REVISION 03 UPDATE:
				Unit 2 has completed fastener testing as required by this Bulletin.
				-----
				-----
				REVISION 13 UPDATE:
				Senior resident administratively closed this item on November 07, 2011.
-----				
B 1988-01	Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers	C	-----	TVA: letter dated November 15, 1991
				NRC: IR 390/391 93-01
-----				
B 1988-02	Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes	CI		NRC acceptance letter dated June 7, 1990, for both units.
		07		Unit 2 Actions:
				* Evaluate E/C data to determine anti-vibration bar penetration depth;
				* perform T/H analysis to identify susceptible tubes;
				* modify, if necessary.
				-----
				-----
				REVISION 07 UPDATE:
				The following actions have been completed:

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			* E/C data was evaluated to determine anti-vibration bar penetration depth;  * T/H analysis was completed identifying susceptible tubes;  * modifications, as necessary, were completed.
B 1988-03	Inadequate Latch Engagement in HFA Type Latching Relays Manufactured by General Electric (GE) Company	<b>C</b> — —	TVA: letter dated April 13, 1992  NRC: IR 390/391 92-13
B 1988-04	Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	NRC acceptance letter dated May 24, 1990, for both units.  Unit 2 Actions:  * Perform calculations, and  * install check valves to prevent pump to pump interaction.  ----- -----  REVISION 08 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.  ----- -----  REVISION 11 UPDATE:  Calculation EPMDHM042689 was revised to reflect acceptance of the 480 GPM mini-flow operation rates for the Containment Spray Pumps. The Unit 2 Containment Spray System Description (WBN2-74-4001) table provides the containment spray pump design parameters. Check valves (2-CKV-074-0544 and 2-CKV-074-0545) were installed between the take-off for the RHR pump minimum flow recirculation line (downstream of the RHR heat exchanger) and the take-off for the Charging pump/RHR spray connection (train A), and the Safety Injection/RHR spray connection (train B).  ----- -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Corrected Status to "C."

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1988-05	Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Piping Supplies, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing Company	<b>C</b>	NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.
		<b>13</b>	Unit 2 Actions:  * Complete review to locate installed WJM material, and  * perform in-situ hardness testing for Unit 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 10 UPDATE:  Inspection Report 391/2013-604 (June 27, 2013) closed Bulletin 1988-05, including Supplements 1 and 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Installed Unit 2 WJM materials/components were located and in-situ hardness testing was performed. Parts that failed hardness testing were replaced.
B 1988-06	Actions to be Taken for the Transfer of Model No. SPEC 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device	<b>NA</b>	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1988-07	Power Oscillations in BWRs	<b>NA</b>	Boiling Water Reactor
B 1988-08	Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Cooling Systems	<b>C</b>	NRC acceptance letter dated September 19, 1991 (both units).
		<b>13</b>	NRC acceptance letter dated June 26, 1995 (Unit 1).  Unit 2 Action:  * Implement program to prevent thermal stratification.  * Submit a letter to NRC that confirms actions are complete for WBN Unit 2 within 30 days of completion of the modifications.  ----- -----  REVISION 09 UPDATE:  TVA to NRC letter dated October 4, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12284A513) contained the following:  From the cover letter:  "The purpose of this letter is to provide the current WBN Unit 2 plan for addressing NRC Bulletin 88-08. Based on analysis and experience gained from WBN Unit 1, WBN Unit 2 has developed an acoustic monitoring program similar to the one currently used on WBN Unit 1. Enclosure 1 provides the background and the basis for this action. The Regulatory Framework status for NRC Bulletin 88-08 shown in Reference 2 will be revised to reflect this change in the next update.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>From Enclosure 1:</p> <p>"Clarification</p> <p>For WBN Unit 2, TVA will utilize the WBN Unit 1 approach which utilizes an EPRI calculational methodology and an augmented Pre-service Inspection Program for the three Unit 2 drain lines.</p> <p>In addition, WBN Unit 2 has developed an acoustic monitoring program for the Unit 2 SI boron injection line governed by Procedure 2-TI-305, 'Acoustic Monitoring to Detect Leakage Through 2-FCV-63-25 &amp; -26,' which is similar to that used on WBN Unit 1 for monitoring its susceptible SI boron injection lines for in-leakage."</p> <p>Enclosure 2 provides the new commitment made in this letter."</p> <p>From Enclosure 2:</p> <p>"The Regulatory Framework status for NRC Bulletin 88-08 shown in Reference 2 will be revised to reflect this change in the next update."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>This update satisfies the commitment.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-612 (March 28, 2013) closed Bulletin 88-08 and Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 1.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>In response to the experience gained from Unit 1, the methodology used for Unit 2 was to perform an engineering assessment of the RCS branch piping as described in MRP-146, "Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines." Unit 2 Calculation 1100448.301 (MRP-146 Assessment of Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Branch Lines) was performed to determine the susceptibility of non-isolable and stagnant branch lines off the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to thermal cycling mechanisms. The results contained within the calculation identified four locations that are susceptible to turbulence/swirl penetration effects that could lead to thermal fatigue cracking and leakage.</p> <p>In compliance with Bulletin 88-08, the three drain lines, identified in the Table 7 of the calculation, are incorporated in the augmented Pre-service Inspection Program for baseline inspections of those areas deemed most susceptible to thermal fatigue cracking as noted in MRP-146. These drain lines, which are concerned with outleakage from the RCS, are incorporated in the augmented Preservice Inspection Program Plan, Program No: WBN-2 PSI.</p> <p>The calculation recommendation, as identified in Table 7, is to monitor the in-leakage status of one SI boron injection line as cyclic stratification only occurs when in-leakage is present. Lack of inleakage could reduce the need for future inspections. Currently Unit 1 utilizes Technical Instruction TI-305, "Acoustic Monitoring To Detect Leakage Through 1-FCV-63-25 &amp;</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-26" for monitoring its two susceptible SI boron injection lines.</p> <p>Unit 2 has issued Technical Instruction 2-TI-305, "Acoustic Monitoring To Detect Leakage Through 2-FCV-63-25 &amp; -26 to provide detailed steps to perform acoustic monitoring within the Unit 2 RCS.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
B 1988-09	Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors	C  12	<p>Reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>TVA letter dated March 11, 1994, for both units committed to establish a program and inspect the thimble tubes during the first refueling outage.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 is installing the Westinghouse In-core, Information, Surveillance, and Engineering (WINCISE) system. Westinghouse has analyzed WINCISE to exhibit essentially no wear due to vibrations, and should there be a breach of the thimble tube there would not be a loss of into the seal table room. Therefore, the thimble tubes for WINCISE do not need eddy current testing.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 is installing the Westinghouse In-core, Information, Surveillance, and Engineering (WINCISE) system. Westinghouse has analyzed WINCISE to exhibit essentially no wear due to vibrations, and should there be a breach of the thimble tube there would not be a loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) water into the seal table room. Therefore, the thimble tubes for WINCISE do not need eddy current testing.</p> <p>[added missing words after "not be a loss of" in the second sentence]</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>Bulletin 1988-09 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014.</p>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 1988-10	Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers	<b>C</b>		Unit 2 Action:
		<b>08</b>		Replace those circuits not traceable to a circuit breaker manufacturer.
				----- -----
				REVISION 07 UPDATE:  All Unit 2 safety-related molded case circuit breakers were replaced with new qualified breakers procured from the original equipment manufacturers.  ----- -----
				REVISION 08 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.
B 1988-11	Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification	<b>CI</b>		NRC SER on "Leak-Before-Break" (April 28, 1993) and reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.
		<b>13</b>		Unit 2 Actions:
				* Complete modifications to accommodate Surge Line thermal movements, and
				* incorporate a temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations into Unit 2 procedures.  ----- -----
				REVISION 13 UPDATE:  A temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations has been incorporated into Unit 2 procedures.
B 1989-01	Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs	<b>C</b>		NRC acceptance letter dated September 26, 1991 for both units.
		<b>06</b>		Unit 2 Action: Remove SG tube plugs.
				----- -----
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The SG tube plugs were removed.  -----
				NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed B 89-001.

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1989-02	Stress Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Nature	<div> <div>*</div> <div>-----</div> <div>C</div> <div>-----</div> <div>11</div> </div>	<div>NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</div> <div>Unit 2 Actions:</div> <div>* Replace the flapper assembly hold-down bolts fabricated on the 14 (12 valves are installed) Atwood and Morrell Mark No. 47W450-53 check valves.</div> <div>* Replacement bolts are to be fabricated from ASTM F593 Alloy 630.</div> <div>* A review of the remaining Unit 2 safety related swing check valves will be performed.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</div> <div>* Bolts fabricated from ASTM F593 Alloy 630 have been procured.</div> <div>* The review of the remaining Unit 2 safety related swing check valves was completed. Needed corrective actions were initiated.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</div> <div>Bolts have been replaced on both the Atwood and Morrell Mark No. 47W450-53 check valves and the ones identified by the review of the remaining Unit 2 safety related swing check valves.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</div> <div>Inspection Report 391/2013-605 (August 7, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1989-02.</div>
B 1989-03	Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations	<div>CI</div> <div>-----</div> <div>07</div>	<div>TVA: letter dated June 19, 1990</div> <div>NRC: IR 390/391 94-04 and letter dated June 22, 1990</div> <div>-----</div> <div>NRC acceptance letter dated June 22, 1990.</div> <div>Unit 2 Action:</div> <div>Ensure that requirements for fuel assembly configuration, fuel loading and training are included in Unit 2.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</div> <div>Requirements for fuel assembly configuration, fuel loading and training are included in Unit 2.</div>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 1993-02	Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers	<b>C</b>		Boiling Water Reactor
		<b>02</b>		----- -----
				REVISION 02 UPDATE:
				In Rev. 01, this was characterized as "NA - BWR only". This Bulletin was provided for Information to holders of construction permits. No WBN response was found.
				Bulletin 1993-02 was closed in IR 50-390/94-04 and 50-391/94-04.
B 1993-03	Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs	<b>NA</b>		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1994-01	Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit 1	<b>NA</b>		Addressed to holders of licenses for nuclear power reactors that are permanently shut down with spent fuel in the spent fuel pool
B 1994-02	Corrosion Problems in Certain Stainless Steel Packagings Used to Transport Uranium Hexafluoride	<b>NA</b>		Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1995-01	Quality Assurance Program for Transportation of Radioactive Material	<b>NA</b>		Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1995-02	Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode	<b>NA</b>		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1996-01, first part	Control Rod Insertion Problems (PWR)	<b>C</b>		NRC acceptance letter for Unit 1 dated July 22, 1996 – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.
		<b>13</b>		Unit 2 Action: Issue Emergency Operating Procedure.
				----- -----
				REVISION 02 UPDATE:
				Unit 2 will load all new RFA-2 fuel for the initial fuel load.
				----- -----
				REVISION 03 UPDATE:
				NRC issued the Safety Evaluation (corrected) for Bulletin 1996-001 on May 3, 2010.
				----- -----
				REVISION 04 UPDATE:

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (Rals) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 fuel has been received.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Emergency Operating Instruction 2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Revision 0, has been IQR'd, sponsor approved, and placed on hold pending its performance.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action    Closed    ..."</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1996-01, last part	Control Rod Insertion Problems (PWR)	<div style="text-align: center;"> <div>-----*</div> <div>C</div> <div>-----</div> <div>13</div> </div>	<p>NRC acceptance letter for Unit 1 dated July 22, 1996 – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: and provide core map.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation (corrected) for Bulletin 1996-001 on May 3, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated May 3, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200035) required Confirmatory Action (See Appendix HH)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The applicable item from SER22, Appendix HH for this item is Open Item 5, "Verify timely submittal of pre-startup core map and perform technical review. (TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML072570676)."</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following response to Open Item 5:</p> <p>"Attachment 1 provides the requested core map."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action    Closed. NRC letter dated May 3, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200035) required Confirmatory Action (See Appendix HH Open Items 5 and 8). By letter dated July 30, 2012, TVA provided the information in the Confirmatory Action and the staff verified the information and has closed Appendix HH Open Items 5 and 8."</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		CO	13	
B 1996-02	Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor, or Over Safety-Related Equipment			<p>NRC closure letter dated May 20, 1998.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Unit 2 Heavy Loads Program will be in compliance with NUREG-0612.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 1996-002 on March 4, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated March 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100480062)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>BL 1996-02 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-603, dated May 1, 2015.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
B 1996-03	Potential Plugging of ECCS Suction Strainers by Debris in BWRs	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
B 1996-04	Chemical, Galvanic, or Other Reactions in Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks	NA		Info
B 1997-01	Potential for Erroneous Calibration, Dose Rate, or Radiation Exposure Measurements with Certain Victoreen Model 530 and 531SI Electrometer/Dosemeters	NA		Does not apply to power reactor.
B 1997-02	Puncture Testing of Shipping Packages Under 10 CFR Part 71	NA		Does not apply to power reactor.



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 2001-01	Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head Penetration Nozzles	<b>C</b> ----- <b>06</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated November 20, 2001 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>* Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>* Evaluate or repair as necessary.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 2001-001 on June 30, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The baseline inspection was performed with evaluations and repairs as necessary.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. See NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 100539515)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed B 01-001.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 2002-01	RPV Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity	<b>C</b> ----- <b>06</b>	<p>NRC review of Unit 1's 15 day response in letter dated May 20, 2002 – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Perform baseline inspection.</li> <li>* Evaluate or repair as necessary.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 2002-001 on June 30, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The baseline inspection was performed with evaluations and repairs as necessary.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. See NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 100539515)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed B 02-001.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 2002-02	RPV Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs	<b>C</b> — — <b>06</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated December 20, 2002 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Perform baseline inspection.</li> <li>* Evaluate or repair as necessary.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 2002-002 on June 30, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The baseline inspection was performed with evaluations and repairs as necessary.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. See NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 100539515)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed B 02-002.</p>
B 2003-01	Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at PWRs	<b>NA</b> — —	TVA: letter dated September 7, 2007

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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B 2003-02	Leakage from RPV Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity (PWRs)	CI ---	06	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated October 6, 2004 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 2003-002 on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Perform baseline inspection.</li> <li>* Evaluate or repair as necessary.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>“Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)”</p>
B 2003-03	Potentially Deficient 1-inch Valves for Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders	NA ---	---	Does not apply to power reactor.
B 2003-04	Rebaselining of Data in the Nuclear Management and Safeguards System	C ---	---	<p>TVA: letter dated December 18, 2003</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Item concerns a multi-unit issue that was completed for both units.</p>
B 2004-01	Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at PWRs	C ---	13	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Provide details of pressurizer and penetrations, and</li> <li>* apply Material Stress Improvement Process.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA provided details of the pressurizer and penetrations on September 29, 2008. This letter committed to:</p> <p>Prior to placing the pressurizer in service, TVA will apply the Material Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) to the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve connections, the safety relief valve connections, the spray line nozzle and surge line nozzle connections.</p> <p>TVA will perform a bare metal visual (BMV) inspection of the upper pressurizer Alloy 600 locations at the first refueling outage.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>April 1, 2010, letter committed to:</p> <p>TVA will perform NDE prior to and after performance of the MSIP. If circumferential cracking is observed in either pressure boundary or non-pressure boundary portions of any locations covered under the scope of the bulletin, TVA will develop plans to perform an adequate extent-of-condition evaluation, and TVA will discuss those plans with cognizant NRC technical staff prior to starting Unit 2.</p> <p>After performing the BMV inspection during the first refueling outage, if any evidence of apparent reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage is discovered, then NDE capable of determining crack orientation will be performed in order to accurately characterize the flaw, the orientation, and extent. TVA will develop plans to perform an adequate extent of condition evaluation, and plans to possibly expand the scope of NDE to other components in the pressurizer will be discussed with NRC technical staff prior to restarting of Unit 2.</p>
			<p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 2004-001 on August 4, 2010.</p>
			<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated August 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102080017)"</p>
			<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed Bulletin 2004-01.</p>
			<p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>All field work for MSIP has been completed as documented in Work Order 09-954268-000.</p>
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Pre-MSIP UT was not performed per Westinghouse letter L TR-A600-10-8 dated January 20, 2010. Westinghouse documented that for WBN2, there is no possibility of PWSCC as the plant has never been in operation and has never been exposed to a harsh environment. Therefore, no pre-MSIP volumetric UT inspection is necessary to determine if PWSCC-induced flaws exist. However, WBN Unit 2 performed an UT examination in 2007 to determine if examination coverage greater than 90 percent could be achieved on each of the six nozzle to safe-end welds associated with the power operated relief valve, safety relief valves, spray line, and surge line per MRP-139, and no indications were identified.</p> <p>Post-MSIP UT examinations were performed in conjunction with the preservice requirements of ASME Section XI.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The remaining action for this Bulletin is: "After performing the BMV inspection during the first refueling outage, if any evidence of apparent reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage is discovered, then NDE capable of determining crack orientation will be performed in order to accurately characterize the flaw, the orientation, and extent. TVA will develop plans to perform an adequate extent of condition evaluation, and plans to possibly expand the scope of NDE to other components in the pressurizer will be discussed with NRC technical staff prior to restarting of Unit 2.")</p> <p>Thus, the Status for this Bulletin is changed to "C."</p>
B 2005-01	Material Control and Accounting at Reactors and Wet Spent Fuel Storage Facilities	C -----	<p>TVA: letters dated March 21, 2005 and May 11, 2005</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Item concerns a multi-unit issue that was completed for both units.</p>
B 2005-02	Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events	C -----	<p>TVA: letters dated January 20, 2006 and August 16, 2006.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Item concerns a multi-unit issue that was completed for both units.</p>
B 2007-01	Security Officer Attentiveness	C  06	<p>Item concerns a multi-unit issue that was completed for both units.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 05 UPDATE:</p> <p>The NRC closed this bulletin via letter dated March 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100770549).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated March 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 100770549)"</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 2011-01	Mitigating Strategies	S	REVISION 09 UPDATE:
		13	<p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11201A303) included the following:</p> <p>“Watts Bar Unit 2 is currently under construction, therefore this is a voluntary response. TVA will respond as appropriate to the information requested in this Bulletin consistent with the approach provided by Watts Bar, Unit 1 prior to licensing Unit 2.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated February 14, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13051A045) included the following:</p> <p>“TVA intends to submit by October 15, 2014, an updated set of mitigation strategy tables which will be applicable to WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. This submittal will also include information which updates WBN's response for Bulletin 2011-01 for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER 26 includes the following:</p> <p>“TVA Action    The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; an updated approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 without change.</p> <p>                  NRC Action    Open”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA's September 30, 2014, Letter to NRC, “Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 – Dual Unit Mitigation Strategy Tables,” submitted updated mitigating strategies tables which describe the pre-arranged B5b mitigation strategies developed for two unit operation at Watts Bar. This letter also updated WBN's response for Bulletin 2011-01 for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.</p>
B 2012-01	Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System	CO	REVISION 09 UPDATE:
		13	<p>Enclosure 3 of TVA to NRC letter dated October 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12312A167) provided the requested information for Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26 includes the following:</p> <p>“TVA Action    The proposed approach has been submitted for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 and is still under review by the NRC staff.</p> <p>                  NRC Action    Open”</p>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC to TVA letter dated December 20, 2013, requested that additional information be provided regarding the completion of interim actions and compensatory measures and the status of long-term corrective actions.</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated February 3, 2014, provided the requested information.</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated June 12, 2014, provided a proposed WBN Unit 2 license condition for completion of actions associated with resolution of Bulletin 2012-01. The proposed license condition also addressed the information NRC requested in Question 5 of NRC to TVA letter dated February 27, 2014, regarding actions TVA is taking with respect to the Open Phase Issue.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 contains the following under 8.2.2 Analysis:</p> <p>"NRC Bulletin 2012-01</p> <p>The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System,' dated July 27, 2012, to notify licensees that the NRC staff is requesting information about the facilities' electric power system designs to determine if further regulatory action is warranted. Bulletin 2012-01 requires addressees to comprehensively verify compliance with the regulatory requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, 'Electric Power Systems,' and the design criteria for protection systems under 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2).</p> <p>TVA provided its response for WBN Unit 2 in Enclosure 3 of letter dated October 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12312A167). Based on review of the response, NRC staff determined that the design vulnerability exists at WBN Unit 2 electric power system and no design features have been provided to enable functioning of electric power system with an open phase condition (OPC) with offsite power circuits. In response to NRC staff's RAI (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A314) concerning status and schedule for completion of plant design changes and modifications to resolve the open phase design vulnerability, TVA provided its response in letter dated February 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14038A075). TVA stated that it is fully engaged in the development of accurate detection and protection equipment without compromising nuclear safety or increasing plant risk, this new OPC technology is being thoroughly evaluated, will be tested, and will be fully analyzed before installation. In addition, based on the operating experience to-date, the OPC of concern is a loss of one or two of the three phases of a nuclear power plant's offsite electrical power circuit due to any component failure on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a qualified offsite electrical power circuit to the transmission system with and without a high impedance ground under all operating electrical system configurations and loading conditions. In supplemental letter dated September 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14247A231), TVA submitted additional text to be added to the FSAR and proposed a license condition associated with actions for resolving NRC Bulletin 2012-01.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>The proposed text that would be added to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 8.2.2 'Analysis,' as part of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 113 states:</p> <p>The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power Systems,' describing a condition resulting from the loss of a single phase between the transmission network and the onsite power distribution system at an operating nuclear plant in the United States. TVA has taken the short term actions described in the bulletin and the nuclear industry is developing a long term resolution. TVA has added the following license condition for the long term actions:</p> <p>Actions to resolve the issues identified in the Bulletin will be implemented on or before December 31, 2017.</p> <p>The NRC staff is proposing the following License Condition:</p> <p>By December 31, 2017, TVA will report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System' have been implemented.</p> <p>Based on the above, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that OPC design vulnerability with the WBN Unit 2 electric power system will be addressed by TVA when license conditions and regulatory commitments are met. The staff will close Bulletin 2012-01 for WBN Unit 2 when TVA notifies the NRC with a close-out letter when full compliance is achieved."</p> <p>Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
C 1976-01	Crane Hoist Control Circuit Modifications	C — —	See B 76-007 for additional information.
C 1976-02	Relay Failures - Westinghouse BF (AC) and BFD (DC) Relays	C — —	<p>TVA: letter dated November 22, 1976 informed NRC that these relay types are not used in Class 1E circuits.</p> <p>NRC: IR 50/390/76-11 and 50/391/76-11</p>
C 1976-03	Radiation Exposures in Reactor Cavities	NA — —	Info
C 1976-04	Neutron Monitor and Flow Bypass Switch Malfunctions	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1976-05	Hydraulic Shock And Sway Suppressors - Maintenance of Bleed and Lock-Up Velocities on ITT Grinnell's Model Nos. - Fig. 200 And Fig. 201, Catalog Ph-74-R	C — —	TVA: letter dated January 7, 1977 informed NRC that no Grinnell shock suppressors or sway braces have been or will be installed at WBN.
C 1976-06	Stress Corrosion Cracks in Stagnant, Low Pressure Stainless Piping Containing Boric Acid Solution at PWRs	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.

