Charles R. Pierce
Regulatory Affairs Director

Southern Nuclear
Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201

Tel 205.992.7872
Fax 205.992.7601

SOUTHERN COMPANY

August 15, 2014

Docket Nos.: 50-321
50-366

NL-14-1197

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to
Add a Critical Instrumentation Electrical Bus in LCO 3.8.7

References:

1. NRC Order EA-12-049, *Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events*, dated March 12, 2012.

2. Southern Nuclear Operating Company letter NL-13-0214, *Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant – Units 1 and 2, Southern Nuclear Operating Company's Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Bases External Events*, dated February 27, 2013.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting a request for an amendment to Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (HNP) Technical Specifications (TS) to add an electrical distribution bus to LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Operating."

The new electrical distribution system is necessary to ensure compliance with SNC's response to EA-12-049 (Reference 1). Instruments providing indication of containment parameters are needed throughout the beyond design basis external event, which assumes a total loss of onsite and offsite AC power. Since those instruments are currently powered from a safety related AC source, a new power supply will be installed which obtains its power from DC sources. The new critical instrumentation bus must be included in the Technical Specifications since the instruments being relocated to those buses also provide operators critical information during design basis events.

In its February 27, 2013 response (Reference 2) to the EA-12-049 Order, SNC committed to implementing the requirements of the order by the Spring 2016 refueling outage for Unit 1 and by December 31, 2016 for Unit 2. However, the last refueling outage for Unit 2 before December 31, 2016 is in the Spring of 2015. Consequently, not completing the design modification during that outage would require a forced outage on Unit 2 to meet the commitment date.

Accordingly, SNC requests review and approval of the amendment by January 15, 2015 with implementation prior to the end of the Spring 2015 refueling outage for Unit 2. The January date is necessary to allow for reviews and approvals of the design package. Since the Unit 1 modification will not be implemented until the Spring of 2016, SNC requests that implementation of the Unit 1 TS be deferred until start-up from the Spring 2016 refueling outage.

Enclosure 1 provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes including the no significant hazards evaluation, regulatory requirements, and environmental considerations.

Enclosure 2 provides the marked-up and clean typed Tech Spec pages.

This letter contains no NRC commitments.

If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924.

Mr. C.R. Pierce states he is the Regulatory Affairs Director of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

Respectfully submitted,

C. R. Pierce

C. R. Pierce
Regulatory Affairs Director

Sworn to me and subscribed to me this 15th day of August, 2014

Notary Public

My commission expires: 1-2-2018

CRP/OCV

Enclosures:
1. Description and Assessment of Change
2. Marked-up and Clean Typed Technical Specifications Changes

Attachments: 1. Critical Instrumentation Bus and Inverter
2. Existing AC Instrument Power Supply System

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO
Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer
Mr. D. R. Vineyard, Vice President – Hatch
Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President – Vogtle 1 & 2
Mr. B. L. Ivey, Vice President – Regulatory Affairs
Mr. T. E. Tynan, Vice President – Fleet Operations
Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President – Engineering
Mr. G. L. Johnson, Regulatory Affairs Manager – Hatch
RTYPE: CHA02.004

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator
Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Senior Project Manager – Hatch
Mr. D. H. Hardage, Senior Resident Inspector – Hatch

1.0 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

This evaluation supports a request to amend Plant Hatch Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5, Units 1 and 2 respectively. The proposed change would revise the Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to add two instrument buses to LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Operating." These buses are being added to support NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events." The new instrument buses will be installed on Unit 2 during the Spring 2015 refueling outage. The Unit 1 buses will be installed during the Spring 2016 refueling outage.

Consequently, SNC requests that, to allow for reviews and approvals of the Unit 2 design package the amendment be approved for Unit 2 by January 15, 2015.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Two new divisionally separated critical instrumentation buses (R25-S066 and S067) are being added to the Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 electrical distribution system to ensure power is available to critical control room instrumentation during a beyond design bases external event (BDBEE) (Re: EA-12-049). These new buses will provide power to instruments that are being re-located from the existing 120/208 V AC instrument buses (R25-S064 and S065) and the 120/208 V Essential Cabinets (R25-S036 and S037).

