

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: **12298**

FILE: _____

FROM: Carolina Power & Light Co. Raleigh, N.C. E.E. Utely			DATE OF DOC 11-25-74	DATE REC'D 12-5-74	LTR xxxxx	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley			ORIG 3-signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR xxxxxxx SENT LOCAL PDR xxxxxxx		
CLASS	UNCLASS xxxxxxx	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 40		DOCKET NO: 50-261		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr Trans the Following:

ACKNOWLEDGED

PLANT NAME: **D. B. Robinson SEC Plant**

ENCLOSURES:

Abnormal Occurrence #74-26 on 11-15-74 concerning
Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater Valve VI-8B
operator to Body Capscrews.....

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

12-5-74

JGB

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (L) W/ Copies	STOLZ (L) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (L) W/ Copies
PARR (L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE AEC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A MUNTZING/STAFF CASE GIAMBUSSO BOYD MOORE (L) (BWR) DEYOUNG (L) (PWR) SKOVHOLT (L) GOLLER (L) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION 2 MORRIS STEELE	TECH REVIEW SCHROEDER MACCARY KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO STELLO HOUSTON NOVAK ROSS IPPOLITO TEDESCO LONG LAINAS BENAROYA VOLIMER	DENTON GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER ENVIRO MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR HARLESS	LIC ASST DIGGS (L) GEARIN (L) GOULBOURNE (L) KREUTZER (E) LEE (L) MAIGRET (L) REED (E) SERVICE (L) SHEPPARD (L) SLATER (E) SMITH (L) TEETS (L) WILLIAMS (E) WILSON (L)	A/T IND BRAITMAN SALTZMAN B. HURT PLANS MCDONALD CHAPMAN DUBE w/input E. COUPE D. THOMPSON (2) KLECKER EISENHUT
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

As H.

4 - LOCAL PDR Hartsville, S.C.	1 - NATIONAL LABS	1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10)	1 - ASLBP (E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1 - ASLB	1 - B&M SWINEBROAD, Rm E-201 GT	1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) Rm B-127 GT
1 - Newton Anderson	1 - CONSULTANTS	1 - R. D. MUELLER, Rm E-201 GT
1 - ACRS	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	

**SENT to Lic Asst
TEETS**



Carolina Power & Light Company

November 25, 1974

50 - 261


File: NG-3513 (R)
NG-3514 (R)

Regulatory

File Cy. Serial: NG-74-1419

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II, Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. Donald Knuth, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545




Dear Sirs:

H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2
LICENSE NO. DPR-23

FAILURE OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER VALVE VI-8B OPERATOR TO BODY CAPSCREWS


In accordance with 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications for H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2, the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report is submitted for your information. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within ten days of an Abnormal Occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in Regulatory Guideline 1.16, Revision 1.

Yours very truly,


E. E. Utley
Vice-President
Bulk Power Supply

DBW:mc
Attachment

cc: Messrs. N. B. Bessac
W. B. Howell
J. B. McGirt
D. V. Menscer
D. B. Waters



12298

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

1. Report No. 50-261/74-26
- 2a. Date November 21, 1974
- 2b. Occurrence Date November 15, 1974
3. Facility H. B. Robinson SEG Plant
Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

4. Identification of Occurrence

Motor driven valve operator separated from valve VI-8B, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump steam supply from "B" Steam Generator. This constitutes an abnormal occurrence as defined in Technical Specification paragraph 1.8.d.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was at 100% power with all conditions normal.

6. Description of Occurrence

On November 15, 1974, at 0755 hours "A" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump were satisfactorily tested in preparation for removing "B" Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from service for repair of its oil cooler. After "B" pump was removed from service, "A" was again tested satisfactorily, and then the steam driven pump was tested during which the RTGB valve indication for VI-8B, steam supply from "B" Steam Generator to the pump, cycled back and forth between "open" and "close."

VI-8B was physically examined and the motor operator was found lying on the floor grating beside the valve body. The valve was in the open position and the steam driven pump was running. "B" Auxiliary Pump was returned to service and "A" pump was again tested prior to removing the steam driven pump from service.

At 0835 hours, the steam driven pump was removed from service by manually tripping the pump, and valve VI-8B was cleared for repair. Both "A" and "B" Motor Driven Pumps were then satisfactorily tested to insure proper operation.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The failure of valve VI-8B was apparently due to stress in the tensile mode causing the four capscrews which hold the motor operator to the valve yoke to break. The motor operator, therefore, separated from the valve and prevented proper operation.

8. Analysis of Occurrence

There were no personal injuries nor was there a release of radioactive materials involved in the occurrence.

Failure of valve VI-8B could prevent a steam supply from "B" Steam Generator to the steam driven pump. Feedwater was, however, being supplied to all steam generators by the main feedwater pumps, and both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were satisfactorily tested prior to removing the steam driven pump from service. The steam driven pump was still capable of supplying water to all three steam generators since it could still receive a steam supply from "A" and "C" Steam Generators. Therefore, at no time was there more than one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable.

9. Corrective Action

The motor operator was inspected and no defective parts were found. The capscrews were examined and found to be a mild steel with a low tensile strength. Although these capscrews had the proper thread size and diameter, they did not have sufficient tensile strength to perform their intended function. They were, therefore, replaced with high tensile bolts, and the operator was reinstalled on the valve. The bolts were evenly torqued, and the valve was satisfactorily tested and returned to service at 1810 hours.

To insure that capscrews of this type are not installed on other motor operated valves, an examination of similar application on safety systems will be performed.

10. Failure Data

One previous malfunction of this type occurred on valve VI-8B on July 16, 1974.

Valve Type - Velan 2" stop valve, Model W8-284-B, motor operated.

Operator Type - Limitorque, Model SMB-000.