

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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NUCLEAR FACILITIES, INCLUDING THREE MILE ISLAND

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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BRIEFING ON STUDIES OF CANCER IN POPULATIONS NEAR
NUCLEAR FACILITIES, INCLUDING THREE MILE ISLAND

- - - -

PUBLIC MEETING

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
Rockville, Maryland

Friday, September 28, 1990

The Commission met in open session,
pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., James R. Curtiss,
Commissioner, presiding.

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

KENNETH C. ROGERS, Commissioner
JAMES R. CURTISS, Commissioner
FORREST J. REMICK, Commissioner

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STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:

SAMUEL J. CHILK, Secretary

JOE SCINTO, Office of the General Counsel

JOHN BOICE, JR., National Cancer Institute/NIH

SEYMOUR JABLON, National Cancer Institute/NIH

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2:05 p.m.

COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Welcome.

Chairman Carr will not be with us this afternoon.

The Commission meets today to hear the results of the National Cancer Institute's recently completed study of cancer rates in the vicinity of nuclear facilities in the United States. This study, which represents an important contribution to an area that has generated a great deal of interest over the years, covers all commercial nuclear power plant sites that were operating before 1982, as well as nine Department of Energy sites and the West Valley site in New York. In view of the Commission's responsibility for the licensing and regulation of commercial nuclear power plants, we will be especially interested in your conclusions about these facilities.

Doctor Hatch of the Columbia University School of Public Health, who was to present the work undertaken on behalf of the TMI Public Health Fund, has had an unavoidable conflict this afternoon and accordingly will not be present today. In view of that, the results of her work, which is entitled "Cancer Near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant

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1 Radiation Emissions," and which appeared in the
2 September issue of *The American Journal of*
3 *Epidemiology*, will be placed in the record of today's
4 meeting.

5 Before we begin, do either of my fellow
6 Commissioners have any comments?

7 If not, Doctors Boice and Jablon, we
8 welcome you to the Commission and you may proceed.

9 DOCTOR BOICE: (Slide) May I have the
10 first slide, please?

11 My name is John Boice and I'm Chief of the
12 Radiation Epidemiology Branch at the National Cancer
13 Institute, and Mr. Jablon is an expert within the
14 Program, an expert in epidemiology and biostatistics,
15 and he is the principal investigator for the study.
16 And, as mentioned, we will be discussing this recently
17 conducted study of cancer in populations living near
18 nuclear facilities.

19 I'll start with a brief overview of the
20 study and then Mr. Jablon will present the study
21 design, methods and results, then I'll conclude
22 briefly with the comments made from our oversight
23 committee which monitor the progress of the
24 investigation.

25 (Slide) The next slide.

1 The study was initiated in 1987 after
2 reports from -- could I have the next slide, please?

3 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Takes them a while
4 there sometimes.

5 DOCTOR BOICE: Takes them a while, okay.

6 There we go. The study was started in
7 1987, after reports from the United Kingdom suggested
8 elevated rates of childhood leukemia around certain
9 nuclear installations. A protocol was developed and
10 reviewed in 1988 and an advisory committee was
11 established. The committee met three times and the
12 report was published this month by the Government
13 Printing Office.

14 (Slide) Next slide.

15 The advisory committee consisted of seven
16 scientists outside the United States government and
17 their charge was to provide overall guidance, to
18 assist in the interpretation, and to suggest areas for
19 further study. The members included Doctor Roswell
20 Boutwell from the University of Wisconsin; Doctor
21 Pelayo Correa from Louisiana State University; Doctor
22 Clark Heath, Vice President for Epidemiology and
23 Biostatistics at the American Cancer Society; Doctor
24 Colin Muirhead, a member of the National Radiation
25 Protection Board in England; Doctor Donald Pierce from

1 Oregon State University; Doctor Moyses Szklo, Johns
2 Hopkins University; and Doctor Arthur Upton, New York
3 University. Doctor Upton was also the Chairman of the
4 recent National Academy of Sciences committee, the
5 BEIR V Report, which published their findings on low
6 level radiation effects earlier this year.

7 (Slide) Now, the next slide.

8 In 1987, the Office of Population Census'
9 and Surveys in the United Kingdom published a
10 comprehensive volume of cancer risk in the vicinity of
11 their nuclear installations. They reported a
12 significant excess of childhood leukemia around
13 certain facilities, specifically defense and fuel
14 reprocessing plants. In large part, this
15 investigation prompted us to initiate a similar survey
16 based on routinely collected vital statistics data in
17 the United States. Our study of county death rates
18 used similar methodology as that used in the United
19 Kingdom.

20 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

21 In the United Kingdom, the excess of
22 childhood leukemia was particularly noted around the
23 Sellafield Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant shown here.
24 There was little evidence of excess risk around the
25 nuclear power plants that generated electricity. Most

1 recently, the Sellafield excess was suggested to be
2 possibly related to occupational exposure of the
3 fathers prior to conception.

4 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

5 As Mr. Jablon will discuss in detail, our
6 study includes nine Department of Energy facilities,
7 one commercial reprocessing plant that was active in
8 New York but eventually closed, and 52 commercial
9 nuclear power plants that began operating prior to
10 1982.

11 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

12 This map shows the distribution of study
13 counties in blue and the control counties in yellow,
14 which were selected for the analysis. There were 107
15 counties with or adjacent to nuclear installations,
16 and 292 control counties. I think it is important to
17 note that the methods used to study cancer deaths at
18 the county level have been used effectively by the
19 National Cancer Institute in the past.

20 (Slide) Next slide.

21 For example, this map is taken from our
22 published cancer maps and displays levels of lung
23 cancer deaths for each of the more than 3,000
24 counties in the United States. Red represents
25 counties at highest risk. Although risk is seen to

1 vary across the United States, most remarkable are the
2 high rates of lung cancer in counties along the South
3 Atlantic and the Gulf Coasts. Subsequent studies link
4 the excess rates to asbestos exposure in shipyards,
5 particularly during World War II.

6 (Slide) The next slide.

7 In another survey, counties with non-
8 ferrous smelters and refineries showed elevated rates
9 of lung cancer deaths. Subsequent analytic studies
10 linked the excess risk to residential exposure to
11 arsenic released by smelters into the general
12 environment. These examples are just to indicate that
13 studies of cancer deaths at the county level, despite
14 their limitations which we will discuss, they have
15 been valuable in the past in identifying environmental
16 factors responsible for some geographic patterns of
17 cancer.

18 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

19 Returning now to our survey around nuclear
20 installations, the study once again includes the
21 Department of Energy facilities such as this one at
22 Hanford.

23 (Slide) And, the next slide, and 52
24 nuclear power stations, such as this one at Calvert
25 Cliffs in Maryland.

1 (Slide) The next slide.

2 Now, just to give you a feeling for the
3 numbers involved, there were 62 nuclear facilities in
4 107 of the counties in the United States.
5 Approximately 19 million people live in or near to
6 counties with nuclear facilities.

7 The number of cancer deaths from 1950
8 through 1984 was approximately 900,000. The cancer
9 rates for 16 causes of death due to cancer were
10 contrasted for the control counties, which were 292
11 control counties, which had a population of 33 million
12 people based on the 1980 census, and 1.8 million
13 cancer deaths occurred during this 35 year period.
14 The average population --

15 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Excuse me, would you
16 mind if I ask a question at this point or would you
17 prefer --

18 DOCTOR BOICE: If it's for clarification.
19 We do have a presentation.

20 COMMISSIONER REMICK: I was just wondering
21 how you decided upon the control counties and the
22 number, how that was decided.

23 DOCTOR BOICE: Mr. Jablon will present
24 that in detail, so that you'll see that.

25 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Fine.

1 DOCTOR BOICE: Another interesting fact, I
2 think, would be that the median population size for
3 these counties was approximately 60,000 individuals.

4 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

5 As mentioned, the results were published
6 this month in three volumes, approximately 1,700
7 pages. We are also preparing an article for
8 submission to a peer review journal at this time.

9 And now, Mr. Jablon will discuss the study
10 design and the methods and the results in some detail.

11 DOCTOR JABLON: Thank you, John.

12 I may say that if you would like to
13 interrupt me for a question at any time, please feel
14 free to do so.

15 (Slide) May I have the first slide,
16 please?

17 My presentation is divided into several
18 sections.

19 First, why do a study?

20 What are the data that are available?

21 Which facilities and counties were
22 studied?

23 How were control counties selected?

24 What's the form of analysis and the
25 process of interpretation?

1 What was found for childhood leukemia or
2 for other cancers?

3 What are the limitations and strengths of
4 the study?

5 And what are the conclusions?

6 (Slide) May I have the next slide,
7 please?

