

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706230429 DOC. DATE: 87/06/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power & Light Co 05000261
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 SAYRE, D. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 MORGAN, R. E. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-017-00: on 870522, failure to post fire watch within
 tech spec limits. Caused by loss of fire detection train A.
 Train restored to operable status. W/870619 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

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	PD2-1 LA	1 1	PD2-1 PD	1 1
	ECCLESTON, K	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
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	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1
	RES DEPY GI	1 1	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 42 ENCL 40

NRC Form 306
(9-83)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
TITLE (4) Failure to Post Fire Watch Within One Hour																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0	5	2	8	7	0 1 7	0	6	1					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
N		20.402(b)				20.405(a)				60.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				60.38(a)(1)				60.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(a)		
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				60.38(a)(2)				60.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(i)				60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				60.73(a)(2)(ii)				60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				60.73(a)(2)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Don Sayre, Senior Specialist - Regulatory Compliance										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 810 331 831-1124 2						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD						
D				N												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 22, 1987, with Unit 2 in cold shutdown following a refueling outage, Fire Detection Train "A" was rendered inoperable for one hour and forty-two minutes, between 2200 and 2400 hours. During the performance of a Special Procedure on Diesel Generator "A", power to Motor Control Center No. 5 was transferred from Emergency Buss No. 1 to the 480 Volt Dedicated Shutdown Buss, resulting in a loss of power to Motor Control Center No. 10, and subsequently, an undervoltage trip of the breaker feeding Fire Detection Train "A".

The loss of Fire Detection Train "A" caused the fire detection instrumentation for seven Fire Zones and the automatic fire suppression systems for five Fire Zones to be inoperable.

Technical Specifications require the inspection frequency of Fire Zones with inoperable fire detection instrumentation to be increased within one hour to at least once per hour. The Specifications also require a continuous fire watch to be established within one hour in Fire Zones with automatic fire suppression systems in a condition of readiness less than required.

The condition became apparent after one hour and forty-two minutes had elapsed and the Train was restored to operable status. However, the one-hour action statements of the Technical Specifications were not met.

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PDR ADOCK 05000261
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMS NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31 85

FACILITY NAME (1) H. B. Robinson S.E. Plant, Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 7	0 1 7	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On May 22, 1987, while performing a Special Procedure on Diesel Generator "A" (DG-A), power to Motor Control Center No. 5 (MCC-5) was transferred from Emergency Buss No. 1 (E-1) to the 480 Volt Dedicated Shutdown Buss. The transfer caused loss of power to MCC-10, resulting in an undervoltage trip of the breaker feeding Fire Detection Train "A". The loss of this train existed for one hour and forty-two minutes.

With Fire Detection Train "A" out-of-service, the fire detection instrumentation for seven Fire Zones was also out of service. Technical Specification 3.14.1.2.b requires that, with the number of operable fire detection instruments less than required by Table 3.14.1, within one hour increase the inspection frequency of the zone with the inoperable instrument(s) to at least once per hour. Table 3.14.1 identifies the fire detection instrumentation powered by Train "A" of which the Zones noted were affected:

<u>ZONE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1	DG-B Room
2	DG-A Room
5	CCW Pump Room
13	Auxiliary Building South Corridor (first floor)
21	Rod Control Room
22	Control Room
28	Pipe Space ("Pipe Alley")

The power to Fire Alarm Panel "A" was found de-energized one hour and forty-two minutes after it had been inadvertently rendered inoperable. Power was immediately restored to Train "A"; however, during this interval, the inspection frequency was not increased as required.

The loss of Fire Detection Train "A" also caused the automatic fire suppression systems for five Fire Zones to be out-of-service for one hour and forty-two minutes.

<u>ZONE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
9	North Cable Vault
10	South Cable Vault
12	Auxiliary Building Center Corridor (first floor)
19	Cable Spread Room #2
20	Emergency Switchgear Room

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1) H. B. Robinson S.E. Plant, Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 8 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		-	0 1 7	-	0 0	0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT IF more space is required, use additional NRC Form 308A's (17)

Technical Specification 3.14.3.2.b requires that with the Fire Water Pre-Action System in the first floor Auxiliary Building hallway above the instrument and service air compressor in a condition of readiness less than required, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment.

Technical Specification 3.14.5.2.a requires that with the carbon dioxide Fire Protection Systems for the North and South Cable Vaults in a condition of readiness less than required, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment.

Technical Specification 3.14.6.2.a requires that with the Halon Fire Protection Systems for the Cable Spread Room and Emergency Switchgear Room in a condition of readiness less than required, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with fire suppression equipment.

As discussed above, the power to Fire Alarm Panel "A" was found de-energized one hour and forty-two minutes after it was inadvertently rendered inoperable. Power was immediately restored to Train "A"; however, during this interval, no continuous fire watch was established in the Zones as required.

CAUSE

The Special Procedure and the normal Plant procedure were not adequate in that they did not address loss of Fire Detection Train "A".

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The appropriate Plant operating procedure will be revised to reflect a caution statement stating what steps must be taken when any transferring of power causes loss of power to MCC-10. Also, permanent labels have already been installed on the transfer switches and power supply breakers stating action to be taken to restore power to MCC-10 and the Fire Detection Train "A", and all Operations personnel will be required to review this LER.



Carolina Power & Light Company

Company Correspondence

**ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT DEPARTMENT
POST OFFICE BOX 790
HARTSVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA 29550**

JUN 19 1987

Robinson File No: 13510C

Serial: RNPD/87-2835

**United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555**

**H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-017**

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) is submitted in accordance with the Licensee Event Report System of 10 CFR 50.73. The format of the LER follows the recommendations of NUREG-1022 of September, 1983.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. E. Morgan'.

**R. E. Morgan
General Manager
H. B. Robinson S. E. Plant**

DAS:jch

Enclosure

**cc: J. N. Grace
H. E. P. Krug
INPO**

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