

Final Precursor Analysis

Accident Sequence Precursor Program – Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3		Ground Fault during Line Maintenance Causes Loss of Offsite Power to Both Units
Event Date: 5/25/2014	LER: 336/14-006 IR: 50-336/14-11	CCDPs = 1×10^{-5} (Unit 2) 2×10^{-5} (Unit 3)
Plant Type: Pressurized-Water Reactors (PWRs) Combustion Engineering with a Large Dry Containment (Unit 2) Westinghouse 4-Loop with Sub-Atmospheric Containment (Unit 3)		
Plant Operating Mode (Reactor Power Level): Mode 1 (100% Reactor Power, Both Units)		
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At 7:01 a.m. on May 25, 2014, with Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 operating at 100% reactor power, a total loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurred. The cause of the LOOP was a ground fault on one of the three offsite power lines with another line out for maintenance. The third line tripped on over-current because it was not capable of supporting the full power output for the site. Both units experienced a turbine trip on power to load imbalance followed by an automatic reactor trip. Both units' safety-related emergency diesel generators (EDGs) automatically started and supplied power to their respective safety busses. As designed, the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps automatically started for Unit 2 and all AFW pumps automatically started for Unit 3. Offsite power was restored to at least one safety bus at each unit by approximately 10:30 a.m. and fully restored at 12:56 p.m. on May 25, 2014.

According to the risk analysis modeling assumptions used in this Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) analysis, the most likely core damage sequence for Unit 2 is a non-recoverable LOOP and subsequent station blackout (SBO) due to postulated failures of all EDGs (including the SBO diesel generator), the failure of the turbine-driven AFW pump, and the failure to restore power to a safety bus within one hour. This accident sequence accounts for approximately 67% of the event conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for Unit 2.

For Unit 3, the most likely core damage sequence is non-recoverable LOOP and subsequent SBO due to postulated failures of both Unit 3 EDGs. Operators successfully aligned the SBO diesel generator to one of the Unit 3's safety buses; however, the operators do not have sufficient time to perform this action to prevent a challenge to the integrity of reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals (due to lack of seal injection/cooling) and subsequent loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) occurs. AFW and high-pressure injection (HPI) are successful, but failure of high-pressure recirculation leads to core damage. This accident sequence accounts for approximately 23% of the event CCDP for Unit 3.

In general, these results are consistent with at-power LOOP events previously analyzed by the ASP Program at other PWRs.

Enclosure

EVENT DETAILS

Event Description. At 7:01 a.m. on May 25, 2014, with Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 operating at 100% reactor power, a total LOOP occurred. Both units experienced a turbine trip on power to load imbalance followed by an automatic reactor trip. Both units' safety-related EDGs automatically started and supplied power to their respective safety busses. As designed, the motor-driven AFW pumps automatically started for Unit 2 and all AFW pumps automatically started for Unit 3.

The Millstone staff declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) for both units at 7:15 a.m. due to a LOOP for greater than 15 minutes. Offsite power was restored to at least one safety bus at each unit by approximately 10:30 a.m. and fully restored at 12:56 p.m. on May 25, 2014. The NOUE was exited at 2:14 p.m. on May 25, 2014.

Additional information is provided in [Reference 1](#) (licensee event report) and [Reference 2](#) (inspection report).

Cause. Prior to the event, the station had one offsite line out-of-service (Line 371) for maintenance. A suspected ground fault on the grid in the Northeast Utilities' Card substation caused the loss of offsite Line 383. Line 310 tripped on instantaneous ground over current, which was unexpected. The final line (Line 348) tripped on over-current when both units attempted to feed the full power output of both Millstone units through the single remaining line (Line 348).

Additional Event Information. The following event details are provided as additional information about the event. This additional information was not factored in the modeling of this analysis due to the negligible risk impact.

- Unit 2 experienced a water hammer in the condensate polishing facility during the event. This was entered into licensee's corrective action program. The condensate polishing facility is not risk significant; therefore, the system is not modeled in the Millstone Unit 2 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model. In addition, the condenser heat sink including feedwater condensate systems are assumed to be unavailable during a LOOP.
- The Unit 3 reactor trip was affected by a loss of air when the Instrument Air Compressor 13 failed to start. The loss of instrument air affected head vent letdown alignment. After unsuccessful attempts to align the head vent to the volume control tank, letdown was returned to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) and the PRT rupture disk burst approximately 20 minutes later. Normal charging and letdown was subsequently restored, which resulted in lifting a relief valve in the letdown line. This relief valve discharged to the primary drains transfer tank (PDTT). As a result, a PDTT high level alarm was received and normal charging and letdown was isolated nine minutes later. Instrument air is not safety-related and is not currently modeled in the Millstone Unit 3 SPAR model. However, operators manually cycled the power operated relief valves (PORVs) to control RCS pressure. The demand of the PORVs and their potential failure to reclose after demand is modeled in Unit 3 analysis (see [Key Modeling Assumptions for Unit 3](#)).

MODELING ASSUMPTIONS

Analysis Type. The Millstone Unit 2 SPAR Model Revision 8.17 (created in March 2011) and Millstone Unit 3 SPAR Model Revision 8.20 (created in March 2012), were used for the analyses of this event. This event was modeled as a grid-related LOOP initiating event for both units.

Analysis Rules. The ASP program uses Significance Determination Process results for degraded conditions when available. However, the ASP Program performs independent analysis for initiating events.

Key Modeling Assumptions for Both Units. The following modeling assumptions were determined to be significant to the modeling of the event analyses for both units:

- The analyses model the May 25, 2014, dual-unit reactor trip at Millstone Power Station as grid-related LOOP initiating events.
 - The probability of grid-related LOOP (*IE-LOOPGR*) was set to 1.0; all other initiating event probabilities were set to zero.
 - Basic Event LOOP-DUAL-UNIT (*Dual Unit LOOP*) was set to TRUE. In addition, Basic Event LOOP-SNGL-UNIT (*Single Unit LOOP*) was set to FALSE.
- To adjust the potential for each unit needing the SBO diesel generator, the combined failure probability of each unit's dedicated EDGs was calculated for a 3-hour mission time. The calculated failure probability of 6.8×10^{-4} was used for Basic Events EPS-DGN-FC-UNIT2 (*SBO Diesel Generator Aligned to Unit 2*) and EPS-DGN-FC-UNIT3 (*SBO Diesel Generator Aligned to Unit 3*).
- *Offsite Power Recovery.* The time required to restore offsite power to plant emergency equipment is a significant factor in modeling the CCDP given a LOOP. The LOOP/SBO modeling within the SPAR models includes various sequence-specific power recovery factors that are based on the time available to recover offsite power to prevent core damage. For a sequence involving failure of all of the cooling sources (e.g., postulated SBO with a failure of turbine-driven AFW pump), approximately one hour would be available to recover offsite power to avoid core damage. Sequences involving successful early inventory control and decay heat removal, but subsequent failure of RCP seals resulting in a LOCA or the failure of long-term decay heat removal, would give operators additional time to recover offsite power prior to core damage.

