


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MAY 11 2015

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

10 CFR 50.73

**SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388/2015-002-00
UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14
UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-22
PLA-7328**

**Docket Nos. 50-387
50-388**

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-388/2015-002-00. On March 13, 2015, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) experienced a loss of Secondary Containment. As a result, at 0919 hours, Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was entered for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Secondary Containment was subsequently recovered and the LCO was exited at 0930 hours on March 13, 2015. This LER is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), for an event or condition that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of Secondary Containment to control the release of radioactive material. This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on an SSES Engineering evaluation that concluded there was no loss of Secondary Containment's ability to fulfill its safety function.


There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.


J. A. Franke

Attachment: LER 50-388/2015-002-00

Copy: NRC Region I
Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. J. A. Whited, NRC Project Manager
Mr. L. J. Winker, PA DEP/BRP

NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104		EXPIRES: 01/31/2017			
		LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)							
1. FACILITY NAME Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2				2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000388		3. PAGE 1 of 3			
4. TITLE Secondary Containment Inoperability Due To Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1									
5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
03	13	2015	2015	- 002	00	05	11	2015	
			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED						
			FACILITY NAME Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1			DOCKET NUMBER 05000387			
			FACILITY NAME			DOCKET NUMBER 05000			
9. OPERATING MODE		11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)							
1		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
10. POWER LEVEL 100		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER									
LICENSEE CONTACT Brenda W. O'Rourke, Senior Engineer – Nuclear Regulatory Affairs						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (570) 542-1791			
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)						15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO						MONTH DAY YEAR			
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)									
<p>On March 13, 2015, at 0919 hours, Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1, Condition A, entry for failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 and Unit 2. The Reactor Building (RB) Zone 2 differential pressure fell below the TS limit of 0.25 inches water column (wc) vacuum, when an air handling plenum door was open for approximately one minute. The LCO was exited at 0930 hours when the differential pressure returned to 0.34 inches wc vacuum. On March 13, 2015, at 1256 hours, this condition was determined to be reportable as an 8 hour ENS (#50885) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. SSES has no redundant Secondary Containment system.</p> <p>The direct cause of the event was due to plant personnel holding the RB plenum door open for approximately one minute while performing radiation surveys.</p> <p>Key Completed Actions: 1) Signs were added to the affected Unit 1 and Unit 2 exhaust fan plenum doors warning of the Secondary Containment implications, and 2) Plant personnel were coached regarding the use of the RB plenum doors.</p> <p>Key Planned Action: Install signs on all major Reactor Building fan plenum doors to alert plant personnel of the Secondary Containment impacts.</p> <p>There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. An Engineering evaluation concluded that Secondary Containment could have performed its safety function of isolating as assumed in the SSES accident analysis and also of re-establishing 0.25 inches wc vacuum (i.e., drawdown time) within the assumed accident analysis time of 10 minutes.</p>									

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollections.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2	05000388	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 of 3
		2015	- 002	- 00	

NARRATIVE**CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT**

Unit 1 – Mode 1, 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

Unit 2 – Mode 1, 100 percent Rated Thermal Power

There were no systems, structures, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event and contributed to the event.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 13, 2015, at 0919 hours, Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1, Condition A, entry for failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 and Unit 2. The Reactor Building (RB) Zone 2 differential pressure fell below the TS limit of 0.25 inches water column (wc) vacuum when an air handling plenum door was opened for approximately one minute. TS 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was exited at 0930 hours when the differential pressure returned to 0.34 inches wc vacuum. On March 13, 2015, at 1256 hours, this condition was determined to be reportable as an 8 hour ENS (#50885) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. SSES has no redundant Secondary Containment system.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), this LER is being submitted for an event or condition that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of Secondary Containment to control the release of radioactive material.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The direct cause of the event was due to plant personnel holding the RB plenum door open for approximately one minute during the performance of radiation surveys.

The apparent causes of the event were due to: 1) an insufficient questioning attitude by plant personnel. Plenum doors are only intended to allow momentary passage. SSES's site generic plant access training instructs personnel not to prop open plant doors, and 2) the plenum access doors were not marked with signs that notified personnel of the potential impacts/consequences to Secondary Containment by opening the door.

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The actual consequence of this event was a degradation of the Secondary Containment vacuum which led to an unplanned entry into TS 3.6.4.1, Condition A, for Unit 1 and Unit 2. An Engineering evaluation was performed which concluded that Secondary Containment could have performed its safety function of isolating as assumed in the SSES accident analysis and also of re-establishing 0.25 inches wc vacuum (i.e., drawdown time) within the assumed accident analysis time of 10 minutes. Therefore, the safety function of the Secondary Containment boundary and Standby Gas Treatment systems were unaffected and remained operable during this event. As such, there were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2	05000388	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2015	-002	-00	

NARRATIVE

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (cont.)

Additionally, this event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the engineering evaluation that concluded there was no loss of Secondary Containment's ability to fulfill its safety function.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Key Completed Actions –

- Signs were added to the affected Unit 1 and Unit 2 exhaust fan plenum doors warning of the Secondary Containment implications.
- Plant personnel were coached regarding the use of the RB plenum doors.

Key Planned Action –

- Install signs on all major Reactor Building fan plenum doors to alert plant personnel of the Secondary Containment impacts.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

- LER 50-388/2014-001: Secondary Containment Personnel Airlock Doors Both Opened Resulting in Failure to meet TS 3.6.4.1
- LER 50-387(388)/2013-003-00: Loss of Secondary Containment
- LER 50-387(388)/2013-004-00: Loss of Secondary Containment Due to Differential Pressure Not Meeting Technical Specification 3.6.4.1
- LER 20-387(388)/2013-005-00: Loss of Secondary Containment