Enclosure
Attachment 4
PG&E Letter DCL-15-069

ATTACHMENT 4

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Technical Assessment
Prepared by Stone and Webster, Inc. (A CB&I Company)

Implementation of Alternative Source Terms
Summary of Dose Analyses and Results

TECHNICAL REPORT
CB&I Stone and Webster, Inc.

IMPLMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCE TERMS
Summary of Dose Analyses and Results

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT

Prepared for:
Pacific Gas & Electric Company

May 15, 2015
QA CATEGORY I
Safety Related

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

As holder of operating licenses issued prior to January 10, 1997, and in accordance with 10CFR50.67 (Reference 1) and Standard Review Plan 15.0.1 (Reference 2), Pacific Gas and Energy (PG&E) proposes to revise the accident source term used in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2 design basis site boundary and control room dose analyses, with the full implementation of Alternative Source Terms (AST) as defined in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, Section 1.2.1 (Reference 3).

The first use of the AST for DCPP was a selective application per RG 1.183, Section 1.2.2, to revise the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) in order to implement changes to the PG&E Design Class I ventilation filter testing program for the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS), Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) and the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System (FHBVS). The FHA analysis demonstrated that acceptable doses would occur at both offsite locations and in the control room without taking credit for filtration by ventilation systems or control room isolation. The application was reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for License Amendment Nos. 163 and 165 to DCPP Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82, respectively. (Reference 4)

With this application, and in the interest of evaluating DCPP design against a more realistic accident sequence, as well as in gaining dose analysis margin, the methodology / scenarios used in the following design basis accident (DBA) analyses discussed in the DCPP UFSAR (some of which utilize pre-NUREG-0800 assumptions), are being updated to reflect the AST guidance provided in RG 1.183.

1. Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
2. FHA in the Containment
3. Locked Rotor Accident (LRA)
4. Control Rod Ejection Accident (CREA)
5. Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
6. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
7. Loss-of Load (LOL) Event

The Loss of Load Event is not addressed in Regulatory Guide 1.183 but has been selected by PG&E for re-evaluation to provide a bounding analysis for Condition II events that have no fuel damage but may have radioactivity in the environmental releases that occur as a result of reactor trip. The control room ventilation system is expected to remain in normal operation mode for the duration of these events.

In addition, the dose consequence analysis associated with the FHA in the FHB has been revised to address updated design input as discussed below.

The dose consequence analyses addressed in this application resolve the findings of a Licensing Basis Verification Project (LBVP) which was initiated by the licensee and has resulted

in a total upgrade of the listed radiological post-accident dose consequence analyses. The effect of the findings on current plant design, have been addressed in Prompt Operability Assessments which resulted in the implementation of several temporary compensatory measures.

In addition, the listed dose consequence analyses have been revised to address:

- Updated control room ventilation system parameters resulting from the installation of new back-draft dampers in the control room emergency ventilation filter recirculation lines. These dampers were installed to prevent reverse unfiltered flow into the control room.
- Updated control room unfiltered inleakage (including back-draft damper leakage)

As part of an effort to improve the completeness and quality of design documentation and reflect current NRC guidance, PG&E has also elected to update the offsite atmospheric dispersion factors (χ/Q) using recent meteorological data and RG 1.145, Revision 1 (Reference 5) methodology. The χ/Q values applicable to on-site locations such as the Control Room and Technical Support Center, have been calculated using the "**A**tmospheric **R**elative **CON**centrations in Building Wakes" (ARCON96) methodology (Ramsdell, 1997, Reference 6). The updated off-site and on-site atmospheric factors are utilized in the dose consequence analyses for the accident listed above.

Also, and as part of the effort to clarify and streamline the DCPP licensing basis related to post-accident dose consequences documented in DCPP UFSAR Section 15.5, PG&E is requesting NRC approval of the following proposed changes in licensing basis:

1. Removal of all the "expected" accident dose consequence assessments that were included in DCPP UFSAR Section 15.5.1 as part of the original license application.

   The original DCPP licensing basis included two evaluations, or cases, for each accident. The first case, called the expected case, used values for each factor involved in the accident, which were intended to be estimates of the actual values expected to occur if the accident took place. The resulting doses were close to the doses expected from an accident of this type. The second case, the DBA, used the customary conservative assumptions. The calculated doses for the DBA, while not a realistic estimate of expected doses, provided the basis for determination of the design adequacy of the plant safety systems.

   Current NRC guidance related to expectations for a Safety Analysis Report for a nuclear power plant (e.g., NUREG-0800), does not require the inclusion of dose consequences from "expected" accident scenarios. Since these "expected accident scenario" evaluations are not relevant for determination of the design adequacy of the plant safety systems, PG&E is proposing to remove this information from its licensing basis.

2. Elimination of the dose contribution of a containment purge via the Containment Hydrogen Purge System (CHPS) following a LOCA for purposes of hydrogen control.

The NRC revised 10CFR50.44 (Reference 9) to acknowledge that the amount of combustible gas generated for the design basis LOCA was not a risk significant threat to containment integrity. Thus, with the exception of demonstrating the capability of ensuring a mixed atmosphere within containment, the requirements for hydrogen control pertaining to the design basis LOCAs was eliminated. In the SER for License Amendment Nos. 168 and 169 to DCPP Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82, respectively (Reference 10), the NRC confirmed the elimination of hydrogen release concerns associated with a design-basis LOCA, and the associated requirements that necessitated the need for the hydrogen recombiners and backup hydrogen vent and purge systems.

To ensure consistency with the current licensing basis, PG&E is proposing to eliminate the dose contribution due to the containment purge pathway currently included in the LOCA dose consequence analysis in support of hydrogen control.

2.0 REGULATORY APPROACH

In 1962, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) published Technical Information Document (TID)-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactors" (Reference 7), which specified release fractions of the different categories of fission products from the core to the reactor containment, or "source term", to be considered in the event of a postulated design basis accident (DBA) involving a "substantial meltdown of the core" in a Light Water Reactor. These fractions were based on small-scale experiments performed in the late 1950s in which irradiated UO2 pellets were heated to accident temperatures.

The TID-14844 accident source term formed the basis for NRC Regulatory Guide 1.4 (Reference 8), which was used to determine compliance with the NRC reactor siting criteria, 10CFR100.11 (Reference 11). It was also used to evaluate other plant performance requirements including control room habitability requirements given in 10CFR50 Appendix A, GDC-19 (Reference 12) and expanded in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 6.4 (Reference 13), to 5 rem whole body dose, 30 rem beta dose and 30 rem thyroid dose. The TID-14844 source term was also used for evaluation of equipment qualification (EQ) of class IE electrical components in accordance with 10CFR50.49 (Reference 14), and evaluation of vital area accessibility post-LOCA in accordance with NUREG-0737 (Reference 15).

Since the publication of TID-14844, significant advances have been made in understanding the timing, magnitude, and chemical form of fission product releases from severe nuclear power plant accidents. In 1995, the NRC published NUREG-1465, "Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants" (Reference 16), which used this research to provide estimates of an accident source term that was more physically based and that could be applied to Light Water Reactors. This effort crystallized into regulatory acceptance for an alternative source term and the issuance of 10CFR50.67 and RG 1.183, which formalized the applicability of AST for operating reactors.

As noted in Section III.2.a, Standard Review Plan 15.0.1, July 2000, (Reference 2), a full implementation of AST addresses a) all the characteristics of AST (i.e., the radionuclide composition and magnitude, chemical and physical form of the radionuclides, and the timing of the release of these nuclides), b) replaces the previous accident source term used in all design basis radiological analyses, and c) incorporates the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) criteria of 10CFR50.67, and Section II of Standard Review Plan 15.0.1.

With this application, PG&E proposes a "full" implementation of AST as defined in RG 1.183, Section 1.2.1 for DCCP Units 1 and 2. To that end, the dose consequences of the eight accidents discussed in Section 1.0 have been re-analyzed using the guidance provided in RG 1.183. The dose consequences for the other events that have an accident source term, and are a part of the current DCPP licensing basis, are addressed by qualitative comparisons to the accidents that have been analyzed. (Refer to Section 2.1, Item 22).

However, for the reasons outlined below, the post-LOCA integrated doses utilized for radiological environmental qualification of PG&E Design Class I equipment, and the estimated operator mission doses while performing vital functions post-LOCA, will continue to be based on TID-14844 assumptions and will remain unchanged.

- Equipment Qualification (EQ): This above approach is acceptable based on Section 1.3.5 of RG 1.183 which indicates that though EQ analyses impacted by plant modifications should be updated to address the impact of the modification, no plant modification is required to address the impact of the difference in source term characteristics (i.e. AST vs TID-14844) on EQ doses until the generic issue associated with a potential increase in cesium releases is resolved. NUREG-0933, "Resolution of Generic Safety Issues", Section 3.0, Item 187 resolved the generic issue related to the effect of increased cesium releases on EQ doses. The NRC staff concluded that there is no clear basis for a requirement to modify the design basis for EQ to adopt AST since there would be no discernible risk reduction associated with adopting AST for EQ. (Reference 55)

- Post-LOCA Vital Area Mission Doses: This above approach is acceptable based on the AST benchmarking study reported in SECY-98-154 (Reference 17) which concluded that results of analyses based on TID-14844 would be more limiting earlier on in the event, after which time the AST results would be more limiting. The NRC SER for Fort Calhoun Station's implementation of AST (Reference 18) referenced the SECY-98-154 study as the source for the conclusion that results of analyses based on TID-14844 would be more limiting for periods up to one to four months after which time the AST results would be more limiting. Post-LOCA access to vital areas usually occur within the first one or two weeks when the original TID-14844 source term is more limiting.

2.1 Proposed Changes to Current Licensing Basis

PG&E proposes to revise the DCPP licensing basis to implement the AST described in RG 1.183 through a) reanalysis of the radiological consequences of the UFSAR Chapter 15.5 accidents listed in Chapter 1.0 in accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.183, and b) implementation of the following changes in plant operations / licensing basis.

1. The TEDE acceptance criterion of 10CFR50.67(b)(2) will replace the previous whole body and thyroid dose acceptance criteria of 10CFR100.11.

2. Use of new offsite atmospheric dispersion factors (χ/Q) based on recent 5-year meteorological data (2007 to 2011) and RG 1.145 methodology.

3. Use of new on-site atmospheric dispersion factors (χ/Q) for locations such as the Control Room and the Technical Support Center based on recent 5-year meteorological data (2007 to 2011) and ARCON96 methodology.

4. Use of inhalation dose conversion factors from Federal Guidance Reports (FGR) No.11 (Reference 19)

5. Proposed changes to the DCPP Plant Technical Specifications / Technical Specifications Bases include

    - TS 1.1 - Dose Equivalent I-131 concentrations will be developed based on the committed thyroid dose equivalent conversion factors provided in EPA FGR No. 11

- TS 3.4.16 – The Noble gas activity shall be limited to ≤ 270 µci/gm DE Xe-133. The current limit of 600 µCi/gm DE Xe-133 corresponds to ~1% fuel defects which is the DCPP design basis value for system and shielding design. The limit is being reduced to control the noble gas activity in the coolant to levels below the design basis values.
- TS 3.6.3 – The 48 inch containment purge valves will meet NUREG 0737, Item II.E.4.2, Position 6 (Reference 15), by being sealed closed as defined by SRP 6.2.4, item II.6.f (Reference 22) during MODE's 1 through 4 (currently allows the containment purge system to be operable for less than 200 hours per year during MODE's 1 through 4).
- TS 5.5.11 - The allowable methyl iodine penetration for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation charcoal filter will be changed to 5% (currently the allowable methyl iodine penetration for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation charcoal filter is 15%)
- TS 5.5.9 - Primary to secondary accident induced steam generator tube leakage will be limited to a maximum of 0.75 gpm at standard temperature and pressure
- TS 5.5.19 – The dose acceptance criterion to demonstrate compliance with the control room habitability program will be changed from 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body for the duration of the accident to 5 rem TEDE.
- TS Bases 3.4.17 – Primary to Secondary leakage (total for all 4 Steam Generators (SGs)) will be limited to a maximum of 0.75 gpm at STP which includes accident induced leakage (note that TS 3.4.13d limits the maximum allowable operational leakage to 150 gpd, per SG)
- TS Bases 3.6.6 - will be updated to require initiation of containment spray in the recirculation mode within 12 minutes of termination of injection spray inclusive of a description of the updated valve alignments.

The related TS Bases, including those that reference 10CFR100 or define recently irradiated fuel, will also be affected.

6. Use of an increased value for control room (CR) unfiltered air inleakage.

7. Credit for the dual ventilation intake design of the CR pressurization air intakes. Based on the availability of redundant PG&E Design Class I radiation monitors at each pressurization intake location, the DCPP design has the capability of initial selection of the cleaner intake, but does not have the capability of automatic selection of the clean intake throughout the event. Based on the CRVS pressurization intake design, and the expectation that the operator will manually make the proper intake selection throughout the event, and per RG 1.194, June 2003, Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.3, (Reference 21), when the CRVS is in Mode 4, the χ/Q values for the more favorable CR intake is reduced by a factor of 4 and utilized to estimate the dose consequences. See Section 5.2 for further detail.

8. To support flexibility in future DCPP fuel management schemes with respect to the potential of having fuel rods that exceed the RG 1.183 linear heat generation rate criteria, the gap fractions used for the DCPP Non-LOCA events (with the exception of

the CREA) are based on the bounding (higher) values per isotope / isotope class provided in the following documents:

- Safety Guide (SG) 25, March 1972 (Reference 23)
- NUREG/CR 5009 (Reference 24), and
- RG 1.183 Rev 0.

9. MSLB / SGTR / LRA / CREA / LOL: Credit for a reduction factor of 5 applied to the calculated ARCON96 χ/Q values for energetic releases from the DCPP Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) and the 10% Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs). This approach has been deemed acceptable per Regulatory Position C.6 of RG 1.194 for uncapped and vertically-oriented relief valves. See Section 5.2 for further detail.

10. MSLB / SGTR / LRA / CREA / LOL: Credit for the fact that as a result of the close proximity of the MSSVs/10% ADVs and the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant post-accident plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit. See Section 5.2 for further detail.

11. FHA: Credit for the PG&E Design Class I radiation monitors located at the control room (CR) normal intakes to switch the CRVS from Mode 1 (normal operation) to Mode 4 (pressurized filtered mode) following a FHA in the Fuel Handling Building or Containment. See Section 7.3 for further detail.

12. FHA: Credit for the following administrative controls reflected in plant procedures that ensure the FHB is maintained at a negative pressure relative to atmosphere during movement of irradiated fuel thus ensuring that the environmental releases occur via the Unit vent: See Section 7.3 for further detail.

    - The movable wall is in place and secured
    - No exit door from the FHB is propped open
    - At least one FHBVS exhaust fan is operating. The supply fan flow has been confirmed by design to have less flow than the exhaust fan; thus environmental releases are via the Unit Vent

13. FHA: A minimum decay time of 72 hrs prior to fuel movement. See Section 7.3 for further detail.

14. LOCA: Removal of all the "expected" accident dose consequence assessments that were included in DCPP UFSAR Section 15.5.1 as part of the original license application.

15. LOCA: Credit for containment spray in the recirculation mode - To address the delayed core damage sequence of a post-LOCA AST scenario and support fission product removal from the containment atmosphere, credit is taken for manual initiation of containment spray in the recirculation mode within 12 minutes of termination of containment spray in the injection mode. Containment spray in the recirculation mode is credited until 6.25 hours after accident initiation. See Section 7.2.1 for more detail.

16. LOCA: Updated allowable ESF System leakage values and associated release points. See Section 7.2.3.3 for more detail.

17. LOCA: Updated allowable ESF System leakage into the Miscellaneous Equipment Drain Tank (MEDT) and associated releases / release points. See Section 7.2.3.6 for more detail.

18. LOCA: Inclusion of environmental releases from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) vent due to sump water back-leakage. See Section 7.2.3.5 for more detail.

19. LOCA: Elimination of the dose contribution due to the containment purge pathway currently included in the dose consequence analysis in support of hydrogen control.

20. LOCA: Inclusion of environmental releases via the 12 inch Containment Vacuum / pressure relief pathway prior to containment isolation. See Section 7.2.3.1 for more detail.

21. LOCA: Defining the portion of Room 506 of the Control Room which serves as a control room foyer adjacent to the Shift Supervisor's office, as a low occupancy area, and conservatively assigning the referenced area with an occupancy factor of less than 5% of the total time spent daily in the control room. See Section 7.2.5.2 for more detail.

22. LOCA/ FHA / MSLB / SGTR / LRA / CREA / LOL: Update of the list of computer codes that support the dose consequence analyses.

23. Dose Consequences Associated with Other Chapter 15 Accidents:

    The DCPP licensing basis includes dose assessments at offsite locations for several Condition III and Condition IV events which are not addressed in Regulatory Guide 1.183 and have therefore not been re-analyzed with this application. The demonstration of compliance with the accident-specific regulatory limits at the EAB and LPZ for the referenced accidents will be addressed using engineering judgment and by comparison to the accident sequence, predicted fuel damage (if applicable), and resultant dose consequences of the DBAs discussed in Section 1.0 and re-analyzed in support of this application.

    (i) Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) inside Containment (Condition III event): The possible radiological consequence of a SBLOCA inside containment (defined in UFSAR Chapter 15.3.1 as a break that is large enough to actuate the emergency core cooling system), is expected to be bounded by the "containment release" scenario of the control rod ejection accident (CREA) since the CREA is postulated to result in 10% fuel damage, whereas the SBLOCA has no fuel damage. Refer to Section 7.5 for the CREA.

    (ii) Minor Secondary System Pipe Break (Condition III event): The possible radiological consequence of a minor secondary system line break (defined n UFSAR Section 15.3 as 6 inch diameter or smaller) is expected to be significantly less than a MSLB since in both cases there is no fuel damage and the steam

releases following a minor secondary line break is expected to be significantly less than that associated with a MSLB. Refer to Section 7.6 for the MSLB.

(iii) Complete Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow (Condition III event): The possible radiological consequence of a complete loss of forced reactor coolant flow (postulated to result from a simultaneous loss of electrical supplies to all reactor coolant pumps resulting in increased coolant temperature; no predicted fuel damage; dose consequences resulting from the atmospheric steam dumping required for plant cooldown), is expected to be bounded by the conservative Loss-of-Load scenario with a coincident Loss of Offsite power analyzed herein. Refer to Section 7.8 for the LOL event.

(iv) Underfrequency Event (Condition III event): The possible radiological consequence of an underfrequency event (no predicted fuel damage; dose consequences resulting from the atmospheric steam dumping required for plant cooldown), is expected to be bounded by the conservative Loss-of-Load scenario evaluated for DCPP which includes a coincident Loss of Offsite Power. Refer to Section 7.8 for the LOL event.

(v) A Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal (Condition III event): The possible radiological consequence of a single rod cluster control assembly withdrawal will be less than a CREA since the CREA is postulated to result in 10% fuel damage, whereas the condition of one rod cluster control assembly fully withdrawn with the rest of the bank fully inserted, at full power has only 5% fuel damage. Refer to Section 7.5 for the CREA.

(vi) Major Rupture of a Main Feedwater Pipe (Condition IV event): The possible radiological consequence of a main feedwater line break (no predicted fuel damage; dose consequences resulting from airborne activity released to the environment from the break location and via the MSSVs / 10% ADVs) is expected to be bounded by the MSLB since the airborne environmental release via the break point is expected to be less than the MSLB. Per Standard Review Plan 15.2.8, Section III, Item 6 (Reference 32), the evaluation of the radiological consequences of a design basis feedwater line break may be based on a qualitative comparison to the results of the design basis MSLB. Refer to Section 7.6 for the MSLB.

Tank Rupture Events: The tank rupture events represent the accidental release of the radioactivity accumulated in tanks resulting from normal plant operations and are not affected by the accident source term associated with AST. Therefore, the tank rupture events are not reanalyzed in support of this Licensing Application Request.

2.2 Planned Design Modifications

The following design modifications will be implemented prior to implementation of AST:

1. The external west wall of the Control Room has a 6'-8.5" x 10'-1" area where the concrete was replaced by other material as a result of a design change. The affected

area is the CR briefing room. PG&E will install shielding material at this location equivalent to that provided by the CR outer walls.

2. The setpoints for the redundant PG&E Design Class I gamma sensitive area radiation monitors 1-RE-25/26, 2-RE-25/26 will be updated. These monitors are designed to automatically isolate the control room normal air intakes and shift to CRVS Mode 4 (filtered / pressurized emergency ventilation) on detection of high radiation at the location of the CR normal intakes. The FHA analyses developed in support of this License Application Request utilize an "analytical limit" of 1 mR/hr for the gamma radiation environment at the CR normal operation air intakes prior to taking credit for CRVS Mode 4 actuation. The actual monitor trip setpoint will include instrument loop uncertainty; i.e., Trip setpoint (or High Alarm Setpoint (HASP) = Analytical limit / (1 + uncertainty %)).

3. The 40 inch GE/GW Containment Penetration Area Ventilation line and the 2 inch gaseous radwaste system line which connect to the PG&E Design Class I Plant Vent are currently classified as PG&E Design Class II. In support of this application:

    a. The portion of the 2 inch gaseous radwaste system line that connects to the Plant Vent will be re-classified as PG&E Design Class I.
    b. The portion of the GE/GW 40 inch Containment Penetration Area Ventilation line that connects to the Plant Vent up to and including the isolating damper solenoid valves, the associated damper actuators and the pressure switches will be re-classified as PG&E Design Class I (Refer to Section 5.2 for detail).

4. Install a high efficiency particulate (HEPA) filter in the TSC normal ventilation system intake.

2.3 Planned Procedural Updates

Provided below are the key plant operating procedures that will be updated prior to implementation of AST. The full set of impacted procedures will be addressed in the AST Engineering Change Package (ECP).

1. Update of Equipment Control Guideline ECG 42.1 to lower the restriction on fuel movement from 100 hrs to 72 hrs post-shutdown.

2. Review / update (as deemed necessary) of the EOPs and operator training procedures to ensure that the requisite steps to select the least contaminated outside air intake, and the provisions for monitoring to ensure the least contaminated intake is in use throughout the event, are provided.

3. Update of Surveillance Test Procedure STP M-57, Control Room Ventilation System Tracer Gas Test Procedure, to include the new CR inleakage test acceptance criteria and the range of CRVS ventilation flows deemed acceptable by the AST dose consequence analyses.

4. Update of the EOPs to include valve alignment information to manually initiate containment spray in the recirculation mode within 12 minutes of termination of injection spray, and to ensure, that at a minimum, spray operation continues until 6.25 hours after accident initiation. An associated Time Critical Operator Action (TCOA) will be implemented upon receipt of NRC approval of this application.

5. Update of the ESF system leak testing procedures that are part of the Boundary Leakage Program to establish administrative acceptance criteria to ensure that:

   a) The total as-tested leakage from ESF systems that recirculate sump fluid outside containment is ≤ 126 cc/min, and with the following breakdown:

      - In areas covered by the Auxiliary Building ventilation the as-tested leakage is ≤ 120 cc/min
      - In the containment penetration area the as-tested leakage is ≤ 6 cc/min

   b) The total as-tested back leakage into the RWST from the containment recirculation sump is ≤ 1 gpm.

   c) The total as-tested flow hard piped to the MEDT is ≤ the following values:

      - Leakage from systems carrying non-radioactive fluids ≤ 484 cc/min
      - Leakage from ESF systems that recirculate sump fluids ≤ 950 cc/min

6. Update the TSC administrative procedures to ensure that
   - The nominal normal operation TSC ventilation air intake flowrate is 500 cfm
   - Following a LOCA, the TSC will be manually placed in Mode 4 operation such that filtered pressurization and recirculation can be credited within 2 hours of accident initiation.
   - The nominal post-LOCA TSC ventilation filtered pressurization and recirculation flowrates are 500 cfm, respectively.

7. Review and update, as necessary, administrative procedure OP B-8H (which is a compilation of all the precautions and prerequisites involved with moving irradiated fuel, fuel components and other items over / within the spent fuel pool) to include the requirements and / or restrictions imposed by the FHA dose consequence analyses on the FHB door closure status, the operation of the FHB ventilation system and the ability of the CRVS to actuate Mode 4 operation.

2.4 Dose Acceptance Criteria

PG&E has utilized the following acceptance criteria for the AST DCPP site boundary and control room dose analyses supporting this application:

The acceptance criteria for the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and Low Population Zone (LPZ) Dose are based on 10CFR50.67, and Section 4.4 Table 6 of Regulatory Guide 1.183:

(i) An individual located at any point on the boundary of the exclusion area for any 2-hour period following the onset of the postulated fission product release, shall not receive a radiation dose in excess of the accident-specific TEDE value noted in Reference 3, Table 6.

(ii) An individual located at any point on the outer boundary of the low population zone, who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage), shall not receive a radiation dose in excess of the accident-specific TEDE value noted in Reference 3, Table 6.

EAB and LPZ Dose Acceptance Criteria - Condition II and Condition III events:

RG 1.183 (regulatory guidance for accident analyses using AST), does not specifically address Condition II and Condition III scenarios. However, per RG 1.183, Section 1.2.1, a full implementation of AST allows a licensee to utilize the dose acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.67 in all dose consequence analyses. In addition, Section 4.4 of RG 1.183 indicates that for events with a higher probability of occurrence than those listed in Table 6 of RG 1.183, the postulated EAB and LPZ doses should not exceed the criteria tabulated in Table 6. Thus, the dose consequences at the EAB and LPZ for Condition II and Condition III events will be limited to the lowest value reported in Table 6, i.e., a small fraction (10%) of the limit imposed by 10CFR50.67.

The acceptance criterion for the Control Room Dose is based on 10 CFR 50.67:

Adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access to and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem) TEDE for the duration of the accident.

This criteria ensures that the dose criteria of GDC 19, 1999 and NUREG-0737, November 1980, Item III.D.3.4 is met.

The acceptance criterion for the Technical Support Center Dose is based on Section 8.2.1, Item f of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 27), as amended by RG 1.183, Section 1.2.1, which states that a full implementation of AST allows a licensee to utilize the dose acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.67 in all dose consequence analyses:

The dose to an operator in the TSC should not exceed 5 rem TEDE for the duration of the accident.

3.0 COMPUTER CODES

The computer codes utilized in support of this application are listed below. These computer programs have been verified and validated under the CB&I S&W Inc. NRC approved Quality Assurance Program, and have been shown to be accurate and acceptable for the use discussed below.

Code Name	Description of Code Use
SCALE 4.3 / SAS2/ ORIGEN-S	SCALE 4.3, "Modular Code System for Performing Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation for Workstations And Personal Computers," Control Module SAS2 – CB&I S&W Inc. QA Category I Computer Code NU-230, V04, L03. (Reference 60) ORIGEN-S is part of the SCALE 4.3 suite of codes which was developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the NRC to perform standardized computer analyses for licensing evaluations. SAS2 is a control module that provides a sequence to calculate the nuclide inventory in a fuel assembly by calling various neutron cross section treatment modules and the exponential matrix point-depletion module ORIGEN-S. SAS2/ORIGEN-S calculates the time-dependent neutron flux and the buildup of fissile trans-uranium nuclides. It properly accounts for all major nuclear interactions including fission, activation, and various neutron absorption reactions. It can calculate accurately the neutron-activated products, the actinides and the fission products in a reactor core. SAS2/ORIGEN-S is used to develop the DCPP equilibrium core activity inventory and the decayed fuel inventories after shutdown (for the FHA). SAS2/ORIGEN-S has been used in prior AST licensing applications (e.g., Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204], Fort Calhoun Power Station [ML013030027]) to develop the core inventory, and its results accepted by the NRC.
ACTIVITY2	ACTIVITY2, "Fission Products in a Nuclear Reactor" – CB&I S&W Inc. Proprietary QA Category I Computer Code NU-014, V01, L03. (Reference 61) ACTIVITY2 calculates the concentration of fission products in the fuel, coolant, waste gas decay tanks, ion exchangers, miscellaneous tanks, and release lines to the atmosphere for a pressurized water reactor system. The program uses a library of properties of more than 100 significant fission products and may be modified to include as many as 200 nuclides. The program output presents the activity and energy spectrum at the selected part of the system for any specified operating time. ACTIVITY2 is used to develop the DCPP reactor coolant activity inventory (design and as limited by the plant Technical Specifications) ACTIVITY2 has been used in prior AST licensing applications (e.g., Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204], Fort Calhoun Power Station [ML013030027]) to develop the primary coolant inventory, and its results accepted by the NRC.

Code Name	Description of Code Use
IONEXCHANGER	IONEXCHANGER, - CB&I S&W Inc. Proprietary QA Category I Computer Code NU-009, Ver. 01, Lev. 03. (Reference 62) IONEXCHANGER calculates the activity of nuclides in an ion exchanger or tank of a nuclear reactor plant by solving the appropriate growth-decay-purification equations. Based on a known feed rate of primary coolant or other fluid with known radionuclide activities, it calculates the activity of each nuclide and its products in the ion exchanger or tank at some later time. The program also calculates the specific gamma activity for each of the seven fixed energy groups. IONEXCHANGER is used to develop the DCPP secondary coolant activity inventory (design and as limited by the plant Technical Specifications) IONEXCHANGER has been used in prior AST licensing applications (e.g., Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204], Fort Calhoun Power Station [ML013030027]) to develop the secondary coolant inventory, and its results accepted by the NRC.
Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	EN-113, "Atmospheric Dispersion Factors" – CB&I S&W Inc. Proprietary QA Category I Computer Code EN-113, V06, L08. (Reference 63) EN-113 calculates χ/Q values at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and Low Population Zone (LPZ) following the methodology and logic outlined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145. The program can handle single or multiple release points for a specified time period and set of site-specific and plant-specific parameters. A release point can be identified as either of two types of release (i.e., ground or elevated), time periods for which sliding averages are calculated (i.e., 1 to 624 hours and/or annual average), applicable short-term building wake effect, meandering plume, long-term building height wake effect, and a wind speed value to be assigned to calm conditions. Downwind distances can be assigned for each of the sixteen 22.5-degree sectors for two irregular boundaries and for ten additional concentric boundaries used only in the annual average calculation. EN-113 performs the same calculations as the NRC PAVAN code except that EN-113 calculates χ/Q values for the various averaging periods directly using hourly meteorological data whereas PAVAN uses a joint frequency distribution of wind speed, wind direction, and stability class. EN-113 is used to develop the DCPP site boundary atmospheric dispersion factors. EN-113 has been used in prior AST licensing applications (e.g., Fort Calhoun Power Station [ML013030027]), and its results accepted by the NRC.
ARCON96	ARCON96, "Atmospheric Relative Concentrations in Building Wakes" – CB&I S&W Inc. QA Category I Computer Code EN-292, V00, L00. (Reference 64) ARCON96 was developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to calculate relative concentrations in plumes from nuclear power plants at control room air intakes in the vicinity of the release point. ARCON96 has the ability to evaluate ground-level, vent, and elevated stack releases; it implements a straight-line Gaussian dispersion model with dispersion coefficients that are modified to account for low wind meander and building wake effects. The methodology is also able to evaluate diffuse and area source releases using the virtual point source technique, wherein initial

Code Name	Description of Code Use
	values of the dispersion coefficients are assigned based on the size of the diffuse or area source. Hourly, normalized concentrations (χ/Q) are calculated from hourly meteorological data. The hourly values are averaged to form χ/Qs for periods ranging from 2 to 720 hours in duration. The calculated values for each period are used to form cumulative frequency distributions. ARCON96 is used to develop the DCPP on-site control room and technical support center atmospheric dispersion factors. ARCON96 has been used extensively by the nuclear power industry in prior AST licensing applications and its results accepted by the NRC.
SWNAUA	SWNAUA, "Aerosol Behavior in Condensing Atmosphere", CB&I S&W Inc. Proprietary QA Category I Computer Code NU-185, V02, L00. (Reference 65) SWNAUA is a derivative of industry computer code NAUA/Mod 4 which was originally developed in Germany and was based on experimental data. NAUA/Mod 4 addressed particulate aerosol transport and removal following a LOCA at an LWR. It developed removal coefficients to address physical phenomena such as gravitational settling (also called gravitational sedimentation), diffusion, particle growth due to agglomeration, etc. using time-dependent airborne aerosol mass. NAUA4 (included in the NRC Source Term Code Package) was used by NRC during the initial evaluations of post-TMI data. S&W modified NAUA/Mod 4 to include spray removal and diffusiophoretic effects suitable for design basis accident analyses. A version of SWNAUA (SWNAUA-HYGRO) was proven to be the most reliable of more than a dozen international entries, in making predictions of aerosol removal for the LWR Aerosol Containment Experiments (LACE) series. SWNAUA is used to develop the time dependent post LOCA particulate aerosol removal coefficients in the sprayed and unsprayed regions of DCPP containment. SWNAUA has been used in prior AST applications (e.g., the design certification of CE System 80+, and for operating nuclear plants Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204] and Fort Calhoun Station [ML013030027]) and its results accepted by the NRC.
RADTRAD 3.03	RADTRAD 3.03 "A Simplified Model for RADionuclide Transport and Removal And Dose Estimates" – CB&I S&W Inc. QA Category I computer code No. NU-232, Version 3.03, Level (NA). (Reference 66) RADTRAD 3.03 is a NRC sponsored program, developed by Sandia National Labs (SNL). It can be used to calculate radiological doses to the public, plant operators and emergency personnel due to environmental releases that resulting from postulated design basis accidents at light water reactor (LWR) power plants The RADTRAD 3.03 (GUI Interface Mode) includes models for a variety of processes that can attenuate and/or transport radionuclides. It can model sprays and natural deposition that reduce the quantity of radionuclides suspended in the containment or other compartments. It can model the flow of radionuclides between compartments within a building, from buildings into the environment, and from the environment into a Control Room (CR)). These flows can be through filters, piping, or simply due to air leakage. RADTRAD 3.03 can also model radioactive decay and in-growth of daughters. Ultimately the program

Code Name	Description of Code Use
	calculates the Thyroid and TEDE dose (rem) to the public located offsite and to onsite personnel located in the CR due to inhalation and submersion in airborne radioactivity based on user specified, fuel inventory, nuclear data, dispersion coefficients, and dose conversion factors. RADTRAD is used to develop the TEDE dose to the public located offsite and to onsite personnel located in the CR due to inhalation and submersion in airborne radioactivity following the DCPP accidents listed in Chapter 1.0. RADTRAD has been used extensively by the nuclear power industry in prior AST licensing applications and its results accepted by the NRC.
PERC2	PERC2, "Passive Evolutionary Regulatory Consequence Code" – CB&I S&W Inc. Proprietary QA Category I Computer Code, NU-226, V00, L02. (Reference 67) PERC2 is a multi-region activity transport and radiological dose consequence program. It includes the following major features: • Provision of time-dependent releases from the reactor coolant system to the containment atmosphere. • Provision for airborne radionuclides for both TID and AST release assumptions, including daughter in growth. • Provision for calculating the CEDE to individual organs as well as EDE from inhalation, DDE and beta from submersion, and TEDE. • Provisions for tracking time-dependent inventories of all radionuclides in all control regions of the plant model. • Provision for calculating instantaneous and integrated gamma radiation source strengths as well as activities for the inventoried radionuclides to permit direct assessment of the dose from contained / or external sources for equipment qualification, vital area access and CR/TSC and EAB direct shine dose estimates. PERC2 is used to calculate the accident energy release rates and integrated gamma energy releases versus time for the various DCPP post-LOCA external and contained radiation sources. This source term information is input into SW_QADCGGP to develop the direct shine dose to the CR. PERC2 is also used to develop the decay heat in the RWST and MEDT and develop the TEDE dose to personnel located in the technical support center due to inhalation and submersion in airborne radioactivity following LOCA. PERC2 has been used in prior AST licensing applications (e.g., Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204], Fort Calhoun Power Station [ML013030027]), and its results accepted by NRC.
SW-QADCGGP	SW-QADCGGP, "A Combinatorial Geometry Version of QAD-5A" – CB&I S&W Inc. Proprietary QA Category I Computer Code, NU-222, V00, L02. (Reference 68) SW-QADCGGP is a variant of the QAD point kernel shielding program originally written at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory by R. E. Malenfant. The QADCGGP version implements combinatorial geometry and the geometric progression build-up factor algorithm. The SW-QADCGGP implements a graphical indication of the status of the computation process.

Code Name	Description of Code Use
	SW-QADCGGP is used to develop the direct shine dose to the DCPP CR, TSC and EAB. SW-QADCGGP has been used in prior AST licensing applications (e.g., Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204], Fort Calhoun Power Station [ML013030027]), and its results accepted by NRC.
GOTHIC	GOTHIC, "Generation of Thermal-Hydraulic Information for Containments", CB&I S&W Inc. QA Category I computer code No. ME-376, Version 8.0, Lev (NA). (Reference 69) GOTHIC is developed and maintained by Numerical Applications Incorporated (NAI) and is an integrated, general purpose thermal-hydraulics software package for design, licensing, safety and operating analysis of nuclear power plant containments and other confinement buildings. GOTHIC solves the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy for multicomponent, multi-phase flow in lumped parameter and/or multi-dimensional geometries. The phase balance equations are coupled by mechanistic models for interface mass, energy and momentum transfer that cover the entire flow regime from bubbly flow to film/drop flow, as well as single phase flows. The interface models allow for the possibility of thermal non equilibrium between phases and unequal phase velocities, including countercurrent flow. Other phenomena include models for commonly available safety equipment, heat transfer to structures, hydrogen burn and isotope transport. GOTHIC is used to estimate the containment and sump pressure and temperature response with recirculation spray, the temperature transient in the DCPP RWST / MEDT gas and liquid due to incoming sump water leakage / inflow / decay heat from the RWST / MEDT fission product inventory, and the volumetric release fraction transient from the RWST / MEDT gas space to the environment. GOTHIC has been used in prior AST licensing applications for this purpose (Beaver Valley Power Station [ML072780163]), and its results accepted by NRC.

4.0 RADIATION SOURCE TERMS

4.1 Core Activity Inventory

The guidance provided in Section 3.1 of RG 1.183 indicates that the inventory of fission products in the reactor core available for release to the containment following an accident should reflect maximum full power operation of the core with the current licensed values for fuel enrichment, fuel burnup, and an assumed core power equal to the current licensed rated thermal power times the ECCS evaluation uncertainty in the 10CFR50 Appendix K analysis (typically 1.02).

In accordance with the above guidance, the isotopic inventory of fission products in the DCPP reactor core developed in support of implementation of AST is conservatively based on plant operation at 105% of the current licensed rated thermal power of 3411 MWth, with current licensed values of fuel enrichment and fuel burnup.

The DCPP equilibrium core inventory is calculated using computer code ORIGEN-S. The calculation is performed by utilizing Control Module SAS2 of the SCALE 4.3 computer code package. The SAS2 control module provides a sequence to calculate the nuclide inventory in a fuel assembly by calling various neutron cross section treatment modules and the exponential matrix point-depletion module ORIGEN-S. It calculates the time-dependent neutron flux and the buildup of fissile trans-uranium nuclides. It accounts for all major nuclear interactions including fission, activation, and various neutron absorption reactions with materials in the core. It calculates the neutron-activated products, the actinides, and the fission products in a reactor core.

The DCPP reactor core consists of 193 fuel assemblies with various Uranium-235 enrichments. Per DCPP core-reload design documentation, the peak rod burnup limit at the end of cycle is not allowed to exceed 62,000 MWD/MTU. The current licensed maximum value for fuel enrichment is 5.0%. To account for variation of U-235 enrichment in fresh fuel, the radionuclide inventories were calculated for a 4.2% average enriched core (representing minimum enrichment at DCPP), and 5% average enriched core (representing maximum enrichment). The higher activity for each isotope from the above two enrichment cases is chosen to represent the inventory of that isotope in the equilibrium core.

The equilibrium core at the end of a fuel cycle is assumed to consist of fuel assemblies with three different burnups, i.e., approximately 1/3 of the core is subjected to one fuel cycle, 1/3 of the core to two fuel cycles and 1/3 of the core to three fuel cycles. This approach has been demonstrated to develop an isotopic core inventory that is a reasonable and conservative approximation of a core inventory developed using DCPP specific fuel management history data.

A 19 month fuel cycle length was utilized in the analysis. The 19-month average fuel cycle is an artifact of the current DCPP fuel management scheme which specifies 3 fuel cycles every 5 years and refueling outages in Spring or Fall. Minor variations in fuel irradiation time and duration of refueling outages will have a slight impact on the estimated inventory of long-lived isotopes in the core. However, these inventory changes will have an insignificant impact on the radiological consequences of postulated accidents. Regardless, a 4% margin has been

included in the final isotopic radioactive inventories in support of bounding analyses and to address minor changes in future fuel management schemes.

In summary, the equilibrium isotopic core average inventory is based on

- A power level of 3580 MWth inclusive of power uncertainty
- A range of enrichment of 4.2 to 5.0 w % U-235. Use of a few assemblies with lower enrichment is a common industry practice when replacing assemblies previously irradiated but proven unsuitable for continued irradiation. As these assemblies are designed to replace higher enrichment assemblies with ones of similar reactivity for the remainder of the fuel cycle, their inventory is enveloped by the isotopic core average inventory developed to support the dose consequence analyses
- A maximum core average burnup of 50 GWD/MTU

The core inventory developed by ORIGEN-S using the above methodology includes over 800 isotopes. The DCPP equilibrium core fission product inventory of dose significant isotopes relative to LWR accidents is presented in Table 4.1-1.

4.2 Coolant Activity Inventory

Design Basis Primary and Secondary Coolant Activity Concentrations

CB&I S&W Inc. computer code ACTIVITY2, is used to calculate the design basis primary coolant activity concentrations for both DCPP Units 1 and 2 based on the core inventory developed using ORIGEN-S and discussed in Section 4.1. The source terms for the primary coolant fission product activity include leakage from 1% fuel defects and the decay of parent and second parent isotopes. The depletion terms of the primary coolant fission product activity include radioactive decay, purification of the letdown flow and neutron absorption when the coolant passes the reactor core. The nuclear library includes 3rd order decay chains of approximately 200 isotopes.

CB&I S&W Inc. computer code IONEXCHANGER, is used to calculate the design basis halogen and remainder activity concentrations in the secondary side liquid. The source terms for the secondary side activity include the primary-to-secondary leakage in steam generators and the decay products of parent and second parent isotopes. The depletion terms of the secondary side liquid activity include radioactive decay, and purification due to the steam generator blowdown flow, and continuous condensate polishing.

The design basis noble gas concentrations in the secondary steam are calculated by dividing the appearance rate (μCi/sec) by the steam flow rate (gm/sec). The noble gas appearance rate in the steam generator steam space includes the primary-to-secondary leak contribution and the noble gas generation due to decay of halogens in the SG liquid. The activity concentrations of the other isotopes in the steam are determined by the SG liquid concentrations and the partition coefficients recommended in NUREG-0017, Revision 1. (Reference 25)

Technical Specification Primary and Secondary Coolant Activity Concentrations

DCPP Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.16 limits the specific activity for iodines and noble gases in the primary coolant to 1 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent (DE) I-131, and 600 µCi/gm DE Xe-133 (corresponds to ~1% fuel defects), respectively. Technical Specifications LCO 3.7.18 limits the specific activity for iodines in the secondary liquid to 0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131.

In accordance with current licensing basis, the primary coolant technical specification activities for iodines are based on 1.0 µCi/gm DE I-131. As discussed earlier, with this application, PG&E proposes to reduce the TS LCO limit for the noble gases to 270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133 (corresponds to ~ 0.5 % fuel defects).

The Technical Specification (TS) based primary coolant isotopic activity reflects the following:

- Isotopic compositions based on the design basis primary coolant equilibrium concentrations at 1% fuel defects.
- Iodine concentrations based on the thyroid inhalation weighting factors* for I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 obtained from Federal Guidance Report 11 (Reference 19).
- Noble gas concentrations based on the submersion weighting factors for Xe-133, Xe-133m, Xe-135m, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85m, Kr-87 and Kr-88 obtained from Federal Guidance Report 12 (Reference 20)

* The isotopic iodine concentrations in the primary and secondary coolant allowable by the Plant Technical Specifications are based on committed *thyroid* dose equivalent conversion factors from Table 2.1 of Federal Guidance 11. This selection is made in recognition of the fact that available physical data with respect to radiation damage resulting from inhalation of radioactive iodine is associated with a specific organ, i.e., the thyroid.

It is noted that use of the committed *effective* dose equivalent conversion factors from Table 2.1 of Federal Guidance 11 would predict slightly lower Technical Specification primary and secondary coolant iodine concentrations (by ~ 2%), which, when used in the accident analyses to estimate the releases, would result in slightly lower dose consequences (~2%).

It is acknowledged that defining the dose equivalent I-131 based on the committed effective dose has the advantage of being consistent with the post-accident dose consequences since with the implementation of AST, the dose is estimated in terms of TEDE. However, the approach used in defining DE I-131 based on the thyroid dose conversion factors is more conservative, and believed to be more appropriate since the thyroid dose is a more precisely defined physical quantity for the radio-toxicity of iodines.

In accordance with the requirements of Item 10 of RIS 2006-04 (Reference 70), the TS definition for Dose Equivalent I-131 will be updated to reflect the use of the committed thyroid dose equivalent conversion factors.

The Technical Specification 1 µCi/gm DE I-131 concentrations per nuclide in the primary coolant are calculated with the following equation:

$$DEI_{131}(i)(\mu Ci/gm) = \frac{C(i) \times CT_{tot}}{\sum\{F(i) \times C(i)\}}$$

Where:

F(i) = DCF(i) / DCF $_{I-131}$
DCF(i)= FGR-11 Table 2-1 Thyroid Dose Conversion Factor per Nuclide (Rem/Ci)
C(i) = design basis primary coolant equilibrium iodine concentration per nuclide (µCi/gm)
CT_{tot} = primary coolant total (DE I-131) technical specification iodine concentration (µCi/gm).

The CT_{tot} for the pre-accident iodine spike is 60 µCi/gm (transient TS limit for full power operation), or 60 times the primary coolant total iodine technical specification concentration.

The accident initiated iodine spike activities are based on an accident dependent multiplier times the equilibrium iodine appearance rate. The equilibrium appearance rates are conservatively calculated based on the technical specification reactor coolant activities, along with the maximum design letdown rate, maximum technical specification based allowed primary coolant leakage, and an assumed ion-exchanger iodine removal efficiency of 100%.

The TS secondary liquid iodine concentration is determined using methodology similar to that described above for the primary coolant where CT_{tot} is 0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131, and C(i) is the design basis secondary coolant equilibrium concentrations per nuclide.

The TS noble gas concentrations for the primary coolant are based on 270 µci/gm DE Xe-133. The DE Xe-133 for noble gases is calculated as follows:

$$DE\ X_{133} = \Sigma\{F(i) \times C(i)\}$$

Where:

F(i) = DCF(i) / DCF Xe-133
DCF(i) = EPA FGR-12 (1993), Table III.1, Dose Coefficient per Nuclide [(rem-m^3)/(Ci-sec)]
C(i) = design basis primary coolant equilibrium noble gas concentration per nuclide (µCi/gm)

The noble gas and halogen primary and secondary coolant Technical Specification Activity Concentrations for DCPP Units 1 and 2 are presented in Table 4.2-1. The pre-accident iodine spike concentrations and the equilibrium iodine appearance rates (utilized to develop accident initiated iodine spike values), are presented in Table 4.2-2.

4.3 Gap Fractions for Non-LOCA Events

RG 1.183, Rev 0, Table 3 provides the gap fractions for Non-LOCA events (with the exception of the CREA) for AST applications. The referenced gap fractions are contingent upon meeting Note 11 of RG 1.183. Note 11 indicates that the release fractions listed in Table 3 are "acceptable for use with currently approved LWR fuel with a peak burnup of 62,000 MWD/MTU provided that the maximum linear heat generation rate does not exceed 6.3 kw/ft peak rod average power for burnups exceeding 54 GWD/MTU." As documented in NRC communications with other licensees, (Millstone, ML041320350), the burnup criterion associated with the maximum allowable linear heat generation rate is applicable to the peak rod average burnup in

any assembly and is not limited to assemblies with an average burnup that exceeds 54 GWD/MTU.

Based on NRC acceptance of licensing applications from Millstone Unit 2 (SER: ML042360671) and Indian Point Unit 3 (SER: ML030760135) for fuel rods that exceed the RG 1.183 linear heat generation rate criteria, and to support flexibility in future DCPP fuel management schemes, the gap fractions used for the DCPP Non-LOCA events (with the exception of the CREA) are based on the bounding (higher) values per isotope / isotope class provided in the following documents:

- Safety Guide (SG) 25, March 1972 (Reference 23)
- NUREG/CR 5009 (Reference 24), and
- RG 1.183 Rev 0.

SG25 was traditionally the regulatory guidance used for gap fractions at LWRs for Non-LOCA events with the exception of the CREA and is the current DCPP licensing basis. NUREG/CR 5009 Section 3.2.2 addresses the impact of extended burn fuel on the gap fractions.

Nuclide Group	RG 1.183 Gap Fraction for Non-LOCA events	DCPP Gap Fraction for Non-LOCA events	
		Gap Fraction	Source Document
I-131	0.08	0.12	NUREG/CR 5009
Kr-85	0.10	0.30	Safety Guide 25
Other Noble Gases	0.05	0.10	Safety Guide 25
Other Halogens	0.05	0.10	Safety Guide 25
Alkali Metals	0.12	0.17	NUREG/CR 5009

In accordance with RG 1.183, the gap fraction associated with the CREA is as follows:

Noble Gases: 10%
Halogens: 10%

Refer to the following Tables for the isotopic activity in the gap for Non-LOCA events

Tables 4.3-1 - LRA and CREA
Table 7.3-2 - FHA

Table 4.1-1
DCPP Equilibrium Core Inventory (Power Level: 3580 MWth)
Dose Significant Isotopes including the Parent, Grandparent and 2nd Parent Isotopes

ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)	ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)	ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)
AG-110	2.67E+07	IN-125	8.46E+05	**SB-125**	9.63E+05
AG-110M	6.92E+05	IN-127	1.86E+06	**SB-127**	9.14E+06
AG-111	7.09E+06	IN-129	3.55E+06	**SB-129**	3.25E+07
AG-111M	7.09E+06	IN-131	1.09E+06	**SB-130**	1.08E+07
AG-112	3.16E+06	IN-132	2.85E+05	**SB-130M**	4.38E+07
AG-115	6.21E+05	**KR-83M**	1.14E+07	**SB-131**	7.67E+07
AG-115M	2.60E+05	**KR-85**	1.11E+06	**SB-132**	4.70E+07
AM-239	4.90E-01	**KR-85M**	2.33E+07	**SB-132M**	4.37E+07
AM-241	1.32E+04	**KR-87**	4.65E+07	**SB-133**	6.32E+07
AM-242	9.40E+06	**KR-88**	6.43E+07	SB-134	1.14E+07
AM-242M	8.54E+02	**KR-89**	7.94E+07	SB-135	5.46E+06
AM-243	5.28E+03	**KR-90**	8.48E+07	SB-136	8.63E+05
AM-244	3.79E+07	KR-91	5.83E+07	**SE-83**	5.38E+06
AM-245	1.12E-03	KR-92	3.12E+07	SE-83M	5.65E+06
AS-76	3.05E+03	KR-93	1.07E+07	SE-84	2.04E+07
AS-83	7.02E+06	KR-94	5.00E+06	SE-85	9.54E+06
BA-137M	1.30E+07	**LA-140**	1.85E+08	SE-87	1.32E+07
BA-139	1.76E+08	**LA-141**	1.61E+08	SE-88	7.15E+06
BA-140	1.78E+08	**LA-142**	1.57E+08	SE-89	2.49E+06
BA-141	1.59E+08	**LA-143**	1.48E+08	**SM-153**	6.04E+07
BA-142	1.51E+08	LA-144	1.31E+08	SM-155	4.30E+06
BA-143	1.29E+08	**MO-99**	1.84E+08	SM-156	2.66E+06
BA-144	9.93E+07	**MO-101**	1.69E+08	SM-157	1.70E+06
BR-82	4.44E+05	MO-103	1.62E+08	**SN-121**	8.43E+05
BR-82M	3.88E+05	MO-104	1.33E+08	**SN-123**	6.43E+04
BR-83	1.13E+07	MO-105	9.97E+07	**SN-125**	5.25E+05
BR-84	2.10E+07	MO-106	5.86E+07	SN-125M	1.58E+06
BR-85	2.31E+07	NB-101	1.59E+08	**SN-127**	3.69E+06
BR-87	3.67E+07	NB-104	5.10E+07	SN-127M	4.95E+06
BR-88	3.52E+07	**NB-95**	1.66E+08	SN-129	1.28E+07
BR-89	2.45E+07	**NB-95M**	1.89E+06	SN-129M	1.17E+07
BR-90	1.35E+07	**NB-97**	1.59E+08	SN-130	3.28E+07
CD-115	9.17E+05	**NB-97M**	1.50E+08	SN-131	2.83E+07
CD-115M	4.43E+04	NB-99	1.07E+08	SN-132	2.28E+07

Table 4.1-1
DCPP Equilibrium Core Inventory (Power Level: 3580 MWth)
Dose Significant Isotopes including the Parent, Grandparent and 2nd Parent Isotopes

ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)	ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)	ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)
CD-121	7.67E+05	NB-99M	7.35E+07	SN-133	6.21E+06
CE-141	1.63E+08	**ND-147**	6.59E+07	SN-134	1.07E+06
CE-143	1.50E+08	ND-149	3.90E+07	**SR-89**	9.05E+07
CE-144	1.26E+08	ND-151	2.08E+07	**SR-90**	9.67E+06
CE-147	6.18E+07	NP-238	6.20E+07	**SR-91**	1.13E+08
CF-249	2.46E-02	**NP-239**	2.16E+09	**SR-92**	1.22E+08
CM-241	3.54E+00	NP-240	6.23E+06	**SR-93**	1.39E+08
CM-242	5.88E+06	**PD-109**	4.73E+07	**SR-94**	1.39E+08
CM-244	1.31E+06	PD-109M	3.12E+05	SR-95	1.25E+08
CM-245	1.26E+02	PD-111	7.09E+06	SR-97	4.68E+07
CO-58**	0.00E+00	PD-112	3.14E+06	**TB-160**	1.87E+05
CO-60**	0.00E+00	PD-115	7.84E+05	**TC-99M**	1.63E+08
CS-132	5.75E+03	**PM-147**	1.68E+07	**TC-101**	1.69E+08
CS-134	2.41E+07	**PM-148**	1.88E+07	TC-103	1.65E+08
CS-134M	5.63E+06	**PM-148M**	2.83E+06	**TC-104**	1.40E+08
CS-136	7.01E+06	**PM-149**	6.43E+07	**TC-105**	1.18E+08
CS-137	1.37E+07	**PM-151**	2.10E+07	TC-106	8.80E+07
CS-138	1.85E+08	PM-153	9.77E+06	**TE-127**	9.03E+06
CS-139	1.72E+08	**PR-142**	9.47E+06	**TE-127M**	1.52E+06
CS-140	1.54E+08	**PR-143**	1.47E+08	**TE-129**	3.10E+07
CS-141	1.17E+08	**PR-144**	1.27E+08	**TE-129M**	6.30E+06
CS-142	6.80E+07	PR-144M	1.76E+06	**TE-131**	8.28E+07
CS-143	3.41E+07	PR-147	6.52E+07	**TE-131M**	2.04E+07
DY-166	4.91E+02	PR-149	3.57E+07	**TE-132**	1.41E+08
EU-154	9.00E+05	PR-151	1.23E+07	**TE-133**	1.09E+08
EU-155	3.83E+05	**PU-238**	5.22E+05	**TE-133M**	8.93E+07
EU-156	3.90E+07	**PU-239**	3.06E+04	**TE-134**	1.75E+08
EU-157	4.12E+06	**PU-240**	4.87E+04	TE-135	9.68E+07
EU-158	1.01E+06	**PU-241**	1.36E+07	TE-136	4.29E+07
EU-159	5.15E+05	**PU-242**	3.34E+02	TE-137	1.45E+07
GA-72	1.71E+03	PU-243	7.36E+07	TE-138	3.65E+06
GA-77	1.66E+05	RA-224	5.16E-01	**TH-228**	5.14E-01
GD-159	8.91E+05	**RB-86**	2.50E+05	U-239	2.17E+09
GE-77	6.48E+04	RB-86M	2.07E+04	**XE-131M**	1.42E+06

Table 4.1-1
DCPP Equilibrium Core Inventory (Power Level: 3580 MWth)
Dose Significant Isotopes including the Parent, Grandparent and 2nd Parent Isotopes

ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)	ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)	ISOTOPE*	ACTIVITY (CURIES)
GE-77M	1.70E+05	**RB-88**	6.60E+07	**XE-133**	2.01E+08
GE-83	1.24E+06	**RB-89**	8.57E+07	**XE-133M**	6.42E+06
H-3	6.10E+04	**RB-90**	7.86E+07	**XE-135**	4.92E+07
HO-166	2.58E+04	**RB-90M**	2.53E+07	**XE-135M**	4.30E+07
I-129	4.00E+00	RB-91	1.05E+08	**XE-137**	1.84E+08
I-130	3.58E+06	RB-92	9.35E+07	**XE-138**	1.70E+08
I-130M	1.92E+06	RB-93	7.89E+07	XE-139	1.25E+08
I-131	9.90E+07	RB-94	4.13E+07	XE-140	8.66E+07
I-132	1.44E+08	RB-95	2.01E+07	XE-142	1.33E+07
I-133	2.01E+08	**RH-103M**	1.66E+08	**Y-90**	1.02E+07
I-134	2.22E+08	**RH-105**	1.08E+08	Y-90M	7.71E+02
I-134M	2.07E+07	**RH-105M**	3.43E+07	**Y-91**	1.19E+08
I-135	1.92E+08	**RH-106**	7.53E+07	**Y-91M**	6.57E+07
I-136	8.73E+07	RH-109	3.65E+07	**Y-92**	1.23E+08
I-137	9.40E+07	RN-220	5.16E-01	**Y-93**	9.41E+07
I-138	4.80E+07	**RU-103**	1.66E+08	**Y-94**	1.50E+08
I-139	2.22E+07	**RU-105**	1.21E+08	**Y-95**	1.57E+08
I-140	6.06E+06	**RU-106**	6.68E+07	Y-97	1.26E+08
IN-115M	9.17E+05	RU-109	3.16E+07	ZN-72	1.71E+03
IN-121	7.55E+04	**SB-122**	1.57E+05	ZR-101	9.55E+07
IN-121M	7.82E+05	SB-122M	1.57E+04	**ZR-95**	1.65E+08
IN-123	6.87E+05	**SB-124**	1.21E+05	**ZR-97**	1.58E+08
		SB-124M	2.34E+03	ZR-99	1.66E+08

Note:

* Isotopes in **Bold** Font are dose-significant for inhalation, submersion and direct shine. The parent, grandparent and second parent of the isotopes in **Bold** Font are also required to address daughter product in-growth.