The key offsite power recovery times for Millstone Unit 2 that are modeled within the SPAR model are:

- 1 Hour—A LOOP and subsequent SBO with failure of all turbine-driven AFW pump, failure of a PORV(s) to reclose resulting in a LOCA, or a LOCA resulting from the failure of the RCP seals.
- 2 Hours—A LOOP with successful emergency ac power and AFW, but with a PORV(s) failing to reclose resulting in a LOCA. Recovery of offsite power must occur with sufficient time to recover condenser vacuum and depressurize the reactor coolant system (RCS) to shutdown cooling initiation conditions (assumed to take 4 hours) before refueling water storage tank (RWST) depletion and recirculation sump switch over at six hours. Failure requires the use of high-pressure recirculation.

- 6 Hours—A LOOP with successful emergency ac power with the failure of AFW and successful once through cooling. Recovery of offsite power must occur with sufficient time to recover secondary side cooling before RWST depletion and recirculation sump switch over at six hours. Failure requires the use of high-pressure recirculation.
- 8 Hours—A LOOP and subsequent SBO with successful running of the turbine-driven AFW pump with no subsequent LOCA (e.g., PORV failing to reclose or RCP seal failure). Operators must restore offsite power prior to the battery depletion time of 8 hours.

The key offsite power recovery times for Millstone Unit 3 that are modeled within the SPAR model are:

- 1 Hour—A LOOP and subsequent SBO with failure of all turbine-driven AFW pump, failure of a PORV(s) to reclose resulting in a LOCA, or a LOCA resulting from the failure of the RCP seals.
- 2 Hours—A LOOP with successful emergency ac power and AFW, but with a PORV(s) failing to reclose resulting in a LOCA. Recovery of offsite power must occur with sufficient time to recover condenser vacuum and depressurize the reactor coolant system (RCS) to shutdown cooling initiation conditions (assumed to take 4 hours) before refueling water storage tank (RWST) depletion and recirculation sump switch over at six hours. Failure requires the use of high-pressure recirculation. In addition, the 2-hour recovery time applies to a LOOP and subsequent SBO with failure of both stages of RCP seals resulting in a 480 gpm/RCP LOCA. Operators must recover offsite power prior to core uncover.
- 3 Hours—A LOOP and subsequent SBO with operators failing to depressurize the secondary and the failure (binding/popping or o-ring extrusion) of Stage 2 of RCP seals resulting in a 176–182 gpm/RCP LOCA. Operators must recover offsite power prior to core uncover.
- 4 Hours—A LOOP and subsequent SBO with operators successfully depressurizing the secondary and the failure (binding/popping) of Stage 2 of RCP seals resulting in a 182 gpm/RCP LOCA. Operators must recover offsite power prior to core uncover.
- 6 Hours—A LOOP with successful emergency ac power with the failure of AFW and successful once through cooling. Recovery of offsite power must occur with sufficient time to recover secondary side cooling before RWST depletion and recirculation sump switch over at six hours. Failure requires the use of high-pressure recirculation. In addition, the 6-hour recovery time applies to a LOOP and subsequent SBO with operators failing to depressurize the secondary and the failure (o-ring extrusion) of Stage 1 of RCP seals resulting in a 61 gpm/RCP LOCA. Operators must recover offsite power prior to core uncover.
- 8 Hours—A LOOP and subsequent SBO with successful running of the turbine-driven AFW pump with no subsequent LOCA (e.g., PORV failing to reclose or RCP seal failure). Operators must restore offsite power prior to the battery depletion time of 8 hours.

Offsite power was restored to both units' reserve station service transformers (RSSTs) approximately 3 hours after the LOOP occurred. It took an additional 30 minutes (approximately) for operators to restore offsite power to the first safety bus for each unit. However, this could be done more quickly (5–10 minutes) if more immediate power recovery

was needed (e.g., postulated SBO). Based on this information, recovery of offsite power to a safety bus prior to 3 hours is assumed to fail for both units.

- Therefore, the recovery action OEP-XHE-XL-N01H (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 1 Hour*), and OEP-XHE-XL-N02H (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 2 Hours*) were set to TRUE for Unit 2. For Unit 3, OEP-XHE-XL-N01HGR (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 1 Hour (Grid-Related)*), OEP-XHE-XL-N02HGR (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 2 Hours (Grid-Related)*), and OEP-XHE-XL-N03HGR (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 3 Hours (Grid-Related)*) were set to TRUE.

Credit was given for offsite power recovery for applicable times greater than 3 hours. The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method ([Reference 3](#) and [Reference 4](#)) was used to estimate non-recovery probabilities as a function of time following restoration of offsite power to the switchyard.

Tables 1 and 2 provide the key qualitative information for this recovery and the performance shaping factor (PSFs) adjustments required for the quantification of offsite power recovery events for times greater than 2 hours using SPAR-H.

Table 1. Key Qualitative Information for Offsite Power Recovery after 3 Hours.

Definition	The definition for overall recovery is the operators' failure to align the RSST to re-energize a safety bus in 4 to 8 hours (depending on the sequence).
Description and Event Context	Depending on postulated failures of the EDGs, RCP seals (due to unavailability of seal injection/cooling), PORV(s) reclosing after demand, the availability of the turbine-driven AFW pump, and the time until the station batteries are depleted, operators would have between 4–8 hours to re-energize prior to core uncovery.
Operator Action Success Criteria	Once power has been restored to the RSST, operators would need to close one of the RSS supply breakers to energize a safety bus. The time available for operators to perform this action would be a minimum of 1 hour.
Nominal Cues	Loss of voltage on one or more safety buses
Procedural Guidance	<p>Unit 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EOP 2528, "Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Forced Circulation" • EOP 2530, "Station Blackout" • Appendix 23, "Restoring Electrical Power" <p>Unit 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EOP 35, ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power" • EOP 35, GA-3, "Energizing 4.16V Bus from Offsite Power"
Diagnosis/Action	This recovery action contains diagnosis and action activities.

Table 2. SPAR-H Evaluation for Offsite Power Recovery after 3 Hours.

