AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Carolina Power & Light & Power Co.<br>Raleigh, N.C. 27602<br>Mr. E.E. Utley | 5-20-74 | 5-28-74 | X | | | |

| TO: | ORIG | CC | OTHER | SENT AEC PDR | SENT LOCAL PDR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| J.F. O'Leary | 2 signed | | | XXX | XXX |

| CLASS | UNCLASS | PROP INFO | INPUT | NO CYS REC'D | DOCKET NO: |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | XXX | | | 40 | 50-261 |

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr trans the following.....

ENCLOSURES:
30 day written report for the abnormal occurrence concerning small fires at the H.B. Robinson Plant.....

ACKNOWLEDGED
(40 cys encl rec'd)
DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: H.B. Robinson

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 5-29-74 JB

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| BUTLER(L)<br>W/ Copies | SCHWENCER(L)<br>W/ Copies | ZIEMANN(L)<br>W/ Copies | REGAN(E)<br>W/ Copies |
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| PARR(L)<br>W/ Copies | VASSALLO(L)<br>W/ Copies | KNIGHTON(E)<br>W/ Copies | W/ Copies |
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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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| ✓REG FILE | TECH REVIEW | DENTON | | A/T IND |
| ✓AEC PDR | ✓HENDRIE | GRIMES | LIC ASST | BRAITMAN |
| ✓OGC, ROOM P-506A | SCHROEDER | GAMMILL | DIGGS (L) | SALTZMAN |
| ✓MUNTZING/STAFF | ✓MACCARY | KASTNER | GEARIN (L) | B. HURT |
| ✓CASE | ✓KNIGHT | BALLARD | GOULBOURNE (L) | PLANS |
| GIAMBUSSO | ✓PAWLICKI | SPANGLER | LEE (L) | MCDONALD |
| BOYD | ✓SHAO | | MAIGRET (L) | DUBE w/Input |
| MOORE (L)(BWR) | ✓STELLO | ENVIRO | REED (E) | |
| DEYOUNG(L)(PWR) | ✓HOUSTON | MULLER | SERVICE (L) | INFO |
| SKOVHOLT (L) | ✓NOVAK | DICKER | SHEPPARD (L) | C. MILES |
| ✓GOLLER(L) | ✓ROSS | KNIGHTON | SLATER (E) | ✓KLECKER |
| P. COLLINS | ✓IPPOLITO | YOUNGBLOOD | SMITH (L) | ✓EISENHUT |
| DENISE | ✓TEDESCO | REGAN | ✓TEETS (L) | |
| ✓REG OPR | ✓LONG | PROJECT LDR | WADE (E) | ✓AOR FILE |
| FILE & REGION(3) | ✓LAINAS | | WILLIAMS (E) | D. THOMPSON (2) |
| ✓MORRIS | ✓BENAROYA | HARLESS | WILSON (L) | |
| ✓Steele | ✓VOLLMER | | | |

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

RG

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✓1 - TIC (ABERNATHY)
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1 - ASLB
1 - P. R. DAVIS (AERojet NUCLEAR)
✓16 - CYS ACRS ~~HOLDING~~ Sent to Teets
5-29-74

(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LAB'S
1-ASLBP(E/W Bldg,Rm 529)
1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT
1-CONSULTANT'S
NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN
1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL
1-B & M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT

1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1-GERALD LELLOUCHE
BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB
1-AGMED(Ruth Gussman)
RM-B-127, GT.
1-RD..MULLER..F-309 GT

CP&L
Carolina Power & Light Company



May 20, 1974

File: NG-3513 and NG-3514 Serial: NG-74-629

50-261

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Sirs:

H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2
LICENSE DPR-23
UNUSUAL EVENTS - SMALL FIRES

In accordance with Section 6.6.2g of the Technical Specification, the attached unusual event report concerning fires at the H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2 Plant is submitted for your information. This report fulfills the requirements for a written report within thirty days of an unusual event.

Yours very truly,

E. E. Utley
Vice-President
Bulk Power Supply

DBW:mvp
Attachment

cc: Messrs. N. B. Bessac
B. J. Furr
W. E. Graham
D. V. Menscer
D. B. Waters
R. A. Watson

4677

336 Fayetteville Street • P. O. Box 1551 • Raleigh, N. C. 27602

# UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT

1. Event Dates: April 19, 1974, and April 26, 1974

2. Identification of Events:

   April 19: Fire in the concrete expansion joint filler between the RHR Pit Wall and the Auxiliary Building Wall.

   April 26: Fire in the concrete expansion joint filler between the Containment Vessel Pad and the floor of the Containment Purge Inlet Cubicle.

3. Conditions Prior to Events:

   In both cases the plant was operating at 100% power with all systems functioning normally.

4. Description of Events:

   April 19: At approximately 1800 smoke was reported in the north end of the pipe alley. The Fire Brigade immediately reported to the area. A fire was found in the pipe and cable penetration between the RHR Pit and the Auxiliary Building. Water and $CO_2$ extinguishers were used to quickly extinguish the fire. No apparent damage was sustained by any cables or pipes; however, one section of flexible conduit was charred. All systems associated with the cables and pipes in this area were checked and found to be operating normally.

   April 26: At 1745 a contract worker reported a fire in the Containment Purge Inlet Cubicle. The Fire Brigade reported to the area and found the fire to be located in the expansion joint separating the floor of the Containment Purge Inlet Cubicle and the Containment Vessel Pad. The fire was extinguished using $CO_2$ extinguishers and water. No damage was sustained to any structures or equipment.

5. Designation of Apparent Cause of the Events:

   April 19: It is speculated that construction workers working above the RHR Pit accidentally dropped either a cigarette butt or hot welding slag into the expansion joint between the RHR Pit and the Auxiliary Building. The hot material then ignited the filler material between the two walls which probably smoldered for several hours before the fire was discovered.

   April 26: Contract workers were welding inside the Containment Purge Inlet Cubicle. Some welding slag fell into the expansion joint between the cubicle floor and the Containment Vessel Pad. The slag ignited the filler material in the joint causing the fire.

6. Analysis of Events:

In both cases the cause of the fire was hot material igniting the filler material in the expansion joint between two concrete structures. This material was installed during construction. A concrete wall was poured, the filler was attached to the side of the wall, and the next concrete wall was poured sealing the filler between the two walls with only the top edge exposed. The exact composition of the filler material has not been determined yet, but is being investigated.

7. Corrective Action:

All supervisors and foremen have been contacted as to the potential hazard of this material. Safe welding and cutting procedures as well as the welding and cutting permit system will be strictly enforced. Investigation is continuing to determine the basic identity and fire resistance of the joint filler. In critical areas, the upper, exposed portion of this filler will be replaced with a nonflammable material.

8. Failure Data:

No previous events of this nature have been recorded.