The re-location is necessary because AC power to the safety related 120 VAC Instrument and Essential AC cabinets will not be available during Phase I of a BDBEE. Consequently, critical containment instruments necessary for event mitigation would otherwise not be available during the BDBEE. These instruments are therefore being moved to a new instrument bus, such that primary power will be supplied via the existing safety related DC station service system.

The critical instruments being relocated to the new FLEX critical instrumentation bus include primary containment pressure, reactor and suppression pool water level, and drywell and suppression pool temperature indications. Additionally, the new instrument bus will be providing power and position indication to some Primary Containment Isolation Valves, as well as to the hardened vent valves, as required by the EA-13-109 Order.

The new divisionally separated critical instrumentation buses will each be supplied power via a safety related DC/AC inverter which in turn will receive its primary power from the safety related DC station service buses (R22-S016 and S017). (Attachment 1 provides an information drawing showing the latest Unit 2 design for the inverter and the critical instrumentation bus. The Unit 1 design will be similar). Alternate power to the new inverters will be provided by the existing essential AC cabinets, through a bypass switch internal to the inverter. Back-up power to the inverters will ensure that power to equipment supplied by the inverters is not lost upon DC system maintenance. A cross tie between divisions will also be added to provide further diversity in the power supplies.

One inverter and its critical instrumentation bus will be installed on each existing DC division to ensure access to essential instrumentation is available during a BDBEE.

Loads being moved to the new critical instrumentation buses from the existing buses are required for design basis events as well as BDBEEs. Accordingly, the existing instrument buses are included in the Hatch TS, LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Operating," which is applicable

in Modes 1, 2, and 3. It follows that the new critical instrumentation buses must also be included in the TS.

120/208 V AC essential cabinets 'A' and 'B', and 120/208 V AC instrument buses 'A' and 'B' are explicitly listed in LCO 3.8.7 under items a.3 and a.4, respectively. The proposed change will add the two new 120 V AC critical instrumentation buses 'A' and 'B' to the LCO 3.8.7 list, as provided in the enclosed TS mark-up under item 3.8.7.a.7. Should an individual new critical instrumentation bus become inoperable, Condition 3.8.7.C, "One or more (Unit 1[2] or swing bus) AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable" will be entered. This is the same Condition that is entered when an existing instrument bus or essential cabinet becomes inoperable.

No changes are necessary to the LCO 3.8.7 Bases.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The safety related AC secondary electrical distribution system begins with the two essential 600 V AC buses 'C' and 'D' (R23-S003 and S004). The 'A' and 'B' 120/208 V AC essential cabinets are powered from the C and D 600 V buses, respectively, through the 'B' and 'C' essential transformers. The existing 'A' and 'B' instrument buses are in turn powered from the essential cabinets. (Attachment 2 provides an informational drawing of the existing Unit 2 system).

The existing essential cabinets and instrument buses provide power to instruments supporting the Core Spray, Residual Heat Removal (RHR), High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), and Containment Systems.

As previously described, the essential cabinets and the instrument buses are among those distribution systems listed in LCO 3.8.7. The LCO 3.8.7 systems are designed to ensure the availability of the necessary power to Engineered Safety Features (ESF) so that fuel, reactor coolant system, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The Operability requirements on these buses ensures they are available during accident conditions in the event of an assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC electrical power sources, and a postulated worst case single failure.

The existing essential cabinets and instrument buses satisfy 10 CFR 50.36 criterion #3, and so will the new critical instrumentation buses.