		* ----- REV	
ITEM	TITLE		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
C 1976-07	Inadequate Performance by Reactor Operating and Support Staff Members	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
C 1977-002a	Potential Heavy Spring Flooding (CP)	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
C 1977-01	Malfunctions of Limitorque Valve Operators	NA	Info
C 1977-03	Fire Inside a Motor Control Center	NA	Info
C 1977-04	Inadequate Lock Assemblies	NA	Info
C 1977-05	Fluid Entrapment in Valve Bonnets	NA — —	Info
C 1977-06	Effects of Hydraulic Fluid on Electrical Cables	NA — —	Info
C 1977-07	Short Period During Reactor Startup	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1977-08	Failure of Feedwater Sample Probe	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
C 1977-09	Improper Fuse Coordination in BWR Standby Liquid Control System Control Circuits	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1977-10	Vacuum Conditions Resulting in Damage to Liquid Process Tanks	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
C 1977-11	Leakage of Containment Isolation Valves with Resilient Seats	NA — —	Info
C 1977-12	Dropped Fuel Assemblies at BWR Facilities	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1977-13	Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing	NA — —	Info
C 1977-14	Separation of Contaminated Water Systems from Noncontaminated Plant Systems	NA	Info
C 1977-15	Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency Diesel Generator	NA	Info
C 1977-16	Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Lock-Out Features	NA — —	Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		REV		
C 1978-01	Loss of Well Logging Source	NA — —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1978-02	Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines	NA — —		Info
C 1978-03	Packaging Greater Than Type A Quantities of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material for Transport	NA — —		Info
C 1978-04	Installation Errors That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors	NA — —		Info
C 1978-05	Inadvertent Safety Injection During Cooldown	NA — —		Info
C 1978-06	Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities	NA — —		Info
C 1978-07	Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand	NA — —		Info
C 1978-08	Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants	NA — —		Info
C 1978-09	Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors	NA — —		Info
C 1978-10	Control of Sealed Sources in Radiation Therapy	NA — —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1978-11	Recirculation MG Set Overspeed Stops	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
C 1978-12	HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
C 1978-13	Inoperability of Service Water Pumps	NA — —		Info
C 1978-14	HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
C 1978-15	Tilting Disc Check Valves Fail to Close with Gravity in Vertical Position	NA — —		Info
C 1978-16	Limiter Valve Actuators	NA — —		Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	Info	
C 1978-17	Inadequate Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Training Records	— —		
C 1978-18	UL Fire Test	— —	Info	
C 1978-19	Manual Override (Bypass) of Safety System Actuation Signals	— —	Info	
C 1979-01	Administration of Unauthorized Byproduct Material to Humans	— —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1979-02	Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies	— —	Info	
C 1979-03	Inadequate Guard Training - Qualification and Falsified Training Records	— —	Info	
C 1979-04	Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators	— —	Info	
C 1979-05	Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors	— —	Info	
C 1979-06	Failure to Use Syringe and Bottle Shields in Nuclear Medicine	— —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1979-07	Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase			Boiling Water Reactor
C 1979-08	Attempted Extortion - Low Enriched Uranium	— —		Fuel facilities and operating reactors at the time the item was issued
C 1979-09	Occurrences of Split or Punctured Regulator Diaphragms in Certain Self Contained Breathing Apparatus	— —	Info	
C 1979-10	Pipefittings Manufactured from Unacceptable Material	— —	Info	
C 1979-11	Design/Construction Interface Problem	— —	Info	
C 1979-12	Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem	— —	Info	
C 1979-13	Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors	— —	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
C 1979-14	Unauthorized Procurement and Distribution of XE-133	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1979-15	Bursting of High Pressure Hose and Malfunction of Relief Valve O-Ring in Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
C 1979-16	Excessive Radiation Exposures to Members of the General Public and a Radiographer	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1979-17	Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on General Electric Company Metalclad Circuit Breakers	NA — —	Info
C 1979-18	Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1979-19	Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps	NA — —	Info
C 1979-20	Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay Type PM Bulletin 7305 Catalog 5U12-11-AC with a 120V AC Coil	NA — —	Info
C 1979-21	Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity	NA — —	Info
C 1979-22	Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves	NA — —	Info
C 1979-23	Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate	C — — 01	The Circular did not require a response.  TVA reported a nonconformance under 10 CFR 50.55e on January 17, 1980, that four motor starters of this type had been located in the 480V control and auxiliary vent boards at WBN. Gould factory representatives supervised the replacement of the carrier assemblies in accordance with the Gould instructions. The starters with replaced carriers were acceptable.  NRC IR 50-390/80-03 and 50-391/80-02 reviewed and closed the associated nonconformance reports.
C 1979-24	Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Detection Equipment on BWRs	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
C 1979-25	Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference	C 01	The Circular did not require a response.  TVA reported a nonconformance under 10 CFR 50.55e on March 6, 1980, that a review had determined that nine installed supports had brackets with the potential of hindering full function of the support. Additional supports that were not installed had the same potential problem. TVA initially determined that the supports would be modified in accordance with a vendor approved drawing. TVA subsequently determined that no actual problem existed and no field work was required.  NRC IR 50-390/83-15 and 50-391/83-11 reviewed and closed the associated nonconformance reports.
C 1980-01	Service Advice for GE Induction Disc Relays	NA	Info
C 1980-02	Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours	NA	Info
C 1980-03	Protection from Toxic Gas Hazards	NA	Info
C 1980-04	Securing of Threaded Locking Devices on Safety-Related Equipment	NA	Info
C 1980-05	Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and Onsite Supply	NA	Info
C 1980-06	Control and Accountability Systems for Implant Therapy Sources	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1980-07	Problems with HPCI Turbine Oil System	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1980-08	BWR Technical Specification Inconsistency - RPS Response Time	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
C 1980-09	Problems with Plant Internal Communications Systems	NA	Info
C 1980-10	Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Equipment	NA	Info
C 1980-11	Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures	NA	Info
C 1980-12	Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place when Mounted Below Horizontal Axis	NA	Info



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	Info	
C 1980-13	Grid Strap Damage in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies	— —		
C 1980-14	Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel	— —		
C 1980-15	Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown	— —		
C 1980-16	Operational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 510DU Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters	— —		
C 1980-17	Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water Jet from Baffle Plate Corner	— —		
C 1980-18	10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems	— —		
C 1980-19	Noncompliance with License Requirements for Medical Licensees	— —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1980-20	Changes in Safe-Slab Tank Dimensions	— —		
C 1980-21	Regulation of Refueling Crews	— —		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
C 1980-22	Confirmation of Employee Qualifications	— —		
C 1980-23	Potential Defects in Beloit Power Systems Emergency Generators	— —		
C 1980-24	AECL Teletherapy Unit Malfunction	— —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1980-25	Case Histories of Radiography Events	— —		Does not apply to power reactor.
C 1981-01	Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated	— —		
C 1981-02	Performance of NRC-Licensed Individuals while on Duty	— —		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
C 1981-03	Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-04	The Role of Shift Technical Advisors and Importance of Reporting Operational Events	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-05	Self-Aligning Rod End Bushings for Pipe Supports	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-06	Potential Deficiency Affecting Certain Foxboro 10 to 50 Milliampere Transmitters	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-07	Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-08	Foundation Materials	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-09	Containment Effluent Water that Bypasses Radioactivity Monitor	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-10	Steam Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System During Decay Heat Removal Cooldown	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
C 1981-11	Inadequate Decay Heat Removal During Reactor Shutdown	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
C 1981-12	Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Reactor Protection System	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-13	Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors	C — — 01	The Circular did not require a response.  TVA reported a nonconformance under 10 CFR 50.55e on April 4, 1986 (NCR W367-P), that required closing torque switches were found improperly wired. This issue (Torque switch and overload relay bypass capability for active safety related valves) is part of the Electrical Issues Corrective Action Program for WBN Unit 2.	
C 1981-14	Main Steam Isolation Valve Failures to Close	NA — —	Info	
C 1981-15	Unnecessary Radiation Exposures to the Public and Workers During Events Involving Thickness and Level Measuring Devices	NA — —	Info	
GL 1977-01	Intrusion Detection Systems Handbook	NA — —	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1977-02	Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities	NA — —	Info
GL 1977-03	Transmittal of NUREG-0321, “A Study of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Quality Assurance Program”	NA — —	Info
GL 1977-04	Shipments of Contaminated Components From NRC Licensed Power Facilities to Vendors & Service Companies	NA — —	Info
GL 1977-05	Nonconformity of Addressees of Items Directed to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation	NA — —	Info
GL 1977-06	Enclosing Questionnaire Related to Steam Generators	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1977-07	Reliability of Standby Diesel Generator Units	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1977-08	Revised Intrusion Detection Handbook and Entry Control Systems Handbook	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-01	Correction to Letter of 12/15/77 [GL 77-07]	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1978-02	Asymmetric Loads Background and Revised Request for Additional Information	C — —	NRC: Reviewed in SSER15 – Appendix C (June 1995). Resolved by approval of leak-before-break analysis.
GL 1978-03	Request For Information on Cavity Annulus Seal Ring	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1978-04	GAO Blanket Clearance for Letter Dated 12/09/77 [GL 77-06]	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1978-05	Internal Distribution of Correspondence – Asking for Comments on Mass Mailing System	NA	Info
GL 1978-06	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1978-07	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1978-08	Enclosing NUREG-0408 Re Mark I Containments, and Granting Exemption from GDC 50 and Enclosing Sample Notice	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1978-09	Multiple-Subsequent Actuations of Safety/Relief Valves Following an Isolation Event	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1978-10	Guidance on Radiological Environmental Monitoring	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-11	Guidance on Spent Fuel Pool Modifications	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-12	Notice of Meeting Regarding “Implementation of 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements and Status of Research ...”	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-13	Forwarding of NUREG-0219	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-14	Transmittal of Draft NUREG-0219 for Comment	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-15	Request for Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel	NA — —	See GL 81-007.
GL 1978-16	Request for Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel Pools	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-17	Corrected Letter on Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-18	Corrected Letter on Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel	NA — —	Duplicate of GL 81-007
GL 1978-19	Enclosing Sandia Report SAND 77-0777, “Barrier Technology Handbook”	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-20	Enclosing – “A Systematic Approach to the Conceptual Design of Physical Protection Systems for Nuclear Facilities	NA	Info
GL 1978-21	Transmitting NUREG/CR-0181, “Concerning Barrier and Penetration Data Needed for Physical Security System Assessment”	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-22	Revision to Intrusion Detection Systems and Entry Control Systems Handbooks and Nuclear Safeguards Technology Handbook	NA — —	Info

		***** REV	
ITEM	TITLE		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1978-23	Manpower Requirements for Operating Reactors	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-24	Model Appendix I Technical Specifications and Submittal Schedule For BWRs	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1978-25	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1978-26	Excessive Control Rod Guide Tube Wear	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1978-27	Forwarding of NUREG-0181	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-28	Forwarding pages omitted from 07/11/78 letter [GL 78-24]	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1978-29	Notice of PWR Steam Generator Conference	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-30	Forwarding of NUREG-0219	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-31	Notice of Steam Generator Conference Agenda	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-32	Reactor Protection System Power Supplies	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1978-33	Meeting Schedule and Locations For Upgraded Guard Qualification	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-34	Reactor Vessel Atypical Weld Material	C — —	See B 78-12.
GL 1978-35	Regional Meetings to Discuss Upgraded Guard Qualifications	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-36	Cessation of Plutonium Shipments by Air Except In NRC Approved Containers	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1978-37	Revised Meeting Schedule & Locations For Upgraded Guard Qualifications	NA — —	Info
GL 1978-38	Forwarding of 2 Tables of Appendix I, Draft Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications, PWR, and NUREG-0133	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	Info	
GL 1978-39	Forwarding of 2 Tables of Appendix I, Draft Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications, BWR, and NUREG-0133	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1978-40	Training & Qualification Program Workshops	NA	Info	
GL 1978-41	Mark II Generic Acceptance Criteria For Lead Plants	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1978-42	Training and Qualification Program Workshops	NA	Info	
GL 1979-01	Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development - TRADOC	NA	Info	
GL 1979-02	Transmitting Rev. to Entry Control Systems Handbook (SAND 77-1033), Intrusion Detection Handbook (SAND 76-0554), and Barrier Penetration Database	NA	Info	
GL 1979-03	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual	NA	Info	
GL 1979-04	Referencing 4/14/78 Letter - Modifications to NRC Guidance "Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Pool Storage and Handling"	NA	Info	
GL 1979-05	Information Relating to Categorization of Recent Regulatory Guides by the Regulatory Requirements Review Committee	NA	Info	
GL 1979-06	Contents of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual	NA	Info	
GL 1979-07	Seismic (SSE) and LOCA Responses (NUREG-0484)	NA	Info	
GL 1979-08	Amendment to 10 CFR 73.55	NA	Info	
GL 1979-09	Staff Evaluation of Interim Multiple-Consecutive Safety-Relief Valve Actuations	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1979-10	Transmitting Regulatory Guide 2.6 for Comment	NA		Does not apply to power reactor.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1979-11	Transmitting "Summary of Operating Experience with Recalculating Steam Generators, January 1979," NUREG-0523	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-12	ATWS - Enclosing Letter to GE, with NUREG-0460, Vol. 3	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-13	Schedule for Implementation and Resolution of Mark I Containment Long Term Program	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-14	Pipe Crack Study Group - Enclosing NUREG-0531 and Notice	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-15	Steam Generators - Enclosing Summary of Operating Experience with Recirculating Steam Generators, NUREG-0523	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-16	Meeting Re Implementation of Physical Security Requirements	NA	Info	
GL 1979-17	Reliability of Onsite Diesel Generators at Light Water Reactors	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-18	Westinghouse Two-Loop NSSS	NA — —	Addressed to specific plant(s).	
GL 1979-19	NRC Staff Review of Responses to Bs 79-06 and 79-06a	NA	Addressed to specific plant(s).	
GL 1979-20	Cracking in Feedwater Lines	C — —	See B 79-13.	
GL 1979-21	Enclosing NUREG/CR-0660, Enhancement of on Site Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1979-22	Enclosing NUREG-0560, "Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater Transients in PWRs Designed by B&W"	NA	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants	
GL 1979-23	NRC Staff Review of Responses to B 79-08	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	01	
GL 1979-24	Multiple Equipment Failures in Safety-Related Systems	NA	01	GL 79-24 provided a discussion of an inadvertent reactor scram and safety injection during monthly surveillance tests of the safeguards system at a PWR facility. The GL requested a review to determine if similar errors had or could have occurred at other PWRs. The GL further requested a review of management policies and procedures to assure that multiple equipment failures in safety-related systems will be vigorously pursued and analyzed to identify significant reduction in the ability of safety systems to function as required. A response was requested within 30 days of receipt of the GL with the results of these reviews. TVA does not have a record of receiving or responding to this GL. Thus, TVA concluded that this item was applicable only to PWRs with an operating license at the time the GL was issued.
GL 1979-25	Information Required to Review Corporate Capabilities	NA	Info	
GL 1979-26	Upgraded Standard Technical Specification Bases Program	NA	Info	
GL 1979-27	Operability Testing of Relief and Safety Relief Valves	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1979-28	Evaluation of Semi-Scale Small Break Experiment	NA	Info	
GL 1979-29	Transmitting NUREG-0473, Revision 2, Draft Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications	NA	Info	
GL 1979-30	Transmitting NUREG-0472, Revision 2, Draft Radiological Technical Specifications	NA	Info	
GL 1979-31	Submittal of Copies of Response to 6/29/79 NRC Request [79-25]	NA	Info	
GL 1979-32	Transmitting NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned"	NA	Info	
GL 1979-33	Transmitting NUREG-0576, "Security Training and Qualification Plans"	NA	Info	
GL 1979-34	New Physical Security Plans (FR 43280-285)	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.	
GL 1979-35	Regional Meetings to Discuss Impacts on Emergency Planning	NA	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
GL 1979-36	Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution Systems Voltages	CI ---	11	<p>This GL tracked compliance with BTP PSB-1, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages."</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform verification during the preoperational testing.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA's commitment to perform verification of adequacy of voltages during the preoperational testing is not required, since WBN Unit 1's test program has previously performed PTI-200-02 (AC Auxiliary Power System Survey), which proved the voltage analyses used to design the plant were sound methodologies. Since the performance of PTI-200-02 proved the design methodology was sound, and the offsite power system and the onsite distribution system is of sufficient capacity and capability to automatically start as well as operate all required safety loads, it is not necessary to repeat this voltage analysis survey as the design methodologies have not changed. Additionally, the offsite power system is a common system shared between Unit 1 and Unit 2 and further testing is not needed and the onsite distribution system is designed the same; therefore, the calculation and testing methodologies apply to Unit 2.</p>
GL 1979-37	Amendment to 10 CFR 73.55 Deferral from 8/1/79 to 11/1/79	NA ---		Info
GL 1979-38	BWR Off-Gas Systems - Enclosing NUREG/CR-0727	NA ---		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1979-39	Transmitting Division 5 Draft Regulatory Guide and Value Impact Statement	NA ---		Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1979-40	Follow-up Actions Resulting from the NRC Staff Reviews Regarding the TMI-2 Accident	NA ---		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-41	Compliance with 40 CFR 190, EPA Uranium Fuel Cycle Standard	NA		Info
GL 1979-42	Potentially Unreviewed Safety Question on Interaction Between Non-Safety Grade Systems and Safety Grade Systems	NA		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-43	Reactor Cavity Seal Ring Generic Issue	NA		Addressed to specific plant(s).
GL 1979-44	Referencing 6/29/79 Letter Re Multiple Equipment Failures	NA		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-45	Transmittal of Reports Regarding Foreign Reactor Operating Experiences	NA		Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	---	
GL 1979-46	Containment Purge and Venting During Normal Operation – Guidelines for Valve Operability	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-47	Radiation Training	NA	---	Info
GL 1979-48	Confirmatory Requirements Relating to Condensation Oscillation Loads for the Mark I Containment Long Term Program	NA	---	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1979-49	Summary of Meetings Held on 9/18-20/79 to Discuss Potential Unreviewed Safety Question on Systems Interaction for B&W PI	NA	---	Info
GL 1979-50	Emergency Plans Submittal Dates	NA	---	Info
GL 1979-51	Follow-up Actions Resulting from the NRC Staff Reviews Regarding the TMI-2 Accident	NA 01	---	GL 1979-51 provided follow-up actions resulting from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident. GL 1979-51 was provided for planning and guidance purposes. Its principal element was a report titled "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations" (NUREG-0573). This GL and the NUREG were superseded by GL 1980-90 and NUREG-0737. See GL 1980-90 for further information.
GL 1979-52	Radioactive Release at North Anna Unit 1 and Lessons Learned	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-53	ATWS	NA	---	Info
GL 1979-54	Containment Purging and Venting During Normal Operation	NA	---	Addressed to specific plant(s).
GL 1979-55	Summary of Meeting Held on October 12, 1979 to Discuss Responses to Bulletins 79-05C and 79-06C and HPI Termination Criteria	NA	---	Info
GL 1979-56	Discussion of Lessons Learned Short Term Requirements	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-57	Acceptance Criteria for Mark I Long Term Program	NA	---	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1979-58	ECCS Calculations on Fuel Cladding	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1979-59	This GL was never issued.	NA	---	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	Info	
GL 1979-60	Discussion of Lessons Learned Short Term Requirements	NA	Info	
GL 1979-61	Discussion of Lessons Learned Short Term Requirements	NA	Info	
GL 1979-62	ECCS Calculations on Fuel Cladding	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
			Duplicate of GL 1979-058	
GL 1979-63	Upgraded Emergency Plans	C 01	GL 1979-63 advised applicants for licenses of proposed rulemaking that NRC concurrence in State and local emergency plans would be a condition for issuing an operating license. TVA responded to GL 1979-63 on January 3, 1980, and confirmed the intent to revise the Emergency Plan to address the NRC requirements.	
GL 1979-64	Suspension of All Operating Licenses (PWRs)	NA	Info	
GL 1979-65	Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Requirements - Enclosing Branch Technical Position, Revision 1	NA	Info	
GL 1979-66	Additional Information Re 11/09/79 Letter on ECCS Calculations [GL 79-62]	NA	Info	
GL 1979-67	Estimates for Evacuation of Various Areas Around Nuclear Power Reactors	NA	Info	
GL 1979-68	Audit of Small Break LOCA Guidelines	NA	Info	
GL 1979-69	Cladding Rupture, Swelling, and Coolant Blockage as a Result of a Reactor Accident	NA	Info	
GL 1979-70	Environmental Monitoring for Direct Radiation	NA	Info	
GL 1980-001	NUREG-0630, "Cladding, Swelling and Rupture - Models For LOCA Analysis"	NA	Info	
GL 1980-002	QA Requirements Regarding Diesel Generator Fuel Oil	C	TVA: FSAR 9.5.4.2	
GL 1980-003	BWR Control Rod Failures	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
GL 1980-004	B 80-01, "Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply"	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1980-005	B 79-01b, "Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment"	NA		Info
GL 1980-006	Issuance of NUREG-0313, Rev 1, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping"	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1980-007	This GL was never issued.	NA		
GL 1980-008	B 80-02. "Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied Equipment"	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1980-009	Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal	NA		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-010	Issuance of NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position On Equipment Qualifications of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment"	NA		Info
GL 1980-011	B 80-03, "Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Absorber Cells"	C 01		GL 1980-11 transmitted Bulletin 1980-03. TVA responded to B 1980-03 on March 21, 1980. See B 1980-03 for further information.
GL 1980-012	B 80-04, "Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break With Continued Feedwater Addition"	NA		Info
GL 1980-013	Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment	NA		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-014	LWR Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves	S 02		TVA: FSAR 5.2.7.4 NRC: 1.14.2 of SSER 6  NRC reviewed in 1.14.2 of SSER6.  Unit 2 Action: Incorporate guidance into Technical Specifications.
REVISION 02 UPDATE:				
Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.				