PSF	Multiplier Diagnosis / Action	Notes
Time Available	0.01 / 1	For recovery actions with 4 hours or more available, approximately 1 hour (at a minimum) would be available to perform the actions required to re-energize a safety bus prior to core uncover. Therefore, the diagnosis PSF for available time is assigned as <i>Expansive Time</i> (i.e., $\times 0.01$; time available is >2 times nominal and >30 minutes). Sufficient time exists to perform the action component of the offsite power recovery; therefore, the action PSF for available time is set to <i>Nominal</i> . See Reference 4 for guidance on apportioning time between the diagnosis and action components of an HFE.
Stress	2 / 1	The PSF for diagnosis stress is assigned a value of <i>High Stress</i> (i.e., $\times 2$) due to the postulated SBO and that core damage will occur if operators fail to restore power to a safety bus. The PSF for action stress was not determined to be a performance driver for this HFE; and therefore, was assigned a value of <i>Nominal</i> (i.e., $\times 1$).
Complexity	2 / 1	The PSF for diagnosis complexity is assigned a value of <i>Moderately Complex</i> (i.e., $\times 2$) because operators would have to deal with multiple equipment unavailabilities and the concurrent actions/multiple procedures during a LOOP and postulated SBO. The PSF for action complexity was not determined to be a performance driver for this HFE; and therefore, was assigned a value of <i>Nominal</i> (i.e., $\times 1$).
Procedures Experience/Training, Ergonomics/HMI, Fitness for Duty, Work Processes	1 / 1	No event information is available to warrant a change in these PSFs (diagnosis or action) from <i>Nominal</i> for this HFE.

Offsite power recovery actions with at least three hours of available time are calculated using the following SPAR-H formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Power Recovery HEP} &= (\text{Product of Diagnosis PSFs} * \text{Nominal Diagnosis HEP}) + \\
 &\quad (\text{Product of Action PSFs} * \text{Nominal Action HEP}) \\
 &= (0.04 * 0.01) + (1 * 0.001) = 1 \times 10^{-3}
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the following Unit 2 HEPs for offsite power recovery, OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 6 Hours*) and OEP-XHE-XL-NR08H (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 8 Hours*), are calculated to be 1×10^{-3} .

The following Unit 3 HEPs for offsite power recovery, OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HGR (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 4 Hours(Grid-Related)*), OEP-XHE-XL-NR06HGR

(*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 6 Hours(Grid-Related)*), and OEP-XHE-XL-NR08HGR (*Operator Fails to Recover Offsite Power in 8 Hours (Grid-Related)*), are calculated to be 1×10^{-3} .

- The offsite power was recovered to at least one safety bus in both units in approximately 3 hours and 30 minutes after the LOOP occurred. Offsite power was restored to all safety buses (for both units) approximately 6 hours after the LOOP occurred. Therefore, the default EDG and turbine-driven AFW pump mission times were changed to reflect the actual time offsite power was restored to the safety buses. Since the overall fail-to-run is made up of two separate factors, the mission times for these factors were set to the following: ZT-DGN-FR-E = 1 hour and ZT-TDP-FR-E = 1 hour (nominal values) and ZT-DGN-FR-L = 2.5 hours and ZT-TDP-FR-L = 5 hours.

Key Modeling Assumptions for Unit 3. In addition, to the modeling assumptions above; the following assumptions were made in Unit 3 analysis:

- The Basic Events PPR-SRV-CO-L (*PORVs/SRVs Open during a LOOP*) and PPR-SRV-CO-B (*PORVs/SRVs Open during an SBO*) were set to TRUE because operators used both PORVs to control RCS pressure due to the loss of letdown. There were 11 open/close cycles of both PORVs; PORV 455A was cycled six times and PORV 456 was cycled five times. Therefore, a binomial expansion was used to adjust the failure probabilities for Basic Events PPR-SRV-OO-455A (*PORV 455A Fails to Reclose after Opening*) and PPR-SRV-OO-456 (*PORV 456 Fails to Reclose after Opening*) to account for the increased probability that the valves could stick open. These probabilities were changed to 5.8×10^{-3} and 4.8×10^{-3} , respectively.
- The diesel-driven firewater pump was reported to be out of service. The firewater system is not modeled explicitly except two operator actions to align firewater for alternated supply of AFW and alternated cooling water to the charging pumps. Therefore, Basic Events AFW-XHE-XM-FIREW (*Operator Fails to Align Firewater to AFW Suction*) and CCE-XHE-XM-ACool (*Operator Fails to Establish Firewater to the Charging Pump Cooling Heat Exchangers*) were set to TRUE. This simplifying modeling assumption has a negligible impact on the Unit 3 CCDP.

ANALYSIS RESULTS

CCDPs. The point estimate CCDPs for this event are 1.2×10^{-5} (Unit 2) and 1.6×10^{-5} (Unit 3). The ASP Program acceptance threshold is a CCDP of 1×10^{-6} or the CCDP equivalent of an uncomplicated reactor trip with a non-recoverable loss of secondary plant systems (e.g., feed water and condensate), whichever is greater. This CCDP equivalent is 1×10^{-6} and 6×10^{-7} , for Millstone Units 2 and 3, respectively. Therefore, this event resulted in a precursor for both units.

Unit 2 Dominant Sequence. The dominant accident sequence is LOOP/SBO Sequence 22-31 (CCDP = 8.1×10^{-6}), which contributes approximately 67% of the total internal events CCDP. The cut sets and sequences that contribute to the top 95% and/or at least 1% of the total internal events CCDP are provided in Appendix A.

The dominant sequence is shown graphically in Figures C-1 and C-2 in Appendix C. The events and important component failures in LOOP/SBO Sequence 22-31 are:

- A non-recoverable grid-related LOOP occurs,
- Reactor scram succeeds,
- Emergency powers fails,
- Safety relief valves reclose (if opened),
- Turbine-driven AFW pump fails, and
- Operators fail to recover ac power (offsite power or EDGs) within 1 hour.

Unit 3 Dominant Sequence. The dominant accident sequence is LOOP/SBO Sequence 16-01-04 (CCDP $\approx 3.7 \times 10^{-6}$), which contributes approximately 23% of the total internal events CCDP. The cut sets and sequences that contribute to the top 95% and/or at least 1% of the total internal events CCDP are provided in Appendix B.

The dominant sequence is shown graphically in Figures C-3 and C-4 in Appendix C. The events and important component failures in LOOP/SBO Sequence 16-01-04 are:

- A non-recoverable grid-related LOOP occurs,
- Reactor scram succeeds,
- Normal emergency powers fails resulting in an SBO,
- SBO diesel generator is successful, but not before RCP seals are challenged due to lack of cooling/injection,
- Safety relief valves reclose (if opened),
- AFW is successful,
- Rapid secondary depressurization is successful,
- Stage 2 of the RCP seals fail (binding and popping),
- Operators fail to recover ac power (offsite power or EDGs) within 2 hours,
- High-pressure injection is successful, and
- High-pressure recirculation fails.

