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 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 STARKEY, R.B. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 REGION 2, ATLANTA, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: LER 79-004/03L-0 ON 790127: DURING FULL POWER OPERATION, TWO
 CONST DRILLED, UNSEALED & UNATTENDED 3 INCH CONDUIT
 PENETRATIONS WERE FOUND IN E1-E2 ROOM SOUTH WALL. CAUSED BY
 CONST PERSONNEL FAILURE TO SEAL PENETRATIONS.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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CON'T

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

NAME OF PREPARER

R. B. Starkey, Jr.

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Supplemental Information For Licensee Event
Report 79-04

1. Cause Description and Analysis

On January 26, 1979, second shift construction personnel were core boring 3 inch penetrations for running Fire Protection Modification conduit. The penetrations were located between the E1 - E2 Room and the Hagan Room, and between the E1 - E2 Room and the Unit No. 2 Cable Spread Room. At midnight the construction personnel left the site without sealing or providing a fire watch on two penetrations as required by written procedures to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.14.5. These unsealed penetrations were discovered at 1930 hours on January 27, 1979, during the Shift Foreman's routine plant inspection tour. These penetrations, open and unattended, breached the fire barrier created by the Auxiliary Building room walls. This resulted in a degraded mode of operation permitted by Technical Specification 3.14.5.

2. Corrective Action

As soon as the penetrations were discovered, a fire watch was posted and the fire detection systems on both sides of the affected wall were verified to be operational in accordance with Technical Specification 3.14.5. In addition, construction personnel were called to the plant to seal the penetrations in accordance with approved plant modification procedures.

3. Corrective Action To Prevent Further Occurrence

Construction personnel were again given explicit instructions on the necessity of following plant procedures when core boring penetrations through the Unit No. 2 Auxiliary Building Fire Barriers. In addition, measures are being implemented by the on-site construction forces to keep track of the status of all new Fire Protection Modification penetrations in an effort to prevent recurrence.