8 In 1983, Yorkshire TV broadcast a
9 documentary indicating excessive mortality from
10 leukemia among young persons who lived near the
11 Sellafield Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant in
12 Cumberland. This aroused considerable interest and
13 the Ministry of Health asked a committee chaired by
14 Sir Douglas Black to investigate the situation. This
15 shows the essence of what the Black Committee reported
16 in the next year, 1984. There were only a few cases
17 of leukemia in young persons, but the number was
18 clearly excessive. There were eight cases, while only
19 2.3 would have been expected at national mortality
20 rates, so there were 3.5 times as many deaths from
21 leukemia as would have occurred had the leukemia rate
22 been the same as in England and Wales. Other forms of
23 cancer, however, were not increased.

24 In 1985, the government established a
25 committee on the medical aspects of radiation in the

1 environment called COMARE to investigate further, and
2 in 1986 the scope of the investigation was broadened
3 when the Scottish authorities reported on the
4 incidence of leukemia in the neighborhood of the
5 Dounreay Reprocessing Plant, a facility that had much
6 lower radiation emissions than Sellafield.

7 (Slide) May I have the next slide,
8 please?

9 Near Dounreay there were only four cases
10 of childhood leukemia, but the population is not large
11 and at national rates less than half a case would be
12 expected. The number of cases was nearly 12 times the
13 number expected. These reports have stimulated a
14 large number of studies of individual nuclear plants
15 in Britain and the U.S.

16 (Slide) Next slide, please.

17 In particular, COMARE investigated the
18 situation near the Aldermaston and Burghfield military
19 weapons plants and found some increases in childhood
20 cancer, not only leukemia but other forms of cancer
21 also, unlike the situation around Sellafield where
22 childhood leukemia mortality was increased but not
23 deaths from other forms of cancer. The leukemia
24 increase was, however, much smaller than at the two
25 reprocessing plants.

1 The British Office of Population Census'
2 and Surveys then published a massive study of
3 populations near every nuclear facility in the United
4 Kingdom and this stimulated the National Cancer
5 Institute to mount a parallel study in the United
6 States making use of the county data that were
7 available, as Doctor Boice has told you.

8 (Slide) Next slide, please. What data
9 are available? Next slide, please.

10 The data available included counts of the
11 numbers of deaths each year in each county.
12 Population data, which are needed to calculate rates,
13 were also available.

14 (Slide) Next slide.

15 Although incidence data -- that is, the
16 number of cases of disease diagnosed -- are very
17 desirable for research purposes, they existed only for
18 a few states and cities, while the mortality data were
19 available for every county in the U.S. for each year
20 from 1950 forward, classified by cause of death, age,
21 sex, and race. Also, the findings in the U.K. had
22 largely been based on mortality data.

23 (Slide) Next slide, please.

24 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Just out of
25 curiosity, is the incidence data collected at the

1 discretion of the states or why do we have it just for
2 some limited states here?

3 DOCTOR JABLON: Well, it's largely at the
4 discretion of the states. Some years ago, the
5 National Cancer Institute organized a program called
6 "Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results," or SEER
7 for short, and there are now ten SEER registries in
8 ten different states. Other states have started tumor
9 registries also that are not part of the SEER program.
10 Most of the registries now existent have started
11 relatively recently, so it's not easy to do a long-
12 term longitudinal study for those states. We could
13 for two states, as we shall see.

14 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: If you could, just
15 slide over in front of that mike so the people in the
16 back can hear you. Just speak in the box there.

17 DOCTOR JABLON: Is this better?

18 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: They're hard to
19 pick up.

20 DOCTOR JABLON: Okay.

21 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Can you hear back
22 there?

23 DOCTOR JABLON: I don't know which slide
24 we're on now. Okay. Well, which facilities.

25 (Slide) May I have the next, please? No.

1 Back two. Well, all right.

2 Though incidence data -- that is, the
3 number of cases of disease diagnosed -- are very
4 desirerable for research purposes, they existed only
5 for a few states and cities while the mortality data
6 were available for every county. Well, I guess we had
7 gone through that.

8 Every nuclear generating plant in the
9 United States that went into service before 1982 was
10 included in the survey, in addition to nine facilities
11 operated for the Department of Energy and one former
12 commercial reprocessing plant. The DOE plants include
13 reprocessing plants such as Hanford, and nuclear
14 weapons manufacturing plants analogous to Aldermaston
15 and Burghfield such as Rocky Flats, Fernald, and
16 others. Sellafield and Dounreay are both reprocessing
17 plants, so there was much interest in similar
18 facilities in this country.

19 Besides the reprocessing plants and other
20 Department of Energy facilities, 52 commercial nuclear
21 electric plants are included in the survey. So,
22 there's a total of 62 facilities. The nuclear
23 electric plants have been treated in three groups.

24 (Slide) Next slide, please.

25 The early plants, those that went into

1 service before 1970, generally had much lower power
2 levels than the later plants, but they have been
3 active long enough that if their emissions or other
4 characteristics were responsible for the induction of
5 leukemia or other cancer, the increase might be
6 detected in mortality data through 1984.

7 (Slide) Next slide, please.

8 Many more electric generating plants came
9 into service in the years 1970 to 1974. The minimum
10 time for the development of a radiation induced
11 leukemia is thought to be about two years. So, if
12 these plants are associated with excess deaths from
13 leukemia, that fact might possibly be detected from
14 mortality data through 1984. The elapsed time is
15 rather short, however, for detection of other forms of
16 radiation-induced cancer which generally take ten or
17 more years to develop.

18 (Slide) Next slide, please.

19 The last group of facilities, those that
20 started service in 1975 or later, conceivably could be
21 associated with detectable deaths from leukemia, but
22 other forms of cancer, if induced after plant start-
23 up, would not be reflected in mortality data through
24 1984, since less than ten years would have elapsed
25 since the earliest possible radiation exposure to the

1 neighboring population.

2 (Slide) Next slide, please.

3 There are 107 counties -- that is,
4 counties that either contain or are adjacent to one of
5 the facilities -- which account for 20 percent or more
6 of the area within ten miles of the facility.

7 (Slide) Next slide, please.

8 Three control or comparison counties were
9 chosen for each study county, attempting to match on
10 several characteristics that are important for
11 mortality rates. For purposes of analysis, data for
12 all of the study counties for a particular facility
13 were added together as were the data for the
14 comparison counties to create study areas and
15 corresponding comparison areas for that facility.

16 (Slide) Next slide.

17 Doctor Boice has shown you the totality of
18 study and comparison areas as shown here, and it's
19 plain that the counties in the West are often much
20 larger than are the Eastern counties.

21 (Slide) Next slide.

22 How are the data presented and analyzed?

23 (Slide) Next slide, please.

24 The data are presented as the number of
25 deaths, the expected number at concurrent rates for

1 the United States, and the ratio of the observed
2 number to the expected number.

3 (Slide) Next slide, please.

4 Expected numbers of deaths were calculated
5 taking account of age, sex, race, and year. Although
6 age was considered in five year groups when expected
7 values were calculated, for presentation the data have
8 been combined into five age classes.

9 (Slide) Next slide, please.

10 One to 10, 10 to 19, and so forth, plus
11 the all ages group.

12 (Slide) Next slide, please.

13 Standardized mortality ratios, or SMRs,
14 are simply the ratios of the observed number of deaths
15 to the number expected at U.S. death rates; while
16 standardized registration ratios, called SRRs, refer
17 to the numbers of cases of disease diagnosed rather
18 than deaths caused. They measure by what percent the
19 disease in question is increased or decreased over
20 national or other standard rates.

21 (Slide) Next slide, please.

22 The relative risk or, briefly, the RR,
23 measures the excess or deficit of a disease in one
24 group compared with another. An RR of 1.0 shows that
25 the amount of disease in the two groups is the same,

1 while an RR of 1.1, for example, would imply ten
2 percent more disease in one group than in the other,
3 while an RR of 0.9 would show ten percent less
4 disease.

5 In this survey, we compare the frequency
6 of disease in counties with nuclear facilities with
7 the frequency in control counties and compare the
8 amount of disease before a facility went into service
9 with the amount afterwards. All relative risks, when
10 the numbers were large enough to sustain the
11 calculation, were tested for what's called
12 "statistical significance" to determine whether or not
13 the difference could be the result of chance.

14 (Slide) Next slide, please.

15 Sixteen kinds of cancer have been examined
16 including leukemia, all other cancers combined, and
17 particular forms of cancer including breast cancer,
18 lung cancer, and other types known to be sensitive to
19 induction by radiation.

20 (Slide) Next slide, please.

21 Here's an extract from the data in the
22 report. These data are for mortality in children
23 below age ten for all facilities combined.