The group of isotopes needed to determine the "submersion and inhalation" dose in the Control Room and at the Site Boundary is typically a subset of the isotopes listed above in **bold** font, and represent a small group of reasonably long half-life isotopes with significant inhalation dose conversion factors which dominate the TEDE dose.

To determine the TEDE resulting from inhalation and submersion following a LOCA, the DCPP LOCA dose consequence analysis uses the default group of 60 isotopes provided with computer code RADTRAD 3.03 plus 13 additional nuclides that were deemed to be dose significant (i.e., Br-82, Br-84, Rb-88, Rb-89, Te-133, Te-133m, Te-134, I-130, Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-138, Cs-138 and Np-238).

** Co-58 / Co-60 are activation products that are developed external to the core and typically do not appear in the equilibrium core inventory.

Table 4.2-1 Primary and Secondary Coolant Technical Specification Activity Concentrations		
Nuclide	**Primary Coolant (µCi/gm)**	**Secondary Coolant (µCi/gm)**
Kr-83M	1.87E-01	-----
Kr-85M	6.60E-01	-----
Kr-85	5.60E+00	-----
Kr-87	4.41E-01	-----
Kr-88	1.22E+00	-----
Xe-131M	1.88E+00	-----
Xe-133M	1.92E+00	-----
Xe-133	1.29E+02	-----
Xe-135M	4.07E-01	-----
Xe-135	3.76E+00	-----
I-131	7.87E-01	8.06E-02
I-132	2.99E-01	1.94E-02
I-133	1.16E+00	1.08E-01
I-134	1.67E-01	4.78E-03
I-135	6.68E-01	5.09E-02

Table 4.2-2 Primary Coolant Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentrations & Equilibrium Iodine Appearance Rates		
Nuclide	Pre-Accident Spike RCS Concentrations (60 µCi/gm DE I-131) (µCi/gm)	Equilibrium Iodine Activity Appearance Rates into RCS (µCi/sec)
I-131	47.2	7.18E+03
I-132	17.9	7.78E+03
I-133	69.5	1.25E+04
I-134	10.0	8.91E+03
I135	40.1	9.91E+03

Table 4.3-1
Isotopic Gap Activity
Locked Rotor Accident / Control Rod Ejection Accident

Nuclide	Core Activity (Ci)	Fraction of Core Activity in Gap LRA	Core Gap Activity w/o Peaking Factor (Ci) LRA	Fraction of Core Activity in Gap CREA	Core Gap Activity w/o Peaking Factor (Ci) CREA
KR-85	1.11E+06	0.30	3.33E+05	0.10	1.11E+05
KR-85M	2.33E+07	0.10	2.33E+06	0.10	2.33E+06
KR-87	4.65E+07	0.10	4.65E+06	0.10	4.65E+06
KR-88	6.43E+07	0.10	6.43E+06	0.10	6.43E+06
Xe-131M	1.42E+06	0.10	1.42E+05	0.10	1.42E+05
Xe-133M	6.42E+06	0.10	6.42E+05	0.10	6.42E+05
XE-133	2.01E+08	0.10	2.01E+07	0.10	2.01E+07
XE-135	4.92E+07	0.10	4.92E+06	0.10	4.92E+06
Xe-138	1.70E+08	0.10	1.70E+07	0.10	1.70E+07
I-130	3.58E+06	0.10	3.58E+05	0.10	3.58E+05
I-131	9.90E+07	0.12	1.19E+07	0.10	9.90E+06
I-132	1.44E+08	0.10	1.44E+07	0.10	1.44E+07
I-133	2.01E+08	0.10	2.01E+07	0.10	2.01E+07
I-134	2.22E+08	0.10	2.22E+07	0.10	2.22E+07
I-135	1.92E+08	0.10	1.92E+07	0.10	1.92E+07
BR-82	4.44E+05	0.10	4.44E+04	0.10	4.44E+04
BR-84	2.10E+07	0.10	2.10E+06	0.10	2.10E+06
CS-134	2.41E+07	0.17	4.10E+06	-	-
CS-136	7.01E+06	0.17	1.19E+06	-	-
CS-137	1.37E+07	0.17	2.33E+06	-	-
CS-138	1.85E+08	0.17	3.15E+07	-	-
RB-86	2.50E+05	0.17	4.25E+04	-	-
Rb-88	6.60E+07	0.17	1.12E+07	-	-
Rb-89	8.57E+07	0.17	1.46E+07	-	-

Note: Values reported reflect the core isotopic gap activity assumed for the LRA and CREA. These values have to be adjusted for a) the failed fuel percentage (10%) and b) peaking factor (1.65), prior to assessing the associated dose consequences.

For the isotopic gap activity associated with the FHA refer to Table 7.3-2.

5.0 ACCIDENT ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION FACTORS (χ/Q)

The DCPP meteorological measurement program is described in DCPP UFSAR Section 2.3.3. The meteorological program was designed to meet the requirements of Safety Guide 23, February 1972 (Reference 59). The program consists of monitoring wind speed, wind direction, ambient temperature, and precipitation. Operation of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

5.1 Exclusion Area Boundary and Low Population Zone Atmospheric Dispersion Factors

Atmospheric dispersion factors (i.e., χ/Qs) are calculated at the DCPP EAB and LPZ for post-accident environmental releases originating from DCPP Units 1 and 2.

The applicable methodology is identified in RG 1.145 for ground level releases (Reference 5). The methodology is implemented using CB&I S&W Inc. computer program "Atmospheric Dispersion Factors" using a continuous temporally representative 5-year period of hourly meteorological data from the DCPP onsite meteorological tower (i.e., January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011).

The Regulatory Guide 1.145 methodology for ground level sources is as follows:

$$\chi/Q_1 = \{(u)[(\pi)(\sigma_y)(\sigma_z) + (A/2)]\}^{-1}$$
$$\chi/Q_2 = [(u)(3\pi)(\sigma_y)(\sigma_z)]^{-1}$$
$$\chi/Q_3 = [(u)(\pi)(\Sigma_y)(\sigma_z)]^{-1}$$

where:

- χ/Q = relative concentration (sec/m^3);
- σ_y, σ_z = horizontal and vertical dispersion coefficients, respectively, based on stability class and horizontal downwind distance (m);
- u = wind speed at the 10-meter elevation (m/sec);
- A = cross-sectional building area (m^2);
- Σ_y = (M)(σ_y) for distances of 800 meters or less; and
- Σ_y = [(M-1)(σ_{y800m}) + σ_y] for distances greater than 800 meters with M representing the meander factor in Reference 5.

Per the guidance provided in RG 1.145, χ/Q $_1$ and χ/Q $_2$ values are calculated by EN-113 and the higher value selected. This value is then compared to the χ/Q $_3$ value calculated by EN-113, and the smaller value is then selected as the appropriate value.

The EAB distances for the sixteen 22.5° azimuth downwind sectors are derived from a DCPP site boundary drawing (Figure 5.1-1), taking into consideration a 45-degree azimuth sector centered on each 22.5° azimuth sector as described in RG 1.145, Regulatory Position C.1.2. The EAB χ/Q values for the radiological releases from each unit are conservatively based on

the EAB distances from the outer edge of each containment building. The release point locations are listed in Table 5.2-1.

An LPZ distance of 6 miles (9,654 meters) is used in the analysis. The use of one LPZ distance in all directions from the center of the site for all release points is reasonable given the magnitude of this distance relative to the separation of the release point locations from one another.

The containment building cross-sectional area along with the containment building height is used for the annual average χ/Q calculations (used as input to develop the accident χ/Q values at the LPZ using Regulatory Guide 1.145 methodology). The applicable methodology is identified in RG 1.111, Regulatory Position C.1.c.(Reference 26) These annual average χ/Q values are used to calculate the intermediate averaging time χ/Q values for the periods of 2-8 hours, 8-24 hours, 1-4 days, and 4-30 days by logarithmic interpolation.

The following conservative assumptions are made for these calculations:

- All releases are treated as point sources
- All releases are treated as ground-level as there are no release conditions that are high enough to escape the aerodynamic effects of the plant buildings
- The distances from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 releases are determined from the closest edge of the containment buildings to the EAB
- The plume centerline from each release is transported directly over the receptor and
- A terrain recirculation factor of 4 is used in the calculation of the annual average χ/Q values, and
- Radioactive decay or plume depletion due to deposition is not considered

The highest EAB & LPZ χ/Q values from among all 22.5° downwind sectors for each release/receptor combination and accident period are summarized in Table 5.1-1. EAB χ/Q values are presented for releases from Unit 1 and Unit 2 while the LPZ χ/Q values are applicable to both units. The 0.5% sector dependent χ/Q values are presented with the worst case downwind sector indicated in parentheses.

5.2 On-Site Atmospheric Dispersion Factors

Regulatory Guide 1.194, June 2003 (Reference 21), Regulatory Position C.1 through C.3, and the adjustment factor for vertically orientated energetic releases from steam relief valves and atmospheric dump valves allowed by Regulatory Position C.6 are used to determine short-term on-site χ/Q values in support of design basis radiological habitability assessments.

In accordance with Regulatory Position C.2 of RG 1.194, the control room and technical support center χ/Q values for radiological releases from DCPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 were calculated using the NRC "**A**tmospheric **R**elative **CON**centrations in Building Wakes" (ARCON96) methodology as documented in NUREG/CR-6331, Revision 1 (Reference 6). Input data consist of: hourly on-

site meteorological data; release characteristics (e.g., release height, building area affecting the release) and various receptor parameters (e.g., the distance and direction from the release to the control room air intake and intake height).

A continuous temporally representative 5-year period of hourly on-site meteorological data from the DCPP onsite meteorological tower (i.e., January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011) was used for the ARCON96 runs. Each hour of data, at a minimum, had a validated wind speed and direction at the 10-meter level and a temperature difference between the 76- and 10-meter levels. This period of data is temporally representative and meets Safety Guide 23, (Reference 59) guidance.

The ARCON96 modeling utilized to establish the Unit 1 and Unit 2 χ/Q values follows the ground level release guidance of Regulatory Position C.3 of RG 1.194 (Reference 21) relative to release height (i.e., ground-level vs. elevated), release type (i.e., diffuse vs. point) and configuration of release points and receptors (i.e., building cross-sectional area, release heights, line-of-sight distance between release and receptor, initial diffusion coefficients etc.).

All releases were assumed to be ground-level as none of the release points at DCPP meet the definition of an elevated release as indicated in Regulatory Position C.3.2.2 of RG 1.194 (i.e., do not meet the requirement to be 2.5 times the height of plant buildings).

Only the containment building edge releases were treated as diffuse sources as the releases occur from the entire surface of the building. In these cases, initial values of the diffusion coefficients (σ_y, σ_z) were determined in accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.194, June 2003, Regulatory Position C.3.2.4. Release and receptor locations are applied in accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.194, Regulatory Position C.3.4 for building geometry and line-of-site distances (refer to Appendix A).

The following recommended default values from Regulatory Guide 1.194, June 2003, Table A-2, are judged to be applicable to DCPP:

- Wind direction range = 90 degrees azimuth
- Wind speed assigned to calm = 0.5 m/sec
- Surface roughness length = 0.20 meter and
- Sector averaging constant = 4.3 (dimensionless).

The following assumptions are made for these χ/Q calculations:

- The plume centerline from each release is transported directly over the control room or technical support center air intake/receptor (conservative)

- The distances from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment building surfaces to the receptors are determined from the closest edge of the containment buildings and the source/receptor elevation differences are set to zero (conservative)

- The applicable structure relative to quantifying building wake effects on the dispersion of the releases is based on release/receptor orientation relative to the plant structures

- The releases from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment building surfaces are treated as diffuse sources

- All releases are conservatively treated as ground level as there are no release conditions that merit categorization as an elevated release (i.e., 2.5 times containment building height) at this site

- The χ/Q value from the accident release point to the center of the control room boundary at roof level is utilized for Control Room in-leakage since the above χ/Q can be considered an average value for in-leakage locations around the Control Room envelope. The χ/Q from the accident release point to the center of the control room boundary at roof level is also utilized for Control Room ingress/egress. The outer doors to the Control Room are located at approximately the middle of a) the east side (i.e., Auxiliary building side) wall of the Control Room and b) the west side (i.e., Turbine building side) wall of the Control Room. Similarly, the χ/Q from the accident release point to the center of the TSC at its roof level is utilized for TSC inleakage since the above χ/Q can be considered an average value for in-leakage locations around the TSC building envelope.

Summarized below are some of the other salient aspects of the DCPP control room and technical support center χ/Q analyses, as applicable

- Control room receptors within 10-meters of release: In accordance with RG 1.194, Regulatory Position C.3.4, the ARCON96 methodology is not recommended for use at distances less than about 10 meters. Based on engineering judgment, the ARCON96 methodology has been applied for 2 cases when the distance from the release to the receptor is slightly less than 10 meters. Use of ARCON96 methodology for release point-receptors distances less than 10 meters (i.e., 9.4 meters for Unit 1 containment building to Unit 1 control room normal intake and 7.8 meters for Unit 2 containment building to Unit 2 control room normal intake) is considered acceptable since the dominating factors in the calculation are building cross-sectional area and plume meander and not the normal atmospheric dispersion coefficients. Note that the χ/Q values for the above 2 cases were developed to establish the bounding χ/Q values; the referenced χ/Q's were not the bounding values and therefore not used in the dose consequence analyses.

- Control room receptors at 1.5 meters from release: Since the Unit 1 and Unit 2 MSSVs, 10% ADVs, and MSL break release points are located within 1.5 meters line-of-sight distance from the affected unit's control room normal intake, this near-field distance is considered outside of the ARCON96 application domain. Although ARCON96 is capable of estimating near-field dispersion, the 1.5-meter line-of-sight distance from the releases to the receptors is much less than the 10-meter distance recommended as the minimum applicable distance in Regulatory Position C.3.4 of RG 1.194. Thus no χ/Qs are developed for the above release point / receptor combinations. The bullet below provides a discussion of the effect of atmospheric dispersion on releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs with respect to the affected unit's control room normal intake. Atmospheric dispersion is not credited when determining the CR operator dose due to

releases out of the MSL break location in the faulted steam generator. For further detail see Section 7.6.

- Energetic releases: The vertical velocity of the releases from the MSSVs and 10% ADVs are at least 95 times the 95th percentile wind speed of 1 m/sec and approximately 5 times the highest observed 10-meter wind speed (i.e., 18.9 m/sec) over the 5-year meteorological data base. The large vertical velocities of the MSSV and 10% ADV releases, ranging from 98.9 - 94.9 m/sec, preclude any down-washing of the releases by the aerodynamic effects of the containment buildings such that the control room normal intake of the same unit as the release (e.g., Unit 1 MSSV/10% ADV releases to Unit 1 CR normal intake) is not contaminated given that the horizontal distance is only 1.5 meters. Moreover, this short distance precludes the releases from reaching the control room normal intakes of the same unit given the height of the MSSV and 10% ADV releases (i.e., 27.1 and 26.5 meters, respectively) relative to the height of the normal intakes (i.e., 22 meters). Plume rise calculations indicate that the MSSV and ADV release heights will be enhanced by 11 meters at the 95th percentile wind speed of 1 m/sec due to the large vertical velocities of the releases. Thus, for purposes of estimating dose consequences, it is appropriate to use the χ/Q associated with the normal CR intake of the opposite unit for releases from the MSSVs / 10% ADVs as the worst case CR normal intake location.

- Vertically-oriented energetic releases: Regulatory Position C.6 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.194 establishes the use of a deterministic reduction factor of 5 applied to ARCON96 χ/Q values for energetic releases from steam relief valves or atmospheric dump valves. These valves must be uncapped and vertically-oriented and the time-dependent vertical velocity must exceed the 95th-percentile wind speed at the release point height by at least a factor of 5. Since the DCPP MSSVs and 10% ADVs are vertically oriented / uncapped and will have a vertical velocity of at least 94.9 m/sec until initiation of shutdown cooling at 10.73 hours of the accident, the reduction factor of 5 is applicable to the DCPP MSSV and 10% ADV releases. Note that since χ/Q values are averaged over the identified period (i.e., 0-2 hours, 2-8 hours, 8-24 hours, etc.), and the vertical velocity has been estimated to occur for 10.73 hours, application of the factor of 5 reduction is not appropriate for χ/Q values applicable to *averaging periods* beyond the 2-8 hours averaging period. For assessment of an environmental release between T= 8 to 10.73 hrs, continued use of the 2-8 hr χ/Q (with the factor of 5 reduction) is acceptable and conservative.

- Dual Intakes: The Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room emergency air intakes (also serve the technical support center), may be considered dual intakes for the purpose of providing a low contamination intake regardless of wind direction for any of the release points since the two control room emergency air intakes are ^{never} within the same wind direction window; defined as a wedge centered on the line of sight between the source and the receptor with the vertex located on the release point. The size of the wedge for each release-receptor combination is 90 degrees azimuth with the use of ARCON96, as described in Regulatory Position C.3.3.2 of RG 1.194.

- Redundant radiation monitors: Per RG 1.194, Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.3, based on the dual intake design of the control room pressurization intakes, and as discussed later

in Section 7.1, the availability of redundant PG&E Design Class I radiation monitors at each pressurization intake (which provide the capability of initial selection of the cleaner intake and support the expectation that the operator will manually make the proper intake selection throughout the event), the χ/Q values applicable to the more favorable CR pressurization intake can be reduced by a factor of 4 and utilized to estimate the dose consequences.

- PG&E Design Class II lines connecting to PG&E Design Class I Plant Vent: It has been determined that there are several PG&E Design Class II lines that connect to the PG&E Design Class I Plant Vent; specifically, a) the 40 inch containment penetration area (GE/GW) HVAC ventilation line, b) a 2 inch gaseous radwaste system line, and c) the 16 inch gland steam condenser (GSC) / steam jet air ejector (SJAE) exhaust header. In addition, it has been determined that the Plant Vent Expansion Joint may experience a tear during a seismic event, however, the plant vent will remain intact and functional.

  a) The 40 inch Containment Penetration Area Ventilation line and the 2 inch gaseous radwaste system line were originally designed as PG&E Design Class I, but were subsequently declassified to PG&E Design Class II. As noted in Section 2.2, the portion of these lines that connect to the Plant Vent will be re-classified as PG&E Design Class I.

  b) The GSC / SJAE 16 inch exhaust header connects to the Plant Vent at El 144'-6" (Centerline) on the North-East side / South–East side of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments, respectively. It has been determined that should a failure occur due to a seismic event, it would most likely occur at the interface of this line and the plant vent.

  c) The plant vent expansion joint is located at El 155.83' North-East side / South–East side of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments, respectively. As discussed earlier, the plant vent expansion joint may experience a tear during a seismic event.

  An assessment of the potential release locations identified in items b) and c) above indicates that the χ/Q values developed for the plant vent are either conservative or representative of these potential release points (i.e., at the interface of the GSC / SJAE 16 inch line and the plant vent or at the plant vent expansion joint). In addition, and for purposes of completeness, the dose impact in the control room due to back flow from the Plant Vent out of a potential break in GSC / SJAE 16 inch exhaust header at locations other than the point of interface with the Plant Vent has been evaluated and demonstrated to be insignificant.

The configuration of release point and receptor information used in the χ/Q calculations including all significant release and receptor location permutations, release and receptor heights above plant grade, cross-sectional building areas encountered by the release on its path to the receptor, and line-of-sight distance between release and receptor used in the ARCON96 calculations are summarized in Appendix A of this report. A drawing showing the locations of the release points and receptors is also provided in Appendix A (See Figure A-1). Also provided in Appendix A is the hourly 5-year on-site meteorological data from the DCPP onsite

meteorological tower (i.e., January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011) which was used in the ARCON96 analyses.

Table 5.2-1 provides the release point / receptor combinations evaluated. Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3 provide the control room χ/Q values for the individual release point-receptor combinations for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively.

Note that the specific CR χ/Q values used in each of the accident analyses are presented in the accident-specific Tables presented in Chapter 7. The χ/Q values selected for use in the Chapter 7 dose consequence analyses are intended to support bounding analyses for an accident that occurs at either unit. They take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to each accident to identify the bounding χ/Q values and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed earlier in this section and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

Table 5.2-4 presents the χ/Q values for the individual post-LOCA release point - TSC receptor combinations for Unit 1 and Unit 2 applicable to the TSC normal intake and the center of the TSC boundary at roof level (considered an average value for potential TSC unfiltered in-leakage locations around the envelope). The Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room pressurization air intakes also serve the TSC during the post-accident pressurization mode. Thus, the χ/Qs presented in Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3 for the control room pressurization intakes inclusive of the credit for dual intake design and ability to select the more favorable intake are also applicable to the TSC.

Presence of the Simulator Building in the vicinity of the DCPP Onsite Meteorological Tower

PG&E conducted an analysis to determine whether the presence of the Simulator Building in the vicinity of the DCPP onsite meteorological tower is meaningfully affecting the spatial representativeness of the meteorological data used for atmospheric dispersion calculations. This was done in response to an NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) dated July 6, 2010 concerning the distance of the location of the onsite meteorological tower being less than ten times the height of the Simulator Building (Regulatory Position C.3 of RG 1.23, Revision 1, Reference 28) and is documented here for completeness. The distance from the Simulator Building to the meteorological tower is just over seven times the height of the Simulator Building.

The assessment of the presence of the Simulator Building on the spatial representativeness of the meteorological data involved several steps.

- The first step established the Simulator Building region of influence (ROI) in terms of distance and upwind fetch azimuth, on the DCPP meteorological tower.
- The second step determined the source-receptor cases that are within the Simulator Building ROI which may be potentially affected by the aerodynamic effects of the Simulator Building on the local wind field.
- The third step involved an analysis comparing pre-building and post-building meteorological data base sigma theta averages based on work performed by Bellinger (Reference 29) and Call (Reference 30).

- The fourth step involved calculating and comparing the χ/Q values using ARCON96 (for the control room) and Regulatory Guide 1.145 methodology (for the EAB and LPZ) for the pre-Simulator Building and post-Simulator Building meteorological data bases for the source-receptor cases within the Simulator Building ROI.
- The fifth step involved calculating and comparing the χ/Q values using ARCON96 (for the control room) and Regulatory Guide 1.145 methodology (for the EAB and LPZ) for the pre-Simulator Building and post-Simulator Building meteorological data bases for the source-receptor cases that were outside the Simulator Building ROI.

These analyses were examined to determine whether any differences in sigma theta averages and calculated χ/Q values were systematic, as well as for excessively large and outside-the range-of-expected stochastic climatic variations.

A comparison of the χ/Q values *within the Simulator Building ROI* and relevant to the FHA and MSSV / 10% ADV / MSL Break releases, indicated that χ/Q values calculated with the pre-Simulator Building onsite meteorological data (1974 to 1978) are always slightly smaller than those calculated with the 2007-2011 onsite meteorological data for all relevant time periods. A comparison of the χ/Q values generated by the two different meteorological data bases for the LOCA releases, indicated that for the 0-2 hour period, all but one of the 16 cases showed a small decrease in χ/Q values when calculated with the pre-Simulator Building onsite meteorological data. For the longer post-LOCA time periods, the calculated χ/Qs demonstrated, for the most part, a combination of small decreases and small increases for the pre-Simulator Building onsite meteorological data versus the post-Simulator Building onsite meteorological data.

In order to better determine if the differences in χ/Q values developed using the pre-Simulator Building and post-Simulator Building meteorological data bases are primarily the result of expected climatological differences, the LOCA releases for those source-receptor combinations that were *outside the Simulator Building ROI* were also examined. The magnitude of the variation in the χ/Q values were found, for the most part, to be similar to that for the χ/Q values within the Simulator Building ROI, and the results reflected a similar combination of increases and decreases.

It was concluded that the differences in χ/Q values most likely reflect the climatological differences between the 1974-1978 and 2007-2011 data bases, as opposed to the limited aerodynamic effect of the Simulator Building on the wind flow at the meteorological tower location. If there is an effect of the Simulator Building on the meteorological data, it is overshadowed by climatological differences in the data bases.

It was therefore judged that the Simulator Building has little to no influence on the DCPP meteorological tower data as it is applied to Gaussian atmospheric dispersion modeling. Moreover, the heuristic uncertainties in Gaussian modeling, which are more than adequately compensated for by conservative assumptions of point releases, centerline calculations and 95% meteorological conditions, are larger than the differences in comparative χ/Q values from the meteorological databases.

Table 5.1-1 Site Boundary Atmospheric Dispersion Factors					
	χ/Q (sec/m^3)				
Receptor	0 - 2 hours	2 - 8 hours	8 - 24 hours	1 - 4 days	4 - 30 days
Unit 1 EAB (NW)	2.50E-04				
Unit 2 EAB (SSE)	2.30E-04				
Unit 1/2 LPZ (NW)	2.12E-05	9.26E-06	6.26E-06	2.67E-06	7.86E-07

Note

1 An EAB χ/Q value of 2.5E-4 sec/m^3 is used for all release points.

2. The 0.5% sector dependent χ/Q values are presented with the worst case downwind sector indicated in parentheses

TABLE 5.2-1[1] DCPP On-Site Atmospheric Dispersion Factor Evaluation Post-Accident Release Point / Receptor Combinations	
Release Points	**On-Site Receptors**
1. Unit 1 Containment Building Edge	1. Unit 1 Control Room Normal Intake
2. Unit 2 Containment Building Edge	2. Unit 2 Control Room Normal Intake
3. Unit 1 Plant Vent	3. Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Intake
4. Unit 2 Plant Vent	4. Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Intake
5. Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Vent[2]	5. Control Room Center (i.e., In-leakage)
6. Unit 2 RWST Vent[2]	6. TSC Normal Intake[3]
7. Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GE Area)	7. TSC Center (i.e., In-leakage)[3]
8. Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GE Area)	
9. Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area)	
10. Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area)	
11. Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building	
12. Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building	
13. Unit 1 Equipment Hatch	
14. Unit 2 Equipment Hatch	
15. Unit 1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)	
16. Unit 2 MSSVs	
17. Unit 1 10% Atmospheric Dump Valves[4]	
18. Unit 1 10% Atmospheric Dump Valves [4]	
19. Unit 1 Main Steam Line Break Location	
20. Unit 2 Main Steam Line Break Location	

Notes:

1. See Appendix A, Table A-1 and Figure A-1 for Release Point / Receptor Locations, including all input data used in the ARCON96 calculations.
2. χ/Q s for RWST releases to the control room normal intakes are not needed for the dose calculations since the normal intakes are isolated prior to releases occurring from the RWST vent.
3. χ/Q s developed only for the LOCA, i.e., release points 1 through 10.

TABLE 5.2-2[5]
DCPP Unit 1 Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Source and Receptor	0-2 Hour	2-8 Hour	8-24 Hour	1-4 Day	4-30 Day
Unit 1 Containment Edge to Unit 1 Control Room (CR) Normal Intake	1.28E-03	7.12E-04	2.87E-04	2.90E-04	2.84E-04
Unit 1 Containment Edge to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	6.52E-04	3.51E-04	1.51E-04	1.49E-04	1.37E-04
Unit 1 Containment Edge to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	4.11E-04	2.30E-04	9.62E-05	8.69E-05	7.03E-05
Unit 1 Containment Edge to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	1.67E-04	7.95E-05	2.63E-05	2.81E-05	2.34E-05
Unit 1 Containment Edge to CR Center	8.85E-04	4.43E-04	1.75E-04	1.77E-04	1.65E-04
Unit 1 Plant Vent to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	1.67E-03	1.22E-03	4.90E-04	4.90E-04	4.44E-04
Unit 1 Plant Vent to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	9.10E-04	6.57E-04	2.68E-04	2.62E-04	2.45E-04
Unit 1 Plant Vent to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	5.59E-04	3.38E-04	1.32E-04	1.12E-04	8.38E-05
Unit 1 Plant Vent to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.26E-04	1.48E-04	5.40E-05	5.47E-05	4.45E-05
Unit 1 Plant Vent to CR Center	1.26E-03	8.96E-04	3.44E-04	3.44E-04	2.99E-04
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	6.84E-03	3.08E-03	1.21E-03	1.12E-03	8.75E-04
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	2.24E-03	1.15E-03	3.98E-04	3.89E-04	3.20E-04
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	3.75E-04	2.33E-04	9.12E-05	8.45E-05	6.62E-05
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.55E-04	1.25E-04	4.42E-05	4.38E-05	3.55E-05
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to CR Center	3.22E-03	1.42E-03	5.54E-04	5.20E-04	4.21E-04
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	4.90E-03	3.45E-03	1.37E-03	1.37E-03	1.28E-03
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	1.38E-03	9.83E-04	3.92E-04	3.88E-04	3.65E-04
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	8.20E-04	5.40E-04	2.15E-04	1.87E-04	1.43E-04
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.58E-04	1.54E-04	4.95E-05	5.26E-05	4.48E-05
Unit 1 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to CR Center	2.59E-03	1.81E-03	7.29E-04	7.15E-04	6.64E-04
Unit 1 RWST Vent to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	3.27E-04	1.90E-04	7.13E-05	6.99E-05	5.76E-05
Unit 1 RWST Vent to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.10E-04	9.83E-05	3.73E-05	3.53E-05	2.86E-05
Unit 1 RWST Vent to CR Center	1.07E-03	4.86E-04	1.99E-04	1.75E-04	1.43E-04

TABLE 5.2-2[5] (Continued)
DCPP Unit 1 Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Source and Receptor	0-2 Hour	2-8 Hour	8-24 Hour	1-4 Day	4-30 Day
Unit 1 MSSVs to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake [1, 2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit 1 MSSVs to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake [3]	4.29E-03	2.76E-03	1.04E-03	1.06E-03	9.46E-04
Unit 1 MSSVs to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake [3, 4]	4.66E-04	2.92E-04	1.16E-04	1.04E-04	8.08E-05
Unit 1 MSSVs to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake [3, 4]	3.14E-04	1.53E-04	5.12E-05	5.29E-05	4.38E-05
Unit 1 MSSVs to CR Center [3]	1.39E-02	7.40E-03	2.38E-03	2.56E-03	2.15E-03
Unit 1 10% ADVs to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake [1, 2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit 1 10% ADVs to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake [3]	4.30E-03	2.79E-03	1.05E-03	1.06E-03	9.49E-04
Unit 1 10% ADVs to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake [3, 4]	4.66E-04	2.92E-04	1.16E-04	1.04E-04	8.07E-05
Unit 1 10% ADVs to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake [3, 4]	3.13E-04	1.54E-04	5.13E-05	5.30E-05	4.39E-05
Unit 1 10% ADVs to CR Center [3]	1.39E-02	7.45E-03	2.39E-03	2.59E-03	2.15E-03
Unit 1 MSL Break Location to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake [1]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit 1 MSL Break Location to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	4.23E-03	2.90E-03	1.13E-03	1.11E-03	1.02E-03
Unit 1 MSL Break Location to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake [4]	4.35E-04	2.94E-04	1.15E-04	1.01E-04	7.76E-05
Unit 1 MSL Break Location to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake [4]	3.06E-04	1.54E-04	5.19E-05	5.32E-05	4.38E-05
Unit 1 MSL Break Location to CR Center	1.24E-02	7.10E-03	2.24E-03	2.43E-03	2.07E-03
Unit 1 FHB to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	6.98E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 FHB to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	2.93E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 FHB to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake [4]	3.31E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 FHB to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake [4]	2.56E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 FHB to CR Center	3.78E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 Equipment Hatch to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	2.61E-02	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 Equipment Hatch to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	2.88E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 Equipment Hatch to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake [4]	4.36E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 Equipment Hatch to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake [4]	2.64E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 1 Equipment. Hatch to CR Center	5.51E-03	-	-	-	-

Notes:

1. ARCON96 based χ/Q s are not applicable for these cases given that the horizontal distance from the source to the receptor is 1.5 meters (which is much less than the 10 meters required by ARCON96 methodology).

2. Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit.

3. For releases from the MSSVs and 10% ADVs (which are uncapped / vertically oriented and have a high vertical velocity discharge for the first 10.73 hours of the accident), a χ/Q reduction factor of 5 is applicable to the values listed above. Since χ/Q values are averaged over the identified period (i.e., 0-2 hrs, 2-8 hrs, 8-24 hrs, etc), and the vertical velocity has been estimated only up to 10.73 hrs, application of the factor of 5 reduction is not appropriate for χ/Q values applicable to averaging periods beyond the 2-8 hrs averaging period. For assessment of an environmental release between T= 8 to 10.73 hrs, continued use of the 2-8 hr χ/Q (with the factor of 5 reduction) is acceptable and conservative.

4. The more favorable χ/Q value presented above for the CR Pressurization Intakes is further reduced by a factor of 4 to address the "dual intake" credit and the capability of initial selection of the cleaner intake and expectation that the operator will manually make the proper intake selection throughout the event.

5. χ/Q values for RWST releases to the control room normal intakes are not needed for the dose calculations since the normal intakes are isolated prior to releases occurring from the RWST vent.

TABLE 5.2-3[5]
DCPP Unit 2 Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Source and Receptor		0-2 Hour	2-8 Hour	8-24 Hour	1-4 Day	4-30 Day
Unit 2 Containment Edge to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake		1.96E-03	9.42E-04	4.48E-04	3.98E-04	3.18E-04
Unit 2 Containment Edge to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake		6.93E-04	3.84E-04	1.67E-04	1.42E-04	1.08E-04
Unit 2 Containment Edge to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]		1.70E-04	1.06E-04	4.23E-05	3.81E-05	2.95E-05
Unit 2 Containment Edge to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]		3.85E-04	1.47E-04	5.94E-05	5.84E-05	4.84E-05
Unit 2 Containment Edge to CR Center		1.08E-03	5.46E-04	2.47E-04	2.12E-04	1.68E-04
Unit 2 Plant Vent to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake		1.51E-03	9.41E-04	3.86E-04	3.23E-04	2.23E-04
Unit 2 Plant Vent to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake		7.88E-04	4.86E-04	2.01E-04	1.69E-04	1.17E-04
Unit 2 Plant Vent to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]		2.03E-04	1.29E-04	5.13E-05	4.32E-05	3.19E-05
Unit 2 Plant Vent to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]		5.71E-04	2.96E-04	1.20E-04	1.04E-04	8.19E-05
Unit 2 Plant Vent to CR Center		1.13E-03	7.08E-04	2.85E-04	2.39E-04	1.70E-04
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake		6.71E-03	3.12E-03	1.21E-03	1.22E-03	1.02E-03
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake		2.14E-03	1.39E-03	5.72E-04	4.83E-04	3.62E-04
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]		2.28E-04	1.60E-04	6.25E-05	5.52E-05	4.21E-05
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]		3.97E-04	1.76E-04	6.93E-05	6.44E-05	5.27E-05
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GE Area) to CR Center		3.16E-03	1.85E-03	7.17E-04	6.84E-04	5.43E-04
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake		3.55E-03	1.19E-03	4.82E-04	4.56E-04	3.03E-04
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area) to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake		1.22E-03	6.26E-04	2.53E-04	2.12E-04	1.41E-04
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area)to Unit CR Emergency Intake[4]		2.28E-04	1.62E-04	6.58E-05	5.43E-05	3.99E-05
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area)to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]		8.64E-04	4.23E-04	1.50E-04	1.48E-04	1.20E-04
Unit 2 Containment Penetration (GW/FW Area)to CR Center		2.21E-03	1.17E-03	4.70E-04	3.90E-04	2.61E-04
Unit 2 RWST Vent to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]		1.91E-04	1.21E-04	4.58E-05	4.39E-05	3.53E-05
Unit 2 RWST Vent to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]		3.29E-04	1.61E-04	6.10E-05	5.53E-05	4.45E-05
Unit 2 RWST Vent to CR Center		1.07E-03	5.80E-04	2.18E-04	2.19E-04	1.79E-04

TABLE 5.2-3[5] (Continued)
DCPP Unit 2 Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Source and Receptor	0-2 Hour	2-8 Hour	8-24 Hour	1-4 Day	4-30 Day
Unit 2 MSSVs to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake[3]	3.87E-03	2.42E-03	9.89E-04	8.17E-04	6.09E-04
Unit 2 MSSVs to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake[1,2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit 2 MSSVs to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[3,4]	2.89E-04	1.91E-04	7.45E-05	6.62E-05	5.08E-05
Unit 2 MSSVs to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[3,4]	4.90E-04	2.29E-04	8.24E-05	8.07E-05	6.49E-05
Unit 2 MSSVs to CR Center[3]	1.22E-02	8.10E-03	3.27E-03	2.76E-03	2.08E-03
Unit 2 10% ADVs to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake[3]	3.88E-03	2.43E-03	9.94E-04	8.19E-04	6.10E-04
Unit 2 10% ADVs to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake[1,2]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit 2 10% ADVs to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[3,4]	2.87E-04	1.92E-04	7.48E-05	6.61E-05	5.07E-05
Unit 2 10% ADVs to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[3,4]	4.90E-04	2.29E-04	8.24E-05	8.08E-05	6.48E-05
Unit 2 10% ADVs to CR Center[3]	1.22E-02	8.16E-03	3.28E-03	2.78E-03	2.09E-03
Unit 2 MSL Break Location to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	3.81E-03	2.40E-03	1.01E-03	8.09E-04	5.88E-04
Unit 2 MSL Break Location to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake[1]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit 2 MSL Break Location to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.75E-04	1.91E-04	7.45E-05	6.53E-05	4.86E-05
Unit 2 MSL Break Location to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	4.76E-04	2.24E-04	8.14E-05	7.94E-05	6.40E-05
Unit 2 MSL Break Location to CR Center	1.09E-02	7.35E-03	3.01E-03	2.48E-03	1.86E-03
Unit 2 FHB to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	2.72E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 FHB to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	6.98E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 FHB to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.49E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 FHB to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	3.50E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 FHB to CR Center	3.71E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 Equipment Hatch to Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	2.49E-03	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 Equipment Hatch to Unit 2 CR Normal Intake	2.51E-02	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 Equipment Hatch to Unit 1 CR Emergency Intake[4]	2.49E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 Equipment Hatch to Unit 2 CR Emergency Intake[4]	4.68E-04	-	-	-	-
Unit 2 Equipment Hatch to CR Center	5.19E-03	-	-	-	-

Notes:

1 ARCON96 based χ/Qs are not applicable for these cases given that the horizontal distance from the source to the receptor is 1.5 meters (which is much less than the 10 meters required by ARCON96 methodology).

2 Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit.

3 For releases from the MSSVs and 10% ADVs (which are uncapped / vertically oriented and have a high vertical velocity discharge for the first 10.73 hours of the accident), a χ/Q reduction factor of 5 is applicable to the values listed above. Since χ/Q values are averaged over the identified period (i.e., 0-2 hrs, 2-8 hrs, 8-24 hrs, etc), and the vertical velocity has been estimated only up to 10.73 hrs, application of the factor of 5 reduction is not appropriate for χ/Q values applicable to averaging periods beyond the 2-8 hrs averaging period. For assessment of an environmental release between T= 8 to 10.73 hrs, continued use of the 2-8 hr χ/Q (with the factor of 5 reduction) is acceptable and conservative.

4 The more favorable χ/Q value presented above for the CR Pressurization Intakes is further reduced by a factor of 4 to address the "dual intake" credit and the capability of initial selection of the cleaner intake and expectation that the operator will manually make the proper intake selection throughout the event.

5 χ/Q values for RWST releases to the control room normal intakes are not needed for the dose calculations since the normal intakes are isolated prior to releases occurring from the RWST vent.

TABLE 5.2-4
DCPP Units 1 and 2 Technical Support Center Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Source and Receptor	0-2 Hour	2-8 Hour	8-24 Hour	1-4 Day	4-30 Day
UNIT 1					
Unit 1 Containment Edge to TSC Normal Intake	2.57E-04	1.18E-04	4.27E-05	4.24E-05	3.50E-05
Unit 1 Containment Edge to TSC Center	2.90E-04	1.33E-04	4.98E-05	4.83E-05	4.02E-05
Unit 1 Plant Vent to TSC Normal Intake	3.12E-04	1.77E-04	6.91E-05	6.29E-05	5.21E-05
Unit 1 Plant Vent to TSC Center	3.54E-04	1.95E-04	7.71E-05	6.70E-05	5.67E-05
Unit 1 RWST Vent to TSC Normal Intake	2.72E-04	1.27E-04	4.80E-05	4.49E-05	3.71E-05
Unit 1 RWST Vent to TSC Center	2.94E-04	1.38E-04	5.40E-05	4.89E-05	3.97E-05
Unit 1 140' Leakage to TSC Normal Intake	3.64E-04	1.74E-04	6.55E-05	6.14E-05	5.00E-05
Unit 1 140' Leakage to TSC Center	4.27E-04	1.91E-04	7.45E-05	6.84E-05	5.62E-05
Unit 1 Penetration Leakage TSC Normal Intake	4.80E-04	2.51E-04	8.31E-05	8.64E-05	6.95E-05
Unit 1 Penetration Leakage to TSC Center	5.98E-04	3.03E-04	1.04E-04	1.03E-04	8.46E-05
UNIT 2					
Unit 2 Containment Edge to TSC Normal Intake	5.48E-04	2.00E-04	8.52E-05	8.37E-05	6.84E-05
Unit 2 Containment Edge to TSC Center	5.57E-04	2.01E-04	8.81E-05	8.89E-05	6.92E-05
Unit 2 Plant Vent to TSC Normal Intake	5.52E-04	2.35E-04	1.06E-04	8.71E-05	6.95E-05
Unit 2 Plant Vent to TSC Center	5.43E-04	2.16E-04	9.97E-05	8.11E-05	6.58E-05
Unit 2 RWST Vent to TSC Normal Intake	3.63E-04	1.68E-04	6.47E-05	6.04E-05	4.91E-05
Unit 2 RWST Vent to TSC Center	3.72E-04	1.68E-04	6.64E-05	6.17E-05	5.10E-05
Unit 2 140' Leakage to TSC Normal Intake	5.47E-04	2.41E-04	9.36E-05	8.83E-05	7.02E-05
Unit 2 140' Leakage to TSC Center	5.72E-04	2.43E-04	9.75E-05	9.12E-05	7.52E-05
Unit 2 Penetration Leakage TSC Normal Intake	1.80E-03	7.72E-04	3.07E-04	2.87E-04	2.33E-04
Unit 2 Penetration Leakage to TSC Center	1.83E-03	7.49E-04	3.16E-04	2.92E-04	2.41E-04

Figure 5.1-1
Diablo Canyon Power Plant – Site Drawing



6.0 DOSE CALCULATION METHODOLOGY

6.1 Inhalation and Submersion Doses from Airborne Radioactivity

Computer Code RADTRAD 3.03 is used to calculate the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from inhalation and the effective dose equivalent (EDE) from submersion due to airborne radioactivity at offsite locations and in the control room. The summation of CEDE and EDE is reported as the TEDE. As allowed in Section 4.1.4 of RG 1.183, since the submersion exposure is uniform to the whole body, the EDE is used in lieu of the deep dose equivalent (DDE) in determining the contribution of the submersion dose to the TEDE.

The CEDE is calculated using the inhalation dose conversion factors provided in Table 2.1 of Federal Guidance Report 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion" (Reference 19). The factors in the column headed "effective" yield doses corresponding to the CEDE and are derived based on ICRP-30.

The submersion EDE is calculated using the air submersion dose coefficients provided in Table III.1 of Federal Guidance Report 12, "External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil" (Reference 20). The dose coefficients in the column headed "effective" yield doses corresponding to the EDE and are derived based on a semi-infinite cloud model. The submersion EDE is reported as the whole body dose in the RADTRAD 3.03 output.

RADTRAD 3.03 includes models for a variety of processes that can attenuate and/or transport radionuclides. It can model the effect of sprays and natural deposition that reduce the quantity of radionuclides suspended in the containment or other compartments. In addition, it can model the flow of radionuclides between compartments within a building, from buildings into the environment, and from the environment into a Control Room (CR). These flows can be through filters, piping, or simply due to air leakage. RADTRAD 3.03 can also model radioactive decay and in-growth of daughters. Ultimately the program calculates the whole body dose, the thyroid dose, and the TEDE dose (rem) to the public located offsite, and to onsite personnel located in the CR due to inhalation and submersion in airborne radioactivity based on user specified, fuel inventory, nuclear data, dispersion coefficients, and dose conversion factors. Note that the code uses a numerical solution approach to solve coupled ordinary differential equations. The basic equation for radionuclide transport and removal is the same for all compartments. The program breaks its processing into 2 parts a) radioactive transport and b) radioactive decay and daughter in-growth.

CB&I S&W Inc. computer program PERC2 is used to calculate the CEDE from inhalation and the EDE from submersion due to airborne radioactivity in the Technical Support Center (TSC). PERC2 is a multiple compartment activity transport code with the dose model consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.183 guidance. The decay and daughter build-up during the activity transport among compartments and the various cleanup mechanisms are included. The CEDE is calculated using the Federal Guidance Report No.11 dose conversion factors. The EDE in the TSC is based on a finite cloud model that addresses buildup and attenuation in air. The dose equation is based on the assumption that the dose point is at the center of a hemisphere of the same volume as the TSC. The dose rate at that point is calculated as the sum of typical differential shell elements at a radius R. The equation utilizes the integrated activity in the TSC

air space, the photon energy release rates per energy group from activity airborne in the TSC, and the ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1991 neutron and gamma-ray fluence-to-dose factors. (Reference 62)

Offsite Dose – In accordance with RG 1.183, for the first 8 hours, the breathing rate of the public located offsite is assumed to be 3.5×10^{-4} m^3/sec. From 8 to 24 hours following the accident, the breathing rate is assumed to be 1.8×10^{-4} m^3/sec. After that and until the end of the accident, the rate is assumed to be 2.3×10^{-4} m^3/sec. The maximum EAB TEDE for any two-hour period following the start of the radioactivity release is calculated and used in determining compliance with the dose criteria in 10CFR50.67. The LPZ TEDE is determined for the most limiting receptor at the outer boundary of the low population zone and is calculated for the entire accident duration.

Control Room Dose - The control room inhalation CEDE is calculated assuming a breathing rate of 3.5×10^{-4} m^3/sec for the duration of the event. The following occupancy factors are credited in determining the control room TEDE: 1.0 during the first 24 hours after the event, 0.6 between 1 and 4 days, and 0.4 from 4 days to 30 days. The submersion EDE is corrected for the difference in the finite cloud geometry in the control room and the semi-infinite cloud model used in calculating the dose coefficients. The following expression obtained from RG 1.183 is used in RADTRAD 3.03 to correct the semi-infinite cloud dose, EDE_∞, to a finite cloud dose, EDE_{finite}, where the control room is modeled as a hemisphere that has a volume, V, in cubic feet, equivalent to that of the control room.

$$EDE_{finite} = \frac{EDE_\infty \, V^{0.338}}{1173}$$

Technical Support Center Dose - The TSC inhalation CEDE is calculated by CB&I S&W Inc. computer code PERC2 assuming the same breathing rate and occupancy factors as those used in determining the control room dose. The submersion EDE developed by PERC2 (which computes the photon fluence at the center of TSC and utilizes the ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1991 fluence to effective dose conversion factors), is a close approximation of the dose determined using Table III.1 of FGR No. 12, column headed "effective" (see Section 4.1.4, RG 1.183, R0) and adjusted by the finite volume correction factor given in RG 1.183, R0, Section 4.2.7.

6.2 Direct Shine Dose from External and Contained Sources

CB&I S&W Inc. point kernel shielding computer program SW-QADCGGP is used to calculate the deep dose equivalent (DDE) in the control room, TSC and at the EAB due to external and contained sources. The calculated DDE is added to the inhalation (CEDE) and the submersion (EDE) dose due to airborne radioactivity to develop the final TEDE. Conservative build-up factors are used and the geometry models are prepared to ensure that un-accounted streaming/scattering paths were eliminated. The dose albedo method with conservative albedo values is used to estimate the scatter dose in situations where the scattering contributions are potentially significant. ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1977 "neutron and gamma-ray flux-to-dose-rate factors" (Reference 31) is used to convert the gamma flux to the dose equivalent rate.

7.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES USING AST

As discussed in Chapter 1, the methodology / scenarios used in the existing design basis accident analyses discussed in the DCPP UFSAR and listed below, are being updated to reflect AST in accordance with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.183.

1. Loss of Coolant Accident
2. Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling Building
3. Fuel Handling Accident in the Containment
4. Locked Rotor Accident
5. Control Rod Ejection Accident
6. Main Steam Line Break
7. Steam Generator Tube Rupture
8. Loss-of Load Event

In addition, the updated analyses reflect the results of a "licensing basis verification / design basis re-constitution" effort that was initiated by PG&E to support a total upgrade of the listed radiological post-accident dose consequence analyses. Appendix B provides a comparison of the critical input parameter values utilized in the current licensing basis dose consequence analysis versus that used to support this AST application.

Also included in this application is the use of updated atmospheric dispersion factors for the site boundary (EAB & LPZ), control room and technical support center. (Refer to Chapter 5.0 for detail)

The proposed changes to the current licensing basis that are incorporated in these analyses are summarized in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 provides a summary of the proposed plant modifications. Section 2.3 identifies the key plant operating procedures that will be updated. The full set of impacted procedures will be addressed in the AST ECP.

The assumptions and methodology utilized to estimate the dose consequences at the site boundary and in the control room for the listed design basis accidents are summarized in this Chapter. Parameter values are selected to ensure bounding dose consequences applicable to either unit.

In accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.183, the assumptions regarding the occurrence and timing of a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) during an accident are selected with the intent of maximizing the dose consequences. A LOOP is assumed for events that have the potential to cause grid perturbation. The dose consequences of the LOCA, MSLB, SGTR, LRA, CREA and LOL event are evaluated with the assumption of a LOOP concurrent with reactor trip. The assumption of a LOOP related to a postulated design basis accident which leads to a reactor trip does not directly correlate to an FHA. Specifically, a FHA does not directly cause a reactor trip and a subsequent LOOP due to grid instability; nor can a LOOP be the initiator of an FHA. Thus the FHA dose consequence analyses are evaluated without the assumption of a LOOP.

The worst 2-hour period dose at the EAB, and the dose at the LPZ for the duration of the release, is calculated for each of the above events based on postulated airborne radioactivity

releases. This represents the post-accident dose to the public due to inhalation and submersion for each of these events. Due to distance/plant shielding, the dose contribution at the EAB / LPZ due to direct shine from contained sources is expected to be negligible for all the accidents. However, for purposes of completeness, the direct shine dose at the EAB following a LOCA was evaluated and the almost insignificant dose contribution (< 0.01 rem) included in the dose estimate.

The 30-day integrated dose to an operator in the Control Room due to airborne radioactivity releases is developed for all of the listed design basis accidents. This represents the post-accident dose to the operator due to inhalation and submersion.

The CR shielding design is based on the LOCA which represents the worst case DBA relative to radioactivity releases. The direct shine dose due to contained sources / the external radioactive cloud is included in the CR doses reported for the LOCA.

In accordance with current licensing basis, the 30-day integrated dose to an operator in the Technical Support Center (TSC) due to immersion, inhalation and direct shine is evaluated for the DBA that has the worst case radioactivity release, i.e., the LOCA.

7.1 Control Room Design / Operation / Transport Model

The DCPP main control room (CR) serves both units and is located at El 140' of the Auxiliary Building. The walls facing the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments (i.e., the north and south walls) are made of 3'-0" concrete, whereas the CR east and west walls are made up of 2'-0" concrete. The floor and ceiling thickness / material reflect a minimum of 2'-0" and 3'-4" of concrete, respectively. The CR Mechanical Equipment and HVAC room is located adjacent to the CR (east side), at El 154'-6".

The CR has a normal intake per unit (each located on opposite sides the Auxiliary Building; i.e., north and south), and a pressurization flow intake per unit (each located on either side of the Turbine Building, i.e., north and south). The DCPP CR pressurization air intakes have dual ventilation outside air intake design as defined by Regulatory Position C.3.3.2 of RG 1.194. (See Section 5.2 for additional details)

During normal operation (CRVS Mode 1), both CR normal intakes are operational. Redundant PG&E Design Class I radiation monitors located at each CR normal intake (1-RE-25/26, 2-RE-25/26) have the capability of isolating the CR normal intakes on detection of high radiation and switching the CRVS to Mode 4 operation (i.e., CR filtered intake and pressurization). Other signals that initiate CRVS Mode 4 operation include the safety injection signal (SIS) and Containment Isolation Phase A. The SIS does not directly initiate CRVS Mode 4, however, it initiates Containment Isolation Phase A which initiates Mode 4.

CRVS Mode 4 operation utilizes redundant PG&E Design Class I radiation monitors located at each CR pressurization air intake and the provisions of acceptable control logic to automatically select the least contaminated inlet at the beginning of the accident, and manually select the least contaminated inlet during the course of the accident. Thus, during Mode 4 operation the dose consequence analyses can utilize the χ/Q values for the more favorable pressurization air intake reduced by a factor of 4 to credit the "dual intake" design (See Section 5.2 for additional

details).

