

# REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8103050562 DOC. DATE: 81/02/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Light 05000261  
 AUTH. NAME: STARKEY, R.B. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Carolina Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP. NAME: REGION 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 81-006/03L-0: on 810129, fire protection valve FR-248  
 failed to close upon receipt of spurious Phase A containment  
 isolation signal. Caused by tripped motor operator breaker  
 due to personnel error & inadequate installation procedure.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 1+3  
 TITLE: Incident Reports

## NOTES:

ACTION:	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	04	COPIES		RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	03	COPIES	
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	A/D MATL & QU08		1	1	A/D OP REACT009		1	1
	A/D PLANT SYS10		1	1	A/D RAD PROT 11		1	1
	A/D SFTY ASSE12		1	1	ACC EVAL BR 14		1	1
	AEOD		3	3	ASLBP/J. HARD		1	1
	AUX SYS BR 15		1	1	CHEM ENG BR 16		1	1
	CONT SYS BR 17		1	1	CORE PERF BR 18		1	1
	DIR, DIV OF LIC		1	1	DIR, ENGINEERI20		1	1
	DIR, HUM FAC S21		1	1	DIR, SYS INTEG22		1	1
	EFF TR SYS BR23		1	1	EQUIP QUAL BR25		1	1
	GEOSCIENCES 26		1	1	I&C SYS BR 29		1	1
	I&E 05		2	2	JORDAN, E./IE		1	1
	LIC GUID BR 30		1	1	MATL ENG BR 32		1	1
	MECH ENG BR 33		1	1	MPA		3	3
	NRC PDR 02		1	1	OP EX EVAL BR34		3	3
	OR ASSESS BR 35		1	1	POWER SYS BR 36		1	1
	RAD ASSESS BR39		1	1	REACT SYS BR 40		1	1
	REG FILE 01		1	1	REL & RISK A 41		1	1
	SFTY PROG EVA42		1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44		1	1
	SYS INTERAC B45		1	1				
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 46		16	16	LPDR 03		1	1
	NSIC 05		1	1	TERA: DOUG MAY		1	1

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28

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	S	C	H	B	R	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57	CAT	58

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE    L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 7 0 1 2 9 8 1 8 0 2 2 7 8 1 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

On January 29, 1981 at 0624 hours with the unit at 6% power the main breakers were opened to separate the unit from the grid. At this time a spurious SI signal was generated which caused a Phase A containment isolation. Fire protection valve FP-248 failed to close on the Phase A signal. This resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by Technical Specification 3.6.1.a and is reportable pursuant to 6.9.2.b.2. The valve in series with FP-248, FP-249, closed as required; therefore, containment isolation was achieved.

7 8 9		SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE			
0	9	S	D	A	E	C	K	T	B	R	K	A	Z				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
17	8	1	0	0	6	0	3	L	0								
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
E	A	Z	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	Y	N	W	1	2	1			
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Isolation valve FP-248 failed to close on a Phase A containment isolation when the

1 1 motor operator breaker tripped. Due to personnel error and inadequate procedures

1 2 during installation, the instantaneous trip setpoint on the breaker was set too

1 3 low for proper operation of the motor operator. As immediate corrective action,

1 4 the valve was manually closed and as followup, the setpoint was properly

readjusted. Also, the appropriate personnel in the organizations involved in the installation will review the event. Any additional corrective actions resulting from this review will be reported as a supplement to this LER.

7 8 9  
FACILITY STATUS  
1 5 X 28  
% POWER  
0 0 0 29  
OTHER STATUS 30  
Phase A Isolation  
METHOD OF DISCOVERY  
A 31  
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32  
Annunciator panel indicated open valve

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION		
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A

7		8	9	11		12	13
		PERSONNEL INJURIES					
		NUMBER			DESCRIPTION		
1	8	0	0	0	40	N/A	

7		8	9	11		12
		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				
TYPE		DESCRIPTION				
1	9	Z	42	N/A		

7 8 9 10  
PUBLICATION  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8108050562  
2 0 Z (44) N/A  
7 8 9 10 68 69 80  
NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

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PHONE: (803) 383-4524

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

### FOR

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-006

### 1. Cause Description and Analysis

On January 29, 1981 at 0624 hours the unit was being separated from the system when a spurious SI signal caused a Phase A containment isolation. As part of a Phase A containment isolation four fire protection containment isolation valves (FP-248, FP-249, FP-256, FP-258) automatically close. These valves were installed during the 1980 refueling outage as part of the plant fire protection modifications. One of these valves, FP-248, failed to close. The valve was closed manually. The cause of failure was a tripped circuit breaker. The setpoint of the breaker had not been set high enough during initial installation to insure proper operation. Containment isolation was maintained by the redundant isolation valve FP-249. Failure of FP-248 to close resulted in a degraded mode permitted by Technical Specification 3.6.3.a which is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.2.

The failed breaker, which was installed with the plant at cold shutdown, was actually the third breaker installed in implementation of the modification. The first two breakers were installed during the 1980 refueling outage (October, 1980). The original breaker was undersized and required replacement. A second breaker was installed temporarily while a replacement breaker was on order. The third (permanent) breaker when received was then used to replace the temporary breaker. All were required to be installed in accordance with the modification installation procedure. However, for the third installation (December 9, 1980) the implementing procedure was not used nor was the post installation testing, performed on previous installations, completed. Additionally, review of the installation procedure revealed that neither the proper setpoint nor the method for setting any of the four breakers was included in the installation procedures. This information was identified in the procedure to be provided later but was never provided. It is believed that the post installation testing, if performed, could have identified the problem.

### 2. Corrective Action

As immediate corrective action, the valve, FP-248, was closed manually by Operations personnel at the valve operator.

### 3. Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence

The breakers for FP-248 and the other three valves were readjusted to the correct setting. Additionally, this LER will be forwarded to the organizations involved in the breaker installation for review. Appropriate personnel in each organization will be required to review the event and take actions necessary to 1) insure that all personnel follow all implementing procedures and, 2) insure that implementing procedures provide sufficient details and instructions for the setting and establishment of setpoints on parameters affecting operation of equipment. Any additional corrective actions resulting from this review will be reported as a supplement to the LER.