

## REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8009150289 DOC. DATE: 80/09/10 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Light 05000261  
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 STARKEY, R.B. Carolina Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: LER 80-018/03L-0: on 800811, w/unit in refueling shutdown condition & while performing refueling period test  
 CPL-PT-2.1, valve PCV-1716 failed to close due to isolation override switch being on. Cause not determined.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 1+2  
 TITLE: Incident Reports

## NOTES:

ACTION:	RECIPIENT		COPIES		RECIPIENT	COPIES	
	ID CODE/NAME		LTTR	ENCL		ID CODE/NAME	LTTR
	VARGA, S.	04	3	3			
INTERNAL:	A/D COMP&STRU06		1	1	A/D ENV TECH 07	1	1
	A/D MATL & QU08		1	1	A/D OP REACT009	1	1
	A/D PLANT SYS10		1	1	A/D RAD PROT 11	1	1
	A/D SFTY ASSE12		1	1	A/D TECHNOLOG13	1	1
	ACC EVAL BR 14		1	1	AEOD	2	2
	ASLBP/J.HARD		1	1	AUX SYS BR 15	1	1
	CHEM ENG BR 16		1	1	CONT SYS BR 17	1	1
	CORE PERF BR 18		1	1	D/DIR, HUM FAC19	1	1
	DIR, ENGINEERI20		1	1	DIR, HUM FAC S21	1	1
	DIR, SYS INTEG22		1	1	EFF TR SYS BR23	1	1
	EMERG PREP 24		1	1	EQUIP QUAL BR25	1	1
	GEOSCIENCES 26		1	1	HUM FACT ENG 27	1	1
	HYD/GEO BR 28		1	1	I&C SYS BR 29	1	1
	I&E 05		2	2	JORDAN, E./IE	1	1
	LIC GUID BR 30		1	1	LIC QUAL BR 31	1	1
	MATL ENG BR 32		1	1	MECH ENG BR 33	1	1
	MPA		3	3	NRC PDR 02	1	1
	OP EX EVAL BR34		3	3	OR ASSESS BR 35	1	1
	POWER SYS BR 36		1	1	PROC/TST REV 37	1	1
	QA BR 38		1	1	RAD ASSESS BR39	1	1
	REACT SYS BR 40		1	1	<u>REG FILE</u> 01	1	1
	REL & RISK A 41		1	1	SFTY PROG EVA42	1	1
	SIT ANAL BR 43		1	1	STRUCT ENG BR44	1	1
	SYS INTERAC B45		1	1			
EXTERNAL:	ACRS	46	16	16	LPDR	03	1
	NSIC	05	1	1	TERA: DOUG MAY		1

SEP 16 1980

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 75 ENCL 75

## (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
7	9

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 7 0 8 1 1 8 0 8 0 9 1 0 8 0 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 63 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

60	61	BUCKET NUMBER
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)		

02 At 2016 hours on August 11, 1980, with the unit at refueling shutdown condition, while performing Refueling Periodic Test CPL-PT-2.1 which confirms Containment Isolation Phase A, Valve PCV-1716 (instrument air to containment) failed to close due to the isolation override feature being on. Investigation revealed that due to a lack of adequate administrative controls the valve could have been in override during power operation. This constitutes a reportable occurrence per Technical Specification paragraph 6.9.2.b.3.

7	8	9	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE		COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE				
0	9		S	D	D	Z	V	A	L	V	E	X	E	D
7	8		9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER			EVENT YEAR			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.		
21			8	0	22	0		1	8	23	/	0	3	24
25			ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
26			H	18	G	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	22
27			28		29	30		31	32	33	34	35	36	
37			38		39	40		41	42	43	44	45	46	
47			48		49	50		51	52	53	54	55	56	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS	
1 0	It could not be determined when or for what reason the valve was placed in override.
1 1	The override control is located in the reactor auxiliary building out of the control
1 2	room (CR). Although its operation is addressed in Emergency Instructions, it was
1 3	not addressed in normal operating procedures. The override will be relocated on the
1 4	RTGB in the CR and procedures will be revised to adequately reflect its operation
	prior to power operation.

8 9  
FACILITY STATUS  
1 5 H 28 0 0 0 29 NA 44  
7 8 9 10 12 13

45 46  
METHOD OF DISCOVERY  
B 31 Conducting Refueling Test CPL-PT-2.1 80

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE  
1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA 44  
7 8 9 10 11

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35

LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES  
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39  
1 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 80  
7 8 9 11 12 13

PERSONNEL INJURIES  
NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41  
1 8 0 0 0 40 NA 80  
7 8 9 11 12

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY  
TYPE DESCRIPTION 43  
1 9 Z 42 NA 80  
7 8 9 10

PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45  
2 0 N 44 NA 80  
7 8 9 10

8009150289

NRC USE ONLY  
68 69 80

NAME OF PREPARER

R. B. Starkey, Jr.

PHONE: (803) 383-4524

NRC USE ONLY

8009150289

7-926

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-018

1. Cause Description and Analysis: On August 11, 1980, at 2016 hours, with the unit at refueling shutdown condition, while performing Refueling Periodic Test CPL-PT-2.1 which confirms Containment Isolation Phase A, valve PCV-1716 (instrument air to containment) failed to close due to the isolation override feature being turned to the "ON" position.

Investigation revealed that due to a lack of adequate administrative controls for the normal use of this override switch which is located in the reactor auxiliary building out of the control room, the valve could have been in the override condition during operation. Under that condition; therefore, the valve would not have closed for containment isolation. This constitutes a reportable occurrence in accordance with Technical Specification paragraph 6.9.2.b.3.

There was no threat to the health and safety of the public as a result of this occurrence because the unit was in a refueling condition at the time. In addition, the Instrument Air System normally maintains a pressure of 85 to 100 PSI which is greater than the accident pressure conditions of containment (42 PSI). A check valve in the line downstream of PCV-1716 serves as back-up to the isolation valve.

2. Corrective Actions: The override switch was placed in the proper position and additional testing verified PCV-1716 operability. An unsuccessful investigation was initiated to determine when and why the switch was placed in override. During this investigation the apparent lack of adequate administrative controls was identified.
3. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence: The control circuit of the isolation valve for instrument air to containment will be modified to relocate the isolation override switch to the control room (RTGB) and procedures will be revised to adequately reflect its operations prior to power operation following refueling.