During normal operations, 2100 (±10%) cfm of unfiltered air is drawn into the control room envelope (i.e., ~170,000 ft^3 of free volume) from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 normal intakes for a total of 4200 (±10%) cfm. In response to a CR radiation monitor or SI signal, the CR switches to CRVS Mode 4 operation, and control logic ensures that the CRVS pressurization fan of the non-accident unit is initiated and air is taken from the less contaminated of the Unit 1 or Unit 2 CR pressurization air intakes. The pressurization flow at either intake ranges between 650 - 900 cfm. The CR pressurization flowrate used in the dose consequence analyses is selected to maximize the estimated dose in the control room. With the exception of 100 cfm which is assumed to be unfiltered due to backdraft damper leakage, the pressurization flow is filtered.

The allowable methyl iodide penetration and filter bypass for the CRVS Mode 4 Charcoal Filter is controlled by DCPP TS 5.5.11 and is <2.5% and <1%, respectively. In accordance with the NRC SER for License Amendment Nos. 163 and 165, PG&E has committed to the test methods of ASTM D3803-1989, and thus in accordance with the guidance provided in GL 99-02 (Reference 41), use is made of a safety factor of 2 in determining the charcoal filter efficiency to be used in safety analyses. Thus the CR charcoal filter efficiency for elemental and organic iodine used in the DCPP safety analyses is 100% - [(2.5% + 1%) x 2] = 93%. The acceptance criteria for the in-place test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters in DCPP TS 5.5.11 is a "penetration plus system bypass" < 1.0%. Thus using methodology similar to the charcoal filters, the HEPA filter efficiency for particulates used in the DCPP safety analyses is 100% - [(1%) x 2] = 98%.

During Mode 4 operation, the CR air is also recirculated and a portion of the recirculation flow filtered through the same filtration unit as the pressurization flow. The range of the flow through the filter banks is 1800 – 2200 cfm with the minimum filtered recirculation flow being 1250 cfm.

Unfiltered inleakage into the CR during Mode 1 and Mode 4 is assumed to be 70 cfm (includes 10 cfm for ingress/egress based on the guidance provided in SRP 6.4). Note that the December 2012 Control Room Tracer Gas Test recorded a maximum unfiltered inleakage of 37 cfm (i.e., 32±5 cfm). (Reference 50)

The CRVS Mode 4 parameter values assumed in the dose consequence analyses are summarized below. These values encompass the results of the recent control room tracer gas test.

Mode 4 CR Parameters	Min Flow (cfm)	Max Flow (cfm)
Pressurization Flow	650	900
Backdraft damper Lkg.	100	100
Filtered Intake	550	800
Charcoal Filter Flow	1800	2200
Filtered Recirc Flow	1250	1400
Unfiltered Inleakage	70	70
CR Exhaust Flow	720	970

For purposes of estimating the post-accident dose consequences, the DCPP control room (CR) is modeled as a single region. When in CRVS Mode 4, the Mode 1 intakes are isolated and outside air is a) drawn into the CR through the filtered emergency intakes; b) enters the CR as infiltration, c) enters the CR during operator egress/ingress, and d) enters the CR as unfiltered leakage via the emergency intake back draft dampers. The direction of flow uncertainty on the CRVS ventilation intake flowrates (normal as well as accident), are selected to maximize the dose consequence in the CR.

As discussed in Section 7.0, the dose consequence analyses for the events that can cause grid instability and credit CRVS Mode 4 operation (i.e., the LOCA, MSLB, SGTR and the CREA), assume a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) concurrent with reactor trip.

In accordance with current licensing basis the non-accident unit is assumed unaffected by the LOOP. Thus, to address the effect of a LOOP, and taking into consideration the fact that the time of receipt of the signal to switchover from CRVS Mode 1 to Mode 4 is dependent on the time of reactor trip and is therefore accident specific:

- Automatic isolation of the CR normal intake of the "non-accident" unit, is delayed by 12 seconds from receipt of the signal to switch to CRVS Mode 4. This delay takes into account a 2 second SI signal processing time and a 10 second damper closure time.
- Automatic isolation of the CR normal intake of the "accident" unit, and credit for CRVS Mode 4 operation is delayed by 38.2 seconds from receipt of the signal to switch to CRVS Mode 4. This delay takes into account a) 28.2 seconds for the diesel generator to become fully operational including sequencing delays, and b) 10 seconds for the CR ventilation dampers to re-align. The 2 second SI signal processing time occurs in parallel with diesel generator sequencing and is therefore not included as part of the delay. In addition, and as discussed earlier, the CRVS system design ensures that upon receipt of a signal to switch to Mode 4, the CR pressurization fans of the non-accident unit is initiated; thus fan ramp-up is assumed to occur well within the 38.2 seconds delay discussed above, unhampered by a LOOP.

As discussed in Section 7.0, the FHA dose consequence analyses do not address the potential effects of a LOOP.

The dose consequence analyses for the LRA and the LOL event assume that the CR remains in normal operation mode and do not credit CRVS Mode 4 operation.

Table 7.1-1 lists key assumptions / parameters associated with DCPP control room design.

7.2 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

The accidental rupture of a main coolant pipe is the event assumed to initiate a large break LOCA. Analyses of the response of the reactor system, including the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), to ruptures of various sizes are presented in DCPP UFSAR Sections 15.3.1 and 15.4.1. As demonstrated in these analyses, the ECCS, using emergency power, is designed to keep cladding temperatures well below melting and to limit zirconium-water reactions to an insignificant level. However, as a result of the increase in cladding temperature

and the rapid depressurization of the core, some cladding failure may occur in the hottest regions of the core. Following the cladding failure, some of the core fission products would be released to the primary coolant and subsequently to the inside of the containment building. There are several passive and active fission product removal mechanisms available inside containment. Active mechanisms include radioactive particulate and iodine removal by the containment sprays inclusive of the containment air mixing provided by the containment fan coolers. DCPP UFSAR Section 6.2 describes the design and operation of the containment spray system and the containment fan coolers.

RG 1.183, Appendix A, identifies the large break LOCA as the design basis case of the spectrum of break sizes for evaluating performance of release mitigation systems and the containment, and for facility siting relative to radiological consequences.

AST methodology as provided by RG 1.183 presents a more credible accident scenario than the instantaneous fuel damage scenario depicted in TID-14844 with respect to fission product releases from the core following a LOCA, and the timing and chemical form of such releases.

The core damage sequence of a AST LOCA scenario as defined by RG 1.183 addresses a delayed radioactivity release, i.e., a gap release starting at t=30 secs, followed by fuel melt starting at t = 30 mins and continuing on to t = 1.8 hrs. At DCPP, containment spray in the injection mode is exhausted within approximately an hour after accident initiation, or earlier if full safeguards is available. Thus in order for the containment spray to continue to be effective as a fission product removal mechanism, the sprays have to be made available beyond the injection mode and continue on in the recirculation mode.

7.2.1 Use of Containment Spray in the Recirculation Mode

DCPP is designed and licensed to operate using containment spray in the recirculation mode. In accordance with current licensing basis, and as documented in the NRC SER related to License Amendment No. 139 to Facility Operating License No's DPR-80 and DPR-82 (Reference 54), containment spray is not required per analyses to be actuated during recirculation, but may be actuated in accordance with the EOPs or at the discretion of the Technical Support Center. With this application, TS Bases 3.6.6 and the associated emergency operating procedures will be updated to require initiation of containment spray in the recirculation mode from the control room within 12 minutes of termination of injection spray.

Minimum Core flow rate and Containment Spray flow rate when CS is operating in the recirculation mode.

- The minimum ECCS core flow available when containment spray is operating in the recirculation mode is 713.4 gpm in addition to the spill flow via the break. The above value is greater than the required core flow rate acceptance criteria of 709.6 gpm and is based on a single active failure of Train B to minimize the available pumps for core cooling. Thus the minimum ECCS core flow is based on operation with 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump / 1 Safety Injection Pump (SI) Pump / 1 Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP). Note that the minimum *required* ECCS core flow of 709.6 gpm was determined by Westinghouse as 1.2 times the core boil-off with Replacement Steam Generators. The boil-off rates are conservatively calculated based on the minimum

RWST drain-down time of 24 minutes, and an assumed saturation temperature of 212°F for the ECCS fluid downstream of the RHR heat exchanger. The predicted minimum ECCS core flow rate of 713.4 gpm when operating in the recirculation spray mode is based on the calculated ECCS fluid temperature downstream of the RHR heat exchanger; thus the margin between the minimum ECCS core flow rate when operating in the recirculation spray mode, and the acceptance criteria will increase if it is adjusted to 212°F.

- The minimum containment recirculation spray flow rate is determined to be 1211 gpm. The above value is based on Valves 8809A and B being closed during the recirculation spray mode which is in accordance with current licensing basis. A single active failure of the Train-A RHR pump is assumed to minimize the CS flow and maximize the flow to the core. In summary, the minimum CS flowrate is based on operation with 1 RHR Pump / 2 SI Pumps / 2 CCPs.

7.2.2 Activity Release Pathways following a LOCA

DCPP has identified six activity release paths following a LOCA

1. Release via the Containment Pressure / Vacuum Relief pathway to the environment until the containment isolation valves are closed.

2. Containment leakage to the environment after containment isolation is achieved.

3. Sump water leakage from ESF systems that recirculate sump water outside containment.

4. Failure of the RHR pump seal at T=24 hrs resulting in a 50 gpm leak of sump water for 30 mins.

   Note: DCPP design includes an ESF atmosphere filtration system, so from a regulatory standpoint per SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B (Reference 51), as well as RG 1.183, inclusion of this leakage path in dose consequences is not required. However, the RHR pump seal failure resulting in a "filtered" release is DCPP's licensing basis with respect to passive single failure, and will be maintained for this application. Specifically,

   - *UFSAR Section 3.1.1.1 (Single Failure Criteria / Definitions), Item 2; discusses passive failures – "The structural failure of a static component that limits the component's effectiveness in carrying out its design function. When applied to a fluid system, this means a break in the pressure boundary resulting in abnormal leakage not exceeding 50 gpm for 30 minutes. Such leak rates are assumed for RHR pump seal failure."*

   - *UFSAR Appendix 6.3A.3.2 (discusses passive failures), indicates that – the design of the auxiliary building and related equipment is based on handling of leaks up to a maximum of 50 gpm. Means are provided to detect and isolate such leaks in the emergency core cooling pathway within 30 mins*

   - *UFSAR Section 15.5.17.2.8 indicates that - failure of an RHR pump seal at 24 hrs is assumed as the single failure that can be tolerated without loss of the required functioning of the RHR system*

Therefore, the RHR Pump Seal Failure is retained as a release pathway for the AST dose consequence analysis.

5. Releases to the environment from the MEDT which collects component leakage hard-piped to the MEDT. The collected fluid includes both post-LOCA sump water and other non-radioactive fluid.

6. Releases to the environment via the refueling water storage tank (RWST) vent due to post-LOCA sump fluid back-leakage into the RWST via the mini-flow recirculation lines connecting the high head and low head safety injection pump discharge piping to the RWST.

The DCPP LOCA dose consequence analysis follows the guidance provided in the pertinent sections of RG 1.183 including Appendix A. Table 7.2-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following a LOCA at either unit.

7.2.3 Dose from Submersion and Inhalation

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a LOCA.

7.2.3.1 Containment Pressure /Vacuum Relief Line Release

In accordance with RG 1.183, Appendix A, Section 3.8, for containments such as DCPP that are routinely purged during normal operations, the dose consequence analysis must assume that 100% of the radionuclide inventory in the primary coolant is released to the containment at the initiation of the LOCA. The inventory of the release from containment should be based on primary coolant equilibrium activity as allowed by the Technical Specifications (see Table 4.2-1). Iodine spikes need not be considered.

Thus, in accordance with the above guidance, the 12 inch containment vacuum / over pressure relief valves are assumed to be open to the extent allowed by DCPP Technical Specifications (i.e., blocked to prevent opening beyond 50 degrees) at the initiation of the LOCA, and the release via this pathway terminated as part of containment isolation. The analysis assumes that 100% of the radionuclide inventory in the primary coolant, assumed to be at Technical Specification levels, is released to the containment at T= 0 hours. It is conservatively assumed that 40% of release flashes and is instantaneously and homogeneously mixed in the containment atmosphere, and that the activity associated with the volatiles, i.e., 100% of the noble gases and 40% of the iodine in the reactor coolant, is available for release to the environment via this pathway.

Containment pressurization (due to the RCS mass and energy release), combined with the relief line cross-sectional area, results in a 218 acfs release of containment air to the environment for a conservatively estimated period of 13 seconds. Credit is taken for pressure boundary integrity of the containment pressure / vacuum relief system ductwork which is classified as PG&E Design Class II, and seismically qualified; thus, environmental releases are via the Plant Vent.

Since the release is isolated within 13 seconds after LOCA, i.e., before the onset of the gap phase release, releases associated with fuel damage are not postulated. The chemical form of the iodine released from the RCS to the environment is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.

7.2.3.2 Containment Leakage

The inventory of fission products in the reactor core available for release into the containment following a LOCA is provided in Table 4.1-1 which represents a conservative equilibrium reactor core inventory of the dose significant isotopes assuming maximum full power operation at 1.05 times the current licensed thermal power, and taking into consideration fuel enrichment and burnup. The notes provided at the bottom of Table 4.1-1 provide information on isotopes used to estimate the inhalation and submersion doses following a DCPP LOCA, vs isotopes that are considered to estimate the post-LOCA direct shine dose.

Per RG 1.183, the fission products released from the fuel are assumed to mix instantaneously and homogeneously throughout the free air volume of the primary containment as it is released from the core. Containment spray is utilized as one of the primary means of fission product cleanup following a LOCA. Mixing of the "effectively" sprayed volume of containment, with the unsprayed volume of the containment is enhanced by operation of the PG&E Design Class I containment fan coolers. In order to quantify the effectiveness of the containment spray system, both the volume fraction of containment that is sprayed, and the mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed volumes are quantified.

The LOCA dose consequence analysis is based on an assumed worst case single failure of loss of one ESF train. A single train ESF consists of one train of ECCS, one train of CSS, and two Containment Fan Cooling Units (CFCUs). A single train scenario is selected to be consistent with the use of reduced iodine and particulate removal coefficients associated with single train operation.

7.2.3.2.1 Spray Duration

Containment Spray in the injection mode is initiated at 111 seconds after the LOCA and terminated at 3798 seconds. Manual operation is credited to initiate containment recirculation spray. Thus, based on single train operation, containment spray in the recirculation mode is initiated at 4518 seconds (i.e., twelve (12) minutes after injection spray is terminated), and terminated at 22,518 seconds. In summary, containment spray operation (injection plus recirculation) is credited until 6.25 hrs post-LOCA, with a twelve minute gap after injection spray is terminated.

7.2.3.2.2 Effectively Sprayed Volume Fraction of Containment

The current licensing basis containment sprayed volume for the spray injection mode is calculated based on the assumption that the unoccupied containment volume above the operating floor is 100% covered by sprays. It includes the sprayed volume below the grating in the operating floor deck, and the refueling cavity volume. The percentage of the total containment free volume that is sprayed is 82.5%.

To justify the assumption that the unoccupied containment volume above the operating floor is 100% covered by sprays, the analysis supporting the current licensing basis containment spray coverage during the spray injection mode with only one CSS train operating estimated the projected unsprayed area percentage of the containment deck area of 42% for Unit 1 and 44% for Unit 2, using actual spray flow patterns. The spray reduction factor of 0.5 used to address the spray compression effect due to elevated containment pressure was conservatively based on the containment design pressure. It was concluded that the whole volume above the operating floor can be considered well mixed and totally subjected to the sprays given the estimated spray coverage calculated above based on actual spray patterns, and the high levels of turbulence due to spray action, entrainment of the air from the volume outside the spray patterns, and induced upflow of air to balance the downflow experienced in the sprayed volume.

In support of this application, an analysis was performed to evaluate the effect of the reduction in spray flow rate between the spray injection phase (i.e., 2456 gpm) and the spray recirculation phase (i.e., 1211 gpm) on the containment spray coverage. The minimum volumetric flow rate of water through the spray nozzles, the associated nozzle water pressure drop, and Figure 1 of NUREG/CR-5966 (Reference 33), were used to establish the effect of the reduction in spray flow rate on the spray pattern. The analysis determined that with the continued use of a spray reduction factor of 0.5 for spray compression, there was a 3% increase in the "unsprayed area percentage of the containment deck" for both Units. It concluded that the use of a spray pattern reduction factor of 0.5 is extremely conservative when applied to the recirculation mode (the containment pressure is substantially lower than the design pressure), and that use of a sprayed volume of 82.5% of the containment free volume, is acceptable, for both the containment spray injection as well as the containment spray recirculation mode.

7.2.3.2.3 Mixing between Sprayed and Unsprayed Regions of Containment

The PG&E Design Class I containment fan cooler units support post-LOCA mixing of the sprayed and unsprayed volume of the containment at a rate higher than that justified by natural convection. The containment mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed regions following a LOCA is determined to be 9.13 turnovers of the unsprayed regions per hour. This mixing rate is based on the operation of two Containment Fan Coolers Units (CFCUs) with a total volumetric flow rate of 68,000 cfm, between the unsprayed regions and sprayed regions. The design flow for each CFCU is 47,000 cfm; the value used to determine the mixing rate addresses surveillance margins and uncertainty.

Review of the layout and arrangement of the intake and exhaust registers of the CFCUs indicate that the air intakes are all located above the operating floor (sprayed region) and the air discharge registers are all located below the operating floor in the unsprayed region. Additional review of the containment configuration including the location of major openings, and the various active and passive mixing mechanisms, results in the conclusion that following a LOCA, credit can be taken for a) the entire flowrate provided by each operating CFCU to support mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions, and b) homogeneous mixing within the sprayed and unsprayed regions, of the volume of air transferred from one region to the other due to CFCU operation. CFCU operation is initiated at 86 seconds after the LOCA and operates for the duration of the accident. In accordance with RG 1.183, Appendix A, Section 3.3, prior to CFCU initiation, the dose consequence model assumes a mixing rate attributable to

natural convection between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of 2 turnovers of the unsprayed region per hour.

7.2.3.2.4 Fission Product Removal

RG 1.183, Appendix A, Section 3.3, invokes SRP 6.5.2 (Reference 42) and NUREG/ CR 5966 (Reference 33) as acceptable models for removal of iodines and particulates.

Regulatory guidance provided in SRP 6.5.2 outlines simplified methodology to develop steady state and conservative iodine and particulate removal coefficients in the containment for post-LOCA fission products. However, since with implementation of AST, the releases from the core are assumed to be predominantly particulate in nature, refinement of the SRP 6.5.2 methodology in determining particulate removal coefficients is deemed appropriate.

RG 1.183, Appendix A, Section 3.3, permits the use of time-dependent particulate aerosol removal coefficients by invoking NUREG/CR 5966, and indicates that no reduction in particulate aerosol removal coefficients is required when a DF of 50 is reached if the removal rates are based on the calculated time-dependent airborne aerosol mass.

Thus the fission product removal coefficients developed for the LOCA reflect the following guidance documents:

- Elemental iodine removal coefficients are calculated using guidance provided in SRP 6.5.2 which is invoked by Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A, Sec 3.3
- Time dependent particulate aerosol removal coefficients are estimated using guidance provided in RG 1.183 Appendix A, Sec 3.3, for alternative source terms, and use of CB&I S&W Inc. computer program SWNAUA

The total elemental iodine and particulate removal coefficients in the sprayed and unsprayed region of the containment as a function of time are summarized in Table 7.2-2. The methodology utilized to develop these values is summarized below.

1. Particulate Removal

There are several aerosol mechanics phenomena that promote the depletion of aerosols from the containment atmosphere. These include the natural phenomena of particle growth due to agglomeration, gravitational settling of particles (also called gravitational sedimentation), diffusiophoresis (particulate removal due to steam condensation); and removal by fluid mechanical interaction with the falling droplets that enter the containment atmosphere through the spray system nozzles (i.e., containment spray).

All of the above phenomena are credited for DCPP. Agglomeration of the aerosol is considered in both sprayed and unsprayed regions. In the sprayed region, the particulate removal calculation takes credit for the removal effectiveness of diffusiophoresis and sprays. Gravitational settling is considered only in the unsprayed region.

The methodology presented below envelopes both Unit 1 and Unit 2 and addresses the development *of time-dependent particulate aerosol removal coefficients.*

a. Removal of Particulates by Sprays

The particulate removal rate is calculated using CB&I S&W Inc. computer code SWNAUA. Computer code SWNAUA is a derivative of NAUA/MOD 4 (Reference 40). The results of SWNAUA have been accepted by the NRC for the AST applications supporting the design certification of CE System 80+, and for operating nuclear plants Beaver Valley Power Station [ML032530204] and Fort Calhoun Station [ML013030027].

The NAUA/MOD4 code does not include a model for aerosol removal by sprays. The aerosol removal model for sprays was developed and incorporated into the SWNAUA code by CB&I S&W Inc. as a conservative model suitable for design basis accident calculations. The model correlations implemented into SWNAUA conservatively underestimate the spray removal coefficient. The spray model incorporated in the SWNAUA code was originally described in Reference 34. When performing DBA calculations to determine particulate removal in the effectively sprayed region of the containment, only the conservatively developed spray removal models and conservative steam condensation rates for the diffusiophoresis calculation are utilized. While agglomeration is considered in the calculation, its impact on the resulting particulate removal rates is negligible. In summary, the aerosol removal rates calculated by SWNAUA are conservative lower bound estimates.

The spray model in SWNAUA evaluates the particulate removal efficiency for each particle size in the aerosol by the following mechanisms: inertial impaction, interception, and Brownian diffusion. The aerosol removal constant due to spray is presented in NUREG-0772 (Reference 35) as:

$$\lambda_{spray} = \frac{3 F_m h \varepsilon}{4 R_{sp} \rho_w V} x \frac{v_{spray} - v_{sed}}{v_{spray}}$$

Where

λ_{spray}	=	Particulate removal constant for spray (sec^{-1})
F_m	=	Spray mass flow rate (gm/sec)
h	=	Spray fall height (cm)
ε	=	Collision efficiency
R_{sp}	=	Spray droplet radius (cm)
ρ_w	=	Density of the spray droplet (gm/cm^3)
V	=	Effectively sprayed volume of containment (cm^3)
v_{spray}	=	Velocity of the spray droplets (cm/sec)
v_{sed}	=	Aerosol sedimentation velocity (cm/sec)

The collision efficiency is divided into three contributing mechanisms as described in BMI-2104 (Reference 36):

$$\varepsilon = \varepsilon_i + \varepsilon_r + \varepsilon_d$$

Where

ε_i	=	Efficiency due to inertial impaction,
ε_r	=	Efficiency due interception and
ε_d	=	Efficiency due to Brownian diffusion.

For viscous flow around the spray droplet, the inertial impaction efficiency is given in NUREG-0772 (Reference 35):

$$\varepsilon_i = \frac{1}{\left[1 + \frac{0.75 \ln (2\,\mathrm{Stk})}{\mathrm{Stk} - 1.214}\right]^2}$$

The critical Stokes number, Stk, for viscous flow is 1.214; for Stk below this value, the model assumes the efficiency of inertial impaction is 0.0. The Stk is calculated from BMI-2104 (Reference 36):

$$\mathrm{Stk} = \frac{2 \rho_p r^2 C_c (v_{spray} - v_{sed})}{9 \mu R_{sp}}$$

Where

r	=	Aerosol particle radius (cm)
ρ_p	=	Aerosol density (gm/cc)
C_c	=	Cunningham slip correction factor,
μ	=	Gas viscosity (gm/(cm-sec))

For droplet sizes typical of nuclear plant spray systems, the data of Walton and Woolcock (Reference 37) show that collision efficiency will be closer to that predicted for potential flow around the droplet. Calvert (Reference 38) fitted this data to the expression:

$$\varepsilon_i = \left(\frac{\mathrm{Stk}}{\mathrm{Stk} + 0.7}\right)^2$$

The collision efficiency predicted by this equation is always higher than that predicted by the viscous flow expression given above. The Calvert's fit is employed in this calculation.

As for the remaining constituents of the collision efficiency, the spray model employs an interception efficiency of the form:

$$\varepsilon_r \cong \frac{3}{2}\left(\frac{r}{R_{sp}}\right)^2 x \left(1 - \frac{1}{3}\frac{r}{R_{sp}}\right)$$

which is a conservative approximation of the expression given by BMI-2104 (Reference 36). The efficiency due to Brownian motion is also taken from this report:

$$\varepsilon_d = 3.5 Pe^{-2/3}$$

Where

Pe	=	Peclet number
	=	$2v_{spray}R_{sp}/D_B$,
D_B	=	Aerosol diffusion coefficient (cm^2/sec)
	=	k_{Boltz}TB (Fuchs, Reference 39, p. 181),
k_{Boltz}	=	Boltzmann constant
	=	1.3804×10^{-16} (erg/°K).
T	=	Temperature (°K)

Fuchs (Reference 39, p. 27) gives the aerosol mobility, B:

$$B = \frac{C_c}{6\pi\mu r}$$

In most cases, the overall collision efficiency is dominated by inertial impaction, but for small aerosols, Brownian diffusion may become dominant. The collision efficiency due to inertial impaction increases as the aerosol size is increased, whereas that due to Brownian diffusion increases as the aerosol size decreases.

The model has the capability of handling a distribution of up to 20 droplet radii with the spray removal efficiency being determined for each aerosol size bin.

Elia and Lischer (Reference 34) investigated the use of a single spray droplet size in the analysis instead of a drop size distribution. While Reference 34 does not specifically analyze the DCPP spray system, the parameter sensitivities for the spray model are applicable. The paper demonstrates that the droplet diameter distribution can be represented by a single diameter that is the mass mean diameter. The case 6 droplet distribution presented in the paper is for the SPRACO 1713A nozzle that is frequently used by the nuclear industry for fission product/heat removal spray systems. This diameter approximates that used in case 1, 1000μ. The spray flow rate used for both case 1 and case 6 is 10,000 gpm. Table 2 in the paper indicates that the spray removal rates for these two cases are very close. The mass mean spray droplet radii for DCPP are specified in the table below.

The paper also investigated the variation of particulate removal coefficient with droplet diameter. Cases 1 through 3 vary the mass mean droplet diameter from 500μ to 1500μ. Although Table 2 in the paper indicates that these cases assume a spray flow of 10,000 gpm, the spray removal coefficient reduction by about 67 percent is expected to be independent of spray flow rate.

The bounding plant parameters for the DCPP Units are listed below.

Plant Parameters for Fission Product Cleanup Calculations

Parameter	Value
Sprayed Containment Volume	5.960×10^{10} cm^3
Fall Height	3,536 cm
Spray Flow Rate	2,456 gpm (111 - 3,798 sec) 0 gpm (3,798 - 4,518 sec) 1,211 gpm (4,518 - 22,518 sec)
Spray droplet radius	500×10^{-4} cm : (111- 3,798 sec)* 500×10^{-4} cm : (4,518 - 22,518 sec)

* Spray droplet radius during the injection phase conservatively assigned the larger droplet radius applicable to the recirculation phase.

The DCPP spray coverage fraction of 82.5% is utilized for the duration of injection and recirculation spray.

The DCPP containment pressure, temperature, and relative humidity transient data following the limiting DBA are presented in Table 7.2-2A.

Description of Aerosol

The chemical composition of the aerosol is only important as it relates to the density of aerosol utilized in the development of spray removal rates. The chemical composition during the gap release phase is assumed to be pre-dominantly CsOH. The chemical composition during the in-vessel release phase is assumed to be 20 percent CsOH, 20 percent indium, and 60 percent silver. These assumed compositions are based on a review of the SASCHA experimental results. The aerosol input data for SWNAUA are provided below.

Description of Aerosol	
Minimum Aerosol Radius	1.0000E-07 cm
Maximum Aerosol Radius	1.0000E-02 cm
Maximum Number of Aerosol Size Bins	100
From 30 sec to 1830.0 sec	
Aerosol Injection Rate	10.29 (gm/sec)
Mean Geometric Radius	7.50000E-06 cm
Geometric Standard Deviation	1.56
Aerosol Density	3.7 gm/cc
From 1830 sec to 6510.0 sec	
Aerosol Injection Rate	88.74 (gm/sec)
Mean Geometric Radius	4.00000E-05 cm
Geometric Standard Deviation	1.46
Aerosol Density	4.6 gm/cc

Removal of Particulates by Diffusiophoresis

Particulate matter is entrained in the steam as it flows to the condensation surfaces. This phenomenon is called diffusiophoresis. Steam is assumed to condense on spray droplets, on the containment fan cooler units, and on heat sinks. The diffusiophoresis model in the SWNAUA computer code is the same as that in the NAUA/MOD4 computer code.

The containment steam condensation rates used by SWNAUA are presented in Table 7.2.2B.

The coefficients for removal of particulates from the effectively sprayed and unsprayed regions of the containment are plotted versus time in Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2, respectively. For the effectively sprayed region, the aerosol removal is due to sprays and diffusiophoresis. The particulate removal coefficient in the unsprayed region is due to gravitational settling only.

2. Elemental Iodine Removal

The methodology presented in Section III, 4.C.i, of SRP 6.5.2 (Reference 42) is used to estimate the elemental iodine removal coefficients. The removal of elemental iodine from the containment atmosphere can be attributed due to wall deposition ($\lambda_{E, Wall}$) and due to the action of containment spray ($\lambda_{E, Spray}$)

a. Elemental Iodine Removal Coefficients Due to Wall Deposition (λ_E, Wall)

The elemental iodine removal coefficients due to wall deposition can be estimated using the equation provided in Reference 42.

$$\lambda_{E, Wall} = K_w \cdot A / V$$

Where:

K_w = mass transfer coefficient (ft/hr)
A = wetted surface area (ft^2)
V = volume of the containment (ft^3)

Note: A value of 4.9 m/hr (16.08 ft./hr) for K_w conservatively envelopes all available experimental data (Reference 42).

The total containment surface area (435,256 ft^2) is initially available for wall deposition due to condensation on heat sink surfaces prior to spray actuation after accident. Subsequently, due to heat-up, certain portions of the heat sink surfaces become non-condensing and can no longer be considered as "wetted" surfaces. However, after spray actuation, since the heat sink surfaces in the sprayed region are continuously wetted by sprays, elemental iodine removal due to wall deposition in the sprayed region is valid over the entire period of containment spray operation. The wetted surface area within the sprayed volume is conservatively assumed to be limited to the carbon steel lined containment shell surface area (90,560 ft^2) multiplied by the spray coverage fraction of containment volume. Therefore, wall deposition elemental iodine removal coefficients are calculated during the period (1) prior to containment spray actuation, applicable to the entire containment, and (2) post containment spray actuation, applicable in the sprayed region for the duration of spray operation.

b. Elemental iodine Removal Coefficients Due to Sprays in the Sprayed Region ($\lambda_{E,\ Spray}$)

The elemental iodine removal coefficients due to spray actuation can be estimated using the equation provided in Reference 42.

$$\lambda_{E,\ Spray} = (6\ K_g \cdot t \cdot F) / (V_s \cdot d)$$

Note: This equation is valid for 10 hr^{-1} $\leq \lambda_{E,\ Spray} \leq$ 20 hr^{-1} to prevent extrapolation beyond the existing data for boric acid solution with a pH of 5 (Reference 42).

Where:

K_g	= gas phase mass transfer coefficient (ft/hr)
t	= time of fall of the spray droplets (≈ h/U_T) (hr)
F	= volumetric spray flow rate (ft^3/hr)
V_s	= effectively sprayed containment free volume (ft^3)
d	= mass-mean diameter of the spray droplets (ft)
h	= mean fall height of the spray droplet (ft)
U_T	= terminal velocity of the spray droplet (ft/hr)

The gas phase mass transfer coefficient is determined by using the equation provided on pages 418 and 441 of Reference 43.

$$K_g = (D_g/d) \times 2.0 \times (1 + 0.276 \cdot Re^{1/2}\ Sc^{1/3})$$

where: D_g = diffusivity of iodine in the gas film surrounding the drop (ft^2 /hr)
Re = dimensionless Reynolds number = $U \cdot \rho \cdot d/\mu$
Sc = dimensionless Schmidt number = $\mu / (\rho \cdot D_g)$

7.2.3.2.5 Sump Water pH

SRP Sections 6.1.1 (Reference 45) and 6.5.2 (Reference 42) require that the pH of the sump water be controlled to maintain a minimum value of 7.0 following a LOCA. This is required to prevent re-evolution of the iodine that have been removed from the containment atmosphere by the containment spray and washed into the sump water. A neutral pH also limits material degradation, in particular, stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components in the post LOCA environment.

Long-term retention of iodine in the sump fluid is strongly dependent on the pH. Per SRP 6.5.2, II.1.g, long term iodine retention may be assumed only when the equilibrium sump water pH after mixing and dilution with the primary coolant is above 7. Per RG 1.183, long-term production of acids (hydrochloric acid (HCl) and nitric acid (HNO_3)) by irradiation needs to be addressed in determining whether the plant chemical addition system is adequate for long-term pH control.

NUREG/CR-5732 (Reference 44), states that iodine re-evolution is not a factor if the ultimate sump water pH of ≥ 7 is achieved prior to the time when iodine re-evolution could potentially occur. Section 3.1 of NUREG/CR-5732 notes that the following phenomena occur during the first time interval between t = 0 to t = 1000 min, a) events "leading" to the formation of I_2 by

radiolysis, and b) all HI effects except for those related to pH. Re-evolution (i.e. vapor phase elemental iodine produced by radiolysis and partitioned between the aqueous and gas) can occur in the second time interval which is from t=1000 min to t~2 to 3 weeks. It is therefore concluded that for Light Water Reactors, a pH of 7 must be achieved within 1000 min of the initial post-LOCA release.

At DCPP, RWST drain-down and chemical addition is essentially complete within ~ 1 hour post-LOCA; thus it is expected that as a result of recirculation, the sump water will be well mixed by t=1000 minutes or ~ 16 hours.

As part of the AST application, a conservative analysis is performed to confirm that the sump water pH at thirty (30) days following a LOCA remains greater than 7.0. The analysis assumes the minimum volume / concentration values for NaOH, in combination with the maximum volume / boration values for the water sources contributing to the sump water volume, i.e., the reactor coolant and the RWST. To establish the cable inventory inside containment, a simplified conservative upper bound approach is utilized by taking into consideration a) cable insulation data provided in NUREG/CR-5950 (Reference 46), specifically, the amounts of EPR/Hypalon cable from PWRs listed in Table 2.2 of Reference 46; and b) by examining the mass/type of cable installed in CB&I S&W constructed PWRs. A safety factor of 1.5 is applied to the largest mass of electrical cable identified (was determined to be for a 4-loop PWR with a power level slightly greater than DCPP), to estimate an upper bound value for the electrical cable installed inside the DCPP containments. Although the mass of electrical cable identified was applicable to both insulation and conductors, the DCPP analysis conservatively assumed that it was all insulation. The airborne LOCA radiation dose was conservatively assumed to be 2E+08 Rads which is commonly used for evaluating environmental qualification of electrical equipment in PWR containments, and was recommended post-TMI in IEB 79-01B (Reference 47) as a representative / upper bound value for the beta dose inside containment for PWRs, while the gamma dose estimate was a decade lower.

Based on the above approach, the DCPP minimum ultimate sump pH was conservatively determined to be ~ 7.8 without long-term acid production due to radiolysis, and >7.5 at T=30 days following a LOCA, inclusive of long-term acid production inside containment. Due to the availability of significant margin even with the use of conservative methodology, it is concluded that determination of the actual mass of cable insulation inside the DCPP containments is not required, and that the minimum sump pH at DCPP will be ≥ 7.5 inclusive of acid production. Iodine volatility is analyzed for a maximum sump pH of 7.0.

Based on the above assessment it is concluded that the that the DCPP sump water pH will remain greater than 7.0, and the post-LOCA dose consequence analyses need not consider iodine re-evolution from the sump fluid.

7.2.3.2.6 Containment Leakage Transport Model

As indicated previously, the fission products released from the fuel are assumed to mix instantaneously and homogeneously throughout the free air volume of the primary containment as it is released from the core. In accordance with RG 1.183, two fuel release phases are considered for DBA analyses: (a) the *gap release*, which begins 30 seconds after

the LOCA and continues to t=30 mins and (b) the *early In-Vessel release* phase which begins 30 minutes into the accident and continues for 1.3 hours (i.e., t=1.8 hrs).

Per RG 1.183, the core inventory release fractions, by radionuclide groups, for the gap and early in-vessel damage are as follows. Per Note 10, of Section 3.2 of RG 1.183, the release fractions listed below are acceptable for use with currently approved LWR fuel with a peak rod burnup up to 62,000 MWD/MTU.

Group	Gap Release Phase	Early In-Vessel Release Phase
Noble gas	0.05	0.95
Halogens	0.05	0.35
Alkali Metals	0.05	0.25
Tellurium Group	-	0.05
Ba, Sr	-	0.02
Noble Metals	-	0.0025
Cerium Group	-	0.0005
Lanthanides	-	0.0002

The elements in each radionuclide group released to the containment following a LOCA are assumed to be as follows (note that the groupings were expanded from that in RG 1.183 to address isotopes in the core with similar characteristics; the added isotopes are in bold font):

Noble gases:	Xe, Kr
Halogens:	I, Br
Alkali Metals:	Cs Rb
Tellurium Grp:	Te, Sb, Se, **Sn, In, Ge, Ga, Cd, As, Ag**
Ba,Sr:	Ba, Sr
Noble Metals:	Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo, Tc, Co
Cerium Grp:	Ce, Pu, Np, **Th**
Lanthanides:	La, Zr, Nd, Eu, Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm, Y, Cm, Am, **Gd, Ho, Tb**

As discussed in Section 7.2.3.2.5, current DCPP design includes chemical addition into the containment spray system which ensures a long term sump pH equal to or greater than 7.0. Thus, the chemical form of the radioidine released from the fuel is assumed to be 95% particulate (Cesium iodide (CsI)), 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodine. With the exception of noble gases, elemental and organic iodine, all fission products released are assumed to be in particulate form.

The activity released from the core during each release phase is modeled as increasing in a linear fashion over the duration of the phase. The release into the containment is assumed to terminate at the end of the early in-vessel phase, approximately 1.8 hours after the LOCA.

Isotopic decay, containment leakage and spray removal are credited to deplete the inventory of fission products airborne in containment. Containment Spray in the injection mode is initiated at 111 seconds after the LOCA and terminated at 3798 seconds. As discussed in Section 7.2.3.2.2, the sprays are estimated to cover 82.5% of the containment free volume of 2.55E+06

ft^3. Manual operation is credited to initiate containment recirculation sprays. Thus, based on single train operation, containment spray in the recirculation mode is initiated at 4518 seconds (i.e., twelve (12) minutes after injection spray is terminated), and terminated at 22,518 seconds. In summary, containment spray operation (injection plus recirculation) is credited until 6.25 hrs post-LOCA, with a twelve minute gap after injection spray is terminated.

In the effectively sprayed region the activity transport model takes credit for aerosol removal due to steam condensation and via containment spray based on spray flowrates associated with minimum ESF. It considers mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of the containment, reduction in airborne radioactivity in the containment by concentration dependent aerosol removal lambdas, and isotopic in-growth due to decay.

During spray operation in the injection mode, the elemental iodine removal rate for the sprays exceeds 20 hr^{-1}, the maximum value permitted by SRP Section 6.5.2; thus the elemental iodine removal rate attributable to sprays is limited to 20 hr^{-1}. During recirculation spray operation, the elemental removal rate for the sprays is 19.34 hr^{-1}. As discussed earlier, the wall deposition removal coefficient for elemental iodine has been calculated with the model provided in SRP Section 6.5.2. In sprayed and unsprayed regions, prior to spray actuation, the wall deposition removal coefficient is estimated to be 2.74 hr^{-1}, while during spray operation, and in the sprayed region only, the wall deposition removal coefficient is estimated to be 0.57 hr^{-1}.

In the unsprayed region, the aerosol removal lambdas reflect gravitational settling. No credit is taken for elemental iodine removal in the unsprayed region.

Since the spray removal coefficients are based on calculated time dependent airborne aerosol mass, there is no restriction on the DF for particulate iodine. The maximum DF for elemental iodine is based on SRP 6.5.2 and is limited to a DF of 200. The maximum allowable DF for elemental iodine is developed using methodology outlined in RG 1.183 Section 3.3.

The methodology used to develop the elemental iodine and particulate removal coefficients in the sprayed and unsprayed region of the containment is discussed in Section 7.2.3.2.4. The total elemental iodine and particulate removal coefficients in the sprayed and unsprayed region of the containment as a function of time are summarized in Table 7.2-2

As discussed in Section 7.2.3.2.5, the long term sump water pH is greater than 7.0. Consequently, iodine re-evolution is not addressed.

As discussed in Section 7.2.3.2.3, mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of the containment is assumed for the duration of the accident. CFCU operation is initiated at 86 seconds after the LOCA and operates for the duration of the accident. The containment mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed regions following CFCU initiation is determined to be 9.13 turnovers of the unsprayed regions per hour with a total volumetric flow rate of 68,000 cfm between the unsprayed regions and sprayed regions. In accordance with RG 1.183, Appendix A, Section 3.3, prior to CFCU initiation, the dose consequence model assumes a mixing rate attributable to natural convection between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of 2 turnovers of the unsprayed region per hour.

Radioactivity is assumed to leak from both the sprayed and unsprayed region to the environment at the containment technical specification leak rate for the first day, and half that

leak rate for the remaining duration of the accident (i.e., 29 days). To ensure bounding values, the atmospheric dispersion factors utilized for the containment release path reflects the worst value between the containment wall release point, the plant Vent, the Containment Penetration Area GE (EL 140') and the Containment Penetration Areas GW/FW (EL 140').

7.2.3.3 *ESF System leakage outside Containment*

In accordance with RG 1.183, with the exception of noble gases, all the fission products released from the core during the gap and early in-vessel release phases are assumed to be instantaneously and homogeneously mixed in the primary containment recirculation sump water at the time of release from the fuel. A minimum sump water volume of 480,015 gallons is utilized in this analysis.

In accordance with regulatory guidance, the DCPP ESF systems that recirculate sump fluids outside containment are analyzed to leak at twice the sum of the administratively controlled total allowable leakage applicable to all components in the ESF recirculation systems. With the exception of iodine, all radioactive materials in the recirculating liquid are assumed to be retained in the liquid phase. In addition, per RG 1.183, if the temperature of the leakage exceeds 212°F, the fraction of the total iodine in the liquid that becomes airborne should be assumed equal to the fraction of the leakage that flashes to vapor. However, if the temperature of the leakage is less than 212°F, or the calculated flash fraction is less than 10%, the amount of iodine that becomes airborne should be assumed to be 10% of the total iodine activity in the leaked fluid unless a smaller amount can be justified based on the actual sump pH history data and area ventilation rates.

ESF leakage is assumed to occur at initiation of the recirculation mode for safety injection, which at DCPP occurs as early as t=829 seconds. The maximum temperature of the recirculation fluid is 259.9°F which has a flash fraction less than 10%, thus, per RG 1.183, ten percent (10%) of the halogens associated with this leakage are assumed to be airborne and are exhausted (without mixing and without holdup) to the environment. The iodine release from the core is 95% particulate (CsI), 4.85% elemental and 0.15% organic, however after interactions with sump water the environmental release is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.

At DCPP, the environmental release of ESF system leakage can occur via the 2 pathways listed below. As part of this application, DCPP is proposing to establish administrative acceptance criteria to ensure the total as-tested leakage from ESF systems that recirculate sump fluid outside containment is less than or equal to 126 cc/min, and with the following breakdown:

- Environmental release of ESF System leakage via the plant vent: The sum of the maximum allowable simultaneous leakage from all components in the ESF recirculation systems located in the auxiliary building is limited to 120 cc/min. Thus, and in accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.183, the analysis addresses an ESF leakage of 240 cc/min in the Auxiliary Building (AB). The areas where these components are located are covered by the PG&E Design Class I Auxiliary Building ventilation system which discharges to the environment out of the Plant Vent. Only selected portions of the Auxiliary Building ventilation system are processed through the PG&E Design Class I AB ventilation filters. For purposes of estimating the dose consequences, it is assumed that with the exception of the RHR pump rooms (refer to

Section 7.2.3.4), this release pathway bypasses the PG&E Design Class I AB ventilation filters.

- Environmental release of ESF System leakage via Containment Penetration Area GE and Areas GW and FW: The sum of the maximum allowable simultaneous leakage from all components in the ESF recirculation systems located in the containment penetration areas is limited to 6 cc/min. Thus, and in accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.183, the analysis addresses an ESF leakage of 12 cc/min in the containment penetration areas. The ventilation system covering this area is not PG&E Design Class I, thus the release path to the environment is unfiltered and could occur via the Plant Vent or via the closest structural opening in the Containment Penetration Areas GE and Areas GW and FW.

7.2.3.4 RHR Pump Seal Failure

As discussed in Section 7.2.2, the RHR pump seal failure resulting in a *filtered release* via the plant vent is DCPP's licensing basis with respect to the worst case passive single failure in the RHR System. Therefore, the RHR pump Seal Failure is retained as a release pathway for the AST LOCA dose consequence analysis.

The activity transport model is based on a 50 gpm leak of sump water activity for 30 minutes that occurs 24 hours after the LOCA. The temperature of the recirculation fluid is conservatively assumed to remain at the maximum temperature of 259.9°F. Thus as discussed above in Section 7.2.3.3 under ESF system leakage, the amount of iodine that becomes airborne is assumed to be 10% of the total iodine activity in the leaked fluid.

The ventilation exhaust from the RHR pump rooms is covered by the PG&E Design Class I Auxiliary Building ventilation system and processed through the PG&E Design Class I AB ventilation filters. Thus, credit for filtration of the release of a RHR pump seal failure by the Auxiliary Building Ventilation system is taken in determining the dose consequences to the public at the EAB and LPZ, to the operator in the control room, and to personnel in the technical support center.

The efficiency of the AB charcoal filters is determined using methodology similar to that documented in Section 7.1 for the CRVS Mode 4 ventilation filters. The allowable methyl iodide penetration / filter bypass for the Auxiliary Building Charcoal Filter is controlled by DCPP TS 5.5.11; currently the associated values are 15% and <1%, respectively. With this application, the allowable methyl iodide penetration for the AB filter will be reduced to 5%. Based on the above, an efficiency of 88% is assigned to the charcoal filters in the AB ventilation system prior to environmental release via the plant vent. Similar to the ESF system leakage, the environmental release of iodine is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.

7.2.3.5 *Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Back-Leakage*

Dose consequences associated with the potential for post-LOCA radioactive leakage to tanks vented to the atmosphere was raised in NRC Information Notice (IN) 91-56. (Reference 48)

At DCPP, the safety injection and containment spray systems function to provide reactor core cooling and mitigate the containment pressure and temperature rise, respectively, in the event of a LOCA. Both systems initially take suction from the RWST. Once the RWST water supply is depleted, both the containment spray and safety injection systems are supplied by the RHR System. The RHR pumps take suction from the containment recirculation sump water. Under LOCA conditions, the recirculation sump water is assumed to be radioactively contaminated by fission products, of which the main contributors to airborne dose are the various isotopes of iodine.

Per IN 91-56, during containment sump water recirculation, there is the potential for leakage from the mini-flow recirculation lines connecting the high head and low head safety injection pump discharge piping to the RWST. Since the RWST is vented to the atmosphere, this presents a pathway for iodine release to the atmosphere. As part of this application, DCPP is proposing to establish administrative acceptance criteria to ensure the total as-tested back leakage into the RWST from the containment recirculation sump is less than or equal to 1 gpm.

The methodology discussed below to determine the post-LOCA iodine and noble gas (iodine daughters) releases via the RWST vent has been previously used and accepted by NRC for the Beaver Valley AST application (SER to License Amendment Numbers 257 and 139 for License Nos DPR-66 and NPF-73, [ML032530204]) and for the Prairie Island LOCA Re-analysis [ML091490611]. A technical paper, "Modeling Radioactive Leakage from Atmospheric Tank Vents Following a LOCA", describing this methodology was presented by CB&I S&W Inc. in the ANS Summer Conference in 2007 and is published in Transactions of the American Nuclear Society Volume 96, Radiation Protection and Shielding Session I, pg 441. (Reference 49)

Dose consequences of RWST back-leakage assumes that leakage starts at the switchover to recirculation (829 second following the LOCA) and continues for 30 days. Per regulatory guidance, a safety factor of 2 is applied to the leak rate, i.e., a 2-gpm leakage rate is assumed for the full duration of the event, which is two times the allowable leakage of 1 gpm. Also, in accordance with RG 1.183, with the exception of noble gases, all fission products released from the fuel to the containment are instantaneously and homogeneously mixed in the sump water at the time of release. However, only iodine and their daughter products are released through RWST back-leakage since the particulates would remain in the sump water.

A significant portion of the iodine associated with sump water back-leakage into the RWST is retained within the RWST fluid due to the equilibrium iodine distribution balance between the RWST gas and liquid phases. The time dependent iodine partition coefficient takes into consideration the temperature and pH of the RWST liquid and sump fluid, the RWST liquid and gas volumes, and the temperature, pH and volume of the incoming leakage. The iodines that evolve into the RWST gas space as a result of the equilibrium iodine distribution balance, and the noble gas daughters of iodines, are released to the environment via the RWST vent, at a vent rate established by the temperature transient in the RWST (which includes the effect of decay heat), the increase in the liquid inventory of the RWST due to the incoming leakage, the gases evolving out of incoming leakage, and the environmental conditions outside the RWST.

The average time-dependent RWST iodine release fractions along with the fractional RWST gas venting rates (may be applied to the noble gas daughters of iodines) to the atmosphere from the Units 1 and 2 RWSTs due to RWST back-leakage following switchover to the sump water recirculation mode of operation is summarized in Table 7.2-3. As discussed earlier, the release

fractions / rates presented in Table 7.2-3 reflect a safety factor of 2 on the leak rates, i.e., are developed based on a RWST back-leakage of 2 gpm. The iodine released to the environment is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.

The equilibrium iodine concentration in the RWST gas space utilized to develop Table 7.2-3 is based on the iodine mass in the sump fluid entering the RWST vapor space as back-leakage or the total iodine mass contained in the RWST liquid, whichever results in higher RWST vapor phase concentrations. The RWST maximum venting rate averaged over an interval is primarily based on RWST back-leakage entering the RWST gas space and thermally equilibrating, and is used in conjunction with the higher RWST gas space iodine concentration to calculate an iodine mass release rate as a function of time. An interval based averaging approach is utilized in preparing Table 7.2-3 to reduce the number of input values to the dose analysis while preserving the boundaries for the time periods used for atmospheric dispersion; the actual iodine release calculated in an interval is normalized to the iodine mass leaking into the RWST during that time interval.

Examination of the average gas space venting rates indicate that after the first day, the noble gases formed by decay of iodine will primarily remain in the RWST during the 30 day period of evaluation and not be released. However, the dose consequence analysis conservatively releases the noble gases formed by decay of iodine, directly to the environment without taking any credit for tank holdup.

7.2.3.6 *Miscellaneous Equipment Drain Tank (MEDT) Leakage*

The DCPP Units 1 and 2 MEDT is a covered rectangular (12' x 5' x 10') stainless steel lined concrete tank located in the Auxiliary Building below El 60 ft. The MEDT tank vent is hard-piped to the Auxiliary Building ventilation ductwork; thus the airborne releases from the MEDT are ultimately discharged to the environment via the plant vent.

Following a LOCA, the MEDT will receive both post-LOCA sump fluids as well as non-radioactive fluids (i.e., ESF system leakage from the accident unit, as well as non-radioactive fluids from equipment drains and RWST leakage from the non-accident unit) which are hard-piped to the MEDT. As part of this application, DCPP is proposing to establish administrative acceptance criteria to ensure the total as-tested flow hard piped to the MEDT is less than 950 cc/min of ESF system leakage and 484 cc/min of non-radioactive fluid leakage.

Similar to the RWST back-leakage model, dose consequences due to releases from the MEDT assumes that leakage starts at the switchover to recirculation (829 second following the LOCA) and continues for 30 days. Per regulatory guidance, a safety factor of 2 is applied to the leak rate, i.e., 1900 cc/min of ESF system leakage and 968 cc/min of non-radioactive fluids into the MEDT is assumed for the full duration of the event, which is two times the allowable leakage. For purposes of bounding analyses, the boron concentration of the pre-existing fluid in the MEDT, as well as the incoming leakage is assumed to be at its upper bound levels. With the exception of noble gases, all fission products released from the fuel to the containment are instantaneously and homogeneously mixed in the sump water at the time of release. Only iodine and their daughter products are released through MEDT leakage since the particulates would remain in the sump water.

The methodology used to determine the post-LOCA iodine and noble gas releases via the MEDT vent and Plant Vent has been used previously in evaluating post-LOCA leakage into the RWST. Adaptation of the methodology to address overflows/room ventilation releases is straightforward with the room ventilation rate being treated as the tank exhaust rate. As discussed earlier in Section 7.2.3.5, this equilibrium based methodology for RWST vent release paths has been accepted by NRC for the Beaver Valley AST application (SER to License Amendment Numbers 257 and 139 for License Nos DPR-66 and NPF-73, [ML032530204]) and for the Prairie Island LOCA Re-analysis [ML091490611].

The transport model utilized to determine airborne releases from the MEDT takes into account the fact that the MEDT is a small tank with an auto-transfer capability which is PG&E Design Class II. Consequently, and for purposes of conservatism, it is assumed that a) the LOCA occurs when the MEDT water level is at the normal maximum setpoint to initiate auto transfer, b) the auto-transfer capability is not initiated because it is not a safety function, and c) the MEDT contents will spill over into the Equipment Drain Receiver Tank (EDRT) Room after the tank is full. Thus, for the post-LOCA scenario, the MEDT is conservatively assumed to overflow via its manway into the EDRT Room. The EDRT room drains into the Auxiliary Building Sump (ABS), which ultimately overflows into the U1 / U2 pipe tunnels. The ABS is also a covered rectangular (16' × 5' × 10') stainless steel lined concrete tank with a vent that is hard-piped to the Auxiliary building ductwork with a PG&E Design Class II auto transfer capability. The ABS is located adjacent to the MEDT.

The bounding transient release of iodine along with the gas venting rate to the atmosphere as a result of post-LOCA leakage of radioactive and non-radioactive fluid hard-piped into the MEDT is developed in 2 parts: a) prior to MEDT overflow and b) post MEDT overflow.

a) Prior to MEDT overflow - The iodines evolve into the MEDT gas space as a result of the equilibrium iodine distribution balance between the MEDT gas and liquid phases (either the MEDT liquid inventory or the incoming leakage), and are released to the environment via the plant vent, at a vent rate established by the temperature transient in the MEDT (including the effect of decay heat), the increase in the liquid inventory of the MEDT due to the incoming leakage, and the gases evolving out of the incoming leakage.

b) After MEDT overflow – The equilibrium iodine distribution balance is conservatively assumed to be between the iodine concentrations in the MEDT overflow liquid and the EDRT room (or U1/U2 pipe tunnels) ventilation flow (rather than the average concentration in the EDRT room (or U1/U2 pipe tunnels) free volume). This maximizes the iodine release rate. Thus, the iodines released are a sum total of the following:

    i) the iodines that evolve into the EDRT room air space as a result of the equilibrium iodine distribution balance between the spilled liquid from the MEDT (at the temperature of the MEDT), and the EDRT room ventilation flow, and is released to the environment via the plant vent, at the vent rate established by the EDRT room ventilation system, and

    ii) the iodines that evolve into the U1/U2 Pipe Tunnel air space as a result of the equilibrium iodine distribution balance between the spilled liquid from the MEDT (at the maximum temperature of the U1/U2 Pipe Tunnel), and the U1/U2 Pipe Tunnel

ventilation flow, and is released to the environment via the plant vent, at the vent rate established by the U1/U2 Pipe Tunnel ventilation system

The exhaust fans servicing the EDRT room and pipe tunnel are PG&E Design Class I. There is also a potential that the non-LOCA unit's ABVS will be operating with the flow being exhausted to the associated unit specific plant vent. Thus, it is conservatively assumed that the non-LOCA unit's ABVS is operating, and together with the accident units' exhaust fans, are providing the motive force to exhaust the airborne releases to the environment, unfiltered, via the respective plant vents.