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
				TS Surveillance Requirement 3.4.13.1 verifies RCS operational leakage by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.
GL 1980-015	Request for Additional Management and Technical Resources Information	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-016	B 79-01b, "Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-017	Modifications to BWR Control Rod Drive Systems	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-018	Crystal River 3 Reactor Trip From Approximately 100% Full Power	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants	
GL 1980-019	Resolution of Enhanced Fission Gas Release Concern	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-020	Actions Required From OL Applicants of NSSS Designs by W and CE Resulting From NRC B&O Task Force Review of TMI2 Accident	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-021	B 80-05, "Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System Holdup Tanks"	CI — —	Closed in IR 50-390/84-59 and 50-391/84-45.	
		12	Unit 2 Action:	
			Complete surveillance procedures for Unit 2.	
			REVISION 12 UPDATE:	
			Surveillance procedure 2-SI-0-902, which addresses inservice testing of the Unit 2 CVCS HUT Vacuum Relief Valve 2-RFV-62-1079, is active.	
GL 1980-022	Transmittal of NUREG-0654, "Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plan"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-023	Change of Submittal Date For Evaluation Time Estimates	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-024	Transmittal of Information on NRC "Nuclear Data Link Specifications"	NA	Info	
GL 1980-025	B 80-06, "Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-026	Qualifications of Reactor Operators	NA — —	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1980-027	B 80-07, "BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-028	B 80-08, "Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds"	C 01	GL 1980-28 transmitted Bulletin 1980-08. TVA responded to B 1980-08 on July 8, 1980. See B 1980-08 for further information.	
GL 1980-029	Modifications to Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Systems	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-030	Clarification of The Term "Operable" As It Applies to Single Failure Criterion For Safety Systems Required by TS	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1980-031	B 80-09, "Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-032	Information Request on Category I Masonry Walls Employed by Plants Under CP and OL Review	C 01	GL 1980-32 transmitted NRC questions on masonry walls. TVA provided the information requested by letters dated February 12, 1981, for reinforced walls and August 20, 1981, for nonreinforced walls. TVA provided a final response on January 22, 1982. See B 1980-11 for further information.	
GL 1980-033	Actions Required From OL Applicants of B&W Designed NSSS Resulting From NRC B&O Task Force Review of TMI2 Accident	NA	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants	
GL 1980-034	Clarification of NRC Requirements for Emergency Response Facilities at Each Site	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-035	Effect of a DC Power Supply Failure on ECCS Performances	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-036	B 80-10, "Contamination of Non-Radioactive System and Resulting Potential For Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-037	Five Additional TMI-2 Related Requirements to Operating Reactors	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1980-038	Summary of Certain Non-Power Reactor Physical Protection Requirements	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.	
GL 1980-039	B 80-11, "Masonry Wall Design"	NA — —	Info	



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ITEM	TITLE		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1980-040	Transmittal of NUREG-0654, "Report of the B&O Task Force" and Appropriate NUREG-0626, "Generic Evaluation of FW Transient and Small Break LOCA"	NA — —	Info
GL 1980-041	Summary of Meetings Held on April 22 &23, 1980 With Representatives of the Mark I Owners Group	NA — —	Info
GL 1980-042	B 80-12, "Decay Heat Removal System Operability"	NA — —	Info
GL 1980-043	B 80-13, "Cracking In Core Spray Spargers"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1980-044	Reorganization of Functions and Assignments Within ONRR/SSPB	NA — —	Info
GL 1980-045	Fire Protection Rule	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-046 and GL 1980-047	Generic Technical Activity A-12, "Fracture Toughness and Additional Guidance on Potential for Low Fracture toughness and Laminar Tearing on PWR Steam Generator Coolant Pump Supports"	C — —	No response was required for this GL, and NUREG-0577 states that the lamellar tearing aspect of this issue was resolved by the NUREG. Further, the NUREG states that for plants under review, the fracture toughness issue was resolved.
GL 1980-048	Revision to 5/19/80 Letter On Fire Protection [GL 80-45]	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-049	Nuclear Safeguards Problems	NA — —	Info
GL 1980-050	Generic Activity A-10, "BWR Cracks"	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1980-051	On-Site Storage of Low-Level Waste	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-052	Five Additional TMI-2 Related Requirements - Errata Sheets to 5/7/80 Letter [GL 80-37]	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-053	Decay Heat Removal Capability	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1980-054	B 80-14, "Degradation of Scram Discharge Volume Capability"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1980-055	B 80-15, "Possible Loss of Hotline With Loss of off-Site Power"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-056	Commission Memorandum and Order on Equipment Qualification	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-057	Further Commission Guidance For Power Reactor Operating Licenses NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0694	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-058	B 80-16, "Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc. Models 1151/1152 Pressure Transmitters With "A" Or "D" Output Codes"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-059	Transmittal of Federal Register Notice RE Regional Meetings to Discuss Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-060	Request for Information Regarding Evacuation Times	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-061	TMI-2 Lessons Learned	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-062	TMI-2 Lessons Learned	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-063	B 80-17, "Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-064	Scram Discharge Volume Designs	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-065	Request for Estimated Construction Completion and Fuel Load Schedules	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-066	B 80-17, Supplement 1, "Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-067	Scram Discharge Volume	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-068	B 80-17, Supplement 2, "Failures Revealed by Testing Subsequent to Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1980-069	B 80-18, "Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Through Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side HELB"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-070	B 80-19, "Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in RPS of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by GE"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-071	B 80-20, "Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-072	Interim Criteria For Shift Staffing	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-073	"Functional Criteria For Emergency Response Facilities," NUREG-0696	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-074	Notice of Forthcoming Meeting With Representatives of EPRI to Discuss Program For Resolution of USI A-12, "Fracture Toughness Issue"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-075	Lessons Learned Tech. Specs.	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1980-076	Notice of Forthcoming Meeting With GE to Discussed Proposed BWR Feedwater Nozzle Leakage Detection System	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-077	Refueling Water Level – Technical Specifications Changes	S — — 02	Unit 2 Action: Address in Technical Specifications, as appropriate.	
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:	
			Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.	
			TS LCO 3.9.7 requires the refueling cavity water level to be maintained greater than or equal to 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.	
GL 1980-078	Mark I Containment Long-Term Program	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-079	B 80-17, Supplement 3, "Failures Revealed by Testing Subsequent to Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram At a BWR"	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1980-080	Preliminary Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-081	Preliminary Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements - Addendum to 9/5/80 Letter [GL 80-80]	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-082	B 79-01b, Supplement 2, "Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-083	Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-084	BWR Scram System	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-085	Implementation of Guidance From USI A-12, "Potential For LOW Fracture Toughness and Lamellar Tearing On Component Support"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-086	Notice of Meeting to Discuss Final Resolution of USI A-12	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-087	Notice of Meeting to Discuss Status of EPRI-Proposed Resolution of the USI A-12 Fracture Toughness Issue	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-088	Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1980-089	B 79-01b, Supplement 3, "Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-090	NUREG-0737, TMI (Prior and future GLs, with the exception of certain discrete scopes, have been screened into NUREG list for those applicable to Watts Bar 2)	CI — —	See NUREG items in this list.	
GL 1980-091	ODYN Code Calculation	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-092	B 80-21, "Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc."	C — — 01	GL 1980-92 transmitted Bulletin 1980-21. TVA responded to B 1980-21 on May 6, 1981. See B 1980-21 for further information.	
GL 1980-093	Emergency Preparedness	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		-----		
GL 1980-094	Emergency Plan	NA	Info	
GL 1980-095	Generic Technical Activity A-10, NUREG-0619, “BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking”	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-096	Fire Protection	NA	Addressed to specific plant(s).	
GL 1980-097	B 80-23, “Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation”	NA	Info	
GL 1980-098	B 80-24, “Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment”	NA	Info	
GL 1980-099	Technical Specifications Revisions For Snubber Surveillance	NA	Info	
GL 1980-100	Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 Regarding Fire Protection - Federal Register Notice	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1980-101	Inservice Inspection Programs	NA	Addressed to specific plant(s).	
GL 1980-102	Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980 (Referencing B 79-01b, Supplement 2 - q.2 & 3 - Sept 30, 1980)	NA	Info	
GL 1980-103	Fire Protection - Revised Federal Register Notice	NA	Info	
GL 1980-104	Orders On Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment	NA	Info	
GL 1980-105	Implementation of Guidance For USI A-12, “Potential For Low Fracture toughness and Lamellar Tearing On Component Supports”	NA	Info	
GL 1980-106	Report On ECCS Cladding Models, NUREG-0630	NA	Info	
GL 1980-107	BWR Scram Discharge System	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-108	Emergency Planning	NA	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1980-109	Guidelines For SEP Soil Structure Interaction Reviews	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-110	Periodic Updating of FSARS	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1980-111	B 80-17, Supplement 4, "Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1980-112	B 80-25, "Operating Problems With Target Rock Safety Relief Valves"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1980-113	Control of Heavy Loads	C — —	Superseded by GL 1981-07.	
GL 1981-01	Qualification of Inspection, Examination, Testing and Audit Personnel	NA — —	Info	
GL 1981-02	Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations Concerning Operator Licensing	NA — —	Info	
GL 1981-03	Implementation of NUREG-0313, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1981-04	Emergency Procedures and Training for Station Blackout Events	C — —	Superseded by Station Blackout Rule.	
GL 1981-05	Information Regarding The Program For Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment	NA — —	Info	
GL 1981-06	Periodic Updating of Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARS)	NA — —	Info	
GL 1981-07	Control of Heavy Loads	CI — —	"Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor, or Over Safety-Related Equipment" – NRC closure letter dated May 20, 1998.	
			LICENSE CONDITION: Control of heavy loads (NUREG-0612)	
			The staff concluded in SSER13 that the license condition was no longer necessary based on their review of TVA's response to NUREG-0612 guidelines for Phase I in TVA letter dated July 28, 1993.	
			Unit 2 Action:	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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				Unit 2 Heavy Loads Program will be in compliance with NUREG-0612.
GL 1981-08	ODYN Code	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-09	BWR Scram Discharge System	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-10	Post-TMI Requirements For The Emergency Operations Facility	NA		Info
GL 1981-11	BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking (NUREG-0619)	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-12	Fire Protection Rule	NA		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1981-13	SER For GEXL Correlation For 8X8R Fuel Reload Applications For Appendix D Submittals of The GE topical Report	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-14	Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems	S		TVA: FSAR 10.4.9
		12		-----  Unit 2 Action:  Additional Unit 2 implementing procedures or other activity is required for completion.  [WAS "OL."]  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 2 is designed with a seismically rated AFW system and facilities. GL 1981-14 is already integrated into the construction design and is incorporated into the FSAR. TVA to NRC letter dated September 07, 2007, lists the Generic Communications issued prior to 1995 and the status of each unit in addressing that communication. GL 1981-14 is listed as closed and the closing document for each unit is the FSAR, Section 10.4.9. Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Supplements 23 and 24 last addressed a separate issue in Section 10.4.9, and the NRC accepted the solution to the issue. SER Supplements 23 and 24 illustrate that there are no other open items against this section of the SER.
GL 1981-15	Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment - Clarification of Staff's Handling of Proprietary Information	NA		Info



		-----*	
ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1981-16	NUREG-0737, Item I.C.1 SER on Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG)	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1981-17	Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities	NA — —	Info
GL 1981-18	BWR Scram Discharge System - Clarification of Diverse Instrumentation Requirements	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-19	Thermal Shock to Reactor Pressure Vessels	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1981-20	Safety Concerns Associated With Pipe Breaks in the BWR Scram System	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-21	Natural Circulation Cooldown	CI — —  13	TVA responded December 3, 1981.  Unit 2 Action: Issue operating procedures.  ----- -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  The operating procedures have been approved through Sponsor approval; they will not be issued until the applicable system(s) is (are) turned over to Operations. This is sufficient for closure of this item.
GL 1981-22	Engineering Evaluation of the H. B. Robinson Reactor Coolant System Leak on 1/29/81	NA — —	Info
GL 1981-23	INPO Plant Specific Evaluation Reports	NA — —	Info
GL 1981-24	Multi-Plant Issue B-56, "Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert"	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1981-25	Change in Implementing Schedule For Submission and Evaluation of Upgraded Emergency Plans	NA — —	Info
GL 1981-26	Licensing Requirements for Pending Construction Permit and Manufacturing License Applications	NA — —	Applicants with pending Construction Permits
GL 1981-27	Privacy and Proprietary Material in Emergency Plans	NA — —	Info
GL 1981-28	Steam Generator Overfill	NA — —	Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		---	---	
GL 1981-29	Simulator Examinations	NA	Info	
GL 1981-30	Safety Concerns Associated With Pipe Breaks in the BWR Scram System	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1981-31	This GL was never issued.	NA		
GL 1981-32	NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.44, "Evaluation of Anticipated Transients Combined With Single Failure"	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1981-33	This GL was never issued.	NA		
GL 1981-34	Safety Concerns Associated With Pipe Breaks in the BWR Scram System	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1981-35	Safety Concerns Associated With Pipe Breaks in the BWR Scram System	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1981-36	Revised Schedule for Completion of TMI Action Plan Item II.D.1, "Relief and Safety Valve Testing"	NA	Info	
GL 1981-37	ODYN Code Reanalysis Requirements	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1981-38	Storage of Low Level Radioactive Wastes at Power Reactor Sites	NA	Info	
GL 1981-39	NRC Volume Reduction Policy	NA	Info	
GL 1981-40	Qualifications of Reactor Operators	NA	Info	
GL 1982-01	New Applications Survey	NA	Info	
GL 1982-02	Commission Policy on Overtime	NA	Info	
GL 1982-03	High Burnup MAPLHGR Limits	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1982-04	Use of INPO See-in Program	NA	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	---	
GL 1982-05	Post-TMI Requirements	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-06	This GL was never issued.	NA	---	
GL 1982-07	Transmittal of NUREG-0909 Relative to the Ginna Tube Rupture	NA	---	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1982-08	Transmittal of NUREG-0909 Relative to the Ginna Tube Rupture	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-09	Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-10	Post-TMI Requirements	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-11	Transmittal of NUREG-0916 Relative to the Restart of R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-12	Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-13	Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Examinations	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-14	Submittal of Documents to the NRC	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-15	This GL was never issued.	NA	---	
GL 1982-16	NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications	NA	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-17	Inconsistency of Requirements Between 50.54(T) and 50.15	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-18	Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Requalification Examinations	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-19	Submittal of Copies of Documentation to NRC - Copy Requirements for Emergency Plans and Physical Security Plans	NA	---	Info
GL 1982-20	Guidance for Implementing the Standard Review Plan Rule	NA	---	Info

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1982-21	Fire Protection Audits	NA	Info
GL 1982-22	Congressional Request for Information Concerning Steam Generator Tube Integrity	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-23	Inconsistency Between Requirements of 10CFR 73.40(d) and Standard Technical Specifications For Performing Audits of Safeguards Contingency Plans	NA	Info
GL 1982-24	Safety Relief Valve Quencher Loads: BWR MARK II and III Containments	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1982-25	Integrated IAEA Exercise for Physical Inventory at LWRS	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-26	NUREG-0744, REV. 1, "Pressure Vessel Material Fracture Toughness"	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-27	Transmittal of NUREG-0763, "Guidelines For Confirmatory In-Plant Tests of Safety-Relief Valve Discharge for BWR Plants"	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1982-28	Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System	CO	LICENSE CONDITION: Detectors for Inadequate core cooling (II.F.2)
		07	In the original SER, the review of the ICC instrumentation was incomplete. The January 24, 1992, letter superseded the previous responses on this issue. TVA letter for Units 1 and 2 dated January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware. NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER10. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System.
			Unit 2 Action: Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.
			REVISION 06 UPDATE:
			SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:
			"Closed. Subsumed as part of NRC staff review of Instrumentation and Controls submitted April 8, 2010."
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-608 closed GL 82-028.
GL 1982-29	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1982-30	Filings Related to 10 CFR 50 Production and Utilization Facilities	NA — —	Info
GL 1982-31	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1982-32	Draft Steam Generator Report (SAI)	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1982-33	Supplement to NUREG-0737, "Requirements for Emergency Response Capability"	CI 12	"Safety Parameter Display System" (SPDS) / "Requirements for Emergency Response Capability" - NRC reviewed in SSER5, SSER6, and 18.2.2 of SSER15.  Unit 2 Action:  Install SPDS and have it operational prior to start-up after the first refueling outage.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  SPDS has been installed.
GL 1982-34	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1982-35	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1982-36	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1982-37	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1982-38	Meeting to Discuss Developments for Operator Licensing Examinations	NA — —	Info
GL 1982-39	Problems With Submittals of Subsequent Information of CURT 73.21 For Licensing Reviews	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-01	Operator Licensing Examination Site Visit	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-010a	Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —	Applies only to Combustion Engineering designed plants

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1983-010b	Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —	Applies only to Combustion Engineering designed plants
GL 1983-02	NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications	NA	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1983-03	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1983-04	Regional Workshops Regarding Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, "Requirements For Emergency Response Capability"	NA	Info
GL 1983-05	Safety Evaluation of "Emergency Procedure Guidelines, Revision 2," June 1982	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1983-06	Certificates and Revised Format For Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Licenses	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-07	The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-08	Modification of Vacuum Breakers on Mark I Containments	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1983-09	Review of Combustion Engineering Owners' Group Emergency Procedures Guideline Program	NA — —	Applies only to Combustion Engineering designed plants
GL 1983-10c	Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	CI — —	TVA: letters dated January 5, 1984 and June 25, 1984  NRC: letter dated June 8, 1990.  -----  Unit 2 Action:  Incorporate emergency response guidelines into applicable procedures.  [WAS "NOTE 3."]
GL 1983-10d	Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1983-10e	Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants

		* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
ITEM	TITLE			
GL 1983-10f	Resolution of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5., "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —		Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1983-11	Licensee Qualification for Performing Safety Analyses in Support of Licensing Actions	NA — —		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1983-12	Issuance of NRC FORM 398 - Personal Qualifications Statement - Licensee	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-13	Clarification of Surveillance Requirements for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Absorber Units In Standard Technical Specifications on ESF Cleanup Systems	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-14	Definition of "Key Maintenance Personnel," (Clarification of Generic Letter 82-12)	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-15	Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.150, "Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel Welds During Preservice & Inservice Examinations, Revision 1"	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-16	Transmittal of NUREG-0977 Relative to the ATWS Events at Salem Generating Station, Unit No.1	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-16a	Transmittal of NUREG-0977 Relative to the ATWS Events at Salem Generating Station, Unit No.1	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-17	Integrity of Requalification Examinations for Renewal of Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Licenses	NA — —		Info
GL 1983-18	NRC Staff Review of the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) Control Room Survey Program	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1983-19	New Procedures for Providing Public Notice Concerning Issuance of Amendments to Operating Licenses	NA — —		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1983-20	Integrated Scheduling for Implementation of Plant Modifications	NA — —		Info



ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1983-21	Clarification of Access Control Procedures for Law Enforcement Visits	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-22	Safety Evaluation of "Emergency Response Guidelines"	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-23	Safety Evaluation of "Emergency Procedure Guidelines"	NA — —	Applies only to Combustion Engineering designed plants
GL 1983-24	TMI Task Action Plan Item I.G.1, "Special Low Power Testing and Training," Recommendations for BWRs	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1983-25	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1983-26	Clarification Of Surveillance Requirements For Diesel Fuel Impurity Level Tests	NA — —	Info
GL 1983-27	Surveillance Intervals in Standard Technical Specifications	NA	Info
GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  1.2 – Post Trip Review Data and Information Capability	C	TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983 and December 4, 1987  NRC: IR 50-390, 391/86-04
GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  2.1 – Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface (Reactor Trip System Components)	CI — —  06	TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983 and August 24, 1990  NRC: letters dated October 20, 1986 and June 18, 1990  -----  Unit 2 Action:  Ensure that required information on Critical Structures and Components is properly incorporated into procedures.  [WAS "NOTE 3."]  -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  Confirmed that required information on Critical Structures and Components is properly incorporated into procedures.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  2.2 – Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface (All SR Components)"	CI	---	Unit 2 Action:  Enter engineering component background data in INPO's Equipment Performance and Information Exchange System (EPIX) for Unit 2.
GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  3.1 – Post-Maintenance Testing (Reactor Trip System Components)	S ---	02	TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983, January 17, 1986 and November 1, 1993  NRC: letters dated December 10, 1985, October 27, 1986, and July 2, 1990; IR 390, 391/86-04  -----  Unit 2 Action: Test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications will include post-maintenance operability testing of safety-related components of the reactor trip system.  -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 TS (including the TS Bases) was submitted on March 4, 2009.  The Bases for TS Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 states, in part, "Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2."
GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  3.2 – Post-Maintenance Testing (All SR Components) Remains in Section 1.14 (i.e., OPEN ).	S ---	06	TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983, January 17, 1986 and November 1, 1993  NRC: letters dated December 10, 1985, October 27, 1986, and July 2, 1990; IR 390, 391/86-04  -----  Unit 2 Action:  Test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications will include post-maintenance operability testing of other (than reactor trip system) safety-related components.  -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 TS (including the TS Bases) was submitted on March 4, 2009.  The Bases for TS Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 states, in part, "Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Watts Bar's Preventative Maintenance Program is not unit specific; no further action is required for Unit 2.</p>
GL 1983-28	<p>"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:</p> <p>4.1 – Reactor Trip System Reliability (Vendor Related Modifications)</p>	<p><b>C</b></p> <p>-----</p> <p><b>07</b></p>	<p>TVA: letter dated May 19, 1986</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Confirm vendor-recommended DS416 breaker modifications are implemented.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed GL 83-028, Item 4.1.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>New Unit 2 DS-416 breakers were purchased from Westinghouse; these new breakers have the required modifications already installed.</p>
GL 1983-28	<p>"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:</p> <p>4.2 – Reactor Trip System Reliability (Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Program for Reactor Trip Breakers)</p>	<p><b>S</b></p> <p>-----</p> <p><b>11</b></p>	<p>TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983, February 10, 1986, and May 19, 1986</p> <p>NRC: letters dated July 26, 1985 and June 18, 1992; SSER 16</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Ensure maintenance instruction procedure and Technical Specifications support reliable reactor trip breaker operation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 TS was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>Item 17. (Reactor Trip Breakers) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 states the requirement for the reactor trip breakers.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			REVISION 11 UPDATE:
			Maintenance Instructions 2-MI-99.001 (Reactor Trip Breaker Inspection and Testing) and MI-99.002 (Reactor Trip Switchgear Inspection and Testing) have been issued. These MIs provide detailed steps for manufacturer's recommended inspection and preventive maintenance of Unit 2 Westinghouse's reactor trip breakers and reactor trip switchgear, respectively.
GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  4.3 – Reactor Trip System Reliability (Automatic Actuation of Shunt Trip Attachment)	<b>C</b> — —	TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983, March 22, 1985  NRC: IR 50-390/86-04 and 50-391/86-04; letter dated June 18, 1990
GL 1983-28	"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events:  4.5 – Reactor Trip System Reliability (Automatic Actuation of Shunt Trip Attachment)	<b>S</b> — — <b>02</b>	TVA: letters dated November 7, 1983 and July 26, 1985  NRC: letters dated June 28, 1990 and October 9, 1990; SSERs 5 and 16  -----  Unit 2 Action: Address in Technical Specifications, as appropriate.  -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.  Item 18. (Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 states the requirement for the shunt trip attachment.
GL 1983-29	This GL was never issued.	<b>NA</b> — —	
GL 1983-30	Deletion of Standard Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.6 For Diesel Generator Testing	<b>NA</b> — —	Info
GL 1983-31	Safety Evaluation of "Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines"	<b>NA</b>	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1983-32	NRC Staff Recommendations Regarding Operator Action for Reactor Trip and ATWS	<b>NA</b> — —	Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	Info	
GL 1983-33	NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50	— —		
GL 1983-34	This GL was never issued.	NA		
GL 1983-35	Clarification of TMI Action Plan Item II.K.3.31	NA	Info	
GL 1983-36	NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1983-37	NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1983-38	NUREG-0965, "NRC Inventory of Dams"	NA	Info	
GL 1983-39	Voluntary Survey of Licensed Operators	NA	Info	
GL 1983-40	Operator Licensing Examination	NA	Info	
GL 1983-41	Fast Cold Starts of Diesel Generators	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1983-42	Clarification to GL 81-07 Regarding Response to NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants"	NA	Info	
GL 1983-43	Reporting Requirements of 10 CFR 50, Sections 50.72 and 50.73, and Standard Technical Specifications	NA	Info	
GL 1983-44	Availability of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner Standards"	NA	Info	
GL 1984-01	NRC Use Of The Terms "Important To Safety" and "Safety Related"	NA	Info	
GL 1984-02	Notice of Meeting Regarding Facility Staffing	NA	Info	
GL 1984-03	Availability of NUREG-0933, "A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues"	NA	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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GL 1984-04	Safety Evaluation of Westinghouse Topical Reports Dealing with Elimination of Postulated Pipe Breaks in PWR Primary Main Loops	NA	Info	
GL 1984-05	Change to NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner Standards"	NA	Info	
GL 1984-06	Operator and Senior Operator License Examination Criteria For Passing Grade	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.	
GL 1984-07	Procedural Guidance for Pipe Replacement at BWRs	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1984-08	Interim Procedures for NRC Management of Plant-Specific Backfitting	NA	Info	
GL 1984-09	Recombiner Capability Requirements of 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(ii)	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1984-10	Administration of Operating Tests Prior to Initial Criticality	NA	Info	
GL 1984-11	Inspection of BWR Stainless Steel Piping	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1984-12	Compliance With 10 CFR Part 61 and Implementation of Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETs) and Attendant Process Control Program (PCP)	NA	Info	
GL 1984-13	Technical Specification for Snubbers	NA	Info	
GL 1984-14	Replacement and Requalification Training Program	NA	Info	
GL 1984-15	Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability	NA	Info	
GL 1984-16	Adequacy of On-Shift Operating Experience for Near Term Operating License Applicants	NA	Info	

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1984-17	Annual Meeting to Discuss Recent Developments Regarding Operator Training, Qualifications, and Examinations	NA — —	Info	
GL 1984-18	Filing of Applications for Licenses and Amendments	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.	
GL 1984-19	Availability of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0933, "A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1984-20	Scheduling Guidance for Licensee Submittals of Reloads That Involve Unreviewed Safety Questions	NA — —	Info	
GL 1984-21	Long Term Low Power Operation in Pressurized Water Reactors	NA — —	Info	
GL 1984-22	This GL was never issued.	NA — —		
GL 1984-23	Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1984-24	Certification of Compliance to 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important To Safety For Nuclear Power Plants	CI	See Special Program for Environmental Qualification.	
GL 1985-01	Fire Protection Policy Steering Committee Report	NA — —	Only issued as draft	
GL 1985-02	Recommended Actions Stemming From NRC Integrated Program for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity	CI — —	TVA responded to the GL on June 17, 1985.  Unit 2 Action: Perform SG inspection.	
GL 1985-03	Clarification of Equivalent Control Capacity for Standby Liquid Control Systems	NA	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1985-04	Operating Licensing Examinations	NA — —	Info	
GL 1985-05	Inadvertent Boron Dilution Events	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1985-06	Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That Is Not Safety-Related	NA — —	Info	

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ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1985-07	Implementation of Integrated Schedules for Plant Modifications	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1985-08	10 CFR 20.408 Termination Reports - Format	NA — —	Info
GL 1985-09	Technical Specifications For Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.3	NA — —	Info
GL 1985-10	Technical Specification For Generic Letter 83-28, Items 4.3 and 4.4	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1985-11	Completion of Phase II of “Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,” NUREG-0612	C — —	See GL 81-07.
GL 1985-12	Implementation Of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5, "Automatic Trip Of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	CI — —	“Implementation of TMI Item II.K.3.5” – Reviewed in 15.5.4 of original 1982 SER; became License Condition 35. The staff determined that their review of Item II.K.3.5 did not have to be completed to support the full power license and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4. The item was further reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.  Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications as required.
GL 1985-13	Transmittal Of NUREG-1154 Regarding The Davis-Besse Loss Of Main And Auxiliary Feedwater Event	NA — —	Info
GL 1985-14	Commercial Storage At Power Reactor Sites Of Low Level Radioactive Waste Not Generated By The Utility	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1985-15	Information On Deadlines For 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification Of Electric Equipment Important To Safety At Nuclear Power Plants"	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1985-16	High Boron Concentrations	NA — —	Info
GL 1985-17	Availability Of Supplements 2 and 3 To NUREG-0933, "A Prioritization Of Generic Safety Issues"	NA — —	Info
GL 1985-18	Operator Licensing Examinations	NA — —	Info
GL 1985-19	Reporting Requirements On Primary Coolant Iodine Spikes	NA — —	Info



ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1985-20	Resolution Of Generic Issue 69: High Pressure Injection/Make-up Nozzle Cracking In Babcock And Wilcox Plants	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1985-21	This GL was never issued.	NA — —	
GL 1985-22	Potential For Loss Of Post-LOCA Recirculation Capability Due To Insulation Debris Blockage	NA — —	Info
GL 1986-01	Safety Concerns Associated With Pipe Breaks In The BWR Scram System	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1986-010, S1	Fire Endurance Test Acceptance Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used to Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Trains Within the Same Fire Area	NA — —	Info
GL 1986-02	Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-19 - Thermal Hydraulic Stability	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1986-03	Applications For License Amendments	NA — —	Info
GL 1986-04	Policy Statement On Engineering Expertise On Shift	C — — 01	TVA responded to GL 86-04 on May 29, 1986. TVA provides engineering expertise on shift in the form of a dedicated Shift Technical Advisor (STA) or an STA qualified Senior Reactor Operator.
GL 1986-05	Implementation Of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5, "Automatic Trip Of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —	Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox designed plants
GL 1986-06	Implementation Of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5, "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps"	NA — —	Applies only to Combustion Engineering designed plants
GL 1986-07	Transmittal of NUREG-1190 Regarding The San Onofre Unit 1 Loss of Power and Water Hammer Event	NA — —	Info
GL 1986-08	Availability of Supplement 4 to NUREG-0933, "A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues"	NA — —	Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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GL 1986-09	Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-59, (N-1) Loop Operation in BWRs and PWRs	<b>S</b> ---	<b>02</b>	N-1 Loop operation was addressed in original 1982 SER (4.4.7).  Unit 2 Action:  Confirm Technical Specifications prohibit (N-1) Loop Operation.  ----- -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.  TS LCO 3.4.4 requires that four Reactor Coolant System loops be operable and in operation during Modes 1 and 2.
GL 1986-10	Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements	<b>NA</b> ---		Info
GL 1986-11	Distribution of Products Irradiated in Research	<b>NA</b> ---		Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1986-12	Criteria for Unique Purpose Exemption From Conversion From The Use of Heu Fuel	<b>NA</b> ---		Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1986-13	Potential Inconsistency Between Plant Safety Analyses and Technical Specifications	<b>NA</b> ---		Applies only to Babcock and Wilcox and Combustion Engineering designed plants
GL 1986-14	Operator Licensing Examinations	<b>NA</b> ---		Info
GL 1986-15	Information Relating To Compliance With 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important To Safety For Nuclear Power Plants"	<b>NA</b> ---		Info
GL 1986-16	Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Models	<b>NA</b> ---		Info
GL 1986-17	Availability of NUREG-1169, "Technical Findings Related to Generic Issue C-8, BWR MSIC Leakage And Treatment Methods"	<b>NA</b> ---		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1987-01	Public Availability Of The NRC Operator Licensing Examination Question Bank	<b>NA</b> ---		Info
GL 1987-02 and GL 1987-03	Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, USI A-46	<b>NA</b> ---		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.

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ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION		
GL 1987-04	Temporary Exemption From Provisions Of The FBI Criminal History Rule For Temporary Workers	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.		
GL 1987-05	Request for Additional Information on Assessment of License Measures to Mitigate and/or Identify Potential Degradation of Mark I Drywells	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor		
GL 1987-06	Periodic Verification of Leak Tight Integrity of Pressure Isolation Valves	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.		
GL 1987-07	Information Transmittal of Final Rulemaking For Revisions To Operator Licensing - 10 CFR 55 And Confirming Amendments	NA — —	Info		
GL 1987-08	Implementation of 10 CFR 73.55 Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.		
GL 1987-09	Sections 3.0 And 4.0 of Standard Tech Specs on Limiting Conditions For Operation And Surveillance Requirements	NA — —	Info		
GL 1987-10	Implementation of 10 CFR 73.57, Requirements For FBI Criminal History Checks	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.		
GL 1987-11	Relaxation in Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Rupture Requirements	NA — —	Info		
GL 1987-12	Loss of Residual Heat Removal While The Reactor Coolant System is Partially Filled	C — —	This GL was superseded by GL 88-17.		
GL 1987-13	Integrity of Requalification Examinations At Non-Power Reactors	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.		
GL 1987-14	Operator Licensing Examinations	NA — —	Info		
GL 1987-15	Policy Statement On Deferred Plants	NA — —	Info		
GL 1987-16	Transmittal of NUREG-1262, "Answers To Questions On Implementation of 10 CFR 55 On Operators' Licenses"	NA — —	Info		

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1988-01	NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1988-02	Integrated Safety Assessment Program II	NA — —		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1988-03	Resolution of GSI 93, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps"	CI — —		TVA: letter June 3, 1988. NRC letters dated February 17, 1988 and July 20, 1988  NRC: SSER 16  -----  NRC accepted approach in letter dated July 20, 1988, and reviewed response in Appendix EE of SSER16.  Unit 2 Action:  Procedures and hardware will be in place to ensure recognition of indications of steam binding and maintenance of system operability until check valves are repaired and back leakage stopped.
GL 1988-04	Distribution of Gems Irradiated in Research Reactors	NA — —		Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1988-05	Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR plants	CI — —		NRC acceptance letter dated August 8, 1990 for both units.  Unit 2 Action: Implement program.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The program has been implemented on Unit 2.
GL 1988-06	Removal of Organization Charts from Technical Specification Administrative Control Requirements	NA — —		Info
GL 1988-07	Modified Enforcement Policy Relating to 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants"	CI — —		See Special Program for Environmental Qualification.
GL 1988-08	Mail Sent or Delivered to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation	NA — —		Info
GL 1988-09	Pilot Testing of Fundamentals Examination	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1988-10	Purchase of GSA Approved Security Containers	NA — —		Info

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ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1988-11	NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Material and its Impact on Plant Operations	S 02	NRC acceptance letter dated June 29, 1989, for both units.  Unit 2 Action: Submit Pressure Temperature curves.  <

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1988-17	Loss of Decay Heat Removal	CO 13	NRC acceptance letter dated March 8, 1995 (Unit 1).  Unit 2 Action:  Implement modifications to provide RCS temperature, RV level and RHR system performance.  ----- -----  REVISION 10 UPDATE:  Inspection Report 391/2013-604 (June 27, 2013) closed Generic Letter 1988-17.  ----- -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Correct Status to “C-O.” While the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.
GL 1988-18	Plant Record Storage on Optical Disks	NA	Info
GL 1988-19	Use of Deadly Force by Licensee Guards to Prevent Theft of Special Nuclear Material	NA	Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1988-20	Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities	C 08	Unit 2 Action: Complete evaluation for Unit 2.  ----- -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Individual Plant Examination Summary Report was submitted on February 9, 2010.  ----- -----  REVISION 04 UPDATE:  The Individual Plant Examination of External Events Design Report was submitted on April 30, 2010.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The NRC issued Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) on November 12, 2010.  TVA responded to the RAIs on December 17, 2010, and April 1, 2011.  -----

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER24 contained the following for NRC Action for GL 88-020 through Supplement 3:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated August 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111960228)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER25 contained the following for NRC Action for GL 88-020, Supplements 4 and 5:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated September 20, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111960300)."</p>
GL 1989-01	Implementation of Programmatic and Procedural Controls for Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications	<b>NA</b> -- --	Info
GL 1989-02	Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marketed Products	<b>C</b> -- -- <b>08</b>	<p>GL 89-02 did not require a response.</p> <p>WBN Unit 2 program for procurement and dedication of materials is based in part on and complies with the guidance of GL 89-02. The program is implemented through project procedures.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-604 closed this item.</p>
GL 1989-03	Operator Licensing Examination Schedule	<b>NA</b> -- --	Info
GL 1989-04	Guidelines on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>NRC reviewed in 3.9.6 of SSER14 (Unit 1).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Submit an ASME Section XI Inservice Test Program for the first ten year interval six months before receiving an Operating License.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated December 12, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13358A066) provided the NRC with a copy of TVA Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100-006, "Inservice Testing Program" for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2. The TI addresses both the updated Unit 1 and initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (1ST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program.</p> <p>Additionally, the letter contained, "The submittal of the WBN 1ST Program</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>document, including the WBN2 PST Program (Enclosure 1), the exemption request (Enclosure 2), and the relief requests (Enclosure 3), described above, will also satisfy SSER 22, Appendix HH, Open Item No. 13.</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>“NRC Action Closed. NRC letter dated October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14289A222).”</p>
GL 1989-05	Pilot Testing of the Fundamentals Examination	NA	Info
GL 1989-06	Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 – Safety Parameter Display System – 10 CFR 50.54(f)	CI 12	<p>“Safety Parameter Display System” (SPDS) / “Requirements for Emergency Response Capability” - NRC reviewed in SSER5, SSER6, and 18.2.2 of SSER15.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Install SPDS and have it operational prior to start-up after the first refueling outage.</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>SPDS has been installed.</p>
GL 1989-07	Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs	C	<p>TVA: letter dated October 31, 1989</p> <p>NRC: memo dated June 26, 1990</p>
GL 1989-08	Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning	CI 12	<p>Unit 1 Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program reviewed in IR 390/94-89 (February 1995).</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Prepare procedure, and</li> <li>* perform baseline inspections.</li> </ul> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>The procedures associated with Flow Accelerated Corrosion control are applicable to both Unit 1 and Unit 2, and the baseline inspections for Unit 2 are complete and incorporated into the WBN FAC program.</p>
GL 1989-09	ASME Section III Component Replacements	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1989-10	Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance	CI — —		NRC accepted approach in September 14, 1990, letter and reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.  Unit 2 Action:  Implement pressure testing and surveillance program for safety-related MOVs, satisfying the intent of GL 89-10.
GL 1989-10 or GL 1996-05	Involves Main Steam Isolation Valves	NA		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1989-11	Resolution of Generic Issue 101, "Boiling Water Reactor Water Level Redundancy"	NA — —		Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1989-12	Operator Licensing Examination	NA — —		Info
GL 1989-13	Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment	CO 13		NRC letters dated July 9, 1990 and June 13, 1994, accepting approach.  Unit 2 Actions:  1) Implement initial performance testing of the heat exchangers; and  2) Establish eddy current baseline data for the Containment Spray heat exchangers.  ----- -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed GL 89-013.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  WBN Unit 2 Eddy Current Examination Reports for Containment Spray 2A and Containment Spray 2B establish the pre-service baseline for both Containment Spray heat exchangers.  ----- -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Corrected Status to "C-O." While the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.
GL 1989-14	Line-Item Improvements in Technical Specifications - Removal of 3.25 Limit on Extending Surveillance Intervals	NA — —		Info
GL 1989-15	Emergency Response Data System	NA — —		Info

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1989-16	Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1989-17	Planned Administrative Changes to the NRC Operator Licensing Written Examination Process	NA — —	Info
GL 1989-18	Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues A-17, "Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants"	NA	Info
GL 1989-19	Request for Actions Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47, "Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	CI — — 11	<p>TVA responded by letter dated March 22, 1990. NRC acceptance letter dated October 24, 1990, for both units.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform evaluation of common mode failures due to fire.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA as-designed Calculation EDQ00099920090012 (Unit 1 and 2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis) performed the analysis of fires throughout the plant and their impact on essential functions including Steam Generator overfill.</p> <p>The Watts Bar as-designed Dual Unit Fire Protection Report (FPR) Part III (Safe Shutdown Capabilities) Table 3-2 (Safe Shutdown Equipment List) lists the Steam Generator level indicators required for safe shutdown due to an Appendix R fire. Further, as-designed FPR Part VI (Fire Area 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume) demonstrates the steam generator inventory control of the fire safe shutdown analysis.</p> <p>The NRC completed their review and acceptance of the as-designed dual unit FPR as documented in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 26. The basic discussion and acceptance is discussed in Section 9.5 while the detailed analysis is contained in Appendix FF. In SSER 26 the NRC accepted the as-designed dual unit FPR which contains the "required evaluation of common mode failures due to fire."</p>
GL 1989-20	Protected Area Long-Term Housekeeping	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1989-21	Request for Information Concerning Status of Implementation of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) Requirements	CO — — 07	<p>TVA responded to GL 89-21 with the status of USIs for both units on November 29, 1989. NRC provided an assessment of WBN USI status on May 1, 1990. The NRC assessment included a list of incomplete USIs for WBN. USIs were initially reviewed for WBN in the SER Appendix C. USIs were subsequently reviewed in SSER 15 Appendix C (June 1995) and SSER 16 (September 1995).</p> <p>Unit 2 actions:</p> <p>* Provide a status of WBN Unit 2 USIs.</p> <p>* Complete implementation of USIs.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Status of USIs was provided by Enclosure 2 of TVA letter dated September 26, 2008.</p> <p>The applicable USIs are either closed, deleted, or captured in either the SER Framework or the Generic Communications Framework, or they are part of the CAPs and SPs.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Updated status of USIs was provided on January 25, 2011.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-30 of SSER23 provided the following as NRC Action for this GL:</p> <p>"Closed. See Appendix C of SSER23."</p>
GL 1989-22	Potential For Increased Roof Loads and Plant Area Flood Runoff Depth At Licensed Nuclear Power Plants Due To Recent Change In Probable Maximum Precipitation Criteria Developed by the National Weather Service	<b>C</b>	<p>TVA: letter dated December 16, 1981</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Answer to informal question provided in TVA letter dated December 16, 1981, and subsequently included in FSAR. GL did not require a response. No further action required.</p>
GL 1989-23	NRC Staff Responses to Questions Pertaining to Implementation of 10 CFR Part 26	<b>NA</b> — —	Info
GL 1990-01	Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey	<b>NA</b>	Info
GL 1990-02	Alternative Requirements for Fuel Assemblies in the Design Features Section of Technical Specifications	<b>NA</b>	Info
GL 1990-03	Relaxation of Staff Position in Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.2 Part 2 "Vendor Interface for Safety-Related Components"	<b>NA</b> — —	Info
GL 1990-04	Request for Information on the Status of Licensee Implementation of GSIs Resolved with Imposition of Requirements or CAs	<b>C</b> — —	TVA responded on June 23, 1990

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		NA	Info	
GL 1990-05	Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping	NA	Info	
GL 1990-06	Resolution of Generic Issues 70, "PORV and Block Valve Reliability," and 94, "Additional LTOP Protection for PWRs"	S 02	NRC letter dated January 9, 1991, accepted TVA's response for both units.  Unit 2 Actions:  1) Revise operating instruction and surveillance procedure; and  2) Incorporate testing requirements in the Technical Specifications.  ----- -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.  TS Surveillance Requirement 3.4.11.2 specifies the required testing of each PORV.	
GL 1990-07	Operator Licensing National Examination Schedule	NA	Info	
GL 1990-08	Simulation Facility Exemptions	NA	Info	
GL 1990-09	Alternative Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective Actions	NA	Info	
GL 1991-01	Removal of the Schedule for the Withdrawal of Reactor Vessel Material Specimens from Technical Specifications	NA	Info	
GL 1991-02	Reporting Mishaps Involving LLW Forms Prepared for Disposal	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.	
GL 1991-03	Reporting of Safeguards Events	NA	Info	
GL 1991-04	Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle	NA	Info	
GL 1991-05	Licensee Commercial-Grade Procurement and Dedication Programs	NA	Info	

		* ----- REV			
ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION		
GL 1991-06	Resolution of Generic Issue A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies," Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.		
GL 1991-07	GI-23, "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures" and Its Possible Effect on Station Blackout	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-08	Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-09	Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electrical Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor		
GL 1991-10	Explosives Searches at Protected Area Portals	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.		
GL 1991-11	Resolution of Generic Issues A-48, "LCOs for Class 1E Vital Instrument Buses", and 49, "Interlocks and LCOs for Class 1E Tie Breakers," Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.		
GL 1991-12	Operator Licensing National Examination Schedule	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-13	Request for Information Related to Resolution of Generic Issue 130, "Essential Service Water System Failures @ Multi-Unit Sites"	NA — —	Addressed to specific (non-TVA) plants.		
GL 1991-14	Emergency Telecommunications	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-15	Operating Experience Feedback Report, Solenoid-Operated Valve Problems at U.S. Reactors	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-16	Licensed Operators' and Other Nuclear Facility Personnel Fitness for Duty	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-17	Generic Safety Issue 29, "Bolting Degradation or Failure in Nuclear Power Plants"	NA — —	Info		
GL 1991-18	Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability	NA — —	GL 91-18 has been superseded by RIS 2005-20.		

