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Dominion®

JAN 15 2014

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 14-006
MPS Lic/TGC R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. DPR-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2013-009-00
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY BREACH
COULD HAVE PREVENTED SAFETY FUNCTION

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-009-00 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 on November 19, 2013. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,

Stephen E. Scace
Site Vice President – Millstone

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None

IE22
NRR

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100
King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713

J. S. Kim
Project Manager - Millstone Power Station
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

ATTACHMENT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2013-009-00
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY BREACH COULD HAVE PREVENTED SAFETY FUNCTION

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

NRC FORM 366 (10/2010) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
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4. TITLE

Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Could Have Prevented Safety Function

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
11	19	2013	2013	-009-	00	01	15	2014	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE

1

10. POWER LEVEL

100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*

☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ OTHER
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
William D. Bartron, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing	860-444-4301

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)* ☒ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On November 19, 2013 while operating in MODE 1 at 100% power, a security door in the auxiliary building at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) was found unlatched during a door seal check. Upon discovery, the door was successfully latched and the control room notified. In addition to being a security boundary, this door is also a secondary containment boundary, specifically a supplemental leak collection release system (SLCRS) boundary. The door was previously verified properly latched on November 16, 2013. On November 20, 2013 operators determined that the unlatched door resulted in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The direct cause of the condition was an unlatched door that did not ensure proper sealing of the credited SLCRS boundary. Upon discovery, the door was successfully latched and the control room notified. Since the door is a SLCRS boundary, it is sealed to tight tolerances and is stiff to open, close, and latch due to the sealing design. The stiffness of the door can be misleading to persons who pull/push on the door to verify it is latched. The door seals and latching mechanism were inspected with no apparent failure and received minor adjustment. Positive assurance of proper latching of doors continues to be reinforced at MPS. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

1. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On November 19, 2013 while operating in MODE 1 at 100% power, a security door in the auxiliary building at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) was found unlatched during a door seal check. Upon discovery, the door was successfully latched and the control room notified. In addition to being a security boundary, this door is also a secondary containment boundary, specifically a supplemental leak collection release system (SLCRS) boundary. On November 20, 2013 operators determined that the unlatched door resulted in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

Background Information:

The secondary containment is comprised of the containment enclosure building, engineered safety features building (partial), auxiliary building, main steam valve building (partial), and hydrogen recombiner building (partial). Together with the associated SLCRS, they mitigate the radiological consequences of postulated accidents for MPS3.

The SLCRS consists of two exhaust fans, each supplied from a separate emergency bus, two filter banks, and associated ductwork and dampers.

All SLCRS boundaries are established by use of low leakage doors (weather stripped), sealed building joints, sealed piping, conduit cable and ductwork penetrations, and boundary isolation dampers for ventilation systems. Therefore, containment leakage is contained in these areas until filtered by the SLCRS and the auxiliary building ventilation system filtration subsystem.

2. CAUSE

The direct cause of the condition was an unlatched door that did not ensure proper sealing of the credited SLCRS boundary. This door is infrequently accessed and has an alarm if opened. Since the door is a SLCRS boundary, it is sealed to tight tolerances and is stiff to open, close, and latch due to the sealing design. The stiffness of the door can be misleading to persons who pull/push on the door to verify it is latched.

3. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The safety consequences associated with the breach of secondary containment via the unlatched door is considered low. The purpose of secondary containment is to restrict leakage paths and associated leak rates of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere. The limiting scenario associated with an event is considered to be a design basis loss of coolant accident. The secondary containment in-leakage associated with this secondary containment breach was assessed. With the secondary containment breach, the ability of one train of SLCRS to draw a sufficient negative pressure in secondary containment could not be assured. However, since both trains of SLCRS were available, adequate SLCRS flow was available to compensate for the increased flow into the secondary containment supplied through the breach of secondary containment. The door was previously verified properly latched on November 16, 2013.

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NARRATIVE

4. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The door seals and latching mechanism were inspected with no apparent failure and received minor adjustment. Positive assurance of proper latching of doors continues to be reinforced at MPS. Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

5. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

MPS3 LER 2010-003-00, Secondary Containment Rendered Inoperable Due to Misaligned Dampers

MPS3 LER 2013-002-00, Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Could Have Prevented Safety Function

6. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes

- Auxiliary Building – NF
- Secondary Containment - NG
- SLCRS – VF, VG, VH
- Door – DR