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SUBJECT: Clarifies issues resulting from triennial fire protection audit.Single jacket synthetic hoses purchased for existing four pin type racks & fire detection powered from emergency power bus.

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OCT 15 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261/LICENSE NO. DPR-23
FIRE PROTECTION

Dear Mr. Varga:

The purpose of this letter is to provide clarification to the NRC on certain issues arising as a result of the triennial Fire Protection Audit of the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Project. These issues are of little, if any, consequence related to fire protection, and this letter is provided to clarify previous NRC correspondence. The issues are specifically related to NRC's February 28, 1978 Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

SER Section 3.1.4 states: Fire retardant coating will be applied to cables in 13 different fire areas of the plant.

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) position: CP&L coated cables in many of the areas of concern; however, not all areas have been completed. One area specifically is the south cable vault. In view of the staff position that cable coatings are not credited for reducing the fire load or combustion in any given area, there are no plans to complete coating of cables in these areas. Additionally, because a large number of cables, including safety-related cables, pass through this area, it is essential that contact with those cables be minimized in order to reduce the potential for damage.

SER Section 3.1.10 states: Pin type hose racks will be replaced with the hose reels.

CP&L position: The original concern was that pin type racks would not function adequately with the rubber hoses in use at that time. Subsequently, CP&L has purchased single jacket synthetic hoses for the existing four pin type racks. Operation with this arrangement has been satisfactory and will be maintained.

SER Section 3.1.2 states: Those portions of the existing fire detection system which are not supplied from an emergency power source will be connected to an emergency power source.

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CP&L clarification: Fire detection is powered from an emergency power bus. The low voltage detection system trips on low bus voltage and requires manual resetting. The station blackout procedure provides assurance that the fire detection system would be out of service for only a brief period of time; therefore, it is not necessary to meet NFPA72D requirements for automatic secondary power within 30 seconds.

SER Section 3.1.18 states: The controls for the diesel generator room ventilation systems will be modified so that flame detectors to be installed in these rooms will de-energize the ventilation supply and exhaust fan in the affected room.

CP&L position: According to NFPA12, forced air ventilating systems are to be shutdown before or simultaneously with the start of the carbon dioxide discharge. The CO_2 suppression system is automatically actuated by the HAD (heat actuated device) system. The diesel generator room ventilation systems have been interlocked with the CO_2 system actuation to de-energize the ventilation supply and exhaust fan in the affected room.

Yours very truly,

S. R. Zimmerman
Manager
Nuclear Licensing Section

PS/cfr (727PSA)

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)
Mr. G. Requa (NRC)
NRC Resident Inspector (RNP)