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1991-19	Information to Addressees Regarding New Telephone Numbers for NRC Offices Located in One White Flint North	NA — —	Info	
GL 1992-01	Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity	C — —		By letter dated May 11, 1994, for both units NRC confirmed TVA had provided the information requested in GL 92-01. NRC issued GL 92-01 Revision 1, supplement 1 on May 19, 1995. By letter dated July 26, 1996, NRC closed GL 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1 for both Watts Bar units.
GL 1992-02	Resolution of Generic Issue 79, "Unanalyzed Reactor Vessel (PWR) Thermal Stress During Natural Convection Cooldown"	NA — —	Info	
GL 1992-03	Compilation of the Current Licensing Basis: Request for Voluntary Participation in Pilot Program	NA — —	Info	
GL 1992-04	Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor	
GL 1992-05	NRC Workshop on the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Program	NA	Info	
GL 1992-06	Operator Licensing National Examination Schedule	NA — —	Info	
GL 1992-07	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganization	NA — —	Info	
GL 1992-08	Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers	CO 13		<p>TVA configurations for Thermo-Lag 330-1 were reviewed in SSER18 and accepted in NRC letter dated January 6, 1998 (includes a supplemental SE).</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Review Watts Bar design and installation requirements for Thermolag 330-1 fire barrier system and evaluate the Thermolag currently installed in Unit 2.</li> <li>2) Remove and replace, as required, or prepare an approved deviation.</li> </ol> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>GL 1992-08 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-612, dated February 2, 2015.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1992-09	Limited Participation by NRC in the IAEA International Nuclear Event Scale	NA	Info
GL 1993-01	Emergency Response Data System Test Program	NA	Addressed to specific plant(s).
GL 1993-02	NRC Public Workshop on Commercial Grade Procurement and Dedication	NA	Info
GL 1993-03	Verification of Plant Records	NA	Info
GL 1993-04	Rod Control System Failure and Withdrawal of Rod Control Cluster Assemblies, 10 CFR 50.54(f)	CO 13	NRC letter dated December 9, 1994, accepted TVA commitments for both units.  Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications and testing.  

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1994-01	Removal of Accelerated Testing and Special Reporting Requirements for Emergency Diesel Generators	NA — —	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1994-02	Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in BWRs	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1994-03	IGSCC of Core Shrouds in BWRs	NA — —	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1994-04	Voluntary Reporting of Additional Occupational Radiation Exposure Data	NA — —	Info
GL 1995-01	NRC Staff Technical Position on Fire Protection for Fuel Cycle Facilities	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.
GL 1995-02	Use of NUMARC/EPRI Report TR-102348, "Guideline on Licensing Digital Upgrades," in Determining the Acceptability of Performing Analog-to-Digital Replacements under 10 CFR 50.59	NA — —	Info
GL 1995-03	Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes	C 13	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated May 16, 1997 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>* Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>* Evaluate or repair as necessary.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
				<p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>100% of the steam generator tubes have been inspected.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 1995-04	Final Disposition of the Systematic Evaluation Program Lessons-Learned Issues	NA	Info	
GL 1995-05	Voltage-Based Repair Criteria for Westinghouse Steam Generator Tubes Affected by Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking	C 06		<p>No specific action or response required by the GL; TVA responded on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)."</p>
GL 1995-06	Changes in the Operator Licensing Program	NA	Info	
GL 1995-07	Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves	C 13		<p>Unit 1 SER for GL 95-07 dated Sept 15, 1999</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>* Perform evaluation for pressure locking and thermal binding of safety related power-operated gate valves, and</p> <p>* take corrective actions for those valves identified as being susceptible.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>April 1, 2010, letter committed to evaluate missing GL 89-10 motor-operated valves for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC letter dated July 29, 2010, provided RAIs on the GL.</p> <p>TVA letter dated July 30, 2010, answered the RAIs and provided the following commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* EDCRs 53292 and 53287 shall be implemented to eliminate the potential for pressure locking prior to startup.</li> <li>* Valves 2-FCV-63-25 and -26 will be evaluated for impact due to new parameters from the JOG Topical Report MPR 2524A prior to startup.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for GL 1995-007 on August 12, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA letter to NRC dated July 30, 2010, documented that none of the missing Watts Bar Unit 2 GL 89-10 valves are GL 95-07 valves.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated August 12, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100190443)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>EDCRs 53292 and 53287 have been implemented.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Pressure locking and thermal binding evaluations have been completed. Corrective actions have been completed for those valves identified as being susceptible.</p>
GL 1995-08	10 CFR 50.54(p) Process for Changes to Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval	NA — —	Info

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1995-09	Monitoring and Training of Shippers and Carriers of Radioactive Materials	NA	Info	
GL 1995-10	Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation	NA	Info	
GL 1996-01	Testing of Safety-Related Circuits	CO		TVA responded for both units on April 18, 1996.
		13		Unit 2 Action: Implement Recommendations.
				REVISION 13 UPDATE:
				GL 1996-01 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated February 13, 2015.
				Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.
GL 1996-02	Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements Associated with an Internal Threat	NA	Info	
GL 1996-03	Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Limits	CI		No response required
		06		Unit 2 Actions:
				* Submit Pressure Temperature limits, and
				* similar to Unit 1, upon approval, incorporate into licensee-controlled document.
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:
				The Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) was submitted via TVA to NRC letter dated February 2, 2010.
				The PTLR was incorporated in the system description for the Reactor Coolant System (WBN2-68-4001).
GL 1996-04	Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks	NA		Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1996-05	Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves	CI		SE of TVA response to GL 96-05 dated July 21, 1999.
				Unit 2 Actions:
				* Implement the Joint Owner's Group recommended GL 96-05 MOV PV program, as described in Topical Report No. OG-97-018, and
				* begin testing during the first refueling outage after startup.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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GL 1996-06	Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions	<b>C</b> ---	<b>06</b>	<p>NRC letter dated April 6, 1999, accepting TVA response for Unit 1.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Implement modification to provide containment penetration relief.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1996-006 on January 21, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100130227)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Modification to provide containment penetration relief was implemented.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-603 closed GL 96-006.</p>
GL 1996-07	Interim Guidance on Transportation of Steam Generators	<b>NA</b> ---	---	<p>Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.</p>
GL 1997-01	Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations	<b>C</b> ---	<b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated November 4, 1999 (Unit 1).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide a report to address the inspection program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 97-001 on June 30, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100539515)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>In a TVA letter to the NRC, dated April 1, 2010, TV A addressed the inspection program for GL 1997-01. The letter stated, in part:</p> <p>"In previous responses, TVA WBN Unit 2 committed to perform the first inspections according to the requirements of paragraphs IV.C(5)(a) and IV.C(5)(b) of the First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009 ... at the first refueling outage. First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009 has been superseded by 10 CFR 50.55a Codes and Standards (g)(6)(ii)(D)(2) through (6) and the ASME Code Case N-729-1. TVA WBN Unit 2 will perform inspections during the first refueling outage according to 10 CFR 50.55a (g)(6)(ii)(D)(2) through (6) and ASME Code Case N-729-1.</p> <p>As committed previously, TVA WBN Unit 2 will perform a baseline inspection prior to fuel load that consists of paragraph IV.C(5)(b) of the First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009."</p> <p>Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Preservice Inspection (PSI) Program Plan re-establishes the requirements for the PSI at WBN-2, and follows the inspection requirements of 10CFR 50.55a(g)(2). Paragraph 3.21 of the WBN-2 Program Plan also includes augmented examinations. USNRC Generic Letters are included to be performed as augmented examinations when applicable.</p> <p>All of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations have been examined and found to be acceptable.</p> <p>The vent line weld and AHA welds were examined and determined to be acceptable. These weld examinations serve as the PSI baseline examinations for implementing ASME Code Case N-729-1 when WBN-2 enters commercial operation.</p>
GL 1997-02	Revised Contents of the Monthly Operating Report	NA	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.
GL 1997-03	Annual Financial Update of Surety Requirements for Uranium Recovery Licensees	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1997-04	Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated June 17, 1998 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Install new sump strainers, and</li> <li>* perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1997-004 on February 18, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>See the REVISION 06 UPDATE for GL 04-002 for new commitments.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 18, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100200375)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 1997-05	Steam Generator Tube Inspection Techniques	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated September 22, 1998 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Employ the same approach used on the original Unit 1 SGs. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 1997-06	Degradation of Steam Generator Internals	<p><b>C</b></p> <p>— —</p> <p><b>06</b></p>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated October 19, 1999 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform SG inspections during each refueling outage.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)"</p>
GL 1998-01	Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants	<p><b>NA</b></p> <p>— —</p>	<p>Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.</p>
GL 1998-02	Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition	<p><b>CO</b></p> <p>— —</p> <p><b>13</b></p>	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>1) Review the ECCS designs to ensure they do not contain design features which can render them susceptible to common-cause failures; and</p> <p>2) document the results.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1998-002 on March 3, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 98-002 on May 11, 2010. This letter noted that it superseded the SE issued by NRC on March 3, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>April 1, 2010, letter committed to ensure that the guidance added to the Unit 1 procedure as a result of the review of NRC GL 98-02 is incorporated into the Unit 2 procedures. Specifically, when decreasing power, valve HCV-74-34, Refueling Water Return (normally locked closed valve) has a hold order placed with specific release criteria before entry into Mode 4 and to remove the hold order before entry into Mode 3 when returning to power.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated May 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200155)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>The ECCS designs were reviewed and the results were documented.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>Generic Letter 1998-02 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status above to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1998-03	NMSS Licensees' and Certificate Holders' Year 2000 Readiness Programs	NA — —	Does not apply to power reactor.



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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GL 1998-04	Potential for Degradation of the ECCS and the Containment Spray System After a LOCA Because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment	<b>C</b> ---	---	<p>NRC closure letter dated November 24, 1999 (Unit 1). – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Install new sump strainers, and</li> <li>* perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1998-004 on February 1, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>See the REVISION 06 UPDATE for GL 2004-002 for new commitments.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 1, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100260594)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 1998-05	Boiling Water Reactor Licensees Use of the BWRVIP-05 Report to Request Relief from Augmented Examination Requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Welds	<b>NA</b> ---	---	Boiling Water Reactor
GL 1999-01	Recent Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Decision on Bundling Exempt Quantities	<b>NA</b> ---	---	Info
GL 1999-02	Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal	<b>NA</b> ---	---	Item was applicable only to units with operating license at the time the item was issued.

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 2003-01	Control Room Habitability	C	Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007
		13	Unit 2 Action: Incorporate TSTF-448 into Technical Specifications.  -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2003-01 on February 1, 2010.  -----  Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.  TS Surveillance Requirement 3.7.10.4 requires performance of a Control Room Envelope (CRE) unfiltered air inleakage test in accordance with the CRE Habitability Program.  TS 5.7.2.20 provides for the CRE Habitability Program.  These portions of the Unit 2 TS were based on the Unit 1 TS which incorporated TSTF-448 per Amendment 70 (NRC approved A70 on 10/08/2008).  -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:  SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:  "Closed. NRC Letter dated February 1, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100270076)"  -----  REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Corrected Status to "C."
GL 2004-01	Requirements for Steam Generator Tube Inspection	C	NRC acceptance letter dated April 8, 2005 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.
		13	Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.  -----  REVISION 02 UPDATE:  On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.  -----  REVISION 06 UPDATE:

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>100% of the steam generator tubes have been inspected.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 2004-02	Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs	CO — — 13	<p>NRC Audit Report dated February 7, 2007 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Install new sump strainers, and</li> <li>* perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Additional TVA letters concerning GL 2004-02 were sent to the NRC on the following dates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- January 29, 2008,</li> <li>- May 19, 2008,</li> <li>- September 10, 2010,</li> <li>- March 4, 2011, and</li> <li>- April 29, 2011.</li> </ul> <p>The March 4, 2011, letter provided a response that superseded previous responses and commitments. It provided the following new commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unit 2 will install sump modifications per the requirements of Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02 prior to Unit 2 fuel load.</li> <li>- A confirmatory walkdown for loose debris will be performed on Unit 2 after containment work is completed and the containment has been cleaned. This walkdown will be completed prior to startup.</li> <li>- New throttle valves will be installed in the CVCS and SI injection lines to the RCS. The new valves will be opened sufficiently to preclude downstream blockage.</li> <li>- The current Unit 1 TVA protective coating program contains requirements for conducting periodic visual examinations of Coating Service Level I and Level II protective coatings. The Unit 2 program will be the same.</li> <li>- Procedural controls will be put in place at WBN Unit 2 to ensure that potential quantities of post-accident debris are maintained within the bounds of the analyses and design bases that support ECCS and CSS</li> </ul>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>recirculation functions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TVA will complete the WBN in-vessel downstream effects evaluation discussed in the supplemental response to Generic Letter 2004-02 following issuance of the final NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Topical Report No. WCAP-16793-NP, "Evaluation of Long-Term Cooling Considering Particulate, Fibrous, and Chemical Debris in the Recirculating Fluid."</li> <li>- The design basis of the modified emergency sump strainer has been incorporated into the plant's current licensing basis. The WBN Unit 2 FSAR will be amended to include this information.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unit 1 and Unit 2 share a common protective coatings program.</li> <li>- Amendment 103 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted to the NRC on March 15, 2010. This amendment included the design basis of the modified emergency sump strainer.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>Procedural controls are in place.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA's letter to the NRC dated September 16, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13262A270) included:</p> <p>"A summary of the evaluation of WBN Unit 2 long-term core cooling consistent with the Limitations and Conditions of Reference 1. The unit-specific evaluation, in conjunction with previous TVA letters related to GL 2004-02 (References 2, 3, and 4), establishes that the WBN Unit 2 containment sump design conforms to the NRC requirements and regulations on recirculation from the containment sump during Design Basis Accidents."</p> <p>New throttle valves were installed in the CVCS and SI injection lines to the RCS. The new valves will open sufficiently to preclude downstream blockage.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action    Closed. NRC Letter dated September 18, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14163A658)."</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 2006-01	Steam Generator Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications	C	Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.
		13	Unit 2 Action: Incorporate TSTF-449 into Technical Specifications.
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REVISION 02 UPDATE:			
On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.			
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Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.			
TS 5.7.2.12 is the Steam Generator (SG) Program. This program is implemented to ensure that SG tube integrity is maintained.			
Unit 2 TS 5.7.2.12 was based on Unit 1 TS 5.7.2.12. Unit 1 TS 5.7.2.1.12 was based on TSTF-449 (NRC approved Unit 1 TS A65 on 1/03/2006).			
-----			
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REVISION 06 UPDATE:			
SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:			
"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061) (See Appendix HH)"			
-----			
The applicable item from SER22, Appendix HH for this item is Open item 6, "Verify implementation of TSTF-449. (TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML072570676)."			
TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following response to Open Item 6:			
"Amendment 65 to the Unit 1 TS revised the existing steam generator tube surveillance program and was modeled after TSTF-449, Rev. 4. The NRC approved Amendment 65 via letter dated November 3, 2006, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity (TS-05-10) (TAC No. MC9271).' Revision 82 made the associated changes to the Unit 1 TS Bases.			
Developmental Revision A to the Unit 2 TS and TS Bases made the equivalent changes to the Unit 2 TS / TS Bases. Affected TS sections include the following: LEAKAGE definition in 1.1, LCO 3.4.13 (RCS Operational LEAKAGE), LCO 3.4.17 (SG Tube Integrity), 5.7.2.12 (Steam Generator (SG) Program), and 5.9.9 (Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report).			
Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 TS was submitted to the NRC via letter dated March 4, 2009, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Operating License Application Update,' (ADAMS Accession number ML090700378)."			

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under item 6 on page HH-4:</p> <p>"Verify implementation of TSTF-449. (TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML072570676). Staff has reviewed Revision I to the proposed technical specifications and found that TSTF 449 has been incorporated." This is an entry in Closed Items Table.</p>
GL 2006-02	Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power	C 13	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Complete the two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2006-002 on January 20, 2010.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061) (See Appendix HH)"</p> <p>Note that the correct date and ADAMS Accession No. are January 20, 2010, and ML100080768, respectively.</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures have been completed and issued.</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action    Closed.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 2006-03	Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configurations Section 1.14 says, "CLOSED."	<b>C</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>TVA does not rely on Hemyc or MT materials to protect electrical and instrumentation cables or equipment that provide safe shutdown capability during a postulated fire.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Addressed in CAP/SP.</p> <p>The Fire Protection Corrective Action Program will ensure Unit 2 conforms with NRC requirements and applicable guidelines.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2006-003 on February 25, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100470398)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Fire barrier configurations approved for installation at WBN are documented in WBN's design basis G-98 {Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems (ERFBS)}. The maintenance of G-98 and the translation of approved changes to affected documents (i.e., the Fire Protection Report), is controlled by Section 7.0, "Design Control," of TVA's Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan or through Bechtel's PNQAP.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>GL 2006-03 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-607, dated September 30, 2014.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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GL 2007-01	Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients	<b>C</b>	<b>08</b>	Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.
				Unit 2 Action: Complete testing of four additional cables.
				----- -----
				REVISION 02 UPDATE:
				NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2007-001 on January 26, 2010.
				----- -----
				REVISION 04 UPDATE:
				NRC Inspection Report 391/2010-603 closed GL 2007-001.
				----- -----
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:
				The four additional cables passed the testing.
				-----
				SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:
				"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 26, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100120052)"
				----- -----
				REVISION 08 UPDATE:
				Status was changed from "CI" to "C."
				-----
				-----
				-----
				-----
GL 2008-01	Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems	<b>CO</b>	<b>13</b>	Initial response for Unit 2 on October 1, 2008.
				----- -----
				REVISION 02 UPDATE:
				Unit 2 Actions:
				- TVA will provide a submittal within 45 days of completion of the engineering for the ECCS, RHR, and CSS systems.
				- WBN Unit 2 will complete the required modifications and provide a submittal consistent with the information requested in the GL 90 days prior to fuel load.
				----- -----
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:
				The submittal was provided in TVA to NRC letter dated March 11, 2011.
				-----
				-----



