

**CONTROL BLOCK:**

							(1)
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-----

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	S	C	H	B	R	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER											25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57	CAT	58	

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 7 1 0 3 0 7 9 8 1 1 2 9 7 9 9

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation on October 30, 1979, at 1130 hours, as a result of information

[03] received from another utility, an investigation revealed that the wrong class of insu-

04 | lating material was installed on one of the containment fan cooler unit (HVH Unit 3) |

05 motor leads to field cable connections. These motor leads had been disconnected in

06 July, 1979, and had not been insulated properly when reconnected. The remaining three

07 HVH units were unaffected by the repair and were verified to have the proper insulation

08 This resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for  
7 8 operations and is reportable under Section 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications. 80

SYSTEM CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. VALVE SUBCODE

0 9 7 8 S F 9 10 11 D 12 13 Z 14 M O T O R X 18 19 Z 15 20 Z 16

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9 — 0 4 1 / 0 3 L — 0

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER					
B	18	G	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	22	Y	23	Y	24	N	25	W	1	2	0	47
22		24		25		26		37				40	41		42		43		44				

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause of this event was an unawareness of the specific insulating requirement on

111 the part of the individuals involved in the repair. HVH-3 was immediately shutdown

12 and the motor leads properly insulated using Class H materials. The unit was returned

1 2 I to service at 1508 hours. A procedure is being implemented to prevent recurrence of

1 1 This event.

7 8 9  
FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 E  
% POWER 0 6 1 (29) NA OTHER STATUS (30)  
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) D Electrical DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Inspection

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

1 6 Z (33) Z (34) NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0					
		(37)	Z	(38) NA					

PERSONNEL INJURIES			DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER				
1	8	0	0	0
0	0	0	40	NA

7	8	9	11	12	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY					(43)
TYPE		DESCRIPTION			
1	2	3	4	5	

7 8 9 10  
PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
7912040 432 NRC USE ONLY

7912040 432

NRC USE ONLY

rnd

NAME OF PREPARER R. B. Starkey, Jr.

PHONE: (803) 383-4524

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-41

1. CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS:

During normal operation with reactor power at 61% on October 30, 1979, at 1130 hours, as a result of information from another utility, an investigation revealed the wrong class of insulating material had been installed on the HVH-3 motor leads to field cable connections in containment. The instructions for this repair were not detailed enough to indicate Class H material be used. The remaining three HVH units were unaffected by the repair and were verified to have the proper insulation. The HVH unit was removed from service as permitted by Technical Specifications 3.3.2.2.a. Operation in this degraded mode is reportable under Section 6.9.2.b.2.

2. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The HVH-3 was removed from service and the motor leads to field cable connections were reinsulated with Class H insulating material. The other three HVH motor connections were inspected with the units in service and confirmed to be in a correct as-built condition.

3. CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCE:

A Maintenance Instruction will be written to cover the connections of all motor leads to field cables of safety related equipment in containment that must operate during a design basis accident.