The primary power to the new critical instrumentation buses will be supplied from the safety related station service DC system; the normal and accident station service DC loads will therefore increase. Accordingly, calculations have been performed to account for the additional loading. These calculations show, for Unit 1 and Unit 2, that the station service DC system (batteries and battery chargers) retains adequate capacity to supply normal and accident loads (References 6.1- 6.4). Calculations have also been performed to verify that adequate capacity exists for the extended loss of power scenario (References 6.5 – 6.8). Therefore, the FSAR design function of the DC system is not adversely affected by the increased loading on the DC system.

The area heat loads (Units 1 and 2 Control Building, elevation 130') were also evaluated for the addition of the inverters and the instrumentation panels. It was concluded that the additional

heat load coming from the new components would not adversely affect any FSAR design functions (Reference 6.9).

The AC inverters and the critical instrumentation buses will be installed safety related with the inverters receiving power from the safety related station service DC system and receiving alternate power from the safety related essential cabinets. Furthermore, the new equipment will be environmentally qualified to the appropriate IEEE standards. (References 6.10 – 6.15).

Therefore, highly reliable components will provide power to the instruments on the critical instrumentation bus. This is important since these instruments will serve the operator during design basis events as well as BDBEEs. Furthermore, the inverters and instrumentation buses will be divisionally separated to protect against single failures. Cross tie between divisions will be possible via two seismically mounted fused disconnect switches (Attachment 1). These switches will be normally open and will be operated only during an extended loss of offsite power BDBEE, concurrent with a single division failure. These switches will therefore be open during normal operation, and thus during the start of any design basis event.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Significant Hazards Consideration

Two new safety related AC instrument buses will be added to the Hatch electrical system distribution. Certain instruments will be re-located from existing safety related electrical buses to these new "critical instrumentation buses." The existing buses are listed in LCO 3.8.7 of the Hatch Units 1 and 2 TS and, since some of the instruments powered from these buses will be moved to the critical instrumentation buses, the new buses will be added to the list of the existing electrical buses in LCO 3.8.7.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below.

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified?

   Response: No

   These new critical instrumentation buses and their inverters are not intended for the prevention of any previously analyzed transient or accident. They are intended to provide power to instruments which may be necessary to aid the operator in the mitigation of a beyond design basis external event. The new critical instrumentation buses perform the same function as existing instrumentation buses except they will have the added capability of obtaining primary power from DC through their inverters connected to the station service DC power supplies.

   The new equipment (inverters and critical instrumentation bus) will be installed as safety related, seismically and environmentally qualified equipment, with the primary power coming from the safety related DC station service buses, and alternate power available from the safety related AC essential cabinets. Therefore, the instruments being moved to the critical instrumentation bus will have a highly reliable source of power.

Consequently, should the operator require the use of one of these instruments to aid in mitigating the consequences of a previously analyzed design basis event, it is highly likely that they will be available to him/her. It is therefore unlikely that the consequences of a previously evaluated accident would increase due to an inability to monitor a key containment parameter.

The TS are being revised to add these instrument buses to the LCO requirements for the electrical distribution buses. No other TS LCOs are changing, no Surveillance Requirements are changing, and no instrument setpoints are changing. In fact, this TS change does not reduce any requirements. All of the components required to be Operable by the TS before this revision request, will be required to be Operable following this change, as well as the new critical instrumentation bus. The TS requirements will therefore remain the same for the instruments being powered from the new critical instrumentation bus as well as for the instruments remaining on the AC instrument buses. In other words, the power supplies for these instruments will still be included in the TS as LCO requirements, as they were before the design change to add the critical instrumentation buses. The TS requirements will therefore continue to ensure that these indicators remain Operable during design basis events.

For the above reasons, revising the TS to include the new critical instrument buses in the electrical bus distribution Limiting Condition for Operation does not increase the probability, or consequences, of a previously analyzed event.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

   Response: No

   TS LCO 3.8.7 is being changed to add the new critical instrumentation bus. No new modes of operation or new failure modes result from the actual TS change to any system intended for the prevention of accidents.