The average time-dependent MEDT iodine release fractions, along with the fractional MEDT gas venting rates (which may be applied to the noble gas daughters of iodines prior to MEDT overflow) to the atmosphere following switchover to the sump water recirculation mode of operation, is summarized in Table 7.2-4. As discussed earlier, the release fractions / rates presented in Table 7.2-4 reflect a safety factor of 2 on the leak rates, i.e., are developed based on an input of 1900 cc/min of ESF system leakage and 968 cc/min of non-radioactive fluids into the MEDT. Through the use of extremely conservative assumptions, the calculated iodine release fractions / gas venting rates presented in Table 7.2-4 when used in combination with the analyzed ESF system leak rate, bound the iodine releases of all combinations of radioactive and non-radioactive leakages less than or equal to the leak rates analyzed. The iodine released from the ventilation system is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic, and is released to the environment via the plant vent. In addition, the dose consequence analysis conservatively releases the noble gases formed by decay of iodine, directly to the environment without taking any credit for tank holdup.

7.2.4 Offsite Dose Assessment

Due to the delayed post-LOCA fuel release sequence of an AST model, and the rate at which aerosols and elemental iodine are removed from the containment, the maximum 2-hour EAB dose for a PWR LOCA typically occurs between 0.5 hrs to 2.5 hrs.

To establish the "worst case 2-hour release window" for the DCPP EAB dose, the integrated dose versus time for each of the six pathways discussed above was evaluated. The 0-2 hr EAB Atmospheric Dispersion Factor was utilized for all cases.

The analysis demonstrated that for DCPP the *maximum 2 hour EAB dose will occur, as a result of the RHR pump seal failure, between T=24 hrs to T=26 hrs, and is unrelated to the post-LOCA fuel release sequence associated with AST.*

For purposes of completeness, the "worst case 2-hour release window" for the DCPP EAB dose is estimated for 2 cases:

a) Without the RHR pump seal failure release, and

b) With the RHR pump seal failure release.

The direct shine dose at the EAB due to a) the airborne activity inside containment, and b) the sump water collected in the RWST due to RWST back-leakage, was also evaluated. Based

on the results of the EAB evaluation which determined that the dose contribution due to direct shine was minimal (<0.01 rem), the dose at the LPZ due to direct shine is deemed negligible.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a LOCA at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.2.5 Control Room Occupancy Dose

7.2.5.1 Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical LOCA-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Timing for Initiation of CRVS Mode 4 (if applicable):

- An SI signal will be generated at t = 6 sec following a LOCA.
- The CRVS normal intake dampers of the accident unit start to close after a 28.2 second delay due to delays associated with diesel generator loading onto the 4kv buses. The CR dampers are fully closed 10 secs later, or at t=44.2 secs (i.e., 6 + 28.2 + 10). The 2 second SI signal processing time occurs in parallel with diesel generator sequencing and is therefore not included as part of the delay.
- In accordance with DCPP licensing basis, the CRVS normal operation dampers of the non-accident unit are not affected by the LOOP and are isolated at t=18 secs (i.e., 6 + 2 secs signal processing time + 10 sec damper closure time).

Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors:

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to a LOCA at either unit are provided in Table 7.2-5. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.2-5 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the LOCA to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a LOCA at either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

7.2.5.2 Direct Shine Dose to the Control Room from External and Contained Sources

The direct shine dose to an operator in the control room due to contained or external sources resulting from a postulated LOCA is calculated using CB&I S&W Inc. point kernel shielding computer program SW-QADCGGP. The post-LOCA gamma energy release rates (MeV/sec) and integrated gamma energy release (MeV-hr/sec) in the various external sources are developed with CB&I S&W Inc. computer program PERC2.

The LOCA sources that could potentially impact the CR operator dose due to direct shine are identified below.

1. Direct shine from containment – shine from the airborne source in the containment structure via the bulk shielding (3'-8" thick concrete walls below the bendline, 2'-6" thick concrete dome), including shine through one of the main steam line penetrations and the Personnel Hatch facing the CR
2. Direct shine from the contaminated cloud outside the control room pressure boundary resulting from containment leakage, ESF system leakage, RHR Pump seal leakage, RWST back-leakage, MEDT leakage - shine occurs through the CR walls, via wall penetrations such as CR doors to the outside, and from the airborne activity in cable spreading room below via CR floor penetrations.
3. Dose due to scattered gamma radiation through wall penetrations from the CRVS filters located in the adjacent mechanical equipment room.
4. Direct shine from the sump fluid that is postulated to collect in the RWST

Cloud shine through CR doorways was found to be the most significant of all the identified contained or external post-LOCA radiation sources listed above, followed by the dose contribution through the CR floor penetrations. Note that other radiation sources were identified and deemed insignificant due to the presence of significant shielding between the operator and the radiation sources. Examples of these dose contributors include most of the large and small electrical and pipe penetrations in the Containment outer wall that faces the CR, and the ESF system piping and components located in the Auxiliary Building.

The direct shine dose estimate in the CR takes into consideration the function of Room 506 (which serves as a control room foyer adjacent to the Shift Supervisor's office), where occupancy is deemed to be minimal; i.e., conservatively estimated at less than 5% of the total time spent daily in the control room. The above "occupancy adjustment" is utilized to determine the maximum 30-day integrated dose in Control Room (i.e., the total direct shine dose in the CR includes the 30-day dose in Room 506 adjusted by the referenced occupancy factor).

The bounding control room operator dose following a LOCA at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.2.6 Control Room Operator Dose during Access

Diablo Canyon assumes that the dose received by the operator during routine access to the control room for the 30 day period following the LOCA is minimal. Thus, as long as some reasonable margin exists between the regulatory limit and the estimated dose to the operator during control room occupancy, the additional dose due to ingress / egress can be accommodated.

This approach is consistent with the approach used by other licensees, and is reasonable since a) transit to and from the control room is only expected after the first 24 hours following the accident by which time the airborne levels inside containment has reduced significantly due to the use of active fission product removal mechanisms such as containment sprays, and radioactive decay, and b) the operator is protected from radioactive ESF fluids by the shielding provided by the buildings that house such equipment. In addition, it is expected that during a

postulated event, access to the control room will be controlled by Health Physics and the Emergency Plan based on real time data, with the purpose of minimizing personnel dose.

It is also noted that the dose received by the operator during transit outside the control room is not a measure of the "habitability" of the control room which is defined by the radiation protection provided to the operator by the control room shielding and ventilation system design. Thus, the estimated dose to the operator during routine post-LOCA access to the control room is addressed separately from the control room occupancy dose which is used for the demonstration of control room habitability.

DCPP's current licensing basis provides an estimated dose contribution to the operator during egress and ingress to the control room following a LOCA. The access dose estimate currently reported in the UFSAR has been part of DCPP's licensing basis since the original Safety Analysis Report. While several of the input values and the calculations for the original ingress/egress dose values are no longer available, selected inputs, the ingress/egress dose values and methodology are still in the UFSAR.

To address the existing licensing basis, a TEDE dose is estimated for operator access to the control room. Because RG 1.183 does not provide guidance on determining the egress and ingress to the control room following an accident, the same inputs used to estimate the current licensing basis values for access to the control room, along with the associated dose estimate presented in the UFSAR, are used to determine the TEDE dose estimate for ingress/egress.

With this application, and consistent with the assumption made by other licensees, PG&E is proposing to demonstrate that the dose contribution due to routine ingress/egress during the accident is minimal.

In accordance with DCPP original licensing basis, radiation exposures to personnel during egress and ingress (i.e., during routine access to the control room for the duration of the accident) could result from the following sources:

(1) Airborne activity in the containment leakage plume

(2) Direct gamma radiation from fission products in the containment structure

Post-accident egress-ingress exposures were based on 27 outbound excursions, from the control room to the site boundary, and 26 inbound excursions, from the site boundary to the control room. It was estimated that each excursion would take 5 minutes, and no credit was taken for breathing apparatus or special whole body shielding.

Egress-ingress thyroid and whole body exposures from airborne activity are functions of containment activity, containment leakage, atmospheric dispersion, and excursion time. The airborne activity concentrations were calculated and the then conventional exposure equations from Regulatory Guide 1.4, Revision 1, were used to calculate gamma, beta, and thyroid exposures (Reference 8). The exposure from betas was calculated on the basis of an infinite uniform cloud, and exposure from gammas was calculated on the basis of a semi-infinite cloud.

Because of the containment shielding and short excursion time, egress-ingress containment shine exposures were estimated to be small. The shine model assumed a cylindrical radiation

source having the same radius and height as the containment structure with a 3.5-foot-thick concrete shield surrounding it. The receptor point was assumed to be a distance of 10 meters from the outer surface of the containment wall.

The estimated egress-ingress exposures developed in support of DCPP original licensing basis are listed below.

- The dose to control room personnel during egress / ingress from airborne fission products in the containment leakage plume: 0.0066 rem gamma, 0.0243 rem beta, and 4.72 rem thyroid

- The dose to control room personnel during egress / ingress as a result of direct radiation shine from the fission products in the containment structure: 0.022 rem.

As part of this AST licensing application, DCPP has identified additional post-LOCA fission product release pathways, as discussed in Section 7.2.2. The postulated effect of these additional radioactivity release paths, as well as the implementation of AST, on the estimated dose to control room personnel during routine egress / ingress takes into consideration the following:

- The transport models used to develop the dose to the control room operator during occupancy address a control room occupancy factor of 1.0 till t=24 hours after the accident. This implies that during the first 24 hours the control room operator stays in the control room. This is also reflected in the DCPP original licensing basis which addresses one more outbound trip than the inbound trips.

- Routine ingress / egress to the control room during the 30 day period following a LOCA falls into the mission dose category as discussed in NUREG-0737, II. B. 2 (Reference 15).

- NUREG-0737, Item II. B. 2 states that leakage of systems outside containment need not be considered as potential sources.

Based on the above considerations, the dose consequences of the additional activity release paths addressed in Section 7.2.2 (and listed below), is addressed as follows:

- Containment Pressure /Vacuum relief release - this release occurs at accident initiation (before t=24hr), so there is no dose contribution to the control operator during routine ingress /egress during the 30 day period following the accident.

- Containment leakage:

  - The airborne activity in the containment after t=24 hours with an AST source term is primarily *100% of the core noble gases and 0.06% of the core iodines* that were released to containment.

    Note: The iodine source term at t=24 hrs is essentially the organic iodines released to the containment which are not effected by sprays, and which per Regulatory Guide 1.183,

represent 0.06% of the core iodines (i.e., 0.15% of the 40% core iodines released to containment atmosphere at accident initiation). Also, the essentially particulate nature of the radioactivity release associated with an AST source term, and the effectiveness of particulate removal by sprays / settling makes the dose contribution from the particulate source minimal after t=24 hours.

- The corresponding airborne activity in the containment after t=24 hours for a TID-14844 source term is *100% of the core noble gases and 1% of the core iodines.*

  Note: Per Regulatory Guide 1.4, Revision 1, the organic iodines released to the containment is 4% of the 25% iodines released to containment atmosphere at accident initiation.

- Based on the above it is concluded that after t=24hrs:

  a. The dose consequences due to containment leakage based on a TID-14844 based scenario will bound the dose consequences based on an AST scenario.

  b. Since the thyroid dose is primarily due to iodines, the associated dose to the operator will vary proportionately to the amount of iodine airborne in containment. Thus the thyroid dose to the operator during ingress /egress for an AST scenario may be estimated by adjusting the TID-14844 based dose by the ratio of the iodine estimated to be airborne in containment for each of the scenarios. As noted earlier, the current licensing basis thyroid dose to the operator during ingress / egress is 4.72 rem. The corresponding thyroid dose based on an AST scenario is estimated to be 4.72 x 0.06 = 0.28 rem thyroid.

- The RHR Pump Seal Failure, ESF System Leakage, RWST back leakage and MEDT leakage – All of these releases are based on leakage of systems outside containment. In accordance with NUREG-0737 II. B. 2, the dose contribution due to these sources need not be considered for access calculations.

To address the TEDE dose acceptance criteria applicable to the use of AST, the original licensing basis egress-ingress exposures have been updated as noted below using the guidance provided in 10CFR20.1003 (Reference 61). The referenced federal regulation defines TEDE as the sum of the deep dose equivalent for external exposures (i.e., external whole body exposure) and the committed effective dose equivalent for internal exposures (i.e., sum of the product of the weighting factor applicable to each organ irradiated and the dose to that organ). Per 10CFR20.1003, the weighting factor for the whole body is 1.0 and for the thyroid is 0.03. While the weighting factor for beta radiation is undefined, the contribution of the beta dose to the total effective dose equivalent is expected to be insignificant. Therefore,

- Radiation from airborne fission products in the containment leakage plume to the control room personnel during egress ingress is approximately 0.0066 rem + 0.28 x 0.03 rem, i.e., 0.015 rem TEDE
- Direct radiation from the fission products in the containment structure to control room personnel during egress ingress is 0.022 rem TEDE.

Thus the total dose to the control room operator during access is estimated to be 0.037 rem TEDE; i.e., 0.015 + 0.022. This value is 1% of the estimated operator dose due to control room occupancy following a LOCA (Refer to Table 8.1-1) and is therefore considered to be minimal.

7.2.7 Technical Support Center Dose

In accordance with current licensing basis, the Technical Support Center (TSC) design has been evaluated for the LOCA.

CB&I S&W Inc. computer code PERC2 is used to calculate the dose to TSC personnel due to airborne radioactivity releases following a LOCA. The direct shine dose to an operator in the TSC due to contained or external sources resulting from a postulated LOCA is calculated using CB&I S&W Inc. point kernel shielding computer program SW-QADCGGP. The post-LOCA gamma energy release rates (MeV/sec) and integrated gamma energy release (MeV-hr/sec) in the various external sources are developed with computer program PERC2.

The TSC serves both units and is located at El 104' on the south-west side of the Unit 2 turbine building and is shared between Unit 1 and Unit 2. The north and south walls are made up of 2'-2" of concrete, whereas the east and west walls are made of 1'-4" and 1'-6" of concrete, respectively. The floor and ceiling thickness / material reflect a minimum of 1'-0" and 1'-8" of concrete, respectively.

As part of this application, DCPP proposes to process the TSC normal ventilation intake flow through a HEPA filter. In addition, the nominal air intake flowrate during normal operations will be 500 cfm. The above air intake is filtered through the referenced HEPA filter and drawn into the TSC envelope which has a free volume of 51,250 ft^3. The TSC normal intake is isolated and the TSC ventilation placed into filtered / pressurized Mode 4 operation by manual operator action within 2 hours of the LOCA.

The post-accident pressurization flow to the TSC is provided via the CRVS Mode 4 pressurization intakes (i.e., 1 per unit, each located on either side of the Turbine Building). As noted in Section 7.1, the DCPP CR pressurization air intakes have dual ventilation outside air intake design. The nominal air intake flowrate during the TSC pressurization mode is 500 cfm.

Mode 4 operation of the TSC utilizes the CRVS. As discussed in Section 7.1, CRVS Mode 4 operation (which also serves the TSC) utilizes redundant PG&E Design Class I radiation monitors located at each pressurization air intake and has the provisions of acceptable control logic to automatically select the least contaminated inlet at the beginning of the accident, and manually select the least contaminated inlet during the course of the accident. Thus, during Mode 4 operation the TSC dose consequence analysis can utilize the χ/Q values for the more favorable pressurization air intake reduced by a factor of 4 to credit the "dual intake" design (See Section 5.2 for additional details).

The allowable methyl iodide penetration and filter bypass for the TSC Mode 4 Charcoal Filter is <2.5% and <1%, respectively. Thus in accordance with GL 99-02 (Reference 41), the CR charcoal filter efficiency for elemental and organic iodine used in the TSC dose analysis is 100% - [(2.5% + 1%) x 2] = 93%. The acceptance criteria for the TSC normal operation and Mode 4 HEPA filters is "penetration plus system bypass" < 1.0%. Thus, using methodology similar to

the charcoal filters, the HEPA filter efficiency for particulates used in the TSC dose analysis is 100% - [(1%) x 2] = 98%.

During TSC Mode 4 operation, the TSC air is also recirculated through the same filtration unit as the pressurization flow. The air flow allowable through the pressurization charcoal / HEPA filter during TSC Mode 4 is 1000 cfm. This flow is comprised of a minimum filtered recirculation flow of 500 cfm and the previously discussed pressurization flow of 500 cfm, for a total flow through the filtration unit of 1000 cfm (pressurization plus recirculation).

Unfiltered inleakage into the TSC during Mode 1 and Mode 4 is assumed to be 60 cfm (includes 10 cfm for ingress/egress based on the guidance provided in SRP 6.4).

For purposes of estimating the post-LOCA dose consequences, the DCPP TSC is modeled as a single region. When in TSC Mode 4, the Mode 1 intakes are isolated and outside air is a) drawn into the TSC through the filtered emergency intakes; b) enters the TSC as infiltration, and c) enters the TSC during operator egress/ingress.

The dose assessment model utilizes nominal values for the ventilation intake flowrates since the intake pathways (normal as well as accident) are filtered, thus the controlling dose contributor is the unfiltered inleakage. The effect of intake flow uncertainty on the TSC dose is expected to be insignificant.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / TSC receptors applicable to a LOCA at either unit are provided in Table 7.2-6. The χ/Q values presented take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the LOCA to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to an accident at either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5.

The direct shine dose into the TSC due to the external cloud and contained sources is calculated in a manner similar to that described for the control room in Section 7.2.5.2. The LOCA sources that could potentially impact the TSC operator dose due to direct shine are identified below.

1. Direct shine from containment – shine from the airborne source in the containment structure via the bulk shielding (3'-8" thick concrete walls below the bendline, 2'-6" thick concrete dome), including shine through the Personnel Hatch facing the TSC
2. Direct shine from the contaminated cloud outside the TSC pressure boundary resulting from containment leakage, ESF system leakage, RHR Pump seal leakage, RWST back-leakage, MEDT leakage - shine occurs through the TSC walls and via wall penetrations such as TSC doors to the outside.
3. Dose due to scattered gamma radiation through wall penetrations from the TSC filters located in the adjacent mechanical equipment room, and scatter past labyrinths provided for selected doors.

Note that other radiation sources were identified and deemed insignificant due to the presence of significant shielding between the operator in the TSC and the radiation sources.

Table 7.1-2 lists key assumptions / parameters associated with DCPP TSC design.

The bounding TSC operator dose following a LOCA at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.3 Fuel Handling Accident (FHA)

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a FHA. In accordance with current licensing basis, an FHA is assumed to occur in the Spent Fuel Pool located in the Fuel Handling building (FHB), or in the Containment.

This event postulates that a spent fuel assembly is dropped during refueling in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) located in the FHB, or in the reactor cavity located in the Containment. In accordance with current licensing basis, all of the fuel rods (264 rods) in the dropped fuel assembly are assumed to be damaged; thus all of the activity in the fuel gap of the dropped assembly is assumed to be instantaneously released into the SFP or into the reactor cavity. As documented in the NRC SER for License Amendments 8 and 6 to DCPP Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82, respectively (Reference 58), the assumption that all fuel rods in one assembly rupture is conservative because the kinetic energy available for causing damage to a fuel assembly dropped through water is fixed by the drop distance. The kinetic energy associated with the maximum drop height for a fuel handling accident is not considered sufficient to rupture the equivalent number of fuel rods of one assembly in both the dropped assembly and the impacted assembly.

This assessment follows the guidance provided for the FHA in pertinent sections of RG 1.183 including Appendix B. As discussed in Section 4.3, and as part of the change in licensing basis requested with this application, the core gap activity is assumed to be comprised of 12% of the core I-131 inventory, 30% of the core Kr-85 activity, 10% of the remaining noble gas and halogen isotopes, and 17% of the core alkali metals (Cesium and Rubidium). Table 7.3-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following an FHA at either location and at either unit.

Current DCPP procedures prohibit movement of recently irradiated fuel which is defined as fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 100 hours. As a part of this application, it is proposed that the definition of recently irradiated fuel at DCPP be updated to reflect fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 72 hours. Table 7.3-2 provides the gap activity inventory of the noble gases, iodines and alkali metals in a single fuel assembly at t=72 hrs post reactor shutdown.

DCPP TS 3.7.15 requires the SFP water level to be ≥23 feet over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks. TS 3.9.7 requires the refueling cavity water level to be maintained ≥23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Additional margin is provided through operating procedures.

The fission product inventory in the fuel rod gap of all the rods in the damaged assembly are assumed to be instantaneously released into the spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, both of which

have a minimum of 23 ft of water above the damaged fuel assembly. A radial peaking factor of 1.65 is applied to the activity release.

Per RG 1.183, the radioiodine released from the fuel gap is assumed to be 95% particulate (CsI), 4.85% elemental, and 0.15% organic. Due to the acidic nature of the water in the fuel pool (pH less than 7), the CsI is assumed to immediately disassociate and re-evolve as elemental iodine, thus changing the chemical form of iodine to 99.85% elemental and 0.15% organic. In addition, and per RG 1.183, an iodine decontamination factor of 200 is assumed for the SFP / reactor cavity. Noble gases and unscrubbed iodines rise to the water surface where they are mixed in the available air space. All of the alkali metals released from the gap are retained in the pool. In accordance with RG 1.183, the chemical form of the iodines above the pool is 57% elemental and 43% organic.

Per RG 1.183, the activity released due to an FHA is assumed to be discharged to the environment in a period of 2 hrs (or less if the ventilation system promotes a faster release rate).

FHA in the FHB

The radioactivity release pathways following an FHA in the FHB are established taking into consideration the following Administration Controls:

During fuel movement in the FHB:

- The movable wall is put in place and secured
- No exit door is propped open
- One FHBVS exhaust fan is operating (The supply fan flow (if operating) has been confirmed by design to have less flow than the exhaust fan)

Operation of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation system (FHBVS) with a minimum of 1 exhaust fan operating and all significant openings administratively closed will ensure negative pressure in the FHB which will result in post-accident environmental release of radioactivity occurring via the Plant Vent. The activity release due to the FHA in the FHB is assumed to be discharged to the environment as follows:

- A maximum release rate of 46,000 cfm via the Plant Vent due to operation of the FHBVS with a closed FHB configuration.

- A maximum conservatively assumed outleakage of 500 cfm occurring from the closest edge of the FHB to the control room normal intake (i.e., 30 cfm outleakage is assumed for ingress/egress; 470 cfm is assumed for outleakage from miscellaneous gaps/openings in the FHB structure).

It has been determined that for the FHA in the FHB, the actual release rate lambda based on the FHBVS exhaust (i.e., 8.7 hr^{-1}) is larger than the release rate applicable to "a 2-hr release" per regulatory guidance (i.e., 3.45 hr^{-1}). Thus the larger exhaust rate lambda associated with FHBVS operation plus the exhaust rate lambda for the 500 cfm outleakage is utilized in the analysis.

FHA in the Containment

The potential radioactivity release pathways following a FHA in the containment are established taking into consideration

- Operation of the containment purge system which would result in radioactivity release via the plant vent

- Plant Technical Specification Section 3.9.4 that allows for an "open containment" during fuel movement in containment during offload or reload. The most significant containment opening closest to the Control room normal operation intake is the equipment hatch. The equipment hatch is an approximately 20-ft wide circular opening in containment. In the event the containment purge system ceased to operate (a viable scenario since it is single train and has non-vital power), the density driven convective flow out of the equipment hatch (due to the thermal gradient between inside and outside containment conditions), could be significant.

It has been determined that for the FHA in the Containment, the release rate assuming a regulatory based 2 hr release is larger than that dictated by the containment purge ventilation system, or convective flow out of the equipment hatch. Thus the regulatory based release rate (i.e., 3.45 hr^{-1}), is utilized for this analysis. Review of the atmospheric dispersion factors associated with the plant vent vs the equipment hatch indicates that dose consequences due to releases via the equipment hatch will be bounding.

EAB 2 hr Worst Case Window

AST methodology requires that the worst case dose to an individual located at any point on the boundary at the EAB, for any 2-hr period following the onset of the accident be reported as the EAB dose. Since the FHA is based on a 2-hour release, the worst 2-hour period for the EAB is the 0 to 2-hour period.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a FHA at either location and at either unit is presented in Section 8.

Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical FHA-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Design Basis FHA (occurs at t=72 hours after reactor shutdown)

The current licensing basis analyses supporting the DBA FHA in the FHB and the FHA in the Containment assume that the CR remains in normal operation mode for the duration of the accident.

As part of this application, credit is taken for PG&E Design Class I area radiation monitors located at the Control Room (CR) normal intakes (1-RE-25/26, 2-RE-25/26) to initiate CRVS

Mode 4 (filtered / pressurized accident ventilation) upon detection of high radiation levels at the CR normal intakes as a result of an FHA.

An analytical safety limit of 1 mR/hr for the gamma radiation environment at the CR normal operation air intakes has been used in the FHA analyses to initiate CRVS Mode 4. As discussed in Section 2.2, the actual monitor trip setpoint will be lower to include the instrument loop uncertainty.

The radiation monitor response time is primarily dependent on the type of monitor, the setpoint, the background radiation levels and the magnitude of increase in the radiation environment at the detector location.

For a monitor with an instrument time constant of "τ" (2 seconds) and a background of 0.05 mR/hr, the response time "t" to a high alarm Setpoint (HASP < 1 mr/hr), for a step increase of radiation level DR (mR/hr) is determined by solving the following equation that represents the monitor reading approaching the final reading exponentially.

$$HASP = 0.05 + DR(1 - e^{-\frac{t}{\tau}})$$

It is determined that a DBA FHA (i.e., occurs at 72 hrs post shutdown) will result in a radiation environment at the CR normal operation intakes that greatly exceed the analytical limit of 1 mR/hr for initiating CRVS Mode 4. This will result in an almost instantaneous generation of a radiation monitor signal to initiate CRVS Mode 4 (radiation monitor response time is estimated to be < 1 sec). For purposes of conservatism, and since the delay in isolation of the normal intake has a significant impact on the estimated dose consequences, the analysis conservatively assumes a monitor response time to the HASP of 10 secs.

As discussed in Section 7.1, when crediting CRVS Mode 4, the FHA dose consequence analyses does not address the potential effects of a LOOP. Thus delays associated with diesel generator sequencing are not required.

Therefore, the time delay between the arrival of radioactivity released due to a DBA FHA at both the CR normal Intakes (assumed to be instantaneous) and CRVS Mode 4 operation is estimated to be the sum total of the monitor response time (10 secs), the signal processing time (2 secs) and the damper closure time (10 secs) for a total delay of 22 seconds.

Delayed FHA:

It is recognized that the response time for radiation monitors are dependent on the magnitude of the radiation level / energy spectrum of the airborne cloud at the location of the detectors, which in turn are dependent on the fuel assembly decay time. Thus an additional case is considered for each of the two FHA scenarios described above (i.e., a FHA in the FHB and a FHA in Containment) when determining the dose to the CR operator; i.e., a case that reflects a delayed FHA at Fuel Offload or a FHA during Reload, occurring at a time when the fuel has decayed to such an extent that the radiation environment at the CR normal intake radiation monitors is just below the setpoint; thus the CR remains in normal operation mode and CRVS Mode 4 is not initiated.

The analyses determined that the dose consequences of a DBA FHA bound that associated with the delayed FHA for both the FHA in the FHB and the FHA in the containment.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to an FHA at either location, and at either unit, are provided in Table 7.3-3. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.3-3 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the FHA to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a FHA at either unit and at either location, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

The bounding Control Room dose following a FHA at either location and at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.4 Locked Rotor Accident (LRA)

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a LRA.

This event is caused by an instantaneous seizure of a primary reactor coolant pump (RCP) rotor. Flow through the affected loop is rapidly reduced, causing a reactor trip due to a low primary loop flow signal. Fuel damage is predicted to occur as a result of this accident. Due to the pressure differential between the primary and secondary systems and assumed Steam Generator (SG) tube leakage, fission products are discharged from the primary into the secondary system. A portion of this radioactivity is released to the outside atmosphere from the secondary coolant system via the 10% ADVs and MSSVs. Following reactor trip, and based on an assumption of a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) coincident with reactor trip, the condenser is assumed to be unavailable and reactor cooldown is achieved using steam releases from the SG MSSVs and 10% ADVs until initiation of shutdown cooling. DCPP has established that the LOL event generates the maximum primary to secondary heat transfer and the LRA assumes these same conservatively bounding secondary steam releases.

Regulatory guidance provided for the LRA in pertinent sections of RG 1.183 including Appendix G is used to develop the dose consequence model. The fuel gap fractions used for non-LOCA events are discussed in Section 4.3. Table 7.4-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following a LRA.

Consistent with current licensing basis, the LRA is postulated to result in 10% fuel failure resulting in the release of the associated gap activity. As discussed in Section 4.3, and as part of the licensing basis change requested with this application, the core gap activity is assumed to be comprised of 12% of the core I-131 inventory, 30% of the core Kr-85 activity, 10% of the remaining noble gas and halogen isotopes, and 17% of the core alkali metals (Cesium and Rubidium).

In accordance with RG 1.183, the activity released from the fuel is assumed to be released instantaneously and mixed homogenously through the primary coolant mass and transmitted to the secondary side via primary to secondary SG tube leakage. A radial peaking factor of 1.65 is applied to the activity release from the fuel gap. The activity associated with the

release of the primary to secondary leakage of normal operation RCS, (at Technical Specification levels) via the MSSVs/10% ADVs are insignificant compared to the failed fuel release and are therefore not included in this assessment.

DCPP Plant Technical Specification 3.4.13d limits primary to secondary SG tube leakage to 150 gpd per steam generator for a total of 600 gpd in all 4 SGs. To accommodate any potential accident induced leakage, the LRA dose consequence analysis addresses a limit of 0.75 gpm from all 4 SGs (or a total of 1080 gpd).

The chemical form of the iodines in the gap are assumed to be 95% particulate (CsI), 4.85% elemental and 0.15% organic. The effect of SG tube uncovery in intact SGs (for SGTR and non-SGTR events), has been evaluated for potential impact on dose consequences as part of a Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Program and demonstrated to be insignificant; therefore, the gap iodines are assumed to have a partition coefficient of 100 in the SG. The iodine releases to the environment from the SG are assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. The gap noble gases are released freely to the environment without retention in the SG whereas the particulates are assumed to be carried over in accordance with the design basis SG moisture carryover fraction.

The condenser is assumed unavailable due to the loss of offsite power. Consequently, the radioactivity release resulting from a LRA is discharged to the environment from all steam generators via the MSSVs and the 10% ADVs. The SG releases continue for 10.73 hours, at which time shutdown cooling is initiated via operation of the RHR system, and environmental releases are terminated.

EAB 2 hr Worst Case Window

AST methodology requires that the worst case dose to an individual located at any point on the boundary at the EAB, for any 2-hr period following the onset of the accident be reported as the EAB dose. For the LRA, the worst two hour period can occur either during the 0-2 hr period when the noble gas release rate is the highest, or during the t=8.73 hr to 10.73 hr period when the iodine and particulate level in the SG liquid peaks (SG releases are terminated at T=10.73 hrs). Regardless of the starting point of the worst 2 hr window, the 0-2 hr EAB χ/Q is utilized.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a LRA at either unit is presented in Section 8.

Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical LRA-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Timing for Initiation of CRVS Mode 4 (if applicable):

The LRA does not initiate any signal which could automatically start the control room emergency ventilation. Thus the dose consequence analysis for the LRA assumes that the CR remains in normal operation mode.

Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors

As noted in Section 5.0, because of the proximity of the MSSV/10% ADVs to the CR normal intake of the affected unit (~ 15 ft above the CR intake, horizontal distance is ~ 1.5 meters), and because the releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs have a vertically upward discharge, it is expected that the concentrations near the normal operation CR intake of the faulted unit (closest to the release point) will be insignificant. Therefore, only the unaffected unit's CR normal intake is assumed to be contaminated by a release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to an LRA at either unit are provided in Table 7.4-2. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.4-2 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the LRA to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a LRA at either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

The bounding Control Room dose following a LRA at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.5 Control Rod Ejection Accident (CREA)

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a CREA.

This event consists of an uncontrolled withdrawal of a control rod from the reactor core. The CREA results in reactivity insertion that leads to a core power level increase, and under adverse combinations of circumstances fuel failure, and a subsequent reactor trip. In this case, some of the activity in the fuel rod gaps would be released to the coolant and in turn to the inside of the containment building. As a result of pressurization of the containment, some of this activity could leak to the environment.

Following reactor trip, and based on an assumption of a Loss of Offsite Power coincident with reactor trip, the condenser is assumed to be unavailable and reactor cooldown is achieved using steam releases from the SG MSSVs and 10% ADVs until initiation of shutdown cooling. DCPP has established that the LOL event generates the maximum primary to secondary heat transfer and the CREA assumes these same conservatively bounding secondary steam releases.

Regulatory guidance provided for the CREA in pertinent sections of RG 1.183 including Appendix H is used to develop the dose consequence model. Table 7.5-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following a CREA.

Consistent with current licensing basis, the CREA is postulated to result in 10% fuel failure resulting in the release of the associated gap activity. Per RG 1.183, the core gap activity is assumed to be comprised of 10% of the core noble gases and halogens. A radial peaking factor of 1.65 is applied to the activity release from the fuel gap.

In accordance with guidance provided in RG 1.183, two independent release paths to the environment are analyzed: first, via *containment leakage* of the fission products released due to the event from the primary system to containment, *assuming that the containment pathway is the only one available*; and second, via releases from the *secondary system*, outside containment, following primary-to-secondary leakage in the steam generators, assuming that *the latter pathway is the only one available.*

The actual doses resulting from a postulated CREA would be a composite of doses resulting from portions of the release going out via the containment building and, portions via the secondary system. If regulatory compliance to dose limits can be demonstrated for each of the scenarios, the dose consequence of a scenario that is a combination of the two will be encompassed by the more restrictive of the two analyzed scenarios.

The DCPP CREA dose consequence analysis evaluates the following two scenarios.

Scenario 1: The failed fuel resulting from a postulated CREA is released into the RCS, which is released in its entirety into the containment via the ruptured control rod drive mechanism housing, is mixed in the free volume of the containment, and then released to the environment at the containment technical specification leak rate for the first 24 hrs and at half that value for the remaining 29 days.

Scenario 2: The failed fuel resulting from a postulated CREA is released into the RCS which is then transmitted to the secondary side via steam generator tube leakage. The condenser is assumed to be unavailable due to a loss of offsite power. Environmental releases occur from the steam generators via the MSSVs and 10% ADVs.

The chemical composition of the iodine in the gap is assumed to be 95% particulate (CsI), 4.85% elemental and 0.15% organic. However, because the sump pH is not controlled following a CREA, it is conservatively assumed that the iodine released via the containment leakage pathway has the same composition as the iodine released via the secondary system release pathway; i.e.; it is assumed that for both scenarios, 97% of all halogens available for release to the environment are elemental, while the remaining 3% is organic.

Scenario 1: Transport From Containment

The failed fuel activity released due to a CREA into the RCS is assumed to be instantaneously released into the containment where it mixes homogeneously in the containment free volume. The containment is assumed to leak at the technical specification leak rate of 0.001 per day for the first 24 hours and at half that value for the remaining 29 days after the event. Except for decay, no credit is taken for depleting the halogen or noble gas concentrations airborne in the containment. Per RG 1.183, the chemical composition of the iodine in the gap fuel is 95% particulate (CsI), 4.85% elemental and 0.15% organic. However, since no credit is taken for the actuation of sprays or pH control, the iodine released via containment leakage pathway is assumed to have the same composition as iodine activity released to the environment from the secondary coolant; i.e.; 97% elemental and 3% organic. Environmental releases due to containment leakage can occur unfiltered as a diffuse source from the containment wall, and as a point source via the containment penetration areas or the Plant Vent. The dose consequences are estimated based on the worst case atmospheric dispersion factors, i.e., an

assumed environmental release via the containment penetration areas.

Scenario 2: Transport from Secondary System

The failed fuel activity released due to a CREA into the RCS is assumed to be instantaneously and homogeneously mixed in the reactor coolant system and transmitted to the secondary side via primary to secondary SG tube leakage. The activity associated with the release of the initial inventory in secondary steam/liquid, and primary to secondary leakage of normal operation RCS, (both at Technical Specification levels) via the MSSVs/10% ADVs are insignificant compared to the failed fuel release, and are therefore not included in this assessment.

DCPP Plant Technical Specification 3.4.13d limits primary to secondary SG tube leakage to 150 gpd per steam generator for a total of 600 gpd in all 4 SGs. To accommodate any potential accident induced leakage, the CREA dose consequence analysis addresses a limit of 0.75 gpm from all 4 SGs (or a total of 1080 gpd).

The effect of SG tube uncovery in intact SGs (for SGTR and non-SGTR events), has been evaluated for potential impact on dose consequences as part of a WOG Program and demonstrated to be insignificant; therefore, the gap iodines have a partition coefficient of 100 in the SG. The gap noble gases are released freely to the environment without retention in the SG.

The condenser is assumed unavailable due to the loss of offsite power. Consequently, the radioactivity release resulting from a CREA is discharged to the environment from steam generators via the MSSVs and the 10% ADVs. Per RG 1.183, 97% of all halogens available for release to the environment via the Secondary System are elemental, while the remaining 3% are organic. The SG releases continue until shutdown cooling is initiated via operation of the RHR system (10.73 hours after the accident) and environmental releases are terminated.

EAB 2 hr Worst Case Window

AST methodology requires that the worst case dose to an individual located at any point on the boundary at the EAB, for any 2-hr period following the onset of the accident be reported as the EAB dose. For Scenario 1 (release via Containment leakage), the worst case 2-hour period occurs during the first 2 hours). For Scenario 2 (release via secondary side), the worst two hour period can occur either during the 0-2 hr period when the noble gas release rate is the highest, or during the t=8.73 hr to 10.73 hr period when the iodine and particulate level in the SG liquid peaks (SG releases are terminated at T=10.73 hrs). Regardless of the starting point of the worst 2 hr window, the 0-2 hr EAB χ/Q is utilized.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a CREA at either unit for both scenarios are presented in Section 8.

Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical CREA-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Timing for Initiation of CRVS Mode 4:

The time to generate a signal to switch CRVS operation from Mode 1 to Mode 4 is based on the containment pressure response following a 2 inch small-break LOCA (SBLOCA), and the fact that at DCPP, a Containment High Pressure signal will initiate a SI signal which will automatically initiate CRVS Mode 4 pressurization. The containment pressure response analysis for a 2 inch SBLOCA shows that the 5 psig setpoint for Containment High Pressure is reached in ~ 150 seconds after the SBLOCA. As indicated earlier, releases to the containment following a CREA are through a ruptured control rod drive mechanism housing. The control rod shaft diameter is 1.840 inches and the RCCA housing penetration opening is 4 inches in diameter. Based on the above and for the purposes of conservatism, the time to generate the Containment High Pressure SI signal following a CREA is assumed to be double the value applicable to the 2 inch SBLOCA, or 300 seconds.

Based on the above, following a CREA,

- An SI signal will be generated at t = 300 sec following a CREA.
- The CRVS normal intake dampers of the accident unit start to close after a 28.2 second delay due to delays associated with diesel generator loading onto the 4kv buses. The CR dampers are fully closed 10 secs later, or at t=338.2 secs (i.e., 300 + 28.2 + 10). The 2 second SI signal processing time occurs in parallel with diesel generator sequencing and is therefore not included as part of the delay.
- In accordance with DCPP licensing basis, the CRVS normal operation dampers of the non-accident unit are not affected by the LOOP and are isolated at t=312 secs (i.e., 300 + 2 secs signal processing time + 10 sec damper closure time).

Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors:

As noted in Section 5.0, because of the proximity of the MSSV/10% ADVs to the CR normal intake of the affected unit (~ 15 ft above the CR intake, horizontal distance is ~ 1.5 meters), and because the releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs have a vertically upward discharge, it is expected that the concentrations near the normal operation CR intake of the faulted unit (closest to the release point) will be insignificant. Therefore, prior to switchover to CRVS Mode 4 pressurization, only the unaffected unit's CR normal intake is assumed to be contaminated by a release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to a CREA at either unit are provided in Table 7.5-2. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.5-2 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the CREA to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a CREA at

either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

The bounding Control Room dose following a CREA at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.6 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a MSLB.

This event consists of a double-ended break of one main steam line. The analysis focusses on a MSLB *outside* the containment since a MSLB inside containment will clearly result in a lesser dose to a control room operator or to the offsite public due to hold-up of activity in the containment.

Following a MSLB, the affected SG rapidly depressurizes and releases the initial contents to the environment via the break. Based on an assumption of a Loss of Offsite Power coincident with reactor trip, the condenser is assumed to be unavailable, and environmental steam releases via the MSSVs / 10% ADVs of the intact steam generators are used to cool down the reactor until initiation of shutdown cooling. The activity in the RCS leaks into the faulted and intact steam generators via SG tube leakage and is released to the environment from the break point, and from the MSSVs / 10% ADVs, respectively.

Regulatory guidance provided for the MSLB in pertinent sections of RG 1.183 including Appendix E is used to develop the dose consequence model. Table 7.6-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following a MSLB.

No melt or clad breach is postulated for the DCPP MSLB event. Thus, and in accordance with RG 1.183, Appendix E, item 2, the activity released is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by the plant technical specifications. The plant technical specifications focus on the noble gases and iodines. In addition, and per RG 1.183, two scenarios are addressed, i.e., a) a pre-accident iodine spike and b) an accident-initiated iodine spike.

a. Pre-accident Iodine Spike - the initial primary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be 60 μCi/gm of DE I-131 which is the transient Technical Specification limit for full power operation. The initial primary coolant noble gas activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification levels.

b. Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike - the initial primary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification of 1 μCi/gm DE I-131 (equilibrium Technical Specification limit for full power operation). Immediately following the accident the iodine appearance rate from the fuel to the primary coolant is assumed to increase to 500 times the equilibrium appearance rate corresponding to the 1 μCi/gm DE I-131 coolant concentration. The duration of the assumed spike is 8 hours. The initial primary coolant noble gas activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification levels.

The initial secondary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at the Technical Specification limit of 0.1 μCi/gm DE I-131.

DCPP Plant Technical Specification 3.4.13d limits primary to secondary SG tube leakage to 150 gpd per steam generator for a total of 600 gpd in all 4 SGs. To accommodate any potential accident induced leakage, the MSLB dose consequence analysis addresses a limit of 0.75 gpm from all 4 SGs (or a total of 1080 gpd).

Following a MSLB, the primary and secondary reactor coolant activity is released to the environment via two pathways.

Faulted Steam Generator

The release from the faulted SG occurs via the postulated break point of the main-steam line. The faulted SG is estimated to dry-out almost instantaneously following the MSLB (in ~10 seconds), releasing all of the iodine in the secondary coolant (at Technical Specification concentrations) that was initially contained in the steam generator. The EAB and LPZ dose to the public is calculated using an instantaneous release of the iodine inventory (Ci) in the SG liquid in the faulted SG. The secondary steam activity initially contained in the faulted steam generator is also released; however, the associated dose contribution is not included in this analysis since it is considered insignificant.

To maximize the control room and offsite doses following a MSLB, the maximum allowable primary to secondary SG tube leakage for all SGs (0.75 gpm or 1080 gpd at Standard Temperature and Pressure (STP) conditions), is conservatively assumed to occur in the faulted SG. All iodine and noble gas activities in the referenced tube leakage are released directly to the environment without hold-up or decontamination. The primary to secondary SG tube leakage is assumed to go on until the RCS reaches 212°F, which based on minimum heat transfer rates, is conservatively estimated to occur 30 hours after the event.

Intact Steam Generators

The initial iodine activities in the secondary coolant at Technical Specification levels are released to the environment in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient (limited to 100) defined in RG 1.183. The noble gases are released freely to the environment without retention in the steam generators. However, there is no primary to secondary leakage into the intact SG as all primary to secondary leakage (1080 gpd or 0.75 gpm) is assumed to be occurring in the faulted SG.

The iodine releases to the environment from the SG are assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. The condenser is assumed unavailable due to the loss of offsite power. The SG releases continue for 10.73 hours, at which time shutdown cooling is initiated via operation of the RHR system and environmental releases are terminated.

EAB 2 hr Worst Case Window

AST methodology requires that the worst case dose to an individual located at any point on the boundary at the EAB, for any 2-hr period following the onset of the accident be reported as the EAB dose.

- The Source/Release for the Pre-incident Spike Case is at its maximum levels between 0 and 2 hours.
- The Source/Release for the Accident-Initiated Spike Case is at its maximum levels towards the end of the spiking period.

Regardless of the starting point of the "Worst 2-hr Window," the 0-2 hrs χ/Q is utilized.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a MSLB at either unit for both scenarios are presented in Section 8.

Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical MSLB-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Timing for Initiation of CRVS Mode 4:

- An SI signal will be generated at t = 0.6 sec following a MSLB.
- The CRVS normal intake dampers of the accident unit start to close after a 28.2 second delay due to delays associated with diesel generator loading onto the 4kv buses. The CR dampers are fully closed 10 secs later, or at t=38.8 secs (i.e., 0.6 + 28.2 + 10). The 2 second SI signal processing time occurs in parallel with diesel generator sequencing and is therefore not included as part of the delay.
- In accordance with DCPP licensing basis, the CRVS normal operation dampers of the non-accident unit are not affected by the LOOP and are isolated at t=12.6 secs (i.e., 0.6 + 2 secs signal processing time + 10 sec damper closure time).

Transport of radioactivity from the Break Location

Since the normal operation (CRVS Mode 1) control room intake of the faulted unit is in such close proximity to the break point, an atmospheric dispersion factor (χ/Q) cannot be accurately determined. Thus, atmospheric dispersion is not credited when determining the control room operator dose from the secondary coolant discharge or the primary to secondary SG tube leakage released from the faulted SG via the break point.

Secondary Coolant Discharge: The radioactivity release due to the almost immediate dry-out of the faulted SG following a MSLB is based on a) the radioactivity concentration of the iodine in a finite cloud created by the secondary coolant liquid flash at the break point; b) conservation of total iodine activity in the SG liquid. The

activity concentration at the release point is conservatively based on saturated steam at a density of 5.98E-04 gm/cm^3, (i.e., at 1 atmosphere and 212°F). The activity concentration entering the CR is assumed to be the same as the concentration at the break point until the CR normal ventilation is isolated and the CRVS re-aligned to Mode 4 Pressurization.

Primary to Secondary SG Tube Leakage: Due to the close proximity of the normal operation CR intake of the faulted unit and MSL break release point and consequent unavailability of viable atmospheric dispersion factors, the primary to secondary SG tube leakage into the faulted SG is conservatively assumed to be piped directly into the control room. This model is reasonable since the relatively small plume of steam created by the ~0.485 gallon *{i.e., (0.75 gallon/min)(38.8 s) / 60 s/min}* of reactor coolant released due to SG tube leakage via the MSL break point could easily be swept into the CR due to the close proximity of the CR normal intake to the break point.

Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors

As noted in Section 5.0, because of the proximity of the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the CR normal intake of the affected unit (~ 15 ft above the CR intake, horizontal distance is ~ 1.5 meters), and because the releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs have a vertically upward discharge, it is expected that the concentrations near the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit (closest to the release point) will be insignificant. Therefore, prior to switchover to CRVS Mode 4 pressurization, only the unaffected unit's CR normal intake is assumed to be contaminated by releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to a MSLB at either unit are provided in Table 7.6-2. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.6-2 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the MSLB to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a MSLB at either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

The bounding Control Room dose following a MSLB at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.7 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a SGTR.

This event is caused by the instantaneous rupture of a SG tube with a resultant release of primary coolant into the lower pressure secondary system. No melt or clad breach is postulated for the SGTR event. The calculation assumes a stuck-open 10% ADV of the ruptured steam generator for 30 minutes. Based on an assumption of a Loss of Offsite Power coincident with reactor trip, the condenser is assumed to be unavailable, and environmental steam releases via the MSSVs / 10% ADVs of the intact steam generators are used to cool down the reactor until initiation of shutdown cooling. A portion of the primary coolant break flow in the ruptured SG flashes and is released a) to the condenser before reactor trip and b)

directly to the environment after reactor trip, via the MSSVs and 10% ADVs. The remaining break flow mixes with the secondary side liquid, and is released to the environment via steam releases through MSSVs and 10% ADVs. The activity in the RCS also leaks into the intact steam generators via SG tube leakage and is released to the environment from the MSSVs / 10% ADVs.

Regulatory guidance provided for the SGTR in pertinent sections of RG 1.183 including Appendix F is used to develop the dose consequence model. Table 7.7-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following a SGTR. Table 7.7-2 provides the time dependent steam flow from the ruptured and intact SGs and the flashed and unflashed break flow in the ruptured SG.

No melt or clad breach is postulated for the DCPP SGTR event. Thus, and in accordance with RG 1.183, Appendix F, item 2, the activity released is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by the plant technical specifications. The plant technical specifications focus on the noble gases and iodines. In addition, and per RG 1.183, two scenarios are addressed, i.e., a) a pre-accident iodine spike and b) an accident-initiated iodine spike.

a. Pre-accident Iodine Spike - the initial primary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be 60 μCi/gm of DE I-131 which is the transient Technical Specification limit for full power operation. The initial primary coolant noble gas activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification levels.

b. Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike - the initial primary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification of 1 μCi/gm DE I-131 (equilibrium Technical Specification limit for full power operation). Immediately following the accident the iodine appearance rate from the fuel to the primary coolant is assumed to increase to 335 times the equilibrium appearance rate corresponding to the 1 μCi/gm DE I-131 coolant concentration. The duration of the assumed spike is 8 hours. The initial primary coolant noble gas activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification levels.

The initial secondary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at the Technical Specification limit of 0.1 μCi/gm DE I-131.

DCPP Plant Technical Specification 3.4.13d limits primary to secondary SG tube leakage to 150 gpd per steam generator for a total of 600 gpd in all 4 SGs. To accommodate any potential accident induced leakage, the SGTR dose consequence analysis addresses a limit of 0.75 gpm from all 4 SGs (or a total of 1080 gpd). To maximize the dose consequences, the analysis conservatively assumes that all of the 0.75 gpm SG tube leakage occurs in the intact SGs.

Following a SGTR, the primary and secondary reactor coolant activity is released to the environment via two pathways.

Ruptured Steam Generator

A SGTR will result in a large amount of primary coolant being released to the rutured steam generator via the break location with a significant portion of it flashed to the steam space.

In accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.183, the noble gases in the entire break flow and the iodine in the flashed portion of the break flow are assumed to be immediately available for release from the steam generator. The iodine in the non-flashed portion of the break flow mixes uniformly with the steam generator liquid mass and is released into the steam space in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the allowable partition coefficient of 100. The iodine releases from the SGs are assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.

Before the reactor trip at t=179 seconds, the radioactivity in the steam is released to the environment from the air ejector which discharges into the plant vent. All noble gases and organic iodines in the steam are released directly to the environment. Only a portion of the elemental iodine carried with the steam is partitioned to the air ejector and released to the environment. The rest is partitioned to the condensate, returns to both the intact steam generators and the ruptured steam generator and will be available for future steaming releases.

After the reactor trip, the radioactivity in the steam is released to the environment from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, due to the assumption of loss of offsite power (LOOP). To isolate the ruptured steam loop, the auxiliary feed water to the ruptured SG is secured. The calculation assumes the 10% ADV of the ruptured SG fails open for 30 minutes. The fail-open 10% ADV is isolated at t = 2653 seconds at which time the ruptured steam loop is isolated. The break flow continues until the primary system is in equilibrium with the secondary side of the ruptured SG at t = 5872 seconds. The iodines in the flashed break flow and the noble gases in the entire break flow is bottled up in the steam space of the ruptured SG and released to the environment during the manual depressurization of the ruptured SG after t = 2 hours.

Intact Steam Generators

The radioactivity released from the intact steam generators includes two components: (a) a portion of the break flow activity that is transferred to the intact steam generators via the condenser before reactor trip, and (b) due to SG tube leakage.

Approximately 75% (3 intact SGs vs 1 ruptured SG) of the flashed break flow activity that is transported and retained in the condenser before reactor trip will be transferred to the intact steam generators and released to the environment during the cool-down phase.

The total primary-to-secondary tube leak rate in the 3 intact SGs is conservatively assumed to be 0.75 gpm. The effect of SG tube uncovery in intact SGs (for SGTR and non-SGTR events) has been evaluated for potential impact on dose consequences as part of a WOG Program and demonstrated to be insignificant. Thus all leaked primary coolant iodine activities are assumed to mix uniformly with the steam generator liquid and are released in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient. Before the reactor trip, the activity in the main steam is released from the plant vent via the air ejector/ condenser. After the reactor trip, the steam is released from the MSSVs/10% ADVs. The reactor coolant noble gases that enter the intact steam generator are released directly to the environment without holdup. The iodine releases from the SGs are assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. The intact SG steam release continues until shutdown cooling (SDC) is initiated at t = 10.73 hours

Initial Secondary Coolant Activity Release

The initial iodine activities in the secondary coolant are released to the environment in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient from the ruptured and intact SGs. Twenty five percent of the initial secondary coolant iodine inventory is in the ruptured SG and 75% of the initial secondary coolant iodine inventory is in the 3 intact SGs.

EAB 2 hr Worst Case Window

AST methodology requires that the worst case dose to an individual located at any point on the boundary at the EAB, for any 2-hr period following the onset of the accident be reported as the EAB dose.

For the SGTR, the EAB dose is controlled by the release of the flashed break flow in the ruptured SG which stops at 3402 seconds. The break flow stops at 5872 seconds and the ruptured SG is manually depressurized 2 hours after the accident. Therefore the maximum EAB dose occurs during the 0-2hr period for both the pre-accident and accident initiated iodine spike cases.

Regardless of the starting point of the "Worst 2-hr Window," the 0-2 hrs χ/Q is utilized.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a SGTR at either unit for both scenarios are presented in Section 8.

Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical SGTR-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Timing for Initiation of CRVS Mode 4:

- An SI signal will be generated at t = 219 sec following a SGTR.
- The CRVS normal intake dampers of the accident unit start to close after a 28.2 second delay due to delays associated with diesel generator loading onto the 4kv buses. The CR dampers are fully closed 10 secs later, or at t=257.2 secs (i.e., 219 + 28.2 + 10). The 2 second SI signal processing time occurs in parallel with diesel generator sequencing and is therefore not included as part of the delay.
- In accordance with DCPP licensing basis, the CRVS normal operation dampers of the non-accident unit are not affected by the LOOP and are isolated at t=231 secs (i.e., 219 + 2 secs signal processing time + 10 sec damper closure time).

Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors

As noted in Section 5.0, because of the proximity of the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the CR normal intake of the affected unit (~ 15 ft above the CR intake, horizontal distance is ~ 1.5 meters),

and because the releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs have a vertically upward discharge, it is expected that the concentrations near the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit (closest to the release point) will be insignificant. Therefore, prior to switchover to CRVS Mode 4 pressurization, only the unaffected unit's CR normal intake is assumed to be contaminated by releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to a SGTR at either unit are provided in Table 7.7-3. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.7-3 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the SGTR to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a SGTR at either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

The bounding Control Room dose following a SGTR at either unit is presented in Section 8.

7.8 Loss of Load Event (LOL)

NRC sponsored computer code RADTRAD 3.03, is used to calculate the control room and site boundary dose due to airborne radioactivity releases following a LOL event.

In accordance with DCPP current licensing basis documented in UFSAR Chapter 15.5.10, Condition II events that are expected to result in atmospheric steam releases are:

- Loss of electrical load and/or turbine trip (UFSAR 15.2.7)
- Loss of normal Feedwater (UFSAR 15.2.8)
- Loss of offsite power to the station auxiliaries (UFSAR 15.2.9)
- Accidental depressurization of the main steam system (UFSAR 15.2.14)

At DCPP, the mass of environmental steam releases for the Loss of Load Event bound all Condition II events and encompass the LRA and CREA.