24 The first column shows the numbers of
25 deaths in the study area before plant start-up, and

1 the second column the corresponding SMR or
2 standardized mortality ratio. There were 2,020
3 leukemia deaths before start-up and the SMR was 1.07.
4 That is, the number of deaths was seven percent more
5 than the number expected at U.S. national death rates.

6 The next two columns show corresponding
7 data for the control areas also for the period before
8 plant start-up.

9 The next four columns show parallel data
10 for the period after start-up. And they show that
11 leukemia was one percent high compared with the U.S.
12 in the study areas, while other forms of cancer
13 mortality were three percent high, and so forth.

14 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: That chart is for
15 both DOE and NRC facilities?

16 DOCTOR JABLON: That's everything.

17 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Okay.

18 DOCTOR JABLON: The last two columns show
19 the same data for the control areas. In the report
20 itself, data are shown in the same format for all 16
21 kinds of cancer for each of the six age groups for
22 each individual facility and for various groupings of
23 facilities such as all plants other than electric
24 utilities, and so forth.

25 (Slide) Next slide, please.

Each table, like the preceding one, is paired with a table showing relative risks which compare the study areas with the corresponding control areas before start-up and after start-up. The relative risks also compare the study and control areas after start-up with themselves before. One can, therefore, not only compare the study and control areas after start-up, but see if the comparison changed after the plants went into operation and see what the time trends were in each group separately.

For leukemia, the relative risk was 1.08 for the study counties before start-up and only 1.03 afterwards. The relative risk 1.08 is marked by two asterisks, signifying that the relative risk was unlikely to arise by chance. That is, it's significantly elevated.

Also, before start-up, the relative risk for all cancer other than leukemia was significantly low, only 0.94. For leukemia, the relative risks comparing after start-up with before are 0.93 in the study areas and 0.95 in the control, so that in both the study and comparison areas the risk of death from childhood leukemia went down after plant start-up.

(Slide) Next slide, please.

A very large number of significance tests

1 have been made, more than shown here. Computers make
2 such wholesale testing possible, and I'm not sure that
3 it's necessarily a good thing. It must be remembered
4 that one test in 20 will turn out to be significant
5 purely as a consequence of random variation. So more
6 than 1,000 of these 25,000 tests will turn out to be
7 "significant." Further, a statistical test of
8 significance speaks only to the mathematical meaning
9 of a comparison and not about the biological
10 significance or relevance.

11 (Slide) Next slide, please.

12 The report is quite voluminous, as you
13 know. The tabulated data for all facilities combined
14 as well as certain groups of facilities such as DOE
15 plants, all electric generating plants, early and late
16 plants are included in the first volume. The second
17 and third volumes contain the detailed data concerning
18 individual facilities, and each has more than 700
19 pages. The data in volume III are shown in five year
20 periods, which permits an assessment of whether cancer
21 rates are increasing relative to the U.S., decreasing,
22 or not changing.

23 (Slide) Next slide.

24 What was found for childhood leukemia or
25 for other cancers?

(Slide) Next slide, please.

The table shown here concerns childhood leukemia, which some consider almost as a bell weather indicator of radiation carcinogenesis. Shown are the numbers of deaths in the study and control areas for the groups of facilities before plant start-up and after, and the relative risks both before and after start-up.

All of the relative risks before start-up are larger than 1.0, and three of them are statistically significant. The relative risks for after start-up are sometimes more than 1.0 and sometimes less, but are never significantly different from 1.0. It is presumably mere coincidence that the relative risks before start-up are in every case larger than those after start-up.

(Slide) Next slide, please.

These are the data for all cancer except leukemia for all the facilities for all of the age groups. The overall relative risks are 1.0 before start-up and 1.01 after. The largest relative risk after start-up is for the Department of Energy facilities, but the value is only 1.04 and is actually less than the value, 1.06, before start-up. The number of deaths included here is more than two

1 million, so that even trivial and probably meaningless
2 relative risks such as 1.02 for the later electric
3 plants, but before start-up, are statistically
4 significant.

5 (Slide) Next slide, please.

6 These are the summary relative risks
7 combining all facilities for leukemia and for other
8 cancers. For childhood leukemia, the relative risks
9 are larger than 1.0 both before and after start-up,
10 but actually a little larger before start-up than
11 after. Similarly, for all ages combined, the leukemia
12 relative risk went down after start-up to a value of
13 less than 1.0. For other cancers, the relative risks
14 for children were both less than 1.0, and for all ages
15 only 1.01 after start-up, a one percent increase.

16 (Slide) Next slide, please.

17 We also examined data on childhood
18 leukemia for every individual plant. This shows the
19 distribution of the ratios of the relative risks after
20 start-up to before. If there were increases in
21 childhood leukemia after start-up, the ratios for more
22 of the facilities would be larger than 1.0 and shifted
23 to the right. In fact, as can be seen, the
24 distribution is approximately symmetrical. And, in
25 fact, 17 of the ratios are less than 1.0 and only 15

1 larger.

2 (Slide) Next slide, please.

3 We have searched for every significant
4 statistical test of a relative risk of leukemia that
5 differed from 1.0 after start-up for any facility for
6 any age group. We found 18. Since there were 390
7 such tests in total. Nineteen and a half could have
8 been anticipated to be statistically significant as a
9 result of chance, so the actual number was very close
10 to the number that chance alone would have produced.

11 It's noteworthy that 14 of the significant
12 comparisons were for low relative risks, while only
13 four were high. Further, although the excesses in the
14 U.K. concerned childhood leukemia, only a single one
15 of the significant comparisons was for children under
16 age 10, and there were three significantly low
17 comparisons for children 10 to 19. The significantly
18 high value was found in the data on incidence for the
19 Millstone Nuclear Electric Plant in New London County,
20 Connecticut.

21 (Slide) Next slide, please.

22 Data on cancer incidence were available
23 from two states, Iowa and Connecticut, for the study
24 and comparison counties for four commercial nuclear
25 electric generating stations. In view of the British

1 reports, we were especially interested in leukemia in
2 young children.

3 These are leukemia incidence data for
4 children under age 10 in the study areas in
5 Connecticut and Iowa. Adding together the
6 observations for the four facilities, the standardized
7 registration ratios are: 1.36, which is significantly
8 high, after start-up; and 1.13, not significantly
9 high, before start-up.

10 For individual plants, the numbers for
11 Fort Calhoun are too small to be meaningful. For
12 neither Duane Arnold nor Haddam Neck was the relative
13 risk after start-up significantly elevated.

14 For Millstone in New London County,
15 however, the SRR after start-up was significantly
16 high, 1.55, compared with only 1.19 before start-up.
17 The ratio for mortality was a little smaller than the
18 incidence ratio, 1.45 compared with 1.55. The
19 mortality ratio was not significantly high. There
20 were only 17 deaths, however, in contrast with 44
21 incident cases.

22 The raised SRR near Millstone may simply
23 be a chance finding, or some other characteristic of
24 New London County may be responsible. The SRR was
25 somewhat high even before start-up. In any case, the

1 doses to persons in the area from radioactive
2 emissions from Millstone have been reported to be less
3 than three percent of the doses from natural
4 background, at a maximum, to any person.

5 The Connecticut Department of Health
6 Services in 1987 reported on a study of cancer rates
7 in relation to the Haddam Neck and Millstone power
8 plants and reported no association between leukemia
9 rates or rates for other cancers in proximity to those
10 plants.

11 I should interject at this point that less
12 than a week ago we learned that in 1972 a report on a
13 "leukemia cluster" in the town of Waterford was
14 investigated by CDC. Waterford is, as you know, the
15 town in which Millstone is located. In 1972 there
16 were, I think it was, 11 cases of leukemia and
17 lymphoma compared with an expected number of something
18 like a quarter of that. That was a significant
19 elevation.

20 One of the hypotheses was that it was
21 somehow related to Millstone, but there was no -- on
22 looking at the exact geographic location of these
23 persons, no relationship could be found. In any case,
24 Millstone only went into service in 1972, if I'm not
25 mistaken, so there certainly would not have been time

1 for Millstone to have caused excess cases of leukemia
2 before it went on-line.

3 It's interesting that the excesses of
4 childhood leukemia in the county -- I don't have data
5 for Waterford, but in the county of New London -- have
6 continued to be high. So presumably something is
7 causing childhood leukemia in New London County. What
8 it is we don't know, but it seems unlikely that it's
9 related to the operation of Millstone.

10 In summary, there's little indication of
11 an increase in risk in the study counties after the
12 facilities went into service. Our advisory committee,
13 in fact, concluded that "even the highest relative
14 risks for individual facilities were compatible with
15 the general level of variation seen."

