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FACIL: 50-261 H. B. Robinson Plant, Unit 2, Carolina Power & Light C 05000261
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JAMISON, J. D. Battelle Memorial Institute, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
TESTA, E. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards final rept of FW Victor of BNWL participation in
plant 871006 emergency preparedness exercise. Control room &
technical support ctr discussed.

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28 JAN 13 10:22

January 6, 1988

Mr. Eldan Testa
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Eldan:

H. B. ROBINSON EXERCISE OCTOBER 6, 1987

Enclosed is the final report of Frank W. Victor who was the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) participant during the subject exercise. Only minor changes have been made to the draft given to you prior to his leaving the site. The area covered by Mr. Victor included the Control Room and the Technical Support Center.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on FTS (509) 375-3782.

Sincerely,

J. D. Jamison
Technical Leader
Emergency Preparedness Group
Health Physics Technology Section
HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

JDJ/chb

Enclosure

cc: DB Matthews, w/enclosure

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H. B. ROBINSON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

October 6, 1987

- A. Name: Frank W. Victor
- B. Assignment: Control Room (CR) and Technical Support Center (TSC)
- C. Site Personnel Contacted: D. McCaskill, Lead Controller; R. Muth, Controller; J. Allen, Controller; D. Winters, Shift Foreman; B. Parvin, SRO/SS; S. Atlee, RO; G. Taylor, BOP; J. Berry, Auxiliary Operator; L. Smith, Auxiliary Operator; R. Bernell, Auxiliary Operator; T. White, Auxiliary Operator; M. Morrow, Exercise Lead Controller; D. Blakly, STA; D. Nelson, Operations Supervisor; and D. Morgan, Plant Manager.
- D. Positive Findings:
- The Shift Foreman (SF) continually reviewed the EAL to ensure that the Emergency Response was being carried out at the correct level. He frequently made recommendations to the TSC to increase EAL which were correct and timely.
 - The SF conducted a thorough and well organized brief for the Plant Manager who was relieving as the SEC.
 - The CR watchstander responded quickly to the Medical Emergency ensuring that the ambulance was called and the hospital notified of what to expect.
- E. Negative Findings:
- Not all of the information specified on Attachment 9.3 to PEP-171, Emergency Communicator and Staff, was obtained and recorded when making the Alert notification. Specifically, the CR Emergency Communicator did not obtain and log the names of the person at the state and county warning point who received the Alert notification message.

- Paragraph 5.2.1.5 to PEP 171 indicates that followup messages should be sent about every 30 minutes after notification of a significant event. No followup messages were generated or sent by CR personnel.
- PA announcements were not clearly heard in that part of the CR used for the Emergency Drill.
- The CR Emergency Communicator was not aware that the red phone in the SF's office is connected to U.S. NRC Operations Center at Headquarters. When he briefed the TSC Communicator as part of the CR TSC turnover he stated that Region II doesn't want followup messages, when in fact the Duty Officer at Headquarters was the person who did not want the information.
- There were two occasions where the CR Controller prompted the player. When the SF ordered all steam dump valves opened manually the Controller questioned the order. The SF then realized that only three dump valves should be used because of low RCS temperature and he subsequently changed his order to manually open three valves not all valves. In the second case the SF ordered the Auxiliary Operator to don full anti-C's and an air pack to go out and manually open steam dump valves. He told the Auxiliary Operator he could receive 25 rem. The Controller questioned the dose allowed at which time the SF realized that he did not have the authority to extend dose limits and change the allowable dose to three rem.
- The SF was not familiar with PEP-451, Attachment 9.4, Emergency Work Permits and Exposure Control. The SF believed that he could authorize doses of 25 rem if he was acting as the Site Emergency Coordinator

(SEC). By procedure the SEC has this authority ONLY in the absence of the Plant General Manager or the Radiological Control Director.