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>This submittal satisfied the above Unit 2 actions and generated the following new commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TVA will evaluate adopting the revised ISTS SR 3.5.2.3 (NUREG 1431) at WBN within 6 months of NRC approval of the Traveler.</li> <li>- Complete evaluation of CS pump 2A-A pipe chase horizontal suction piping for venting. Add a vent valve to this location or conduct periodic UT examinations if necessary. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Add vent valves to selected locations in the ECCS and RHRS piping to enhance filling and venting. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Complete walk down survey of ECCS and RHRS piping and evaluate the piping for latent voids that could exceed 5% of the pipe cross sectional area. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Operating procedures are being revised to improve instructions for filling and venting portions of the ECCS discharge pipe. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Complete Preoperational tests on ECCS and RHRS systems to confirm Unit 1 operating experience showing no gas intrusion/accumulation issues. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Periodic venting procedures used to meet SR 3.5.2.3 are being revised to require that, for an extended gas release, a report is entered into the Corrective Action Program. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> </ul> <p>----- -----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER24 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated August 23, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112232205)."</p> <p>----- -----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-605 (August 7, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1989-02.</p> <p>----- -----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE should have read, "Inspection Report 391/2013-605 (August 7, 2013 ) closed Generic Letter 2008-01."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 Surveillance Instructions which implement SR 3.5.2.3 and require a report to be entered into the Corrective Action Program for an extended gas release have been issued.</p> <p>----- -----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TVA evaluated adopting TSTF-523 and concluded that it was not required until well after Unit 2 fuel loading. NRC has reviewed WBN's actions in response to Generic Letter 2008-01 and has closed the issue for WBN Unit 2 licensing. The adoption of TSTF-523 is a post-Licensing action that.</li> <li>- Surveys and evaluations have been completed. No additional vents are required to be installed and no additional evaluations are required.</li> <li>- Surveys and evaluations have been completed. No additional vents are required to be installed and no additional evaluations are required.</li> <li>- Surveys and evaluations have been completed. No additional vents are required to be installed and no additional evaluations are required.</li> <li>- Operating procedure has been revised to improve instructions for filling and venting portions of the ECCS discharge pipe.</li> <li>- Periodic venting procedures used to meet SR 3.5.2.3 were revised to require that, for an extended gas release, a report is entered into the Corrective Action Program.</li> </ul>
NUREG-0737, I.A.1.1	Shift Technical Advisor	NA — —	Not applicable to WBN per SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.A.1.2	Shift Supervisor Responsibilities	NA — —	Not applicable to WBN per SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.A.1.3	Shift Manning	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.A.2.1	Immediate Upgrade of RO and SRO Training and Qualifications	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.A.2.3	Administration of Training Programs	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.A.3.1	Revise Scope and Criteria for Licensing Exams	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.B.1.2	Independent Safety Engineering Group	OV  06	LICENSE CONDITION:  Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) (NUREG-0737, I.B.1.2)  Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER8.  Unit 2 action:  Implement the alternate ISEG that was approved for the rest of the TVA units including WBN Unit 1 by NRC on August 26, 1999. The function will be performed by the site engineering organizations.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>By letter of March 2, 1999, TVA proposed to eliminate the ISEG function from the fleet-wide nuclear organization.</p> <p>NRC safety evaluation of August 26, 1999 shows that the NRC accepted the elimination of the ISEG with alternate organizational responsibilities provided in TVA-NQA-PLN89A and TVA-NPOD89-A.</p> <p>By letter of August 26, 1999, TVA revised Topical Report TVA-NPOD89-A, Rev 8 to describe the alternate organizations responsible for the management and operation of TVA's nuclear projects that replaced the ISEG function.</p> <p>The developmental Unit 2 TS were modeled after the Unit 1 TS. There is no reference to the ISEG.</p> <p>The current revision of TVA-NQA-PLN89-A (24A1) was written to include Unit 2.</p> <p>The current revision of TVA-NPOD89-A (18) was written to include Unit 2.</p>
NUREG-0737, I.C.1	Short Term Accident and Procedure Review	CO  12	<p>NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Implement upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures, including validation and training.</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NUREG-0737, I.C.1 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014.</p>
NUREG-0737, I.C.2	Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures	C	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.C.3	Shift Supervisor Responsibility	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.C.4	Control Room Access	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.C.5	Feedback of Operating Experience	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, I.C.6	Verify Correct Performance of Operating Activities	C — —	Closed in SSER16.

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, I.C.7	NSSS Vendor Revision of Procedures	<b>CI</b> — — <b>13</b>	<p>IR 50-390/391 85-08 closed this item for Unit 1, and NRC also reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Revise power ascension and emergency procedures which were reviewed by Westinghouse.</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The 39 "power ascension" procedures required for WBN Unit 2 startup have been IQR'd, PORC reviewed (including NSSS vendor review), and placed on "administrative hold."</p>
NUREG-0737, I.C.8	Pilot Monitoring of Selected Emergency Procedures For Near Term Operating Licenses	<b>CO</b> — — <b>12</b>	<p>IR 50-390/391 85-08 closed this item for Unit 1, and NRC also reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Pilot monitor selected emergency procedures for NTOL.</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NUREG-0737, I.C.8 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.</p>
NUREG-0737, I.D.1	Control Room Design Review	<b>CO</b> — — <b>12</b>	<p>NRC reviewed in SSER5, SSER6, SSER15, and Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Complete the CRDR process.</li> <li>* Perform rewiring in accordance with ECN 5982.</li> <li>* Take advantage of the completed Human Engineering reviews to ensure appropriate configuration for Unit 2 control panels.</li> </ul> <p>See CRDR Special Program.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed in SSER22, Section 18.2"</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NUREG-0737, I.D.1 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
		CO	13	
NUREG-0737, I.D.2	Plant-Safety-Parameter-Display Console			NRC reviewed in SSER5, SSER6, and 18.2.2 of SSER15.
				Unit 2 Action:
				Install SPDS and have it operational prior to start-up after the first refueling outage.
				----- -----
				REVISION 10 UPDATE:
				Inspection Report 391/2013-604 (June 27, 2013) closed TMI I.D.2.
				----- -----
				REVISION 12 UPDATE:
				SPDS has been installed.
				----- -----
				REVISION 13 UPDATE:
				Corrected Status to "C-O" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.
-----				
NUREG-0737, I.G.1	Training During Low-Power Testing	C		Closed in SSER16.
-----				
NUREG-0737, II.B.1	Reactor Coolant Vent System	CI		LICENSE CONDITION:
				NUREG-0737, II.B.1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents"
				In the original SER, the NRC found TVA's commitment to install reactor coolant vents acceptable pending verification. This was completed for Unit 1 only in SSER5 (IR 390/84-37).
				Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of reactor coolant vents.
-----				
NUREG-0737, II.B.2	Plant Shielding	C		NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.
		13		Unit 2 Action:
				Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations.
				----- -----
				REVISION 12 UPDATE:
				The necessary mission dose calculations have been revised and apply to Unit 2. Completion of the radiation qualification of Unit 2 safety related equipment, as addressed under the Equipment Environmental Qualification programs for Electrical Equipment (10CFR50.49) and Mechanical Equipment qualification programs will be accomplished via licensing commitments for the Equipment Qualification Special Program and

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Mechanical Equipment Qualification Special Program, respectively.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014 issued URI 391/2014-604-01 to Evaluate the Methodology for Calculating Mission Doses.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p>
			<p>NUREG-0737, II.B.2 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014.</p>
<p>NUREG-0737, II.B.3</p>	<p>Post-Accident Sampling</p>	<p><b>C</b>  <b>07</b></p>	<p>NRC reviewed in 9.3.2 of SSER16. TVA submitted a TS improvement to eliminate requirements for the Post Accident Sampling System using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process in a letter dated October 31, 2001.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>Unit 2 Technical Specifications will eliminate requirements for the Post-Accident Sampling System.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.</p> <p>Rev. 0 of the Unit 1 TS contained 5.7.2.6, "Post Accident Sampling."</p> <p>Amendment 34 to the Unit 1 TS (approved by the NRC on January 14, 2002) deleted 5.7.2.6, "Post Accident Sampling."</p> <p>The markup for Unit 2 Developmental Revision A noted that Unit 2 had deleted 5.7.2.6, "Post Accident Sampling" also.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER24 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed in SSER 24, Section 9.3.2."</p>
<p>NUREG-0737, II.B.4</p>	<p>Training for Mitigating Core Damage</p>	<p><b>C</b></p>	<p>Closed in SSER16.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, II.D.1	Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements	CI ----- 13	<p>NRC reviewed in Technical Evaluation Report attached to Appendix CC of SSER15.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Testing of relief and safety valves;</li> <li>2) Reanalysis of fluid transient loads for pressurizer relief and safety valve supports and any required modifications;</li> <li>3) Modifications to pressurizer safety valves, PORVs, PORV block valves and associated piping; and</li> <li>4) Change motor operated block valves.</li> </ol> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Modifications to pressurizer safety and relief valves are completed.</li> <li>- Installation of limit control closure PORV block valves has been completed.</li> <li>- Corrected "Appendix EE" to "Appendix CC" in first paragraph.</li> </ul>
NUREG-0737, II.D.3	Valve Position Indication	CI ----- 13	<p>The design was reviewed in the original 1982 SER and found acceptable pending confirmation of installation of the acoustic monitoring system. In SSER5 (IR 390/84-35), the staff closed the LICENSE CONDITION for Unit 1 only.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The required acoustic monitoring, indication and alarm annunciation to detect lifting and / or leaking of Reactor Coolant downstream of the Pressurizer PORV's and safety valves has been installed.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.E.1.1	Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation, Modifications	C ----- 09	<p>Reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Perform Auxiliary Feedwater System analysis as it pertains to system failure and flow rate.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>Analysis has been completed; no hardware modification is required.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			REVISION 09 UPDATE:
			NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-608 closed this item.
NUREG-0737, II.E.1.2	Auxiliary Feedwater System Initiation and Flow	CI	NRC: IR 50-390/84-20 and 50-391/84-16; letters dated March 29, 1985, and October 31, 1995; SSER 16
			Unit 2 Actions: * Complete procedures, and * qualification testing.
NUREG-0737, II.E.3.1	Emergency Power For Pressurizer Heaters	CO 12	NRC: letters dated March 29, 1985, and October 31, 1995; SSER 16
			Reviewed in original 1982 SER. Unit 2 Action: Implement procedures and testing.
			REVISION 12 UPDATE:
			NUREG-0737, II.E.3.1 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014.
NUREG-0737, II.E.4.1	Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations	C	NRC: IR 50-390/83-27 and 50-391/83-19; SER (NUREG-0847)
NUREG-0737, II.E.4.2	Containment Isolation Dependability	C 07	TVA: letters dated October 29, 1981, and February 25, 1985 NRC: letters dated March 29, 1985, July 12, 1990 and October 31, 1995; SSER 16.
			OUTSTANDING ISSUE for NRC to complete review of information provided by TVA to address Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operation
			LICENSE CONDITION: Containment isolation dependability
			In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that WBN met all the requirements of NUREG-0737, item II.E.4.2 except subsection (6) concerning containment purging during normal operation. In SSER3, the outstanding issue was closed and the LICENSE CONDITION was left open.
			NRC completed the review and issued a Technical Evaluation Report for both units on July 12, 1990. NRC concluded that the isolation valves can close against the buildup of pressure in the event of a design basis accident if the lower containment isolation valves are physically blocked to an opening angle of 50 degrees or less. (SSER5)
			Unit 2 Action:



ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			Reflect valve opening restriction in the Technical Specifications. ----- -----
			REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.  TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.7 requires verification that the valves are "blocked to restrict the valve from opening > 50 degrees." ----- -----
			REVISION 07 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed NUREG-0737, II.E.4.2.
NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.a.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Noble Gas	CI	Reviewed in SSER9.  Unit 2 Actions:  Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors. -----  Unit 2 Action: Install Noble gas monitor for Unit 2.
NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.b.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Iodine/Particulate Sampling	CO 11	Reviewed in SSER9.  Unit 2 Actions:  Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors. -----  Unit 2 Action: Install Iodine / particulate sampling monitor for Unit 2. ----- REVISION 11 UPDATE:  Inspection Report 391/2013-607 (September 30, 2013 ) closed NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.b.
NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.c.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Containment High Range Monitoring	CI	Reviewed in SSER9.  Unit 2 Actions:  Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors. -----  Unit 2 Action: Install high range in-containment monitor for Unit 2.

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.d.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Containment Pressure	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>		Reviewed in SSER9.
				Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of containment pressure indication.
				----- -----
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.d. ----- -----
				REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Containment pressure indication has been installed.
				-----
				-----
				-----
NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.e.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Containment Water Level	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>07</b>		Reviewed in SSER9.
				Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of containment water level monitors.
				----- -----
				REVISION 07 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed
NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.f.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Containment Hydrogen	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>06</b>		Reviewed in SSER9.
				Unit 2 Action:
				Verify installation of containment hydrogen accident monitoring instrumentation.
				----- -----
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.F.
				-----
				-----
				-----
NUREG-0737, II.F.2	Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate Core-Cooling	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>		LICENSE CONDITION: Detectors for Inadequate core cooling (II.F.2)
				In the original SER, the review of the ICC instrumentation was incomplete. The January 24, 1992, letter superseded the previous responses on this issue. TVA letter for Units 1 and 2 dated January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware. NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER10. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System.
				Unit 2 Action: Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.
				----- -----
				REVISION 07 UPDATE:  Page 1-38 of SSER23 provided the following as NRC Action for this item:
				-----
				-----
				-----

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>"Open. See SSER23, Section 4.4.8."</p> <p>Section 4.4.8 ends with:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. This is Open Item 72 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 72 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. (Section 4.4.8)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-608 closed NUREG-0737, II.F.2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action Closed. See SSER 25 and SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2. Open Items 72, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, and 109 were closed in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2. Open items 94, 98, 101, 105, 108, 110, and 111 were closed in SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2."</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.G.1	Power Supplies For Pressurizer Relief Valves, Block Valves and Level Indicators	<b>C</b>  <b>09</b>	<p>Reviewed in original 1982 SER and 8.3.3 of SSER7.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Implement modifications such that PORVS and associated Block Valves are powered from same train but different buses.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>Modifications were implemented such that PORVs and associated Block Valves are powered from same train but different buses.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-608 closed this item.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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NUREG-0737, II.K.1.5	Review ESF Valves	C		NRC: letter dated March 29, 1985; SSER 16  ----- -----  REVISION 08 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-603 closed this item.
		08		
NUREG-0737, II.K.1.10	Operability Status	C		Unit 2 Action:  Confirm multi-unit operation will have no impact on administrative procedures with respect to operability status.  ----- -----  REVISION 11 UPDATE:  The primary procedure that satisfies the commitment for multi-unit operations is OPDP-8, "Operability Determination Process and Limiting Conditions for Operation Tracking. This is a common nuclear corporate procedure that is presently in use on WBN Unit 1 and other TVA nuclear units. No revision is required for WBN two units operation.  ----- -----  REVISION 12 UPDATE:  NUREG-0737, II.K.1.10 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.
		12		
NUREG-0737, II.K.1.17	Trip Per Low-Level B/S	C		NRC: letter dated March 29, 1985; SSER 16
NUREG-0737, II.K.2.13	Effect of High Pressure Injection for Small Break LOCA With No Auxiliary Feedwater	C		LICENSE CONDITION:  Effect of high pressure injection for small break LOCA with no auxiliary feedwater (NUREG-0737, II.K.2.13)  In SSER4, the staff concluded that there was reasonable assurance that vessel integrity would be maintained for small breaks with an extended loss of all feedwater and that the USI A-49, "Pressurized Thermal Shock," review did not have to be completed to support the full-power license. They considered this condition resolved.
NUREG-0737, II.K.2.17	Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System	C		LICENSE CONDITION:  Voiding in the reactor coolant system (NUREG-0737, II.K.2.17)  The staff reviewed the generic resolution of this license condition in SSER4 and approved the study in question, thereby resolving this license condition.
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.1	Auto PORV Isolation	C		Reviewed in SSER5 and resolved based on NRC conclusion that there is no need for an automatic PORV isolation system (NRC letter dated June 29, 1990).

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.2	Report on PORV Failures	C — —	Reviewed in SSER5 and resolved based on NRC conclusion that there is no need for an automatic PORV isolation system (NRC letter dated June 29, 1990).
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.3	Reporting SV/RV Failures/Challenges	C — — 06	<p>(Action from GL 82-16) – NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Include, as necessary, in Technical Specifications submittal.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.</p> <p>Rev. 0 of the Unit 1 TS contained 5.9.4 (Monthly Operating Reports) which implemented the above commitment for Unit 1.</p> <p>Amendment 57 to the Unit 1 TS (approved by the NRC on March 21, 2005) deleted this section of the TS.</p> <p>The markup for Unit 2 Developmental Revision A noted that Unit 2 will apply this change, and the Unit 2 TS will contain no requirement for Monthly Operating Reports.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>“Closed in SSER22, Section 13.5.3.”</p>
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.5	Auto Trip of RCPS	CO 11	<p>Reviewed in 15.5.4 of original 1982 SER; became License Condition 35. The staff determined that their review of Item II.K.3.5 did not have to be completed to support the full power license and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4. The item was further reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications as required.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-608 (November 8, 2013 ) closed NUREG 0737 II.K.3.5.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV		ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.9	PID Controller	C		Reviewed in original 1982 SER.
		07		Unit 2 Action: Set the derivative time constant to zero.
				----- -----
				REVISION 06 UPDATE:  The derivative time constant was set to zero.  ----- -----
				REVISION 07 UPDATE:  NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed NUREG-0737, II.K.3.9.
				-----
				-----
				-----
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.10	Anticipatory Trip at High Power	C		NRC: letter dated October 31, 1995; SSER 16
		13		-----
				Unit 2 Action:  Unit 2 Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures will address this issue.  ----- -----
				REVISION 02 UPDATE:  Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.  Items 14.a. (Turbine Trip - Low Fluid Oil Pressure) and 14.b. (Turbine Trip - Turbine Stop Valve Closure) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 are the trips of interest. The table and the Bases for these items state that below the P-9 setpoint, these trips do not actuate a reactor trip.  Per item 16.d. (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9) of TS Table 3.3.1-1, the Nominal Trip Setpoint for P-9 is "50% RTP" and the Allowable Value is "< 52.4% RTP."  ----- -----
				REVISION 12 UPDATE:  Surveillance procedures to address this issue have been developed and issued.  NUREG-0737 item II.K.3.10 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-603, dated May 9, 2014.  ----- -----
				REVISION 13 UPDATE:  SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			"NRC Action Closed. (SSER23, Section 7.8.4)"
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.12	Confirm Existence of Anticipatory Reactor Trip Upon Turbine Trip	C — —	Closed in SSER16.
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.17	Report On Outage of Emergency Core Cooling System	C — —  08	<p>LICENSE CONDITION:</p> <p>Report on outage of emergency core cooling system (NUREG-0737, II.K.3.17)</p> <p>In the original 1982 SER, the NRC accepted TVA's commitment to develop and implement a plan to collect emergency core cooling system outage information. In SSER3, the staff accepted a revised commitment from an October 28, 1983, letter to participate in the nuclear power reliability data system and comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-603 closed this item.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.25	Power On Pump Seals	C — —  06	<p>NRC reviewed and closed in IR 390/84-35 based on Diesel Generator (DG) power to pump sealing cooling system.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Ensure DG power is provided to pump sealing cooling system.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>It was confirmed that DG power is provided to pump sealing cooling system.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2010-605 closed NUREG-0737, II.K.3.25.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.30	Small Break LOCA Methods	C   06	<p>TVA: letter dated October 29, 1981</p> <p>NRC: letters dated March 29, 1985, and July 24, 1986; SSER 16</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The staff determined in SSER4 that their review of Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 did not have to be completed to support the full-power license and considered this LICENSE CONDITION resolved in SSER4. In SSER5, the staff further reviewed responses to these items, and concluded that the Units 1 and 2 FSAR methods and analysis met the requirements of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. This item was further reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete analysis for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The analysis has been completed for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-603 closed NUREG-0737, II.K.3.30.</p>
			-----
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.31	Plant Specific Analysis	C 06	<p>The staff determined in SSER4 that their review of Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 did not have to be completed to support the full-power license and considered this LICENSE CONDITION resolved in SSER4. In SSER5, the staff further reviewed responses to these items, and concluded that the Units 1 and 2 FSAR methods and analysis met the requirements of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. This item was further reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete analysis for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The analysis has been completed for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-603 closed NUREG-0737, II.K.3.31.</p>
			-----
NUREG-0737, III.A.1.1	Emergency Preparedness, Short Term	C —	<p>LICENSE CONDITION:</p> <p>Emergency Preparedness (NUREG-0737, III.A.1, III.A.2)</p> <p>The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in SSER13 superseded the review in the original 1982 SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LICENSE CONDITION was deleted. The NRC completed the review of the REP in SSER20.</p>
			-----
NUREG-0737, III.A.1.2	Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities	C	<p>LICENSE CONDITION:</p> <p>Emergency Preparedness (NUREG-0737, III.A.1, III.A.2)</p> <p>The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in SSER13 superseded the review in the original 1982 SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LICENSE CONDITION was deleted. The NRC completed the review of the REP in SSER20.</p>
			-----



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, III.A.2	Emergency Preparedness	<b>C</b> -----	<p>LICENSE CONDITION:</p> <p>Emergency Preparedness (NUREG-0737, III.A.1, III.A.2)</p> <p>The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in SSER13 superseded the review in the original 1982 SER. In SSER13, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LICENSE CONDITION was deleted. The NRC completed the review of the REP in SSER20.</p>
NUREG-0737, III.D.1.1	Primary Coolant Outside Containment	<b>S</b> ----- <b>02</b>	<p>Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER10; reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <p>Include the waste gas disposal system in the leakage reduction program and incorporate in Unit 2 Technical Specifications.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p> <p>TS 5.7.2.4 is the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment program. This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. This program includes the "Waste Gas" system.</p>
NUREG-0737, III.D.3.3	In-Plant Iodine Radiation Monitoring	<b>C</b> ----- <b>08</b>	<p>NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete modifications for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2's planned response to Item III.D.3.3 as documented originally in regulatory framework letter (TVA to NRC) dated January 29, 2008, and the latest letter dated December 20, 2011, was to "complete modifications for Unit 2." However since all of the accident monitoring equipment for Unit 2 will be similar to, if not the same, portable equipment that is presently in service for Unit 1, no design changes / modifications are required.</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-605 closed this item.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, III.D.3.4	Control-Room Habitability	<b>C</b>  <b>09</b>	<p>TVA: letter dated October 29, 1981</p> <p>NRC: SSER 16</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC reviewed in SER and in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete with CRDR completion.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed in SSER22, Section 6.4"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>All required actions have been completed. Dose calculations that demonstrate that the control room remains habitable have been revised and issued for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-607 closed NUREG-0737, III.D.3.4.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	<div> <div>*</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REV</div> </div>	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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## STATUS CODE DEFINITIONS

- C:** CLOSED: Previous staff review of NUREG-0847 and/or supplements has closed the item either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2.
- CI:** CLOSED/IMPLEMENTATION: Staff has approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; there is no change to the approved design; and implementation is recommended through Regional Inspection.
- CO:** CLOSED - OPEN: Staff has approved closure of the item; however, TVA actions remain to be completed.
- CT:** CLOSED/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: Item has been approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; however, a change to the original approval requires submittal of the Technical Specifications and staff review.
- NA:** NOT APPLICABLE: Justification as to why a section / subsection is not applicable is provided in the ADDITIONAL INFORMATION column.
- O:** OPEN: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2.
- OI:** OPEN / INSPECTION: Staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2; inspection is required to complete review / close the item.
- OT:** OPEN/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is through submittal of a Technical Specification.
- OV:** OPEN/VALIDATION: The proposed approach has been approved for Watts Bar Unit 1; the same approach is proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 without change.
- S:** SUBMITTED: Information has been submitted, and is under review by NRC staff.

