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Eric W. Olson
Site Vice President

RBG-47448

March 10, 2014

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 2014-001-00
River Bend Station – Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47

RBF1-14-0031

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report.
This document contains no commitments. If you have any questions, please contact
Mr. Joseph Clark at 225-381-4177.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eric W. Olson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

EWO/dhw

Enclosure

1 E22
mll



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cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
1600 East Lamar Blvd.
Arlington, TX 76011-4511

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 1050
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO
(via ICES reporting)

Central Records Clerk
Public Utility Commission of Texas
1701 N. Congress Ave.
Austin, TX 78711-3326

Department of Environmental Quality
Office of Environmental Compliance
Radiological Emergency Planning and Response Section
JiYoung Wiley
P.O. Box 4312
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**
(See Page 2 for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME

River Bend Station - Unit 1

2. DOCKET NUMBER

05000 458

3. PAGE

1 OF 2

4. TITLE

Unanalyzed Condition Associated With Unfused Ammeters in DC Battery Indication Circuits

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
01	09	2014	2014	- 001	- 00	03	10	2014	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
										05000	
9. OPERATING MODE			11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)								
1			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
10. POWER LEVEL			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERFACILITY NAME
Joseph A. ClarkTELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
(225) 381-4177**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
na									

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO**15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE**

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On January 9, 2014, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, the final review of industry operating experience regarding the adverse effects of unfused direct current ammeter circuits in the main control room determined the described condition to be applicable to River Bend Station, resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures have been implemented. This condition has existed since the plant was constructed. Neither the original design criteria nor any industry standards in effect at the time accounted for the possibility of the multiple short-to-ground failure mode and therefore, did not require overcurrent protection for remote ammeter circuits. This condition was documented in the station's corrective action program. Compensatory measures were established to restore margin potentially reduced by postulated fire scenarios. The compensatory actions credit operator presence in the plant for maintaining heightened awareness and taking action to minimize fire hazards. Compensatory actions are incorporated in pertinent operating procedures. The compensatory actions remain in effect. There have been no actual adverse safety consequences resulting from the reported condition. The administrative controls of the fire protection program, the availability of fire detection and suppression systems, and a trained on-site fire brigade all combine to make it highly unlikely that a fire could occur and progress in a manner that actually leads to the event postulated in this scenario.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	
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NARRATIVE**REPORTED CONDITION**

On January 9, 2014, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, the final review of industry operating experience regarding the adverse effects of unfused direct current ammeter circuits in the main control room determined the described condition to be applicable to River Bend Station, resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements.

River Bend Station does have unfused ammeter circuits. This normally is not a concern, since two failures are required to cause the problem described in the document referenced above; an ammeter lead must short to ground, and another lead of the opposite polarity must also short to ground. Either of these events by itself will result in an alarm annunciation, but not cause equipment damage. This allows for locating and repairing the problem before the second failure occurs. However, during a fire, there is a greater chance that these two failures could happen simultaneously, or before a single failure can be repaired. If an unfused ammeter lead shorts to ground while another conductor of the opposite polarity shorts to ground, the unfused path through the lead could allow enough current to flow that the lead will heat up and damage other wiring, with potentially adverse effects on the ability to safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire in the main control room.

This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures have been implemented.

CAUSAL ANALYSIS

This condition has existed since the plant was constructed. Neither the original design criteria nor any industry standards in effect at the time accounted for the possibility of the multiple short-to-ground failure mode and therefore, did not require overcurrent protection for remote ammeter circuits.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

This condition was documented in the station's corrective action program. Compensatory measures were established to restore margin potentially reduced by postulated fire scenarios. The compensatory actions credit operator presence in the plant for maintaining heightened awareness and taking action to minimize fire hazards. Compensatory actions are incorporated in pertinent operating procedures. The compensatory actions remain in effect.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There have been no actual adverse safety consequences resulting from the reported condition. The administrative controls of the fire protection program, the availability of fire detection and suppression systems, and a trained on-site fire brigade all combine to make it highly unlikely that a fire could occur and progress in a manner that actually leads to the event postulated in this scenario.