



Exelon Generation®

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

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10 CFR 50.73

SVPLTR # 13-0049

December 20, 2013

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

Subject: Licensee Event Report 237/2013-001-01, Secondary Containment Inoperable
Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously

Enclosed is Supplemental Licensee Event Report 237/2013-001-01, "Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously." This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), "any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material."

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Glen Morrow at (815) 416-2800.

Respectfully,

Shane M. Marik
Site Vice President
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Dresden Nuclear Power Station

IE22
NRR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000237	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously
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5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
06	28	2013	2013	- 001 -	01	12	20	2013	Dresden Unit 3	05000249
									N/A	05000

9. OPERATING MODE 1	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)			
10. POWER LEVEL 100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

NAME Glen Morrow – Regulatory Assurance Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 815-416-2800
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
X	NG	IMEC	NA	Y					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO**15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE**

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On 6/28/2013, from 07:49:07 to 07:49:14, control room operators received a control room alarm indicating that the unit 2/3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) interlock doors were open simultaneously. Individuals were able to enter the interlock, from two directions, at the same time. With two interlock doors open simultaneously, Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2, was not met. With the Surveillance Requirement not met, Secondary Containment was declared inoperable, and entry into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 Condition A was made. The doors were immediately closed and the Technical Specifications Condition was exited. Based upon the investigation performed, the failure mechanism for this event was determined to be an isolated and rare premature failure of the latch bolt monitor.

Based upon the short duration of the secondary containment doors being opened simultaneously and that the Secondary Containment differential pressure remained negative during the course of this event, this event is of low safety significance.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	05000237	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2013	- 001	- 01	

NARRATIVE

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Units 2 and 3 are General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactors with a licensed maximum power level of 2957 megawatts thermal. The Energy Industry Identification System codes used in the text are identified as [XX].

A. Plant Conditions Prior to Event:

Unit: 02	Event Date: 06-28-2013	Event Time: 0749 hours CDT
Reactor Mode: 1	Mode Name: Power Operation	Power Level: 100 percent
Unit: 03	Event Date: 06-28-2013	Event Time: 0749 hours CDT
Reactor Mode: 1	Mode Name: Power Operation	Power Level: 100 percent

B. Description of Event:

At 0749 CDT on June 28, 2013, indication was received in the control room that two secondary containment [NG] doors leading to the Unit 2/3 EDG room were opened simultaneously. Two individuals from the Operations Department staff were exiting 2/3 EDG Room at the same time that a Radiation Protection Department technician in the Unit 2 Reactor Building was heading towards the 2/3 EDG room. The individuals were able to enter the interlock at the same time which resulted in both doors opening simultaneously. The interlock was empty at the time the doors were opened simultaneously and it was reported that both red lights were out (i.e., indicating the other door was shut and the interlock logic would allow the door to open) prior to the buttons being pushed to open the doors.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

C. Cause of Event:

Maintenance troubleshooting efforts recreated the failure scenario in the plant, and further investigation of the component identified the latch bolt monitor switch tripper as the failure mechanism. This failure mechanism was determined to be an isolated and rare premature failure.

D. Safety Analysis:

The Secondary Containment interlock doors were open for approximately seven seconds and based upon the short duration of the secondary containment doors being opened simultaneously and that the Secondary Containment differential pressure remained negative during the course of this event, this event is of low safety significance.

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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NARRATIVE

E. Corrective Actions:

As a result of this event, and a September 23, 2013 event, site engineering performed an apparent cause evaluation that identified the need to develop a modification to improve the interlock door circuit. Dresden engineering has completed the engineering change under EC 395616, and the modification was installed under Work Order 1679716.

F. Previous Occurrences:

A search was performed to determine the number of previous occurrences for this event over the past two years. The following table presents these results for the Unit 2/3 Interlock:

IR	Date	Sort Description
1493171	3/27/2013	Unit 2/3 Interlock Failure
1530208	6/28/2013	Unit 2/3 Interlock Failure
1562654	9/23/2013	Unit 2/3 Interlock Failure

The search revealed that there was one prior occurrence, within the past two years, that specifically related to a failure of the Unit 2/3 Interlock. Additionally, there was one occurrence after the event being reported in this LER.

F. Component Failure Data:

Manufacturer	Model	Part	Type	Vendor
Folger Adam	Model 310	Series 310-1	Door Strike	Hanchett Entry Systems, Inc