

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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| 7 | 8 | 9 | LICENSEE CODE | | | | | 14 | 15 | LICENSE NUMBER | | | | | | | | | | 25 | 26 | LICENSE TYPE | | | | | 30 | 57 | CAT. 58 | |

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| 7 | 8 | REPORT SOURCE | | 60 | 61 | DOCKET NUMBER | | | | | | 68 | 69 | EVENT DATE | | | | 74 | 75 | REPORT DATE | | | | | 80 | |

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On February 21, 1980 at approximately 1015 hours while construction personnel were in-

03 stalling a seismic restraint pursuant to Modification 492-16, a pinhole leak was acci-

04 dentally cut in the "C" CVCS holdup tank inlet piping. Gas began escaping from the

05 tank which was under a slight positive pressure. The leak was stopped by operator

06 action at approximately 1119 hours. Air samples taken in the room showed no detectable

07 particulate or gaseous activity. There was no noticeable increase of activity in the

08 area or vent stack monitors, and there was no release of activity to the environment. This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.b.(4).

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| 0 | 9 | P | C | 11 | A | 12 | E | 13 | P | I | P | E | X | X | 14 | B | 15 | Z | 16 | 8 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | L | 0 | B | H | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | A | 25 | X | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | SYSTEM CODE | | 9 | 10 | CAUSE CODE | | 11 | CAUSE SUBCODE | | 12 | COMPONENT CODE | | | | 18 | COMP. SUBCODE | | 19 | VALVE SUBCODE | | 20 | EVENT YEAR | | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | | 24 | 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | | 28 | 29 | REPORT TYPE | | 30 | 31 | REVISION NO. | | 32 | ACTION TAKEN | | 33 | FUTURE ACTION | | 34 | EFFECT ON PLANT | | 35 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | | 36 | HOURS | | 37 | 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | | 41 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | | 42 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | | 43 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | | 44 | 47 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The event was attributed to personnel performing the modification work not properly

11 clearing the line, i.e., removing it from service prior to welding the attachment to

12 the pipe. As a result, when heated, the slight internal pressure blew a small hole

13 through the pipe in the weld area. The tank was removed from service and the leak

14 temporarily repaired at 1119 hours. A permanent repair was completed on February 28, 1980. All appropriate personnel were advised that in all future work, appropriate clearance procedures should be followed.

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| 1 | 5 | E | 28 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 29 | NA | 30 | A | 31 | Personnel Observation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | FACILITY STATUS | | 9 | 10 | % POWER | | 12 | 13 | OTHER STATUS | | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | | 45 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 36 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE | | 9 | 10 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 35 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 39 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | | 9 | 10 | TYPE | | 11 | 12 | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 39 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 41 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | | 9 | 10 | DESCRIPTION | | 41 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 9 | Z | 42 | NA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 43 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | | 9 | 10 | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 43 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 0 | N | 44 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 45 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | PUBLCITY ISSUED | | 9 | 10 | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 45 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 46 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| pb | | NAME OF PREPARER | | | | | | | | | | | | | | R. B. Starkey, Jr. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PHONE: (803) 383-4524 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 8003 240 484 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NRC USE ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | GPO 917-926 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 80-03

1. Cause Description and Analysis

At approximately 1015 hours on February 21, 1980 with the unit at 93% power, construction personnel were attaching a pipe stanchion and reinforcing pad to the "C" CVCS holdup tank inlet pipe. The pipe involved is a 4 inch diameter, Schedule 10S stainless steel pipe. The pipe stanchion was a part of Modification 492-16 which was required to increase the design conservatism of the seismic restraint on this line and was a result of evaluations performed during the IE Bulletin 79-14 reverification program. At the time, the "C" holdup tank was aligned for normal service.

While making a weld pass on the pipe to reinforcing pad boundary, the heat of the welding process melted the base metal and the slight (1.5 psig) internal pressure in the pipe caused a small hole to open through the pipe in the heated area. Due to the pressure and the escaping gas, the filler metal would not fill this small hole. The Shift Foreman was alerted, and operations personnel isolated the "C" tank inlet at approximately 1105 hours. A temporary repair was completed to patch the hole at approximately 1119 hours and the "C" tank remained out of service until a permanent repair to the line was completed on February 28, 1980.

The area radiation monitor was checked and no noticeable increase in activity was observed. The plant vent stack monitor was also checked and no noticeable increase in activity was observed. In addition, RC&T personnel were informed and air samples of the holdup tank room were taken. No detectable radioactive gasses or particulate were found. It was determined that no detectable amounts of activity were released and there was no impact on the plant or on the general public.

The event was caused by the failure of the construction personnel to have the line properly removed from service and the pressure in the line removed prior to performing the modification. Due to misinterpretation of the instructions given to the construction personnel and miscommunication between the construction personnel and the Shift Foreman, the tank was not removed from service. Had the internal pressure been removed from the pipe, this event would have been avoided.

2. Corrective Action

As immediate corrective action, the tank was removed from service and a temporary repair was made to cover the hole and prevent leakage of gas from the tank. Construction personnel were informed in a formal meeting to adhere to modification instructions which require that the Shift Foreman be notified of and explicitly understand the modification work to be done. At that time any required clearances shall be taken prior to any work on the modification.

As followup to the initial corrective action, a permanent repair to the pipe was completed on February 28, 1980.

3. Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence

The corrective action described above should prevent recurrence of this type of event.