

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 6845

FILE: *Abn Oc*

FROM: Carolina Power & Light Company Raleigh, N.C. 27602 Mr. E.E. Utley			DATE OF DOC 8-31-73	DATE REC'D 9-10-73	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: J.F. O'Leary			ORIG 3 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS XXX	UNCLASS	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 40	DOCKET NO: 50-261			

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr adv of an abnormal occurrence.....concerning
a violation of High Steam Line Flow Setpoint.

ENCLOSURES:

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: H.B. Robinson Unit #2

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 9-11-73 JB

BUTLER(L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER(L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN(L) W/ Copies	REGAN(E) W/ Copies
CLARK(L) W/ Copies	STOLZ(L) W/ Copies	DICKER(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
GOLLER(L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO(L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL(L) W/ Copies	✓ SCHEMEL(L) W/ 7 Copies	YOUNGBLOOD(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ REG FILE AEC PDR ✓ OGC, ROOM P-506A ✓ MUNTZING/STAFF ✓ CASE GIAMBUSSO BOYD MOORE (L)(BWR) DEYOUNG(L)(PWR) ✓ SKOVHOLT (L) P. COLLINS	✓ TECH REVIEW ✓ HENDRIE SCHROEDER ✓ MACCARY ✓ KNIGHT ✓ PAWLICKI ✓ SHAO ✓ STELLO ✓ HOUSTON ✓ NOVAK ✓ ROSS ✓ IPPOLITO ✓ TEDESCO ✓ LONG ✓ LAINAS ✓ BENAROYA ✓ VOLIMER	DENTON GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER ENVIRO MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR HARLESS	✓ LIC ASST DIGGS (L) GEARIN (L) GOULBOURNE (L) LEE (L) MAIGRET (L) SERVICE (L) SHEPPARD (E) SMITH (L) ✓ TEETS (L) WADE (E) WILLIAMS (E) WILSON (L)	A/T IND BRAITMAN SALTZMAN PLANS MCDONALD DUBE INFO C. MILES ✓ B. King (RO)(OOE)
✓ REG OPR FILE & REGION(3) ✓ MORRIS ✓ STEELE				


EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

✓ 1 - LOCAL PDR <u>Hartville, S.C.</u> ✓ 1 - DTIE(ABERNATHY) ✓ 1 - NSIC(BUCHANAN) 1 - ASLB(YORE/SAYRE/ WOODARD/"H" ST. ✓ 16 - CYS ACRS XXXXXX Sent to Teets 9-11-73	(1)(2X10)-NATIONAL LAB'S 1-R.Schoonmaker, OC, GT, D-323 1-R. CATLIN, E-256-GT 1-CONSULTANT'S NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN 1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY 1-GERALD LELLOUCHE BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB 1-AGMED(WALTER KOESTER RM-C-427-GT 1-RD..MULLER..F-309 GT
--	---	---



Carolina Power & Light Company

August 31, 1973




File: NG 3514

Serial: NG-73-353

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

50-261

Dear Mr. O'Leary:



H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2
LICENSE NO. DPR-23

VIOLATION OF HIGH STEAM LINE FLOW SETPOINT

As a result of a letter from Westinghouse, a review was made to determine proper scaling of setpoints for all safeguards flow loop instrumentation which have control bistables located upstream of the square root converters. On August 24, 1973, it was determined that the setpoint for high steam line flow specified in Technical Specifications, Table 3.5-1, was incorrectly set above its limits. This condition is an abnormal occurrence as defined in Technical Specification 1.8.a, and is reportable to the AEC under Specification 6.6.2.a.

This incident was caused by incorrect initial setpoint calculations during plant startup. These setpoints were expressed in volts and consequently, were never recognized as incorrectly representing steam flow. PLS and Technical Specifications state that the steam flow setpoint be set linearly between a ΔP corresponding to 20% full steam flow at zero load and ΔP corresponding to 120% full steam flow at full load. The actual setting corresponded to approximately 69% full steam flow at zero load and 128% full steam flow at full load.

On August 24, 1973, the high steam line flow setpoints were reset to the correct values. A letter was written to Westinghouse requesting their evaluation of this incident including possible cause.

The high steam line flow limit is designed to protect against large steam line break accidents. For breaks in a location which would actuate the high steam line flow signals protective response could have been delayed causing a departure from the analysis of the FSAR. However, high steam flow protection is paralleled by coincident low pressurizer level and pressure, steam line differential pressure, and containment vessel pressure. The accident analysis also includes many conservative assumptions which would cause the analysis to be more severe than the actual case.

Mr. John F. O'Leary


- 2 -

August 31, 1973

The Plant Nuclear Safety Committee met in special session on August 24, 1973, to discuss this incident. The Committee recommended that the steam flow setpoints be reset and that Westinghouse be consulted for comments and evaluation.

Notification of the incident was made to Mr. Herb Whitener of DRO by telephone and to the Director of Reactor Licensing and the Director of Regulatory Operations, Region II, by telegraph on August 24, 1973.

Yours very truly,



E. E. Utley
Vice-President
Bulk Power Supply

ACT:mvp

cc: Messrs. C. D. Barham
N. B. Bessac
B. J. Furr
D. V. Menscer
N. C. Moseley
D. B. Waters