   The design function of the instruments being moved from the existing instrument buses to the critical instrumentation buses will not change. Also, the operation of these instruments during any type of event is not changing. Only their power supply is being changed and thus no new modes of operation are created for these instruments. It is true that new components are being introduced, i.e., the inverters and instrumentation buses, thus introducing a potential failure that would not be present before the modification. However, their failure cannot cause a new or different type of accident. Furthermore the addition of these components will not affect any other system intended for the prevention of accidents.

   The design change does not impact the existing essential cabinets or instrument buses, except to remove some loads from the existing buses. Consequently, the design function, operation, maintenance, and testing of these existing power supplies will not change.

   Finally, the new inverters and the critical instrumentation buses are not potential accident initiators; they are not intended to prevent an accident in that they do not serve as a barrier to the release of radiation, either from the direct fission product boundary, or

from the containment. Rather, they are intended to power instruments which serve the operators in their attempt to mitigate the consequences of accidents. Therefore, failure of these power supplies, or failure of any instrument being powered from them, cannot create an accident.

For the above reasons, the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

   Response: No

   The new critical instrumentation buses being referenced in the TS will power several instruments currently being powered by the safety related instrument bus. The new inverters and critical instrumentation buses will also be safety related, as will their primary power sources, the DC station service buses. Additionally, the inverters are alternately powered from the safety related essential cabinets. Therefore, because of the reliability and diversity of power supplies, the margin of safety of a loss of power event to the relocated instruments is not significantly reduced.

   Loading calculations confirm that adequate design margin still exists for the DC station service buses with respect to their loading for design basis events, even with the additional loads of the added instruments (References 6.1 – 6.4).

   Additionally, area heat load calculations were performed for the 130 ft elevation of the Units 1 and 2 Control Buildings which account for the new inverters, instrumentation bus and supporting components. These calculations concluded that there are no adverse effects on the FSAR design functions (Reference 6.9).

   Adding the critical instrumentation buses to the TS ensures that the new power supplies to the safety related instruments have the same TS requirements as their previous power supply. Therefore, no TS requirements have been eliminated or reduced.

   For the above reasons, the margin of safety is not significantly reduced.

4.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

General Design Criterion 17 – Electric Power Systems

An onsite electric power system and an offsite power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure the following:

A. Specified acceptable fuel-design limits and design conditions of the RCPB are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences.

B. The core is cooled, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents ...

SNC Evaluation

Both onsite and offsite electric power systems are capable of providing a reliable source of power to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. Both of these sources have the capability to furnish required power for all postulated AOO and accident conditions.

This particular TS change involves the addition of a critical instrumentation electrical bus which will power some of the instruments currently powered by the safety related AC instrument bus. The new bus and its power supply will be safety related such that the instruments powered from the new bus will continue to have a reliable power supply, ensuring that they remain available to the operator to assess the condition of the plant, thus allowing him/her to provide whatever actions are required to protect the fission product barriers. Also, calculations demonstrate that the station service DC system is sized with adequate margin to respond to design basis events with the additional loading of the inverter and critical instrumentation buses.

General Design Criterion 18 – Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems

Electric Power Systems important to safety shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features, e.g., wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components. The systems shall be designed with a capability to periodically test the following:

- *Operability and functional performance of the system's components, such as onsite power sources, relays, switches, and buses.*

- *Operability of the systems as a whole and, under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operational sequence that brings the systems into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system and the transfer of power among the nuclear power unit, the offsite power system, and the onsite power system.*

SNC Evaluation

The new critical instrumentation buses will remain capable of being inspected and tested. They will, in fact, be subject to TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.7.1 which requires verifications of breaker alignments and voltages to the required electrical distribution systems, as is currently required of the essential cabinets and instrument buses.

