

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO:

Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM:

Carolina Power & Light Company
Raleigh, North Carolina
H. R. Banks

DATE OF DOCUMENT

2/8/77

DATE RECEIVED

2/10/77

☒ LETTER☐ NOTORIZED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED

☐ ORIGINAL☒ UNCLASSIFIED☒ COPY

One signed copy

DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following:

PLANT NAME:

H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2

(1-P)

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-261/77-2) on
1/25/77 concerning the flow paths from the
boric acid storage tanks being made inoperable
while the reactor was in a hot shutdown
condition, to perform maintenance on two
Chemical and Volume Control System valves...

(3-P)

ACKNOWLEDGED
DO NOT REMOVENOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 2/10/77

RJL

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BRANCH CHIEF:	Reid
<input type="checkbox"/> W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LIC. ASST.:	Ingram
<input type="checkbox"/> W/ CYS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACRS 16 CYS HOLDING/SENT	CAT B (2/10/77)

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NRC PDR	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I & E (2)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MIPC	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HOUSTON	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOVAK/CHECK	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GRIMES	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CASE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BUTLER	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HANAUER	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TEDESCO/MACCARY	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EISENHUT	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BAER	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SHAO	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VOLLMER/BUNCH	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KREGER/J. COLLINS	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LPDR:Hartscille, S.C.	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TIC:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSIC:	

CONTROL NUMBER

1406

February 8, 1977


FILE: NG-3513 (R)

SERIAL: NG-77-134

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-2



In accordance with Section 6.9.2.a of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the attached Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4.

Yours very truly,


H. R. Banks

H. R. Banks
Manager
Nuclear Generation

WH:bb

Attachment

cc: Messrs. W. G. McDonald
E. Volgenau



Regulatory Docket File

1406

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 6

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME										LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE					EVENT TYPE		
01	S	C	H	B	R	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1			
7	8	9				14	15							25				26					30	31	32		

CATEGORY			REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER					EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE								
01	CONT			T	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	6	1	0	1	2	5	7	7	0	2	0	8	7	7
7	8		57	58	59	60	61					68	69					74	75					80	

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	With the reactor sub-critical in a hot shutdown condition, the flow paths from the																							80
03	boric acid storage tanks were made inoperable for the repair of two CVCS valves.																							80
04	Although a flow path from the RWST was available, this isolation is contrary to																							80
05	Technical Specifications for the stated plant condition. The valves were reassembled																							80
06	and the system was returned to service. (HBR2 RO 77-2)																							80

SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					VIOLATION	
07	P	C	A	V	A	L	V	E	X	A	G	2	5	7	Y			
7	8	9	10	11	12				17	43	44			47	48			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	Personnel failed to recognize the requirements of Technical Specification 3.2 as																							80
09	they apply to hot shutdown conditions. Upon identifying the requirements, the																							80
10	system was returned to service.																							80

FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
11	G	0	0	0	N/A	A	N/A														
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80												

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED			CONTENT OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			LOCATION OF RELEASE									
12	Z	Z																
7	8	9	10	11				44	45	80								

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER			TYPE		DESCRIPTION														
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A														
7	8	9	11	12	13	80													

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER			DESCRIPTION															
14	0	0	0	N/A														
7	8	9	11	12	80													

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																							80
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE			DESCRIPTION														
16	Z	N/A															
7	8	9	10	80													

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																							80
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	Supplemental Information Attached																							80
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19																								80
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NAME: Jack B. McGirt

PHONE: (803) 332-1351

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 77-2

1. REPORT NO: 50-261/77-2
- 2a. REPORT DATE: February 3, 1977
- 2b. OCCURENCE DATE: January 25, 1977
3. FACILITY: H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2
Hartsville, South Carolina
4. IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

The flow paths from the boric acid storage tank, were made inoperable, while the reactor was in a hot shutdown condition, to perform maintenance on two Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) valves. This is a violation of a limiting condition of operation as described in Plant Technical Specification 3.2.5 and constitutes a reportable occurrence in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.9.2.a.2.

5. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

The plant was in a hot shutdown condition with the reactor subcritical following a trip caused by the loss of an Instrument Bus.

6. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1200 on January 25, 1977, following a plant shutdown resulting from a reactor trip, it was decided to take advantage of the plant conditions to perform needed maintenance to valves CVC-348 and CVC-375. Upon review of Technical Specification 3.2.2, it was decided that the isolation of flow paths from the boric acid storage tanks, required for the maintenance, was permissible. Specifications 3.2.2 states that for critical operation, "valves shall be operable to the extent of establishing one flow path from the boric acid tanks and one flow path from the refueling water storage tank to the Reactor Coolant System". This specification was constructed to imply that the specified flow paths were required for critical operation and since the flow path from the RWST was maintained, maintenance to the valves was begun. Additional review of Section 3.2 revealed the previous oversight of Specification 3.2.5. This Specification further requires that "when the reactor is in the hot shutdown condition, the requirements of 3.2.2...shall be met". Following identification of the oversight, the valves were reassembled and the system was returned to service at approximately 1300 hours, January 25, 1977.

7. DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The violation of the limiting condition of operation resulted from personnel error in that all aspects of the affecting specification were not thoroughly reviewed prior to commencing the maintenance effort.

8. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The occurrence resulted in the temporary isolation of one of the two flow paths, to the Reactor Coolant System for injection of boric acid, required for hot shutdown condition. No personnel injuries, undue personnel exposures or releases of radioactivity resulted from this occurrence.

9. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediately following identification of the event, the boric acid transfer system was returned to service. Subsequent corrective action will include the cautioning of all operations personnel to insure applicable specifications are thoroughly understood prior to removing safety related equipment from service.

10. FAILURE DATA:

No incidents of this nature have previously occurred.

Central File
50-261

CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
Post Office Box 790
Hartsville, South Carolina 29552

January 26, 1977

77-2

Robinson File No. 2-0-4-a-1

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:


In accordance with section 6.9.2.a.2 of the Technical Specifications, the following Reportable Occurrence is submitted:

On January 25, 1977 following a plant trip, with the reactor subcritical the flow paths from the boric acid tanks were made inoperable for the repair of valves CVC 348 and CVC 373. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.2.2.d. This was reported to Mr. Harold Banks of Carolina Power and Light Company on January 25, 1977 and Mr. Bud Epps of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, January 26, 1977.

Yours very truly,


Jack B. McGirt, Manager
H. B. Robinson SEG Plant

REM/lid



Carolina Power & Light Company

February 8, 1977

FILE: NG-3513 (R)

SERIAL: NG-77-134

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-2

In accordance with Section 6.9.2.a of the Technical Specifications for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the attached Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4.

Yours very truly,

H. R. Banks
Manager
Nuclear Generation

WH:bb

Attachment

cc: Messrs. W. G. McDonald
E. Volgenau

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">01</div> S C H B R 2	LICENSE NUMBER <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">00-000000-00</div>	LICENSE TYPE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">41110</div>	EVENT TYPE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">01</div>
CATEGORY <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">01</div> CONT	REPORT TYPE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">T</div>	REPORT SOURCE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">L</div>	DOCKET NUMBER <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">050-0261</div>
EVENT DATE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">012577</div>	REPORT DATE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">020877</div>		

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 With the reactor sub-critical in a hot shutdown condition, the flow paths from the

03 boric acid storage tanks were made inoperable for the repair of two CVCS valves.

04 Although a flow path from the RWST was available, this isolation is contrary to

05 Technical Specifications for the stated plant condition. The valves were reassembled

06 and the system was returned to service. (HBR2 RO 77-2)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">07</div> P C	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">A</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">V A L V E X</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">A</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">G 2 5 7</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Y</div>

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Personnel failed to recognize the requirements of Technical Specification 3.2 as

09 they apply to hot shutdown conditions. Upon identifying the requirements, the

10 system was returned to service.

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">11</div> G	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">000</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">N/A</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">A</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">N/A</div>

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">12</div> Z	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Z</div>		

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">13</div> 000	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">Z</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">N/A</div>

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">14</div> 000	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">N/A</div>

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15

N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">16</div> Z	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">N/A</div>

PUBLICITY

17

N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 Supplemental Information Attached

19

NAME: Jack B. McGirt

PHONE: (803) 332-1351

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

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10. FAILURE DATA:

No incidents of this nature have previously occurred.

U.S.A.E.C.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.

FEB 9 1 45 PM '77