REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:7901030079 DOC.DATE: 78/12/27 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-261 H B ROBINSON #2, CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. 05000261
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
STARKEY,R.B. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER#78-028/03L-0 on 781124:during normal oper.constr personnel dropped a piece of metal which damaged FI 1920 IVSW "C" header flow indicator.Header was isolated,meter tube replaced & flow indicator tested successfully.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 1+2
TITLE: INCIDENT REPORTS

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL
ACTION:	05 BC ORB #1	4	4			
INTERNAL:	01 REG FILE	1	1	02 NRC PDR	1	1
	09 I&E	2	2	11 MPA	3	3
	14 HANAUER	1	1	15 NOVAK/KNIEL	1	1
	16 EEB	1	1	17 AD FOR ENGR	1	1
	18 PLANT SYS BR	1	1	19 I&C SYS BR	1	1
	20 AD PLANT SYS	1	1	21 AD SYS/PROJ	1	1
	22 REAC SAFT BR	1	1	23 ENGR BR	1	1
	24 COLLINS	0	0	24 KREGER	1	1
	25 PWR SYS BR	1	1	26 HOUSTON	0	0
	26 VOLLMER	1	1	E JORDAN/IE	1	1
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
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FACIL:50-261 H B ROBINSON #2, CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. 05000261
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
FURR,B.J. CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
O'REILLY,J.P. **REG.2,ATLANTA,OFF.OF THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Forwards LER#78-028/03L-0.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR __ ENCL __ SIZE:_____
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NOTES:_____

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL
ACTION:	05 BC	4	4			
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	22 REAC SAFT BR	1	1	23 ENGR BR	1	1
	24 COLLINS	0	0	24 KREGER	1	1
	25 PWR SYS BR	1	1	26 HOUSTON	0	0
	26 VOLLMER	1	1	E JORDAN/IE	1	1
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
	27 ACRS	16	16			

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 43

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE [illegible] REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	LICENSEE CODE (2)	SCHBR2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	00-00000-00
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	41110
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	05000261
	EVENT DATE (8)	112478
	REPORT DATE (9)	122778

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 1100 hours on November 24, 1978, during normal operation, construction personnel
03 dropped a piece of metal, while installing duct work, which struck and damaged
04 FI 1920, IVSW "C" header flow indicator. This constitutes operation in a degraded
05 mode under Technical Specification 3.3.6.2. The tube was replaced and the header was
06 declared operable at 1430 on November 24, 1978. This is a back-up system which is not
07 required by accident analyses, therefore no significant consequences resulted from
08 this occurrence. This event, however, constitutes a reportable occurrence pursuant

Line 09	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
09	SD	A	E	INSTRU	I	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
78	—	028	/	03	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
A	H	Z	Z	0000	Y	N	X	S223

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The event was caused by construction personnel dropping a piece of metal which cracked
11 the glass tube of flow indicator FI 1920. The shift foreman was notified immediately
12 and the header was isolated. The meter tube was replaced and the flow indicator
13 tested successfully. Flow indicator FI 1920 was returned to normal operation on
14 11-24-78 at 1400. Construction personnel will be cautioned regarding the event.

Line	Field	Value
15	FACILITY STATUS (28)	E
	% POWER (29)	100
	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A
	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	
16	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	000
	TYPE (38)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	000
	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE (42)	Z
	DESCRIPTION	NA
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA

790103 0079

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER R. B. Starkey, Jr. PHONE: (803) 332-1351

GPO 917-926

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT - Continued

to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR REPORTABLE - OCCURRENCE 78-28

I. Cause Description and Analysis:

On November 24, 1978, at 1100 hours, construction personnel dropped a piece of metal while installing ductwork. This metal struck the "C" IVSW Header Flow Indicator FI 1920, cracking the tube. The shift foreman was notified immediately and the header was isolated. This event and the isolation of this header constitutes operation in a degraded condition allowed by Technical Specification 3.3.6.2. No significant consequences resulted from this event.

The IVSW system is a back-up system to the containment isolation valves. The system provides a water seal between the seats of isolation valves on certain containment vessel penetrations. The system, upon a safety injection (Phase A isolation) signal, automatically pressurizes the interspaces of the valves to a pressure in excess of the maximum post-accident containment pressure. This prevents leakage of any fluid from the containment to the atmosphere through the specific penetrations the system supplies in the event of valve leakage. In all safety analyses performed for the unit in which containment vessel leakage to the environs were considered, no credit was taken for the use of this safety system. Its functioning is not required to meet safety limits, however, its use does provide reasonable assurance that in the unlikely event of an accident, the releases to the environment should be much lower than the conservative analyses performed for the unit. Based on this assessment, it is concluded that no adverse effects not already analyzed and evaluated would have occurred even if the system had been required while the header was out of service.

II. Corrective Action:

The indicator tube was replaced and the flow indicator was tested successfully. The header was then returned to service.

III. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrences:

Construction personnel will be instructed to be aware of the areas in which they are performing work and also the equipment in and around the work area.