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SUBJECT: Forwards summary of 850214 telcons re effects of postulated high energy line break outside containment.

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MAR 18 1985

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261/LICENSE NO. DPR-23
CONFERENCE CALL DISCUSSING POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY
LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Dear Mr. Varga:

On February 14, 1985 two conference calls were held between Carolina Power & Light Company and the NRC discussing the effects of a postulated high energy line break outside containment at H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2. The enclosure to this letter summarizes key points raised during the discussions. Based on further conversations with the Project Manager, we understand that no further responses are required at this time.

Questions regarding this matter may be referred to Mr. Jan Kozyra at (919) 836-7924.

Yours very truly,

S. R. Zimmerman
Manager
Nuclear Licensing Section

JSK/ccc (1157JSK)

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Mr. G. Requa (NRC)
Mr. H. Krug (NRC Resident Inspector - RNP)

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ENCLOSURE
SUMMARY OF HELB DISCUSSIONS
FEBRUARY 14, 1985

Item 1

Which areas of the plant are subject to review for the effects of a HELB outside containment?

Response 1

Pipe Alley, charging pump room, and auxiliary feedwater subcompartment (as stated in CP&L's October 12, 1984 letter).

Item 2

CP&L's May 30, 1984 letter contains a reference to a "maximum addition of 2.4°." What is this?

Response 2

As explained in the May 30, 1984 letter, the 2.4° was a typographical error in the 1973 Westinghouse report. CP&L's calculations led to discovery of this error and Westinghouse concurs that it should be 214°.

Item 3

It was suggested that there may be an error in early versions of the CONTEMPT code. Which version was used for the CP&L analysis? Was it benchmarked?

Response 3

CP&L analysis was done with the CONTEMPT LT/028,30; April 1978, EG&G, Idaho version. It was not benchmarked, but hand calculations were performed which showed agreement with the computer results.

Item 4

Were calculations performed for all three areas subject to review for effects of the postulated HELB?

Response 4

No. As stated in our October 12, 1984 letter, the charging pump room was concluded not to be a problem because a harsh environment is not created from a HELB. Detailed engineering reviews were performed for the AFW subcompartment and the Pipe Alley.

Item 5

Would a HELB in the AFW subcompartment result in the loss of the motor driven AFW pump?

Response 5

Maybe, but loss of the AFW pump would not affect the ability to mitigate the effects of the event or impact the safe shutdown of the reactor because the turbine driven AFW pump (in a separate area) is still available as well as the main feedwater pumps.

Item 6

What other safety-related equipment is located in the AFW subcompartment?

Response 6

There is some equipment (e.g., motor operated valve operators and transmitters), but we cannot give a complete answer without consulting the documentation. It should be noted, however, that analyses for fire protection purposes indicate that the reactor can be safely shut down with the dedicated shutdown system even if the equipment in the AFW pump room is unavailable.

Item 7

What is the qualification temperature for equipment (solenoids) needed to operate the blowdown isolation valves in the Pipe Alley?

Response 7

An exact qualification temperature could not be given without consulting the documentation, but the solenoids are qualified to a higher temperature than created in the area as a result of a HELB.

Item 8

Since the blowdown lines were the high energy lines in question, what was the rated blowdown flow? Could this cause a turbine or reactor trip?

Response 8

Blowdown for each of the three blowdown lines is limited by flow restrictors to about 3% of the feedwater input to each steam generator. This occurrence alone would not cause turbine or reactor trip.

Item 9

It was indicated that these discussions obviate a proposed March 2, 1985 visit to HBR by the reviewer.