REFERENCES

1. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., "LER 336/14-006– Millstone Power Station Dual Unit Reactor Trip on Loss of Offsite Power," dated July 24, 2014 (ML14211A526).
2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3 – NRC Special Inspection Report 05000336/2014011 AND 05000423/2014011," dated August 28, 2014 (ML14240A006).
3. Idaho National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-6883, "The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method," August 2005 (ML051950061).
4. Idaho National Laboratory, "INL/EXT-10-18533, SPAR-H Step-by-Step Guidance," May 2011 (ML112060305).

Appendix A: Unit 2 Analysis Results

Summary of Conditional Event Changes

Event	Description	Cond. Value	Nominal Value
EPS-DGN-FC-UNIT3	BLACKOUT DIESEL IS REQUIRED BY UNIT 3	6.80E-4	0.00E+0
IE-LOOP ^a	LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER	1.00E+0	2.84E-2
LOOP-DUAL-UNIT	DUAL UNIT LOOP	TRUE	5.82E-1
LOOP-SNGL-UNIT	SINGLE UNIT LOOP	FALSE	4.18E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR01H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR	TRUE	5.46E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 HOURS	TRUE	3.39E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 6 HOURS	1.00E-3	1.10E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR08H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 8 HOURS	1.00E-3	7.82E-2
ZT-DGN-FR-L	DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO RUN	2.70E-3	2.47E-2
ZT-TDP-FR-L	TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN	7.80E-3	3.52E-2

a. All other initiating event probabilities were set to zero.

Dominant Sequence Results

Only items contributing at least 1.0% to the total CCDP are displayed.

Event Tree	Sequence	CCDP	% Contribution	Description
LOOP	22-31	8.06E-6	67.1%	/RPS, EPS, EPS-SBO, AFW-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H
LOOP	21	3.59E-6	29.9%	/RPS, /EPS, AFW-L, OTC-L
Total		1.20E-5	100.0%	

Referenced Fault Trees

Fault Tree	Description
AFW-B	MILLSTONE 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER USING SBO-FTF FLAG SET
AFW-L	MILLSTONE 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER USING LOOP-FTF FLAG SET
DGR-01H	MILLSTONE 2 OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR
EPS	EMERGENCY POWER
EPS-SBO	STATION BLACKOUT POWER
OPR-01H	OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 1 HOUR
OTC-L	MILLSTONE 2 ONCE THROUGH COOLING USING LOOP-FTF FAULT TREE FLAGS

Cut Set Report - LOOP 22-31

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	8.06E-6	100	Displaying 5766 Cut Sets. (5766 Original)
1	6.36E-7	7.88	IE-LOOP,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
2	3.88E-7	4.82	IE-LOOP,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
3	3.54E-7	4.39	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
4	3.54E-7	4.39	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
5	3.36E-7	4.16	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
6	2.06E-7	2.56	IE-LOOP,AFW-TDP-FS-TDP,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
7	2.03E-7	2.51	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
8	1.99E-7	2.46	IE-LOOP,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
9	1.71E-7	2.13	IE-LOOP,AFW-TDP-TM-TDP,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
10	1.25E-7	1.55	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-FS-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
11	1.25E-7	1.55	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-FS-DGB,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
12	1.21E-7	1.50	IE-LOOP,AFW-TDP-FR-TDP,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
13	1.09E-7	1.35	IE-LOOP,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-CF-START,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
14	1.03E-7	1.28	IE-LOOP,ACP-CRB-CC-24DIT2,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
15	1.03E-7	1.28	IE-LOOP,ACP-CRB-CC-S324D2,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
16	1.03E-7	1.28	IE-LOOP,ACP-CRB-CC-24CIT2,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
17	1.03E-7	1.28	IE-LOOP,ACP-CRB-CC-S324C2,ACP-XHE-XM-ALT,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H

Cut Set Report - LOOP 21

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	3.60E-6	100	Displaying 8266 Cut Sets. (8266 Original)
1	6.39E-8	1.78	IE-LOOP,AFW-AOV-CF-FW43AB,AFW-XHE-XM-BYPASS,HPI-XHE-XM-FBL
2	5.29E-8	1.47	IE-LOOP,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,DCP-BCH-CF-CHR,DCP-XHE-XM-CH201C
3	4.56E-8	1.27	IE-LOOP,AFW-MDP-TM-9B,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,PPR-MOV-FC-BLK1
4	4.56E-8	1.27	IE-LOOP,AFW-MDP-TM-9A,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,PPR-MOV-FC-BLK2
5	3.84E-8	1.07	IE-LOOP,AFW-MDP-TM-9A,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,IAS-MDC-FR-IAF3A
6	3.84E-8	1.07	IE-LOOP,AFW-MDP-TM-9B,AFW-XHE-XM-TDP,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,IAS-MDC-FR-IAF3B

Referenced Events

Event	Description	Probability
ACP-CRB-CC-24CIT2	FAILURE OF OFFSITE LINE CRB 24C-IT-2 FROM BUS 24A TO OPEN	2.39E-3
ACP-CRB-CC-24DIT2	FAILURE OF OFFSITE LINE CRB 24D-IT-2 FROM BUS 24B TO OPEN	2.39E-3
ACP-CRB-CC-S324C2	FAILURE OF OFFSITE LINE CRB 22S3-24C-2 FROM RSST TO OPEN	2.39E-3
ACP-CRB-CC-S324D2	FAILURE OF OFFSITE LINE CRB 22S3-24D-2 FROM RSST TO OPEN	2.39E-3
ACP-XHE-XM-ALT	OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND ALIGN SBO DGN	5.00E-2
AFW-AOV-CF-FW43AB	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF FLOW CONTROL VALVES 2-FW-43A/43B	3.19E-5
AFW-MDP-TM-9A	AFW MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP 9A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M	3.98E-3
AFW-MDP-TM-9B	AFW MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP 9B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M	3.98E-3
AFW-TDP-FR-TDP	AFW TURBINE- DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN	1.22E-2
AFW-TDP-FS-TDP	AFW TURBINE- DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO START	6.49E-3
AFW-TDP-TM-TDP	AFW TURBINE- DRIVEN PUMP UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M	5.39E-3
AFW-XHE-XM-BYPASS	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN BYPASS VALVES FW-56A OR 56B	1.00E-1
AFW-XHE-XM-TDP	OPERATOR FAILS TO LOCALLY START/OPERATE TDP	2.00E-2
AFW-XHE-XM-TDP1	OPERATOR FAILS TO LOCALLY START TDP	6.90E-2
DCP-BCH-CF-CHR	CCF OF BATTERY CHARGERS	2.64E-6