16 (Slide) Next slide, please.

17 What are the limitations and strengths of
18 the survey? There are both.

19 (Slide) Next slide.

20 First, the limitations. So many
21 comparisons have been made that some significant
22 differences would result from chance. For leukemia
23 after start-up, there were 390 comparisons in the
24 different study areas and age groups. Just over 19 of
25 the 366 of the 390 comparisons could be expected to

1 have probabilities below 0.05, and the number actually
2 was 18.

3 The study is based upon counties, some of
4 which are very large and contain large cities far
5 distant from the facility. For example, San Onofre,
6 in San Diego County, California, and Turkey Point in
7 Dade County, Florida.

8 (Slide) Next slide, please.

9 Many of the facilities began operations
10 only in recent years and not enough time may have
11 passed to permit the detection of any cancers that may
12 have been associated with their operations.

13 For most of the facilities studied, only
14 mortality data were available. Incidence data, which
15 are needed for the study of thyroid cancer and which
16 are highly desirable for childhood leukemia and female
17 breast cancer, were available for only four
18 facilities.

19 There are, however, also some considerable
20 strengths.

21 (Slide) Next slide.

22 It was possible to examine data for each
23 study area over a span of 35 years, which in most
24 instances allowed for comparison between cancer risks
25 before and after nuclear facilities began operation.

1 (Slide) Next slide, please.

2 The very large number of facilities in the
3 United States provided ample opportunity for the
4 expression of risk. There were more than 35,000
5 deaths from leukemia and half a million deaths from
6 other cancers in the study areas after plant start-up.

7 (Slide) Next slide, please.

8 And, as Doctor Boice has mentioned, the
9 study of county data has in previous studies
10 successfully identified lung cancer risks associated
11 with asbestos exposures in shipyards and with
12 arsenical air pollution from the smelting of non-
13 ferrous ores.

14 (Slide) Next slide, please.

15 What are the final conclusions, the bottom
16 line?

17 (Slide) Next slide, please.

18 No evidence was found that operations at
19 any of the nuclear facilities studied caused excess
20 deaths from childhood leukemia or from other cancers
21 in the counties in which they are located. The
22 increases in childhood leukemia seen in the United
23 Kingdom occurred near reprocessing and weapons plants.
24 No parallel increases near such plants are apparent in
25 the United States.

1 The study does provide general background
2 information that can help to guide any future studies
3 around nuclear facilities.

4 Doctor Boice will close the session.

5 DOCTOR BOICE: Yes. I thought it might be
6 informative to the Commission to hear what our
7 advisory committee concluded with regard to the study
8 and also what their recommendations were.

9 (Slide) Could I have the first slide,
10 next slide?

11 Once again, there were seven eminent
12 scientists who served on our committee. They were
13 expert in radiation carcinogenesis and other relevant
14 areas. They met three times to provide advice and
15 guidance. They were extremely helpful and their
16 consensus statement was also published in the volumes
17 available from GPO.

18 (Slide) Go to the next slide, please.

19 "The Committee concludes that the survey
20 has produced no evidence that an excess occurrence of
21 cancer has resulted from living near nuclear
22 facilities. Further, measurements of radioactive
23 releases from nuclear facilities indicate that the
24 dose from routine operations is generally much below
25 natural background radiation, and hence may be

1 unlikely to produce observable effects on the health
2 of surrounding populations."

3 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

4 They go on to state, "however, there have
5 been releases from some facilities, such as at
6 Hanford, that were high, and there continues to be
7 widespread public and scientific concern, in part
8 raised by the unexpected findings in the United
9 Kingdom that have not yet been fully explained.
10 Consideration should be given, therefore, to further
11 investigations and monitoring, including attention to
12 the following points."

13 (Slide) Could I have the next slide?

14 These are the Committee's considerations
15 for further study.

16 Consider surveys of smaller population
17 groups, such as census tracts. The Department of
18 Energy with investigators at the University of
19 California at Berkeley have initiated such a study
20 around the DOE facilities and also nuclear power
21 plants. Departments of public health in Connecticut
22 and other states have also conducted surveys at the
23 town rather than the county level.

24 Continue monitoring of mortality rates.
25 This is something that we can do relatively easily and

1 which we will do periodically, perhaps every five
2 years.

3 Explore the use of cancer incidence data.
4 We were able to use several registries in the current
5 investigation, but in only two states. There are
6 other cancer registries in the United States and it
7 might be possible to expand the investigation
8 accordingly.

9 The Committee stated that case-control
10 studies in small areas around nuclear facilities are
11 potentially informative, but should be undertaken only
12 after careful consideration. Specific studies were
13 not recommended because of the overall lack of excess
14 cancer deaths around nuclear facilities and the lack
15 of consistency with the U.K. studies.

16 Once again, recall that in the United
17 Kingdom small clusters of childhood leukemia were
18 noted around nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and
19 weapons installations. The DOE facilities in the U.S.
20 were most similar to these installations, but
21 elevations in childhood leukemia were not observed.

22 Some additional types of studies, however,
23 perhaps based on linking rosters of records together,
24 might be feasible.

25 Consider replicating the United Kingdom

1 worker study of preconception effects that was
2 conducted around the Sellafield fuel reprocessing plant
3 In this regard, scientists at the Pacific Northwest
4 Laboratories in Washington State have initiated a
5 study around the Hanford site to learn whether
6 childhood leukemia could possibly be linked to any
7 occupational exposures of the parents. Also, the
8 National Cancer Institute is currently conducting a
9 large collaborative study of 2,000 children who
10 developed leukemia, which will evaluate the risk of
11 preconception radiation from diagnostic x-rays,
12 environmental exposures, and parental occupation.

13 And finally, cooperate with others
14 conducting similar research. We certainly believe
15 that this is important and we have attempted to keep
16 in contact with the Department of Energy
17 investigations, those being conducted by the Centers
18 for Disease control, and others.

19 Also, I should add that we have been
20 interested for several years in studying the workers
21 at nuclear power stations, and with the Nuclear
22 Regulatory Commission we have recommended changing the
23 requirements for reporting occupational doses so that
24 a registry of radiation workers might be created. I
25 understand that the proposed changes will be published

1 in the near future, but perhaps this volume in front
2 of me indicates that it has been published in the
3 *Federal Registry*.

4 (Slide) The next slide.

5 In conclusion, while the overall findings
6 are reassuring, it should be kept in mind that the
7 size of some of the counties may be too large to
8 detect risks that are present only in limited areas
9 around plants and that no study can in fact prove the
10 absence of an effect.

11 However, if any excess cancer risks due to
12 radiation pollution is present in counties with
13 nuclear facilities, the risk may just be too small to
14 be detected by the methods used. This study should
15 thus not be considered the definitive one, but rather
16 a first step in providing background information to
17 help guide further studies.

18 Thanks very much for your attention.
19 Seymour Jablon and I will be glad to address any
20 questions that you might have.

21 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Several questions.

22 You mentioned that around Sellafield they
23 found that occupational exposures might be the cause
24 of the cancer. What type of occupational exposure?
25 Did they find those? I assume that's industrial,

1 rather than radiological.

2 DOCTOR BOICE: What they did --

3 COMMISSIONER REMICK: It is radiological?

4 DOCTOR BOICE: It is radiological, yes.

5 COMMISSIONER REMICK: I see.

6 DOCTOR JABLON: They did a case controlled
7 study on the leukemias and found there were five
8 childhood leukemia deaths in the town of Seascale,
9 which is only about three kilometers from the
10 Sellafield plant. Four of the fathers were definitely
11 identified in the Sellafield work force, and the fifth
12 one probably was a Sellafield worker also although
13 notes could not be obtained for him.

14 The fathers of these cases, the four
15 fathers, had occupational doses exceeding ten rem, if
16 you'll allow me to use an antiquated term.

17 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I feel very
18 comfortable with it.

19 DOCTOR JABLON: Ten rem over their
20 lifetime work, and one rem presumably in the six
21 months prior to conception. Doctor Gardner, who did
22 the study, had a number of controls selected for each
23 case and in those four instances in every case the
24 dose to the father exceeded the dose to any of the
25 controls. Now, this created a lot of excitement in

1 the United Kingdom, of course, but there are problems.
2 There are problems.

3 The first problem, the first thing that
4 was mentioned was that no such excess related to
5 preconception irradiation had been seen in the
6 Japanese survivors. But that really is not a
7 pertinent observation, because, if you're talking
8 about only six months prior to conception, there were
9 very few children born in Hiroshima or Nagasaki that
10 had been conceived during that time whose fathers had
11 had any dose.

