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ACCESSION NBR: 9211060280 DOC. DATE: 92/11/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-261 H.B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power & Light C 05000261
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 BAUCOM, C.T. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 CHAMBERS, R.H. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 92-021-00: on 921002, containment isolation valve RC-553
 failed to operate during routine operations surveillance
 test. Caused by personnel error. TS 3.6.3 was entered
 following review of OST-701.W/921102 ltr.

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INTERNAL:	ACNW		2	2		AEOD/DOA		1	1	
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB		1	1		AEOD/ROAB/DSP		2	2	
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	RES/DSIR/EIB		1	1		RGN2 FILE 01		1	1	
EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE, J.H		2	2		L ST LOBBY WARD		1	1	
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Carolina Power & Light Company

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RNPD/92-2908
(10CFR50.73)

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
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H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 92-021

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER), is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73 and NUREG 1022, Supplements No. 1 and 2.

Very truly yours,

R. H. Chambers
General Manager
H. B. Robinson S. E. Plant

CTB:sgk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. L. W. Garner
INPO

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2**05000261****1**

TITLE (4)

FAILURE TO ENTER TECH. SPEC. ACTION STATEMENT FOR INOPERABLE CV ISOLATION VALVE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NO.	REV. NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
10	02	92	92	-	021	-	00	11	02	92	05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)								
		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract and Text)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
POWER LEVEL (10)	100	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

TELEPHONE NUMBER

C. T. BAUCOM - REGULATORY COMPLIANCE**(803)383-1253**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X

NO

DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 2, 1992, with H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2 operating at 100% power, containment isolation valve RC-553 failed to operate during performance of a routine operations surveillance test. This valve is normally closed and must be stroke-timed from the open position to the closed position. At approximately 1330 hours, when the operating crew attempted to open this valve using its control switch, the valve failed to operate. The operating crew subsequently failed to recognize that the inoperability of this valve required implementation of the actions specified within Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3. Later that day, at approximately 2100 hours, this oversight was identified and the TS-required actions were taken. The valve remained closed throughout this occurrence and the containment isolation function was maintained. The valve operator was repaired, and the responsible operating crew has been counseled and has completed a training session specific to this occurrence. This occurrence is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) **TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)					PAGE (3)
		YEAR		SEQ NO.		REV NO.	
H. B. ROBINSON, UNIT NO. 2	05000261	92	-	021	-	00	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On October 2, 1992, H. B. Robinson Unit No. 2 was operating at a steady-state power level of 100% with routine activities in progress.¹ The dayshift operating crew was in the process of performing Operations Surveillance Test, OST-701, "Inservice Inspection Valve Test (Quarterly)." As noted within the OST, this test is performed on a quarterly basis to verify mechanical performance and assess operational readiness of components to fulfill their safeguards functions, and to comply with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS) and Section XI of the ASME Code.

In accordance with the instructions provided within Section 7.5 of this OST, operations personnel were to perform stroke-time testing of containment isolation valve RC-553, Pressurizer Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer Valve. This valve is normally closed and must be stroke-timed from the open position to the closed position. At approximately 1330 hours, the operator attempted to open RC-553 to support stroke-time testing, however, the valve failed to operate. The valve was in the closed position and could not be opened using its control switch. The operator assumed the valve to be failed in the proper position, and subsequently notified the Shift Supervisor of the condition and initiated a Work Request for repairs. However, the dayshift operating crew failed to recognize this problem required entry into a TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), and did not isolate the affected penetration by "use of a deactivated automatic valve(s) secured in the isolation position(s)" as required by TS 3.6.3.

The nightshift operating crew performed the required reviews of the completed OST-701. At 2102 hours on October 2, these reviews identified that RC-553 had been inoperable since approximately 1330 hours, however, the actions required by TS 3.6.3 had not been performed. At that time, TS 3.6.3 was entered and the required compensatory actions were initiated. Instrument air was isolated to the valve operator, failing the valve in the closed position, and the LCO was exited at 2116 hours.

II. CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence was personnel error in that the dayshift operating crew failed to recognize that the inoperability of RC-553 required entry into an LCO condition and the implementation of actions specified in TS 3.6.3. Since the valve had failed in the closed position, the operating crew assumed that containment integrity was maintained from a functional perspective. As a result, the valve was not deactivated in the closed position as required by the TS.

¹H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2, is a Pressurized Water Reactor in commercial operation since March, 1971.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

III. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

A review of this occurrence has established its safety significance to be minimal. Containment isolation valve RC-553 is typically closed, and remained closed throughout the performance of OST-701 and subsequent activities. As such, containment integrity was maintained and there was no loss of the containment isolation function.

The failure to implement actions required by TS 3.6.3 represents a "condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." Therefore, this Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

As stated above, TS 3.6.3 was entered at 2102 hours on October 2 following review of OST-701. At 2116 hours, instrument air was isolated to the valve operator, and the LCO condition was exited. A Shift Supervisor's clearance was issued for the instrument air isolation valves and the Gas Analyzer control switch for RC-553. In addition, Operation Management was notified of this occurrence.

To more closely review this occurrence and identify root cause(s), Adverse Condition Report No. 92-363 was initiated on October 2.

The dayshift operating crew that was involved in this occurrence has completed a training session on the applicable TS and OST-701 acceptance criteria. Further, the responsible members of this crew have been counseled regarding attention to detail and procedure adherence.

Subsequent investigation of RC-553 on October 6 and 7 identified a failed solenoid coil. This coil was replaced, post-maintenance testing was satisfactorily completed, and the valve was subsequently declared operable.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS
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MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
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FACILITY NAME (1) H. B. ROBINSON, UNIT NO. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000261	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3) 4
		YEAR 92	SEQ NO. -	REV NO. 00		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**1. Failed Component Identification**

Although a component failure was involved, this occurrence is reportable based on the failure to implement TS-required actions. Therefore, "Failed Component Identification" information is not applicable.

2. Previous Similar Occurrences

None.