Event	Description	Probability
DCP-XHE-XM-CH201C	OPERATOR FAILS TO ALIGN CHARGE 201C TO FAILED BUS	1.00E+0
EPS-DGN-CF-RUN	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN	1.12E-4
EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN	3.65E-5
EPS-DGN-CF-START	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATORS TO START	3.61E-5
EPS-DGN-CF-START3	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATORS TO START	1.14E-5
EPS-DGN-FR-DGA	DIESEL GENERATOR A FAILS TO RUN	8.21E-3
EPS-DGN-FR-DGB	DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO RUN	8.21E-3
EPS-DGN-FS-DGA	DIESEL GENERATOR A FAILS TO START	2.89E-3
EPS-DGN-FS-DGB	DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO START	2.89E-3
EPS-DGN-TM-DGA	DIESEL GENERATOR A UNAVAILABLE DUE T & M	1.43E-2
EPS-DGN-TM-DGB	DIESEL GENERATOR B UNAVAILABLE DUE T & M	1.43E-2
EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR	8.71E-1
HPI-XHE-XM-FBL	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE F&B COOLING GIVEN A LOOP	2.00E-2
IAS-MDC-FR-IAF3A	INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR F3A FAILS TO RUN	5.89E-2
IAS-MDC-FR-IAF3B	INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR F3B FAILS TO RUN	5.89E-2
IE-LOOP	LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER	1.00E+0
PPR-MOV-FC-BLK1	PORV 402 BLOCK VALVE 403 CLOSED DURING POWER	6.99E-2
PPR-MOV-FC-BLK2	PORV 404 BLOCK VALVE 405 CLOSED DURING FULL POWER	6.99E-2

Appendix B: Unit 3 Analysis Results

Summary of Conditional Event Changes

Event	Description	Cond. Value	Nominal Value
AFW-XHE-XM-FIREW	OPERATOR FAILS TO ALIGN FWS OR OTHER SOURCE TO AFW SUCTION	TRUE	1.00E-3
CCE-XHE-XM-ACOOOL	OPERATOR FAILS TO ESTABLISH FIRE WATER TO CCE HTXs	TRUE	2.00E-2
EPS-DGN-FC-UNIT2	BLACKOUT DIESEL IS REQUIRED BY UNIT 2	6.80E-4	0.00E+0
IE-LOOPGR ^a	LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (GRID-RELATED)	1.00E+0	2.84E-2
LOOP-DUAL-UNIT	DUAL UNIT LOOP	TRUE	5.82E-1
LOOP-SNGL-UNIT	SINGLE UNIT LOOP	FALSE	4.18E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR01HGR	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR (GRID-RELATED)	TRUE	6.59E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR02HGR	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 HOURS (GRID-RELATED)	TRUE	3.91E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR04HGR	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 4 HOURS (GRID-RELATED)	1.00E-3	1.69E-1
OEP-XHE-XL-NR06HGR	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 6 HOURS (GRID-RELATED)	1.00E-3	8.68E-2
OEP-XHE-XL-NR08HGR	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 8 HOURS (GRID-RELATED)	1.00E-3	5.00E-2
PPR-SRV-CO-L	PORVs/SRVs OPEN DURING LOOP	TRUE	1.48E-1
PPR-SRV-CO-SBO	PORVs/SRVs OPEN DURING SBO	TRUE	3.70E-1
PPR-SRV-OO-455A	PORV 455A FAILS TO RECLOSE AFTER OPENING	5.80E-3	9.66E-4
PPR-SRV-OO-456	PORV 456 FAILS TO RECLOSE AFTER OPENING	4.80E-3	9.66E-4
ZT-DGN-FR-L	DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO RUN	2.70E-3	2.47E-2
ZT-TDP-FR-L	TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN	7.80E-3	3.52E-2

a. All other initiating event probabilities were set to zero.

Dominant Sequence Results

Only items contributing at least 1.0% to the total CCDP are displayed.

Event Tree	Sequence	CCDP	% Contribution	Description
LOOPGR	16-01-04	3.65E-6	23.3%	/RPS-L, EPS, /EPS-SBO, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, /HPI-B, HPR-B
LOOPGR	09	2.87E-6	18.3%	/RPS-L, /EPS, /AFW-L, PORV-L, /HPI-L, OPR-02H, HPR-L
LOOPGR	02-04	2.41E-6	15.4%	/RPS-L, /EPS, /AFW-L, /PORV-L, LOSE-L, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, /HPI-L, HPR-L
LOOPGR	02-05	1.85E-6	11.8%	/RPS-L, /EPS, /AFW-L, /PORV-L, LOSE-L, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, HPI-L
LOOPGR	16-46	1.65E-6	10.5%	/RPS-L, EPS, EPS-SBO, AFW-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H
LOOPGR	16-01-05	8.15E-7	5.2%	/RPS-L, EPS, /EPS-SBO, /RSD, /BP1, BP2, OPR-02H, HPI-B
LOOPGR	16-43	7.20E-7	4.6%	/RPS-L, EPS, EPS-SBO, /AFW-B, PORV-B, OPR-01H, DGR-01H
LOOPGR	15	6.82E-7	4.4%	/RPS-L, /EPS, AFW-L, FAB-L
LOOPGR	16-01-08	1.82E-7	1.2%	/RPS-L, EPS, /EPS-SBO, /RSD, BP1, /BP2, OPR-02H, /HPI-B, HPR-B
Total		1.56E-5	100.0%	

Referenced Fault Trees

Fault Tree	Description
AFW-B	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING SBO
AFW-L	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING LOOP
BP1	RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY
BP2	RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY
DGR-01H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR
EPS	EMERGENCY POWER
EPS-SBO	STATION BLACKOUT POWER
FAB-L	FEED AND BLEED DURING LOOP
HPI-B	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SBO SEQUENCES W/ SBO DGN OPERATING
HPI-L	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION
HPR-B	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRCULATION SBO SEQUENCES W/ SBO DGN OPERATING
HPR-L	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC
LOSC-L	RCP SEAL COOLING MAINTAINED DURING LOOP
OPR-01H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR
OPR-02H	OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 2 HRS
PORV-B	PORVs/SRVs OPEN DURING STATION BLACKOUT
PORV-L	PORVs ARE CLOSED DURING LOOP

