



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
**DESIGN-SPECIFIC REVIEW STANDARD
FOR NuScale SMR DESIGN**

7.0 APPENDIX B INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS - SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Introduction

The instrumentation and control (I&C) system architecture provides high-level definition of I&C systems, the assignment of I&C functions to these systems, and the communications between I&C systems. The implementation of the defense-in-depth concept for I&C is achieved mostly at the I&C architectural level. This section provides an approach to describe the I&C system architecture and identifies relevant information to assess the design's conformance to the defense-in-depth concept and the relevant regulations (e.g., Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Section 50.55a(h)). This guidance applies to microprocessor-based technology as well as other forms of complex logic such as programmable logic devices (e.g., Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)). This design-specific review standard (DSRS) uses the term software to refer to such technology and complex logic.

DSRS Chapter 7 sections on the fundamental design principles discuss more specific areas of staff review that take into account the overall I&C architecture. In addition, the actual system development process typically includes, in part, its development life-cycle and the development of system architecture descriptions. The application should contain sufficient information on architecture, whether or not a specific platform or technology has been selected, to support the staff's determination of reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety from the perspective of the fundamental design principles: independence, diversity and defense-in-depth (D3), redundancy, and predictability and repeatability.

Experience has shown that the review of an I&C system design that has a high degree of interconnectivity among computer-based equipment is quite challenging. Without the information related to the overall I&C system architecture, the review of the fundamental design principles may take on a more segmented review approach resulting in a less streamlined, more complicated, and more resource-intensive review effort.

Relevant Information to Support Consideration of I&C Architecture during Design Review

Section 4 of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. Standard 603-1991 requires, in part, that a specific basis be established for the design of each safety system, including all system functions necessary to fulfill the system's safety intent. The architecture description provides a representation of the I&C system's properties, elements, functions, and the relationship among them. The architectural description should also include the rationale, justification, or reasoning behind architecture choices, including potential consequences of such choices.

The reviewer should consider the I&C system overall architecture in concert with the sections relating to the fundamental design principles. In addition, the reviewer should consider other sections of the DSRS that discuss the I&C system design basis, the I&C system descriptions, and the I&C system functions for consistency and additional information.

The reviewer, using engineering judgment that is corroborated in the review of each of the sections of this chapter, should verify that the application includes sufficient information at the architectural level to support a more streamlined review.

The staff should review, as a minimum, the following information, which the application should include:

1. Description of the I&C system architecture. The architecture description should demonstrate that the architecture reflects the fundamental design principles of independence, redundancy, and D3, and supports predictability and repeatability. Regarding safety of the I&C system design, the application should provide sufficient information to demonstrate that the overall architecture proposed is sufficiently robust.
2. All I&C functions that are part of the design basis.
3. Diagrams of the overall architecture. These diagrams should illustrate the I&C system architecture principles and concepts (as addressed in Item 1 above). The staff review should ensure that sufficient detail is provided as follows:
 - A. Physical architectures to include
 - i. All of the safety systems and relevant control systems
 - ii. Connections between the above systems
 - iii. Identification of signal / data barrier devices
 - B. Functional block diagrams to include
 - i. Major components from sensor(s) to actuation device(s), including various channels / divisions used for signal / data processing, voting unit(s) and actuation devices
 - ii. Signal / data flow paths.
4. Description of systems necessary to support the defense-in-depth concept to be implemented for the plant, which provides layers of defensive capabilities to mitigate or prevent potential hazards, including the following:
 - A. The I&C systems, including their classification, technologies, boundaries, and interfaces with other systems.

- B. End-to-end signal flows and their descriptions (e.g., signal flow paths from sensor input through signal conditioning, data processing, voting, and actuation).
- C. Key functional blocks that make up the I&C architecture, through which the data (plant process information or command signals) are transmitted and their descriptions.
- D. Simplified logic diagrams.
- E. Signal processing block diagrams and their descriptions.
- F. When a vendor's design includes a prioritization scheme that is used to signal selections, the priority functions, diagrams, and their descriptions.
- G. Interfaces and comparisons of electrical and I&C diagrams.
- H. Specific constraints identified in the I&C design resulting from the general plant safety approach that could affect compliance with regulatory requirements (e.g., if plant system(s) specifically addressed in regulations or guidance are used in a different manner, or not used at all, in the reactor design due to the general plant safety approach, those differences and their impact on the overall I&C design should be identified).