## **Enclosure 4**

### **Generic Communications - Revision 13 Changes**

# GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS: REVISION 13 CHANGES

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B 1980-11	Masonry Wall Design	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC accepted all but completion of corrective actions in IR 50-390/93-01 and 50-391/93-01(February 25, 1993) and closed for Unit 1 in IR 50-390/95-46 (August 1, 1995).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Complete implementation for Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-610 closed this item.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
B 1987-02	Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>TVA: letters dated April 15, 1988, July 6, 1988, September 12, 1988, and January 27, 1989</p> <p>NRC: letter dated August 18, 1989</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC closed in letter dated August 18, 1989.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Complete for Unit 2, using information used for Unit 1, as applicable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 has completed fastener testing as required by this Bulletin.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Senior resident administratively closed this item on November 07, 2011.</p>
B 1988-04	Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated May 24, 1990, for both units.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Perform calculations, and</li> <li>* install check valves to prevent pump to pump interaction.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Calculation EPMDHM042689 was revised to reflect acceptance of the 480 GPM mini-flow operation rates for the Containment Spray Pumps. The Unit 2 Containment Spray System Description (WBN2-74-4001) table provides the containment spray pump design parameters. Check valves (2-CKV-074-0544 and 2-CKV-074-0545) were installed between the take-off for the RHR pump minimum flow recirculation line (downstream of the RHR heat exchanger) and the take-off for the Charging pump/RHR spray connection (train A), and the Safety Injection/RHR spray connection (train B).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
			-----
B 1988-05	Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Piping Supplies, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing Company	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Complete review to locate installed WJM material, and</li> <li>* perform in-situ hardness testing for Unit 2.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-604 (June 27, 2013) closed Bulletin 1988-05, including Supplements 1 and 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Innsted Unit 2 WJM materials/components were located and in-situ hardness testing was performed. Parts that failed hardness testing were replaced.</p>
			-----
B 1988-08	Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Cooling Systems	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated September 19, 1991 (both units).</p> <p>NRC acceptance letter dated June 26, 1995 (Unit 1).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Implement program to prevent thermal stratification.</li> <li>* Submit a letter to NRC that confirms actions are complete for WBN Unit 2 within 30 days of completion of the modifications.</li> </ul>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated October 4, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12284A513) contained the following:</p> <p>From the cover letter:</p> <p>"The purpose of this letter is to provide the current WBN Unit 2 plan for addressing NRC Bulletin 88-08. Based on analysis and experience gained from WBN Unit 1, WBN Unit 2 has developed an acoustic monitoring program similar to the one currently used on WBN Unit 1. Enclosure 1 provides the background and the basis for this action. The Regulatory Framework status for NRC Bulletin 88-08 shown in Reference 2 will be revised to reflect this change in the next update.</p> <p>From Enclosure 1:</p> <p>"Clarification</p> <p>For WBN Unit 2, TVA will utilize the WBN Unit 1 approach which utilizes an EPRI calculational methodology and an augmented Pre-service Inspection Program for the three Unit 2 drain lines.</p> <p>In addition, WBN Unit 2 has developed an acoustic monitoring program for the Unit 2 SI boron injection line governed by Procedure 2-TI-305, 'Acoustic Monitoring to Detect Leakage Through 2-FCV-63-25 &amp; -26,' which is similar to that used on WBN Unit 1 for monitoring its susceptible SI boron injection lines for in-leakage."</p> <p>Enclosure 2 provides the new commitment made in this letter."</p> <p>From Enclosure 2:</p> <p>"The Regulatory Framework status for NRC Bulletin 88-08 shown in Reference 2 will be revised to reflect this change in the next update."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>This update satisfies the commitment.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-612 (March 28, 2013) closed Bulletin 88-08 and Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 1.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>In response to the experience gained from Unit 1, the methodology used for Unit 2 was to perform an engineering assessment of the RCS branch piping as described in MRP-146, "Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines." Unit 2 Calculation 1100448.301 (MRP-146 Assessment of Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Branch Lines) was performed to determine the susceptibility of</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>non-isolable and stagnant branch lines off the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to thermal cycling mechanisms. The results contained within the calculation identified four locations that are susceptible to turbulence/swirl penetration effects that could lead to thermal fatigue cracking and leakage.</p> <p>In compliance with Bulletin 88-08, the three drain lines, identified in the Table 7 of the calculation, are incorporated in the augmented Pre-service Inspection Program for baseline inspections of those areas deemed most susceptible to thermal fatigue cracking as noted in MRP-146. These drain lines, which are concerned with outleakage from the RCS, are incorporated in the augmented Preservice Inspection Program Plan, Program No: WBN-2 PSI.</p> <p>The calculation recommendation, as identified in Table 7, is to monitor the in-leakage status of one SI boron injection line as cyclic stratification only occurs when in-leakage is present. Lack of inleakage could reduce the need for future inspections. Currently Unit 1 utilizes Technical Instruction TI-305, "Acoustic Monitoring To Detect Leakage Through 1-FCV-63-25 &amp; -26" for monitoring its two susceptible SI boron injection lines.</p> <p>Unit 2 has issued Technical Instruction 2-TI-305, "Acoustic Monitoring To Detect Leakage Through 2-FCV-63-25 &amp; -26 to provide detailed steps to perform acoustic monitoring within the Unit 2 RCS.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
B 1988-11	Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification	<b>CI</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC SER on "Leak-Before-Break" (April 28, 1993) and reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Complete modifications to accommodate Surge Line thermal movements, and</li> <li>* incorporate a temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations into Unit 2 procedures.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>A temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations has been incorporated into Unit 2 procedures.</p>
B 1992-01	Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damage	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>This bulletin was provided for information only to plants with construction permits. See Generic Letter 92-08 for Thermo-lag related actions.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Bulletin 1992-01 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-612, dated February 2, 2015.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
B 1996-01, first part	Control Rod Insertion Problems (PWR)	C ----- 13	<p>NRC acceptance letter for Unit 1 dated July 22, 1996 – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Issue Emergency Operating Procedure.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 will load all new RFA-2 fuel for the initial fuel load.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation (corrected) for Bulletin 1996-001 on May 3, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession number ML102290258) provided responses to several Requests for Additional Information (Rals) regarding the Unit 2 FSAR.</p> <p>RAI SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. and TVA's response to it are as follow:</p> <p>"SNPB 4.4.2 - 3. Confirm that WBN Unit 2 is limited to cores with only RFA-2 fuel and will not use any other type of fuel until an approved transition core methodology is submitted.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The fuel fabrication contract for WBN specifies that the RFA-2 fuel design will be supplied. There are no provisions for the supply of a different fuel design. There is no plan to change the fuel design. If TVA decides to change the fuel design, TVA will comply with applicable fuel transition requirements."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 FSAR Amendments 95 and 97 made changes to Chapters 4 and 15 to reflect the use of Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel on Unit 2.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 fuel has been received.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Emergency Operating Instruction 2-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Revision 0, has been IQR'd, sponsor approved, and placed on hold pending its performance.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action    Closed    ..."</p>
B 1996-01, last part	Control Rod Insertion Problems (PWR)	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter for Unit 1 dated July 22, 1996 – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: and provide core map.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation (corrected) for Bulletin 1996-001 on May 3, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated May 3, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200035) required Confirmatory Action (See Appendix HH)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The applicable item from SER22, Appendix HH for this item is Open Item 5, "Verify timely submittal of pre-startup core map and perform technical review. (TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML072570676)."</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following response to Open Item 5:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>“Attachment 1 provides the requested core map.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>“NRC Action    Closed. NRC letter dated May 3, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200035) required Confirmatory Action (See Appendix HH Open Items 5 and 8). By letter dated July 30, 2012, TVA provided the information in the Confirmatory Action and the staff verified the information and has closed Appendix HH Open Items 5 and 8.”</p>
B 1996-02	Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor, or Over Safety-Related Equipment	<b>CO</b> <b>13</b>	<p>NRC closure letter dated May 20, 1998.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Unit 2 Heavy Loads Program will be in compliance with NUREG-0612.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 1996-002 on March 4, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>“Closed. NRC letter dated March 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100480062)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>BL 1996-02 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-603, dated May 1, 2015.</p> <p>Status above was changed to “CO” indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
B 2004-01	Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at PWRs	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Provide details of pressurizer and penetrations, and</li> <li>* apply Material Stress Improvement Process.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA provided details of the pressurizer and penetrations on September 29, 2008. This letter committed to:</p> <p>Prior to placing the pressurizer in service, TVA will apply the Material Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) to the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve connections, the safety relief valve connections, the spray line nozzle and surge line nozzle connections.</p> <p>TVA will perform a bare metal visual (BMV) inspection of the upper pressurizer Alloy 600 locations at the first refueling outage.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>April 1, 2010, letter committed to:</p> <p>TVA will perform NDE prior to and after performance of the MSIP. If circumferential cracking is observed in either pressure boundary or non-pressure boundary portions of any locations covered under the scope of the bulletin, TVA will develop plans to perform an adequate extent-of-condition evaluation, and TVA will discuss those plans with cognizant NRC technical staff prior to starting Unit 2.</p> <p>After performing the BMV inspection during the first refueling outage, if any evidence of apparent reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage is discovered, then NDE capable of determining crack orientation will be performed in order to accurately characterize the flaw, the orientation, and extent. TVA will develop plans to perform an adequate extent of condition evaluation, and plans to possibly expand the scope of NDE to other components in the pressurizer will be discussed with NRC technical staff prior to restarting of Unit 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Bulletin 2004-001 on August 4, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>“Closed. NRC Letter dated August 4, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102080017)”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-605 closed Bulletin 2004-01.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>All field work for MSIP has been completed as documented in Work Order 09-954268-000.</p>
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Pre-MSIP UT was not performed per Westinghouse letter L TR-A600-10-8 dated January 20, 2010. Westinghouse documented that for WBN2, there is no possibility of PWSCC as the plant has never been in operation and has never been exposed to a harsh environment. Therefore, no pre-MSIP volumetric UT inspection is necessary to determine if PWSCC-induced flaws exist. However, WBN Unit 2 performed an UT examination in 2007 to determine if examination coverage greater than 90 percent could be achieved on each of the six nozzle to safe-end welds associated with the power operated relief valve, safety relief valves, spray line, and surge line per MRP-139, and no indications were identified.</p> <p>Post-MSIP UT examinations were performed in conjunction with the preservice requirements of ASME Section XI.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The remaining action for this Bulletin is: "After performing the BMV inspection during the first refueling outage, if any evidence of apparent reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage is discovered, then NDE capable of determining crack orientation will be performed in order to accurately characterize the flaw, the orientation, and extent. TVA will develop plans to perform an adequate extent of condition evaluation, and plans to possibly expand the scope of NDE to other components in the pressurizer will be discussed with NRC technical staff prior to restarting of Unit 2.")</p> <p>Thus, the Status for this Bulletin is changed to "C."</p>
B 2011-01	Mitigating Strategies	<b>S</b> <b>13</b>	<p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated July 18, 2011 (ADAMS Accession Number ML11201A303) included the following:</p> <p>"Watts Bar Unit 2 is currently under construction, therefore this is a voluntary response. TVA will respond as appropriate to the information requested in this Bulletin consistent with the approach provided by Watts Bar, Unit 1 prior to licensing Unit 2."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated February 14, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13051A045) included the following:</p> <p>"TVA intends to submit by October 15, 2014, an updated set of mitigation strategy tables which will be applicable to WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. This submittal will also include information which updates WBN's response for Bulletin 2011-01 for both Unit 1 and Unit 2."</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>SSER 26 includes the following:</p> <p>"TVA Action    The proposed approach has been approved for WBN Unit 1; an updated approach will be proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 without change.</p> <p>NRC Action    Open"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA's September 30, 2014, Letter to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 – Dual Unit Mitigation Strategy Tables," submitted updated mitigating strategies tables which describe the pre-arranged B5b mitigation strategies developed for two unit operation at Watts Bar. This letter also updated WBN's response for Bulletin 2011-01 for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.</p>
B 2012-01	Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System	<b>CO</b> <b>13</b>	<p>REVISION 09 UPDATE:</p> <p>Enclosure 3 of TVA to NRC letter dated October 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12312A167) provided the requested information for Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER 26 includes the following:</p> <p>"TVA Action    The proposed approach has been submitted for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 and is still under review by the NRC staff.</p> <p>NRC Action    Open"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC to TVA letter dated December 20, 2013, requested that additional information be provided regarding the completion of interim actions and compensatory measures and the status of long-term corrective actions.</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated February 3, 2014, provided the requested information.</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated June 12, 2014, provided a proposed WBN Unit 2 license condition for completion of actions associated with resolution of Bulletin 2012-01. The proposed license condition also addressed the information NRC requested in Question 5 of NRC to TVA letter dated February 27, 2014, regarding actions TVA is taking with respect to the Open Phase Issue.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 contains the following under 8.2.2 Analysis:</p> <p>"NRC Bulletin 2012-01</p> <p>The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System,' dated July 27, 2012, to notify licensees that the NRC staff is requesting information about the facilities' electric power system designs to determine if further regulatory action is warranted. Bulletin 2012-01 requires addressees to comprehensively verify compliance with the regulatory requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, 'Electric Power Systems,' and the design criteria for protection systems under 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2).</p> <p>TVA provided its response for WBN Unit 2 in Enclosure 3 of letter dated October 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12312A167). Based on review of the response, NRC staff determined that the design vulnerability exists at WBN Unit 2 electric power system and no design features have been provided to enable functioning of electric power system with an open phase condition (OPC) with offsite power circuits. In response to NRC staff's RAI (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A314) concerning status and schedule for completion of plant design changes and modifications to resolve the open phase design vulnerability, TVA provided its response in letter dated February 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14038A075). TVA stated that it is fully engaged in the development of accurate detection and protection equipment without compromising nuclear safety or increasing plant risk, this new OPC technology is being thoroughly evaluated, will be tested, and will be fully analyzed before installation. In addition, based on the operating experience to-date, the OPC of concern is a loss of one or two of the three phases of a nuclear power plant's offsite electrical power circuit due to any component failure on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a qualified offsite electrical power circuit to the transmission system with and without a high impedance ground under all operating electrical system configurations and loading conditions. In supplemental letter dated September 3, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14247A231), TVA submitted additional text to be added to the FSAR and proposed a license condition associated with actions for resolving NRC Bulletin 2012-01.</p> <p>The proposed text that would be added to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR Section 8.2.2 'Analysis,' as part of WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 113 states:</p> <p>The NRC issued Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power Systems,' describing a condition resulting from the loss of a single phase between the transmission network and the onsite power distribution system at an operating nuclear plant in the United States. TVA has taken the short term actions described in the bulletin and the nuclear industry is developing a long term resolution. TVA has added the following license condition for the long term actions:</p> <p>Actions to resolve the issues identified in the Bulletin will be implemented on or before December 31, 2017.</p> <p>The NRC staff is proposing the following License Condition:</p> <p>By December 31, 2017, TVA will report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, 'Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System' have been implemented.</p> <p>Based on the above, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that OPC design vulnerability with the WBN Unit 2 electric power system will</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>be addressed by TVA when license conditions and regulatory commitments are met. The staff will close Bulletin 2012-01 for WBN Unit 2 when TVA notifies the NRC with a close-out letter when full compliance is achieved."</p> <p>Status was changed to "Resolved" in SSER27.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1981-21	Natural Circulation Cooldown	<b>CI</b> <b>13</b>	<p>TVA responded December 3, 1981.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Issue operating procedures.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>The operating procedures have been approved through Sponsor approval; they will not be issued until the applicable system(s) is (are) turned over to Operations. This is sufficient for closure of this item.</p>
GL 1988-17	Loss of Decay Heat Removal	<b>CO</b> <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated March 8, 1995 (Unit 1).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Implement modifications to provide RCS temperature, RV level and RHR system performance.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-604 (June 27, 2013) closed Generic Letter 1988-17.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Correct Status to "C-O." While the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1989-04	Guidelines on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>NRC reviewed in 3.9.6 of SSER14 (Unit 1).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Submit an ASME Section XI Inservice Test Program for the first ten year interval six months before receiving an Operating License.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated December 12, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13358A066) provided the NRC with a copy of TVA Technical Instruction (TI), 0-TI-100-006, "Inservice Testing Program" for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2. The TI addresses both the updated Unit 1 and</p>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>initial Unit 2 Inservice Test (1ST) Programs, and the Unit 2 Preservice Test (PST) Program.</p> <p>Additionally, the letter contained, "The submittal of the WBN 1ST Program document, including the WBN2 PST Program (Enclosure 1), the exemption request (Enclosure 2), and the relief requests (Enclosure 3), described above, will also satisfy SSER 22, Appendix HH, Open Item No. 13.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action Closed. NRC letter dated October 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14289A222)."</p>
GL 1989-13	Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC letters dated July 9, 1990 and June 13, 1994, accepting approach.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Implement initial performance testing of the heat exchangers; and</li> <li>2) Establish eddy current baseline data for the Containment Spray heat exchangers.</li> </ol> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-602 closed GL 89-013.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>WBN Unit 2 Eddy Current Examination Reports for Containment Spray 2A and Containment Spray 2B establish the pre-service baseline for both Containment Spray heat exchangers.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C-O." While the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1992-08	Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>TVA configurations for Thermo-Lag 330-1 were reviewed in SSER18 and accepted in NRC letter dated January 6, 1998 (includes a supplemental SE).</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Review Watts Bar design and installation requirements for Thermolag 330-1 fire barrier system and evaluate the Thermolag currently installed in Unit 2.</li> </ol>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>2) Remove and replace, as required, or prepare an approved deviation.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>GL 1992-08 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-612, dated February 2, 2015.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1993-04	Rod Control System Failure and Withdrawal of Rod Control Cluster Assemblies, 10 CFR 50.54(f)	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC letter dated December 9, 1994, accepted TVA commitments for both units.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications and testing.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed GL 93-004.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Required modifications have been implemented.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action (i.e., testing).</p>
GL 1995-03	Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated May 16, 1997 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>* Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>* Evaluate or repair as necessary.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>100% of the steam generator tubes have been inspected.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 1995-07	Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>Unit 1 SER for GL 95-07 dated Sept 15, 1999</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Perform evaluation for pressure locking and thermal binding of safety related power-operated gate valves, and</li> <li>* take corrective actions for those valves identified as being susceptible.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>April 1, 2010, letter committed to evaluate missing GL 89-10 motor-operated valves for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC letter dated July 29, 2010, provided RAIs on the GL.</p> <p>TVA letter dated July 30, 2010, answered the RAIs and provided the following commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* EDCRs 53292 and 53287 shall be implemented to eliminate the potential for pressure locking prior to startup.</li> <li>* Valves 2-FCV-63-25 and -26 will be evaluated for impact due to new parameters from the JOG Topical Report MPR 2524A prior to startup.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for GL 1995-007 on August 12, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA letter to NRC dated July 30, 2010, documented that none of the missing Watts Bar Unit 2 GL 89-10 valves are GL 95-07 valves.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>-----</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated August 12, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100190443)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 08 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2012-602 closed this item.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>EDCRs 53292 and 53287 have been implemented.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Pressure locking and thermal binding evaluations have been completed. Corrective actions have been completed for those valves identified as being susceptible.</p>
GL 1996-01	Testing of Safety-Related Circuits	<b>CO</b> <b>13</b>	<p>TVA responded for both units on April 18, 1996.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Implement Recommendations.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>GL 1996-01 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2015-602, dated February 13, 2015.</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1997-01	Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated November 4, 1999 (Unit 1).</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Provide a report to address the inspection program.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 97-001 on June 30, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 04 UPDATE:</p>