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 16-01-04

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	3.65E-6	100	Displaying 1786 Cut Sets. (1786 Original)
1	9.44E-8	2.58	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32U,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
2	9.44E-8	2.58	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32T,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
3	6.42E-8	1.76	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
4	6.42E-8	1.76	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
5	5.40E-8	1.48	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32T,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
6	5.40E-8	1.48	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32U,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
7	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-MOV-OO-8512B,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
8	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,RHR-MOV-OO-8812A,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
9	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,RHR-MOV-OO-8812B,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
10	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,LPI-MOV-CC-8804A,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
11	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,LPI-MOV-CC-8804B,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
12	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MOV-OO-8813,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
13	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MOV-OO-8814,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
14	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, HPI-MOV-OO-8920, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
15	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8511A, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
16	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8512A, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
17	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8511B, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
18	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C, SWS-MOV-OO-50A
19	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D, SWS-MOV-OO-50B
20	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C, SWS-MOV-OO-71A
21	3.92E-8	1.07	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D, SWS-MOV-OO-71B
22	3.67E-8	1.01	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
23	3.67E-8	1.01	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 09

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	2.87E-6	100	Displaying 826 Cut Sets. (826 Original)
1	1.66E-7	5.81	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, HPI-XHE-XM-RECIRC, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
2	1.38E-7	4.80	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, HPI-XHE-XM-RECIRC, PPR-SRV-OO-456
3	9.52E-8	3.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, HPI-XHE-XM-RECIRC, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
4	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8512B, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
5	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, HPI-MOV-OO-8813, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
6	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A, RHR-MOV-OO-8812B
7	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A, SWS-MOV-OO-50B
8	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, LPI-MOV-CC-8804B, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
9	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A, SWS-MOV-OO-71B
10	8.02E-8	2.80	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8511B, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
11	7.88E-8	2.75	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, HPI-XHE-XM-RECIRC, PPR-SRV-OO-456
12	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, HPI-MOV-OO-8814, PPR-SRV-OO-456
13	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, HPI-MOV-OO-8920, PPR-SRV-OO-456
14	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, LPI-MOV-CC-8804A, PPR-SRV-OO-456
15	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456, SWS-MOV-OO-50A
16	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456, RHR-MOV-OO-8812A
17	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456, SWS-MOV-OO-71A
18	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8511A, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456
19	6.63E-8	2.31	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8512A, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456
20	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8512B, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
21	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, HPI-MOV-OO-8813, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
22	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A, RHR-MOV-OO-8812B
23	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A, SWS-MOV-OO-50B
24	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, LPI-MOV-CC-8804B, PPR-SRV-OO-455A

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
25	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A, SWS-MOV-OO-71B
26	4.59E-8	1.60	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8511B, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, PPR-SRV-OO-455A
27	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, HPI-MOV-OO-8814, PPR-SRV-OO-456
28	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, HPI-MOV-OO-8920, PPR-SRV-OO-456
29	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, LPI-MOV-CC-8804A, PPR-SRV-OO-456
30	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456, SWS-MOV-OO-50A
31	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456, RHR-MOV-OO-8812A
32	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456, SWS-MOV-OO-71A
33	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8511A, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456
34	3.80E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-MOV-OO-8512A, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, PPR-SRV-OO-456
35	3.35E-8	1.17	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-FS-DGA, HPI-XHE-XM-RECIRC, PPR-SRV-OO-455A

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 02-04

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	2.41E-6	100	Displaying 4493 Cut Sets. (4493 Original)
1	4.70E-8	1.95	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32W, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
2	4.70E-8	1.95	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32W, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
3	4.70E-8	1.95	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32R, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
4	4.70E-8	1.95	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32R, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
5	3.19E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34D41X, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
6	3.19E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34D41X, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
7	3.19E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34C51X, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
8	3.19E-8	1.32	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34C51X, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
9	2.69E-8	1.11	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32W, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
10	2.69E-8	1.11	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32W, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
11	2.69E-8	1.11	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32R, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
12	2.69E-8	1.11	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-BAC-LP-32R, CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 02-05

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	1.85E-6	100	Displaying 3360 Cut Sets. (3360 Original)
1	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SWS-1CRUN-1ASTBY, SWS-1DRUN-1BSTBY, SWS-MDP-CF-START
2	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SWS-1ARUN-1CSTBY, SWS-1DRUN-1BSTBY, SWS-MDP-CF-START
3	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR, CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SWS-1ARUN-1CSTBY, SWS-1BRUN-1DSTBY, SWS-MDP-CF-START

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
4	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-1ARUN-1CSTBY,SWS-1DRUN-1BSTBY,SWS-MDP-CF-START
5	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-1ARUN-1CSTBY,SWS-1BRUN-1DSTBY,SWS-MDP-CF-START
6	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-1CRUN-1ASTBY,SWS-1DRUN-1BSTBY,SWS-MDP-CF-START
7	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-1BRUN-1DSTBY,SWS-1CRUN-1ASTBY,SWS-MDP-CF-START
8	4.81E-8	2.60	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-1BRUN-1DSTBY,SWS-1CRUN-1ASTBY,SWS-MDP-CF-START
9	2.12E-8	1.15	IE-LOOPGR,CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY,CVC-MDP-TM-P3A,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MDP-TM-P1A,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
10	2.12E-8	1.15	IE-LOOPGR,CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY,CVC-MDP-TM-P3B,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,HPI-MDP-TM-P1B,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
11	2.08E-8	1.12	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-FAN-CF-HVY2ABS,SWS-XHE-XL-VENT
12	2.08E-8	1.12	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SWS-FAN-CF-HVY2ABS,SWS-XHE-XL-VENT
13	1.95E-8	1.05	IE-LOOPGR,CCE-MDP-TM-P1A,CCE-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MDP-TM-P1A,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
14	1.95E-8	1.05	IE-LOOPGR,CCE-MDP-TM-P1B,CCE-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,HPI-MDP-TM-P1B,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 16-46

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	1.64E-6	100	Displaying 701 Cut Sets. (701 Original)
1	3.87E-7	23.55	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
2	2.06E-7	12.52	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FS-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
3	1.71E-7	10.40	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-TM-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
4	1.21E-7	7.37	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
5	6.45E-8	3.92	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FS-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
6	5.35E-8	3.26	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-TM-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
7	2.19E-8	1.33	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-SBO
8	1.80E-8	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-DGN-TM-SBO,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
9	1.80E-8	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-SBO,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
10	1.80E-8	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-FR-SBO,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H
11	1.71E-8	1.04	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN,EPS-DGN-TM-SBO,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 16-01-05

