

**Ferrante, Fernando**

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**From:** Weerakkody, Sunil *AKK*  
**Sent:** Monday, October 17, 2011 11:47 AM  
**To:** Ferrante, Fernando  
**Subject:** RE: OUO SRI - RE: IN Dam Failure Frequency -- SUNSI Review - OUO-SRI

Nice! Thank you.

Sunil

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**From:** Ferrante, Fernando *AKK*  
**Sent:** Monday, October 17, 2011 11:41 AM  
**To:** Beaulieu, David  
**Cc:** Rosenberg, Stacey; Weerakkody, Sunil  
**Subject:** OUO SRI - RE: IN Dam Failure Frequency -- SUNSI Review - OUO-SRI

Dave,

I have been closely following the issue with OUO-SRI with respect to GI-204 and based on my understanding of how RES resolved this issue with NSIR and the current content of their screening report, I can confirm the correctness of my original Form 665S SUNSI review determination.

This is based on the fact that (i) there is no discussion in the IN with respect to specific impacts to an NPP site as described in the redacted paragraph for the screening report, and (ii) discussion of Jocassee Dam/ONS and failure rates for dams (the core of the discussions in the IN) are also contained in the screening report. The GSI screening report, in fact, goes beyond information in the IN and explicitly refers to dam failure rates included in non-public NRC internal analysis, which the IN does not mention. Hence, I believe the IN is more conservative with respect to the guidance provided by NSIR, but appropriate for the context of the IN. Last, but not least, the content of the IN has been briefed to DRA management and in LT/ET meetings and the recommendation has always been to issue the IN publicly. I believe the effort undertaken by RES with NSIR regarding the screening report actually reinforces the decision to publicly release the IN.

Thank you,  
Fernando

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**From:** Beaulieu, David  
**Sent:** Monday, October 17, 2011 9:51 AM  
**To:** Ferrante, Fernando  
**Cc:** Rosenberg, Stacey  
**Subject:** IN Dam Failure Frequency -- SUNSI Review

As you know, because the IN and GSI must be made publicly available together at the same time, the final signature of the IN has been delayed because NRR concurrence on the GSI had delayed to resolve whether the GSI contains OUO-Security Related Information. I spoke with Richard Perkins last week who said that it is his understanding that NRR intended to resolve OUO-SRI concern by blacking out the below paragraph from the public version of the GSI making the entire GSI uncontrolled. I reviewed the latest version of the IN (attached) and found no similar plant-specific details. Fernando, please review the IN in light of this new information and confirm the correctness of your Form 665S SUNSI review where you specified a document availability of Publicly Available, Non-Sensitive.

Notification from Jocassee would occur before a total failure of the dam; however, for purposes of this timeline, notification is assumed to be at the same time the dam fails. Following notification from Jocassee, the reactor(s) are shutdown within approximately 1

hour. The predicted flood would reach [Oconee Nuclear Station] in approximately 5 hours, at which time the [Standby Shutdown Facility] walls are overtopped. The [Standby Shutdown Facility] is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the [Standby Shutdown Facility] wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about 8 to 9 hours following the dam break and containment failure in about 59 to 68 hours. When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.

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*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*