REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8011030423 DOC.DATE: 80/10/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Ligh 05000261
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
STARKEY,R.B. Carolina Power & Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 80-024/01T-0:on 801014,small fire was reported inside containment & airlock door interlocks failed to function. Caused by personnel error.Airlock door & interlock were repaired & placed in satisfactory sealed condition.

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TITLE: Incident Reports

NOTES:

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ACTION:	VARGA,S.	04	3	3				
INTERNAL:	A/D COMP&STRU	06	1	1	A/D ENV TECH	07	1	1
	A/D MATL & QU	08	1	1	A/D OP REACT	09	1	1
	A/D PLANT SYS	10	1	1	A/D RAD PROT	11	1	1
	A/D SFTY ASSE	12	1	1	A/D TECHNOLOG	13	1	1
	ACC EVAL BR	14	1	1	AEOD		2	2
	ASLBP/J.HARD		1	1	AUX SYS BR	15	1	1
	CHEM ENG BR	16	1	1	CONT SYS BR	17	1	1
	CORE PERF BR	18	1	1	D/DIR,HUM FAC	19	1	1
	DIR,ENGINEERI	20	1	1	DIR,HUM FAC S	21	1	1
	DIR,SYS INTEG	22	1	1	EFF TR SYS BR	23	1	1
	EQUIP QUAL BR	25	1	1	GEOSCIENCES	26	1	1
	I&C SYS BR	29	1	1	I&E	05	2	2
	JORDAN,E./IE		1	1	LIC GUID BR	30	1	1
	LIC QUAL BR	31	1	1	MATL ENG BR	32	1	1
	MECH ENG BR	33	1	1	MPA		3	3
	NRC PDR	02	1	1	OP EX EVAL BR	34	3	3
	OR ASSESS BR	35	1	1	POWER SYS BR	36	1	1
	RAD ASSESS BR	39	1	1	REACT SYS BR	40	1	1
	REG FILE	01	1	1	REL & RISK A	41	1	1
	SFTY PROG EVA	42	1	1	STRUCT ENG BR	44	1	1
	SYS INTERAC B	45	1	1				
EXTERNAL:	ACRS	46	16	16	LPDR	03	1	1
	NSIC	05	1	1	TERA:DOUG MAY		1	1

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S.L

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	LICENSEE CODE (2)	S C H B R 2
01	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
01	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
01	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
01	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1
01	EVENT DATE (8)	1 0 1 4 8 0
01	REPORT DATE (9)	1 0 2 8 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On two occasions, at 0910 and 1600 hours on October 14, 1980, while in a hot shutdown
03 subcritical condition, the containment personnel airlocks were opened simultaneously.
04 During the first event, maintenance was being performed on the airlock door interlocks
05 when a small fire was reported inside containment. During an attempt to enter
06 containment, operations personnel opened the exterior door while the inner door was not sealed. During the second event, the interlock failed to function properly,
07 allowing both doors to be opened. These events are contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.1.a and is reportable pursuant to paragraph 6.9.2.a.2 of Technical
08 Specifications.

09	
SYSTEM CODE (11)	S A
CAUSE CODE (12)	A
CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	A
COMPONENT CODE (14)	P E N E T R
COMP. SUBCODE (15)	A
VALVE SUBCODE (16)	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 0	—	0 2 4	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
B	A	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	Y	A	C 3 1 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The airlock interlocks were not in service at the time of the first event due to work being performed on the doors. The interlocks require periodic maintenance in order to
11 maintain routine operation of the doors. In the haste to access containment to extinguish the fire and assess damage caused by the fire, the operator opened the door
12 without first checking with the maintenance personnel working on the doors. The air-lock interlocks failed to function properly during the second event while personnel
13 were exiting the containment. These events indicate the need to have the vendor inspect and recommend improvements to the airlock interlocks as necessary. This
14 inspection and further evaluations will be performed in the near future.

Line	Field	Value
15	FACILITY STATUS (28)	G
15	% POWER (29)	0 0 0
15	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
15	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A
15	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	Operator Observation
16	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
16	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
16	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
16	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	0 0 0
17	TYPE (38)	Z
17	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	0 0 0
18	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	Z
19	DESCRIPTION (43)	NA
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	N
20	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA

8011030423

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER R. B. Starkey, Jr. PHONE: (803) 383-4524

GPO 917-926

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-24

1. Cause Description and Analysis: At 0910 hours on October 14, 1980, with the plant in a hot shutdown subcritical condition, a small fire was reported inside the containment by a construction worker. At the time of this occurrence, maintenance was being performed on the personnel airlock doors and interlocks. The interlocks were out of service. Operations personnel in their haste to enter containment to inspect for possible fire damage and verify the fire was extinguished, did not check to verify the inner door was properly sealed. Both containment personnel airlock doors were opened momentarily when the operator entered containment. At 1600 hours on the same day while personnel were exiting containment, the airlock door interlocks failed to function properly. This also resulted in a momentary opening of both airlock doors. Both doors being open, even momentarily, is contrary to the requirements of section 3.6.1.a. No adverse conditions resulted form these occurrences.

2. Corrective Action: In both occurrences, one airlock door was immediately placed in a satisfactory sealed condition. After the first event, the mechanic continued performing his work on the repair of the airlock interlock. After the second event, the interlock was repaired and placed in a satisfactory condition and door operating personnel were assigned to operate the airlock for the duration of the outage to prevent recurrence.

3. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence: Due to an unusually high level of job activities inside containment during the refueling outage, in addition to routine refueling activities, the airlock doors including the interlock mechanism was subjected to an unusually high amount of use by a significant number of personnel. As a result of this type of use, the airlock doors' operating mechanism required an excessive amount of maintenance to keep the doors operating as required. Due to this excessive amount of maintenance required, and as followup to this event, a specialist will be contracted to inspect and recommend improvements. This inspection and evaluation will be conducted in the near future. When this action is complete, a supplemental report to this LER will be submitted.