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	8.15E-7	100	Displaying 1419 Cut Sets. (1419 Original)
1	9.44E-8	11.58	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-34D,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
2	9.44E-8	11.58	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-34C,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
3	6.16E-8	7.55	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-CF-C3D2,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
4	6.16E-8	7.55	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-CF-C3D2,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
5	5.40E-8	6.63	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-34C,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
6	5.40E-8	6.63	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-34D,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
7	3.54E-8	4.34	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32U,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
8	3.54E-8	4.34	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32T,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
9	2.41E-8	2.95	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
10	2.41E-8	2.95	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
11	2.03E-8	2.49	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32U,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
12	2.03E-8	2.49	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32T,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
13	1.90E-8	2.33	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-34C,EPS-DGN-FS-DGB,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
14	1.90E-8	2.33	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-34D,EPS-DGN-FS-DGA,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
15	1.38E-8	1.69	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X,CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
16	1.38E-8	1.69	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X,CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,NOTWINTER,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 16-43

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	7.21E-7	100	Displaying 365 Cut Sets. (365 Original)
1	1.84E-7	25.52	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-455A
2	1.52E-7	21.12	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-456
3	5.76E-8	7.99	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-455A
4	4.76E-8	6.61	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-CF-START3,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-456
5	1.04E-8	1.44	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-455A
6	8.61E-9	1.20	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,EPS-XHE-XM-SBO,PPR-SRV-OO-456
7	8.54E-9	1.19	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-FR-SBO,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-455A
8	8.54E-9	1.19	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,EPS-DGN-TM-SBO,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-455A
9	8.54E-9	1.19	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-SBO,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-455A
10	8.10E-9	1.12	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-CF-RUN,EPS-DGN-TM-SBO,EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H,PPR-SRV-OO-455A

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 15

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	6.82E-7	100	Displaying 1663 Cut Sets. (1663 Original)
1	2.84E-8	4.16	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-PMP-CF-STRT,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
2	1.39E-8	2.04	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-TM-1A,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
3	1.39E-8	2.04	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-TM-1B,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
4	1.16E-8	1.70	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-CF-START,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
5	8.74E-9	1.28	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-TNK-FC-DWST,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
6	7.98E-9	1.17	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-TM-1A,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
7	7.98E-9	1.17	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-TM-1B,AFW-TDP-FR-P2,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
8	7.41E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-TM-1A,AFW-TDP-FS-P2,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-XHE-XM-FB
9	7.41E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,AFW-MDP-TM-1B,AFW-TDP-FS-P2,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,HPI-XHE-XM-FB

Cut Set Report - LOOPGR 16-01-08

Only items contributing at least 1% to the total are displayed.

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
	1.82E-7	100	Displaying 554 Cut Sets. (554 Original)
1	4.78E-9	2.63	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32U,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
2	4.78E-9	2.63	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32T,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
3	3.25E-9	1.79	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
4	3.25E-9	1.79	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
5	2.73E-9	1.51	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32T,EPS-DGN-FR-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
6	2.73E-9	1.51	IE-LOOPGR,ACP-BAC-LP-32U,EPS-DGN-FR-DGA,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
7	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-MOV-OO-8512B,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
8	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,RHR-MOV-OO-8812A,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
9	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,RHR-MOV-OO-8812B,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
10	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,LPI-MOV-CC-8804A,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
11	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,LPI-MOV-CC-8804B,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
12	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MOV-OO-8813,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D
13	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MOV-OO-8814,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
14	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,HPI-MOV-OO-8920,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
15	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-MOV-OO-8511A,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
16	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-MOV-OO-8512A,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
17	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR,CVC-MOV-OO-8511B,EPS-DGN-TM-DGA,EPS-DGN-TM-DGB,RCS-MDP-LK-BP1,/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2,SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D

#	CCDP	Total%	Cut Set
18	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C, SWS-MOV-OO-50A
19	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D, SWS-MOV-OO-50B
20	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C, SWS-MOV-OO-71A
21	1.98E-9	1.09	IE-LOOPGR, EPS-DGN-TM-DGA, EPS-DGN-TM-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D, SWS-MOV-OO-71B
22	1.86E-9	1.02	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X, EPS-DGN-FR-DGB, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C
23	1.86E-9	1.02	IE-LOOPGR, ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X, EPS-DGN-FR-DGA, RCS-MDP-LK-BP1, /RCS-MDP-LK-BP2, SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D

Referenced Events

Event	Description	Probability
ACP-BAC-LP-32R	FAILURE OF 480V AC BUS 32R	3.33E-5
ACP-BAC-LP-32T	FAILURE OF 480V AC BUS 32T	3.33E-5
ACP-BAC-LP-32U	FAILURE OF 480V AC BUS 32U	3.33E-5
ACP-BAC-LP-32W	FAILURE OF 480V AC BUS 32W	3.33E-5
ACP-BAC-LP-34C	4160 VAC BUS 34C FAILS	3.33E-5
ACP-BAC-LP-34D	4160 VAC BUS 34D FAILS	3.33E-5
ACP-TFM-CF-C3D2	CCF OF 4160/480V TRANSFORMERS 34C3-1X/34D2-1X	8.31E-7
ACP-TFM-FC-34C31X	FAILURE OF 4160/480V TRANSFORMER 34C3-1X TO OPERATE	2.27E-5
ACP-TFM-FC-34C51X	FAILURE OF 4160/480V TRANSFORMER 34C5-1X TO OPERATE	2.27E-5
ACP-TFM-FC-34D21X	FAILURE OF 4160/480V TRANSFORMER 34D2-1X TO OPERATE	2.27E-5
ACP-TFM-FC-34D41X	FAILURE OF 4160/480V TRANSFORMER 34D4-1X TO OPERATE	2.27E-5
AFW-MDP-CF-START	CCF OF AFW MDPS TO START	4.76E-5
AFW-MDP-TM-1A	AFW MDP UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	3.98E-3
AFW-MDP-TM-1B	AFW MDP UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	3.98E-3
AFW-PMP-CF-STRT	CCF OF AFW PUMPS TO START (EXCLUDING DRIVER) - PSA	1.42E-6
AFW-TDP-FR-P2	TURBINE DRIVEN FEED PUMP P2 FAILS TO RUN	1.22E-2
AFW-TDP-FS-P2	TURBINE DRIVEN FEED PUMP P2 FAILS TO START	6.49E-3
AFW-TDP-TM-P2	FEED PUMP P2 IS IN TEST OR MAINTENANCE	5.39E-3
AFW-TNK-FC-DWST	DWST EXTERNAL LEAKAGE	4.37E-7
CCE-MDP-TM-P1A	CCE MDP P1A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	7.12E-3
CCE-MDP-TM-P1B	CCE MDP P1B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	7.12E-3
CCE-P3AOP-P3BSTBY	CCE P1A IN OPERATION WHILE PUMP P1B IN STANDBY	5.00E-1
CCE-P3BOP-P3ASTBY	CCE P1B IN OPERATION WHILE PUMP P1A IN STANDBY	5.00E-1
CCW-1A1BRUN-1CSTBY	CCW MDP 1A RUNNING CCW MDP 1B RUNNING CCW MDP 1C STANDBY	9.95E-1
CVC-MDP-TM-P3A	PUMP P3A IS IN TEST OR MAINTENANCE	3.88E-3
CVC-MDP-TM-P3B	PUMP P3B IS IN TEST OR MAINTENANCE	3.88E-3
CVC-MOV-OO-8511A	CHARGING PUMP TRAIN A MINFLOW MOV 8511A FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
CVC-MOV-OO-8511B	CHARGING PUMP TRAIN B MINFLOW MOV 8511B FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
CVC-MOV-OO-8512A	CHARGING PUMP TRAIN B MINFLOW MOV 8512A FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
CVC-MOV-OO-8512B	CHARGING PUMP TRAIN A MINFLOW MOV 8512B FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
CVC-P3AOP-P3BSTBY	CHARGING PUMP 3A IN OPERATION WHILE PUMP 3B IN STANDBY	5.00E-1
CVC-P3BOP-P3ASTBY	CHARGING PUMP 3B IN OPERATION WHILE PUMP 3A IN STANDBY	5.00E-1

