NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NUMBER 50-261

FILE NUMBER INCIDENT REPORT

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

TO: Mr Moseley

FROM: Caroling Pwr & Light Co
Raleigh, NC
E E Utley

DATE OF DOCUMENT 4-16-76

DATE RECEIVED 4-19-76

☒ LETTER ☐ NOTORIZED
☐ ORIGINAL ☒ UNCLASSIFIED
☒ COPY

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED none signed

DESCRIPTION

Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO-76-7) on4-2-76 concerning failure to find current flow during periodic testing on boric acid heat tracing .....

PLANT NAME: Robinson #1

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

SAFETY	ENVIRO 4-20-76 ehf
BRANCH CHIEF: Reid	
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
LIC. ASST: Ingram	
W/1 CYS	
ACRS 16 CYS ~~HOLDING~~/SENT TO LA Ingram	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE		
NRC PDR		
I & E (2)		
MIPC (3)		
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO		
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CASE		
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EISENHUT		
BAER		
SHAO		
VOLLMER/BUNCH		
KREGER/J. COLLINS		

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: Hartsville, SC	
TIC	
NSIC	

CONTROL NUMBER 3786

April 16, 1976

File: NG-3513 (R)

Serial: NG-76-581



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 76-7

In accordance with Section 6.9.2.a of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the attached Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4.

Yours very truly,

E. E. Utley
Vice-President
Bulk Power Supply



CSB:mvp
Attachment

cc: Messrs. W. G. McDonald
E. Volgenan

3886

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 SCHBR2 (7–8 9–14)	00–00000–00 (15–25)	4 1 1 1 0 (26–30)	01 (31–32)

CON'T	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 (7–8)	(57–58)	T (59)	L (60)	05000261 (61–68)	040276 (69–74)	041676 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During performance of a Periodic Test on Boric Acid Heat Tracing, no current flow was
03 found in Primary Ckt 56. (Secondary was operating properly). Breakers were opened to
04 facilitate repair. This inadvertently deenergized ckts 25 and 55 creating a low
05 temp. condition in system. Low temp. was noted and breakers were reclosed. (76-7)
06

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	AA (10)	A (11)	CKTBRK (12–17)	W (43)	W120 (44–47)	Y (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Maintenance personnel inadvertently opened Heat Tracing Ckts. 25 and 55 while making
09 repairs on ckt. 56. A clearance for ckt. 56 was not obtained. Personnel will
10 receive instruction on clearance procedure.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	E (9)	100 (10–12)	NA (13–44)	A (45)	NA (46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z (9)	Z (10)	NA (11–44)	NA (45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000 (9–11)	Z (12)	NA (13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000 (9–11)	NA (12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z (9)	NA (10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18

19

NAME: J. B. McGirt PHONE: 803-332-1351

GPO 881-667

Supplementary Information For
Reportable Occurrence 76-7

1. Report No: 50-261/76-7

2a. Report Date: April 8, 1976

2b. Occurrence Date: April 2, 1976

3. Facility: H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2
Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

4. Identification of Occurrence

There was a loss of power to circuit #55 of the Boric Acid Heat Tracing System which caused a low temperature condition in the boric acid pump discharge piping to the Boric Acid blender. This low temperature condition constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 3.2.2.e and is a reportable occurrence in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(2).

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at 100% of rated power. Periodic Test (PT-7.3), "Boric Acid Heat Tracing Operability", had been performed. During the PT it was found that Boric Acid Heat Tracing circuit #56 primary had no current flow because of a burned open wire. Circuit #56 secondary was operating properly. Circuit #56 is in a portion of line from the boric acid blender to the charging pump suction lines. Circuit #56 primary had to be deenergized to safely repair the circuit.

6. Description of the Occurrence

At 1140 on April 2, 1976, in order to secure power to repair circuit #56 primary a breaker was opened in each of the two (Primary and Secondary) Heat Trace Power Panels. About 35 minutes later a low temperature alarm for circuit #55 was acknowledged at the Heat Tracing alarm panel. At that time it was realized that the breakers (opened for circuit #56) also supplied power to both primary and secondary of circuits #25 and 55. The power was immediately restored by closing the above breakers and circuit #55 returned to a greater than 145°F condition. Circuit #25 remained greater than 145°F the whole time. Circuit #25 is in a portion of line from the boric acid transfer pump discharge to the boric acid filter discharge. Circuit #55 is in a portion of line from the boric acid transfer pump discharge piping to the boric acid blender. Repairs on circuit #56 primary had not been completed prior to reclosure of the breakers. Circuit #56 primary was restored to service later in the day at 1950 hours.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Investigation of the occurrence revealed that there had been no clearance made on circuit #56 to facilitate the repair. Maintenance personnel opened the breakers in the Heat Trace Power Panels without the cognizance of operations personnel.

Plant policy requires that opening circuits at breakers always requires that the established clearance procedure be utilized and that Operations personnel shall have cognizance of the clearance. The cause of the occurrence was failure to adhere to Plant Policy in obtaining clearances.

8. Analysis of Occurrence

The occurrence could have been avoided if the clearance procedure for opening breakers had been utilized. In doing so, operations would have been known which breakers were opened and perhaps known that this would have opened circuits #25 and 55 primary and secondary.

9. Corrective Action

It has been determined that more training is required for the I and C Group regarding Plant Clearance procedures. Plant Management will administer training that it determines to be the most effective.

10. Failure Data

None.

CP&L
Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
Post Office Box 790
Hartsville, South Carolina

April 2, 1976

Robinson File No. 2-0-4-a-1

50-261/76-7

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. Donald Knuth, Director
Directorate of Regulatory
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Sirs:

In accordance with Section 6.6.2 of the Technical Specifications, the following Reportable Occurrence is reported:

On April 2, 1976, while performing PT-7.3, Boric Acid Heat Tracing, it was discovered that Circuit 56 (primary) had no current flow and was inoperative. Circuit 56 (secondary) was operating properly. This circuit covers a portion of the charging pumps suction lines.

Later on April 2, at 1140, in order to secure power to repair Circuit 56, a breaker was opened in each of the two Heat Trace Power Panels. About 35 minutes later due to a temperature alarm it was realized that these breakers also supplied both primary and secondary on Circuits 25 and 55, and power was immediately restored. These circuits cover portions of the boric acid pump discharge piping.

This constitutes an immediate Reportable Occurrence as defined in Technical Specifications 3.2.2.e and 6.9.2.a.(2). It was reported to the NRC, Atlanta and Mr. B. J. Furr of Carolina Power & Light Company on April 2, 1976.

Yours very truly,

Jack B. McGirt, Manager
H. B. Robinson SEG Plant

ACT:sla