



LR-N13-0088

NEI 99-04

DEC 13 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DRP-70 and DRP-75
NRC Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Subject: 2012 Summary of Revised Regulatory Commitments- Salem

In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) process for managing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) commitments and associated NRC notifications, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) submits this correspondence to discuss commitments that were changed and not reported by other means during 2012.

The attached commitments were evaluated in accordance with the requirements of the PSEG Regulatory Commitment Change Process, which is consistent with the guidance in NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitments."

There are no new commitments in this letter.

If there are any questions, please contact Thomas Cachaza at 856-339-5038.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John F. Perry". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "John" and last name "Perry" clearly legible.

John F. Perry
Site Vice President – Salem

Attachments (1)

- C W. Dean, Administrator – Region 1
- J. Hughey, Project Manager – Salem
- USNRC Senior Resident Inspector – Salem
- P. Mulligan, Manager, IV, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
- T. Cachaza, Salem Commitment Coordinator
- L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Coordinator

	Revised Commitment Description	Justification for Change
<p>Original Commitment: Operation in the recirculation mode of Control Area Ventilation (CAV) will be required for short durations during delivery of Ammonium Hydroxide in accordance with commitments relative to Regulatory Guide 1.78 Revision 1</p> <p>Source Document: PSEG Response to Violation Letter NLR-N92-0100</p> <p>References: CM-SC-1992-336 70105367</p> <p>Date of Change: 01/17/2012</p>	<p>Operation in the recirculation mode of Control Area Ventilation (CAV) is no longer required during deliveries of Ammonium Hydroxide to prevent exceeding the toxicity limits specified in Regulatory Guide 1.78 Revision 1.</p>	<p>The practice of placing CAV in recirculation mode of ventilation during receipt of Ammonium Hydroxide is no longer required during normal deliveries since implementation of a design change that reduced the ammonium hydroxide delivery volume.</p> <p>The original installed ammonium hydroxide storage tank held a volume of 3000 gallons. The postulated release of the chemical directly from a 2000 gallon tanker while onsite during delivery was determined to challenge the toxicity limit specified in Regulatory Guide 1.78 Revision 0. Administrative controls were therefore implemented into S1/2.OP-SO.CAV-0001 to instruct the Salem control room to place the ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation every time a tanker of ammonium hydroxide was delivered to the site.</p> <p>Design changes 80070384 and 80072671 implemented the use of 350 gallon totes of ammonium hydroxide to lower the risk of spills and personnel</p>

		<p>injury during filling. The new chemical addition system is designed such that one tote serves as the in service inventory while another tote sits on top of the in service tote and is supplied with a quick-disconnect and is used for filling the other. Rupturing one tote would have the potential to allow a release of approximately 700 gallons of ammonia hydroxide. A catastrophic failure and release of 800 gallons of ammonia hydroxide was evaluated to occur at the closest point of the chemical container dike curb to each individual control room ventilation intake in calculation S-5-CAV-NEE-1868 Revision 1.</p> <p>The analysis concluded that the worst case scenario caused a control room concentration of ammonium hydroxide of 36 ppm. The limit specified in Regulatory Guide 1.78 Revision 1 is 300 ppm, which is significantly higher than the calculated 36 ppm.</p>
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	Revised Commitment Description	Justification for Change
<p>Original Commitment: TSI for units 1 and 2 will be issued by 12/92 to limit the time the D vital instrument bus may be inoperable during modes 1-4. The allowed outage time will be no more than 72 hours and will be addressed in the evaluation for the TS. The TSI will remain in effect until extension of the allowed outage time or deletion of the TSI is justified by further evaluation or the tech specs are changed to include the D inverter</p> <p>Source Document: NRC GL 91-11</p> <p>References: CM-SC-1992-355 70142246</p> <p>Date of Change: 09/26/2012</p>	None- Commitment was completed	Commitment was completed with approval TS Amendment 221 for Salem Unit 1 and TS Amendment 203 for Salem Unit 2. The change added the D Vital Instrument Bus to TS 3/4.8.2.1