SRP 15.2.1 to 15.2.5 (Reference 52) indicates that a Loss of Load event is different from the Loss of Alternating Current (AC) power condition (discussed in SRP 15.2.6, Reference 53), in that offsite AC power remains available to support station auxiliaries (e.g., reactor coolant pumps). The Loss of AC power condition results in the condenser being unavailable and reactor cooldown being achieved using steam releases from the SG MSSVs and 10% ADVs until initiation of shutdown cooling.

In keeping with the concept of developing steam releases that bound all Condition II events and encompass the LRA and CREA, the analysis performed to determine the mass of steam released following a Loss of Load event incorporates the assumption of Loss of offsite power to the station auxiliaries.

Neither RG 1.183 nor NUREG-0800 provides specific guidance with respect to scenarios to be assumed to determine radiological dose consequences from Condition II events. Thus the scenario outlined below for the bounding Condition II event that results in environmental releases is based on the conservative assumptions outlined in RG 1.183 for the MSLB.

Table 7.8-1 lists the key assumptions / parameters utilized to develop the radiological consequences following a LOL event. The conservative assumptions utilized to assess the dose consequences ensure that it represents the Limiting Condition II event.

As noted in DCPP UFSAR Section 15.2, no melt or clad breach is postulated for the DCPP LOL- Limiting Condition II event. Thus, and in accordance with RG 1.183, Appendix E, item 2, the activity released is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by the plant technical specifications. The plant technical specifications focus on the noble gases and iodines. In addition, and per RG 1.183, two scenarios are addressed, i.e., a) a pre-accident iodine spike and b) an accident-initiated iodine spike.

a. Pre-accident Iodine Spike - the initial primary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be 60 μCi/gm of DE I-131 which is the transient Technical Specification limit for full power operation. The initial primary coolant noble gas activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification levels.

b. Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike - the initial primary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification of 1 μCi/gm DE I-131 (equilibrium Technical Specification limit for full power operation). Immediately following the accident the iodine appearance rate from the fuel to the primary coolant is assumed to increase to 500 times the equilibrium appearance rate corresponding to the 1 μCi/gm DE I-131 coolant concentration. The duration of the assumed spike is 8 hours. The initial primary coolant noble gas activity is assumed to be at Technical Specification levels.

The initial secondary coolant iodine activity is the Technical Specification limit of 0.1 μCi/gm DE I-131.

DCPP Plant Technical Specification 3.4.13d limits primary to secondary SG tube leakage to 150 gpd per steam generator for a total of 600 gpd in all 4 SGs. To accommodate any potential accident induced leakage, the LOL dose consequence analysis addresses a limit of 0.75 gpm from all 4 SGs (or a total of 1080 gpd).

The entire primary-to-secondary tube leakage of 0.75 gpm (maximum leak rate at STP conditions; total for all 4 SGs) is leaked into an effective SG. In accordance with RG 1.183, the pre-existing iodine activity in the secondary coolant and iodine activity due to reactor coolant leakage into the 4 SGs is assumed to be homogeneously mixed in the bulk secondary coolant. The effect of SG tube uncovery in intact SGs (for SGTR and non-SGTR events) has been evaluated for potential impact on dose consequences as part of a WOG Program and demonstrated to be insignificant. Therefore, per RG 1.183, the iodines are released to the environment via the MSSVs / 10% ADVs in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of a partition coefficient of 100. The iodine releases to the environment from the SG are assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. The noble gases are released freely to the environment without retention in the SG.

The condenser is assumed unavailable due to a loss of offsite power coincident with reactor trip. Consequently, the radioactivity release resulting from a LOL-Limiting Condition II event is discharged to the environment from the steam generators via the MSSVs and the 10% ADVs.

The SG releases continue for 10.73 hours, at which time shutdown cooling is initiated via operation of the RHR system and environmental releases are terminated.

EAB 2 hr Worst Case Window

AST methodology requires that the worst case dose to an individual located at any point on the boundary at the EAB, for any 2-hr period following the onset of the accident be reported as the EAB dose. For the LOL-Limiting Condition II event, the worst two hour period can occur either during the 0-2 hr period when the noble gas release rate is the highest, or during the t=8.73 hr to 10.73 hr period when the iodine level in the SG liquid peaks (SG releases are terminated at T=10.73 hrs). Regardless of the starting point of the worst 2 hr window, the 0-2 hr EAB χ/Q is utilized.

The bounding EAB and LPZ dose following a LOL-Limiting Condition II event at either unit is presented in Section 8.

Accident Specific Control Room Model Assumptions

The parameter values utilized for the control room in the accident dose transport model are discussed in Section 7.1. Provided below are the critical LOL event-specific assumptions associated with control room response and activity transport.

Timing for Initiation of CRVS Mode 4 (if applicable):

The LOL-Limiting Condition II event does not initiate any signal which could automatically start the control room pressurization air ventilation. Thus the dose consequence analysis for the LOL-Limiting Condition II event assumes that the CR remains in normal operation mode.

Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors

As noted in Section 5.0, because of the proximity of the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the CR normal intake of the affected unit (~ 15 ft above the CR intake, horizontal distance is ~ 1.5 meters), and because the releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs have a vertically upward discharge, it is expected that the concentrations near the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit (closest to the release point) will be insignificant. Therefore, only the unaffected unit's CR normal intake is assumed to be contaminated by releases from the MSSVs/10% ADVs.

The bounding atmospheric dispersion factors applicable to the radioactivity release points / control room receptors applicable to an LOL-Limiting Condition II event at either unit are provided in Table 7.8-2. The χ/Q values presented in Table 7.8-2 take into consideration the various release points-receptors applicable to the LOL to identify the bounding χ/Q values applicable to a LOL-Limiting Condition II event at either unit, and reflect the allowable adjustments / reductions in the values as discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized in the notes of Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.

The bounding Control Room dose following a LOL-Limiting Condition II event at either unit is presented in Section 8.

Table 7.1-1
Control Room
Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values

Parameter	Value
Free Volume	170,000 ft^3
Unfiltered Normal Operation Intake	Unit 1: 2100 cfm ± 10% Unit 2: 2100 cfm ± 10%
Emergency Pressurization Flow Rate	650 – 900 cfm
Maximum Unfiltered Backdraft Damper Leakage during CR Pressurization Operation	100 cfm
Carbon / HEPA Filter Flow during CR Pressurization Operation	1800 – 2200 cfm
Emergency Filtered Recirculation Rate	1250 cfm (minimum)
Pressurization Intake and Recirculation Carbon/HEPA Filter Efficiency (includes filter bypass)	93% (iodine) 98% (particulates)
Unfiltered Inleakage (Normal and Pressurization Mode)	70 cfm (maximum) Includes 10 cfm ingress / egress
Occupancy Factors	0-24 hr (1.0)
	1 - 4 d (0.6)
	4-30 d (0.4)
Operator Breathing Rate	0-30 d (3.50E-04 m^3/sec)

Table 7.1-2 Technical Support Center Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	Value
Free Volume	51,250 ft^3
Filtered (HEPA only) Normal Operation Intake Flow Rate	500 cfm
Normal Intake HEPA Filter Efficiency (includes filter bypass)	98% (particulates)
Filtered (Carbon / HEPA) Pressurization Flow Rate	500 cfm
Flow through Carbon / HEPA Filter during Pressurization mode	1000 cfm
Filtered Recirculation flow rate during Pressurization mode	500 cfm (minimum)
Pressurization Intake and Recirculation Carbon/HEPA Filter Efficiency (includes filter bypass)	93% (iodine) 98% (particulates)
Unfiltered Inleakage	60 cfm (maximum) Includes 10 cfm ingress/egress
Occupancy Factors	0-24 hr (1.0)
	1 - 4 d (0.6)
	4-30 d (0.4)
Operator Breathing Rate	0-30 d (3.50E-04 m^3/sec)

Table 7.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Core Power Level (105% of the rated power of 3411 MWth)	3580 MWt
Fuel Activity Release Fractions	Per Reg. Guide 1.183 (See Section 7.2.3.2.6)
Fuel Release Timing (gap)	Onset: 30 sec
	Duration: 0.5 hr
Fuel Release Timing (Early-In-Vessel)	Onset: 0.5 hr
	Duration: 1.3 hr
Core Activity	Table 4.1-1
Chemical Form of Iodine released from fuel to containment atmosphere	4.85% elemental 95% particulate 0.15% organic
Chemical Form of Iodine Released from RCS and sump water	97% elemental 3% organic
Containment Vacuum/Pressure Relief Parameters	
Minimum Containment Free Volume:	2.550E+06 ft^3
Primary Coolant Tech Spec Activity	Table 4.2-1
Chemical Form of Iodine Released	97% elemental; 3% organic
Maximum RCS flash fraction after LOCA Noble Gases Halogens	 100% 40%
Maximum containment pressure relief line air flow rate	218 actual cubic feet per second (acfs)
Maximum duration of release via containment pressure relief line	13 sec
Release Point	Plant Vent
Containment Leakage Parameters	
Containment Spray Coverage – Injection Spray and Recirculation Spray Modes: Sprayed Volume Unsprayed Volume	82.5% (sprayed fraction) 2.103E+06 ft^3 4.470E+05 ft^3
Minimum mixing flow rate from unsprayed to sprayed region: Before actuation of CFCUs After actuation of CFCUs	 2 unsprayed regions/hr 9.13 unsprayed regions/hr
Minimum duration of mixing via CFCUs	Start = 86 sec End = 30 days
Containment spray in injection mode Initiation time Termination time	 111 sec 3798 sec

Table 7.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Maximum delay between end of injection spray and initiation of recirculation spray	12 min (based on manual operator action)
Containment spray in recirculation mode Initiation time Termination time	 4518 sec 22,518 sec
Long-term Sump Water pH	≥ 7.5
Maximum allowable DF for fission product removal	Elemental Iodine: 200 Others: not applicable
Elemental iodine and particulate spray removal coefficients in sprayed region during both injection spray and recirculation spray modes	See Table 7.2-2
Elemental iodine removal coefficients due to wall deposition	See Table 7.2-2
Particulate removal coefficients in unsprayed region due to gravitational settling	See Table 7.2-2
Containment Leak rate (0-24 hr)	0.1% weight fraction per day
Containment Leak rate (1-30 day)	0.05% weight fraction per day
Containment Leakage Release Point (Unfiltered)	From the worst case release point of the following: Diffuse source via the containment wall Via Plant Vent Via Containment Pen Area GE Via Containment Pen Areas GW & FW
ESF System Environmental Leakage Parameters	
Minimum post-LOCA containment water volume sources	480,015 gal.
Minimum time after LOCA when recirculation is initiated	829 sec
Duration of leakage	30 days
Maximum ECCS fluid temperature after initiation of recirculation	259.9 °F
Maximum ECCS leak rate (including safety factor of 2)	Unfiltered via plant vent = 240 cc/min Unfiltered via Containment Penetration Areas GE or GW & FW = 12 cc/min
RHR pump seal failure	Filtered(1) via plant vent 50 gpm starting at t = 24 hrs for 30 min
Iodine Airborne Release Fraction	10%
Auxiliary Building ESF Ventilation System filter efficiency	Elemental iodine: 88% Organic iodine: 88%

Table 7.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Back-Leakage Parameters	
Earliest initiation time of RWST back-leakage	829 sec
Maximum ECCS / sump water back-leakage rate to RWST (includes safety factor of 2)	2 gpm
RWST back-leakage iodine release fractions	See Table 7.2-3
RWST back-leakage noble gas, as iodine daughters, release rate from the RWST vent	See Table 7.2-3
Miscellaneous Equipment Drain Tank (MEDT) Leakage Parameters	
MEDT inflow rate (includes safety factor of 2)	1900 cc/min
MEDT leakage Iodine release fractions	See Table 7.2-4
MEDT leakage noble gas, as iodine daughters release rate from plant vent	See Table 7.2-4
CR Emergency Ventilation: Initiation Signal/Timing	
Initiation time (signal)	SI signal generated: 6 sec Non-Affected Unit NOP Intake Isolated: 18 sec Affected Unit NOP Intake Isolated and CRVS Mode 4 in full Operation: 44.2 sec
Bounding Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors for LOCA	Table 7.2-5

Note:

(1) Releases from the RHR Pump Seal failure are filtered for CR dose evaluation and filtered for Site Boundary Dose Evaluation

Table 7.2-2
Loss of Coolant Accident
Total Elemental Iodine & Particulate Removal Coefficients

From Time (sec)	To Time (sec)	Elemental Iodine Removal Coefficient (hr^{-1}) – *Note 1*		Particulate Removal Coefficient (hr^{-1})	
		Sprayed Region	Unsprayed Region	Sprayed Region	Unsprayed Region
0	30	2.74	2.74	N/A	N/A
30	111			5.89	0.0062
111	1,800	20.57 *(Note 2)*	0.00	2.24	0.0071
1,800	3,798			9.35	0.1144
3,798	4,518	0.00 *(Note 3)*		1.02	0.1229
4,518	5,030	19.91 *(Note 2)*		7.50	0.1239
5,030	6,480			6.40	0.1237
6,480	7,200			4.74	0.1236
7,200	8,004			3.39	0.1222
8,004	22,152			1.53	0.1040
22,152	22,518				0.00
22,518	720 hrs	0.00		0.00 *(Note 4)*	

Notes:
1. Per RG 1.183 and SRP 6.5.2, removal credit for elemental iodine by sprays is eliminated after a DF=200 is reached in the containment atmosphere.
2. Wall deposition removal coefficient (0.57 hr^{-1}) is included.
3. Time period without spray.
4. For purposes of conservatism, no credit is taken for particulate removal in the sprayed region after termination of recirculation spray

Figure 7.2-1
Aerosol Removal Rates Within Sprayed Region



Figure 7.2-2
Aerosol Removal Rates Within Unsprayed Region



Table 7.2-2A
Containment Pressure/Temperature/ Relative Humidity Data – LOCA

Post-LOCA Time	Containment Pressure	Containment Temperature	Containment RH
Seconds	psia	°F	%
0.00	16.00	120	18
0.52	18.81	145.9	72.3
1.04	21.45	163.8	88.2
1.54	23.76	176.78	93.5
2.04	25.88	186.8	96
2.54	27.80	194.83	97.4
3.04	29.44	201.03	98.1
3.54	30.86	205.97	98.5
4.04	32.10	210.01	98.9
4.54	33.21	213.43	99.1
5.04	34.24	216.47	99.2
7.04	38.04	226.75	99.5
7.54	38.96	229.03	99.5
8.54	40.68	233.06	99.6
10.04	43.06	238.34	99.7
10.54	43.81	239.9	99.7
11.54	45.21	242.76	99.8
13.04	47.12	246.47	99.8
14.54	48.82	249.65	99.8
16.04	50.36	252.4	99.9
17.54	51.70	254.7	99.9
19.04	52.87	256.67	99.9
20.54	53.88	258.34	99.9
21.54	54.24	258.9	99.9
22.04	54.36	259.08	100
23.54	54.48	259.25	100
25.04	54.40	259.12	100
29.54	53.87	258.24	100
32.54	53.62	257.85	100
48.54	53.14	257.02	100
54.54	53.37	257.03	100
68.04	53.70	256.79	100
86.54	53.18	255.93	100
144.18	50.88	251.95	100
158.18	50.44	251.15	100

Table 7.2-2A
Containment Pressure/Temperature/ Relative Humidity Data – LOCA

Post-LOCA Time	Containment Pressure	Containment Temperature	Containment RH
Seconds	psia	°F	%
188.18	49.70	249.82	100
200.18	49.48	249.41	100
212.18	49.33	249.15	100
266.18	49.21	248.92	100
333.18	49.37	249.2	100
400.18	49.70	249.82	99.9
534.18	50.56	251.76	99.1
668.18	51.49	254.34	97.4
803.18	52.60	256.32	97.3
816.18	52.43	255.22	98.7
857.18	52.08	254.17	99.5
912.18	51.73	253.6	99.4
1021.19	51.21	252.76	99.3
1131.19	50.83	252.11	99.2
1240.19	50.55	251.61	99.1
1458.19	50.16	250.91	99
1677.19	49.94	250.49	98.9
1730.19	50.43	251.61	98.5
1746.19	50.26	250.56	99.9
1859.19	49.41	248.91	100
1988.19	48.57	247.32	100
2247.19	47.07	244.4	100
2505.19	45.75	241.75	100
2764.19	44.56	239.29	100
3022.19	43.47	236.96	99.9
3281.19	42.45	234.71	99.8
3604.24	41.26	231.94	99.9
3798.24	40.10	229.1	100
3888.29	40.52	230.99	98.2
3978.29	40.92	233.84	94.6
4068.29	41.24	235.73	92.5
4158.29	41.48	237.00	91.3
4338.29	41.86	238.43	90.3
4518.29	42.13	239.07	90.3
4536.29	42.05	237.81	92.2

Table 7.2-2A
Containment Pressure/Temperature/ Relative Humidity Data – LOCA

Post-LOCA Time	Containment Pressure	Containment Temperature	Containment RH
Seconds	psia	°F	%
4555.29	41.94	235.91	95.2
4573.29	41.87	234.69	97.2
4592.29	41.82	233.97	98.4
4666.29	41.74	233.23	99.5
5110.73	41.37	232.3	99.6
5700.73	40.79	230.94	99.6
6890.73	39.55	227.94	99.6
8080.73	38.36	224.96	99.5
10000.80	36.64	220.36	99.4
11001.50	35.82	218.08	99.4
12001.50	35.08	215.93	99.4
13001.50	34.39	213.85	99.4
14001.50	33.74	211.85	99.4
15001.50	33.13	209.91	99.4
16001.50	32.57	208.07	99.3
18001.50	31.59	204.69	99.3
20001.50	30.71	201.53	99.3
21001.50	30.31	200.06	99.3
22518.00	29.78	198.01	99.4

Table 7.2-2B
Containment Steam Condensation Data – Loss of Coolant Accident

Post-LOCA Time	Steam Condensation Rate					
	Thermal Conductor	Containment Fan Coolers	Injection Spray	Recirculation Spray	Total Steam Condensation Rate	
Seconds	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	g/sec
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.52	8.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.37	3796.57
1.04	49.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.71	22548.08
2.54	204.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	204.71	92854.90
3.04	250.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	250.47	113611.29
3.54	290.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	290.16	131614.37
4.04	325.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	325.28	147544.54
5.04	384.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	384.15	174247.52
7.54	509.97	0.00	0.00	0.00	509.97	231318.52
10.04	611.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	611.01	277149.49
12.54	684.86	0.00	0.00	0.00	684.86	310647.29
15.04	734.83	0.00	0.00	0.00	734.83	333313.30
17.54	766.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	766.16	347524.35
20.54	783.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	783.18	355244.50
24.54	742.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	742.58	336828.64
28.54	684.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	684.40	310438.64
32.54	644.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	644.28	292240.51
37.04	623.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	623.09	282628.89
53.54	538.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	538.96	244468.16
70.04	469.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	469.30	212870.91
87.04	412.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	412.48	187097.79
87.57	410.75	44.28	0.00	0.00	455.03	206398.15
88.07	409.15	45.29	0.00	0.00	454.44	206130.53
107.14	354.70	44.87	13.61	0.00	413.18	187415.31
124.18	312.19	44.28	72.76	0.00	429.23	194695.47
146.18	267.97	43.51	70.37	0.00	381.85	173204.26
169.18	231.50	42.78	68.46	0.00	342.74	155464.26
197.18	197.26	41.97	66.66	0.00	305.89	138749.38
234.18	166.95	41.32	49.25	0.00	257.52	116809.11
262.18	149.95	41.00	48.48	0.00	239.43	108603.63
327.18	121.98	40.50	47.28	0.00	209.76	95145.54
403.18	100.43	40.23	46.58	0.00	187.24	84930.64
449.18	91.02	40.17	46.66	0.00	177.85	80671.41
502.18	82.32	40.11	47.29	0.00	169.72	76983.70

Table 7.2-2B
Containment Steam Condensation Data – Loss of Coolant Accident

Post-LOCA Time	Steam Condensation Rate					
	Thermal Conductor	Containment Fan Coolers	Injection Spray	Recirculation Spray	Total Steam Condensation Rate	
Seconds	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	g/sec
558.18	74.79	40.09	48.64	0.00	163.52	74171.43
560.18	74.55	40.08	48.66	0.00	163.29	74067.10
629.18	67.45	40.12	47.87	0.00	155.44	70506.40
683.18	63.43	40.22	47.23	0.00	150.88	68438.02
754.18	59.41	40.45	47.01	0.00	146.87	66619.12
802.18	57.28	40.64	46.99	0.00	144.91	65730.07
832.18	49.92	40.37	57.62	0.00	147.91	67090.85
876.18	43.40	40.00	58.41	0.00	141.81	64323.94
937.18	37.29	39.57	57.66	0.00	134.52	61017.25
1013.19	32.26	39.16	56.94	0.00	128.36	58223.12
1094.19	28.58	38.82	56.39	0.00	123.79	56150.20
1148.19	26.76	38.64	56.09	0.00	121.49	55106.94
1243.19	24.16	38.39	55.68	0.00	118.23	53628.23
1341.19	22.03	38.19	55.34	0.00	115.56	52417.14
1423.19	20.55	38.07	55.11	0.00	113.73	51587.06
1492.19	19.48	37.98	54.94	0.00	112.40	50983.79
1564.19	18.50	37.90	54.79	0.00	111.19	50434.94
1607.19	17.97	37.86	54.72	0.00	110.55	50144.64
1644.19	17.54	37.83	54.66	0.00	110.03	49908.77
1672.19	17.23	37.81	54.61	0.00	109.65	49736.41
1678.19	17.19	37.71	54.73	0.00	109.63	49727.33
1730.19	19.93	36.37	52.72	0.00	109.02	49450.64
1794.19	16.03	35.05	60.34	0.00	111.42	50539.27
1859.19	14.01	33.89	60.13	0.00	108.03	49001.59
1985.19	11.88	32.19	59.74	0.00	103.81	47087.43
2052.19	11.05	31.50	59.53	0.00	102.08	46302.71
2116.19	10.33	30.96	59.34	0.00	100.63	45645.00
2244.19	9.09	30.09	58.96	0.00	98.14	44515.56
2311.19	8.50	29.72	58.76	0.00	96.98	43989.39
2439.19	7.47	29.12	58.40	0.00	94.99	43086.74
2567.19	6.53	28.62	57.93	0.00	93.08	42220.38
2695.19	5.66	28.19	57.37	0.00	91.22	41376.70
2763.19	5.23	27.94	57.08	0.00	90.25	40936.71
2890.19	4.47	27.51	56.53	0.00	88.51	40147.46

Table 7.2-2B
Containment Steam Condensation Data – Loss of Coolant Accident

Post-LOCA Time	Steam Condensation Rate					
	Thermal Conductor	Containment Fan Coolers	Injection Spray	Recirculation Spray	Total Steam Condensation Rate	
Seconds	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	g/sec
3018.19	3.76	27.11	56.00	0.00	86.87	39403.57
3082.19	3.43	26.92	55.74	0.00	86.09	39049.77
3210.19	2.80	26.56	55.23	0.00	84.59	38369.38
3338.19	2.21	26.22	54.74	0.00	83.17	37725.28
3466.19	1.64	25.89	54.25	0.00	81.78	37094.79
3594.19	1.12	25.58	53.78	0.00	80.48	36505.12
3722.24	0.24	25.02	54.13	0.00	79.39	36010.70
3796.24	0.02	24.72	53.61	0.00	78.35	35538.96
3843.29	2.24	24.91	0.00	0.00	27.15	12315.03
3901.29	4.39	25.13	0.00	0.00	29.52	13390.05
3995.29	6.72	25.42	0.00	0.00	32.14	14578.46
4105.29	8.33	25.70	0.00	0.00	34.03	15435.75
4189.29	9.21	25.87	0.00	0.00	35.08	15912.02
4291.29	10.03	26.06	0.00	0.00	36.09	16370.15
4383.29	10.63	26.21	0.00	0.00	36.84	16710.34
4463.29	11.06	26.33	0.00	0.00	37.39	16959.82
4515.29	11.25	26.41	0.00	0.00	37.66	17082.29
4518.29	11.26	26.41	0.00	0.92	38.59	17504.13
4584.29	10.17	26.48	0.00	8.26	44.91	20370.83
4592.29	10.15	26.49	0.00	9.02	45.66	20711.03
4654.29	10.18	26.55	0.00	11.12	47.85	21704.40
4698.29	10.19	26.59	0.00	11.33	48.11	21822.33
4734.29	10.21	26.60	0.00	11.39	48.20	21863.15
4785.29	10.19	26.62	0.00	11.43	48.24	21881.30
4807.29	10.17	26.63	0.00	11.44	48.24	21881.30
4843.29	10.14	26.63	0.00	11.46	48.23	21876.76
4851.29	10.13	26.64	0.00	11.46	48.23	21876.76
4895.29	10.09	26.64	0.00	11.48	48.21	21867.69
4926.29	10.05	26.64	0.00	11.49	48.18	21854.08
4932.29	10.06	26.63	0.00	11.49	48.18	21854.08
4988.29	9.99	26.63	0.00	11.51	48.13	21831.40
6120.73	8.70	25.98	0.00	11.43	46.11	20915.15
7400.73	7.52	25.02	0.00	11.13	43.67	19808.38
8680.73	6.51	24.04	0.00	10.86	41.41	18783.26

Table 7.2-2B
Containment Steam Condensation Data – Loss of Coolant Accident

Post-LOCA Time	Steam Condensation Rate					
	Thermal Conductor	Containment Fan Coolers	Injection Spray	Recirculation Spray	Total Steam Condensation Rate	
Seconds	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	lbm/sec	g/sec
9510.73	6.06	23.47	0.00	10.70	40.23	18248.02
14001.50	4.42	20.91	0.00	9.98	35.31	16016.35
18001.50	3.69	18.95	0.00	9.59	32.23	14619.28
22518.00	3.23	17.41	0.00	9.27	29.91	13566.95

Table 7.2-3
Loss of Coolant Accident
RWST Iodine Release Fraction and Gas Venting Rate to Atmosphere

From Time	To Time	Iodine Release Fraction to Atmosphere	Average Interval Weighted Gas Space Venting Rate to Atmosphere
Sec	Sec	Fraction $I_{released}$ / $I_{entering}$	Fraction V_{rwst} / day
829	7200	9.451E-05	2.610E+00
7200	28,800	6.357E-05	7.291E-01
28,800	86,400	8.796E-06	7.375E-02
86,400	345,600	4.560E-07	9.955E-03
345,600	471,600	6.347E-07	1.311E-02
471,600	1,011,600	8.231E-07	1.489E-02
1,011,600	2,048,400	1.114E-06	1.547E-02
2,048,400	2,592,000	1.483E-06	1.702E-02

Where:

$I_{released}$ = Total Iodine mass released to atmosphere during specified time interval, gm
$I_{entering}$ = Total Iodine mass entering to the RWST during specified time interval, gm
Frac. V_{rwst} = Rate of Fractional RWST gas volume vented during specified time interval

Table 7.2-4
Loss of Coolant Accident
MEDT Iodine Release Fraction and Gaseous Venting Rate to Atmosphere

From Time	To Time	Iodine Release Fraction to Atmosphere	Average Interval Weighted Gas Space Venting Rate to Atmosphere
Sec	Sec	Fraction $I_{released}$ / $I_{entering}$	Fraction V_{MEDT} / day
829	7,200	4.521E-07	5.024E+00
7,200	28,800	1.386E-08	3.024E-02
28,800	86,400	2.362E-07	3.324E-01
86,400	183,289	3.950E-07	6.497E+00
183,289	345,600	1.236E-02 (Note 2)	(Note 1)
345,600	752,400	2.028E-02 (Note 2)	(Note 1)
752,400	1,530,000	2.390E-02 (Note 2)	(Note 1)
1,530,000	2,592,000	2.166E-02 (Note 2)	(Note 1)

Where:

$I_{released}$ = Total Iodine mass released to atmosphere during specified time interval, gm
$I_{entering}$ = Total Iodine mass entering to the MEDT during specified time interval, gm
Frac V_{MEDT} = Rate of Fractional MEDT gas volume vented during specified time interval

Note 1: After the MEDT overflows at t = 183,289 sec, the gas venting rates are 2640 cfm from the EDRT room, and 1760 cfm from the U1/U2 Pipe Tunnels (i.e., the exhaust ventilation rate from the respective rooms + 10%). To be consistent with the methodology used to determine the iodine release fractions after spillover, the noble gases generated by decay of iodines in the tank and spilled liquid after overflow occurs, should also be released instantaneously to the environment without hold-up.

Note 2: The room ventilation flows addressed in Note 1 (utilized as clean in-coming air) are incorporated into the determination of the iodine equilibrium concentration in the EDRT room and U1/U2 Pipe Tunnels air space, respectively. The bounding iodine release fractions presented above after spillover assume instantaneous release of iodines to the environment without hold-up in the room.

Table 7.2-5
Loss of Coolant Accident
Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Release Location / Receptor	0-2 hr	2-8 hr	8-24 hr	24-96 hr	96-720 hr
Control Room Normal Intakes					
Plant Vent Release					
- Affected Unit Intake	1.67E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	9.10E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----
Containment Penetration Areas					
- Affected Unit Intake	6.84E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.24E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration					
Plant Vent	1.26E-03	8.96E-04	3.44E-04	3.44E-04	2.99E-04
Containment Penetration Areas	3.22E-03	1.85E-03	7.29E-04	7.15E-04	6.64E-04
RWST Vent	1.07E-03	5.80E-04	2.18E-04	2.19E-04	1.79E-04
Control Room Pressurization Intake					
Plant Vent	5.65E-05	3.70E-05	1.35E-05	1.37E-05	1.11E-05
Containment Penetration Areas	6.45E-05	4.05E-05	1.65E-05	1.38E-05	1.12E-05
RWST Vent	5.25E-05	3.03E-05	1.15E-05	1.10E-05	8.83E-06

Note 1: Release from the Containment penetration areas (i.e., areas GE or GW & FW): applicable to containment leakage and ESF system leakage that occurs in the Containment Penetration Area

Note 2: Release from Plant Vent: applicable to ESF system leakage that occurs in the Auxiliary building, MEDT releases, RHR Pump Seal Failure Release and Containment Vacuum/Pressure Relief Line Release

Table 7.2-6
Loss of Coolant Accident
TSC Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Release Location / Receptor	0-2 hr	2-8 hr	8-24 hr	24-96 hr	96-720 hr
TSC Normal Intakes					
Plant Vent Release	5.52E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----
Containment Penetration Areas	1.80E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
RWST Vent	3.63E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----
TSC Infiltration					
Plant Vent	5.43E-04	2.16E-04	9.97E-05	8.11E-05	6.58E-05
Containment Penetration Areas	1.83E-03	7.49E-04	3.16E-04	2.92E-04	2.41E-04
RWST Vent	3.72E-04	1.68E-04	6.64E-05	6.17E-05	5.10E-05
CR/TSC Pressurization Intake					
Plant Vent	-----	3.70E-05	1.35E-05	1.37E-05	1.11E-05
Containment Penetration Areas	-----	4.05E-05	1.65E-05	1.38E-05	1.12E-05
RWST Vent	-----	3.03E-05	1.15E-05	1.10E-05	8.83E-06

Note 1: Release from the Containment penetration areas (i.e., areas GE or GW & FW): applicable to containment leakage and ESF system leakage that occurs in the Containment Penetration Area

Note 2: Release from Plant Vent: applicable to ESF system leakage that occurs in the Auxiliary building, MEDT releases, RHR Pump Seal Failure Release and Containment Vacuum/Pressure Relief Line Release

Table 7.3-1
Fuel Handling Accident in Fuel Handling Building or Containment
Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values

Parameter	Value
Power Level	3580 MWt
Number of Damaged Fuel Assemblies	1
Total Number of Fuel Assemblies	264
Decay Time Prior to Fuel Movement	72 hours
Radial Peaking Factor	1.65
Fraction of Core Inventory in gap	I-131 (12%) Kr-85 (30%) Other Noble Gases (10%) Other Halides (10%) Alkali Metals (17%)
Isotopic Inventory in Fuel Gap (Decayed 72 hours)	Table 7.3-2
Iodine form of gap release before scrubbing	99.85% elemental
	0.15% Organic
Iodine form of gap release after scrubbing	57% elemental
	43% Organic
Scrubbing Decontamination Factors	Iodine (200, effective)
	Noble Gas (1)
	Particulates (∞)
Rate of Release from Fuel	Puff
Environmental Release Rate	All airborne activity released within a 2 hour period (or less if the ventilation system promotes a faster release rate)
Environmental Release Points and Rates	
Accident in SFP in the FHB – Release flow rates	-Plant Vent – 46,000 cfm FHB Outleakage -Ingress/Egress locations – 30 cfm -Miscellaneous gaps/openings – 470 cfm
Minimum free volume in FHB above SFP	317,000 ft^3
Accident in Containment - Release flow rates	-Open Equipment Hatch – All airborne activity released in 2 hrs
Minimum Free Volume in Containment above Operating Floor	2,013,000 ft^3
CR Emergency Ventilation: Initiation Signal/Timing	
Signal(s) available to switch the CRVS from normal operation (NOP) Ventilation (Mode 1) to Pressurized Filtered Ventilation (Mode 4) following a FHA	Radiation signals from gamma sensitive intake monitors that initiate closure of the CR normal intake dampers and switch the CRVS from normal operation Ventilation Mode 1 to Pressurized Filtered Ventilation Mode 4.

Table 7.3-1
Fuel Handling Accident in Fuel Handling Building or Containment
Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values

Parameter	Value
Radiation Monitor Analytical Safety Limit	1 mR/hr
Delay time for CRVS Mode 4 operation, including monitor response, signal processing, and damper closure time	22 seconds (see below)
Radiation Monitor Response Time	10 seconds (conservative assumption) - (Refer to Section 7.3)
Radiation monitor signal processing time	2 seconds
NOP Ventilation Damper Closure Time	10 seconds
Bounding Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors for FHA	Table 7.3-3

Table 7.3-2 Isotopic Gap Activity – Fuel Handling Accident Single Fuel Assembly (Decayed 72 hours)			
Nuclide	Activity Per Assembly (Ci)	Gap Fraction	Gap Activity per Assembly (w/o Peaking Factor)
I-129	2.07E-02	0.10	2.07E-03
I-130	3.29E+02	0.10	3.29E+01
I-131	4.09E+05	0.12	4.91E+04
I-132	3.99E+05	0.10	3.99E+04
I-133	9.73E+04	0.10	9.73E+03
I-135	5.01E+02	0.10	5.01E+01
KR-83M	2.51E-04	0.10	2.51E-05
KR-85	5.75E+03	0.30	1.73E+03
KR-85M	1.77E+00	0.10	1.77E-01
KR-88	7.73E-03	0.10	7.73E-04
XE-127	9.64E-02	0.10	9.64E-03
XE-129M	5.28E+01	0.10	5.28E+00
XE-131M	6.96E+03	0.10	6.96E+02
XE-133	8.31E+05	0.10	8.31E+04
XE-133M	1.88E+04	0.10	1.88E+03
XE-135	1.07E+04	0.10	1.07E+03
XE-135M	8.18E+01	0.10	8.18E+00
CS-132	2.16E+01	0.17	3.67E+00
CS-134	1.25E+05	0.17	2.13E+04
CS-134M	1.04E-03	0.17	1.77E-04
CS-135	3.01E-01	0.17	5.12E-02
CS-136	3.10E+04	0.17	5.27E+03
CS-137	7.10E+04	0.17	1.21E+04
RB-86	1.16E+03	0.17	1.97E+02
RB-87	1.37E-05	0.17	2.33E-06
RB-88	8.63E-03	0.17	1.47E-03

Table 7.3-3
Fuel Handling Accident
Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Release Location / Receptor	0-22 sec	22 sec - 2 hr	2-8 hr	8-24 hr	1-4 d	4-30 d
Control Room Normal Intakes						
Containment Hatch Release						
- Affected Unit Intake	2.61E-02	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.88E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Plant Vent Release						
- Affected Unit Intake	1.67E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	9.10E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FHB Out-leakage points						
- Affected Unit Intake	6.98E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.93E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration						
Containment Hatch Release	5.51E-03	5.51E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
Plant Vent	1.26E-03	1.26E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
FHB Out-leakage points	3.78E-03	3.78E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Pressurization Intake						
Containment Hatch Release	-----	6.60E-05	-----	-----	-----	-----
Plant Vent	-----	5.65E-05	-----	-----	-----	-----
FHB Out-leakage points	-----	6.40E-05	-----	-----	-----	-----

Note 1: Release from the Containment Hatch: applicable to FHA in Containment

Note 2: Release from Plant Vent / FHB Out-leakage: applicable to FHA in FHB

Table 7.4-1
Locked Rotor Accident
Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values

Parameter	Value
Power Level	3580 MWt
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm
Primary to Secondary SG tube leakage	0.75 gpm (total for all 4 SGs); leakage density 62.4 lbm/ft^3)
Melted Fuel Percentage	0%
Failed Fuel Percentage	10%
Equilibrium Core Activity	Table 4.1-1
Radial Peaking Factor	1.65
Fraction of Core Inventory in Fuel Gap	I-131: 12%
	Kr-85: 30%
	Other Noble Gases: 10%
	Other Halogens: 10%
	Alkali Metals: 17%
Isotopic Inventory in Fuel Gap	Table 4.3-1
Iodine Chemical Form in Gap	4.85% elemental
	95% Particulate
	0.15% organic
Secondary Side Parameters	
Initial and Minimum SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm/SG
Iodine Species Released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic
Time period when tubes not totally submerged	insignificant
Steam Releases	0-2 hrs: 651,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,023,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs
Iodine Partition Coefficient in SGs	100
Particulate Carry-Over Fraction in SGs	0.0005 by weight
Fraction of Noble Gas Released	1.0 (Released without holdup)
Termination of releases from SGs	10.73 hours
Environmental Release Point	MSSVs/10% ADVs
CR emergency Ventilation : Initiation Signal/Timing	
	Control Room is assumed to remain on normal ventilation (CRVS Mode 1) for duration of the accident.
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table 7.4-2

Table 7.4-2 Locked Rotor Accident Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)			
Release point and receptor	0-2hr	2-8 hr	8-10.73 hr
MSSVs/10% ADVs to CR NOP Intake (Note 1)	8.60E-04	5.58E-04	5.58E-04
MSSVs/10% ADVs to CR In-leakage (CR Centerline)	2.78E-03	1.63E-03	1.63E-03

Note 1: Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit. Thus the χ/Q s presented reflect those applicable to the CR intake of the unaffected unit.

Table 7.5-1 Control Rod Ejection Accident Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameters	**Value**
Containment Leakage Pathway	
Power Level	3580 MWt
Free Volume	2.550E+06 ft^3
Containment leak rate (0 -24 hr)	0.1% vol. fraction per day
Containment leak rate(1-30 day)	0.05% vol. fraction per day
Failed Fuel Percentage	10%
Percentage of Core Inventory in Fuel Gap	10% (noble gases & halogens)
Melted Fuel Percentage	0%
Chemical Form of Iodine in Failed fuel	4.85% elemental 95% particulate 0.15% organic
Radial Peaking Factor	1.65
Core Activity Release Timing	Puff
Form of Failed Iodine in the Containment Atmosphere	97% elemental 3% organic
Equilibrium Core Activity	Table 4.1-1
Termination of Containment Release	30 days
Environmental Release Point	Same as LOCA Containment Leakage pathway
Secondary Side Pathway	
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm
Primary-to-Secondary Leak rate	0.75 gpm (total for all 4 SGs); leakage density 62.4 lbm/ft^3
Failed Fuel Percentage	Same as containment leakage pathway
Percentage of Core Inventory in Fuel Gap	Same as containment leakage pathway
Minimum Post-Accident SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm / SG
Iodine Species released to Environment	97% elemental 3% organic
Time period when tubes not totally submerged	Insignificant
Steam Releases	0-2 hrs: 651,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,023,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs.
Iodine Partition Coefficient in SGs	100

Table 7.5-1 Control Rod Ejection Accident Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameters	**Value**
Fraction of Noble Gas Released	1.0 (Released without holdup)
Termination of Release from SGs	10.73 hours
Environmental Release Point	MSSVs/10% ADVs
CR emergency Ventilation: Initiation Signal/Timing	
Initiation time (signal)	300 sec (SIS Generated) 312 sec (Non-Affected Unit NOP Intake fully Closed) 338.2 sec (Affected Unit NOP Intake fully Closed with full Mode 4 Emergency Ventilation Operation).
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table 7.5-2

Table 7.5-2
Control Rod Ejection Accident
Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Release Location / Receptor	0-2 hr	2-8 hr	8-10.73	10.73-24 hr	24-96 hr	96-720 hr
Control Room Normal Intakes						
Containment leakage						
- Affected Unit Intake	6.84E-03	-----		-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.24E-03	-----		-----	-----	-----
MSSVs/10% ADVs						
- Affected Unit Intake	Note 3	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	8.60E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration						
Containment leakage	3.22E-03	1.85E-03	7.29E-04	7.29E-04	7.15E-04	6.64E-04
MSSVs/10% ADVs	2.78E-03	1.63E-03	1.63E-03	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Pressurization Intake						
Containment leakage	6.45E-05	4.05E-05	1.65E-05	1.65E-05	1.38E-05	1.12E-05
MSSVs/10% ADVs	1.57E-05	9.60E-06	9.60E-06	-----	-----	-----

Note 1: Containment leakage: Used for Containment release scenario; based on Containment penetration area release point.

Note 2: MSSV /10% ADVs: Used for Secondary System Release Scenario;

Note 3: Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit.

TABLE 7.6-1 Main Steam Line Break Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Power Level	3580 MWt
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm
Leak rate to Faulted Steam Generator	0.75 gpm (conservative assumption) ; leakage density 62.4 lbm/ft^3
Leak rate to Intact Steam Generators	0 gpm (all leakage assumed into faulted SG)
Failed/Melted Fuel Percentage	0%
RCS Tech Spec Iodine Conc.	Table 4.2-1 (1 µCi/gm DE I-131)
RCS Tech Spec Noble Gas Conc.	Table 4.2-1 (270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133)
RCS Equilibrium. Iodine Appearance Rates	Table 4.2-2 (1 µCi/gm DE I-131)
Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentrations	Table 4.2-2 (60 µCi/gm DE I-131)
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike Appearance Rate	500 times equilibrium appearance rate
Duration of Accident- Initiated Iodine Spike	8 hours
Initial Secondary Coolant Iodine Concentrations	Table 4.2-1 (0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131)
Secondary System Release Parameters	
Iodine Species released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic
Fraction of Iodine Released form Faulted SG	1.0 (Released to Environ without holdup)
Fraction of Noble Gas Released from Faulted SG	1.0 (Released to Environ without holdup)
Liquid mass in each SG	Faulted: 182,544 lbm (max.) Intact: 92,301 lbm (min. and initial)
Release Rate of SG liquid activity from Faulted SG	Dryout within10 seconds
Time period when tubes not totally submerged (intact SG)	Insignificant
Steam Releases from intact SGs	0-2 hrs: 384,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 893,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: Same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs
Iodine Partition Coefficient in Intact SG	100 (SGs fully covered)
Termination of release (0.75 gpm leak): Faulted SG	30 hrs when RCS reaches 212 °F
Termination of release from Intact SG	10.73 hours
Release Point: Faulted SG	Outside containment, at the steam line break location

TABLE 7.6-1 Main Steam Line Break Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	Value
Release Point: Intact SG	MSSVs/10% ADVs
CR Emergency Ventilation : Initiation Signal/Timing	
Initiation (signal)	SIS
Unaffected Unit CRVS inlet damper fully closed	Within 12.6 seconds
Affected Unit CRVS inlet dampers fully closed	Within 38.8 seconds
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table 7.6-2

Table 7.6-2
Main Steam Line Break Accident
Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Receptor - Release Point	0-2hr	2-8 hr	8-10.73 hr	10.73-30 hr
CR NOP Intake - Faulted SG (Break Location)	Note 1			
CR NOP Intake - Intact SG (MSSVs/10% ADVs) - Note 2	8.60E-04			
CR Inleakage - Faulted SG (Break Location)	1.24E-02	7.35E-03	3.01E-03	3.01E-03
CR Inleakage - Intact SG (MSSVs/10% ADVs)	2.78E-03	1.63E-03	1.63E-03	-----
CR Emergency Intake & Bypass - Faulted SG (Break Location)	7.65E-05	4.78E-05	1.86E-05	1.86E-05
CR Emergency Intake & Bypass - Intact SG (MSSVs/10% ADVs)	1.57E-05	9.60E-06	9.60E-06	-----

Notes:

1. ARCON96 based χ/Q s are not applicable for these cases given that the horizontal distance from the source to the receptor is 1.5 meters (which is much less than the 10 meters required by ARCON96 methodology).

2. Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit. Thus the χ/Q s presented reflect those applicable to the CR intake of the unaffected unit.

Table 7.7-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Power Level	3580 MWt
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm
Time of Reactor Trip	179.0 sec
Time of isolation of stuck-open 10% ADV on the Ruptured SG	2653 sec
Termination of Break Flow from Ruptured SG that flashes	3402 sec
Termination of Break Flow from Ruptured SG	5872 sec
Time of manual depressurization of the Ruptured SG	2 hours
Break Flow to Ruptured Steam Generator that flashes	Table 7.7-2, Column "A"
Break Flow to Ruptured Steam Generator that does not flash	Table 7.7-2, Column "B"
Tube Leakage rate to Intact Steam Generators	0.75 gpm (total for all 4 SGs; conservatively assumed for 3 intact SGs); leakage density 62.4 lbm/ft^3
Failed/Melted Fuel Percentage	0%
RCS Tech Spec Iodine Concentration	1 µCi/gm DE I-131 (Table 4.2-1)
RCS Tech Spec Noble Gas Concentration	270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133 (Table 4.2-1)
RCS Equilibrium Iodine Appearance Rates	Table 4.2-2 (1 µCi/gm DE I-131)
Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentration	60 µCi/gm DE I-131 (Table 4.2-2)
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike Appearance Rate	335 times TS equilibrium appearance rate
Duration of Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	8 hours
Initial Secondary Coolant Iodine Concentrations	0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131 (Table 4.2-1)
Secondary System Release Parameters	
Initial SG liquid mass	89,707 lbm / SG
Iodine Species released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic
Steam flow rate to condenser from Ruptured SG before trip	63,000 lbm/min
Steam flow rate to condenser from intact SGs before trip	189,000 lbm/min
Partition Factor in Main Condenser	0.01 (elemental iodine)
	1 (organic iodine and noble gases)
Steam Releases from Ruptured SG	Table 7.7-2, Column "C"
Steam Releases from intact SG	Table 7.7-2, Column "D"
Post-accident minimum SG liquid mass for Ruptured SG	89,707 lbm
Post-accident minimum SG liquid mass for intact SGs	89,707 lbm per SG

Table 7.7-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Time period when tubes not totally submerged (intact SG)	insignificant
Fraction of Iodine Released (flashed portion)	1.0 (Released without holdup)
Fraction of Noble Gas Released from all SGs	1.0 (Released without holdup)
Iodine Partition Coefficient	100
Termination of Release from intact SG	10.73 hrs
Environmental Release Points	Plant Vent : 0 – 179 sec MSSVs/10% ADVs:179 sec – 10.73 hr
CR emergency Ventilation : Initiation Signal/Timing	
Initiation time (signal)	SIS: 219 sec Unaffected Unit inlet damper closed: 231 sec Affected Unit inlet damper closed: 257.2 sec
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table 7.7-3

Table 7.7-2
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Break Flows and Steam Releases

	Break Flow and Steam Release within each Time Interval			
	A	B	C	D
Time from Break (sec)	Flashed Break Flow (lbm)	Un-flashed Break Flow (lbm)	Ruptured SG Steam Releases (lbm)	Intact SGs Steam Releases (lbm)
0	1678	8422	187822	563100
179	2217	30003	10527	42565
853	12121	90754	113657	118
2653	1355	15906	0	146
2953	779	23177	0	85467
3402	0	45026	0	97164
4324	0	16870	0	9237
4739	0	23892	0	29103
5872	0	0	0	103300
7200	0	0	270000	1,342,400
38628	0	0	0	0

Note: Data in row for T=0 is applicable to time interval between T=0 sec to T=179 sec (typ)

TABLE 7.7-3
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident
Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Release Location / Receptor	0-179 s	179-257.2 s	257.2 s- 2 h	2-8 hr	8-10.73 hr
Control Room Normal Intakes					
- Plant Vent	1.29E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
- MSSVs/10% ADVs (Note 1)	-----	8.60E-04	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration					
- Plant Vent	1.26E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
- MSSVs/10% ADVs	-----	2.78E-03	2.78E-03	1.49E-03	1.49E-03
Control Room Pressurization Intake					
- MSSVs/10% ADVs	-----	-----	1.57E-05	7.65E-06	7.65E-06

Note 1: Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit. Thus the χ/Q s presented reflect those applicable to the CR intake of the unaffected unit.

Table 7.8-1 Loss of Load Analysis Assumptions & Key Parameter Values	
Parameter	**Value**
Power Level	3580 MWt
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm
Primary to Secondary SG tube leakage	0.75 gpm (total for all 4 SGs); leakage density 62.4 lbm/ft^3
Failed/Melted Fuel Percentage	0%
RCS Technical Specification Iodine Levels	Table 4.2-1 (1 µCi/gm DE I-131)
RCS Technical Specification Noble Gas Levels	Table 4.2-1 (270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133)
RCS Equilibrium Iodine Appearance Rates	Table 4.2-2 (1 µCi/gm DE I-131)
Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentration	Table 4.2-2 (60 µCi/gm DE I-131)
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike Appearance Rate	500 times TS equilibrium appearance rate
Duration of Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	8 hours
Initial Secondary Coolant Iodine Concentrations	0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131 (Table 4.2-1)
Initial and Minimum SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm/SG
Time period of tubes uncovered	insignificant
Steam Releases	0-2 hrs: 651,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,023,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs
Iodine Partition Coefficient in SGs	100
Iodine Species Released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic
Fraction of Noble Gas Released	1.0 (Released without holdup)
Termination of releases from SGs	10.73 hours
Environmental Release Point	MSSVs/10% ADVs
CR emergency Ventilation : Initiation Signal/Timing	
	Control Room is assumed to remain on normal ventilation for duration of the accident.
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table 7.8-2

Table 7.8-2
Loss of Load Accident
Control Room Limiting Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)

Release point and receptor	0-2hr	2-8 hr	8-10.73 hr
MSSVs/10% ADVs to CR NOP Intake (Note 1)	8.60E-04	5.58E-04	5.58E-04
MSSVs/10% ADVs to CR Inleakage (CR Centerline)	2.78E-03	1.63E-03	1.63E-03

Note 1: Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit. Thus the χ/Q s presented reflect those applicable to the CR intake of the unaffected unit.

8.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS: CONTROL ROOM / SITE BOUNDARY DOSES

The accidents listed below have been analyzed for dose consequences at the site boundary and control room.

1. Loss of Coolant Accident
2. Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling Building
3. Fuel Handling Accident in the Containment
4. Locked Rotor Accident
5. Control Rod Ejection Accident
6. Main Steam Line Break
7. Steam Generator Tube Rupture
8. Loss-of Load Event

In accordance with RG 1.183, the "worst 2-hour period" dose at the EAB, and the dose at the LPZ "for the duration of the release" is presented in Table 8.1-1. These dose values represent the post-accident dose to the public due to inhalation and submersion for each of these events. Due to distance/plant shielding, the dose contribution at the EAB/LPZ due to direct shine from contained sources is considered negligible for all the accidents. The associated regulatory limit as discussed in Section 2.4 is also presented.

Per regulatory guidance, the CR dose is integrated over 30 days. The calculated doses address the fact that for events with a duration less than 30 days, the CR dose needs to include the remnant radioactivity within the CR envelope after the event has terminated. The 30-day integrated dose to the control room operator, due to inhalation and submersion, is presented in Table 8.1-1 for all of the referenced design basis accidents. No credit is taken for use of personal protective equipment or prophylactic drugs.

The CR shielding design is based on the LOCA which represents the worst case DBA relative to radioactivity releases. The dose contribution due to direct shine from post LOCA contained sources/external cloud is identified and included in the CR doses reported for the LOCA in Table 8.1-1.

The dose received by the operator during transit outside the control room is not a measure of the "habitability" of the control room which is defined by the radiation protection provided to the operator by the control room shielding and ventilation system design. Thus, the estimated dose to the operator during routine post-LOCA access to the control room is addressed separately from the control room occupancy dose and is not included with the control room occupancy dose for the demonstration of control room habitability.

As demonstrated in Section 7.2.6, the dose contribution to the operator during routine access to control room for the duration of the LOCA is minimal (~ 1% of the occupancy dose).

In accordance with current licensing basis, the TSC design has been evaluated for the worst case DBA, i.e., the LOCA. The 30-day integrated dose to the TSC operator due to inhalation, submersion, and direct shine from the post LOCA contained sources/external cloud is estimated to be 4.1 rem TEDE (note: the dose contribution of direct shine to this total is ~1.3 rem TEDE).

Table 8.1-1
AST Site Boundary and Control Room Dose (TEDE, rem)

Accident	EAB [1] [4]	LPZ [2]	Regulatory Limit	Control Room	Regulatory Limit
LOCA	5.6	1	25	3.7 (0.7) [3]	5
Fuel Handling Accident in Fuel Handling Building	1.5	0.2	6.3	1.1	5
Fuel Handling Accident in Containment	1.5	0.2	6.3	4.7	5
Locked Rotor Accident	0.8	0.2	2.5	2.4	5
Control Rod Ejection Accident			6.3		5
Containment Release	0.7	0.3		3.4	
Secondary Release	0.7	0.2		0.5	
Main Steam Line Break					5
Pre-incident iodine Spike	0.1	<0.1	25	2.0	
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	0.7	0.2	2.5	4.1	
Steam Generator Tube Rupture					5
Pre-incident iodine Spike	1.3	0.1	25	0.6	
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	0.7	<0.1	2.5	0.3	
Loss of Load					5
Pre-incident iodine Spike	<0.1	<0.1	2.5	<0.1	
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	<0.1	<0.1	2.5	<0.1	

Notes

(1) EAB doses are based on *worst 2-hour period* following onset of accident. Except as noted, the maximum 2-hr dose period for the EAB dose for each of the accidents is the 0 to 2 hrs time period.

- LOCA : 24-26 hrs (based on RHR Pump Seal Failure; see note 4 below for additional information)
- LRA: 8.73 to 10.73 hrs
- MSLB (accident initiated spike model): 7.6 to 9.6 hrs
- LOL (accident initiated spike model): 8.73 to 10.73 hrs.

(2) LPZ Doses are based on the duration of the release.

(3) The dose presented represents the operator dose due to occupancy. Value shown in parenthesis represents that portion of the total dose reported that is the contribution of direct shine from contained sources/external cloud. The dose to the CR operator during routine access for the 30 day duration of the accident is discussed in Section 7.2.6 and summarized in the text of Section 8.0.

(4) The maximum 2 hr EAB dose is based on the assumed RHR pump seal failure resulting in a 50 gpm leak of sump water occurring at t=24 hr for 30 mins. This release pathway is considered a part of DCPP licensing basis with respect to passive system failure. If this assumed release pathway were not included, the maximum 2 hr dose at the EAB would occur between t=0.5 hrs to t=2.5 hrs (i.e., during the post-LOCA ex-vessel release phase and would be 3.4 rem.

9.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Alternative Source Term as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.183 has been incorporated into the DCPP site boundary and control room dose re-analyses discussed herein. In accordance with current licensing basis, the dose to the Technical Support Center has been evaluated for the DBA that has the worst case radioactivity release, i.e., the LOCA. The estimated DCPP dose consequences for all design basis events meet the acceptance criteria specified in 10CFR50.67 and RG 1.183. This represents a full implementation of the Alternative Source Terms in which the RG 1.183 source term will become the licensing basis for DCPP.