12 Studies are, as you can imagine,
13 continuing. A study will probably appear this fall, a
14 parallel around Dounreay where there's also an excess.
15 It's regarded as a hypothesis which has not been
16 proved, but which is kind of suggestive.

17 One of the problems is that one must
18 presume that not every worker at Sellafield does
19 exactly the same thing, that workers whose work imply
20 collecting large doses are doing different kinds of
21 work from other workers. There are a lot of chemical
22 processes that go on at Sellafield. It's conceivable
23 that these people are bringing something home on their
24 clothing. I don't know what it is, but we can be sure
25 that the British are going to investigate every

1 possible aspect of that problem.

2 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Thank you.

3 In several cases, you've indicated that
4 one of the limitations of the study and ways of
5 improving the study would be to have access to cancer
6 incidence information. To the best of my knowledge,
7 our health protection standards are based on cancer
8 mortality. Is there anything based on the study, to
9 your knowledge, which would indicate that we're not
10 being conservative enough by using cancer mortality in
11 contrast to cancer incidence or using both? Is there
12 anything to suggest that?

13 DOCTOR BOICE: Well, I think on the basis
14 of, you know, radiation effects, you would get a
15 fuller expression of any adverse effects if you had
16 cancer incidence, date of the occurrence of cases.
17 Unfortunately, this is just not readily available and
18 it's very difficult to obtain data on cancer incidence
19 in the United States or in any other country.

20 For some cancer sites such as thyroid
21 cancer, incidence data definitely would be preferred.
22 I'm not sure how much further you could express that.
23 If you were able to set recommendations based on
24 cancer incidence, that might be a more complete
25 picture.

1 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Let me follow-up on
2 that.

3 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Sure.

4 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: For the four sites
5 where you had cancer incidence data, did the analysis
6 of that information pretty much confirm what you would
7 have concluded just based upon cancer mortality data?

8 DOCTOR BOICE: I think that's true, that
9 the patterns were the same. You just get more cases.
10 The occurrence of cancer, there is more cases, so that
11 could lead to more significant findings or a clearer
12 picture of what the patterns might be. But in large
13 part, the mortality does pattern after the incidence
14 for most cancers.

15 Noted exceptions are thyroid cancer, which
16 has a great cure rate -- perhaps 90 to 95 percent of
17 all thyroid cancers are cured -- and now childhood
18 leukemia, in which great advances have been made now.
19 So there's an increased survival in those areas. And
20 there are a number of other cancers where incidence
21 would be preferred.

22 DOCTOR JABLON: I think the New London
23 situation shows what happens. Actually, the ratios
24 were very close for mortality or for cancer incidence,
25 but if one looked only at the mortality data, one

1 would shrug one's shoulders and say, "Well, it looks
2 like a chance blip." It was not "statistically
3 significant."

4 But we had 44 incident cases, as opposed
5 to only 17 cancer deaths, and those 44 cases were
6 significantly high, so that for those cancers which
7 have cure rates which are significant, like childhood
8 cancer now, like female breast cancer, like thyroid
9 cancer, all of which are radiosensitive cancers,
10 incidence data is very much to be desired, much more
11 sensitive.

12 COMMISSIONER REMICK: The TMI study, if I
13 recall, was based on cancer incidence. Is this the
14 type of study that you have in mind?

15 DOCTOR BOICE: No. That was -- as other
16 states and local communities have conducted some
17 surveys based on the hospitals and the towns and
18 closer geographic regions, they've -- they had to
19 collect the data themselves retrospectively for years.

20 In terms of looking at the United States
21 comprehensively for all nuclear sites, cancer
22 incidence data is not available. What is available,
23 what's reported and is available at the national level
24 are mortality data at the counties.

25 Even the Department of Energy, through the

1 University of California at Berkeley, they're going to
2 try to replicate our study but use census tracts, a
3 smaller geographical area. They're going to do it
4 from mortality. It's just so difficult. It doesn't
5 exist comprehensively for the entire United States.

6 And now, even in the United States today,
7 there are more cancer registries, but comprehensive
8 areas just aren't covered. The National Cancer
9 Institute cancer registries only cover ten percent of
10 the United States population and they began in 1973.

11 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Is there anything in
12 this study which would indicate a -- that you can
13 validate or refute the use of the linear hypothesis in
14 setting radiation protection standards?

15 DOCTOR BOICE: I don't think so.

16 DOCTOR JABLON: No.

17 DOCTOR BOICE: This is not the type of
18 study that would address the issue of low dose
19 radiation effects.

20 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Does the study show
21 us -- tell us anything more about the effects of low
22 levels of radiation?

23 DOCTOR JABLON: No. If you assume that
24 low levels cause harm proportional to the dose, one
25 would predict from the risk estimates at high levels

1 that you wouldn't be able to see it, and we didn't see
2 it. Now whether that validates it or not, I don't
3 know.

4 DOCTOR BOICE: I think it's important to
5 remember that one of the reasons why we started this
6 survey was because of the findings coming out of the
7 United Kingdom where they did a comprehensive
8 mortality survey around their facilities. And they
9 reported in a number of their instances that excess
10 childhood leukemia was occurring. We tried to
11 replicate that and did not find that in the United
12 States.

13 COMMISSIONER REMICK: I was just trying to
14 find if there were findings in the survey that weren't
15 in your conclusions. And certainly, these are some of
16 the ones we're interested in.

17 I have no further questions, but I want to
18 thank you for a very succinct and clear presentation
19 of quite an extensive survey. It's been very helpful.

20 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I was thinking, I
21 take it that childhood leukemia is quite radiation
22 specific. It's a good way to look at radiation-
23 induced cancers.

24 So, the question I had was would there be
25 any point in trying to extend this study to areas

1 around coal-fired fossil fuel plants, which tend to
2 emit about ten times the radiation of a typical
3 nuclear power plant? And there are a lot more of
4 them, so that you've got another point on that curve
5 because you're ten times up from the typical emissions
6 of a nuclear power plant. And of course, they've been
7 around for a longer time, so you have probably a lot
8 more data to go on and to look at childhood leukemia
9 in the counties surrounding coal-fired power plants.

10 DOCTOR BOICE: I think that's a good
11 point, and we have in fact been discussing that in the
12 last several weeks.

13 The National Cancer Institute has, in
14 fact, been using the mappings of cancer since the
15 1970s to try to get leads for cancer etiology and the
16 environmental factors that cause cancer in our
17 society. And we had county based mortality surveys
18 trying to link rates with non-ferrous smelters,
19 shipyards, and a lot of other chemical factories. And
20 we have, in fact, been discussing the possibility that
21 perhaps coal-burning plants or other fossil fuel
22 facilities might be a useful area to study and perhaps
23 provide leads to cancer elevations in various
24 counties.

25 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, I was just

1 thinking that you might be able to even more directly
2 connect it with radiation, because it's another source
3 of radiation that is about ten times higher than the
4 power plants that you're studying now, nuclear power
5 plants you're studying now. So if it's very radiation
6 specific, in a sense, so that the other emissions that
7 come out of the stack are not as important in inducing
8 childhood leukemia, then it might be a very, very
9 useful piece of additional data.

10 DOCTOR BOICE: Yes, thank you.

11 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: What do you see as a
12 follow-up to the Gardner study here? I mean, is
13 there-- here or elsewhere, is this going to be left as
14 a big unanswered question, you think, or do you think
15 there will be some way of --

16 DOCTOR BOICE: Well, I --

17 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: -- down this
18 question of hereditary effects of radiation?

19 DOCTOR BOICE: Certainly. The one plant
20 or facility in the United States that's most similar
21 to Sellafield is the Hanford plant, which started in
22 1943. And at this time, the Pacific Northwest
23 Laboratories, Batelle, has initiated a study to
24 replicate the Gardner findings. They're doing a
25 survey of childhood leukemia, lymphoma around the

1 plant area, and then they'll link that roster,
2 identify the parents and link the rosters to the
3 radiation workers at Hanford to see if they can, in
4 fact, here in the United States, if we can replicate
5 that finding.

6 It is a peculiar finding, you know,
7 because there's not evidence in genetics that leukemia
8 is a particular heritable disease. And the
9 geneticists and molecular biologists that have
10 reviewed the report, they question it based on what's
11 known about biology, that it would perhaps be peculiar
12 that leukemia itself would be passed on and not all
13 the other types of known genetic diseases such as
14 retinoblastoma and Wilm's Tumor or excesses of
15 congenital malformation, which have not been noted in
16 the Cumbria area. So I think people are looking at
17 alternative explanations in addition to preconception.

