

Enclosure 4
ACRS Presentation - Key Design Features
(REDACTED)



ACRS Presentation – Key Design Features (Continued)

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(Redacted Version)

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
This is a pre-application document and includes preliminary B&W mPower reactor design or design supporting information and is subject to further internal review, revision, or verification.

Key Design Features - Agenda

- Simple and Robust Architecture
 - mPower Nuclear Island Design Features
- Integral Design
 - B&W mPower Reactor
- Safety Strategy:
 - Prevention and Mitigation
 - RCS Key Safety Improvements
 - Defense-in-Depth Strategies
 - ECC Video
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment
- Test Program Overview


mPower Nuclear Island Features

- Fully underground
 - › Protected from external threats
 - › Enables security-informed architecture
 - › More efficient seismic design
 - › Robust containment, with space for O&M
- “Passive safety” design
 - › No safety-related emergency AC power
 - › Passive containment heat removal
 - › 72-hour safety-related control/monitoring battery
 - › No shared active safety systems between units
 - › >7-day “coping time” under station blackout
 - › No post-LOCA long term cooling recirculation
- Enhanced spent fuel pool configuration
 - › Underground, inside reactor building
 - › Large heat sink with 30-day “coping time”



B&W mPower™ Reactor

- Integral 530 MWt NSSS module
 - Internal CRDMs, SG, Pressurizer and Coolant Pumps
 - Lowest penetration 23 feet above top of active fuel
 - 50-degree superheat in Secondary Loop
 - 60-year design life, rail shippable
- Next generation passive safety design philosophy
 - Core remains covered during all postulated accidents
 - Long term coping without off-site support
 - Non-safety “defense-in-depth” systems used first
- PRA informed design
 - Multiple defense-in-depth layers: Goal of $\sim 10^{-8}$ /yr CDF
- Testing confirmation of analytic models
- 4-Year fuel cycle with “standard” 17x17 PWR fuel
 - 69 fuel assemblies with $<5\%$ ^{235}U enrichment
 - ~ 40 GWD/T core avg burn-up & no shuffling delivers economics
 - Burnable poisons, no chemical boron shim in coolant
 - Full reactivity control using 69 control rod assemblies and/or moderator temperature coefficient reactivity feedback



Goal: Minimize Radiological Consequences Through Prevention and Mitigation

- Prevention
 - Large class of Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) excluded by design
 - Spectrum of rod ejection accidents precluded by internal CRDMs
 - RCP shaft seal LOCA excluded by canned RCP design
 - Boron dilution event excluded by not using boron for reactivity shim
- Mitigation
 - Defense-in-Depth: non-safety systems are used for transient mitigation; safety systems for accident mitigation
 - Large Safety Margins: Relying only on safety systems, core damage is prevented for all design basis events
 - Core remains covered with water preventing significant cladding heat up and maintaining first fission product barrier intact for all credible scenarios
- Traditional analysis models used – RELAP, GOTHIC, and MAAP

RCS Key Safety Improvements

- Provide double isolation of reactor coolant system
- Eliminate RCS inventory loss through a low break
- Eliminate concerns of debris transport through break (GSI-191)
- > 7 days of cooling from ECC

Defense-in-Depth Strategies

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Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

- Use of PRA
 - Measure of health and safety Risk to the population and surroundings
 - Informs plant design
 - Optimizes design
- mPower and PRA *PRA* ↔ *Design*
 - ADV diversity – Improved CDF an order of magnitude
 - Flooding insights
 - Low Power and Shutdown – auto-isolation to reduce overdrain events

B&W mPower Test Program Overview