10.0 REFERENCES

1. Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.67, "Accident Source Term".

2. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 15.0.1, "Radiological Consequence Analyses using Alternative Source Terms," Revision 0.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.183, Revision 0, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors", July 2000.

4. NRC Safety Evaluation Report Related to License Amendment No. 163 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 and License Amendment No 165 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-82, PG&E, Diablo Canyon Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos 50-275 and 50-323, dated February 27, 2004.

5. Regulatory Guide 1.145, "Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 1.

6. Ramsdell, J. V. Jr. and C. A. Simonen, "Atmospheric Relative Concentrations in Building Wakes". Prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, PNL-10521, NUREG/CR-6331, Revision 1, May 1997.

7. TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites", 1962.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.4, Revision 1, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors".

9. Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.44, "Combustible Gas Control for Nuclear Power Reactors".

10. NRC Safety Evaluation Report Related to License Amendment No. 168 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-80 and License Amendment No 169 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-82, PG&E, Diablo Canyon Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos 50-275 and 50-323, dated May 4, 2004.

11. Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area, Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."

12. Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19, "Control Room".

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APPENDIX A: DCPP ARCON96 ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION FACTOR INPUTS

Appendix A provides the DCPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 release point and receptor configuration information (e.g., height, velocity, distances, direction with respect to true north, etc.), release mode (e.g., ground, elevated, surface), and meteorological sensor configuration, used as input into ARCON96.

Also included as Figure A-1, is a site building layout and arrangement drawing that depicts the locations of the postulated release points and receptors. Figure A-1 shows plant north. The directions provided in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 release point and receptor configuration Tables presented herein account for the 23-degree azimuth clockwise offset of true north from plant north.

The on-site meteorological data input to ARCON96 (January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2011), in the ARCON96 input data format, is embedded below

Attachment	DCPP ARCON96 Atmospheric Dispersion Factor Inputs
	On-site meteorological data in to ARCON96 (1/1/2007 – 12/31/2007)
	On-site meteorological data in to ARCON96 (1/1/2008 – 12/31/2008)
	On-site meteorological data in to ARCON96 (1/1/2009 – 12/31/2009)
	On-site meteorological data in to ARCON96 (1/1/2010 – 12/31/2010)
	On-site meteorological data in to ARCON96 (1/1/2011 – 12/31/2011)

Table A-1
On-Site Atmospheric Dispersion Factor Evaluation
Post-accident Release Point and Receptor Description / Location

ID (See Figure A-1)	Release/Receptor	Description
Note 1	Release Point	Unit 1 Containment Building (CB) edge
Note 1	Release Point	Unit 2 Containment Building (CB) edge
1	Release Point	U1 Plant Vent
2	Release Point	U2 Plant Vent
3	Receptor	U1 Control Room Normal Intake
4	Receptor	U2 Control Room Normal Intake
5	Receptor	U1 Control Room Emergency Intake
6	Receptor	U2 Control Room Emergency Intake
7	Release Point	U1 RWST Vent
8	Release Point	U2 RWST Vent
9	Receptor	Control Room Center (location assigned for unfiltered inleakage)
10	Release Point	Unit 1 Containment Penetration Area, GE
11	Release Point	Unit 2 Containment Penetration Area, GE
12	Release Point	Unit 1 Containment Penetration Area, FW/GW
13	Release Point	Unit 2 Containment Penetration Area, FW/GW
14	Release Point	U1 Fuel Handling Building
15	Release Point	U2 Fuel Handling Building
16	Release Point	U1 Equipment Hatch
17	Release Point	U2 Equipment Hatch
18	Release Point	U1 MSSV
19	Release Point	U2 MSSV
20	Release Point	U1 10% ADVs
21	Release Point	U2 10% ADVs
22	Release Point	U1 MSL Break location
23	Release Point	U2 MSL Break location
24	Receptor	TSC Normal Intake
25	Receptor	TSC Center (location assigned for unfiltered inleakage)

Note 1: Though not depicted in Figure A-1, atmospheric dispersion factors were also calculated from the closest edge of the containment building to the various receptors; this release point was treated as a diffuse source.

Figure A-1 Diablo Canyon Power Plant – Site Layout and Arrangement
Post-Accident Environmental Release Point / Receptor Locations



Unit 1 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Release Point / Receptor			
	U1 CB / U1 CR Normal Intake	**U1 CB / U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U1 CB / U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U1 CB / U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	1	39	2	3
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse
Release Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	9.4	44.6	71.8	151.4
Intake Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	345	339	115	003
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 CB / CR Center	U1 PV / U1 CR Normal Intake	U1 PV / U2 CR Normal Intake	U1 PV / U1 CR Emergency Intake
Case No.	4	37	41	5
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - diffuse	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	24.4	74.1	74.1	74.1
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	27.4	31.7	66.8	93.6
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	347	345	339	115
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	7.42, 11.07	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 PV / U2 CR Emergency Intake	**U1 PV / CR Center**	**U1 RWST/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U1 RWST / U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	6	7	8	9
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	74.1	74.1	26.8	26.8
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	215.5	215.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	173.2	50.7	141.2	189.6
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0[1]	0.0[1]
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	003	354	100	019
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Difference in local grade elevation between the RWST (115 ft) and the CR (85 ft) is accounted for in the release height such that source/receptor elevation difference is set to zero.

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 RWST / CR Center	U1 Cont. Pen GE/ U1 CR Normal Intake	U1 Cont. Pen GE / U2 CR Normal Intake	U1 Cont. Pen GE / U1 CR Emergency Intake
Case No.	10	21	43	22
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point
Release Height (m)	26.8	16.8	16.8	16.8
Building Area (m^2)	215.5	530.4	530.4	2,744.5[2]
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	74.9	26.7	51.2	128.0
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0[1]	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	037	047	007	112
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Difference in local grade elevation between the RWST (115 ft) and the CR (85 ft) is accounted for in the release height such that source/receptor elevation difference is set to zero.
2. Release/receptor path goes around the Unit 1 CB.

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 Cont. Pen GE / U2 CR Emergency Intake	**U1 Cont. Pen GE / CR Center**	**U1 PL GW/FW / Unit 1 CR Normal Intake**	**U1 PL GW/FW / U2 CR Normal Intake**
Case No.	23	24	25	44
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point
Release Height (m)	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8
Building Area (m^2)	530.4	530.4	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	165.0	41.0	34.0	67.1
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4	22.0	22.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	012	027	300	319
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 PL GW/FW / U1 CR Emergency Intake	U1 PL GW/FW / U2 CR Emergency Intake	U1 PL GW/FW / CR Center	
Case No.	26	27	28	
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	
Release Height (m)	16.8	16.8	16.8	
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	83.0	166.0	48.0	
Intake Height (m)	32.0	32.0	24.4	
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	124	354	317	
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to TSC Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 CB / TSC Normal Intake	U1 CB / TSC Center	U1 PV / TSC Normal Intake	U1 PV / TSC Center
Case No.	1	2	3	4
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	11.0	10.7	74.1	74.1
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	109.5	97.4	131.7	119.7
Intake Height (m)	11.0	10.7	11.0	10.7
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	013	017	013	017
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to TSC Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 RWST/ TSC Normal Intake	U1 RWST/ TSC Center	U1 Cont. Pen GE / TSC Normal Intake	U1 Cont. Pen GE / TSC Center
Case No.	5	6	7	8
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	26.8	26.8	16.8	16.8
Building Area (m^2)	215.5	215.5	530.4	530.4
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	159.4	150.8	130.6	121.3
Intake Height (m)	11.0	10.7	11.0	10.7
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	030	035	027	032
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 LOCA Releases to TSC Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 PL GW/FW / TSC Normal Intake	U1 PL GW/FW / TSC Center		
Case No.	9	10		
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011		
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10		
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76		
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec		
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met		
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point		
Release Height (m)	16.8	16.8		
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5		
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0		
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	116.7	103.3		
Intake Height (m)	11.0	10.7		
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0		
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	004	008		
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20		
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90		
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5		
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3		
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0		

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 CB/ U1 CR Normal Intake	**U2 CB/ U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 CB/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U2 CB/ U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	40	11	12	13
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse
Release Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	44.9	7.8	150.6	71.0
Intake Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	154	150	132	027
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 CB / CR Center	**U2 PV / U1 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 PV/ U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 PV/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	14	38	42	15
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - diffuse	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	24.4	74.1	74.1	74.1
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	27.3	67.1	30.1	173.2
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	140	154	150	132
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	7.42, 11.07	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 PV/ U2 CR Emergency Intake	**U2 PV/CR Center**	**U2 RWST/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U2 RWST/ U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	16	17	18	19
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	74.1	74.1	26.8	26.8
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	215.5	215.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	93.7	49.9	190.4	140.5
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0[1]	0.0[1]
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	027	140	105	035
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Difference in local grade elevation between the RWST (115 ft) and the CR (85 ft) is accounted for in the release height such that source/receptor elevation difference is set to zero.

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 RWST/CR Center	U2 Cont. Pen GE / U1 CR Normal Intake	U2 Cont. Pen GE / U2 CR Normal Intake	U2 Cont. Pen GE / U1 CR Emergency Intake
Case No.	20	45	29	30
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point
Release Height (m)	26.8	16.8	16.8	16.8
Building Area (m^2)	215.5	530.4	530.4	530.4
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	74.9	50.9	26.7	168.0
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0[1]	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	099	127	084	124
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Difference in local grade elevation between the RWST (115 ft) and the CR (85 ft) is accounted for in the release height such that source/receptor elevation difference is set to zero.

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 Cont. Pen GE / U2 CR Emergency Intake	U2 Cont. Pen GE / CR Center	U2 PL GW/FW / U1 CR Normal Intake	U2 PL GW/FW / U2 CR Normal Intake
Case No.	31	32	46	33
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point	ground -point
Release Height (m)	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5[2]	530.4	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	125.5	41.0	67.1	34.0
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4	22.0	22.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	025	107	175	194
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Release/receptor path goes around the Unit 2 CB.

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 PL GW/FW / U1 CR Emergency Intake	U2 PL GW/FW / U2 CR Emergency Intake	U2 PL GW/FW / CR Center	
Case No.	34	35	36	
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	
Release Height (m)	16.8	16.8	16.8	
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	165.5	83.0	48.0	
Intake Height (m)	32.0	32.0	24.4	
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	140	012	175	
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to TSC Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 CB/ TSC Normal Intake	U2 CB/ TSC Center	U2 PV/ TSC Normal Intake	U2 PV/ TSC Center
Case No.	11	12	13	14
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - diffuse	ground - diffuse	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	11.0	10.7	74.1	74.1
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	55.1	54.8	77.4	77.1
Intake Height (m)	11.0	10.7	11.0	10.7
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	060	072	060	072
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	7.42, 11.07	7.42, 11.07	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to TSC Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 RWST/ TSC Normal Intake	**U2 RWST/ TSC Center**	**U2 Cont. Pen GE / TSC Normal Intake**	**U2 Cont. Pen GE / TSC Center**
Case No.	15	16	17	18
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	26.8	26.8	16.8	16.8
Building Area (m^2)	215.5	215.5	530.4	530.4
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	129.4	127.8	104.4	100.8
Intake Height (m)	11.0	10.7	11.0	10.7
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	058	064	049	057
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 LOCA Releases to TSC Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 PL GW/FW / TSC Normal Intake	**U2 PL GW/FW / TSC Center**		
Case No.	19	20		
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011		
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10		
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76		
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec		
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met		
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point		
Release Height (m)	16.8	16.8		
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5		
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0		
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	54.5	53.1		
Intake Height (m)	11.0	10.7		
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0		
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	054	070		
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20		
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90		
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5		
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3		
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0		

Unit 1 FHA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 FHB/ U1 CR Normal Intake	**U1 FHB/ U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U1 FHB/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U1 FHB/ U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	1	2	17	3
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3
Building Area (m^2)	530.4	530.4	2,744.5[1]	530.4
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	26.5	44.7	135.1	165.0
Intake Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	067	013	112	013
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Release/receptor path goes around the Unit 1 CB.

Unit 1 FHA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 FHB/CR Center	U1 EH/ U1 CR Normal Intake	U1 EH/ U2 CR Normal Intake	U1 EH/ U1 CR Emergency Intake
Case No.	4	5	6	19
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	18.3	20.1	20.1	20.1
Building Area (m^2)	530.4	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	37.5	14.0	46.8	116.7
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	038	023	349	114
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 FHA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 EH/ U2 CR Emergency Intake	**U1 EH/CR Center**		
Case No.	7	8		
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011		
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10		
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76		
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec		
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met		
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point		
Release Height (m)	20.1	20.1		
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5		
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0		
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	161.9	32.3		
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4		
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0		
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	006	008		
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20		
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90		
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5		
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3		
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0		

Unit 2 FHA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 FHB/ U1 CR Normal Intake	**U2 FHB/ U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 FHB/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U2 FHB/ U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	9	10	11	18
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3
Building Area (m^2)	530.4	530.4	530.4	2,744.5[1]
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	44.7	26.5	162.5	135.1
Intake Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	121	067	112	022
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

1. Release/receptor path goes around the Unit 2 CB.

Unit 2 FHA Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 FHB/CR Center	**U2 EH/ U1 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 EH/ U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 EH/ U1 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	12	13	14	15
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	18.3	20.1	20.1	20.1
Building Area (m^2)	530.4	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	37.5	46.5	13.8	161.6
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	097	145	110	128
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 FHA Releases

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 EH/ U2 CR Emergency Intake	U2 EH/CR Center		
Case No.	20	16		
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011		
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10		
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76		
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec		
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met		
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point		
Release Height (m)	20.1	20.1		
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5		
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0		
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0		
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	116.9	32.0		
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4		
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0		
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	020	126		
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20		
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90		
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5		
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3		
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0		

Unit 1 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 MSSV/ U1 CR Normal Intake	**U1 MSSV / U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U1 MSSV / U1 CR Emergency Intake**	**U1 MSSV / U2 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	1	2	25	3
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	27.1	27.1	27.1	27.1
Building Area (m^2)	0.0	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	1.5	37.5	116.6	149.8
Intake Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	247	337	121	005
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 MSSV /CR Center	U1 10% ADVs / Unit 1 CR Normal Intake	U1 10% ADVs / U2 CR Normal Intake	U1 10% ADVs / U1 CR Emergency Intake
Case No.	4	9	10	27
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	27.1	26.5	26.5	26.5
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	20.5	1.5	37.5	116.6
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	355	247	337	121
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 10% ADVs / U2 CR Emergency Intake	**U1 10% ADVs /CR Center**	**U1 MSLB/ U1 CR Normal Intake**	**U1 MSLB/ U2 CR Normal Intake**
Case No.	11	12	17	18
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	26.5	26.5	17.7	17.7
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	0.0	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	149.8	20.5	1.5	37.5
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4	22.0	22.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	005	355	247	337
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 1 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U1 MSLB / U1 CR Emergency Intake	**U1 MSLB / U2 CR Emergency Intake**	**U1 MSLB/CR Center**	
Case No.	29	19	20	
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	
Release Height (m)	17.7	17.7	17.7	
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	116.6	149.8	20.5	
Intake Height (m)	32.0	32.0	24.4	
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	121	005	355	
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	

Unit 2 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 MSSV/ U1 CR Normal Intake	U2 MSSV / U2 CR Normal Intake	U2 MSSV / U1 CR Emergency Intake	U2 MSSV / U2 CR Emergency Intake
Case No.	5	6	7	26
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	27.1	27.1	27.1	27.1
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	0.0	2,744.5	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	37.5	1.5	149.8	116.6
Intake Height (m)	22.0	22.0	32.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	157	247	130	013
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 MSSV /CR Center	**U2 10% ADVs / U1 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 10% ADVs / U2 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 10% ADVs / U1 CR Emergency Intake**
Case No.	8	13	14	15
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	27.1	26.5	26.5	26.5
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	0.0	2,744.5
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	20.5	37.5	1.5	149.8
Intake Height (m)	24.4	22.0	22.0	32.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	139	157	247	130
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 10% ADVs / U2 CR Emergency Intake	**U2 10% ADVs /CR Center**	**U2 MSLB/ U1 CR Normal Intake**	**U2 MSLB/ U2 CR Normal Intake**
Case No.	28	16	21	22
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	10
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	76
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point
Release Height (m)	26.5	26.5	17.7	17.7
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	0.0
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	116.6	20.5	37.5	1.5
Intake Height (m)	32.0	24.4	22.0	22.0
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	013	139	157	247
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	90
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0

Unit 2 MSSVs / 10% ADVs / MSL Break Location Releases to CR Receptors

ARCON96 Parameter	Receptor			
	U2 MSLB / U1 CR Emergency Intake	**U2 MSLB / U2 CR Emergency Intake**	**U2 MSLB/CR Center**	
Case No.	23	30	24	
Meteorological Information:				
Period of Meteorological Data	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	2007 - 2011	
Lower Measurement Height (m)	10	10	10	
Upper Measurement Height (m)	76	76	76	
Wind Speed Units	m/sec	m/sec	m/sec	
Meteorological Data File Names:	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	dcpp2007.met – dcpp2011.met	
Source Information:				
Release Type	ground - point	ground - point	ground - point	
Release Height (m)	17.7	17.7	17.7	
Building Area (m^2)	2,744.5	2,744.5	2,744.5	
Vertical Velocity (m/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Flow (m^3/sec)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Stack Radius (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Receptor Information:				
Distance to Receptor (m)	149.8	116.6	20.5	
Intake Height (m)	32.0	32.0	24.4	
Elevation Difference (m)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Direction to Source (degrees azimuth)	130	013	139	
Default Information:				
Surface Roughness Length (m)	0.20	0.20	0.20	
Wind Direction Window (degrees azimuth)	90	90	90	
Minimum Wind Speed (m/sec)	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Averaging Sector Width Constant	4.3	4.3	4.3	
Initial Diffusion Coefficients (m)	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	0.0, 0.0	

APPENDIX B: CHANGES TO KEY DESIGN INPUT VALUES (BY ACCIDENT): CLB VS AST

As noted in Section 1.0, with this application, and in the interest of evaluating DCPP design against a more realistic accident sequence, as well as in gaining dose analysis margin, the methodology / scenarios used in the following design basis accident (DBA) analyses discussed in the DCPP UFSAR are being updated to reflect the AST guidance provided in RG 1.183.

1. Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
2. FHA in the Containment or in the Fuel Handling Building (FHA)
3. Locked Rotor Accident (LRA)
4. Control Rod Ejection Accident (CREA)
5. Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
6. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
7. Loss-of Load (LOL) Event

Appendix B provides a comparison between the design input values used in the current licensing basis (CLB) dose consequence analyses supporting DCPP Units 1 and 2, to those utilized in the AST analyses supporting this application. The basis for the change from the CLB value is also included, as applicable. It is noted that the DCPP CLB assesses Control Room habitability for the LOCA, MSLB, SGTR and FHA. The methodology used to assess the CLB analyses supporting the CREA, LRA and LOL event are DCPP-specific with pre-NUREG-0800 assumptions. In addition, the CLB analyses for the CREA, LRA and LOL only address offsite dose consequences.

The AST vs CLB information is provided by accident and in tabular format. The control room parameter values and the offsite atmospheric dispersion factors, both of which are generally applicable to all accidents, are summarized separately.

Table No.	Subject
Table B.1-1	Control Room (CR)
Table B.1-2	Site Boundary Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (χ/Q)
Table B.2-1	Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Table B.2-2A	Limiting CR χ/Q for LOCA – AST Values
Table B.2-2B	CR χ/Q's for LOCA – CLB Values
Table B.3-1	Fuel Handling Accident (FHA)
Table B.3-2A	Limiting CR χ/Q's for FHA – AST Values
Table B.3-2B	CR χ/Q's for FHA – CLB Values
Table B.4-1	Locked Rotor Accident (LRA)
Table B.5-1	Control Rod Ejection Accident (CREA)
Table B.6-1	Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)
Table B.6-2A	Limiting CR χ/Q's for MSLB – AST Values
Table B.6-2B	CR χ/Q's for MSLB – CLB Values
Table B.7-1	Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
Table B.7-2A	Limiting CR χ/Q's for SGTR – AST Values
Table B.7-2B	CR χ/Q's for SGTR – CLB Values
Table B.8-1	Loss of Load (LOL) Event

Table B.1-1 Control Room[1] Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Free Volume	170,000 ft^3		
Unfiltered Normal Operation Intake	Unit 1: 2100 cfm ± 10% Unit 2: 2100 cfm ± 10%	4200 cfm total (SGTR) 2100 cfm (LOCA / MSLB / FHA)	AST: addresses flow uncertainty
Emergency Pressurization Flow Rate	650 – 900 cfm	2100 cfm	AST: Based on results of 2012 Tracer Gas Test
Maximum Unfiltered Backdraft Damper Leakage during CR Pressurization Operation	100 cfm	None	AST: Based on results of 2012 Tracer Gas Test CLB: Analysis predates modification
Carbon / HEPA Filter Flow during CR Pressurization Operation	1800 – 2200 cfm	2100 cfm	AST: Based on results of 2012 Tracer Gas Test
Emergency Filtered Recirculation Rate	1250 cfm (minimum)	2100 cfm	AST: Based on results of 2012 Tracer Gas Test
Pressurization Intake and Recirculation Carbon/HEPA Filter Efficiency (includes filter bypass)	93% (elemental and organic iodine) 98% (particulates)	95% (particulates & all iodine)	AST: Based on test acceptance criteria (see Section 7.1)
Unfiltered Inleakage	70 cfm (maximum)	10 cfm	AST: Includes 10 cfm for ingress / egress; Conservative value based on results of 2012 Tracer Gas Test of 37 cfm.
Occupancy Factors	0-24 hr (1.0) 1 - 4 d (0.6) 4-30 d (0.4)		
Operator Breathing Rate	0-30 d (3.5E-04 m^3/sec)	0-30 d (3.47E-04 m^3/sec)	
Inhalation Dose Conversion Factors	Federal Guidance Report No.11	Various: ICRP-30 (FGR 11), RG 1.109, ICRP 2	
Computer Codes used for CR Dose Calculations	RADTRAD 3.03, PERC2	RADTRAD 3.03 - SGTR LOCADOSE - LOCA / FHA / MSLB	AST: For full list of codes used see Section 3.0. CLB - the site boundary dose for other accidents was developed using EMERALD

Note 1:
CLB: Control Room dose only assessed for LOCA / MSLB / SGTR / FHA; the FHA dose consequence analysis does not take credit for CRVS Mode 4 operation
AST: Control Room dose estimated for all analyzed accidents; i.e., LOCA / MSLB / SGTR / FHA / LRA / CREA / LOL event

Table B.1-2
Site Boundary Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (χ/Q)
Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB

	χ/Q (sec/m^3)				
Receptor	0 - 2 hours	2 - 8 hours	8 - 24 hours	1 - 4 days	4 - 30 days
AST					
Unit 1 EAB (NW)	2.50E-04				
Unit 2 EAB (SSE)	2.30E-04				
Unit 1/2 LPZ (NW)	2.12E-05	9.26E-06	6.26E-06	2.67E-06	7.86E-07
CLB					
EAB	5.29E-04				
LPZ	2.20E-05	2.20E-05	4.75E-06	1.54E-06	3.40E-07

Note:

AST: Based on RG 1.145, Revision 1 methodology and use of hourly meteorological data; see Section 5.1 for detail.

CLB: Based on RG 1.4, Revision 1 methodology.

Table B.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Core Power Level (105% of the rated power of 3411 MWth)	3580 MWt		
Fuel Activity Release Fractions into containment	Per Reg. Guide 1.183 (see Section 7.2.3.2.6)	Per Reg. Guide 1.4: 100% core noble gases, 25% of core iodine.	
Fuel Release Timing (gap)	Onset: 30 sec Duration: 0.5 hr	Instantaneous release	
Fuel Release Timing (Early-In-Vessel)	Onset: 0.5 hr Duration: 1.3 hr		
Fuel Activity Release Fractions into sump liquid	Per Reg. Guide 1.183: Same as that released to containment with the exception of the noble gases which escape into the containment atmosphere	10% of core iodine (i.e., 100% of fuel gap activity) are released to the sump water	
Core Activity	Composite core source calculated by SCALE4.3 SAS2/ ORIGEN-S based on a range of 4.2% to 5.0% U-235 enrichment, a 19-month average fuel cycle, and a maximum core average burnup of 50 GWD/MTU. See Table 4.1-1	Composite core source calculated for 3.5% and 4.5% enrichments, and a burnup range from 0.1 to 50 GWD/MTU, by ORIGEN2 code; Activities of some isotopes are listed in Remark column for comparison.	Comparison of some core isotopes (Ci) AST / CLB I-131 9.90E7 / 9.760E7 I-133 2.01E8 / 1.992E8 Kr-85 1.11E6 / 1.226E6 Kr-88 6.43E7 / 1.045E8 Xe-133 2.01E8 / 1.929E8 Xe-135 4.92E7 / 5.570E7
Chemical Form of Iodine released from fuel to containment atmosphere	4.85% elemental 95% particulate 0.15% organic	91% elemental 5% particulate 4% organic	AST: Per RG 1.183 CLB: Per RG 1.4, R1
Chemical Form of Iodine Released from RCS and sump water	97% elemental 3% organic	99.75% elemental 0.25% organic	AST: Based on RG 1.183 CLB: Based on SG 25
Containment Vacuum/Pressure Relief Parameters			
Minimum Containment Free Volume:	2.550E+06 ft^3	Not Evaluated	
Primary Coolant Tech Spec Activity	Isotopic activity concentrations corresponding to 1 µCi/gm DE I-131 and 270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133		

Table B.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Chemical Form of Iodine Released	97% elemental; 3% organic		
Maximum RCS flash fraction after LOCA Noble Gases Halogens	 100% 40%		
Maximum containment pressure relief line air flow rate	218 acfs		
Maximum duration of release via containment pressure relief line	13 sec		
Release Point	Plant Vent		
Containment Leakage Parameters			
Containment Spray Coverage –: Sprayed Volume Unsprayed Volume	Injection and Recirculation Spray Modes 82.5% (sprayed fraction) of Total volume of 2.55E+06 ft^3 2.103E+06 ft^3 4.470E+05 ft^3	Injection Spray Mode 82.5% (sprayed fraction) of Total volume : 2.55E+06 ft^3 2.103E+06 ft^3 4.470E+05 ft^3	
Minimum mixing flow rate from unsprayed to sprayed region: Before actuation of CFCUs After actuation of CFCUs	 2 unsprayed regions/hr (based on natural convection) 9.13 unsprayed regions/hr (based on 68,000cfm CFCU flow to address surveillance margins and uncertainty)	94,000 cfm between sprayed and unsprayed regions	AST: CFCU flowrate consistent with current containment analysis
Minimum duration of mixing via CFCUs	Start = 86 sec End = 30 days	Start = 0 sec End = 30 days	AST: CFCU start and termination time consistent with current containment analysis for one train operation.

Table B.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Containment spray in injection mode Initiation time Termination time	111 sec 3798 sec Spray removal credit ends for elemental iodine when the maximum DF is reached	86.5 sec Not used Spray removal credit ends when the maximum DF for elemental iodine is reached	AST: Injection spray start and termination times consistent with current containment analysis for one train operation.
Maximum delay between end of injection spray and initiation of recirculation spray	12 min (based on manual operator action)	Not Applicable	
Containment spray in recirculation mode Initiation time Termination time	4518 sec 22,518 sec	Not applicable	AST: Spray initiation / termination in recirculation mode consistent with analysis performed to obtain containment conditions if recirculation CS is initiated 12 minutes after injection spray is terminated (1 train operation).
Long-term Sump Water pH	≥ 7.5 (includes acid production), thus no iodine revolution	No iodine re-evolution	
Maximum allowable DF for fission product removal	Elemental Iodine: 200 Others: not applicable	Elemental Iodine: 100 Others: not applicable	CLB: The value of 100 is applied to the initial release of 25% core iodine to the containment assuming an immediate 50% plateout. The effective DF is 200 if the initial release fraction of 50% was addressed.
Elemental iodine and particulate spray removal coefficients in sprayed region during both injection spray and recirculation spray modes	See Table 7.2-2	Constant spray removal coefficients as given below Elemental iodine:31 hr^{-1} Particulate iodine: 0 hr^{-1}	
Elemental iodine removal coefficients due to wall deposition	See Table 7.2-2	None	
Particulate removal coefficients in unsprayed region due to gravitational settling	See Table 7.2-2	None	
Containment Leak rate (0-24 hr)	0.1% weight fraction per day		

Table B.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Containment Leak rate (1-30 day)	0.05% weight fraction per day		
Containment Leakage Release Point (Unfiltered)	From the worst case release point of the following: • Diffuse source via the containment wall • Via Plant Vent • Via Containment Pen Area GE • Via Containment Pen Areas GW & FW	Top of Containment.	
ESF System Environmental Leakage Parameters			
Minimum post-LOCA containment water volume sources	480,015 gal.	469,000 gal for the ESF leakage source 373,220 gal for the RHR pump seal failure source	AST: Based on current analysis (Min volume of RWST, RCS, SAT and Accumulators) CLB: Based on RWST, RCS and Accumulators; volumes used are different from current analysis.
Minimum time after LOCA when recirculation is initiated	829 sec	0 sec	AST: Based on current containment analysis
Duration of leakage	30 days		
Maximum ESF fluid temperature after initiation of recirculation (used to establish iodine airborne fraction)	259.9 °F	See DF values below.	AST: Based on current containment analysis assuming operation of CS in the recirculation mode.
Maximum ESF leak	Unfiltered via plant vent = 240 cc/min Unfiltered via Containment Penetration Areas GE or GW & FW = 12 cc/min	Unfiltered via plant vent = 1910 cc/hr (~ 32 cc/min) A maximum additional filtered / unfiltered leak via the plant vent of 1.85 gpm (7003 cc/min) / 0.186 gpm (or 704 cc/min)	AST: Based on current operational data with margin. Listed values include a factor of 2. CLB: The maximum additional filtered / unfiltered leak rates of 1.85 gpm (7003 cc/min) / 0.186 gpm (or 704 cc/min) are derived in the CLB analysis and are each based on using all of the dose margin to the regulatory limit. In addition, none of the CLB leakage values have a "safety factor of 2."

Table B.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
RHR pump seal failure	Filtered via plant vent 50 gpm starting at t = 24 hrs for 30 min		AST: Releases from the RHR Pump Seal failure are filtered for CR dose evaluation and filtered for Site Boundary Dose Evaluation
Iodine Airborne Release Fraction	10% (for both RHR pump seal and ESF leakage)	DF for RHR pump seal failure release: 132 DF for ESF leakage: 1.0	CLB: Iodine partition credited for RHR pump seal failure which is a large short-term release. Iodine partition not credited for ESF leakage which is a small long-term release.
Auxiliary Building ESF Ventilation System filter efficiency	Elemental iodine: 88% Organic iodine: 88% (See Section 7.2.3.4)	Elemental iodine: 90% Organic iodine: 70% Particulate iodine: 90%	AST: AB Ventilation filter credited for RHR Pump Seal Failure. CLB: AB Ventilation filter credited for RHR Pump Seal Failure
Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Back-Leakage Parameters			
Earliest initiation time of RWST back-leakage	829 sec	Not Evaluated	
Maximum ECCS / sump water back-leakage rate to RWST (includes safety factor of 2)	2 gpm		
RWST back-leakage iodine release fractions	See Table 7.2-3		
RWST back-leakage noble gas, as iodine daughters, release rate from the RWST vent	See Table 7.2-3		
Miscellaneous Equipment Drain Tank (MEDT) Leakage Parameters			
MEDT inflow rate (includes safety factor of 2)	1900 cc/min	Not Evaluated	
MEDT leakage Iodine release fractions	See Table 7.2-4		
MEDT leakage noble gas, as iodine daughters release rate from plant vent	See Table 7.2-4		
CR Emergency Ventilation: Initiation Signal/Timing			

Table B.2-1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Initiation time (signal)	SI signal generated: 6 sec Non-Affected Unit NOP Intake Isolated: 18 sec Affected Unit NOP Intake Isolated and CRVS Mode 4 in full Operation: 44.2 sec	CLB assumes a 10-second closure time for the CRVS outside air isolation dampers.	
Bounding Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors for LOCA	Table B.2-2A (Same as Table 7.2-5, Refer to Section 5.2 for detail)	Table B.2-2B Based on a modified Halitsky methodology	

Table B.2-2A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) AST Values: Limiting Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)					
Release Location / Receptor	**0-2 hr**	**2-8 hr**	**8-24 hr**	**24-96 hr**	**96-720 hr**
Control Room Normal Intakes					
Plant Vent Release					
- Affected Unit Intake	1.67E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	9.10E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----
Containment Penetration Areas					
- Affected Unit Intake	6.84E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
-Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.24E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration					
Plant Vent	1.26E-03	8.96E-04	3.44E-04	3.44E-04	2.99E-04
Containment Penetration Areas	3.22E-03	1.85E-03	7.29E-04	7.15E-04	6.64E-04
RWST Vent	1.07E-03	5.80E-04	2.18E-04	2.19E-04	1.79E-04
Control Room Pressurization Intake					
Plant Vent	5.65E-05	3.70E-05	1.35E-05	1.37E-05	1.11E-05
Containment Penetration Areas	6.45E-05	4.05E-05	1.65E-05	1.38E-05	1.12E-05
RWST Vent	5.25E-05	3.03E-05	1.15E-05	1.10E-05	8.83E-06

Note 1: Release from the Containment penetration areas (i.e., areas GE or GW & FW): applicable to containment leakage and ESF system leakage that occurs in the Containment Penetration Area

Note 2: Release from Plant Vent: applicable to ESF system leakage that occurs in the Auxiliary building, MEDT releases, RHR Pump Seal Failure Release and Containment Vacuum/Pressure Relief Line Release

Table B.2-2B Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) CLB Values[1]: Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)				
Release Location / Receptor	**0-8 hr**	**8-24 hr**	**1-4 days**	**4-30 days**
Unfiltered inleakage/intake	1.96E-04	1.49E-04	1.08E-04	6.29E-05
Filtered pressurization intake	7.05E-05	5.38E-05	3.91E-05	2.27E-05

Note 1:

The above control room X/Q values are used for all postulated releases and are based on a release point on the top of containment.

Table B.3-1 Fuel Handling Accident in Fuel Handling Building or Containment (FHA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Power Level	3580 MWt		
Number of Damaged Fuel Assemblies	1		
Total Number of Fuel Rods damaged	264 (i.e., all rods in damaged fuel assembly)		
Decay Time Prior to Fuel Movement	72 hours	100 hrs	
Radial Peaking Factor	1.65		
Fraction of Core Inventory in gap	Kr-85 (30%) Other Noble Gases (10%) I-131 (12%) Other Halides (10%) Alkali Metals (17%) Refer to Section 4.3	Kr-85 (30%) Other Noble Gases (10%) All Halides (10%) Based on SG 25	
Equilibrium Fuel Assembly Activity	Based on 72 hour decay. Refer to Table 7.3-2	Based on 100 hour decay. Activities of some isotopes after 100 hr decay are listed in Remark column for comparison.	Comparison of a single fuel assembly activity (Ci) AST(72 hr decay) CLB(100 hr decay) I-131 4.09E5 3.625E5 I-133 9.73E4 3.783E4 Kr-85 5.75E3 6.350E3 Xe-133 8.31E5 6.914E5
Iodine form of gap release before scrubbing in pool/reactor cavity	99.85% elemental 0.15% Organic	99.75% elemental 0.25% Organic	AST: Based on RG 1.183 CLB: Based on SG 25
Iodine form of gap release after scrubbing in pool/reactor cavity	57% elemental 43% Organic	75% elemental 25% Organic	AST: Based on RG 1.183 CLB: Based on SG 25
Pool / reactor cavity scrubbing Decontamination Factors	Iodine (200, effective) Noble Gas (1) Particulates (∞)		AST/CLB: Based on RG 1.183
Rate of Release from Fuel	Puff		
Environmental Release Points and Rates			
Environmental Release Rate	All airborne activity released within a 2 hour period (or less if the ventilation system promotes a faster release rate)	FHA in FHB: All airborne activity released within a 2 hour period FHA in Containment: Puff release	AST FHA: *In FHB*: Analysis uses the actual release rate lambda based on the FHBVS exhaust (i.e., 8.7 hr^{-1}) since it is larger than the release rate applicable to "a 2-hr release" per regulatory guidance (i.e., 3.45 hr^{-1}). *In Containment:* Analysis uses a release rate applicable to "a 2-hr release"
FHA in the FHB – Release flow rates	-Plant Vent – 46,000 cfm FHB Outleakage -Ingress/Egress – 30 cfm -Miscellaneous gaps /	Plant vent – 40,000 cfm	AST: Per Fan curve, 46,000 cfm is maximum flow; other out leakages are conservative assumptions, see Section 7.3

Table B.3-1 Fuel Handling Accident in Fuel Handling Building or Containment (FHA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
	openings – 470 cfm		
Minimum free volume in FHB above SFP	317,000 ft^3	435,000 ft^3	AST: Based on updated assessment of free volume above the SFP
FHA in Containment - Release flow rates	-Open Equipment Hatch – All airborne activity released in 2 hrs	Open containment - All airborne activity released in 1 second (puff release)	
Minimum Free Volume in Containment above Operating Floor	2,013,000 ft^3	33,600 ft^3 containment volume above fuel pool	AST: Based on updated assessment of volume available for dilution of FHA releases CLB: Conservative value based on a small rectangular parallelepiped of air space above the 25 ft x 70 ft square feet pool surface in reactor cavity.
CR Emergency Ventilation: Initiation Signal/Timing			
Signal(s) available to switch the CRVS from normal operation (NOP) Ventilation (Mode 1) to Pressurized Filtered Ventilation (Mode 4) following a FHA	Radiation signals from gamma sensitive intake monitors that initiate closure of the CR normal intake dampers and switch the CRVS from normal operation Ventilation Mode 1 to Pressurized Filtered Ventilation Mode 4. (Refer to Section 7.3) No LOOP (Refer to Section 7.1)	Assumes CR is in normal ventilation mode, with unfiltered inlet/inleakage and exhaust flow rate of 2110 cfm for the duration of the accident. No LOOP	
Delay time for CRVS Mode 4 operation, including monitor response, signal processing, and damper closure time	22 seconds (see below)	Not applicable	
Radiation Monitor Response Time	10 seconds (conservative assumption) -(Refer to Section 7.3)		
Radiation monitor signal processing time	2 seconds		
Damper Closure Time	10 seconds		
Bounding Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors for FHA	Table B.3-2A (Same as Table 7.3-3; Refer to Section 5.2 for detail)	Table B.3-2B Based on a modified Halitsky methodology	

Table B.3-2A Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) AST Values: Limiting Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)						
Release Location / Receptor	**0-22 sec**	**22 sec - 2 hr**	**2-8 hr**	**8-24 hr**	**1-4 d**	**4-30 d**
Control Room Normal Intakes						
Containment Hatch Release						
- Affected Unit Intake	2.61E-02	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.88E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Plant Vent Release						
- Affected Unit Intake	1.67E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	9.10E-04	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FHB Out-leakage points						
- Affected Unit Intake	6.98E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
- Non-Affected Unit Intake	2.93E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration						
Containment Hatch Release	5.51E-03	5.51E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
Plant Vent	1.26E-03	1.26E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
FHB Out-leakage points	3.78E-03	3.78E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Pressurization Intake						
Containment Hatch Release	-----	6.60E-05	-----	-----	-----	-----
Plant Vent	-----	5.65E-05	-----	-----	-----	-----
FHB Out-leakage points	-----	6.40E-05	-----	-----	-----	-----

Table B.3-2B Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) CLB Values[1]: Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)				
Release Location / Receptor	**0-8 hr**	**8-24 hr**	**1-4 days**	**4-30 days**
Unfiltered inleakage/intake	1.96E-04	-	-	-

Note 1:

The above control room X/Q values are used for all postulated releases and are based on a release point on the top of containment.

Table B.4-1 Locked Rotor Accident (LRA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Power Level	3580 MWt	3568 MWt	
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm	Not Available	
Primary to Secondary SG tube leakage	0.75 gpm at STP (total for all 4 SGs)	1.0 gpm at STP (total for all 4 SGs)	
Melted Fuel Percentage	0%		
Failed Fuel Percentage	10%		
Equilibrium Core Activity	Composite core source calculated by SCALE4.3 SAS2/ ORIGEN-S based on current enrichment and burnup. (Refer to Section 4.1 & Table 4.1-1)	Calculated by EMERALD NORMAL computer program based on 3568 MWt core power, 3.18% enrichment, and 12 month fuel cycle. (Refer to UFSAR Table 11.1-2 & 11.1-4)	
Radial Peaking Factor	1.65	Not used	
Fraction of Core Inventory in Fuel gap	I-131: 12% Kr-85: 30% Other Noble Gases: 10% Other Halogens: 10% Alkali Metals: 17%	DCPP specific: Gap fractions are isotope dependent. Provided below are some of the values (based on hot channel factor of 1.70): I-131 - 0.822% Kr-85 - 16.7% Xe-133 - 0.667% (Refer to UFSAR Table 11.1-7)	
Iodine Chemical Form in Gap	4.85% elemental 95% Particulate 0.15% organic	100% elemental	
Secondary Side Parameters			
Initial and Minimum SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm/SG	Not Available	
Iodine Species Released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic	100% elemental	
Time period of tubes being uncovered	insignificant		

Table B.4-1 Locked Rotor Accident (LRA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Steam Releases	0-2 hrs: 651,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,023,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs	0-2 hrs: 656,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,035,000 lbm	AST: Based on RSG and current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range
Iodine Partition Coefficient in SGs	100		
Particulate Carry-Over Fraction in SGs	0.0005 by weight	Not Applicable	
Fraction of Noble Gas Released	1.0 (Released without holdup)		
Termination of releases from SGs	10.73 hours	8 hrs	
Environmental Release Point	MSSVs/10% ADVs		
Initial and Minimum SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm/SG	Not Available	

Note: No comparison is provided for Control Room parameters since the CLB does not include a dose assessment in the Control room following a LRA.

Table B.5-1 Control Rod Ejection Accident (CREA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameters	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Containment Leakage Pathway			
Power Level	3580 MWt	3568 MWt	
Equilibrium Core Activity	Composite core source calculated by SCALE4.3 SAS2/ ORIGEN-S based on current enrichment and burnup. (Refer to Section 4.1 & Table 4.1-1)	The core activity is calculated by EMERALD NORMAL computer program based on 3568 MWt core power, 3.18% enrichment, and 12 month fuel cycle. (Refer to UFSAR Table 11.1-2 & 11.1-4)	
Free Volume	2.55E+06 ft^3		
Containment leak rate (0 -24 hr)	0.1% vol. fraction per day		
Containment leak rate(1-30 day)	0.05% vol. fraction per day		
Failed Fuel Percentage	10%		
Percentage of Core Inventory in Fuel Gap	10% core noble gases 10% core halogens	DCPP specific: Gap fractions are isotopic dependent. Provided below are some of the values are (based on hot channel factor of 1.70): I-131 - 0.822% Kr-85 - 16.7% Xe-133 - 0.667% (Refer to UFSAR Table 11.1-7)	AST: Per RG 1.183 CLB: Plant specific
Percentage of fission products released to coolant that are released to the containment atmosphere	100% of the noble gases 100% of the iodines	100% of the noble gases 10% of the halogens	
Melted Fuel Percentage	0%		
Chemical Form of Iodine in Failed fuel	4.85% elemental; 95% Particulate; 0.15% organic	Not stated	AST: Per RG 1.183
Radial Peaking Factor	1.65	Not used	
Core Activity Release Timing	Puff		
Form of Iodine from failed fuel in the Containment Atmosphere	97% elemental; 3% organic	100% elemental	AST: Per RG 1.183

Table B.5-1 Control Rod Ejection Accident (CREA) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameters	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Credit taken for containment sprays	No	Yes	
Iodine removal coefficients by sprays	Not applicable	Same as LOCA Elemental iodine:31 hr^{-1}	
Termination of Containment Release	30 days		
Environmental Release Point	Same as LOCA Containment Leakage pathway		
Secondary Side Pathway			
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm	The assumptions and inputs for the secondary side pathway are the same as that described in Locked Rotor Accident (Table B.4-1) for CLB	
Primary-to-Secondary Leak rate	0.75 gpm for all 4 SGs		
Failed Fuel Percentage	Same as containment leakage pathway		
Percentage of Core Inventory in Fuel Gap	Same as containment leakage pathway		
Minimum Post-Accident SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm / SG		
Iodine Species released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic		
Time period when tubes not totally submerged	Insignificant		
Steam Releases	0-2 hrs: 651,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,023,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs.		
Iodine Partition Coefficient in SGs	100		
Fraction of Noble Gas Released	1.0 (Released without holdup)		
Termination of Release from SGs	10.73 hours		
Environmental Release Point	MSSVs/10% ADVs		

Note: No comparison is provided for Control Room parameters since the CLB does not calculate a dose assessment in the Control room following a CREA. A qualitative statement made in the current UFSAR indicates that since the activity releases following a CREA will be less than a LOCA, the CR dose will be below GDC 19.

TABLE B.6-1 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Power Level	3580 MWt		
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm	566,000 lbm	AST: A smaller RCS mass is more conservative for the accident-initiated iodine spike (AIS) case. RCS mass is not sensitive to the dose consequences for the pre-accident iodine spike (PIS) case because the amount of RCS loss due to SG leakage is small compared to the total inventory.
Leak rate to Faulted Steam Generator	0.75 gpm at STP (conservative assumption)	The calculated maximum allowable accident induced primary to secondary leak rate of 10.5 gpm based on Alternate Repair Criteria.	
Leak rate to Intact Steam Generators	0 gpm (all leakage assumed into faulted SG)	0.3125 gpm (total for 3 intact SGs)	CLB: TS 3.4.13d allows a maximum operational leakage of 150 gpd per SG, which is equivalent to 0.3125 gpm for 3 SGs.
Failed/Melted Fuel Percentage	0%		
RCS Tech Spec Iodine Conc.	1 µCi/gm DE I-131		
RCS Tech Spec Noble Gas Conc.	270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133	RCS NG activity is based on 1% fuel defects.	AST: The AST NG values correspond to 0.5% fuel defects.
RCS Equilibrium Iodine Appearance Rates	Fuel to RCS appearance rate that results in 1 µCi/gm DE I-131, based on 132 gpm letdown flow rate, 100% ion-exchanger efficiency and 11 gpm RCS leakage	Appearance rate that results in 1 µCi/gm DE I-131, based on 132 gpm letdown flow rate, 100% ion-exchanger efficiency, 11 gpm RCS leakage , 1 gpm boron control shim bleed, and 1 gpm tube leakage	Comparison of I-131 appearance rate: AST – 4.31E-01 Ci/min CLB – 4.29E-01 Ci/min
Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentrations	60 µCi/gm DE I-131		
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike Appearance Rate	500 times equilibrium appearance rate		
Duration of Accident- Initiated Iodine Spike	8 hours		
Initial Secondary Coolant Iodine Concentrations	0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131		

TABLE B.6-1 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Secondary System Release Parameters			
Iodine Species released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic	Not specified	Since the CR filter efficiency is the same for the elemental iodine and the organic iodine, this parameter value is inconsequential for CR dose.
Fraction of Iodine Released from Faulted SG	1.0 (Released to Environ without holdup)		
Fraction of Noble Gas Released from Faulted SG	1.0 (Released to Environ without holdup)		
Liquid mass in each SG	Faulted: 182,544 lbm (max.) Intact: 92,301 lbm (min. and initial)	Faulted: 162,784 lbm Intact: 81,500 lbm / SG	AST: Uses maximum mass for Faulted SG (Hot Zero Power value, RSG / current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range) to maximize dose consequences of release from faulted SG. The initial SG liquid mass for the intact SGs based on RSG / current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range. The initial SG liquid mass is used to determine the total iodine inventory in the SG liquid prior to the accident. The SG liquid mass increases following a reactor trip, so the minimum SG liquid mass post-accident is also the SG initial liquid mass. The minimum post-accident SG liquid mass is used to determine the iodine activity release rate during the accident.
Release Rate of SG liquid from Faulted SG	Dryout of SG liquid within10 seconds	Instantaneous dryout	AST: Dryout time based on RSG / current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range.
Termination of 0.75 gpm leak primary to secondary leak from Faulted SG	30 hrs (when RCS reaches 212 °F)	8 hrs (assumption)	
Steam Releases from intact SGs	0-2 hrs: 384,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 893,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: Same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs	0-2 hrs: 393,464 lbm 2-8 hrs: 915,000 lbm	AST: Based on RSG / current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range
Iodine Partition Coefficient in Intact SG	100 (SGs fully covered)	No iodine partition factor is credited.	
Termination of release from Intact SG	10.73 hours (calculated time for initiation of shutdown cooling)	8 hrs (assumption)	
Release Point: Faulted SG	Outside containment, at the steam line break location		

TABLE B.6-1 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Release Point: Intact SG	MSSVs/10% ADVs		
CR Emergency Ventilation : Initiation Signal/Timing			
Initiation (signal)	SIS / Phase A		
Unaffected Unit CRVS inlet damper fully closed	Within 12.6 seconds	Conservatively assumes that the control room is isolated in 2 minutes	
Affected Unit CRVS inlet dampers fully closed	Within 38.8 seconds		
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table B.6-2A (Same as Table 7.6-2; Refer to Section 5.2 for detail)	Table B.6-2B (based on a modified Halitsky methodology)	

Table B.6-2A Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) AST Values: Limiting Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)				
Receptor – Release Point	0-2hr	2-8 hr	8-10.73 hr	10.73-30 hr
CR NOP Intake - Faulted SG (Break Location)	Note 1			
CR NOP Intake - Intact SG (MSSVs/10% ADVs)	8.60E-04			
CR Inleakage - Faulted SG (Break Location)	1.24E-02	7.35E-03	3.01E-03	3.01E-03
CR Inleakage - Intact SG (MSSVs/10% ADVs)	2.78E-03	1.63E-03	1.63E-03	-----
CR Emergency Intake & Bypass - Faulted SG (Break Location)	7.65E-05	4.78E-05	1.86E-05	1.86E-05
CR Emergency Intake & Bypass - Intact SG (MSSVs/10% ADVs)	1.57E-05	9.60E-06	9.60E-06	-----

Note 1: ARCON96 based χ/Q s are not applicable for this case

Table B.6-2B Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) CLB Values[1]: Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)				
Receptor	0-8 hr	8-24 hr	1-4 days	4-30 days
Unfiltered inleakage/intake	1.96E-04	1.49E-04	1.08E-04	6.29E-05
Filtered pressurization intake	7.05E-05	5.38E-05	3.91E-05	2.27E-05

Note 1:

The above control room X/Q values are used for all postulated releases and are based on a release point on the top of containment

Table B.7-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Power Level	3580 MWt		
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm	499,500 lbm	AST: A smaller RCS mass is more conservative for the accident-initiated iodine spike (AIS) case. A larger RCS mass is more conservative for the pre-accident iodine spike (PIS) case because the integrated RCS break flow is significant compared to the initial inventory. AIS case is the more limiting case relative to the regulatory limits.
Time of Reactor Trip	179.0 sec		
Time of isolation of stuck-open 10% ADV on the Ruptured SG	2653 sec		
Termination of Break Flow from Ruptured SG that flashes	3402 sec		
Termination of Break Flow from Ruptured SG	5872 sec		
Time of manual depressurization of the Ruptured SG	2 hours		
Break Flow to Ruptured Steam Generator that flashes	Table 7.7-2, Column "A"		
Break Flow to Ruptured Steam Generator that does not flash	Table 7.7-2, Column "B"		
Tube Leakage rate to Intact Steam Generators	0.75 gpm at STP (for 3 intact SGs)	1.0 gpm at STP (for 3 intact SGs)	
Failed/Melted Fuel Percentage	0%		
RCS Tech Spec Iodine Concentration	1 µCi/gm DE I-131		
RCS Tech Spec Noble Gas Concentration	270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133	RCS NG activity is based on 1% fuel defects.	AST: The AST NG values correspond to 0.5% fuel defects.
RCS Equilibrium Iodine Appearance Rates	Fuel to RCS appearance rate that results in 1 µCi/gm DE I-131, based on 132 gpm letdown flow rate, 100% ion-exchanger efficiency and 11 gpm RCS leakage	Appearance rate that results in 1 µCi/gm DE I-131, based on 132 gpm letdown flow rate, 100% ion-exchanger efficiency and 11 gpm RCS leakage	Comparison of I-131 appearance rate: AST – 4.31E-01 Ci/min CLB – 4.41E-01 Ci/min
Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentration	60 µCi/gm DE I-131		

Table B.7-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike Appearance Rate	335 times TS equilibrium appearance rate		
Duration of Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	8 hours		
Initial Secondary Coolant Iodine Concentrations	0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131		
Secondary System Release Parameters			
Initial SG liquid mass	89,707 lbm/SG	106,000 lbm for ruptured SG 118,500 lbm for each of the 3 intact SGs	CLB: Values reflect average SG mass during the transient. AST: Value based on current analysis supporting RSG / current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range. The initial SG liquid mass is used to determine the total iodine inventory in the SG liquid prior to the accident
Iodine Species released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic	Not specified	Since the CR filter efficiency is the same for the elemental iodine and the organic iodine, this parameter value is inconsequential for CR dose.
Steam flow rate to condenser from Ruptured SG before trip	63,000 lbm/min		
Steam flow rate to condenser from intact SGs before trip	189,000 lbm/min		
Partition Factor in Main Condenser	0.01 (elemental iodine)		
	1 (organic iodine and noble gases)		
Steam Releases from Ruptured SG	Table .7.7-2, Column "C"		
Steam Releases from intact SG	Table 7.7-2, Column "D"		
Post-accident minimum SG liquid mass for Ruptured SG	89,707 lbm	106,000 lbm	CLB value is the average of the initial SG mass (89,707 lbm) and the minimum mass (122,500 lbm) during the stuck open 10% ADV phase of the transient. AST: The minimum post-accident SG liquid mass is used to determine the iodine activity release rate during the accident. The SG liquid mass increases following a reactor trip, so the minimum SG liquid mass post-accident is also the SG initial liquid mass

Table B.7-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) Changes to Key Input Parameter Values AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Post-accident minimum SG liquid mass for intact SGs	89,707 lbm per SG	118,500 lbm per SG	CLB: value is the average of the initial SG mass (89,707 lbm) and the minimum mass (147,400 lbm) during the transient at the end of the cooldown. AST: The minimum post-accident SG liquid mass is used to determine the iodine activity release rate during the accident. The SG liquid mass increases following a reactor trip, so the minimum SG liquid mass post-accident is also the SG initial liquid mass
Time period of tube uncovery for intact SG	insignificant		
Fraction of Iodine Released (flashed portion)	1.0 (Released without holdup)		
Fraction of Noble Gas Released from all SGs	1.0 (Released without holdup)		
Iodine Partition Coefficient	100		
Termination of Release from intact SG	10.73 hrs (calculated time for initiation of shutdown cooling)	8 hrs (assumed)	
Environmental Release Points	Plant Vent : 0 – 179 sec MSSVs/10% ADVs: 179 sec – 10.73 hr	Condenser exhaust : 0 – 179 sec MSSVs/10% ADVs:179 sec – 8 hr	
CR emergency Ventilation : Initiation Signal/Timing			
Initiation time (signal)	SIS: 219 sec Unaffected Unit inlet damper closed: 231 sec Affected Unit inlet damper closed: 257.2 sec	SIS: 215 sec Unaffected Unit & Affected Unit inlet damper closed: 250 sec	
Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors	Table B.7-2A (Same as Table 7.7-3; Refer to Section 5.2 for detail)	Table B.7-2B (based on a modified Halitsky methodology)	

TABLE B.7-2A Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) AST Values: Limiting Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)					
Release Location / Receptor	**0-179 s**	**179-257.2 s**	**257.2 s- 2 h**	**2-8 hr**	**8-10.73 hr**
Control Room Normal Intakes					
Plant Vent	1.29E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
MSSVs/10% ADVs (Note 1)	-----	8.60E-04	-----	-----	-----
Control Room Infiltration					
Plant Vent	1.26E-03	-----	-----	-----	-----
MSSVs/10% ADVs	-----	2.78E-03	2.78E-03	1.49E-03	1.49E-03
Control Room Pressurization Intake					
MSSVs/10% ADVs	-----	-----	1.57E-05	7.65E-06	7.65E-06

Note 1: Due to the proximity of the release from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, to the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit, and due to the high vertical velocity of the steam discharge from the MSSVs/10% ADVs, the resultant plume from the MSSVs/10% ADVs will not contaminate the normal operation CR intake of the affected unit. Thus the χ/Q s presented reflect those applicable to the CR intake of the unaffected unit.