18 One of the other explanations that have
19 come from the United Kingdom was the response to a
20 virus in a viral infection. When you have a rural
21 community and populations are moving in because of a
22 large industrial complex and the local community
23 somehow does not have an immunity built up, they're
24 susceptible to a common infection and childhood
25 leukemia results. So there's activity in the United

1 Kingdom trying to evaluate that particular factor.

2 Also, chemical exposures is another
3 possibility, as Seymour mentioned. A number of these
4 people, although they did receive meaningful radiation
5 doses, over ten rem -- that's prior to conception -- I
6 think four of the five or five of the key nine were
7 analytical chemists and also were exposed to -- or
8 chemical engineers exposed to a lot of the chemical
9 processing that goes around with plutonium works.

10 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Is there any -- you
11 have such -- you have a fair amount of data. It's, I
12 guess, the largest study of its kind that's every been
13 conducted on this type. Can you look at any other
14 effects, such as the effect of, well, socioeconomic
15 effects such as nutrition and things like that? Is
16 that too low? Are there too few cases where you could
17 differentiate that way? Is that more or less what you
18 were saying in some of your recommendations, don't try
19 to differentiate below where you've done so far?

20 DOCTOR BOICE: I guess there are several
21 levels. If you're doing a comprehensive study, you
22 have to -- you know, covering all plants and the
23 entire United States -- you have to just work with the
24 data that you have at hand. And real specific data,
25 such as smoking characteristics, dietary factors,

1 these things that you would like to do in a more -- we
2 use the term "analytic" study, where you go into an
3 area and you ask the people, their spouses, what
4 factors-- what are their lifestyle factors, what are
5 their occupations, what are their other exposures --

6 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: You just don't have
7 any of that?

8 DOCTOR BOICE: It's not available. It's
9 just not available. There are, though, studies that
10 are trying to get that type of information now in the
11 United Kingdom and the United States.

12 The Centers for Disease Control is
13 supporting another study around the Hanford site,
14 because, as you're probably aware, during World War II
15 there was a rather massive release of radioactive
16 iodine. Radioactive iodine would have been
17 concentrated in the thyroid and that would be the
18 disease of interest, thyroid disorders. So, with the
19 Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, they're conducting a
20 real detailed study trying to find these people over
21 the last 50 years, 45 years, and then trying to get
22 detailed information on disease histories, as well as
23 other factors.

24 Several state governments are also
25 conducting more detailed studies around their sites.

1 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I'd just like to say
2 that it seems to me that you've handled this whole
3 thing in a very admirable way, because there was very,
4 very little leakage along the way of what your results
5 were going to come out to be, and I think that's
6 really the way it ought to be. Until it's out, it
7 shouldn't be out. And it seems as if it's a very
8 excellent study, that while it will never settle all
9 questions it's certainly a very important piece of
10 research in guiding our thinking on such matters.

11 What do you think will be the impact of
12 your study? It seems to me so far, other than a brief
13 flurry of press attention when the report was
14 released, it hasn't seemed to -- it doesn't seem to be
15 getting very much discussion, probably because it's
16 the wrong kind of result. We all like to discuss the
17 doomsday scenarios, but the opposite predictions don't
18 seem to excite people very much. What do you think
19 the impact will be of your study?

20 DOCTOR BOICE: Gosh, that's hard for me to
21 say. I think it's too early to tell. The study has
22 only been out for less than two weeks, so I think it's
23 hard to see how others will respond to it.

24 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Yes, but you know if
25 the results had been quite different it would have

1 been a bombshell. It would have been talked about on
2 radio, television time and time again. The fact that
3 the results are negative seems to totally dissipated
4 at least the media's interest in it.

5 DOCTOR BOICE: I think that's true in
6 general, of course. In most of the studies that we're
7 involved in in terms of epidemiology, whether it's
8 radiation or chemicals or occupation, there does seem
9 to be a lot more media or public interest when you
10 have a significant finding. I think that might just
11 be characteristic of our society.

12 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Oh, I think you had
13 a significant finding. It just wasn't a negative one.

14 DOCTOR BOICE: Right, sure.

15 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, I'd also like
16 to add my commendations to the very fine work that's
17 been done here.

18 DOCTOR BOICE: Thanks.

19 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Thank you.

20 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: I just have a
21 handful of questions here.

22 Doctor Jablon, I wasn't sure I understood
23 your explanation of the significance of statistical
24 significance. I take it, from your explanation, what
25 could be statistically insignificant in one case might

1 be statistically significant in another. Let's say
2 five percent in one case might be statistically
3 significant in one place but not another. Why is
4 that? Without getting into a detailed explanation of
5 how you calculate that, what is the explanation for
6 that?

7 DOCTOR JABLON: "Significance" is a bad
8 word. Statisticians, you know, took it over and it
9 has connotations. It's a purely mathematical term, as
10 it's used. It asks this question. You have a certain
11 number of deaths that you might have expected from
12 leukemia or something else, and there were a certain
13 number that you observed. And that, of course, is not
14 exactly the same. There's a certain amount of random
15 variation.

16 The question is, what is the probability
17 that a difference that large might have arisen by
18 chance? And if that probability is less than some
19 nominal amount, like five in a hundred or one in a
20 hundred, that's called "significant." But that's all
21 it means, that this is a difference which is
22 sufficiently large that random variation would have
23 produced it only five times in a hundred. But if
24 you've done 25 thousand tests, you know, you're going
25 to get a fair number of them.

1 Now what determines whether it's
2 significant? It's a product of two things. First,
3 how big is the difference? If you've observed two
4 cases and you expected one, that's a relative risk or
5 an SMR of 2.0, but it's not significant because if you
6 expect one you could easily get two. But if your
7 expectation was 100 and you actually observe 200, boy,
8 that would be very significant. So there are formulas
9 for calculating what is the probability that this
10 would have arisen by chance, and that's what it comes
11 to.

12 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: All right. A
13 couple of other quick questions. The Gardner study
14 that you referred to, is that the only study that has
15 reached conclusions of that nature on preconception
16 effects? Are there any others that have reached
17 similar conclusions?

18 DOCTOR JABLON: I'm not aware of any
19 others. Well, there have been others. The Tristate
20 Leukemia Study, which was done a considerable number
21 of years ago, found some excesses of, I guess,
22 preconception irradiation to the parents. I don't
23 think it was taken very seriously. Again, part of the
24 problem was that the data concerning parental
25 irradiation were a little on the soft side. They were

1 obtained by interview and they did some checking of
2 doctor's offices, but when you ask people about prior
3 radiological examinations you're likely to get some
4 very incomplete information. Sometimes people think
5 that they're being x-rayed when actually the procedure
6 was something else.

7 And I guess Alice Stewart's original study
8 in the 1957 publication on *The Oxford Survey of*
9 *Childhood Cancer*. She had a small excess. She had an
10 excess in a small number of cases of preconception
11 irradiation and she dismissed that as just one of
12 these chance things. She may have changed her mind
13 about that now. I don't know.

14 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Okay.

15 DOCTOR JABLON: There are a few little
16 indications.

17 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: One final question,
18 I guess. Doctor Hatch, of course, isn't here, but I
19 assume you've read the study that was done for the TMI
20 Public Health Fund. Is there anything between the two
21 studies that you detected constitute an inconsistency
22 or have they reached pretty much the same conclusions?

23 DOCTOR JABLON: I was very pleased when I
24 saw hers. You know, we couldn't find anything going
25 on around TMI and I was somewhat relieved that she

1 hadn't found much either.

2 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: It did strike me
3 that the different methodologies that were used to
4 reach the same conclusion confirmed the results.

5 DOCTOR JABLON: Right.

6 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Other questions?

7 Well, let me thank you for the
8 presentation this afternoon. I must say I found the
9 results quite interesting and the results of the study
10 somewhat reassuring.

11 As Commissioner Rogers indicated, I
12 suspect the debate on this subject will go on, but the
13 contribution which you've made and in particular I
14 guess the credibility that the National Cancer
15 Institute brings to this subject constitutes a real
16 service not just to the country as a whole but I think
17 to those of us who are interested in the subject on a
18 day to day basis and I'd like to thank you.

19 We stand adjourned.

20 (Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the hearing was
21 adjourned.)

