

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 1168

FILE:

FROM: Carolina Power & Light Raleigh, N. C. N.B. Bessac			DATE OF DOC 2-5-74	DATE REC'D 2-13-74	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: J. F. O'Leary			ORIG 3 signed	CC 37	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR XXX SENT LOCAL PDR XXX		
CLASS	UNCLASS	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 40		DOCKET NO: 50-261		
XXX								
DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following.... DO NOT REMOVE ACKNOWLEDGED PLANT NAME: H. B. ROBINSON UNIT #2				ENCLOSURES: Report: Abnormal Occurrence #50-261/74-3 of 1-25-74 in which an air line on the normal drain tank was broken causing the valve to fail to close (40 cys encl rec'd)				

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 2-13-74 GMC

BUTLER(L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER(L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN(L) W/ Copies	REGAN(E) W/ Copies
CLARK(L) W/ Copies	STOLZ(L) W/ Copies	DICKER(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
GOLLER(L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO(L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies
KNIEL(L) W/ Copies	SCHEMEL(L) W/ 7 Copies	YOUNGBLOOD(E) W/ Copies	W/ Copies

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<u>REG FILE</u> AEC PDR OGC, ROOM P-506A MUNTING/STAFF CASE Ltr GIAMBUSSO BOYD MOORE (L)(BWR) DEYOUNG(L)(PWR) SKOVHOLT (L) P. COLLINS DENISE REG OPR FILE & REGION(3) MORRIS STEELE	<u>TECH REVIEW</u> HENDRIE SCHROEDER MACCARY Ltr KNIGHT PAWLICKI SHAO STELLO Ltr HOUSTON NOVAK ROSS IPPOLITO TEDESCO Ltr LONG LAINAS BENAROYA VOLLMER	DENTON GRIMES GAMMILL KASTNER BALLARD SPANGLER ENVIRO MULLER DICKER KNIGHTON YOUNGBLOOD REGAN PROJECT LDR HARLESS	<u>LIC ASST</u> DIGGS (L) GEARIN (L) GOULBOURNE (L) LEE (L) MAIGRET (L) SERVICE (L) SHEPPARD (E) SMITH (L) TEETS (L) WADE (E) WILLIAMS (E) WILSON (L) S. REED (L)	<u>A/T IND</u> BRAITMAN SALTZMAN B. HURT <u>PLANS</u> MCDONALD DUBE w/Input <u>INFO</u> C. MILES B. KING E/W BUDG
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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

1 - LOCAL PDR HARTVILLE, SC	(1)(2)(10)-NATIONAL LAB'S	1-PDR-SAN/LA/NY
1 - DTIE(ABERNATHY)	1-ASLBP(E/W Bldg, Rm 529)	1-GERALD LELLOUCHE
1 - NSIC(BUCHANAN)	1-W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB
1 - ASLB(YORE/SAYRE/ WOODARD/"H" ST.	1-CONSULTANT'S	1-AGMED(Ruth Gussman)
16 - CYS ACRS ADL	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	RM-B-127, GT.
Sent to Lic Asst Teets 2-13-74	1-GERALD ULRIKSON...ORNL	1-RD..MULLER..F-309 GT



Carolina Power & Light Company

February 5, 1974

Regulatory

File Cy.

File: NG-3514

Serial: NG-74-149


Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

50 - 261

H. B. ROBINSON UNIT NO. 2
LICENSE DPR-23

POWER OPERATION WITH MORE THAN ONE INOPERABLE CONTROL ROD



In accordance with Section 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications for H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2, the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report is submitted for your information. This report fulfills the requirements for a written report within ten days of an abnormal occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in Regulatory Guideline 1.16.


Yours very truly,

N. B. Bessac

Manager
Nuclear Generation


DBW:mvp
Attachment

cc: Messrs. T. E. Bowman
B. J. Furr
W. B. Howell
D. V. Menscer
N. C. Moseley
E. E. Utley
D. B. Waters



1168

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT



1. Report No. 50-261/74-3
- 2a. Date January 29, 1974
- 2b. Occurrence Date January 25, 1974
3. Facility H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2
Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

4. Identification of Occurrence

Power operation with more than one inoperable control rod.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at about 97% reactor power at 655 MWe net. Maintenance personnel were repairing the "A" heater drain pump. The alternate heater drain tank level control valve was operating as required to maintain drain tank level.

6. Description of Occurrence

An air line on the normal drain tank level control valve (heater drain pump discharge) was broken causing the valve to fail closed. To compensate for this reduction in feedwater flow, the turbine load was manually run back to 542 MWe net. The air line was repaired within 10 minutes and load was being increased on the unit when control rod H-8 (Bank D, Group 2) was observed to be 50 steps below its bank at 1605 hours. Load increase was curtailed and preparations made to realign H-8 with its bank. When H-8 was stepped by itself an "Urgent Failure" alarm was received which would not reset from the RTGB. Instrumentation and control technicians were called in to evaluate the problem. An "Urgent Failure" was found on the LAC rod control cabinet. Further investigation revealed that the stationary gripper main power fuse for Control Bank C, Group 1 had blown. Since this failure inhibited normal operation of the control rods receiving power from this cabinet, more than one inoperable rod was present which violated Technical Specification 3.10.5.2. At this time the plant was at 88% power and boration was initiated to place the plant in the hot shutdown condition. This failure did not inhibit normal rod insertion from a reactor trip. Voltage measurements were made in the rod control cabinet and no abnormal conditions were found. At this time the affected group was placed on "DC hold" and the blown fuse replaced. The "DC hold" was turned off and the affected bank test operated satisfactorily with no urgent failure. Boration was then terminated with the plant at 76% power. Alignment of H-8 was restarted and was completed at 1800 hours. Power was increased as required by system load.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of the Occurrence

The blown fuse did not occur as a result of a failure or recognizable problem within the rod control system. We have concluded that the cause was due to a faulty fuse. Operation since this equipment was replaced has been satisfactory.

8. Analysis of Occurrence

Since the failure occurred in the IAC cabinet which is not affected by the realignment of H-8 (1BD and 2BD cabinets), we feel that the blown fuse was coincidental and unrelated with the realignment attempt. The IAC groups were not being operating at this time.

9. Corrective Action

- (a) Immediate power reduction was initiated once the rods were declared inoperable.
- (b) Instrumentation and control technicians looked for abnormal conditions within the cabinet and found only a defective fuse. The fuse was replaced and the system satisfactorily test operated.

10. Failure Data

Three other occasions of blown fuses have occurred within the rod control system. On August 18, 1971, the movable gripper coil fuse for H-8 was blown. This occurred during a maintenance shutdown. On February 16, 1973, while at 30% power, two fuses blew in the stationary gripper power to Group 1 of Shutdown Bank "B." The Group 1 rods dropped and the reactor was manually tripped. On March 27, 1973, a fuse was blown in the part length rod power supply for rod B-8. This occurred during a refueling shutdown.