

C 05/19/78

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50-261

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DOCDATE: 05/15/78
DATE RCVD: 05/18/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO

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SUBJECT:

LTR 1 ENCL 1

FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-261/78-011) ON 04/14/78 CONCERNING
WHILE PERFORMING PERIODIC TEST 5.1 ON TAVG AND DELTA-T OVERTEMPERATURE AND
OVERPOWER PROTECTION, LOOP 3 DELTA-T OVERTEMPERATURE WOULD NOT TIRP UNDER
SIMULATED TRIP CONDITIONS ...W/ATT

PLANT NAME: H B ROBINSON - UNIT 2

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: *u*

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INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

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~~I & E**W/2 ENCL~~

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K SEYFRIT/IE**W/ENCL

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MIPC**W/3 ENCL

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BAER**W/ENCL

VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL

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EXTERNAL:

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ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

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DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45
SIZE: 1P+1P+2P

CONTROL NBR: 781390017

***** THE END *****



Carolina Power & Light Company
May 15, 1978

RECEIVED DISTRIBUTION
SERVICES UNIT
1978 MAY 18 AM 11 31
US NUCLEAR SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FILE: NG-3516 (R)

SERIAL: GD-78-1359

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 1217
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 78-011

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.2.b of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the attached Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July, 1977.

Yours very truly,

H. R. Banks
Manager
Nuclear Generation

DCS:tme*

Attachment

cc: Messrs. R. A. Hartfield
E. Volgenau

781390017

A002
S
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ S C H B R 2 ② 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 ③ 4 1 1 1 1 ④ ⑤
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ REPORT SOURCE L ⑥ 0 5 0 - 0 2 6 1 ⑦ 0 4 1 4 7 8 ⑧ 0 5 1 5 7 8 ⑨
7 8 9 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ While performing Periodic Test 5.1 on Tavg and Delta-T Overtemperature and Overpower Protection, it was found that Loop 3 Delta-T Overtemperature would not trip under simulated trip conditions. The instrument which generates the Loop 3 Overtemperature setpoint was found to have its gain switch in the "X10" position which is incorrect. The switch was returned to the "X1" position and the PT completed satisfactorily.

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ SYSTEM CODE 1 B ⑪ CAUSE CODE A ⑫ CAUSE SUBCODE X ⑬ COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U ⑭ COMP. SUBCODE Y ⑮ VALVE SUBCODE Z ⑯
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
⑦ ⑧ ⑨ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER ⑰ EVENT YEAR 7 8 ⑱ SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 1 ⑲ OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 ⑳ REPORT TYPE L ㉑ REVISION NO. 0 ㉒
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN ㉓ FUTURE ACTION ㉔ EFFECT ON PLANT ㉕ SHUTDOWN METHOD ㉖ HOURS ㉗ ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED ㉘ NPRD-4 FORM SUB. ㉙ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER ㉚ COMPONENT MANUFACTURER H 0 2 0 ㉛
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉜

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ For no apparent reason, the gain switch on the instrument, which generates the loop 3 Delta-T overtemperature setpoint, was left in the "X-10" position vice "X-1" position. This instrument is located in a locked cabinet with the key under the shift foremen's control. It is not known how or when it was moved. It was tested on March 31, 1978 satisfactorily.

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ FACILITY STATUS E ㉞ % POWER 0 0 0 ㉟ OTHER STATUS NA ㊱ METHOD OF DISCOVERY B ㊲ DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Periodic Test 5.1, Bi-weekly
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z ㊳ Z ㊴ AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA ㊵ LOCATION OF RELEASE NA ㊶
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 ㊷ TYPE Z ㊸ DESCRIPTION NA ㊹
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 ㊺ DESCRIPTION NA ㊻
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z ㊼ DESCRIPTION NA ㊽
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

⑦ ⑧ ⑨ PUBLICITY ISSUED N ㊾ DESCRIPTION NA ㊿
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

NAME OF PREPARER R. B. Starkey, Jr. PHONE: (803) 332-1351

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 78-11

1. REPORT NO: 50-261/78-11
- 2a. REPORT DATE: April 24, 1978
- 2b. OCCURRENCE DATE: April 14, 1978
3. FACILITY: H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2
Hartsville, South Carolina, 29550
4. IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 14, 1978, while performing the bi-weekly test on Tavg and Delta-T Overtemperature and Overpower Protection (PT-5.1), it was found that Loop 3 Delta-T Overtemperature would not trip under simulated trip conditions. Loops 1 and 2 tested satisfactorily. This is a reportable event in accordance with Technical Specification paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

5. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE:

The plant was at zero power with the reactor critical for physics testing following refueling.

6. DESCRIPTION OF THE OCCURRENCE:

On April 14, 1978, while the I and C technicians were performing a periodic test of reactor protection, it was found that Loop 3 Delta-T Overtemperature would not trip under simulated trip conditions. An investigation revealed that the gain switch on the instrument which generates the Loop 3 Delta-T Overtemperature setpoint had in some unknown manner been switched from the "Times One" position to the "Times Ten" position. The switch was returned to the correct position and the loop was tested satisfactorily.

7. DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The gain switch being in the incorrect position on the instrument which generates the Loop 3 Delta-T Overtemperature setpoint caused this setpoint value to remain too high for a bistable actuation even when simulated trip conditions were applied to the instrument loop. No reason for the mispositioning of the switch was determined. However, in reviewing this occurrence with the technicians performing this periodic test, it was determined that a test cable could have inadvertently come in contact with the switch causing its position to be changed. This could have occurred during removal of test leads following the March 31, 1978 calibration check.

8. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The misadjusted gain switch disabled the Loop 3 Delta-T Overtemperature trip. However, Loops 1 and 2 were tested satisfactorily. These overtemperature setpoints are on indicators and recorders on the control board and had the reactor been brought to power, this condition would have been obvious to the reactor operator. However, at the zero power condition, all the loop setpoints are at the full scale position.

9. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

This instrument is in a locked cabinet with the key under the control of the shift foreman. No change in this system is believed warranted at this time.

The occurrence will be reviewed with all personnel whose normal duties require their access to these control racks, to caution them to exercise care when setting up and moving equipment in and around an open rack.

10. FAILURE DATA:

This is the first occurrence of this nature.