

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8102030427 DOC. DATE: 81/01/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Light 05000261
 AUTH. NAME: STARKEY, R.B. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME: REGION 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 81-002/01T-0: on 810113, during svc water sys review,
 potential unmonitored release path to environ discovered.
 Caused by lack of radiation monitoring of svc water return
 lines to containment. Design configuration being reviewed.

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	ASLBP/J.HARD		1	1	AUX SYS BR 15	1	1
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	CORE PERF BR 18		1	1	DIR, DIV OF LIC	1	1
	DIR, ENGINEER120		1	1	DIR, HUM FAC S21	1	1
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	EQUIP QUAL BR25		1	1	GEOSCIENCES 26	1	1
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	JORDAN, E./IE		1	1	LIC GUID BR 30	1	1
	MATL ENG BR 32		1	1	MECH ENG BR 33	1	1
	MPA		3	3	NRC PDR 02	1	1
	OP EX EVAL BR34		3	3	OR ASSESS BR 35	1	1
	POWER SYS BR 36		1	1	RAD ASSESS BR39	1	1
	REACT SYS BR 40		1	1	REG FILE 01	1	1
	REL & RISK A 41		1	1	SFTY PRUG EVA42	1	1
	STRUCT ENG BR44		1	1	SYS INTERAC B45	1	1
EXTERNAL:	ACRS	46	16	16	LPDR 03	1	1
	NSIC	05	1	1	TERA: DOUG MAY	1	1

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation on 1/13/81, a review of the Service Water System revealed a

0 3 potential unmonitored release path to the environment. This is due to the lack of

0 4 radiation monitoring on the service water return lines from containment for the

0 5 four HVH motor coolers (fan cooler returns are monitored). Therefore, an

0 6 unmonitored release path for activity from containment could exist in an accident

0 7 situation. This could result when post accident containment pressure is above

0 8 Service Water System pressure and there exists a system leak inside containment.

0 8 This condition is considered reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.(9)

0	9	W	A	11	B	12	A	13	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	14	Z	15	Z	16	17	8	1	0	0	2	0	1	T	0	18	X	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	22	Y	23	N	24	Z	25	Z	9	9	9	26
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The above configuration is a result of original system design. The Service Water

1 1 System inside containment is being inspected daily for leaks as a short term

1 2 action. Any service water leak inside containment will be considered a degradation

1 3 of a containment boundary and appropriate action will be taken. As a follow-up

1 4 to IE Bulletin 80-24, the Service Water System to containment, including the fan

1 4 cooler piping configuration, is undergoing a thorough review. Additional corrective

1 4 action is expected as a result of this review.

1	5	E	28	1	0	0	29	NA	30	C	31	Review of System	32
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1	6	Z	33	Z	34	NA	35	NA	36
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7 8 9 10 11 44 45 48

1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39
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7 8 9 11 12 44 48

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7 8 9 10 44 48

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7 8 9 10 44 48

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NAME OF PREPARER

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NRC USE ONLY

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-002

1. Cause Description and Analysis: On 1/9/81, CP&L was informed by Westinghouse of a potential safety problem that had been reported to the NRC. This concerned the lack of radiation monitoring on the service water return lines from containment for the HVH motor coolers at Indian Point 2 (Consolidated Edison). Robinson 2 has a similar configuration. A review of the H. B. Robinson Service Water System was undertaken and a special test was performed to verify service water pressure in the HVH motor cooler lines inside containment. The results of the special test found pressure in portions of the Service Water System to be below containment post accident design pressure (42 psig). Therefore, a potential unmonitored release path from containment could exist in an accident condition. On 1/13/81, it was determined that with a leak in the SW system inside the containment vessel and the lack of radiation monitoring on the fan cooler discharge piping, coupled with the service water pressure inside the containment being lower than design basis accident pressure, an undetected activity release path could exist during post accident conditions. This condition is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.(9).
2. Corrective Action: Service water piping inside containment is being inspected daily for leaks. Should a leak occur, it will be considered a degradation of a containment boundary and the requirements of plant Operating Procedures and Technical Specifications will be applied. Operations personnel will be instructed in the consequences of any Service Water System leak inside containment by February 2, 1981.
3. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence: This system is currently under review and evaluation to determine appropriate permanent corrective action. It is expected that additional corrective action will be identified in this review. When a schedule has been established for additional corrective action, a supplement to this LER will be issued.