Table B.7-2B Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) CLB Values[1]: Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors (sec/m^3)				
Receptor	**0-8 hr**	**8-24 hr**	**1-4 days**	**4-30 days**
Unfiltered inleakage/intake	1.96E-04	1.49E-04	1.08E-04	6.29E-05
Filtered pressurization intake	7.05E-05	5.38E-05	3.91E-05	2.27E-05

Note 1:

The above control room X/Q values are used for all postulated releases and are based on a release point on the top of containment.

Table B.8-1 Loss of Load (LOL) Event Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	**AST Value**	**CLB Value**	**Remark**
Power Level	3580 MWt	3568 MWt	
Reactor Coolant Mass	446,486 lbm	Not Available	
Primary to Secondary SG tube leakage	0.75 gpm at STP (Four SGs)	1.0 gpm at STP (Four SGs)	
Failed/Melted Fuel Percentage	0%		
RCS Technical Specification Iodine Levels	1 µCi/gm DE I-131	Design basis RCS (1% fuel cladding defects) noble gas and iodine activity	
RCS Technical Specification Noble Gas Levels	270 µCi/gm DE Xe-133		
RCS Equilibrium Iodine Appearance Rates	Fuel to RCS appearance rate that results in 1 µCi/gm DE I-131, based on 132 gpm letdown flow rate, 100% ion-exchanger efficiency and 11 gpm RCS leakage	DCPP specific	
Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike Appearance Rate	500 times TS equilibrium appearance rate	30 times the appearance rate of normal operation	
Pre-Accident Iodine Spike Concentration	60 µCi/gm DE I-131	Not evaluated	
Duration of Accident-Initiated Iodine Spike	8 hrs		
Initial Secondary Coolant Iodine Concentrations	0.1 µCi/gm DE I-131	Based on 1% fuel defects and 1 gpm Primary to secondary Leakage	
Initial and Minimum SG Liquid Mass	92,301 lbm/SG	Not Available	
Time period of tubes uncovered	insignificant		
Steam Releases	0-2 hrs: 651,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,023,000 lbm 8-10.73 hrs: same release rate as that for 2-8 hrs	0-2 hrs: 656,000 lbm 2-8 hrs: 1,035,000 lbm	AST: Based on RSG and current allowable T_{avg} and T_{feed} range
Iodine Partition Coefficient in SGs	100		
Iodine Species Released to Environment	97% elemental; 3% organic	100% elemental	
Fraction of Noble Gas Released	1.0 (Released without holdup)		

Table B.8-1 Loss of Load (LOL) Event Changes to Key Input Parameter Values: AST vs CLB			
Parameter	AST Value	CLB Value	Remark
Termination of releases from SGs	10.73 hours	8 hrs	
Environmental Release Point	MSSVs/10% ADVs		

Note: No comparison is provided for Control Room parameters since the CLB does not include a dose assessment in the Control room following a Loss of Load Event

Attachment 5

Regulatory Guide 1.183 Conformance Tables

NOTE: In Table A5 – A through A5 – H, the text shown in "RG Position" columns is taken from RG 1.183; therefore, references to footnotes, tables, and numbered references, may be found in RG 1.183. Only Pressurized Water Reactor items are addressed.

References in the "Comments" columns are specific to this License Amendment Request.

Table A5 - A	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections
Table A5 - B	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix A (Loss-of-Coolant Accident)
Table A5 - C	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)
Table A5 - D	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)
Table A5 - E	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident)
Table A5 - F	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix G (PWR Locked Rotor Accident)
Table A5 - G	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix H (PWR Rod Ejection Accident)
Table A5 - H	Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix I (Equipment Qualification)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
3. – Accident Source Term			
3.1 ¶1	The inventory of fission products in the reactor core and available for release to the containment should be based on the maximum full power operation of the core with, as a minimum, current licensed values for fuel enrichment, fuel burnup, and an assumed core power equal to the current licensed rated thermal power times the ECCS evaluation uncertainty.[8] The period of irradiation should be of sufficient duration to allow the activity of dose-significant radionuclides to reach equilibrium or to reach maximum values.[9] The core inventory should be determined using an appropriate isotope generation and depletion computer code such as ORIGEN 2 (Ref. 17) or ORIGEN-ARP (Ref. 18). Core inventory factors (Ci/MWt) provided in TID 14844 and used in some analysis computer codes were derived for low burnup, low enrichment fuel and should not be used with higher burnup and higher enrichment fuels. [8]The uncertainty factory used in determining the core inventory should be that value provided in Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50, Typically 1.02. [9]Note that for some radionuclides, such as Cs-137, equilibrium will not be reached prior to fuel offload. Thus, the maximum inventory at the end of life should be used.	Conforms	The licensed power level for both units is 3411 MWt (DPR-80, DPR-82). Analyzed power level is 3580 MWt, approximately 105% of 3411 MWt. The maximum core average burnup used is 50 GWD/MTU, which is the maximum core average burnup used in previous consequence analyses. (Att. 4, Section 4.0, and Table 4.1-1, Table B.2-1) ORIGEN-S is used to calculate the DCPP core inventory. The ORIGEN-S calculation is performed for over 800 isotopes by utilizing the Control Module SAS2 of the SCALE 4.3 computer code package. SAS2/ORIGEN-S has been used in prior AST licensing applications. (Att. 4, Section 3.0)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
3.1 ¶2	For the DBA LOCA, all fuel assemblies in the core are assumed to be affected and the core average inventory should be used. For DBA events that do not involve the entire core, the fission product inventory of each of the damaged fuel rods is determined by dividing the total core inventory by the number of fuel rods in the core. To account for differences in power level across the core, radial peaking factors from the facility's core operating limits report (COLR) or technical specifications should be applied in determining the inventory of the damaged rods.	Conforms	For the DBA LOCA, all fuel assemblies in the core are assumed to be affected and the core average inventory is used for dose consequences. For DBA events that do not involve the entire core, the fission product inventory of each of the damaged fuel rods is determined by: 1) dividing the total core inventory by the number of fuel rods in the core, 2) multiplying by the resultant core average inventory per rod by the total number of damaged rods, and 3) multiplying the resultant total damaged rod inventory by a core radial peaking factor 1.65 from the COLR. (Att. 4 Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5)
3.1 ¶3	No adjustment to the fission product inventory should be made for events postulated to occur during power operations at less than full rated power or those postulated to occur at the beginning of core life. For events postulated to occur while the facility is shutdown, e.g., a fuel handling accident, radioactive decay from the time of shutdown may be modeled.	Conforms	No adjustments for less than full power operation are made in any analysis.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections</th></tr>
<tr><th>RG Section</th><th>RG Position</th><th>DCPP Analysis</th><th>Comments</th></tr>
<tr><td>3.2
¶1</td><td>The core inventory release fractions, by radionuclide groups, for the gap release and early in-vessel damage phases for DBA LOCAs are listed in Table 1 for BWRs and Table 2 for PWRs. These fractions are applied to the equilibrium core inventory described in Regulatory Position 3.1. (Footnote 10 applies to entire RG Section 3.2.)

RG 1.183, Table 2
PWR Core Inventory Fraction Released Into Containment
<table><tr><th>Group</th><th>Gap Release Phase</th><th>Early In-Vessel Phase</th><th>Total</th></tr><tr><td>Noble Gases</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.95</td><td>1.0</td></tr><tr><td>Halogens</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.35</td><td>0.4</td></tr><tr><td>Alkali Metals</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.25</td><td>0.3</td></tr><tr><td>Tellurium Metals</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.05</td></tr><tr><td>Ba, Sr</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.02</td></tr><tr><td>Noble Metals</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.0025</td><td>0.0025</td></tr><tr><td>Ceruim Group</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.0005</td><td>0.0005</td></tr><tr><td>Lanthanides</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.0002</td><td>0.0002</td></tr></table>
[10]The release fractions listed here have been determined to be acceptable for use with currently approved LWR fuel with a peak burnup up to 62,000 MWD/MTU. The data in this section may not be applicable to cores containing mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.</td><td>Conforms</td><td>The release fractions from Regulatory Position 3.2, Table 2 are used. Footnote 10 criterion is met in that peak fuel rod burnup is limited to 62,000 MWD/MTU. The equilibrium core average isotopic inventory that meets regulatory Position 3.1 was used for LOCA.

(Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2.6, Table 7.2-1)</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections</th></tr>
<tr><th>RG Section</th><th>RG Position</th><th>DCPP Analysis</th><th>Comments</th></tr>
<tr><td>3.2
¶2</td><td>For non-LOCA events, the fractions of the core inventory assumed to be in the gap for the various radionuclides are given in Table 3. The release fractions from Table 3 are used in conjunction with the fission product inventory calculated with the maximum core radial peaking factor.

RG 1.183, Table 3[11]
Non-LOCA Fraction of Fission Product Inventory in Gap
<table><tr><th>Group</th><th>Fraction</th></tr><tr><td>I-131</td><td>0.08</td></tr><tr><td>Kr-85</td><td>0.10</td></tr><tr><td>Other Noble Gases</td><td>0.05</td></tr><tr><td>Other Halogens</td><td>0.05</td></tr><tr><td>Alkali Metals</td><td>0.12</td></tr></table>
[11]The release fractions listed here have been determined to be acceptable for use with currently approved LWR fuel with a peak burnup up to 62,000 MWD/MTU provided that the maximum linear heat generation rate does not exceed 6.3 kw/ft peak rod average power for burnups exceeding 54 GWD/MTU. As an alternative, fission gas release calculations performed using NRC-approved methodologies may be considered on a case-by-case basis. To be acceptable, these calculations must use a projected power history that will bound the limiting projected plant-specific power history for the specific fuel load. For the BWR rod drop accident and the PWR rod ejection accident, the gap fractions are assumed to be 10% for iodines and noble gases.</td><td>Exceeds/ Conforms</td><td>To support flexibility in future DCPP fuel management schemes, the gap fraction used for the non-LOCA events (with the exception of the CREA) are based on the bounding (higher) values provided per isotope/isotope class in the following: RG 1.25, NUREG/CR 5009, Section 3.2.2, RG 1.183, Table 3.

The CREA gap fractions are assumed to be 10% for iodines and noble gases, as provided in RG 1.183, Appendix H.

(Att. 4, Section 2.1 and Section 4.3)</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections</th></tr>
<tr><th>RG Section</th><th>RG Position</th><th>DCPP Analysis</th><th>Comments</th></tr>
<tr><td>3.3
¶1</td><td>Table 4 tabulates the onset and duration of each sequential release phase for DBA LOCAs at PWRs and BWRs. The specified onset is the time following the initiation of the accident (i.e., time = 0). The early in-vessel phase immediately follows the gap release phase.[12] The activity released from the core during each release phase should be modeled as increasing in a linear fashion over the duration of the phase. For non-LOCA DBAs in which fuel damage is projected, the release from the fuel gap and the fuel pellet should be assumed to occur instantaneously with the onset of the projected damage.

Table 4
LOCA Release Phases
PWR
<table><tr><th>Phase</th><th>Onset</th><th>Duration</th></tr><tr><td>Gap Release</td><td>30 sec</td><td>0.5 hr</td></tr><tr><td>Early In-Vessel</td><td>0.5 hr</td><td>1.3 hr</td></tr></table>
[12]In lieu of treating the release in a linear ramp manner, the activity for each phase can be modeled as being released instantaneously at the start of that release phase, i.e., in step increases</td><td>Conforms</td><td>The core inventory release timing for gap releases and early in-vessel releases from Regulatory Position 3.3, Table 4 are used in the DBA LOCA. The activity released from the core during each release phase is modeled as increasing in a linear fashion over the duration of the phase.

(Att. 4 Section 7.2 and Table 7.2-1)

For non-LOCA events in which fuel damage is projected (FHA, LRA, and CREA), the release from the fuel gap is assumed to occur instantaneously.

(Att. 4 Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5)</td></tr>
<tr><td>3.3
¶2</td><td>For facilities licensed with leak-before-break methodology, the onset of the gap release phase may be assumed to be 10 minutes. A licensee may propose an alternative time for the onset of the gap release phase, based on facility-specific calculations using suitable analysis codes or on an accepted topical report shown to be applicable to the specific facility. In the absence of approved alternatives, the gap release phase onsets in Table 4 should be used.</td><td>Conforms</td><td>DCPP does not take credit for the leak-before-break delay in the accident sequence and the values from RG 1.183 Table 4 are used.

(Att. 4 Section 7.2 and Table 7.2-1)</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections</th></tr>
<tr><th>RG Section</th><th>RG Position</th><th>DCPP Analysis</th><th>Comments</th></tr>
<tr><td>3.4</td><td>Table 5 lists the elements in each radionuclide group that should be considered in design basis analyses.

Table 5
Radionuclide Groups
<table><tr><th>Group</th><th>Elements</th></tr><tr><td>Nobel Gases</td><td>Xe, Kr</td></tr><tr><td>Halogens</td><td>I, Br</td></tr><tr><td>Alkali Metals</td><td>Cs, Rb</td></tr><tr><td>Tellurium Group</td><td>Te, Sb, Se, Ba, Sr</td></tr><tr><td>Nobel Metals</td><td>Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo Tc, Co</td></tr><tr><td>Lanthanides</td><td>La, Zr, Nd, Eu, Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm, Y, Cm, Am</td></tr><tr><td>Cerium</td><td>Ce, Pu, Np</td></tr></table></td><td>Conforms</td><td>The elements in each radionuclide group from Regulatory Position 3.4, Table 5, are included the DCPP Equilibrium Core Inventory.

To determine the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) resulting from inhalation and submersion following a LOCA, the DCPP LOCA dose consequence analysis uses the default group of 60 isotopes provided with computer code RADTRAD 3.03 plus 13 additional nuclides that were deemed to be dose significant (i.e., Br-82, Br-84, Rb-88, Rb-89, Te-133, Te-133m, Te-134, I-130, Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-138, Cs-138 and Np-238).

(Att. 4 Section 4.0 and Table 4.1-1)</td></tr>
<tr><td>3.5</td><td>Of the radioiodine released from the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the containment in a postulated accident, 95 percent of the iodine released should be assumed to be cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85 percent elemental iodine, and 0.15 percent organic iodide. This includes releases from the gap and the fuel pellets. With the exception of elemental and organic iodine and noble gases, fission products should be assumed to be in particulate form. The same chemical form is assumed in releases from fuel pins in FHAs and from releases from the fuel pins through the RCS in DBAs other than FHAs or LOCAs. However, the transport of these iodine species following release from the fuel may affect these assumed fractions. The accident-specific appendices to this regulatory guide provide additional details.</td><td>Conforms</td><td>The assumed chemical form of iodine released to containment following a DBA LOCA is 95% particulate in the form of cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodide. (Att. 4 Section 7.2 and Table 7.2-1)

See details for each event.</td></tr>
</table>

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
3.6	The amount of fuel damage caused by non-LOCA design basis events should be analyzed to determine, for the case resulting in the highest radioactivity release, the fraction of the fuel that reaches or exceeds the initiation temperature of fuel melt and the fraction of fuel elements for which the fuel clad is breached. Although the NRC staff has traditionally relied upon the departure from nucleate boiling ration (DNBR) as a fuel damage criterion, licensees my propose other methods to the NRC staff, such as those based upon enthalpy deposition, for estimating fuel damage for the purpose of establishing radioactivity releases. The amount of fuel damage caused by a FHA is addressed in Appendix B of this guide.	Conforms	The amount of fuel damage caused by non-LOCA design basis events has previously been determined, as described in UFSAR Chapter 15. The amount of fuel damage evaluated is consistent with current licensing basis. See individual event conformance tables in this Attachment.
4. – Dose Calculation Methodology			
4.1.1	The dose calculations should determine the TEDE. TEDE is the sum of the committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from inhalation and the deep dose equivalent (DDE) from external exposure. The calculation of these two components of the TEDE should consider all radionuclides, including progeny from the decay of parent radionuclides, that are significant with regard to dose consequences and the released radioactivity.[13] [13]The prior practice of basing inhalation exposure on only radioiodine and not including radioiodine in external exposure calculations is not consistent with the definition of TEDE and the characteristics of the revised source term.	Conforms	The dose calculations determine the TEDE dose, with all significant progeny included, as the sum of the CEDE and DDE. As allowed in Section 4.1.4 of RG 1.183, since the submersion exposure is uniform to the whole body, the EDE is used in lieu of the deep dose equivalent (DDE) in determining the contribution of the submersion dose to the TEDE. (Att. 4 Section 6.1)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.1.2	The exposure-to-CEDE factors for inhalation of radioactive material should be derived from the data provided in ICRP Publication 30, "Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers" (Ref. 19). Table 2.1 of Federal Guidance Report 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion" (Ref. 20), provides tables of conversion factors acceptable to the NRC staff. The factors in the column headed "effective" yield doses corresponding to the CEDE.	Conforms	The CEDE is calculated using the inhalation dose conversion factors provided in Table 2.1 of Federal Guidance Report 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion". The factors in the column headed "effective" yield doses corresponding to the CEDE and are derived based on ICRP-30. (Att. 4 Section 6.1)
4.1.3	For the first 8 hours, the breathing rate of persons offsite should be assumed to be 3.5×10^{-4} cubic meters per second. From 8 to 24 hours following the accident, the breathing rate should be assumed to be 1.8×10^{-4} cubic meters per second. After that and until the end of the accident, the rate should be assumed to be 2.3×10^{-4} cubic meters per second.	Conforms	The assumed offsite breathing rates are those specified in Section 4.1.3 of RG 1.183. (Att. 4 Section 6.1)
4.1.4	The DDE should be calculated assuming submergence in semi-infinite cloud assumptions with appropriate credit for attenuation by body tissue. The DDE is nominally equivalent to the effective dose equivalent (EDE) from external exposure if the whole body is irradiated uniformly. Since this is a reasonable assumption for submergence exposure situations, EDE may be used in lieu of DDE in determining the contribution of external dose to the TEDE. Table III.1 of Federal Guidance Report 12, "External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil" (Ref. 21), provides external EDE conversion factors acceptable to the NRC staff. The factors in the column headed "effective" yield doses corresponding to the EDE.	Conforms	The submersion EDE is calculated using the air submersion dose coefficients provided in Table III.1 of Federal Guidance Report 12, "External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil." (Att. 4 Section 6.1)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.1.5	The TEDE should be determined for the most limiting person at the EAB. The maximum EAB TEDE for any two-hour period following the start of the radioactivity release should be determined and used in determining compliance with the dose criteria in 10 CFR 50.67.[14] The maximum two-hour TEDE should be determined by calculating the postulated dose for a series of small time increments and performing a "sliding" sum over the increments for successive two-hour periods. The maximum TEDE obtained is submitted. The time increments should appropriately reflect the progression of the accident to capture the peak dose interval between the start of the event and the end of radioactivity release (see also Table 6). [14]With regard to the EAB TEDE, the maximum two-hour value is the basis for screening and evaluation under 10 CFR 50.59. Changes to doses outside of the two-hour window are only considered in the context of their impact on the maximum two-hour EAB TEDE.	Conforms	The Maximum EAB TEDE for any two-hour period is determined and documented in each analysis. See individual events in the Att. 4.
4.1.6	TEDE should be determined for the most limiting receptor at the outer boundary of the low population zone (LPZ) and should be used in determining compliance with the dose criteria in 10 CFR 50.67.	Conforms	The TEDE is determined for the most limiting person at the LPZ. (Att. 4 Section 6.1)
4.1.7	No correction should be made for depletion of the effluent plume by deposition on the ground.	Conforms	No plume depletion due to ground deposition is credited. (Att. 4 Section 5.1)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.2.1	The TEDE analysis should consider all sources of radiation that will cause exposure to control room personnel. The applicable sources will vary from facility to facility, but typically will include: • Contamination of the control room atmosphere by the intake or infiltration of the radioactive material contained in the radioactive plume released from the facility, • Contamination of the control room atmosphere by the intake or infiltration of airborne radioactive material from areas and structures adjacent to the control room envelope, • Radiation shine from the external radioactive plume released from the facility, • Radiation shine from radioactive material in the reactor containment, • Radiation shine from radioactive material in systems and components inside or external to the control room envelope, e.g., radioactive material buildup in recirculation filters.	Conforms	The radiation dose to personnel within the control room envelope includes inhalation and immersion doses due to releases as a result of each event. The control room shielding design is based on the LOCA, which represents the worst case DBA relative to radioactivity releases. Therefore, only the LOCA addresses shine dose. Direct shine doses from contained sources and the external plume are also evaluated. (Att. 4, Section 7.2) See individual events for details.
4.2.2	The radioactive material releases and radiation levels used in the control room dose analysis should be determined using the same source term, transport, and release assumptions used for determining the EAB and the LPZ TEDE values, unless these assumptions would result in non-conservative results for the control room.	Conforms	The control room doses are determined using the same source term, transport, and release assumptions used for determining the EAB and the LPZ TEDE values, resulting in conservative results for the control room. See individual events for details.

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.2.3	The models used to transport radioactive material into and through the control room,[15] and the shielding models used to determine radiation dose rates from external sources, should be structured to provide suitably conservative estimates of the exposure to control room personnel. [15]The iodine protection factor (IFP) methodology of Reference 22 may not be adequately conservative for all DBAs and control room arrangements since it models a steady-state control room condition. Since many analysis parameters change over the duration of the event, the IPF methodology should only be used with caution. The NRC computer codes HABIT (Ref. 23) and RADTRAD (Ref. 24) incorporate suitable methodologies.	Conforms	The models used to transport radioactive material from the fuel to the control room and the shielding models used to determine radiation dose rates from external sources (SW-QADCGGP and PERC2), are structured to provide suitably conservative estimates of the exposure to control room personnel. (Att. 4 Section 3.0)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.2.4	Credit for engineered safety features that mitigate airborne radioactive material within the control room may be assumed. Such features may include control room isolation or pressurization, or intake or recirculation filtration. Refer to Section 6.5.1, "ESF Atmospheric Cleanup System," of the SRP (Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.52, "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 25), for guidance. The control room design is often optimized for the DBA LOCA and the protection afforded for other accident sequences may not be as advantageous. In most designs, control room isolation is actuated by engineered safeguards feature (ESF) signals or radiation monitors (RMs). In some cases, the ESF signal is effective only for selected accidents, placing reliance on the RMs for the remaining accidents. Several aspects of RMs can delay the control room isolation, including the delay for activity to build up to concentrations equivalent to the alarm setpoint and the effects of different radionuclide accident isotopic mixes on monitor response.	Conforms	Credit is taken for automatic initiation of CRVS Mode 4 (filtration and pressurization) during all analyzed events except the LRA and the Loss of Load Limiting Condition II event. Signals that initiate CRVS Mode 4 include radiation monitors located at the CR normal air intakes, safety injection signal (SIS), and Containment Isolation Phase A. The SIS does not directly initiate CRVS Mode 4, however, it initiates Containment Isolation Phase A, which initiates Mode 4. (Att. 4 Section 7.1) CR radiation monitors (1/2 - RE-25/26) located at the CR normal intakes have the capability of isolating the CR normal intakes on high radiation and switching to CRVS Mode 4. Setpoint changes to these monitors will accommodate CR isolation during an FHA. (Att. 4 Sections 2.2, 7.1, and 7.3) Credit is taken for the dual ventilation intake design of the CR pressurization air intakes per RG 1.194, June 2003. (Att. 4 Sections 2.1, 5.2, and 7.1) Filters credited for offsite and CR dose are qualified and acceptable per the DCPP Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) (TS 5.5.11), which states that the VFTP is in accordance with RG 1.52, Revision 2, ANSI N510 1980, and ASTM D3803-1989.

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.2.5	Credit should generally not be taken for the use of personal protective equipment or prophylactic drugs. Deviations may be considered on a case-by-case basis.	Conforms	No credit is taken for the use of personal protective equipment or prophylactic drugs. (Att. 4 Section 8.0)
4.2.6	The dose receptor for these analyses is the hypothetical maximum exposed individual who is present in the control room for 100% of the time during the first 24 hours after the event, 60% of the time between 1 and 4 days, and 40% of the time from 4 days to 30 days.[16] For the duration of the event, the breathing rate of this individual should be assumed to be 3.5×10^{-4} cubic meters per second. [16]The occupancy is modeled in the X/Q values determined in Reference 22 (Murphy-Campe) and should not be credited twice. The ARCON96 Code (Ref. 26) does not incorporate these occupancy assumptions, making it necessary to apply this correction in the dose calculations.	Conforms	The assumed breathing rates and occupancy factors used for DCPP control room operator dose are those specified in Section 4.2.6 of RG 1.183. (Att. 4 Section 6.1) ARCON96 was used for determining CR X/Q values. Occupancy assumptions were an input in RADTRAD. (Att. 4 Section 5)
4.2.7	Control room doses should be calculated using dose conversion factors identified in Regulatory Position 4.1 above for use in offsite dose analyses. The DDE from photons may be corrected for the difference between finite cloud geometry in the control room and the semi-infinite cloud assumption used in calculating the dose conversion factors. The following expression may be used to correct the semi-infinite cloud dose, DDE_{∞}, to a finite cloud dose, DDE_{finite}, where the control room is modeled as a hemisphere that has a volume, V, in cubic feet, equivalent to that of the control room (Ref. 22). $$DDE_{finite} = \frac{DDE_{\infty} V^{0.338}}{1173}$$ Equation 1	Conforms	Control room doses are calculated using dose conversion factors identified in Regulatory Position 4.1. Equation 1 given in RG 1.183, Regulatory Position 4.2.7, is used for finite cloud correction when calculating immersion doses due to the airborne activity inside the control room. (Att. 4 Section 6.1)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.3	The guidance provided in Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2 should be used, as applicable, in re-assessing the radiological analyses identified in Regulatory Position 1.3.1, such as those in NUREG-0737 (Ref. 2). Design envelope source terms provided in NUREG-0737 should be updated for consistency with the AST. In general, radiation exposures to plant personnel identified in Regulatory Position 1.3.1 should be expressed in terms of TEDE. Integrated radiation exposure of plant equipment should be determined using the guidance of Appendix I of this guide.	Conforms	DCPP is applying for full implementation of AST as described in LAR Enclosure Section 1. Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2 have been used in re-assessing the applicable radiological analyses identified in LAR Enclosure Section 1.
4.4	The radiological criteria for the EAB, the outer boundary of the LPZ, and for the control room are in 10 CFR 50.67. These criteria are stated for evaluating reactor accidents of exceedingly low probability of occurrence and low risk of public exposure to radiation, e.g., a large-break LOCA. The control room criterion applies to all accidents. For events with a higher probability of occurrence, postulated EAB and LPZ doses should not exceed the criteria tabulated in Table 6. The acceptance criteria for the various NUREG-0737 (Ref. 2) items generally reference General Design Criteria 19 (GDC 19) from Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 or specify criteria derived from GDC-19. These criteria are generally specified in terms of whole body dose, or its equivalent to any body organ. For facilities applying for, or having received, approval for the use of an AST, the applicable criteria should be updated for consistency with the TEDE criterion in 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2)(iii).	Conforms	The EAB and LPZ acceptance criteria used are those of Table 6 of RG 1.183. The control room acceptance criterion is 5 rem TEDE. Updates to applicable criteria are included in the LAR to be consistent with the TEDE criterion in 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2)(iii), including updating to GDC 19, 1999, for dose only, upon implementation of AST. The dose acceptance criterion for the TSC, which was based on Section 8.2.1, Item f of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, will be 5 rem TEDE. See LAR Enclosure Section 2.1, items 4, 5, and 6.
5. – Analysis Assumptions and Methodology			

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.1.1 ¶1	The evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.67 are re-analyses of the design basis safety analyses and evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.34; they are considered to be a significant input to the evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.92 or 10 CFR 50.59. These analyses should be prepared, reviewed, and maintained in accordance with quality assurance programs that comply with Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50.	Conforms	The analyses are prepared, reviewed, and maintained in accordance with quality assurance programs that comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."
5.1.1 ¶2	These design basis analyses were structured to provide a conservative set of assumptions to test the performance of one or more aspects of the facility design. Many physical processes and phenomena are represented by conservative, bounding assumptions rather than being modeled directly. The staff has selected assumptions and models that provide an appropriate and prudent safety margin against unpredicted events in the course of an accident and compensate for large uncertainties in facility parameters, accident progression, radioactive material transport, and atmospheric dispersion. Licensees should exercise caution in proposing deviations based upon data from a specific accident sequence since the DBAs were never intended to represent any specific accident sequence -- the proposed deviation may not be conservative for other accident sequences.	Conforms	These analyses have been performed as specified in the guidance. See conformance tables for the individual analyses.

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.1.2	Credit may be taken for accident mitigation features that are classified as safety-related, are required to be operable by technical specifications, are powered by emergency power sources, and are either automatically actuated or, in limited cases, have actuation requirements explicitly addressed in emergency operating procedures. The single active component failure that results in the most limiting radiological consequences should be assumed. Assumptions regarding the occurrence and timing of a loss of offsite power should be selected with the objective of maximizing the postulated radiological consequences.	Conforms	Credit is taken for the ESF equipment discussed in RG Position 4.2.4. Credit is also taken for the PG&E Design Class I ABVS and filters, which are also controlled by TS 3.7.12 and TS 5.5.11. Credit is taken for operating Containment Spray during recirculation (Att. 4, Section 2.1, item 14). A Time Critical Operator Action will be implemented to ensure that the realignment from injection to recirculation is performed within 12 minutes of termination of injection spray (Att. 4, Section 2.5). No new system is credited in the analyses; therefore, all ESF systems have been previously reviewed by NRC. Assumptions regarding the occurrence and timing of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) are selected with the intent of maximizing doses. A LOOP is assumed for events that have the potential to cause grid perturbation (LOCA, LRA, CREA, MSLB, SGTR, and LOL). (Att. 4 Sections 7.0) A FHA cannot cause grid instability, nor can a LOOP cause a FHA. Thus the FHA is evaluated without the assumption of a LOOP. (Att. 4 Section 7.0)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.1.3	The numeric values that are chosen as inputs to the analyses required by 10 CFR 50.67 should be selected with the objective of determining a conservative postulated dose. In some instances, a particular parameter may be conservative in one portion of an analysis but be non-conservative in another portion of the same analysis. For example, assuming minimum containment system spray flow is usually conservative for estimating iodine scrubbing, but in many cases may be nonconservative when determining sump pH. Sensitivity analyses may be needed to determine the appropriate value to use. As a conservative alternative, the limiting value applicable to each portion of the analysis may be used in the evaluation of that portion. A single value may not be applicable for a parameter for the duration of the event, particularly for parameters affected by changes in density. For parameters addressed by technical specifications, the value used in the analysis should be that specified in the technical specifications.[18] If a range of values or a tolerance band is specified, the value that would result in a conservative postulated dose should be used. If the parameter is based on the results of less frequent surveillance testing, e.g., steam generator nondestructive testing (NDT), consideration should be given to the degradation that may occur between periodic tests in establishing the analysis value. [18]Note that for some parameters, the technical specification value may be adjusted for analysis purposes by factors provided in other regulatory guidance. For example, ESF filter efficiencies are based on the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 25) and in Generic Letter 99-02 (Ref. 27) rather than the surveillance test criteria in the technical specifications. Generally, these adjustments address potential changes in the parameter between scheduled surveillance tests.	Conforms	Conservative parameters are assumed when calculating each contributor in the dose analyses. See individual events for more information.

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.1.4	The NRC staff considers the implementation of an AST to be a significant change to the design basis of the facility that is voluntarily initiated by the licensee. In order to issue a license amendment authorizing the use of an AST and the TEDE dose criteria, the NRC staff must make a current finding of compliance with regulations applicable to the amendment. The characteristics of the ASTs and the revised dose calculational methodology may be incompatible with many of the analysis assumptions and methods currently reflected in the facility's design basis analyses. The NRC staff may find that new or unreviewed issues are created by a particular site-specific implementation of the AST, warranting review of staff positions approved subsequent to the initial issuance of the license. This is not considered a backfit as defined by 10 CFR 50.109, "Backfitting." However, prior design bases that are unrelated to the use of the AST, or are unaffected by the AST, may continue as the facility's design basis. Licensees should ensure that analysis assumptions and methods are compatible with the ASTs and the TEDE criteria.	Conforms	The analyses assumptions and methods are compatible with the ASTs and the TEDE criteria per RG 1.183 guidance.
5.2 ¶1	The appendices to this regulatory guide provide accident-specific assumptions that are acceptable to the staff for performing analyses that are required by 10 CFR 50.67. The DBAs addressed in these attachments were selected from accidents that may involve damage to irradiated fuel. This guide does not address DBAs with radiological consequences based on technical specification reactor or secondary coolant-specific activities only. The inclusion or exclusion of a particular DBA in this guide should not be interpreted as indicating that an analysis of that DBA is required or not required. Licensees should analyze the DBAs that are affected by the specific proposed applications of an AST.	Conforms	The postulated accident radiological consequence analyses have been updated for AST. The DBA LOCA, FHA, MSLB, SGTR, LRA, and CREA have been analyzed. In addition, the Loss of Load event, which is the limiting Condition II event, is also updated for AST. See conformance tables for individual events. The dose consequences for other events that have an accident source term and are part of the current DCPP licensing basis are addressed by qualitative comparisons to the above analyzed accidents as allowed by RG 1.183, Position 1.3.3.

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.2 ¶2	The NRC staff has determined that the analysis assumptions in the appendices to this guide provide an integrated approach to performing the individual analyses and generally expects licensees to address each assumption or propose acceptable alternatives. Such alternatives may be justifiable on the basis of plant-specific considerations, updated technical analyses, or, in some cases, a previously approved licensing basis consideration. The assumptions in the appendices are deemed consistent with the AST identified in Regulatory Position 3 and internally consistent with each other. Although licensees are free to propose alternatives to these assumptions for consideration by the NRC staff, licensees should avoid use of previously approved staff positions that would adversely affect this consistency.	Conforms	Assumptions for each analysis have been addressed, as shown in the conformance tables for the individual events.
5.2 ¶3	The NRC is committed to using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) insights in its regulatory activities and will consider licensee proposals for changes in analysis assumptions based upon risk insights. The staff will not approve proposals that would reduce the defense in depth deemed necessary to provide adequate protection for public health and safety. In some cases, this defense in depth compensates for uncertainties in the PRA analyses and addresses accident considerations not adequately addressed by the core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) surrogate indicators of overall risk.	Conforms	No changes have been made to analysis assumptions based upon risk insights.

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.3 ¶1	Atmospheric dispersion values (X/Q) for the EAB, the LPZ, and the control room that were approved by the staff during initial facility licensing or in subsequent licensing proceedings may be used in performing the radiological analyses identified by this guide. Methodologies that have been used for determining X/Q values are documented in Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4, Regulatory Guide 1.145, "Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants," and the paper, "Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ventilation System Design for Meeting General Criterion 19" (Refs. 6, 7, 22, and 28).	Conforms	New atmospheric dispersion values (X/Q) for the EAB, LPZ, control room, and the TSC were developed. (Att. 4 Section 5)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.3 ¶2	References 22 [Murphy – Campe] and 28 [RG 1.145] should be used if the FSAR X/Q values are to be revised or if values are to be determined for new release points or receptor distances. Fumigation should be considered where applicable for the EAB and LPZ. For the EAB, the assumed fumigation period should be timed to be included in the worst 2-hour exposure period. The NRC computer code PAVAN (Ref. 29) implements Regulatory Guide 1.145 (Ref. 28) and its use is acceptable to the NRC staff. The methodology of the NRC computer code ARCON96[19] (Ref. 26) is generally acceptable to the NRC staff for use in determining control room X/Q values. Meteorological data collected in accordance with the site-specific meteorological measurements program described in the facility FSAR should be used in generating accident X/ Q values. Additional guidance is provided in Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs" (Ref. 30). All changes in X/Q analysis methodology should be reviewed by the NRC staff. [19]The ARCON 96 computer code contains processing options that may yield X/Q values that are not sufficiently conservative for use in accident consequence assessments or may be incompatible with release point and ventilation intake configurations at particular sites. The applicability of these options and associated input parameters should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The assumptions made in the examples in the ARCON96 documentation are illustrative only and do not imply NRC staff acceptance of the methods or data used in the example.	Conforms	New atmospheric dispersion values (X/Q) for the EAB, LPZ, control room, and the TSC were developed. Meteorological data acquired in accordance with the DCPP meteorological measurement program for the five-year period from 2007 to 2011 are used to calculate X/Q values. The DCPP meteorological measurement program is described in DCPP UFSAR Section 2.3.3 and was designed to meet the requirements of Safety Guide 23, February 1972. The onsite X/Q methodology (CR and TSC) is based upon the methods in RG 1.194 using the computer code ARCON96. The recommended default values from RG 1.194, Table A-2 were used to develop onsite X/Q values. (Att. 4 Sections 5.1 and 5.2) The offsite X/Q methodology (EAB and LPZ) is based upon the methodology in RG 1.145 for ground level releases using CBI S&W Proprietary code EN-113. Per RG 1.145, fumigation is applicable to stack releases. Releases for DCPP are treated as ground level releases, therefore fumigation is not considered. (Att. 4 Sections 3 and 5)

Table A5-A: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Main Sections			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
6. – Assumptions for Evaluating the radiation Doses for Equipment Qualification			
	The assumptions in Appendix I to this guide are acceptable to the NRC staff for performing radiological assessments associated with equipment qualification. The assumptions in Appendix I will supersede Regulatory Positions 2.c(1) and 2.c(2) and Appendix D of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.89, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 11), for operating reactors that have amended their licensing basis to use an alternative source term. Except as stated in Appendix I, all other assumptions, methods, and provisions of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.89 remain effective. The NRC staff is assessing the effect of increased cesium releases on EQ doses to determine whether licensee action is warranted. Until such time as this generic issue is resolved, licensees may use either the AST or the TID14844 assumptions for performing the required EQ analyses. However, no plant modifications are required to address the impact of the difference in source term characteristics (i.e., AST vs TID14844) on EQ doses pending the outcome of the evaluation of the generic issue.	Conforms	Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 187, "The Potential Impact of Postulated Cesium Concentration on Equipment Qualification," has been resolved. The NRC staff concluded that there is no clear basis for a requirement to modify the design basis for equipment qualification to adopt AST since there would be no discernible risk reduction associated with such a requirement. Therefore, this LAR does not propose to modify the EQ design basis to adopt AST. The DCPP EQ analysis will continue to be based upon TID-14844 assumptions at this time.

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
Source Term Assumptions			
1.	Acceptable assumptions regarding core inventory and the release of radionuclides from the fuel are provided in Regulatory Position 3 of this guide.	Conforms	See responses to Regulatory Positon 3 located in Table A5-A.
2.	If the sump or suppression pool pH is controlled at values of 7 or greater, the chemical form of radioiodine released to the containment should be assumed to be 95% cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85 percent elemental iodine, and 0.15 percent organic iodide. Iodine species, including those from iodine re-evolution, for sump or suppression pool pH values less than 7 will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Evaluations of pH should consider the effect of acids and bases created during the LOCA event, e.g., radiolysis products. With the exception of elemental and organic iodine and noble gases, fission products should be assumed to be in particulate form.	Conforms	The sump pH is controlled at a value greater than 7.0. Evaluation of pH takes into consideration acid production due to the radiation environment associated with the accident. The assumed chemical form of iodine released to containment following a DBA LOCA is 95% particulate in the form of cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodide. With the exception of elemental and organic iodine and noble gases, fission products are assumed to be in particulate form. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2.5)
Assumptions on Transport in Primary Containment			
3.1	The radioactivity released from the fuel should be assumed to mix instantaneously and homogeneously throughout the free air volume of the primary containment in PWRs or the drywell in BWRs as it is released. This distribution should be adjusted if there are internal compartments that have limited ventilation exchange. The suppression pool free air volume may be included provided there is a mechanism to ensure mixing between the drywell to the wetwell. The release into the containment or drywell should be assumed to terminate at the end of the early in-vessel phase.	Conforms	All radioactivity released from the fuel is assumed to mix instantaneously and homogeneously throughout the free air volume of the primary containment. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2)

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
3.2	Reduction in airborne radioactivity in the containment by natural deposition within the containment may be credited. Acceptable models for removal of iodine and aerosols are described in Chapter 6.5.2, "Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System," of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800 (Ref. A-1) and in NUREG/CR-6189, "A Simplified Model of Aerosol Removal by Natural Processes in Reactor Containments" (Ref. A-2). The later model is incorporated into the analysis code RADTRAD (Ref. A-3). The prior practice of deterministically assuming that a 50% plateout of iodine is released from the fuel is no longer acceptable to the NRC staff as it is inconsistent with the characteristics of the revised source terms.	Conforms	DCPP does not deterministically assume 50% plateout of iodine. The wall deposition removal coefficient for elemental iodine has been calculated using computer program SWNAUA to estimate the time dependent particulate removal coefficients. The guidance of SRP 6.5.2 was used to determine elemental iodine removal coefficients. Credit is taken for gravitational settling of particulates. (Att. 4 Section 3 for code description, Section 7.2.3.2.4 for fission product removal)

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
3.3 ¶1	Reduction in airborne radioactivity in the containment by containment spray systems that have been designed and are maintained in accordance with Chapter 6.5.2 of the SRP (Ref. A-1) may be credited. Acceptable models for the removal of iodine and aerosols are described in Chapter 6.5.2 of the SRP and NUREG/CR-5966, "A Simplified Model of Aerosol Removal by Containment Sprays"[1] (Ref. A-4). This simplified model is incorporated into the analysis code RADTRAD (Refs. A-1 to A-3). [1]This document describes statistical formulations with differing levels of uncertainty. The removal rate constants selected for use in design basis calculations should be those that will maximize the dose consequences. For BWRs, the simplified model should be used only if the release from the core is not directed through the suppression pool. Iodine removal in the suppression pool affects the species assumed by the model to be present initially.	Conforms	The containment spray system is currently credited in DCPP licensing basis for the removal of fission products from the containment atmosphere. Therefore, containment spray has been reviewed and approved for this use. The AST analysis continues to credit containment spray system for the removal of iodine and aerosols from the containment atmosphere. In addition, credit is now taken for containment spray during recirculation. Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2.4 provides information used for determining the fission product removal coefficients for processes credited in reducing the radionuclide inventory available for release from the containment. The SWNAUA code was used to estimate the time dependent particulate removal coefficients. Use of the SWNAUA code has been approved in prior AST applications. Att. 4 Table 7.2-2 provides removal coefficient used in the LOCA dose analysis.

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
3.3 ¶2	The evaluation of the containment sprays should address areas within the primary containment that are not covered by the spray drops. The mixing rate attributed to natural convection between sprayed and unsprayed regions of the containment building, provided that adequate flow exists between these regions, is assumed to be two turnovers of the unsprayed regions per hour, unless other rates are justified. The containment building atmosphere may be considered a single, well-mixed volume if the spray covers at least 90% of the volume and if adequate mixing of unsprayed compartments can be shown.	Conforms	The percentage of the total containment free volume that is sprayed is 82.5%. DCPP uses safety-related containment fan cooler units to provide mixing of the sprayed and unsprayed volumes of the containment. The containment mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed regions following a LOCA is determined to be 9.13 turnovers of the unsprayed regions per hour. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2)
3.3 ¶3	The SRP sets forth a maximum decontamination factor (DF) for elemental iodine based on the maximum iodine activity in the primary containment atmosphere when the sprays actuate, divided by the activity of iodine remaining at some time after decontamination. The SRP also states that the particulate iodine removal rate should be reduced by a factor of 10 when a DF of 50 is reached. The reduction in the removal rate is not required if the removal rate is based on the calculated time-dependent airborne aerosol mass. There is no specified maximum DF for aerosol removal by sprays. The maximum activity to be used in determining the DF is defined as the iodine activity in the columns labeled "Total" in Tables 1 and 2 of this guide multiplied by 0.05 for elemental iodine and by 0.95 for particulate iodine (i.e., aerosol treated as particulate in SRP methodology).	Conforms	Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2.4 provides information used for determining the fission product removal coefficients for processes credited in reducing the radionuclide inventory available for release from the containment. The removal rate is based on the calculated time-dependent airborne aerosol mass. Since the spray removal coefficients are based on calculated time dependent airborne aerosol mass, there is no restriction on the DF for particulate iodine. Att. 4 Table 7.2-2 provides removal coefficient used in the LOCA dose analysis.
3.4	Reduction in airborne radioactivity in the containment by in-containment recirculation filter systems may be credited if these systems meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52 and Generic Letter 99-02 (Refs. A-5 and A-6). The filter media loading caused by the increased aerosol release associated with the revised source term should be addressed.	N/A	DCPP does not have post-accident in-containment air filtration systems.

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
3.5	Reduction in airborne radioactivity in the containment by suppression pool scrubbing in BWRs should generally not be credited. However, the staff may consider such reduction on an individual case basis. The evaluation should consider the relative timing of the blowdown and the fission product release from the fuel, the force driving the release through the pool, and the potential for any bypass of the suppression pool (Ref. 7). Analyses should consider iodine re-evolution if the suppression pool liquid pH is not maintained greater than 7.	N/A	Not Applicable for a PWR.
3.6	Reduction in airborne radioactivity in the containment by retention in ice condensers, or other engineering safety features not addressed above, should be evaluated on an individual case basis. See Section 6.5.4 of the SRP (Ref. A-1).	N/A	DCPP does not have ice condensers. The engineered safety features applicable to DCPP are addressed.
3.7	The primary containment should be assumed to leak at the peak pressure technical specification leak rate for the first 24 hours. For PWRs, the leak rate may be reduced after the first 24 hours to 50% of the technical specification leak rate. For BWRs, leakage may be reduced after the first 24 hours, if supported by plant configuration and analyses, to a value not less than 50% of the technical specification leak rate. Leakage from subatmospheric containments is assumed to terminate when the containment is brought to and maintained at a subatmospheric condition as defined by technical specifications. For BWRs with Mark III containments, the leakage from the drywell into the primary containment should be based on the steaming rate of the heated reactor core, with no credit for core debris relocation. This leakage should be assumed during the two-hour period between the initial blowdown and termination of the fuel radioactivity release (gap and early in-vessel release phases). After two hours, the radioactivity is assumed to be uniformly distributed throughout the drywell and the primary containment.	Conforms	Radioactivity is assumed to leak from both the sprayed and unsprayed region of the containment to the environment. A containment leak rate, based on DCPP TS 5.5.16, of 0.1% of containment air weight per day is assumed for the first 24 hours. After 24 hours, the containment leak rate is reduced by 50% to 0.05% of containment air weight per day. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.2.6 and Table 7.2-1)

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
3.8	If the primary containment is routinely purged during power operations, releases via the purge system prior to containment isolation should be analyzed and the resulting doses summed with the postulated doses from other release paths. The purge release evaluation should assume that 100% of the radionuclide inventory in the reactor coolant system liquid is released to the containment at the initiation of the LOCA. This inventory should be based on the technical specification reactor coolant system equilibrium activity. Iodine spikes need not be considered. If the purge system is not isolated before the onset of the gap release phase, the release fractions associated with the gap release and early in-vessel phases should be considered as applicable.	Conforms	TS 3.6.3 allows opening the 12-inch containment vacuum/over pressure relief valves during operating MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Releases of RCS radionuclide inventory are assumed through this path until containment is isolated. Containment isolation occurs prior to the onset of the gap release phase, thus no gap releases occur. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.1) TS 3.6.3 is being revised to require the containment purge system (48-in purge valves) to be sealed closed during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. (LAR Enclosure Section 2)
Assumptions on Dual Containments			
4.	For facilities with dual containment systems, the acceptable assumptions related to the transport, reduction, and release of radioactive material in and from the secondary containment or enclosure buildings are as follows.	N/A	Regulatory Positions 4.1 through 4.6 apply to facilities with dual containment systems. As such, these positions are not applicable to DCPP.
Assumptions on ESF System Leakage			

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
5.	ESF systems that recirculate sump water outside of the primary containment are assumed to leak during their intended operation. This release source includes leakage through valve packing glands, pump shaft seals, flanged connections, and other similar components. This release source may also include leakage through valves isolating interfacing systems (Ref. A-7). The radiological consequences from the postulated leakage should be analyzed and combined with consequences postulated for other fission product release paths to determine the total calculated radiological consequences from the LOCA. The following assumptions are acceptable for evaluating the consequences of leakage from ESF components outside the primary containment for BWRs and PWRs:	Conforms	The radiological consequences from the postulated ESF systems leakage are analyzed and combined with consequences postulated for other fission product release paths. ESF systems that recirculate sump fluids outside containment are postulated to leak at twice the sum of the administrative acceptance criteria. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.3)
5.1	With the exception of noble gases, all the fission products released from the fuel to the containment (as defined in Tables 1 and 2 of this guide) should be assume to instantaneously and homogeneously mix in the primary containment sump water (in PWRs) or suppression pool (in BWRs) at the time of release from the core. In lieu of this deterministic approach, suitably conservative mechanistic models for the transport of airborne activity in containment to the sump water may be used. Note that many of the parameters that make spray and deposition models conservative with regard to containment airborne leakage are nonconservative with regard to the buildup of sump activity.	Conforms	With the exception of noble gases, all fission products released from the fuel to the containment are instantaneously and homogeneously mixed in the sump water at the time of release. Only iodine is released through ESF leakage since the noble gases are not assumed to dissolve in the sump and particulates would remain in the water of ECCS leakage. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.3)

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.2	The leakage should be taken as two times the sum of the simultaneous leakage from all components in the ESF recirculation systems above which the technical specifications, or licensee commitments to item III.D.1.1 of NUREG-0737 (Ref. A-8), would require declaring such systems inoperable. The leakage should be assumed to start at the earliest time the recirculation flow occurs in these systems and end at the latest time the releases from these systems are terminated. Consideration should also be given to design leakage through valves isolating ESF recirculation systems from tanks vented to atmosphere, e.g., emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump miniflow return to the refueling water storage tank.	Exceeds	Leakage from the ESF system can occur via the plant vent and via the penetration area. DCPP procedures, which are controlled by TS 5.5.2, will be updated as part of AST implementation to establish administrative acceptance criteria to ensure leakage is less than 126 cc/min with the following breakdown: (See LAR Enclosure Section 2) - Plant vent area – < 120 cc/min - Penetration area – < 6 cc/min The assumed leakage of 252 cc/min (240 cc/min plus 12 cc/min) is two times the administrative limit of 126 cc/min. The leakage is assumed to start with recirculation. DCPP does not take credit for filters for this ESF leakage. The LOCA dose analysis also includes an RHR pump seal passive failure of 50 gpm for 30 minutes that occurs 24 hours after the LOCA. The pump seal failure release is a filtered release. The LOCA dose analysis also accounts for releases through the RWST vent due to sump back-leakage and ESF leakage that is hard-piped to the MEDT. These releases are not filtered. (Att. 4 Sections 7.2.3.3 - 7.2.3.6)

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.3	With the exception of iodine, all radioactive materials in the recirculating liquid should be assumed to be retained in the liquid phase.	Conforms	With the exception of iodine, all radioactive materials in the recirculating liquid are assumed to be retained in the liquid phase. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.3)
5.4	If the temperature of the leakage exceeds 212F, the fraction of total iodine in the liquid that becomes airborne should be assumed equal to the fraction of the leakage that flashes to vapor. This flash fraction , FF, should be determined using a constant enthalpy, h, process, based on the maximum time dependent temperature of the sum water circulating outside the containment: $$FF = \frac{h_{f_1} - h_{f_2}}{h_{fg}}$$ *Where:* h_{fi} is the enthalpy of liquid at system design temperature and pressure; h_{f2} is the enthalpy of liquid at saturation conditions (14.7 psia, 212F); and h_{fg} is the heat of vaporization at 212F.	Conforms	ESF leakage is expected at the initiation of the recirculation mode for safety injection at 829 seconds. The maximum temperature of the recirculation fluid is 259.9°F, which has a flash fraction less than 10%. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.3)
5.5	If the temperature of the leakage is less than 212F or the calculated flash fraction is less than 10%, the amount of iodine that becomes airborne should be assumed to be 10% of the total iodine activity in the leaked fluid, unless a smaller amount can be justified based on the actual sump pH history and area ventilation rates.	Conforms	The temperature of the ESF leakage and RHR pump seal leakage is 259.9°F, which has a flash fraction less than 10%. Thus, a flash fraction of 10% is assumed in the analysis. A calculated flash fraction of less than 10% is addressed for the RWST and MEDT release pathways. (Att. 4 Sections 7.2.3.3 - 7.2.3.6)

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.6	The radioiodine that is postulated to be available for release to the environment is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. Reduction in release activity by dilution or holdup within buildings, or by ESF ventilation filtration systems, may be credited where applicable. Filter systems used in these applications should be evaluated against the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. A-5) and Generic Letter 99-02 (Ref. A-6).	Conforms	The iodine released from ESF leakage is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. No credit for holdup or dilution of ESF component leakage is taken. A time dependent iodine partition coefficient is used to determine the iodine released from the RWST liquid and the MEDT liquid. (Att. 4 Sections 7.2.3.3 - 7.2.3.6) The leakage from the passive RHR pump seal failure is a filtered release. The filter efficiencies are determined in accordance with guidance provided GL 99-02 and controlled by TS 5.5.11 (VFTP) in accordance with RG 1.52, Revision 2, ANSI N510 1980, and ASTM D3803-1989. The LAR proposed a change to TS 5.5.11, as outlined in Section 2. (Att. 4 Section 7.2.3.4)
Assumptions on Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage in BWRs			

Table A5- B: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A (Loss of Coolant Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
6.	For BWRs, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) have design leakage that may result in a radioactivity release. The radiological consequences from postulated MSIV leakage should be analyzed and combined with consequences postulated for other fission product release paths to determine the total calculated radiological consequences from the LOCA. The following assumptions are acceptable for evaluating the consequences of MSIV leakage.	N/A	Regulatory Positions 6.1 through 6.5 relate to MSIV leakage in BWRs, which is not applicable to DCPP.
Assumption on Containment Purging			
7.	The radiological consequences from post-LOCA primary containment purging as a combustible gas or pressure control measure should be analyzed. If the installed containment purging capabilities are maintained for purposes of severe accident management and are not credited in any design basis analysis, radiological consequences need not be evaluated. If the primary containment purging is required within 30 days of the LOCA, the results of this analysis should be combined with consequences postulated for other fission product release paths to determine the total calculated radiological consequences from the LOCA. Reduction in the amount of radioactive material released via ESF filter systems may be taken into account provided that these systems meet the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. A-5) and Generic Letter 99-02 (Ref. A-6).	N/A	DCPP does not require the use of post-LOCA containment purging as a combustible gas or pressure control measure. The 48-inch containment purge valves will be sealed closed during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, as required by the proposed revision to TS 3.6.3. See LAR Enclosure Section 2.

