

**Jon A. Franke**  
Site Vice President

**Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC**  
769 Salem Boulevard  
Berwick, PA 18603  
Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504  
Jon.franke@talenenergy.com



**JUN 25 2015**

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

10 CFR 50.73

**SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2015-004-00  
UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14  
UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-22  
PLA-7353**

---

**Docket Nos. 50-387  
50-388**

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-387/2015-004-00. On April 27, 2015, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Secondary Containment was declared inoperable due to a Secondary Containment door found not closed. As a result, at 0850 hours, Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was entered for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Secondary Containment was subsequently recovered and TS 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was exited at 0915 hours on April 27, 2015.

This LER is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), for an event or condition that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of Secondary Containment to control the release of radioactive material. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the Secondary Containment boundary door was not fully closed and latched. As such, no loss of Secondary Containment's ability to fulfill its safety function occurred.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

  
J. A. Franke

Attachment: LER 50-387/2015-004-00

Copy: NRC Region I  
Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector  
Mr. J. A. Whited, NRC Project Manager  
Mr. B. R. Fuller, PA DEP/BRP



## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of  
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollections.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

## 1. FACILITY NAME

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1

## 2. DOCKET NUMBER

05000387

## 3. PAGE

1 of 3

## 4. TITLE Secondary Containment Inoperable due to Secondary Containment Boundary Door Found Ajar

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	27	2015	2015	- 004	00	06	25	2015	Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2	05000388
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
1	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10. POWER LEVEL	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

## 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

## LICENSEE CONTACT

Brenda W. O'Rourke, Senior Engineer – Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

## TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(570) 542-1791

## 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

## 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)☒ NO

## 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On April 26, 2015 at 2230, with Unit 2 shut down for the 17<sup>th</sup> Refueling Outage, the Shift Manager approved Operations personnel to perform Attachment C, "Operation of 818 Elevation Floor Plug Checklist," in accordance with procedure OP-134-002, "Reactor Building HVAC Zones 1 and 3." This ventilation system realignment was done in support of Unit 2 outage activities to allow equipment to be moved in and out of the 101 railroad bay door. When in this alignment, Door-721 becomes a Secondary Containment boundary door and the door must remain in the closed position. On April 27, 2015, at 0058 hours, Control Room personnel signed off completion of OP-134-002, Attachment C. On April 27, 2015 at 0850 hours, a plant operator found Secondary Containment boundary Door-721 unlatched and protruding out approximately 0.25 inches from the door frame. The plant operator immediately contacted Control Room personnel of the as-found condition of Door-721. As a result, Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was entered for Unit 1 and 2 due to Secondary Containment being declared inoperable. At 0915 hours on April 27, 2015, TS 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was exited.

On April 27, 2015, at 1546 hours, an 8 hour ENS (#51017) was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. SSES has no redundant Secondary Containment system. TS required Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the Door-721 was not fully closed and latched.

The apparent cause of the event was plant personnel did not comply with the signage on Door-721, nor did they challenge the door after passing through it. As a result, Door-721 did not close properly.

Completed Action: Secondary Containment Door-721 was closed. Key Planned Actions: 1) Issue Site Communications to reinforce expectations to site personnel to comply with door signage and the requirement to gently challenge doors (when entering and exiting) in the power block per the plant standards; and 2) Include the expectations in General Employee Training.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to [Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov](mailto:Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov), and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1	05000387	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 of 3
		2015	- 004	- 00	

**NARRATIVE****CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT**

Unit 1 – Mode 1, approximately 97 percent Rated Thermal Power

Unit 2 – Mode 5, 0 percent Rated Thermal Power

There were no systems, structures, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event and contributed to the event.

**EVENT DESCRIPTION**

On Sunday, April 26, 2015 at 2230, with Unit 2 shut down for the 17<sup>th</sup> Refueling Outage, the Shift Manager approved Operations personnel to perform Attachment C, "Operation of 818 Elevation Floor Plug Checklist," in accordance with procedure OP-134-002, "Reactor Building HVAC Zones 1 and 3." This ventilation system realignment was done in support of Unit 2 outage activities to allow equipment to be moved in and out of the 101 railroad bay door. When in this alignment, Door-721 becomes a Secondary Containment boundary door and the door must remain in the closed position. On Monday, April 27, 2015, at 0058 hours, Control Room personnel signed off completion of OP-134-002, Attachment C.

On Monday, April 27, 2015 at 0850 hours, during the performance of plant operator rounds, a plant operator found Secondary Containment boundary Door-721 unlatched and protruding out approximately 0.25 inches from the door frame. The plant operator immediately contacted Control Room personnel of the as-found condition of Door-721. As a result, Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was entered for Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to Secondary Containment being declared inoperable. The door was subsequently closed and Secondary Containment was recovered. At 0915 hours on April 27, 2015, TS 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was exited.

**REPORTABILITY**

On April 27, 2015, at 1546 hours, an 8 hour ENS (#51017) was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. SSES has no redundant Secondary Containment system.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), this LER is being submitted for an event or condition that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of Secondary Containment to control the release of radioactive material. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the Door-721 was not fully closed and latched.

**CAUSE OF THE EVENT**

The apparent cause of the event was plant personnel did not comply with the signage on Door-721, nor did they challenge the door after passing through it. As a result, Door-721 did not close properly.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1	05000387	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2015	-004	-00	

## NARRATIVE

**ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE****POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES**

When the 818 Hatch Alignment is in effect, Door-721 provides a Secondary Containment boundary. The potential consequences of having this door open could have resulted in a failure to maintain/establish Secondary Containment during accident conditions.

**ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES**

There were no actual consequences of this event. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the period that Door-721 was ajar. As such, Secondary Containment could have performed its safety function of isolating as assumed in the SSES accident analysis since differential pressure was maintained. Therefore, the safety function of the Secondary Containment boundary and Standby Gas Treatment systems were unaffected and remained operable during this event. As such, there were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public.

Additionally, this event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator since there was no loss of Secondary Containment's ability to fulfill its safety function.

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

## Key Completed Action –

- Door-721 was immediately closed.

## Planned Actions –

- Issue Site Communications to reinforce expectations to site personnel to comply with door signage and the requirement to gently challenge doors (when entering and exiting) in the power block per the plant standards.
- Include the expectations in General Employee Training.

**PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS**

- LER 50-388/2015-002: Secondary Containment Inoperability Due To Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1
- LER 50-388/2014-001: Secondary Containment Personnel Airlock Doors Both Opened Resulting in Failure to meet TS 3.6.4.1
- LER 50-387(388)/2013-003-00: Loss of Secondary Containment
- LER 50-387(388)/2013-004-00: Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Differential Pressure Not Meeting Technical Specification 3.6.4.1
- LER 20-387(388)/2013-005-00: Loss of Secondary Containment