F. Chronology

<u>Time</u>	<u>Observation</u>
0630	Initial data sheet handed out.
0635	Demonstrated ERFIS data retrieval.
0640	SF briefing Operations Supervisor on the phone.
0645	Passed out data sheets - operators trending data by hand using data sheet comparison.
0649	SF having dew point recorder monitored periodically.
0651	Started leak rate calculation.
0654	Estimated 6 gpm leakage (T/S estimate based on time and humidity reading).
0658	Estimated 10 gpm by VCT readings.
0659	CR personnel discussing shutting down.
0702	Leak rate calculated as 12 gpm - notified dispatcher shutting down. SF declared UE at 0700 based on leak rate greater than 10 gpm. Consulting EPE - BOP working on notification.
0705	Message approved for release.
0706	Call all warning points on Selective Signal System (one call required); State - Darlington - Chesterfield - Lee. Recorded names of each individual who answered phone (received message).
0709	Reading message.
0713	Completed UE call - PA announcement UE.
0716	Notified NRC Duty Officer of UE at 0700 - no further message required until drill terminated.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Observation</u>
0720	SF reviewing EALs to see if upgrade required. Briefing shift on Alert conditions. Let SF know if pressurizer level trends down.
0722	STA doing R-11; R-12 release projection at site boundary.
0724	SF briefing Operations Supervisor on phone. At 0722 Chem Lab OOS due voltage problem.
0726	Comment. SF involved in answering phone. If he let someone else do it he could concentrate on problem and not be distracted continually.
0727	SF reviewing status for watch section.
0730	Data sheet on R-11 reads OSH - STA doing dose projection.
0737	RO reported on phone that SF has I&C on the way to help Chem Lab with instrument problem.
0739	SF securing CV sump pump breakers - briefing Operations Supervisor who arrived in CR.
0707	Late Entry. LPMS alarm - dispatched operator to read panel.
0745	LPMS results phoned in to CR.
0747	SF having area around letdown line evacuated.
0748	TSC search completed.
0751	PA announcement to clear area of letdown line.
0754	SRO getting mobile chem lab sent to site - RO computing leak rate.
0708	Late Entry. Search of TSC ordered by SF.
0800	SF declaring an Alert. No followup message on UE.
0801	Shifting to excess letdown so effluent can be collected in DCT and reduce radiation release outside containment.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Observation</u>
0802	Plant Manager received brief from Operations Supervisor.
0805	Communicator making call to warning points.
0807	PA announcement, Alert due to failed fuel.
0808	Call to WP completed. Communicator did not log names of individuals receiving Alert notification for state and county WP.
0809	PA announcement Alert repeated.
0819	SF looking at Site Emergency criteria.
0824	SF and STA discussing wind direction for personnel evacuation; if needed, use west parking lot.
0826	SF wants SD repaired as soon as possible.
0830	SF turning over SEC duties to Plant Manager (good brief).
0832	Personnel casualty reported to CR. SF directed Andy Ede to handle problem.
0838	TSC activated - Dick Morgan SEC - announcement made to CR personnel.
0840	CR Communicator called ambulance via East gate - ETA 5 minutes.
0844	Called hospital - probable contaminated man, head injury and is unconscious.
0849	Communication turnover completed - Sadler, TSC Communicator. CR Communicator stated Region II doesn't want followup messages. (Doesn't realize NRC red phones are for NRC Headquarters, not Region II.)
0905	Increased CV recirculation.
0915	SPDS (ERFIS data read to TSC by phone talker).

Time	Observation
0917	CR informed ambulance left site at 0911 with contaminated injured man.
0920	SF reviewing EAL to increase or reduce classification.
0935	Investigating LPMS alarms.
0939	Data phone talker reported no ERFIS data in TSC.
0943	Data taker stated that the injured man received his injuries after being attacked in the SI pump room.
0945	Clarified that injured man <u>not</u> attacked.
0946	Reactor trip - Lo-Lo "C" SG from 77% power.
0948	Operations Supervisor wants SD manned and RCP turned off.
0950	LPMS alarm.
0954	PORVs A and B shut. C PORV still open won't close.
0957	Control air to PORVs secured.
1000	SG "C" PORV stuck open.
1001	SD not repaired.
1005	Attempting to manually operate SD.
1003	Site Emergency announced in CR.
1005	Shut MSIV for "C" SG (bypass valve).
1006	PA announcement - Power Plant Alarm. Assemble west parking lot.
1011	Manually opened SD 10%.
1018	"C" SG isolated except for PORV.
1019	SF looking at escalation to GE - concerned he has lost 2 out of 3 barriers.
1020	SF wants to cool down.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Observation</u>
1028	Operations Supervisor wants to secure RCP.
1031	Sampling SG for activity.
1045	SF wants RCS boron sample for shutdown margin. Note: No report on accountability received in CR.
1046	Shifted charging pump suction to RWST.
1048	SG "C" LPMS alarm.
1049	Manual SI on low PZR Press.
1051	SF recommended GE.
1104	PA announcement, GE (release) at 1053.
1105	SF ordered all SD fully opened manually. Controller questioned this action, which reminded SF that only three SDs should be used.
1115	SF dispatching A0 to manually open three SDs. Order A0 to don full anti-C's and air pack. Reminded A0 he was limited to 25 rem (Emergency Dose). There was no one authorized to receive an emergency dose by the SEC.