

February 16, 1978

Docket No. 50-261

LICENSEE: CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

FACILITY: H. B. ROBINSON, UNIT #2

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 8, 1978 TO DISCUSS THE DESIGN OF OVERPRESSURIZATION MITIGATION SYSTEM FOR H. B. ROBINSON, UNIT NO. 2 AND THE RECENT OVERPRESSURIZATION EVENT AT THE FACILITY

The meeting was held at the Carolina Power & Light Company's (CP&L's) engineering offices in the Central Plaza Building, Raleigh, North Carolina. A list of attendees is attached.

CP&L representatives first described the overall design and functioning of the Overpressurization Mitigation System (OMS). As a result of this presentation the staff expressed concerns relating to (1) the ambiguity presented by having a single annunciator indicate several system conditions (system ARM alert, system TRIP, and power-operated relief valve (PORV) OPEN), and (2) the possibility that failure of the single annunciator input circuitry could disable both OMS channels.

After further discussion the staff concluded that it would be acceptable for CP&L to install the OMS, as presently designed, at Robinson-2 subject to the following conditions:

1. CP&L would provide a reflash capability for the annunciator (which would significantly reduce the present ambiguity of indication) as soon as the necessary hardware could be obtained and plant operations would permit;
2. CP&L would review the common annunciator circuitry to determine if any failure could disable both channels of the OMS; and
3. If the result of the review defined in (2) above, is affirmative, CP&L will provide a separate annunciator with reflash capability for each channel of the OMS.

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The CP&L representatives agreed to the above conditions and agreed to keep the staff advised as to the results of the review and the status of implementation of modifications.

The staff emphasized that installation of the OMS should not relieve the need for continued careful review of procedures to assure that overpressurization events did not occur. The CP&L representatives acknowledged their understanding of this position.

The CP&L representatives next presented their explanation of the cause of the overpressurization event which occurred on January 29, 1978. In summary, they believe the event was caused by additional heat input provided by operation of two reactor coolant pumps during this period and by the longer than normal duration of the test occasioned by their concern about potential overpressurization. The possibility of reduced letdown flow as a contributing factor, however, could not be unequivocally excluded.

As a result of the discussion, the staff stated that tests of the Safety Injection System (SIS) normally should not be performed while the reactor coolant system (RCS) was "water solid" (no steam bubble in the pressurizer). A CP&L representative stated that the test conditions prevailing during the recent overpressurization event might be susceptible to modification to reduce the probability of a recurrence. Such possible changes included prohibition of operation of the reactor coolant pumps (probably acceptable), initiation of test at a lower pressure, or initiation of the test with the RCS depressurized but not vented. Review of the bases for the present test conditions was necessary, however, to determine if these latter two changes were acceptable. With respect to testing the SIS with the reactor vessel head removed, as suggested by the staff, the CP&L representatives stated that this would require considerable additional review to determine its acceptability. The staff requested that they be kept advised of progress in this area, and the CP&L representatives agreed to do so.

Because operating records could not establish whether reduction of letdown flow occurred during the transient, or whether pressure was reduced by opening of a relief valve in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, the staff suggested that CP&L perform a special test to develop a clear understanding of what actually occurred. This test, which would be performed prior to startup from refueling, would duplicate the conditions existing during the overpressurization event except that decay heat power would be much lower, the reactor coolant pumps would not be operating, letdown flow and relief valve operation would be closely monitored and the pressure rise would be terminated prior to

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exceeding the technical specification limits. The CP&L representatives agreed to consider performing such a test and agreed to advise the staff of their conclusions in the near future.

The staff asked how CP&L would monitor temperatures to comply with the proposed technical specification defining the allowable temperature difference between the water in the reactor coolant system and the water in the steam generators. When the CP&L representatives responded that the steam generator water temperature would be measured at the vessel wall four feet above the tube sheet, the staff noted that the temperature at that low elevation would not be the hottest temperature in the steam generator and, therefore might not be conservative with respect to the Westinghouse analysis of the heat input transient. CP&L was further advised that they should amend their proposed technical specifications to clearly define where the controlling temperatures would be measured and should provide justification that the temperatures to be used were conservative.

Gerald B. Zwetzig, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Operating Reactors

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DATE	2/16/78	2/16/78	2/16/78		

MEETING SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION

ORB#4

Carolina Power & Light Company  
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Jones  
Senior Vice President  
336 Fayetteville Street  
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Docket File

NRC PDR  
L PDR  
ORB#4 Reading  
NRR Reading  
E. G. Case  
V. Stello  
K. R. Goller  
T. Carter  
D. Eisenhut  
A. Schwencer  
D. K. Davis  
G. Lear  
R. Reid

L. Shao  
R. Baer  
W. Butler  
B. Grimes  
Project Manager  
Attorney, OELD  
OI&E (3)  
R. Ingram  
R. Fraley, ACRS (16)  
T. B. Abernathy  
J. R. Buchanan  
Meeting Summary File  
NRC Participant(s)

(Ed Wenzinger, C. Berlinger,  
Tad Marsh, P. Shemanski,  
D. Hinckley)

LIST OF ATTENDEES

David B. Waters  
Gerald B. Zwetzig  
Ed Wenzinger  
Carl Berlinger  
Tad Marsh  
Paul Shemanski  
Joe Curley  
Charles S. Bohanan  
French Bishop  
Darrel G. Hinckley  
Jim McQueen

CP&L  
DOR/NRC  
SD/DOR/NRC  
DOR/NRC  
DOR/NRC  
DOR/NRC  
CP&L  
CP&L  
CP&L  
NRC Region II  
CP&L

Docket File

FEBRUARY 16 1978

Docket Nos. 50-261/324/325

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. Schwencer, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #1, DOR  
FROM: D. Neighbors, Project Manager, Operating Reactors Branch #1, DOR  
SUBJECT: FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ON PHYSICAL SECURITY

Date & Time: Thursday, March 2, 1978  
10:00 A.M.  
Location: U.S. NRC Region II Headquarters  
230 Peachtree Street, N. W.  
Suite 1217  
Atlanta, Georgia  
Purpose: To discuss the (10 CFR 73.55) review of the H. B. Robinson and Brunswick Security Plans

Participants: NRC  
E. W. McPeck, J. Miller, D. Neighbors  
LASL  
D. Bohl, D. Foster  
CPL  
J. Walker, C. Gibson, H. Banks

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Don Neighbors, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Operating Reactors

OFFICE	ORB #1	ORB #1				
SURNAME	DNeighbors:m	f ASchwencer				
DATE	2/16/78	2/16/78				

Meeting Notice for  
Carolina Power & Light Company

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R. Reid  
L. Shao  
W. Butler  
B. Grimes  
R. Baer  
Project Manager  
Attorney, OELD  
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OSD (3)  
B. Faulkenberry, I&E  
E. L. Jordaon, I&E  
Licensing Assistant  
Receptionist, Bethesda  
Principal Staff Participants  
R. F. Fraley, ACRS (16)



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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D. Bohl, D. Foster

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J. Walker, C. Gibson, H. Banks

*Don Neighbors*  
Don Neighbors, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Operating Reactors



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