22

23

24

25

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This is to certify that the attached events of a meeting
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TITLE OF MEETING: BRIEFING ON STUDIES OF CANCER IN POPULATIONS NEAR
NUCLEAR FACILITIES, INCLUDING THREE MILE ISLAND
PLACE OF MEETING: ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

DATE OF MEETING: SEPTEMBER 28, 1990

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**CANCER IN POPULATIONS
LIVING NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITIES**

NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE

NIH PUBL No. 90-874

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STUDY OVERVIEW

- INITIATED AFTER 1987 REPORTS FROM U.K.
- PROTOCOL REVIEWED AT 1988 SITE VISIT
- ADVISORY COMMITTEE MET 3 TIMES 1989-1990
- REPORT PUBLISHED 1990

NUCLEAR FACILITIES STUDIED

- 9 DOE INSTALLATIONS
- 1 COMMERCIAL FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT
- 52 COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

AREA	NUMBER FACILITIES	NUMBER COUNTIES	NUMBER CA DEATHS (MILLIONS)	NUMBER RESIDENTS (MILLIONS)
STUDY	62	107	0.9	18.7
CONTROL	0	292	1.8	33.0

"THE COMMITTEE CONCLUDES THAT THE SURVEY HAS PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT AN EXCESS OCCURRENCE OF CANCER HAS RESULTED FROM LIVING NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITIES. FURTHER, MEASUREMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES INDICATE THAT THE DOSE FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS IS GENERALLY MUCH BELOW NATURAL BACKGROUND RADIATION, AND HENCE MAY BE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE OBSERVABLE EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF SURROUNDING POPULATIONS."

"HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN RELEASES FROM SOME FACILITIES, SUCH AS AT HANFORD, THAT WERE HIGH, AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE WIDESPREAD PUBLIC AND SCIENTIFIC CONCERN, IN PART RAISED BY UNEXPECTED FINDINGS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXPLAINED FULLY. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN, THEREFORE, TO FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS AND MONITORING, INCLUDING ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS."

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

- SURVEYS OF SMALLER POPULATION GROUPS, e.g., CENSUS TRACTS
- CONTINUED MONITORING OF MORTALITY RATES
- EXPLORE USE OF CANCER INCIDENCE DATA
- USE CAUTION IN CONSIDERING CASE-CONTROL STUDIES
- CONSIDER REPLICATING U.K. WORKER STUDY OF PRECONCEPTION EFFECT
- COOPERATE WITH OTHERS CONDUCTING SIMILAR RESEARCH

CONCLUSIONS

- FINDINGS REASSURING, BUT
 - COUNTY SIZE LARGE
 - CAN NEVER PROVE ABSENCE OF EFFECT
- RISK MAY BE SMALL
- PROVIDES BASELINE DATA

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PROCESS OF INTERPRETATION?
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OF THE STUDY?
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DEATHS FROM CANCER AROUND SELLAFIELD

AGE 0-24, MILLOM RURAL DISTRICT, 1963-80

	OBSERVED NUMBER	EXPECTED NUMBER	RATIO O/E
LEUKEMIA	8	2.31	3.5 **
OTHER CANCER	5	5.03	1.0

** $p < 0.01$

(BLACK, 1984)

LEUKEMIA INCIDENCE AROUND DOUNREAY
AGE 0-14 <12.5 KM FROM DOUNREAY

PERIOD	LEUKEMIA CASES	OBS/EXP	P
1979-84	4	11.73	<0.001

(COMARE II, 1988)

CANCER INCIDENCE AGE 0-14 NEAR ALDERMASTON & BURGHFIELD
ELECTORAL WARDS <10 KM FROM AN ESTABLISHMENT

	OBSERVED NUMBER	EXPECTED NUMBER	RATIO O/E
LEUKEMIA	41	28.6	1.4*
OTHER CANCER	61	47.5	1.3*

* $p < 0.05$

(COMARE III, 1989)

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DATA AVAILABLE FOR COUNTIES

DEATHS: ANNUAL BY CAUSE, SEX, RACE, AGE

POPULATIONS: ESTIMATES BY YEAR, SEX, RACE, AGE

INCIDENT CANCERS: BY KIND OF CANCER, SEX, RACE, AGE
FOR COUNTIES IN CONNECTICUT AND IOWA

WHY MORTALITY?

- NATIONAL DATA ALREADY AVAILABLE IN NCI DATABANK, 1950-84
- DATA FOR EVERY COUNTY BY
 - YEAR
 - AGE
 - SEX
 - RACE
- METHODOLOGY SUCCESSFUL IN PAST

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES

	YEAR OPERATIONS BEGUN
HANFORD	1943
OAK RIDGE NAT. LAB.	1943
MOUND	1947
IDAHO NAT. ENG. LAB.	1949
PADUCAH	1950
SAVANNAH RIVER	1950
FERNALD	1951
PORTSMOUTH	1952
ROCKY FLATS	1953
NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES (COMMERCIAL REPROCESSING)	1966

ELECTRICITY-GENERATING PLANTS IN SERVICE BEFORE 1970

	YEAR COMMERCIAL POWER
SHIPPINGPORT/	1957
BEAVER VALLEY	1976
DRESDEN 1	1959
YANKEE ROWE	1960
BIG ROCK POINT	1962
HALLAM	1962
INDIAN POINT 1	1962
FERMI 1	1963
HUMBOLDT BAY	1963
PATHFINDER	1964
HADDAM NECK	1967
LA CROSSE	1967
SAN ONOFRE 1	1967
GINNA	1969
NINE MILE POINT	1969
OYSTER CREEK	1969

ELECTRICITY-GENERATING PLANTS IN SERVICE 1970-1974

	YEAR		YEAR
MILLSTONE	1970	BROWNS FERRY	1973
POINT BEACH/	1970	FORT CALHOUN	1973
KEWAUNEE	1974	OCONEE	1973
ROBINSON	1970	PRAIRIE ISLAND	1973
MONTICELLO	1971	ARKANSAS	1974
PALISADES	1971	CALVERT CLIFFS	1974
MAINE YANKEE	1972	COOPER STATION	1974
PILGRIM	1972	DUANE ARNOLD	1974
QUAD CITIES	1971	HATCH	1974
SURRY	1972	PEACH BOTTOM	1973
TURKEY POINT	1972	RANCHO SECO	1974
VERMONT YANKEE	1972	THREE MILE ISLAND	1974
ZION	1973		

ELECTRICITY-GENERATING PLANTS IN SERVICE 1975-1981

	YEAR COMMERCIAL POWER
BRUNSWICK	1975
COOK	1975
TROJAN	1975
FORT ST. VRAIN	1976
SALEM	1976
ST. LUCIE	1976
CRYSTAL RIVER	1977
DAVIS BESSE	1977
FARLEY	1977
NORTH ANNA	1978
SEQUOYAH	1980
MCGUIRE	1981

STUDY COUNTIES

107 COUNTIES THAT

(A) CONTAIN A NUCLEAR FACILITY (64), OR

(B) ARE ADJACENT TO A COUNTY WITH A FACILITY
AND ACCOUNT FOR >20% OF THE AREA WITHIN
10 MILES (43)

292 CONTROL COUNTIES


THREE SELECTED FOR EACH STUDY COUNTY

- (A) USUALLY SAME STATE
- (B) ALWAYS SAME REGION

MATCHED ON (1979 DATA)

- (A) MEAN FAMILY INCOME, NET MIGRATION RATE,
INFANT DEATH RATE, POPULATION (1980)
- (B) PERCENT OF POPULATION
WHITE, BLACK, HISPANIC, URBAN, RURAL FARM,
EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING, HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATE, OVER AGE 25

NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, COMMERCIAL AND DOE



KEY



COUNTIES WITH OR NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITIES

CONTROL COUNTIES

ALL OTHER COUNTIES

FIGURE 1

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FORM OF DATA PRESENTATION

OBSERVED DEATHS

NUMBER EXPECTED AT CONCURRENT
NATIONAL RATES

STANDARDIZED MORTALITY RATIO (SMR):
 $\text{NUMBER OBSERVED} / \text{NUMBER EXPECTED}$

EXPECTED VALUES CALCULATED FOR STUDY AND CONTROL
COUNTIES FROM U.S. RATES SPECIFIC FOR

AGE (5-YEAR GROUPS)

SEX

RACE (WHITE, NON-WHITE)

YEAR

**DATA STANDARDIZED FOR SEX AND RACE
SHOWN FOR EACH CANCER FOR AGES:**

UNDER 10

10-19

20-39

40-59

60 AND OVER

ALL AGES

$$\text{SMR: } \frac{\text{OBSERVED DEATHS}}{\text{NO. EXPECTED AT U.S. RATES}}$$

$$\text{SRR: } \frac{\text{OBSERVED CASES}}{\text{NO. EXPECTED AT STATE RATES}}$$

RELATIVE RISKS - RATIO OF SMRs

(A) STUDY VS. CONTROL - BEFORE STARTUP

STUDY VS. CONTROL - AFTER STARTUP

(B) STUDY COUNTY AFTER STARTUP VS. BEFORE STARTUP

CONTROL COUNTY AFTER STARTUP VS. BEFORE START

KINDS OF CANCER

16 CLASSES, INCLUDING LEUKEMIA, NON-LEUKEMIA
CANCER, LYMPHOMA, MULTIPLE MYELOMA, CANCER
OF THE BREAST, LUNG, STOMACH, COLON, BONE,
THYROID, BLADDER, LIVER, BRAIN

AGE AT DEATH: UNDER 10

ALL FACILITIES COMBINED

	BEFORE STARTUP				AFTER STARTUP			
	STUDY		CONTROL		STUDY		CONTROL	
	OBS	SMR	OBS	SMR	OBS	SMR	OBS	SMR
LEUKEMIA & ALEUKEMIA	2020	1.07	4251	0.99	1390	1.01	2572	0.97
ALL CANCER, EXCL LEUK	1969	0.99	4623	1.03	1717	1.03	3243	1.02
HODGKIN'S DISEASE	42	1.33	69	0.95	13	0.75	26	0.78
OTHER LYMPHOMA	266	0.99	584	0.96	217	1.13	397	1.08
.

