

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	S	C	H	B	R	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5				
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	4			57	CAT	58	5

CON'T

0	1	REPORT SOURCE															DOCKET NUMBER															EVENT DATE															REPORT DATE														
7	8	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																																							
		L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	6	1	7	0	8	0	9	7	9	8	0	9	1	0	7	9	9																																			

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operations on August 9, 1979, at 1100 hours the valve SI-855 mechanically
0 3 stuck in mid-travel after adding nitrogen to the accumulators. This valve is a Con-
0 4 tainment Automatic Isolation Trip Valve and its failure is reportable under Technical
0 5 Specification 6.9.2.b(2). The penetration was isolated by locking closed manual valves
0 6 within the four hours as required by Technical Specification 3.6.3.C. This is a closed
0 7 system within containment and therefore was not a threat to the public health or
0 8 safety.

09		SYSTEM CODE S D		11	CAUSE CODE E		12	CAUSE SUBCODE B		13	COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X					14	COMP. SUBCODE F		15	VALVE SUBCODE D		16				
7	8	9	10		11		12		13					18		19		20								
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 7 9		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 8		24	26	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		28	29	REPORT TYPE L		30	REVISION NO. 0		32					
ACTION TAKEN G		18	FUTURE ACTION B		19	EFFECT ON PLANT Z		20	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		21	HOURS 0 0 0 0		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		23	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y		24	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N		25	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 3 1 4		26
33	34		35			36			37				40		41		42		43		44		47			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The Blaw Knox, one inch, globe, air operated, fail close, carbon steel, 1500 pound

1 1 valve failed to close due to mechanical binding. The parallel valves in the line

1 2 downstream from containment were locked closed to satisfy containment isolation

1 3 criteria. When plant conditions permit, the binding in valve 855 will be corrected.

1 4

FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 E 28
 % POWER 1 0 0 29
 OTHER STATUS (30) NA
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A 31
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operator Observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
1 6 Z (33) Z (34) NA
7 8 9 10 11 44

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
NA
45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	40
				NA	

1		9		Z		42		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION		7909120 553		NA	
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ISSUED 20 N 44 DESCRIPTION 45 NA 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-28

1. Cause Description and Analysis:

During normal operations on August 9, 1979, at 1100 hours the Containment Automatic Trip Valve SI-855 failed to close after adding nitrogen to the Safety Injection Accumulators. The fail closed valve was found stuck in mid-travel due to mechanical binding and is reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.2.b(2). The containment penetration was isolated by locking closed two manually operated valves in this line within the four hours as required by Technical Specification 3.6.3.C. This is a closed system within containment and therefore was not a threat to the public health or safety. The precise cause of the binding is not known at this time since the valve cannot be easily disassembled under operating conditions.

2. Corrective Action:

The two manual valves downstream from containment in this line were locked closed. A special procedure was implemented whereby nitrogen could be added to the accumulators by having an operator attend these valves and stay in direct communication with the Control Room. When plant conditions permit, the binding in valve SI-855 will be corrected.

3. Corrective Action to Prevent Further Occurrence:

The valve will be inspected when plant conditions permit. The binding will be corrected and the conditions investigated to determine what can be done to prevent further occurrence. The corrective action taken satisfies the requirements of the Technical Specifications and will be maintained until a permanent repair of the valve is completed.