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Source Term		
1.	Acceptable assumptions regarding core inventory and the release of radionuclides from the fuel are provided in Regulatory Position 3 of this guide.	Conforms	See Table A5-A above for conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183 Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident) source terms. The radiological source term for the FHA is based on the equilibrium core inventory determined with the computer code ORIGEN-S as discussed in Att. 4 Section 4.1 and Table 4.1-1. All fuel rods in one fuel assembly are assumed damaged in the FHA. The FHA is postulated to occur 72 hours after shutdown. The radionuclides relevant to the dose analysis of the postulated FHA for a single fuel assembly at 72 hours post reactor shutdown are shown in Att. 4 Table 7.3-2. The FHA now credits CRVS, which is initiated by radiation monitors. The response time for radiation monitors is dependent on the magnitude of the radiation level and energy spectrum of the airborne cloud at the location of the detector, which are dependent on the fuel decay time. Therefore, a delayed FHA at fuel offload and fuel reload are also evaluated. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
1.1	The number of fuel rods damaged during the accident should be based on a conservative analysis that considers the most limiting case. The analysis should consider parameters such as the weight of the dropped heavy load or the weight of a dropped fuel assembly (plus any attached handling grapples), the height of the drop, and the compression, torsion, and shear stresses on the irradiated fuel rods. Damage to adjacent fuel assemblies, if applicable (e.g., events over the reactor vessel), should be considered.	Conforms	The DCPP FHA utilizes the current licensing basis assumption that all fuel rods in one assembly are damaged. As documented in the NRC SER for License Amendments 8 and 6 to DCPP Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82, respectively, the assumption that all fuel rods in one assembly rupture is conservative because the kinetic energy available for causing damage to a fuel assembly dropped through water is fixed by the drop distance. The kinetic energy associated with the maximum drop height for a fuel handling accident is not considered sufficient to rupture the equivalent number of fuel rods of one assembly in both the dropped assembly and the impacted assembly. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
1.2	The fission product release from the breached fuel is based on Regulatory Position 3.2 of this guide and the estimate of the number of fuel rods breached. All the gap activity in the damaged rods is assumed to be instantaneously released. Radionuclides that should be considered include xenons, kryptons, halogens, cesiums, and rubidiums.	Conforms/ Exceeds	The fission product release from the breached fuel is based on the breach of all fuel rods in one fuel assembly and the following gap fractions. All gap activity is assumed to be instantaneously released. The gap fractions used for the FHA are based on the bounding (higher) values provided per isotope/isotope class in the following: RG 1.25, NUREG/CR 5009, and RG 1.183, Table 3. The gap fractions used have been accepted in prior licensing applications for other utilities. (Att. 4 Sections 4.3, and, 7.3)
1.3	The chemical form of radioiodine released from the fuel to the spent fuel pool should be assumed to be 95% cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodide. The CsI released from the fuel is assumed to completely dissociate in the pool water. Because of the low pH of the pool water, the iodine re-evolves as elemental iodine. This is assumed to occur instantaneously. The NRC staff will consider, on a case-by-case basis, justifiable mechanistic treatment of the iodine release from the pool.	Conforms	The iodine release into the pool from the fuel is assumed to be 95% CsI, 4.85% elemental iodine and 0.15% organic iodine. Due to the acidic nature of the water in the fuel pool (pH less than 7), the CsI is assumed to immediately disassociate and re-evolve as elemental iodine, thus changing the chemical form of iodine to 99.85% elemental and 0.15% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)
Water Depth			

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
2.	If the depth of water above the damaged fuel is 23 feet or greater, the decontamination factors for the elemental and organic species are 500 and 1, respectively, giving an overall effective decontamination factor of 200 (i.e., 99.5% of the total iodine released from the damaged rods is retained by the water). This difference in decontamination factors for elemental (99.85%) and organic iodine (0.15%) species results in the iodine above the water being composed of 57% elemental and 43% organic species. If the depth of water is not 23 feet, the decontamination factor will have to be determined on a case-by-case method (Ref. B-1).	Conforms	The depth of the water above the damaged fuel is greater than 23 feet. An Iodine decontamination factor of 200 is assumed. The chemical form of the iodines above the pool is 57% elemental and 43% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)
Noble Gases			
3.	The retention of noble gases in the water in the fuel pool or reactor cavity is negligible (i.e., decontamination factor of 1). Particulate radionuclides are assumed to be retained by the water in the fuel pool or reactor cavity (i.e., infinite decontamination factor).	Conforms	The noble gas DF is assumed as 1 resulting in negligible retention in water. All alkali metals in the form of particulates are retained in the pool. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)
Fuel Handling Accidents Within The Fuel Building			
4.1	The radioactive material that escapes from the fuel pool to the fuel building is assumed to be released to the environment over a 2-hour time period.	Conforms	It has been determined that for the FHA in the FHB, the actual release rate lambda based on the FHBVS exhaust (i.e., 8.7 hr^{-1}) is larger than the release rate applicable to "a 2-hr release" (i.e., 3.45 hr^{-1}). Thus the larger exhaust rate lambda associated with FHBVS operation plus the exhaust rate lambda for the 500 cfm outleakage is utilized in the analysis. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
4.2	A reduction in the amount of radioactive material released from the fuel pool by engineered safety feature (ESF) filter systems may be taken into account provided these systems meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52 and Generic Letter 99-02 (Refs. B-2, B-3). Delays in radiation detection, actuation of the ESF filtration system, or diversion of ventilation flow to the ESF filtration system[1] should be determined and accounted for in the radioactivity release analyses. [1]These analyses should consider the time for the radioactivity concentration to reach levels corresponding to the monitor setpoint, instrument line sampling time, detector response time, diversion damper alignment time, and filter system actuation, as applicable.	Conforms	No ESF filtration is credited for EAB and LPZ doses. The CR dose analysis credits radiation monitors to switch the CRVS from Mode 1 (normal) to Mode 4 (filtered and pressurized). A 22 second delay is conservatively assumed, including instrument loop uncertainties, from the onset of the event to Mode 4 operation. CR filter efficiencies are determined in accordance with the guidance provided in GL 99-02 and are controlled by TS 5.5.11. (Att. 4 Sections 7.1 and 7.3)
4.3	The radioactivity release from the fuel pool should be assumed to be drawn into the ESF filtration system without mixing or dilution in the fuel building. If mixing can be demonstrated, credit for mixing and dilution may be considered on a case-by-case basis. This evaluation should consider the magnitude of the building volume and exhaust rate, the potential for bypass to the environment, the location of exhaust plenums relative to the surface of the pool, recirculation ventilation systems, and internal walls and floors that impede stream flow between the surface of the pool and the exhaust plenums.	Conforms	Noble gases and iodines are released from the pool and mixed in the available air space, but all activity is released to the environment in less than 2-hours. The radionuclides are released to the environment via the Plant Vent with an assumed 500 cfm outleakage to the environment from the FHB. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)
Fuel Handling Accidents Within Containment			

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.1	If the containment is isolated[2] during fuel handling operations, no radiological consequences need to be analyzed. [2]Containment isolation does not imply containment integrity as defined by technical specifications for non-shutdown modes. The term isolation is used here collectively to encompass both containment integrity and containment closure, typically in place during shutdown periods. To be credited in the analysis, the appropriate form of isolation should be addressed in technical specifications.	Conforms	Containment isolation is not credited in the analysis. Therefore, a radiological consequence analysis is performed. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)
5.2	If the containment is open during fuel handling operations, but designed to automatically isolate in the event of a fuel handling accident, the release duration should be based on delays in radiation detection and completion of containment isolation. If it can be shown that containment isolation occurs before radioactivity is released to the environment, no radiological consequences need to be analyzed.	Conforms	Automatic containment isolation is not credited. Therefore, a radiological consequence analysis is performed. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
5.3	If the containment is open during fuel handling operations (e.g., personnel air lock or equipment hatch is open)[3], the radioactive material that escapes from the reactor cavity pool to the containment is released to the environment over a 2-hour time period. [3]The staff will generally require that technical specifications allowing such operations include administrative controls to close the airlock, hatch, or open penetrations within 30 minutes. Such administrative controls will generally require that a dedicated individual be present, with necessary equipment available, to restore containment closure should a fuel handling accident occur. Radiological analyses should generally not credit this manual isolation.	Conforms	The radioactive material that escapes from the reactor cavity pool to the containment is released to the environment over a 2-hour time period. (Att. 4 Section 7.3) TS 3.9.4 allows the hatches to be open during fuel movements provided that provisions are in place for the hatches to be closed. The TS bases LCO provide guidance on how that capability is available and monitored and the accepted closure time is within 30 minutes. This LAR does not alter TS 3.9.4 or its Bases.
5.4	A reduction in the amount of radioactive material released from the containment by ESF filter systems may be taken into account provided that these systems meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52 and Generic Letter 99-02 (Refs. B-2 and B-3). Delays in radiation detection, actuation of the ESF filtration system, or diversion of ventilation flow to the ESF filtration system should be determined and accounted for in the radioactivity release analyses.[1] [1]These analyses should consider the time for the radioactivity concentration to reach levels corresponding to the monitor setpoint, instrument line sampling time, detector response time, diversion damper alignment time, and filter system actuation, as applicable.	Conforms	No ESF filtration is credited for releases from the containment to the environment. The CR dose analysis credits radiation monitors to switch the CRVS from Mode 1 (normal) to Mode 4 (filtered and pressurized). A 22 second delay is conservatively assumed, including instrument loop uncertainties, from the onset of the event to Mode 4 operation. CR filter efficiencies are determined in accordance with the guidance provided in GL 99-02 and TS 5.5.11. (Att. 4 Sections 7.1 and 7.3)

Table A5-C: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix B (Fuel Handling Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.5	Credit for dilution or mixing of the activity released from the reactor cavity by natural or forced convection inside the containment may be considered on a case-by-case basis. Such credit is generally limited to 50% of the containment free volume. This evaluation should consider the magnitude of the containment volume and exhaust rate, the potential for bypass to the environment, the location of exhaust plenums relative to the surface of the reactor cavity, recirculation ventilation systems, and internal walls and floors that impede stream flow between the surface of the reactor cavity and the exhaust plenums.	Conforms	All airborne activity is released within a 2 hour period. (Att. 4 Section 7.3)

Table A5-D: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Source Terms		
1.	Assumptions acceptable to the NRC staff regarding core inventory and the release of radionuclides from the fuel are provided in Regulatory Position 3 of this regulatory guide. The release from the breached fuel is based on Regulatory Position 3.2 of this guide and the estimate of the number of fuel rods breached. The fuel damage estimate should assume that the highest worth control rod is stuck at its fully withdrawn position.	Conforms	No fuel melt or clad breach is postulated for the DCPP MSLB event. See Item 2 below for source terms. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
2.	If no or minimal[2] fuel damage is postulated for the limiting event, the activity released should be the maximum coolant activity allowed by the technical specifications. Two cases of iodine spiking should be assumed. [2]The activity assumed in the analysis should be based on the activity associated with the projected fuel damage or the maximum technical specification value, whichever maximizes the radiological consequences. In determining dose equivalent I-131 (DE I-131), only the radioiodine associated with normal operations or iodine spikes should be included. Activity from projected fuel damage should not be included.	Conforms	No fuel damage is postulated for the MSLB. Activity released is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by TS. Two cases of iodine spiking are analyzed, pre-accident spike and accident-initiated spike. In addition to the activity associated with the DEI, the initial primary coolant DEX is assumed to be 270 µCi/gm (Revised TS SR 3.4.16.1 value). The initial secondary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at the TS limit of 0.1 µCi/gm DEI (TS 3.7.18). (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
2.1	A reactor transient has occurred prior to the postulated main steam line break (MSLB) and has raised the primary coolant iodine concentration to the maximum value (typically 60 µCi/ DE I-131) permitted by the technical specifications (i.e., a pre-accident iodine spike case).	Conforms	For the pre-accident iodine spike case, it is assumed that a reactor transient has occurred prior to the MSLB and has raised the RCS iodine concentration to a value of 60 µCi/gm of DEI (TS 3.4.16 limit). (Att. 4 Section 7.6)

Table A5-D: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
2.2	The primary system transient associated with the MSLB causes an iodine spike in the primary system. The increase in primary coolant iodine concentration is estimated using a spiking model that assumes that the iodine release rate from the fuel rods to the primary coolant (expressed in curies per unit time) increases to a value 500 times greater than the release rate corresponding to the iodine concentration at the equilibrium value (typically 1.0 µCi/gm DE I-131) specified in technical specifications (i.e., concurrent iodine spike case). A concurrent iodine spike need not be considered if fuel damage is postulated. The assumed iodine spike duration should be 8 hours. Shorter spike durations may be considered on a case-by-case basis if it can be shown that the activity released by the 8- hour spike exceeds that available for release from the fuel gap of all fuel pins.	Conforms	For the accident-initiated iodine spike case, the MSLB causes an iodine spike in the RCS, which increases the iodine release rate from the fuel to the RCS to a value 500 times the appearance rate corresponding to a maximum equilibrium RCS concentration of 1.0 µCi/gm of DEI. The spike is allowed to continue until 8 hours from the start of the event. After this point in the accident there is no activity available for release from the gap. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
3.	The activity released from the fuel should be assumed to be released instantaneously and homogeneously through the primary coolant.	N/A	No fuel damage occurs due to a MSLB. The activity released to the environment is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by TS. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
4.	The chemical form of radioiodine released from the fuel should be assumed to be 95% cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85 percent elemental iodine, and 0.15 percent organic iodide. Iodine releases from the steam generators to the environment should be assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. These fractions apply to iodine released as a result of fuel damage and to iodine released during normal operations, including iodine spiking.	Conforms	No fuel damage occurs due to a MSLB. The chemical form of iodine released from the steam generators to the environment due to the MSLB is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)

Table A5-D: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Transport[3]		
	[3]In this appendix, ruptured refers to the state of the steam generator in which primary-to-secondary leakage rate has increased to a value greater than technical specifications. Faulted refers to the state of the steam generator in which the secondary side has been depressurized by a MSLB such that protective system response (main steam line isolation, reactor trip, safety injection, etc.) has occurred. Partitioning Coefficient is defined as: $$PC = \frac{mass\ of\ I_2\ per\ unit\ mass\ of\ liquid}{mass\ of\ I_2\ per\ unit\ mass\ of\ gas}$$		
5.1	For facilities that have not implemented alternative repair criteria (see Ref. E-1, DG-1074), the primary-to-secondary leak rate in the steam generators should be assumed to be the leak rate limiting condition for operation specified in the technical specifications. For facilities with traditional generator specifications (both per generator and total of all generators), the leakage should be apportioned between affected and unaffected steam generators in such a manner that the calculated dose is maximized.	Conforms	The primary-to-secondary leak rate assumed in the analysis is a total of 0.75 gpm for all four steam generators. This equates to 1080 gpd from all SGs which is greater than the maximum allowable operational leakage of 150 gpd from any one SG imposed by TS 3.4.13d. Conservatively, the total 0.75 gpm tube leakage will be assigned to the faulted SG. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)

Table A5-D: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
5.2	The density used in converting volumetric leak rates (e.g., gpm) to mass leak rates (e.g., lbm/hr) should be consistent with the basis of the parameter being converted. The ARC leak rate correlations are generally based on the collection of cooled liquid. Surveillance tests and facility instrumentation used to show compliance with leak rate technical specifications are typically based on cooled liquid. In most cases, the density should be assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3).	Conforms	The leakage density is assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3). (Att. 4 Section 7.6, Table 7.6-1)
5.3	The primary-to-secondary leakage should be assumed to continue until the primary system pressure is less than the secondary system pressure, or until the temperature of the leakage is less than 100 C (212 F). The release of radioactivity from unaffected steam generators should be assumed to continue until shutdown cooling is in operation and releases from the steam generators have been terminated.	Conforms	The primary to secondary SG tube leakage is assumed to occur until the RCS reaches 212°F, which is conservatively estimated to occur 30 hours after the event. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
5.4	All noble gas radionuclides released from the primary system are assumed to be released to the environment without reduction or mitigation.	Conforms	All noble gases are released freely with no retention or mitigation. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
5.5	The transport model described in the section should be utilized for iodine and particular releases from the steam generators. This model is shown in Figure E-1 and summarized below:		

Table A5-D. Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.5.1	A portion of the primary-to-secondary leakage will flash to vapor, based on the thermodynamic conditions in the reactor and secondary coolant. • During periods of steam generator dryout, all of the primary-to-secondary leakage is assumed to flash to vapor and be released to the environment with no mitigation. • With regard to the unaffected steam generators used for plant cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage can be assumed to mix with the secondary water without flashing during periods of total tube submergence.	Conforms	RCS activities are released to the faulted and intact SGs via tube leakage. • Faulted SG: Due to dry-out, the entire inventory of noble gases and iodines in the SG are released to the environment via the steam line break point without mitigation. The maximum allowable primary to secondary SG tube leakage for all SGs is conservatively assumed to occur in the faulted SG. All iodine and noble gas activities in the tube leakage are assumed to be released directly to the environment without hold-up or mitigation. • Intact SGs: With a loss of offsite power (LOOP), the main steam condenser is not available. Iodines in the intact SGs secondary coolant are released to the environment in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient of 100. Noble gases are released without retention. No primary to secondary leakage into the intact SGs occurs because all tube leakage is conservatively assumed to occur in the faulted SG. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)

Table A5-D: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix E (PWR Main Steam Line Break)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
5.5.2	The leakage that immediately flashes to vapor will rise through the bulk water of the steam generator and enter the steam space. Credit may be taken for scrubbing in the generator, using the models in NUREG-0409, "Iodine Behavior in a PWR Cooling System Following a Postulated Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident" (Ref. E-2), during periods of total submergence of the tubes.	Conforms	No credit is taken for iodine scrubbing in the SG bulk water. Any postulated leakage that immediately flashes to vapor is assumed to rise through the bulk water of the SG into the steam space and is assumed to be immediately released to the environment. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
5.5.3	The leakage that does not immediately flash is assumed to mix with the bulk water.	Conforms	All leakage is conservatively assumed to take place in the faulted SG and immediately flash to steam. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
5.5.4	The radioactivity in the bulk water is assumed to become vapor at a rate that is the function of the steaming rate and the partition coefficient. A partition coefficient for iodine of 100 may be assumed. The retention of particulate radionuclides in the steam generators is limited by the moisture carryover from the steam generators.	Conforms	Iodines in the intact SGs secondary coolant is assumed to be a TS level for secondary system activity. The iodines are released to the environment in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient of 100. No fuel damage occurs due to the MSLB, therefore there are no particulate radionuclides available for release. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)
5.6	Operating experience and analyses have shown that for some steam generator designs, tube uncover may occur for a short period following any reactor trip (Ref. E-3). The potential impact of tube uncovery on the transport model parameters (e.g., flash fraction, scrubbing credit) needs to be considered. The impact of emergency operating procedure restoration strategies on steam generator water levels should be evaluated.	Conforms	Steam generator tube bundle uncovery is not predicted or postulated for the intact SG. (Att. 4 Section 7.6)

Table A5 - E: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Source Terms		
1.	Assumptions acceptable to the NRC staff regarding core inventory and the release of radionuclides from the fuel are provided in Regulatory Position 3 of this regulatory guide. The release from the breached fuel is based on Regulatory Position 3.2 of this guide and the estimate of the number of fuel rods breached.	Conforms	No fuel melt or clad breach is postulated for the SGTR event. See Item 2 below for source terms.
2.	If no or minimal[2] fuel damage is postulated for the limiting event, the activity released should be the maximum coolant activity allowed by the technical specifications. Two cases of iodine spiking should be assumed. [2]The activity assumed in the analysis should be based on the activity associated with the projected fuel damage or the maximum technical specification values, whichever maximizes the radiological consequences. In determining dose equivalent I-131 (DE I-131), only the radioiodine associated with normal operations or iodine spikes should be included. Activity from projected fuel damage should not be included.	Conforms	No fuel damage is postulated for the SGTR. Activity released is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by TS. Two cases of iodine spiking are analyzed, pre-accident spike and accident-initiated spike. In addition to the activity associated with the DEI, the initial primary coolant DEX is assumed to be 270 µCi/gm (Revised TS SR 3.4.16.1 value). The initial secondary coolant iodine activity is assumed to be at the TS limit of 0.1 µCi/gm DEI (TS 3.7.18). (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
2.1	A reactor transient has occurred prior to the postulated steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and has raised the primary coolant iodine concentration to the maximum value (typically 60 µCi/ DE I-131) permitted by the technical specifications (i.e., a pre-accident iodine spike case).	Conforms	For the pre-accident iodine spike case, it is assumed that a reactor transient has occurred prior to the SGTR and has raised the RCS iodine concentration to a value of 60 µCi/gm of DEI (TS 3.4.16 limit). (Att. 4 Section 7.7)

Table A5 - E: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
2.2	The primary system transient associated with the SGTR causes an iodine spike in the primary system. The increase in primary coolant iodine concentration is estimated using a spiking model that assumes that the iodine release rate from the fuel rods to the primary coolant (expressed in curies per unit time) increases to a value 335 times greater than the release rate corresponding to the iodine concentration at the equilibrium value (typically 1.0 µCi/gm DE I-131) specified in technical specifications (i.e., concurrent iodine spike case). A concurrent iodine spike need not be considered if fuel damage is postulated. The assumed iodine spike duration should be 8 hours. Shorter spike durations may be considered on a case-by-case basis if it can be shown that the activity released by the 8- hour spike exceeds that available for release from the fuel gap of all fuel pins.	Conforms	For the accident-initiated iodine spike case, the primary system transient associated with the SGTR causes an iodine spike in the RCS, which increases the iodine release rate from the fuel to the RCS to a value 335 times the appearance rate corresponding to a maximum equilibrium RCS concentration of 1.0 µCi/gm of DEI (TS SR 3.4.16.2). The spike is allowed to continue until 8 hours from the start of the event. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
3.	The activity released from the fuel, if any, should be assumed to be released instantaneously and homogeneously through the primary coolant.	N/A	No fuel damage occurs due to a SGTR. The activity released to the environment is based on the maximum coolant activity allowed by TS. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
4.	Iodine releases from the steam generators to the environment should be assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.	Conforms	The iodine releases from the steam generators to the environment is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)

Table A5 - E: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Transport[3]		
	[3]In this appendix, ruptured refers to the state of the steam generator in which primary-to-secondary leakage rate has increased to a value greater than technical specifications.		
5.1	The primary-to-secondary leak rate in the steam generators should be assumed to be the leak rate limiting condition for operation specified in the technical specifications. The leakage should be apportioned between affected and unaffected steam generators in such a manner that the calculated dose is maximized.	Conforms	The primary-to-secondary leak rate is a total of 0.75 gpm at STP for all four steam generators. This equates to 1080 gpm for all 4 SGs which is greater than the maximum allowable operational leakage of 150 gpd for any one SG imposed by TS 3.4.13d. Conservatively, the total 0.75 gpm tube leakage will be assigned to the 3 intact SGs. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
5.2	The density used in converting volumetric leak rates (e.g., gpm) to mass leak rates (e.g., lbm/hr) should be consistent with the basis of surveillance tests used to show compliance with leak rate technical specifications. These tests are typically based on cool liquid. Facility instrumentation used to determine leakage is typically located on lines containing cool liquids. In most cases, the density should be assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3).	Conforms	The leakage density is assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3). (Att. 4 Section 7.7, Table 7.7-1)

Table A5 - E: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
5.3	The primary-to-secondary leakage should be assumed to continue until the primary system pressure is less than the secondary system pressure, or until the temperature of the leakage is less than 100 C (212 F). The release of radioactivity from unaffected steam generators should be assumed to continue until shutdown cooling is in operation and releases from the steam generators have been terminated.	Conforms	In the ruptured SG, after the reactor trip, the radioactivity in the steam is released to the environment from the MSSVs/10% ADVs due to the assumption of LOOP. It is assumed that the 10% ADV of the ruptured SG fails open for 30 minutes. The fail-open 10% ADV is isolated at 2653 seconds, at which time the ruptured steam loop is isolated. The break flow continues until equilibrium between the primary and secondary side of the ruptured SG is reached (5872 seconds). Manual depressurization of the ruptured SG starts 2 hours after event initiation and continues until shutdown cooling is in operation (10.73 hours). In the intact SGs, release of radioactivity is assumed to continue until shutdown cooling is in operation (10.73 hours). (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
5.4	The release of fission products from the secondary system should be evaluated with the assumption of a coincident loss of offsite power.	Conforms	A loss of offsite power is assumed to occur at the time of the reactor trip. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
5.5	All noble gas radionuclides released from the primary system are assumed to be released to the environment without reduction or mitigation.	Conforms	All noble gases are released freely with no retention or mitigation. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
5.6	The transport model described in Regulatory Positions 5.5 and 5.6 of Appendix E should be utilized for iodine and particulates.		

Table A5 - E: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
	Regulatory Positions 5.5.1of Appendix E A portion of the primary-to-secondary leakage will flash to vapor, based on the thermodynamic conditions in the reactor and secondary coolant. • During periods of steam generator dryout, all of the primary-to-secondary leakage is assumed to flash to vapor and be released to the environment with no mitigation. • With regard to the unaffected steam generators used for plant cooldown, the primary-to-secondary leakage can be assumed to mix with the secondary water without flashing during periods of total tube submergence.	Conforms	RCS activities are released to the ruptured SG through the tube rupture and to the intact SGs via tube leakage as well as a portion of the break flow carried over from the ruptured SG via the condenser before the reactor trip. • Ruptured SG: The noble gases in the entire break flow and the iodine in the flashed portion of the break flow are assumed to be released directly to the environment without hold-up or mitigation. • Intact SGs: Iodines in the intact SGs secondary coolant including iodine due to tube leakage are released to the environment in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient of 100. Noble gases are released without retention. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
	Regulatory Positions 5.5.2 of Appendix E The leakage that immediately flashes to vapor will rise through the bulk water of the steam generator and enter the steam space. Credit may be taken for scrubbing in the generator, using the models in NUREG-0409, "Iodine Behavior in a PWR Cooling System Following a Postulated Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident" (Ref. E-2), during periods of total submergence of the tubes.	Conforms	No credit is taken for iodine scrubbing in the SG bulk water. Any postulated leakage that immediately flashes to vapor is assumed to rise through the bulk water of the SG into the steam space and is assumed to be immediately released to the environment. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
	Regulatory Positions 5.5.3 of Appendix E The leakage that does not immediately flash is assumed to mix with the bulk water.	Conforms	The non-flashed portion of the break flow mixes uniformly with the steam generator liquid mass. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)

Table A5 - E: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix F (PWR Steam Generator Tube Rupture)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Regulatory Positions 5.5.4 of Appendix E The radioactivity in the bulk water is assumed to become vapor at a rate that is the function of the steaming rate and the partition coefficient. A partition coefficient for iodine of 100 may be assumed. The retention of particulate radionuclides in the steam generators is limited by the moisture carryover from the steam generators.	Conforms	In the ruptured SG, the non-flashed portion of the break flow mixes uniformly with the steam generator liquid mass and is released into the steam space in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient of 100. Iodines in the intact SGs secondary coolant are released to the environment in proportion to the steaming rate and the inverse of the partition coefficient of 100. No fuel damage occurs due to the SGTR, therefore there are no particulate radionuclides available for release. (Att. 4 Section 7.7)
	Regulatory Positions 5.6 of Appendix E Operating experience and analyses have shown that for some steam generator designs, tube uncover may occur for a short period following any reactor trip (Ref. E-3). The potential impact of tube uncovery on the transport model parameters (e.g., flash fraction, scrubbing credit) needs to be considered. The impact of emergency operating procedure restoration strategies on steam generator water levels should be evaluated.	Conforms	The amount of steam generator tube bundle uncovery is predicted to be insignificant for the intact SGs. (Att. 4 Section 7.7, Table 7.7-1)

Table A5 - F: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix G (PWR Locked Rotor Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
	Source Terms		
1.	Assumptions acceptable to the NRC staff regarding core inventory and the release of radionuclides from the fuel are provided in Regulatory Position 3 of this regulatory guide. The release from the breached fuel is based on Regulatory Position 3.2 of this guide and the estimate of the number of fuel rods breached.	Conforms	See Table A5-A above for conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix G (PWR Locked Rotor Accident) source terms.
2.	If no fuel damage is postulated for the limiting event, a radiological analysis is not required as the consequences of the event are bounded by the consequences projected for the main steam line break outside containment.	N/A	Since fuel damage is postulated, a radiological consequence analysis is performed.
3.	The activity released from the fuel should be assumed to be released instantaneously and homogeneously through the primary coolant.	Conforms	The activity released from the fuel is assumed to be released instantaneously and homogeneously through the primary coolant. (Att. 4 Section 7.4)
4.	The chemical form of radioiodine released from the fuel should be 95% cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85 percent elemental iodine, and 0.15 percent organic iodide. Iodine releases from the steam generators to the environment should be assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. These fractions apply to iodine released as a result of fuel damage and to iodine released during normal operation, including iodine spiking.	Conforms	The chemical form of iodine released from the fuel is assumed to be 95% CsI, 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodide. The chemical for of iodine released from the SGs to the environment is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.4)
	Release Transport		

Table A5 - F: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix G (PWR Locked Rotor Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.1	The primary-to-secondary leak rate in the steam generators should be assumed to be the leak-rate-limiting condition for operation specified in the technical specifications. The leakage should be apportioned between the steam generators in such a manner that the calculated dose is maximized.	Conforms	The primary-to-secondary leak rate is a total of 0.75 gpm at STP for all four steam generators. This equates to a total of 1080 gpd, which is greater than the maximum allowable operational leakage of 150 gpd for any one SG imposed by TS 3.4.13d. (Att. 4 Section 7.4)
5.2	The density used in converting volumetric leak rates (e.g., gpm) to mass leak rates (e.g., lbm/hr) should be consistent with the basis of surveillance tests used to show compliance with leak rate technical specifications. These tests are typically based on cool liquid. Facility instrumentation used to determine leakage is typically located on lines containing cool liquids. In most cases, the density should be assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3).	Conforms	The leakage density is assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3). (Att. 4 Section 7.4, Table 7.4-1)
5.3	The primary-to-secondary leakage should be assumed to continue until the primary system pressure is less than the secondary system pressure, or until the temperature of the leakage is less than 100 C (212 F). The release of radioactivity should be assumed to continue until shutdown cooling is in operation and releases from the steam generators have been terminated.	Conforms	The primary-to-secondary leakage is assumed to continue until shutdown cooling is in operation and the steam release from the SGs is terminated, which occurs at 10.73 hours after the initiation of the LRA. (Att. 4 Section 7.4, Table 7.4-1)
5.4	The release of fission products from the secondary system should be evaluated with the assumption of a coincident loss of offsite power.	Conforms	A loss of offsite power is assumed to occur at the time of the reactor trip. (Att. 4 Section 7.4)
5.5	All noble gas radionuclides released from the primary system are assumed to be released to the environment without reduction or mitigation.	Conforms	All noble gases are released freely with no retention or mitigation. (Att. 4 Section 7.4)

Table A5 - F: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix G (PWR Locked Rotor Accident)			
RG Section	**RG Position**	**DCPP Analysis**	**Comments**
5.6	The transport model described in Regulatory Positions 5.5 and 5.6 of Appendix E should be utilized for iodine particulates.	Conforms	Regulatory Position 5.6 refers to Appendix E, Regulatory Positions 5.5 and 5.6. The iodine transport model for release for the steam generators is as follows: Activity released from the fuel is assumed to be released instantaneously and mixed homogenously through the primary coolant mass and transmitted to the secondary side via primary to secondary SG tube leakage. SG tubes remain covered for the duration of the LRA; therefore, the gap iodines are assumed to have a partition coefficient of 100 in the SG. Because the amount of SG tube uncovery is insignificant, flashing does not occur. The gap noble gases are released freely to the environment without retention in the SG whereas particulates are carried over in accordance with the design basis SG moisture carryover fraction. (Att. 4 Section 7.4, Table 7.4-1)

Table A5 - G: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix H (PWR Rod Ejection Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
	Source Terms		
1.	Assumptions acceptable to the NRC staff regarding core inventory are in Regulatory Position 3 of this guide. For the rod ejection accident, the release from the breached fuel is based on the estimate of the number of fuel rods breached and the assumption that 10% of the core inventory of the noble gases and iodines is in the fuel gap. The release attributed to fuel melting is based on the fraction of the fuel that reaches or exceeds the initiation temperature for fuel melting and the assumption that 100% of the noble gases and 25% of the iodines contained in that fraction are available for release from containment. For the secondary system release pathway, 100% of the noble gases and 50% of the iodines in that fraction are released to the reactor coolant.	Conforms	The source term for the control rod ejection accident (CREA) is based on RG 1.183, Regulatory Position 3. The radiological source term for the CREA is based on the equilibrium core inventory determined with the computer code ORIGEN-S as discussed in Section 3.2.2.2 and shown in Table 3. The CREA assumes that 10% of the fuel fails. Thus the source terms for the CREA are 10% of the equilibrium core inventory in Table 3. No fuel melt occurs. It is assumed that 10% of the core inventory of the noble gases and iodines are in the fuel gap. Releases are multiplied by a radial peaking factor 1.65. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)
2.	If no fuel damage is postulated for the limiting event, a radiological analysis is not required as the consequences of this event are bounded by the consequences projected for the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), main steam line break, and steam generator tube rupture.	N/A	The CREA is assumed to result in a breach of 10% of the fuel rods in the core, thus a radiological consequence analysis is performed.

Table A5 - G: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix H (PWR Rod Ejection Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
3.	Two release cases are to be considered. In the first, 100% of the activity released from the fuel should be assumed to be released instantaneously and homogeneously through the containment atmosphere. In the second, 100% of the activity released from the fuel should be assumed to be completely dissolved in the primary coolant and available for release to the secondary system.	Conforms	Two release cases are analyzed. In the first, 100% of the activity released from the fuel is assumed to be released instantaneously and homogeneously through the containment atmosphere. In the second, 100% of the activity released from the fuel is assumed to be completely dissolved in the primary coolant and available for release to the secondary system. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)
4.	The chemical form of radioiodine released to the containment atmosphere should be assumed to be 95% cesium iodide (CsI), 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodide. If containment sprays do not actuate or are terminated prior to accumulating sump water, or if the containment sump pH is not controlled at values of 7 or greater, the iodine species should be evaluated on an individual case basis. Evaluations of pH should consider the effect of acids created during the rod ejection accident event, e.g., pyrolysis and radiolysis products. With the exception of elemental and organic iodine and noble gases, fission products should be assumed to be in particulate form.	Conforms	The chemical form of radioiodine released to the containment is assumed to be 95% CsI, 4.85% elemental iodine, and 0.15% organic iodide. However, no credit is taken for spray initiation or pH control. Therefore, the iodine released from the containment atmosphere to the environment is assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)
5.	Iodine releases from the steam generators to the environment should be assumed to be 97% elemental and 3% organic.	Conforms	The chemical form of iodine released form the steam generators to the environment is 97% elemental and 3% organic. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)
Transport From Containment			

Table A5 - G: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix H (PWR Rod Ejection Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
6.1	A reduction in the amount of radioactive material available for leakage from the containment that is due to natural deposition, containment sprays, recirculating filter systems, dual containments, or other engineered safety features may be taken into account. Refer to Appendix A to this guide for guidance on acceptable methods and assumptions for evaluating these mechanisms.	Conforms	With the exception of decay, no other process is credited for fission product removal. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)
6.2	The containment should be assumed to leak at the leak rate incorporated in the technical specifications at peak accident pressure for the first 24 hours, and at 50% of this leak rate for the remaining duration of the accident. Peak accident pressure is the maximum pressure defined in the technical specifications for containment leak testing. Leakage from subatmospheric containments is assumed to be terminated when the containment is brought to a subatmospheric condition as defined in technical specifications.	Conforms	A containment leak rate, based on DCPP TS 5.5.16, of 0.1% of containment air weight per day is assumed for the first 24 hours. After 24 hours, the containment leak rate is reduced by 50% to 0.05% of containment air weight per day. (Att. 4 Section 7.5, Table 7.5-1)
Transport from Secondary System			
7.1	A leak rate equivalent to the primary-to-secondary leak rate limiting condition for operation specified in the technical specifications should be assumed to exist until shutdown cooling is in operation and releases from the steam generators have been terminated.	Conforms	The primary-to-secondary leak rate is a total of 0.75 gpm at STP for all four steam generators. This equates to a total of 1080 gpd from the SG, which is greater than the maximum allowable operational leakage of 150 gpd from any one SG imposed by TS 3.4.13d. Releases from the SG terminate when shutdown cooling is initiated. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)

Table A5 - G. Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix H (PWR Rod Ejection Accident)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
7.2	The density used in converting volumetric leak rates (e.g., gpm) to mass leak rates (e.g., lbm/hr) should be consistent with the basis of surveillance tests used to show compliance with leak rate technical specifications. These tests typically are based on cooled liquid. The facility's instrumentation used to determine leakage typically is located on lines containing cool liquids. In most cases, the density should be assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3).	Conforms	The leakage density is assumed to be 1.0 gm/cc (62.4 lbm/ft^3). (Att. 4 Section 7.5, Table 7.5-1)
7.3	All noble gas radionuclides released to the secondary system are assumed to be released to the environment without reduction or mitigation.	Conforms	All of the noble gas release to the secondary side is assumed to be released directly to the environment without reduction or mitigation. (Att. 4 Section 7.5)
7.4	The transport model described in assumptions 5.5 and 5.6 of Appendix E should be utilized for iodine and particulates.	Conforms	Regulatory Position 7.4 refers to Appendix E, Regulatory Positions 5.5 and 5.6. The iodine transport model for release for the steam generators is as follows: Activity released from the fuel is assumed to be released instantaneously and mixed homogenously through the primary coolant mass and transmitted to the secondary side via primary to secondary SG tube leakage. SG tubes remain covered for the duration of the CREA; therefore, the gap iodines are assumed to have a partition coefficient of 100 in the SG. The gap noble gases are released freely to the environment without retention in the SG. (Att. 4 Section 7.5, Table 7.5-1)

Table A5 - H: Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix I (Equipment Qualification)			
RG Section	RG Position	DCPP Analysis	Comments
1 - 13	This appendix addresses assumptions associated with equipment qualification that are acceptable to the NRC staff for performing radiological assessments. As stated in Regulatory Position 6 of this guide, this appendix supersedes Regulatory Positions 2.c.(1) and 2.c.(2) and Appendix D of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.89, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants" (USNRC, June 1984), for operating reactors that have amended their licensing basis to use an alternative source term. Except as stated in this appendix, other assumptions, methods, and provisions of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.89 remain effective.	N/A	Regulatory Positions 1 through 13 apply to equipment qualification radiological analyses. The DCPP EQ analysis will continue to be based upon TID-14844 assumptions at this time.

Enclosure
Attachment 6
PG&E Letter DCL-15-069

ATTACHMENT 6

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Comparison to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-04 Experience with Implementation of Alternative Source Terms

ATTACHMENT 6
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Comparison to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2006-04
Experience with Implementation of Alternative Source Terms

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1. Level of Detail Contained in LARs An AST amendment request should describe the licensee's analyses of the radiological and non-radiological impacts and provide a justification for the proposed modification in sufficient detail to support review by the NRC staff. For example, the AST amendment request should: 1) Provide justification for each individual proposed change to the technical specification (TS), 2) Identify and justify each change to the licensing basis accident analyses, and 3) Contain enough details (e.g., assumptions, computer analyses input and output) to allow the NRC staff to confirm the dose analyses results in independent calculations.	Attachment 4 of the LAR summarizes the analyses performed to support implementation of AST. Attachment 4 provides sufficient details to accommodate the stated purposes. Each AST analysis is described in detail with assumptions, inputs and results. Each change to the licensing basis accident analyses is identified and justified in Attachment 4 and the main body of the LAR. Justification for each individual proposed change to the technical specifications is included in the submittal. In addition, Appendix B to Attachment 4 contains analysis input tables comparing the current licensing basis values to new AST values for each of the analyzed design basis events. This information is being provided to aid the NRC staff review of the AST submittal.
2. Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage and Fission Product Deposition in Piping	This item is applicable to BWRs only. DCPP is a PWR; therefore this item is not applicable to DCPP.

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3. Control Room Habitability When implementing an AST, some licensees have proposed that certain engineered safety features (ESF) ventilation systems not be credited as a mitigation feature in response to an accident. In some cases, the licensee's revised design basis analysis introduced the assumption that normal (non-ESF) ventilation systems are operating during all or part of an accident scenario. Such an assumption is inappropriate unless the non-ESF system meets certain qualities, attributes, and performance criteria as described in RG 1.183, Regulatory Positions 4.2.4 and 5.1.2. For example, credit for the operation of non-ESF ventilation systems should not be assumed unless they have a source of emergency power. In addition, the operation of ventilation systems establishes certain building or area pressures based upon their flowrates. These pressures affect leakage and infiltration rates which ultimately affect operator dose. Therefore, to credit the use of these systems, licensees should incorporate the systems into the ventilation filter testing program in Section 5 of the TS. In summary, use of non-ESF ventilation systems during a DBA should not be assumed unless the systems have emergency power and are part of the ventilation filter testing program in Section 5 of the TS. Generic Letter (G L) 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability" (Ref. 5) requested licensees to confirm the ability of their facility's control room to meet applicable habitability regulatory requirements. In addition, licensees were requested to confirm that control room habitability systems were designed, constructed, configured, operated and maintained in accordance with the facility's design and licensing bases. The GL placed emphasis on licensees confirming that the most limiting unfiltered inleakage into the control room envelope (CRE) was not greater than the value assumed in the DBA analyses. The tests, measurements, and analyses which were performed for this confirmation were to be described in the response to the GL. Some AST amendment requests proposed operating schemes for the control room and other ventilation systems which affect areas adjacent to the CRE and are different from the manner of operation and	Operation of the ABVS is relied upon to ensure release of ESF leakage via the Plant vent. The ABVS filters are credited for releases of a RHR system pump seal passive failure following a LOCA when determining dose to offsite individuals, as well as onsite personnel in the control room and the TSC. The operation of the FHBVS following a FHA in the FHB is relied on to ensure a negative pressure in the FHB, which will result in post-accident environmental releases via the plant vent. FHBVS filters are not credited. The FHA now credits CRVS Mode 4 operation (filtered), which is actuated by 1/2- RE-25/26. See Attachment 4, Section 7.3 for more detail. CRVS Mode 4 operation (filtered) is also credited for LOCA, MSLB, SGTR, and CREA. Attachment 4, Section 7.1 provides the control room design, operation and transport model. All of these systems are safety related and have operability requirements in Technical Specifications. ESF filters are controlled by TS 5.5.11, "Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)." No changes to operating schemes of the

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performance described in the response to the GL without providing sufficient justification for the proposed changes in the operating scheme. In some cases, licensees proposed new modes of operation that lacked confirmation of the CRE inleakage characteristics. Measurements[1] of these characteristics are important to confirm inleakage assumptions used in the analyses for an AST amendment, even for those situations in which the air in the control room would appear to be stagnant. [1]Use of parametric studies in which inleakage rates are varied is not a preferable alternative to CRE inleakage measurements. (see GL 2003-01)	CRVS, ABVS, or FHBVS are proposed. The AST CR dose analyses use a minimum unfiltered inleakage value of 70 cfm, which includes 10 cfm for ingress/egress based on the guidance provided by NUREG-0800. The 70 cfm provides margin above the actual maximum recorded unfiltered inleakage of 37 cfm from the December 2012 Control Room Tracer Gas Test.
4. Atmospheric Dispersion Licensees may continue to use atmospheric relative concentration (χ/Q) values and methodologies from their existing licensing-basis analyses when appropriate. Licensees also have the option to adopt the generally less conservative (more realistic) updated NRC staff guidance on determining χ/Q values in support of design basis control room radiological habitability assessments provided in RG 1.194, "Atmospheric Relative Concentrations for Control Room Radiological Habitability Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 6). Regulatory positions on χ/Q values for offsite (i.e., exclusion area boundary and low population zone) accident radiological consequence assessments are provided in RG 1.145, "Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 7). Based on submittal reviews, the NRC staff identified the following areas of improvement for licensee submittals that propose revision of the design basis atmospheric dispersion analyses for implementing AST. They should include the following information:	New χ/Q values have been determined for the EAB, LPZ, Control Room, and TSC. Attachment 4, Section 5 provides details of the calculations performed for these new χ/Q values. Included in Attachment 4, Appendix A, is a figure showing plant north with locations of releases and receptors or intakes. Justification for assumptions used to determine the control room χ/Q values are provided in Attachment 4, Section 5. Meteorological data, and inputs used to develop the control room and TSC χ/Q values are being provided in Attachment 4, Appendix A. See Attachment 4, Section 5 and LAR Section 2.1 for discussion on RG 1.145 and RG 1.194 compliance.

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• A site plan showing true North and indicating locations of all potential accident release pathways and control room intake and unfiltered inleakage pathways (whether assumed or identified during inleakage testing). • Justification for using control room intake χ/Q values for modeling the unfiltered inleakage, if applicable. • A copy of the meteorological data inputs and program outputs along with a discussion of assumptions and potential deviations from staff guidelines. Meteorological data input files should be checked to ensure quality (e.g., compared against historical or other data and against the raw data to ensure that the electronic file has been properly formatted, any unit conversions are correct, and invalid data are properly identified). When running the control room atmospheric dispersion model ARCON96, two or more files of meteorological data representative of each potential release height should be used if χ/Q values are being calculated for both ground-level and elevated releases (see RG 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," Regulatory Position 2 (Ref. 8) and Table A-2 in Appendix A to RG 1.194, "Atmospheric Relative Concentrations for Control Room Radiological Habitability Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants"). In addition, licensees should be aware that (1) two levels of wind speed and direction data should always be provided as input to each data file, (2) fields of "nines" (e.g., 9999) should be used to indicate invalid or missing data, and (3) valid wind direction data should range from 1° to 360°. Licensees should also provide detailed engineering information when applying the default plume rise adjustment cited in RG 1.194 to control room χ/Q values to account for buoyancy or mechanical jets of high energy releases. This information should demonstrate that the minimum effluent velocity during any time of the release over which the adjustment is being applied is greater than the 95th percentile wind speed at the height of release.	

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When running the offsite atmospheric dispersion model PAVAN, two or more files of meteorological data representative of each potential release height should be used if χ/Q values are being calculated for pathways with significantly different release heights (e.g., ground level versus elevated stack). The joint frequency distributions of wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability data used as input to PAVAN should have a large number of wind speed categories at the lower wind speeds in order to produce the best results (e.g., Section 4.6 of NUREG/CR-2858, "PAVAN: An Atmospheric Dispersion Program for Evaluating Design Basis Accidental Releases of Radioactive Materials from Nuclear Power Stations" (Ref. 9), suggests wind speed categories of calm, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 5.0, 6.0, 8.0 and 10.0 meters per second).	
5. Modeling of ESF Leakage ESF systems that recirculate sump water outside the primary containment may leak during their intended operation. This release source includes leakage through valve packing glands, pump shaft seals, flanged connections, and other similar components. This release source may also include leakage through valves isolating interfacing systems (e.g., refueling water storage tank). Appendix A to RG 1.183, Regulatory Position 5, states that "the radiological consequences from the postulated [ESF] leakage should be analyzed and combined with consequences postulated for other fission product release paths to determine the total calculated radiological consequences from the [loss-of-coolant accident] LOCA." The allowable ESF leakage is typically contained in the plant's TS or procedures. The ESF leakage at accident conditions may differ from the ESF leakage at normal operating conditions. Licensees should account for ESF leakage at accident conditions in their dose analyses so as not to underestimate the release rate. In Appendix A to RG 1.183, Regulatory Position 5.5, the NRC staff provided a conservative value of 10 percent as the assumed amount of iodine that may become airborne from ESF leakage that is less than 212°F. The NRC staff structured this regulatory position to be deterministic and conservative. The 10 percent value also compensates for the lack of research	Leakage from ESF systems used during post-LOCA recirculation is included in the dose analyses and results are combined with other sources to determine the LOCA dose consequence. (Attachment 4 Section 7.2.2). These include: • Leakage from ESF systems that recirculate sump fluids outside containment • RHR pump seal passive failure • RWST back-leakage • MEDT leakage Attachment 4, Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, describe each of these LOCA post-accident releases, including release paths, flashing fractions, and release amounts. ESF leakage limits are controlled by TS 5.5.2, "Primary Coolant

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concerning iodine speciation beyond the containment and the uncertainties of applying laboratory data to the post-accident environment of the plant. Regulatory Position 5.5 states that a smaller flash fraction could be justified. Some licensees have referenced NUREG/CR-5950, "Iodine Evolution and pH Control" (Ref. 10) to justify a smaller flash fraction. However, NUREG/CR-5950 was developed for very specific laboratory conditions and the results have a degree of uncertainty. The mechanism for release of the fluid is also uncertain. Leaked fluid may spray onto surfaces and evaporate, or be sprayed in fine droplets into the air. A value of less than 10 percent can be justified by including considerations for plant-specific variables, including the post-accident environment (e.g., impurities in the water or the presence of organic substances) and the uncertainties in the application of research situations to plant environments. Figure 3.1 in NUREG/CR-5950 can be used to quantify the amount of elemental iodine as a function of the sump water pH and the concentration of iodine in the solution. In some cases, however, licensees have misapplied this figure. Rather than using the total concentration of iodine (i.e., stable and radioactive), licensees based their assessment on only the radioactive iodine in the sump water. By using only the radioactive iodine, licensees have underestimated how much iodine evolves during post-accident conditions.	Sources Outside containment." DCPP fully complies with RG 1.183, Regulatory Position 5.5, as indicated in Attachment 5. (Attachment 4, Section 7.2.3.2.5)

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6. Release Pathways Changes to the plant configuration associated with an LAR (e.g., an "open" containment during refueling) may require a re-analysis of the design basis dose calculations. A request for TS modifications allowing containment penetrations (i.e., personnel air lock, equipment hatch) to be open during refueling cannot rely on the current dose analysis if this analysis has not already considered these release pathways. RG 1.194, Regulatory Position 3.2.4.2 supports review of penetration pathways, by stating that "leakage is more likely to occur at a penetration, [and that the] analysts must consider the potential impact of leakage from building penetrations exposed to the environment." Therefore, releases from personnel air locks and equipment hatches exposed to the environment and containment purge releases prior to containment isolation need to be addressed. Some licensees have identified unique release pathways that had not been previously considered. For example, a recent submittal noted that containment hatches and containment plugs may be removed during refueling. The removal of these barriers creates new release pathways. Licensees are responsible for identifying all release pathways and for considering these pathways in their AST analyses, consistent with any proposed modification.	No similar plant configuration changes as described by Issue 6 are associated with this LAR. Attachment 4, Section 5 describes the determination of χ/Q values. The description provides the potential release pathways for the various DBAs. The most limiting pathway is used for determining dose consequences.
7. Primary to Secondary Leakage Some analysis parameters can be affected by density changes that occur in the process steam. The NRC staff continues to find errors in LAR submittals concerning the modeling of primary to secondary leakage during a postulated accident. This issue is discussed in Information Notice (IN) 88-31, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency," (Ref. 11) and Item 3.f in RIS 2001-19. An acceptable methodology for modeling this leakage is provided in Appendix F to RG 1.183, Regulatory Position 5.2.	The methodology for modeling primary-to-secondary leakage conforms to the methodology provided in Appendix F to RG 1.183, Position 5.2. See Attachment 5 for the RG 1.183 compliance tables.

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8. Elemental Iodine Decontamination Factor (DF) Appendix B to RG 1.183 provides assumptions for evaluating the radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident. If the water depth above the damaged fuel is 23 feet or greater, Regulatory Position 2 states that "the decontamination factors for the elemental and organic [iodine] species are 500 and 1, respectively, giving an overall effective decontamination factor of 200." However, an overall DF of 200 is achieved when the DF for elemental iodine is 285, not 500.	An iodine decontamination factor of 200 is assumed for the FHA in the FHB and the FHA in containment. The chemical form of iodines above the pool is 57% elemental and 43% organic. Attachment 4, Section 7.3 provides details of the FHA analyses.
9. Isotopes Used in Dose Assessments For some accidents (e.g., main steamline break and rod drop), licensees have excluded noble gas and cesium isotopes from the dose assessment. The inclusion of these isotopes should be addressed in the dose assessments for AST implementation.	The AST analyses consider the radionuclides in RG 1.183, Section 3.4, Table 5. Noble gases are included in all dose analyses. Non-LOCA gap fractions, with the exception of the CREA, include noble gas and cesium isotopes. The gap releases for the CREA include iodines and noble gases, as provided in RG 1.183, Appendix H. Cesium and rubidium are not included in the non-LOCA radiological consequence analyses that do not result in fuel failures since these isotopes would have a negligible impact on the analysis results. Attachment 4, Section 4.0, provides details for determining the radiation source terms.

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10. Definition of Dose Equivalent I-131 In the conversion to an AST, licensees have proposed a modification to the TS definition of dose equivalent I-131. Some have modified the definition to base it upon the thyroid dose conversion factors of International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) Publication 2, "Report of Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation" (Ref. 12) or ICRP Publication 30, "Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers" (Ref. 13). Others have proposed a definition which is a combination of different iodine dose conversion factors, (e.g., RG 1.109, Revision 1, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix I" (Ref. 14), ICRP Publication 2, Federal Guidance Report 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion" (Ref. 15). Although different references are available for dose conversion factors, the TS definition should be based on the same dose conversion factors that are used in the determination of the reactor coolant dose equivalent iodine curie content for the main steamline break and steam generator tube rupture accident analyses.	As part of the AST license submittal, a change is proposed to the DCPP Technical Specification definition of DEI. The change will reflect that the dose conversion factors used to determine DEI will be the same as those used to determine the reactor coolant dose equivalent iodine curie content for the MSLB and SGTR accident analyses.
11. Acceptance Criteria for Off-Gas or Waste Gas System Release As part of full AST implementation,[2] some licensees have included an accident involving a release from their off-gas or waste gas system. For this accident, they have proposed acceptance criteria of 500 millirem (mrem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). The acceptance criteria for this event is that associated with the dose to an individual member of the public as described in 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation."[3] When the NRC revised 10 CFR Part 20 to incorporate a TEDE dose, the offsite dose to an individual member of the public was changed from 500 mrem whole body to 100 mrem TEDE. Therefore, any licensee who chooses to implement AST for an off-gas or waste gas system release should base its acceptance criteria on 100	No design change to the waste gas tank or systems is being proposed with this AST submittal. Therefore, an analysis of a release from the waste gas system is not included in this AST submittal.

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mrem TEDE. Licensees may also choose not to implement AST for this accident and continue with their existing analysis and acceptance criteria of 500 mrem whole body. [2]An off-gas or waste gas system release does not need to be addressed for a full AST implementation unless a design change is being proposed for the waste gas tank or systems at the same time. [3]Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 16).	
12. Containment Spray Mixing Some plants with mechanical means for mixing containment air have assumed that the containment fans intake air solely from a sprayed area and discharge it solely to an unsprayed region or vice versa. Without additional analysis, test measurements or further justification, it should be assumed that the intake of air by containment ventilation systems is supplied proportionally to the sprayed and unsprayed volumes in containment.	Attachment 4, Section 7.2.3.2.3, discusses mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of containment. The locations of the intake and exhaust registers of the operating CFCUs, as well as the major openings in the containment structure, were considered when determining the mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed regions. A review of the layout and arrangement of the intake and exhaust registers of the operating fan coolers demonstrates that the CFCUs intake air solely from the sprayed region and discharge air solely to the unsprayed region of the containment.

ATTACHMENT 7

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
List of Regulatory Commitments for
Alternative Source Term Implementation

Commitment 1:	Install shielding material, equivalent to that provided by the Control Room outer walls, at the external concrete west wall of the Control Room briefing room prior to implementation of Alternate Source Term.
Commitment 2:	Install a high efficiency particulate air filter in the Technical Support Center normal ventilation system.
Commitment 3:	Re-classify a portion of the 40-inch Containment Penetration Area (GE/GW) Ventilation line from PG&E Design Class II to PG&E Design Class I and upgrade the damper actuators, pressure switches, and the damper solenoid valves to PG&E Design Class I prior to implementation of Alternate Source Term.
Commitment 4:	Re-classify a portion of the 2-inch gaseous radwaste system line which connects to the Plant Vent as PG&E Design Class I prior to implementation of Alternate Source Term.
Commitment 5:	Update setpoints for the redundant safety related gamma sensitive area radiation monitors (1-RE 25/26, 2-RE 25/26) prior to implementation of Alternate Source Term.