ITEM	TITLE	<div> <div>*</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REV</div> </div>	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>Corrected status from "OV" to "CI" due to NRC issuance of Safety Evaluation as noted in Revision 03 update.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated June 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100539515)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>In a TVA letter to the NRC, dated April 1, 2010, TV A addressed the inspection program for GL 1997-01. The letter stated, in part:</p> <p>"In previous responses, TVA WBN Unit 2 committed to perform the first inspections according to the requirements of paragraphs IV.C(5)(a) and IV.C(5)(b) of the First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009 ... at the first refueling outage. First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009 has been superseded by 10 CFR 50.55a Codes and Standards (g)(6)(ii)(D)(2) through (6) and the ASME Code Case N-729-1. TVA WBN Unit 2 will perform inspections during the first refueling outage according to 10 CFR 50.55a (g)(6)(ii)(D)(2) through (6) and ASME Code Case N-729-1.</p> <p>As committed previously, TVA WBN Unit 2 will perform a baseline inspection prior to fuel load that consists of paragraph IV.C(5)(b) of the First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009."</p> <p>Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Preservice Inspection (PSI) Program Plan re-establishes the requirements for the PSI at WBN-2, and follows the inspection requirements of 10CFR 50.55a(g)(2). Paragraph 3.21 of the WBN-2 Program Plan also includes augmented examinations. USNRC Generic Letters are included to be performed as augmented examinations when applicable.</p> <p>All of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations have been examined and found to be acceptable.</p> <p>The vent line weld and AHA welds were examined and determined to be acceptable. These weld examinations serve as the PSI baseline examinations for implementing ASME Code Case N-729-1 when WBN-2 enters commercial operation.</p>
GL 1997-04	Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps	<div> <div>C</div> <div>-----</div> <div>13</div> </div>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated June 17, 1998 (Unit 1) – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Install new sump strainers, and</li> <li>* perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1997-004 on February 18, 2010.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>See the REVISION 06 UPDATE for GL 04-002 for new commitments.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 18, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100200375)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 1997-05	Steam Generator Tube Inspection Techniques	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated September 22, 1998 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Employ the same approach used on the original Unit 1 SGs. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 1998-02	Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p data-bbox="717 191 1230 216">Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p data-bbox="717 243 873 268">Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ol data-bbox="717 296 1422 436" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="717 296 1422 380">1) Review the ECCS designs to ensure they do not contain design features which can render them susceptible to common-cause failures; and</li> <li data-bbox="717 407 980 436">2) document the results.</li> </ol> <p data-bbox="717 478 1515 510">-----</p> <p data-bbox="717 548 976 573">REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p data-bbox="717 600 1409 657">NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1998-002 on March 3, 2010.</p> <p data-bbox="717 699 1515 730">-----</p> <p data-bbox="717 768 976 793">REVISION 03 UPDATE:</p> <p data-bbox="717 821 1531 905">NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 98-002 on May 11, 2010. This letter noted that it superseded the SE issued by NRC on March 3, 2010.</p> <p data-bbox="717 940 797 951">-----</p> <p data-bbox="717 989 1515 1150">April 1, 2010, letter committed to ensure that the guidance added to the Unit 1 procedure as a result of the review of NRC GL 98-02 is incorporated into the Unit 2 procedures. Specifically, when decreasing power, valve HCV-74-34, Refueling Water Return (normally locked closed valve) has a hold order placed with specific release criteria before entry into Mode 4 and to remove the hold order before entry into Mode 3 when returning to power.</p> <p data-bbox="717 1192 1515 1224">-----</p> <p data-bbox="717 1262 976 1287">REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p data-bbox="717 1314 1230 1339">SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p data-bbox="717 1367 1409 1423">"Closed. NRC Letter dated May 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200155)"</p> <p data-bbox="717 1465 1515 1497">-----</p> <p data-bbox="717 1535 976 1560">REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p data-bbox="717 1587 1446 1612">The ECCS designs were reviewed and the results were documented.</p> <p data-bbox="717 1654 1515 1686">-----</p> <p data-bbox="717 1724 976 1749">REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p data-bbox="717 1776 1373 1833">Generic Letter 1998-02 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-602, dated March 27, 2014.</p> <p data-bbox="717 1875 1515 1906">-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status above to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 1998-04	Potential for Degradation of the ECCS and the Containment Spray System After a LOCA Because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>NRC closure letter dated November 24, 1999 (Unit 1). – Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Install new sump strainers, and</li> <li>* perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.</li> </ul> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 1998-004 on February 1, 2010.</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>See the REVISION 06 UPDATE for GL 2004-002 for new commitments.</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 1, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100260594)"</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 2003-01	Control Room Habitability	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Incorporate TSTF-448 into Technical Specifications.</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2003-01 on February 1, 2010.</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p>



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>TS Surveillance Requirement 3.7.10.4 requires performance of a Control Room Envelope (CRE) unfiltered air inleakage test in accordance with the CRE Habitability Program.</p> <p>TS 5.7.2.20 provides for the CRE Habitability Program.</p> <p>These portions of the Unit 2 TS were based on the Unit 1 TS which incorporated TSTF-448 per Amendment 70 (NRC approved A70 on 10/08/2008).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 1, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100270076)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>
GL 2004-01	Requirements for Steam Generator Tube Inspection	C ----- 13	<p>NRC acceptance letter dated April 8, 2005 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>100% of the steam generator tubes have been inspected.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Corrected Status to "C."</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
GL 2004-02	Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p data-bbox="716 191 1531 247">NRC Audit Report dated February 7, 2007 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p data-bbox="716 275 873 302">Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="716 329 1068 357">* Install new sump strainers, and</li> <li data-bbox="716 384 1393 411">* perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.</li> </ul> <p data-bbox="716 449 1515 485">----- -----</p> <p data-bbox="716 522 976 550">REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p data-bbox="716 577 1511 634">Additional TVA letters concerning GL 2004-02 were sent to the NRC on the following dates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="716 661 930 688">- January 29, 2008,</li> <li data-bbox="716 688 889 716">- May 19, 2008,</li> <li data-bbox="716 716 963 743">- September 10, 2010,</li> <li data-bbox="716 743 946 770">- March 4, 2011, and</li> <li data-bbox="716 770 894 798">- April 29, 2011.</li> </ul> <p data-bbox="716 825 1498 882">The March 4, 2011, letter provided a response that superseded previous responses and commitments. It provided the following new commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="716 909 1373 966">- Unit 2 will install sump modifications per the requirements of Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02 prior to Unit 2 fuel load.</li> <li data-bbox="716 993 1458 1077">- A confirmatory walkdown for loose debris will be performed on Unit 2 after containment work is completed and the containment has been cleaned. This walkdown will be completed prior to startup.</li> <li data-bbox="716 1104 1471 1188">- New throttle valves will be installed in the CVCS and SI injection lines to the RCS. The new valves will be opened sufficiently to preclude downstream blockage.</li> <li data-bbox="716 1215 1458 1325">- The current Unit 1 TVA protective coating program contains requirements for conducting periodic visual examinations of Coating Service Level I and Level II protective coatings. The Unit 2 program will be the same.</li> <li data-bbox="716 1352 1487 1461">- Procedural controls will be put in place at WBN Unit 2 to ensure that potential quantities of post-accident debris are maintained within the bounds of the analyses and design bases that support ECCS and CSS recirculation functions.</li> <li data-bbox="716 1488 1490 1654">- TVA will complete the WBN in-vessel downstream effects evaluation discussed in the supplemental response to Generic Letter 2004-02 following issuance of the final NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Topical Report No. WCAP-16793-NP, "Evaluation of Long-Term Cooling Considering Particulate, Fibrous, and Chemical Debris in the Recirculating Fluid."</li> <li data-bbox="716 1682 1471 1766">- The design basis of the modified emergency sump strainer has been incorporated into the plant's current licensing basis. The WBN Unit 2 FSAR will be amended to include this information.</li> </ul> <p data-bbox="716 1793 797 1808">-----</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="716 1843 1414 1871">- Unit 1 and Unit 2 share a common protective coatings program.</li> <li data-bbox="716 1898 1442 1925">- Amendment 103 to the Unit 2 FSAR was submitted to the NRC on</li> </ul>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>March 15, 2010. This amendment included the design basis of the modified emergency sump strainer.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 10 UPDATE:</p> <p>Procedural controls are in place.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>TVA's letter to the NRC dated September 16, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13262A270) included:</p> <p>"A summary of the evaluation of WBN Unit 2 long-term core cooling consistent with the Limitations and Conditions of Reference 1. The unit-specific evaluation, in conjunction with previous TVA letters related to GL 2004-02 (References 2, 3, and 4), establishes that the WBN Unit 2 containment sump design conforms to the NRC requirements and regulations on recirculation from the containment sump during Design Basis Accidents."</p> <p>New throttle valves were installed in the CVCS and SI injection lines to the RCS. The new valves will open sufficiently to preclude downstream blockage.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>"NRC Action    Closed. NRC Letter dated September 18, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14163A658)."</p> <p>Status above was changed to "CO" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p>
GL 2006-01	Steam Generator Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Incorporate TSTF-449 into Technical Specifications.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>On January 21, 2010, NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for the following Generic Letters: 1995-03, 1995-05, 1997-05, 1997-06, 2004-01, and 2006-01.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Developmental Revision B of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on February 2, 2010.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>TS 5.7.2.12 is the Steam Generator (SG) Program. This program is implemented to ensure that SG tube integrity is maintained.</p> <p>Unit 2 TS 5.7.2.12 was based on Unit 1 TS 5.7.2.12. Unit 1 TS 5.7.2.1.12 was based on TSTF-449 (NRC approved Unit 1 TS A65 on 1/03/2006).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061) (See Appendix HH)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The applicable item from SER22, Appendix HH for this item is Open item 6, "Verify implementation of TSTF-449. (TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML072570676)."</p> <p>TVA to NRC letter dated April 6, 2011 provided the following response to Open Item 6:</p> <p>"Amendment 65 to the Unit 1 TS revised the existing steam generator tube surveillance program and was modeled after TSTF-449, Rev. 4. The NRC approved Amendment 65 via letter dated November 3, 2006, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity (TS-05-10) (TAC No. MC9271).' Revision 82 made the associated changes to the Unit 1 TS Bases.</p> <p>Developmental Revision A to the Unit 2 TS and TS Bases made the equivalent changes to the Unit 2 TS / TS Bases. Affected TS sections include the following: LEAKAGE definition in 1.1, LCO 3.4.13 (RCS Operational LEAKAGE), LCO 3.4.17 (SG Tube Integrity), 5.7.2.12 (Steam Generator (SG) Program), and 5.9.9 (Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report).</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 TS was submitted to the NRC via letter dated March 4, 2009, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Operating License Application Update,' (ADAMS Accession number ML090700378)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under item 6 on page HH-4:</p> <p>"Verify implementation of TSTF-449. (TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML072570676). Staff has reviewed Revision I to the proposed technical specifications and found that TSTF 449 has been incorporated." This is an entry in Closed Items Table.</p>
GL 2006-02	Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Complete the two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures.</p>

ITEM	TITLE	<div> <div>*</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REV</div> </div>	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</div> <div>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2006-002 on January 20, 2010.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</div> <div>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</div> <div>"Closed. NRC Letter dated January 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093631061) (See Appendix HH)"</div> <div>Note that the correct date and ADAMS Accession No. are January 20, 2010, and ML100080768, respectively.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</div> <div>The two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures have been completed and issued.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</div> <div>"NRC Action    Closed.</div>
GL 2006-03	Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configurations Section 1.14 says, "CLOSED."	<div>C</div> <div>-----</div> <div>13</div>	<div>TVA does not rely on Hemyc or MT materials to protect electrical and instrumentation cables or equipment that provide safe shutdown capability during a postulated fire.</div> <div>Unit 2 Action:</div> <div>Addressed in CAP/SP.</div> <div>The Fire Protection Corrective Action Program will ensure Unit 2 conforms with NRC requirements and applicable guidelines.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</div> <div>NRC issued the Safety Evaluation for Generic Letter 2006-003 on February 25, 2010.</div> <div>-----</div> <div>-----</div> <div>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</div> <div>SSER22 contained the following for NRC Action:</div>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>"Closed. NRC Letter dated February 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100470398)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Fire barrier configurations approved for installation at WBN are documented in WBN's design basis G-98 {Installation, Modification, and Maintenance of Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems (ERFBS)}. The maintenance of G-98 and the translation of approved changes to affected documents (i.e., the Fire Protection Report), is controlled by Section 7.0, "Design Control," of TVA's Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan or through Bechtel's PNQAP.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>GL 2006-03 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-607, dated September 30, 2014.</p>
GL 2008-01	Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	<p>Initial response for Unit 2 on October 1, 2008.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TVA will provide a submittal within 45 days of completion of the engineering for the ECCS, RHR, and CSS systems.</li> <li>- WBN Unit 2 will complete the required modifications and provide a submittal consistent with the information requested in the GL 90 days prior to fuel load.</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>The submittal was provided in TVA to NRC letter dated March 11, 2011. This submittal satisfied the above Unit 2 actions and generated the following new commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TVA will evaluate adopting the revised ISTS SR 3.5.2.3 (NUREG 1431) at WBN within 6 months of NRC approval of the Traveler.</li> <li>- Complete evaluation of CS pump 2A-A pipe chase horizontal suction piping for venting. Add a vent valve to this location or conduct periodic UT examinations if necessary. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Add vent valves to selected locations in the ECCS and RHRS piping to enhance filling and venting. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Complete walk down survey of ECCS and RHRS piping and evaluate the piping for latent voids that could exceed 5% of the pipe cross</li> </ul>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>sectional area. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Operating procedures are being revised to improve instructions for filling and venting portions of the ECCS discharge pipe. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Complete Preoperational tests on ECCS and RHRS systems to confirm Unit 1 operating experience showing no gas intrusion/accumulation issues. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> <li>- Periodic venting procedures used to meet SR 3.5.2.3 are being revised to require that, for an extended gas release, a report is entered into the Corrective Action Program. (90 days prior to fuel load.)</li> </ul> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER24 contained the following for NRC Action:</p> <p>"Closed. NRC letter dated August 23, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112232205)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE:</p> <p>Inspection Report 391/2013-605 (August 7, 2013 ) closed Bulletin 1989-02.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>REVISION 11 UPDATE should have read, "Inspection Report 391/2013-605 (August 7, 2013 ) closed Generic Letter 2008-01."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 Surveillance Instructions which implement SR 3.5.2.3 and require a report to be entered into the Corrective Action Program for an extended gas release have been issued.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TVA evaluated adopting TSTF-523 and concluded that it was not required until well after Unit 2 fuel loading. NRC has reviewed WBN's actions in response to Generic Letter 2008-01 and has closed the issue for WBN Unit 2 licensing. The adoption of TSTF-523 is a post-Licensing action that.</li> <li>- Surveys and evaluations have been completed. No additional vents are required to be installed and no additional evaluations are required.</li> <li>- Surveys and evaluations have been completed. No additional vents are required to be installed and no additional evaluations are required.</li> <li>- Surveys and evaluations have been completed. No additional vents are required to be installed and no additional evaluations are required.</li> <li>- Operating procedure has been revised to improve instructions for</li> </ul>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			filling and venting portions of the ECCS discharge pipe.  - Periodic venting procedures used to meet SR 3.5.2.3 were revised to require that, for an extended gas release, a report is entered into the Corrective Action Program.
NUREG-0737, I.C.7	NSSS Vendor Revision of Procedures	<b>CI</b> ----- <b>13</b>	IR 50-390/391 85-08 closed this item for Unit 1, and NRC also reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.  Unit 2 Action:  Revise power ascension and emergency procedures which were reviewed by Westinghouse.  ----- REVISION 13 UPDATE:  The 39 "power ascension" procedures required for WBN Unit 2 startup have been IQR'd, PORC reviewed (including NSSS vendor review), and placed on "administrative hold."
NUREG-0737, I.D.2	Plant-Safety-Parameter-Display Console	<b>CO</b> ----- <b>13</b>	NRC reviewed in SSER5, SSER6, and 18.2.2 of SSER15.  Unit 2 Action:  Install SPDS and have it operational prior to start-up after the first refueling outage.  ----- REVISION 10 UPDATE:  Inspection Report 391/2013-604 (June 27, 2013) closed TMI I.D.2.  ----- REVISION 12 UPDATE:  SPDS has been installed.  ----- REVISION 13 UPDATE:  Corrected Status to "C-O" indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.
NUREG-0737, II.B.2	Plant Shielding	<b>C</b> ----- <b>13</b>	NRC reviewed in Appendix EE of SSER16.  Unit 2 Action:  Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations.  ----- -----



ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>The necessary mission dose calculations have been revised and apply to Unit 2. Completion of the radiation qualification of Unit 2 safety related equipment, as addressed under the Equipment Environmental Qualification programs for Electrical Equipment (10CFR50.49) and Mechanical Equipment qualification programs will be accomplished via licensing commitments for the Equipment Qualification Special Program and Mechanical Equipment Qualification Special Program, respectively.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-604, dated June 25, 2014 issued URI 391/2014-604-01 to Evaluate the Methodology for Calculating Mission Doses.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>NUREG-0737, II.B.2 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-614, dated December 29, 2014.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.D.1	Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements	CI ----- 13	<p>NRC reviewed in Technical Evaluation Report attached to Appendix CC of SSER15.</p> <p>Unit 2 Actions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Testing of relief and safety valves;</li> <li>2) Reanalysis of fluid transient loads for pressurizer relief and safety valve supports and any required modifications;</li> <li>3) Modifications to pressurizer safety valves, PORVs, PORV block valves and associated piping; and</li> <li>4) Change motor operated block valves.</li> </ol> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Modifications to pressurizer safety and relief valves are completed.</li> <li>- Installation of limit control closure PORV block valves has been completed.</li> <li>- Corrected "Appendix EE" to "Appendix CC" in first paragraph.</li> </ul>
NUREG-0737, II.D.3	Valve Position Indication	CI ----- 13	<p>The design was reviewed in the original 1982 SER and found acceptable pending confirmation of installation of the acoustic monitoring system. In SSER5 (IR 390/84-35), the staff closed the LICENSE CONDITION for Unit 1 only.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
			<p>The required acoustic monitoring, indication and alarm annunciation to detect lifting and / or leaking of Reactor Coolant downstream of the Pressurizer PORV's and safety valves has been installed.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.d.	Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation - Containment Pressure	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>Reviewed in SSER9.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Verify installation of containment pressure indication.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 06 UPDATE:</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-604 closed NUREG-0737, II.F.1.2.d.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>Containment pressure indication has been installed.</p>
NUREG-0737, II.F.2	Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate Core-Cooling	<b>CO</b> <b>13</b>	<p>LICENSE CONDITION: Detectors for Inadequate core cooling (II.F.2)</p> <p>In the original SER, the review of the ICC instrumentation was incomplete. The January 24, 1992, letter superseded the previous responses on this issue. TVA letter for Units 1 and 2 dated January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware. NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER10. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System.</p> <p>Unit 2 Action: Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 07 UPDATE:</p> <p>Page 1-38 of SSER23 provided the following as NRC Action for this item:</p> <p>"Open. See SSER23, Section 4.4.8."</p> <p>Section 4.4.8 ends with:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. This is Open Item 72 (Appendix HH)."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Open Item 72 (Appendix HH) reads as follows:</p> <p>"The NRC staff should complete its review and evaluation of the additional information provided by TVA regarding the ICC instrumentation. (Section 4.4.8)"</p> <p>-----</p> <p>NRC Inspection Report 391/2011-608 closed NUREG-0737, II.F.2.</p> <p>-----</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
NUREG-0737, II.K.3.10	Anticipatory Trip at High Power	<b>C</b> <b>13</b>	<p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>“NRC Action   Closed. See SSER 25 and SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2. Open Items 72, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, and 109 were closed in SSER 25, Section 7.5.2.2. Open items 94, 98, 101, 105, 108, 110, and 111 were closed in SSER 26, Section 7.5.2.2.”</p> <p>Status above was changed to “CO” indicating that while the NRC has closed this item, TVA has remaining action.</p> <hr/> <p>NRC: letter dated October 31, 1995; SSER 16</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Unit 2 Action:</p> <p>Unit 2 Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures will address this issue.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 02 UPDATE:</p> <p>Developmental Revision A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) was submitted on March 04, 2009.</p> <p>Items 14.a. (Turbine Trip - Low Fluid Oil Pressure) and 14.b. (Turbine Trip - Turbine Stop Valve Closure) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 are the trips of interest. The table and the Bases for these items state that below the P-9 setpoint, these trips do not actuate a reactor trip.</p> <p>Per item 16.d. (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9) of TS Table 3.3.1-1, the Nominal Trip Setpoint for P-9 is “50% RTP” and the Allowable Value is “&lt; 52.4% RTP.”</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 12 UPDATE:</p> <p>Surveillance procedures to address this issue have been developed and issued.</p> <p>NUREG-0737 item II.K.3.10 was closed by NRC Inspection Report 391/2014-603, dated May 9, 2014.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>REVISION 13 UPDATE:</p> <p>SSER27 includes the following under 1.14 (Implementation of Applicable Bulletin and Generic Letter Requirements):</p> <p>“NRC Action   Closed. (SSER23, Section 7.8.4)”</p>

ITEM	TITLE	* ----- REV	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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### **STATUS CODE DEFINITIONS**

- C:** CLOSED: Previous staff review of NUREG-0847 and/or supplements has closed the item either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2.
  
- CI:** CLOSED/IMPLEMENTATION: Staff has approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; there is no change to the approved design; and implementation is recommended through Regional Inspection.
  
- CO:** CLOSED - OPEN: Staff has approved closure of the item; however, TVA actions remain to be completed.
  
- CT:** CLOSED/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: Item has been approved either for both units at WBN or explicitly for WBN Unit 2; however, a change to the original approval requires submittal of the Technical Specifications and staff review.
  
- NA:** NOT APPLICABLE: Justification as to why a section / subsection is not applicable is provided in the ADDITIONAL INFORMATION column.
  
- O:** OPEN: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2.
  
- OI:** OPEN / INSPECTION: Staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2; inspection is required to complete review / close the item.
  
- OT:** OPEN/TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: No action or documentation is provided that shows the staff has reviewed the item for WBN Unit 2, and the resolution is through submittal of a Technical Specification.
  
- OV:** OPEN/VALIDATION: The proposed approach has been approved for Watts Bar Unit 1; the same approach is proposed for use on WBN Unit 2 without change.
  
- S:** SUBMITTED: Information has been submitted, and is under review by NRC staff.