LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: S C H B R 2 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 0 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 3 2 0 8 0 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 4 1 9 8 0 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 0615 hours on 3/20/80 during cold shutdown while performing PT.42.0, valve no.
03 CCW-626, RCP thermal barrier outlet containment isolation valve failed to close.
04 This event is contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3 and is
05 reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.(2). The reactor was in cold
06 shutdown, and containment integrity was not required pursuant to the Technical
07 Specification requirements. As a result, no adverse effects resulted and public
08 health and safety was not jeopardized.

09	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	W B (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V E X (14)	E (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 0	—	0 0 5	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	V 0 8 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The valve stem-to-operator shaft locknut loosened resulting in a failure of the
11 valve to close. The nut was tightened and staked and the valve was declared operable
12 at 0208 hours on 3/22/80. As additional action, a sample of the locknuts staked
13 during 1980 outage will be checked for similar conditions. If inspections indicate,
14 additional corrective action will be taken.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: G (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Operator Observation

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
17 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES
18 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
19 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY
20 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY

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8004230525

GPO 917-926

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-05

I. Cause Description and Analysis

During cold shutdown on 3/20/80 at 0615 hours, component cooling water containment isolation valve 626, reactor coolant pump thermal barrier outlet, failed to close while performing periodic test CPL-PT-42.0. This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.3 and is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.(2). At no time was there any threat to public health or safety due to the event. The failure of the valve to close was attributed to the loosening of the operator locknut, allowing the operator shaft to rotate freely and unattached to the valve stem. Valve CCW-626 is one of the containment isolation valves required to close as part of phase B containment isolation.

II. Corrective Action

The locknut was tightened and staked and the valve was operated electrically and returned to service on 3/22/80 at 0280 hours.

III. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrences

Various Limitorque SMB valve operators had maintenance performed on them during the cycle VI-VII refueling outage as follow-up to IE Circular 79-04. The operator-to-valve stem locknut for valve 626 was staked on 5/7/79. The locknut backed over the stake resulting in the failure of the valve to close. The locknut was staked again and the repair is considered adequate.

As additional action, a representative sample of the total locknuts staked during the 1979 refueling outage will be checked to verify similar problems are not occurring on the other valve operators. Additional corrective action will then be taken if the results of these inspections indicate it is necessary. These inspections and any required corrective action will be completed prior to the end of the 1980 refueling outage.

gbm