Event	Description	Probability
EPS-DGN-CF-RUN	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN	1.12E-4
EPS-DGN-CF-RUN3	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 3 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN	3.64E-5
EPS-DGN-CF-START3	COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 3 DIESEL GENERATORS TO START	1.14E-5
EPS-DGN-FR-DGA	DIESEL GENERATOR A FAILS TO RUN	8.21E-3
EPS-DGN-FR-DGB	DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO RUN	8.21E-3
EPS-DGN-FR-SBO	STATION BLACKOUT DIESEL FAILS TO RUN	8.21E-3
EPS-DGN-FS-DGA	DIESEL GENERATOR A FAILS TO START	2.89E-3
EPS-DGN-FS-DGB	DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO START	2.89E-3
EPS-DGN-TM-DGA	DG A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	1.43E-2
EPS-DGN-TM-DGB	DG B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	1.43E-2
EPS-DGN-TM-SBO	SBO DIESEL UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENANCE	1.43E-2
EPS-XHE-XL-NR01H	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR	8.71E-1
EPS-XHE-XM-SBO	OPERATOR FAILS TO START & ALIGN SBO DIESEL	1.00E-2
HPI-MDP-TM-P1A	HPI PUMP TRAIN P1A IS IN TEST OR MAINTENANCE	3.88E-3
HPI-MDP-TM-P1B	HPI PUMP TRAIN P1B IS IN TEST OR MAINTENANCE	3.88E-3
HPI-MOV-OO-8813	SI PUMP MINFLOW VLV 8813 FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
HPI-MOV-OO-8814	SI PUMP MINFLOW VLV 8814 FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
HPI-MOV-OO-8920	SI PUMP MINFLOW VLV 8920 FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
HPI-XHE-XM-FB	OPERATOR FAILS TO INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COOLING	2.00E-2
HPI-XHE-XM-RECIRC	OPERATOR FAILS TO START HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC	2.00E-3
IE-LOOPGR	LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATOR (GRID-RELATED)	1.00E+0
LPI-MOV-CC-8804A	LPSI TO SI ISOLN VALVE 8804A FAILS TO OPEN	9.63E-4
LPI-MOV-CC-8804B	LPSI TO SI ISOLN VALVE 8804B FAILS TO OPEN	9.63E-4
NOTWINTER	NOT WINTER OPERATION (SUMMER TIME)	7.50E-1
PPR-SRV-OO-455A	PORV 455A FAILS TO RECLOSE AFTER OPENING	5.80E-3
PPR-SRV-OO-456	PORV 456 FAILS TO RECLOSE AFTER OPENING	4.80E-3
RCS-MDP-LK-BP1	RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING OPEN) FAILS	1.25E-2
RCS-MDP-LK-BP2	RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING OPEN) FAILS	2.00E-1
RHR-MOV-OO-8812A	RHR PUMP P1A RWST SUCTION VLV 8812A FAILS TO CLOSE (INTERLOCK W/ 8837/8A)	9.63E-4
RHR-MOV-OO-8812B	RHR PUMP P1B RWST SUCTION VLV 8812B FAILS TO CLOSE (INTERLOCK W/ 8837/8B)	9.63E-4
SBO-DGN-ALIGN34C	SBO DIESEL GENERATOR ALIGNED TO BUS 34C	1.00E+0
SBO-DGN-ALIGN34D	SBO DIESEL GENERATOR ALIGNED TO BUS 34D	1.00E+0
SWS-1ARUN-1CSTBY	SWS MDP 1A RUNNING SWS MDP 1C STANDBY	5.00E-1
SWS-1BRUN-1DSTBY	SWS MDP 1B RUNNING SWS MDP 1D STANDBY	5.00E-1
SWS-1CRUN-1ASTBY	SWS MDP 1C RUNNING SWS MDP 1A STANDBY	5.00E-1
SWS-1DRUN-1BSTBY	SWS MDP 1D RUNNING SWS MDP 1B STANDBY	5.00E-1
SWS-FAN-CF-HVY2ABS	CCF OF SWS VENTILLATION FANS TO START	2.11E-5
SWS-MDP-CF-START	PUMPS FAIL FROM COMMON CAUSE TO START	1.95E-6
SWS-MOV-OO-50A	COMPONENT COOLING WATER ISOLATION VLV FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
SWS-MOV-OO-50B	COMPONENT COOLING WATER ISOLATION VLV FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
SWS-MOV-OO-71A	TBCCW ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
SWS-MOV-OO-71B	TBCCW ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE	9.63E-4
SWS-XHE-XL-VENT	OPERATOR FAILS TO PROVIDE ALTERNATE VENTILATION TO SWS	1.00E-2

Appendix C: Key Event Trees




Figure C-1. Millstone Power Station Unit 2, LOOP Event Tree.




Figure C-2. Millstone Power Station Unit 2, SBO Event Tree.




Figure C-3. Millstone Power Station Unit 3, Grid-Related LOOP Event Tree.




Figure C-4. Millstone Power Station Unit 3, SBO Event Tree.