4.3 Conclusions

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Calculation MC-H-14-0021, "Station Service Battery 1A, Sizing and Voltage Profile"
6.2 Calculation MC-H-14-0022, "Station Service Battery 1B, Sizing and Voltage Profile"
6.3 Calculation MC-H-13-0034 "Station Service Battery 2A, Sizing and Voltage Profile"
6.4 Calculation MC-H-13-0035 "Station Service Battery 2B, Sizing and Voltage Profile"
6.5 Calculation SENH-13-001, "Station Service Battery 1A, SBO Extended Coping Time Study"
6.6 Calculation SENH-13-002, "Station Service Battery 1B, SBO Extended Coping Time Study"
6.7 Calculation SENH-13-003, "Station Service Battery 2A, SBO Extended Coping Time Study"
6.8 Calculation SENH-13-004, Station Service Battery 2B, SBO Extended Coping Time Study"
6.9 Calculation MC-H-13-0043, "Heat Loads Generated From Electrical Equipment in Units 1 & 2 Control Building El. 130 During Unit 1 SBO and Unit 2 LOSP"
6.10 IEEE 323-1974, "Standards for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
6.11 IEEE 336-1985, "Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Equipment at Nuclear Facilities"
6.12 IEEE 344-1975, "Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
6.13 IEEE 383-1974, "Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
6.14 IEEE 650-2006, "IEEE Standard for Qualification of Class 1E Static Battery Chargers and Inverters for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
6.15 IEEE 741-1997, "Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class 1E Power Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Add a Critical Instrumentation Electrical Bus in LCO 3.8.7

Enclosure 2

Marked-up and Clean Typed Technical Specifications Changes

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating

LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:

1. 4160 V essential buses 1E, 1F, and 1G;
2. 600 V essential buses 1C and 1D;
3. 120/208 V essential cabinets 1A and 1B;
4. 120/208 V instrument buses 1A and 1B;
5. 125/250 V DC station service buses 1A and 1B;
6. DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and

b. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required Unit 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Restore required Unit 2 AC and DC subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.	7 days

(continued)

7. Critical Instrumentation Buses 1A and 1B

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating

LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:

1. 4160 V essential buses 2E, 2F, and 2G;
2. 600 V essential buses 2C and 2D;
3. 120/208 V essential cabinets 2A and 2B;
4. 120/208 V instrument buses 2A and 2B;
5. 125/250 V DC station service buses 2A and 2B;
6. DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and

b. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System"; LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System"; LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System"; and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required Unit 1 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Restore required Unit 1 AC and DC subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.	7 days

(continued)

7. Critical Instrumentation Buses 2A and 2B

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating

LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:

1. 4160 V essential buses 1E, 1F, and 1G;
2. 600 V essential buses 1C and 1D;
3. 120/208 V essential cabinets 1A and 1B;
4. 120/208 V instrument buses 1A and 1B;
5. 125/250 V DC station service buses 1A and 1B;
6. DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and
7. Critical Instrumentation Buses 1A and 1B

b. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required Unit 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Restore required Unit 2 AC and DC subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.	7 days

(continued)

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating

LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:

1. 4160 V essential buses 2E, 2F, and 2G;
2. 600 V essential buses 2C and 2D;
3. 120/208 V essential cabinets 2A and 2B;
4. 120/208 V instrument buses 2A and 2B;
5. 125/250 V DC station service buses 2A and 2B;
6. DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems; and
7. Critical Instrumentation Buses 2A and 2B

b. Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System"; LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System"; LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System"; and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required Unit 1 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Restore required Unit 1 AC and DC subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.	7 days

(continued)

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Add a Critical Instrumentation Electrical Bus in LCO 3.8.7

Attachment 1

Critical Instrumentation Bus and Inverter

Attachment 1
Critical Instrumentation Bus and Inverter

NOTES:

1. Normally open fused disconnect switch. Fuses shall never be in place during normal operation.
2. Fused disconnect switch operation is to be performed under administrative control and during extended SBO only.



* 2R25-S084
** 2R25-S085

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Add a Critical Instrumentation Electrical Bus in LCO 3.8.7

Attachment 2

Existing AC Instrument Power Supply System

ATTACHMENT 2

Existing AC Instrument Power Supply System