AGE AT DEATH: UNDER 10

ALL FACILITIES COMBINED

RELATIVE RISKS

	STUDY VS. CONTROL		AFTER VS. BEFORE	
	BEFORE	AFTER	STUDY	CONTROL
LEUKEMIA & ALEUKEMIA	1.08**	1.03	0.93	0.95
ALL CANCER, EXCL LEUK	0.94*	0.99	1.05	0.96
HODGKIN'S DISEASE	1.41	0.90	0.94	0.99
OTHER LYMPHOMA	0.94	1.00	0.93	0.94
.

* : $0.01 < P \leq 0.05$

** : $0.001 < P \leq 0.01$

NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANCE TESTS ON RELATIVE RISKS

61 STUDY AREAS, TIMES

6 AGE GROUPS, TIMES

16 CANCER CLASSES, TIMES

4 COMPARISONS (STUDY VS. CONTROL,
AFTER VS. BEFORE)

23,424

CONTENTS OF REPORT

VOL 1: DESCRIPTION, DATA FOR GROUPS OF FACILITIES,
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

VOL 2: DATA FOR EACH FACILITY, BEFORE AND AFTER STARTUP

VOL 3: DATA FOR EACH FACILITY, BY 5 YEAR TIME PERIODS

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MORTALITY FROM LEUKEMIA, UNDER AGE 10, BY TYPE OF FACILITY

TYPE OF FACILITY	BEFORE STARTUP NUMBER OF DEATHS			AFTER STARTUP NUMBER OF DEATHS		
	STUDY	CONTROL	RR	STUDY	CONTROL	RR
DEPT. OF ENERGY	39	48	1.45	601	1009	1.06
ELECTRIC UTILITIES BEFORE 1970	593	1035	1.03	534	993	1.00
1970-1974	996	2383	1.09 [*]	227	482	1.06
1975-1981	392	785	1.11	28	88	0.82
TOTAL	1981	4203	1.08 [*]	789	1563	1.01
ALL FACILITIES	2020	4251	1.08 [*]	1390	2572	1.03

MORTALITY FROM ALL CANCER EXCEPT LEUKEMIA, ALL AGES, BY TYPE OF FACILITY

TYPE OF FACILITY	BEFORE STARTUP NUMBER OF DEATHS			AFTER STARTUP NUMBER OF DEATHS		
	STUDY	CONTROL	RR	STUDY	CONTROL	RR
DEPT. OF ENERGY	5780	8991	1.06	141635	247308	1.04
ELECTRIC UTILITIES						
BEFORE 1970	79902	157745	1.00	197158	364675	1.01
1970-1974	179208	471890	0.98*	139175	317206	0.98
1975-1981	69310	157884	1.02*	26325	68785	0.99
TOTAL	328420	787519	0.99	362658	750666	0.99
ALL FACILITIES	334200	796510	1.00	504293	997974	1.01


OVERALL FINDINGS

RELATIVE RISK

	BEFORE STARTUP	AFTER STARTUP
LEUKEMIA		
CHILDHOOD	1.08	1.03
ALL AGES	1.02	0.98
OTHER CANCER		
CHILDHOOD	0.94	0.99
ALL AGES	1.00	1.01

Distribution of RATIOS of Relative Risks (RR1 / RR2) of CHILDHOOD LEUKEMIA

$$\frac{RR1}{RR2} = \frac{\text{Study vs. Control County After Startup}}{\text{Study vs. Control County Before Startup}}$$



**FACILITIES WITH RELATIVE RISKS
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM 1.00
ALL LEUKEMIA, STUDY VS. CONTROL AFTER STARTUP**

FACILITY	AGE GROUP	RELATIVE RISK
		LARGER THAN 1.00
Millstone (Incidence)	<10	3.04
Savannah River	20-39	1.83
Prairie Island	40-59	2.41
Salem	40-59	1.45
		LESS THAN 1.00
San Onofre	10-19	0.75
Quad Cities	10-19	0.29
Vermont Yankee	10-19	0.09
Hanford	40-59	0.71
Mound	60+	0.92
Robinson	60+	0.64
Maine Yankee	60+	0.64
Turkey Point	60+	0.88
Brunswick	60+	0.15
Fernald	All	0.94
Humboldt Bay	All	0.47
Turkey Point	All	0.93
Pilgrim	All	0.87
Brunswick	All	0.51

INCIDENCE DATA

LEUKEMIA, UNDER 10 YR	BEFORE		AFTER	
	OBS	SRR	OBS	SRR
HADDAM NECK, CT (1967)	15	0.98	16	0.97
MILLSTONE, CT (1970)	49	1.19	44	1.55
FT. CALHOUN, NE (1973)	1	1.91	4	3.13
DUANE ARNOLD, IA (1974)	9	1.04	17	1.26
TOTAL	74	1.13	81	1.36

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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

1. SO MANY COMPARISONS HAVE BEEN MADE THAT SOME 'SIGNIFICANT' DIFFERENCES WILL RESULT FROM CHANCE. FOR LEUKEMIA AFTER STARTUP THERE ARE 61 STUDY AREAS AND 6 AGE GROUPINGS. JUST OVER 18 OF THE 366 COMPARISONS COULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE PROBABILITIES BELOW 0.05, AND THE NUMBER ACTUALLY WAS 18.
2. THE STUDY IS BASED UPON COUNTIES, SOME OF WHICH ARE VERY LARGE AND CONTAIN LARGE CITIES FAR DISTANT FROM THE FACILITY, e.g., SAN ONOFRE, IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA AND TURKEY POINT IN DADE COUNTY, FL.

3. MANY OF THE FACILITIES BEGAN OPERATIONS IN RECENT YEARS AND NOT ENOUGH TIME MAY HAVE PASSED TO ALLOW FOR THE DETECTION OF CANCERS ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR OPERATION.
4. FOR MOST OF THE FACILITIES STUDIED ONLY MORTALITY DATA WERE AVAILABLE; INCIDENCE DATA, NEEDED FOR THE STUDY OF THYROID CANCER AND HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR CANCERS SUCH AS THOSE OF THE FEMALE BREAST, WERE AVAILABLE FOR ONLY FOUR FACILITIES.

STRENGTHS

1. IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO EXAMINE DATA FOR EACH STUDY AREA OVER A SPAN OF 35 YEARS WHICH, IN MOST INSTANCES, ALLOWED FOR COMPARISON BETWEEN CANCER RISKS BEFORE AND AFTER NUCLEAR FACILITIES BEGAN . OPERATION.

2. THE VERY LARGE NUMBER OF FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES PROVIDED AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE EXPRESSION OF RISK; THERE WERE MORE THAN 35,000 DEATHS FROM LEUKEMIA AND HALF A MILLION DEATHS FROM OTHER CANCERS IN THE STUDY AREAS AFTER PLANT. STARTUP.

3. THE STUDY OF COUNTY DATA HAS, IN PREVIOUS STUDIES, SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFIED LUNG CANCER RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ASBESTOS EXPOSURES IN SHIPYARDS AND WITH ARSENICAL AIR POLLUTION FROM THE SMELTING OF NON-FERROUS ORES.

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CONCLUSIONS

NO EVIDENCE WAS FOUND THAT OPERATIONS AT ANY OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES STUDIED CAUSED EXCESS DEATHS FROM CHILDHOOD LEUKEMIA OR FROM OTHER CANCERS IN THE COUNTIES IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED. THE INCREASES IN CHILDHOOD LEUKEMIA SEEN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OCCURRED NEAR REPROCESSING AND WEAPONS PLANTS. NO PARALLEL INCREASES NEAR SUCH PLANTS ARE APPARENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

THIS STUDY PROVIDES GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION THAT CAN HELP TO GUIDE ANY FUTURE STUDIES AROUND NUCLEAR FACILITIES.