

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

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 FACIL:50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Ligh 05000261
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 MCGIRT,R.S. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 81-011/01T-0:on 810414,resident inspector notified
 personnel of taped open containment isolation valve control
 switch.Caused by test technicians.Radiation control & test
 technicians reinstructed.

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 TITLE: Incident Reports

NOTES:

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	MECH ENG BR 33	1	1	NRC PDR 02	1	1
	OR ASSESS BR 35	1	1	POWER SYS BR 36	1	1
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	<u>REG FILE 01</u>	1	1	REL & RISK A 41	1	1
	SFTY PROG EVA42	1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44	1	1
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 46	16	16	LPDR 03	1	1
	NSIC 05	1	1			

MAY 05 1981

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-011

1. Cause Description and Analysis

On April 14, 1981, at approximately 1630 hours, with the plant at 95% power, the resident NRC inspector questioned Engineering personnel about the consequences of the control switch for Sampling System Valves 956C and 956D being taped in the open position, an event he had witnessed earlier. An evaluation of the control wiring for these valves revealed that holding the control switch in the open position defeated the automatic closing of these valves on a containment Phase "A" isolation signal. This is contrary to Technical Specification Section 1.7.d and is reportable under Section 6.9.2.a.6.

An investigation into the background of this event revealed that a Radiation Control and Test Technician in attempting to draw a sample from the pressurizer liquid space found that the isolation valves would not stay open when the control switch was released to its neutral/automatic position. This was caused by a misaligned limit switch which establishes the seal-in circuit for the valves when the switch is returned to the neutral/automatic position. The Technician did not realize that holding the switch in the open position prevented the closure of these valves on a containment Phase "A" isolation signal.

The valves were held open only for the time period required to draw the sample. During the two day period in which the valve seal-in circuit was inoperable, the valves were held open for a cumulative time of approximately 30 minutes. During the sampling operation, the sample is discharged to the sample sink while obtaining a water sample and to the Volume Control Tank (VCT) while obtaining a gaseous sample.

2. Corrective Action

The tape was removed immediately and permanent repairs were completed on April 15, 1981. The available Technicians were assembled on April 15, 1981 and the consequences of the event discussed. Those Technicians who were not immediately available were counselled on the incident prior to their next shift. Each Technician was strongly directed to never maintain a switch in an abnormal position by unauthorized means. A written notice will also be routed to all Technicians describing the event and possible consequences.

3. Corrective Action To Prevent Further Occurrence

Classroom time will be scheduled for all personnel involved in Unit No. 2 sampling. The training will be directed toward the interface between the sampling systems and the safety systems as well as emphasizing the importance of understanding and complying with established procedures. This training will be completed by August 1, 1981.

The precautions of the sampling procedures will be reviewed in light of this event and any changes which are deemed necessary will be implemented prior to July 1, 1981.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 SCHBR2 200-00000-00 341111 45
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T

01 I605000261 7041481 8042781 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80
 REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 At approximately 1630 on April 14, 1981, the NRC resident inspector notified Engineer-
03 ing personnel that he had seen the control switch for containment isolation valves 956C
04 & D (pressurizer liquid space sample) taped in the open position. Investigation of the
05 control wiring of these valves verified that this condition defeated the containment
06 Phase "A" isolation engineered safety feature of these valves. This is contrary to
07 Technical Specification 1.7.d and is reportable under Section 6.9.2.a.6.

08 9

09 SD 11 A 12 D 13 VALVEX 14 F 15 D 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 81 — 011 / 01 T — 0
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
H18 G19 Z20 Z21 0000 Y23 N24 N25 M120 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The valves' control switch was taped in the open position by test technicians who did
11 not realize this act defeated the containment isolation feature. The condition was
12 present less than thirty minutes over a period of two days and then only during the
13 time when a pressurizer liquid space sample was being obtained. Available Radiation
14 Control and Test Technicians were immediately instructed to not maintain a switch in
 an abnormal position by unauthorized means. The sampling procedures will be reviewed
 to determine if precautions are adequate.

15 E28 095 29 N/A D31 NRC Inspector 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

16 Z33 Z34 N/A N/A 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

17 000 37 Z38 N/A 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

18 000 40 N/A 41
7 8 9 11 12 80
 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

19 Z42 N/A 43
7 8 9 10 80
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

20 N44 N/A 45 N/A 46
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION NRC USE ONLY

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