

# REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8405250110 DOC. DATE: 84/05/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power and Light 05000261  
 AUTH. NAME: ZIMMERMAN, S.R. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Carolina Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP. NAME: VARGA, S.A. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Operating Reactors Branch 1

SUBJECT: Updates position re control & usage of spare fuses, per Request 8(g) of Generic Ltr 81-12 re fire protection rule. Std practices for control & replacement will enhance safe operation. Replacement Page G-1 to 820316 response encl.

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 TITLE: OR Submittal: Fire Protection

## NOTES:

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INTERNAL:	ELD/HDS1	1 0	IE FILE 06	1 1
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	NRR WAMBACH	1 0	NRR DE/CEB 09	2 2
	NRR/DL DIR	1 1	REG FILE 04	1 1
	RGN2	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	ACRS 11	3 3	LPDR 03	1 1
	NRC PDR 02	1 1	NSIC 05	1 1
	NTIS	1 1		



Carolina Power & Light Company

MAY 21 1984

SERIAL: NLS-84-155

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
Division of Licensing  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-261/LICENSE NO. DPR-23  
REVISION TO RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 81-12  
FIRE PROTECTION RULE

Dear Mr. Varga:

With a letter dated March 16, 1982, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) forwarded the Safe-Shutdown Capability Assessment and Proposed Modifications report which addressed the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. and responded to Generic Letter 81-12, Fire Protection Rule. On February 6, 1984, CP&L submitted a supplemental response which substitutes manual actions and repairs via procedures in lieu of previously identified plant modifications.

One specific item in the area of repairs deals with the control and usage of spare fuses. This was addressed in the March 16, 1982 response to request 8(g) of Generic Letter 81-12. The supplemental response did not specifically address this item; however upon further evaluation of our statement regarding the control of spare fuses, we have determined that an update of our position is necessary. We believe that maintaining standard practices for the control of spare fuses and for the replacement of failed fuses will enhance the safe operation of the plant and minimize potential confusion. Therefore, we request that you replace the existing page G-1 with the attached page. Revisions are noted by vertical lines in the right margin.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact a member of my staff.

Yours very truly,

S. R. Zimmerman  
Manager

Nuclear Licensing Section

ONH/ccc (9808ONH)  
Attachment

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-R11)  
Mr. G. Requa (NRC)  
Mr. Steve Weise (NRC-HBR)

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- 8(g) Demonstrate that spare fuses are available for control circuits where these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be blown by the effects of a cable spreading room fire. The spare fuses should be located convenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown procedures should inform the operator to check these fuses.

#### RESPONSE

The response to question 8(e) details which equipment necessary for the operation of the dedicated shutdown system, is fused to prevent loss of all control capability due to the effects of a fire in the cable spreading room, control room, or relay room. Spare fuses will be stored, along with other repair equipment, in the warehouse area designated for repair equipment and will be available as necessary to provide power for the alternative shutdown system. The status of all shutdown equipment (e.g., valve position, breaker position) will be indicated visually by lights on the dedicated shutdown control panels. A blown fuse common to both the normal and dedicated shutdown control power supplies (such as in a 480V breaker) would be indicated by a failure of the affected valve, breaker or pump to operate from the local control panel. Operating procedures for the dedicated shutdown system contain instructions to the operator to inspect, and if necessary, replace the appropriate fuse(s). These emergency operating procedures will be available at the Robinson Plant for NRC inspection.