



South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

December 2, 2013  
NOC-AE-13003056  
10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

South Texas Project  
Units 1 & 2  
Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499  
STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information  
Associated With Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns

References:

1. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of the Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident" March 12, 2012 (ML12056A046).
2. Letter from D. W. Rencurrel, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident", November 27, 2012 (NOC-AE-120022931) (ML13003A275)
3. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, "Request for Additional Information Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns", November 1, 2013 (ML13304B418)

On March 12, 2012 (Reference 1), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a letter requesting additional information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter called the 50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees conduct seismic hazard walkdowns to verify the plant configuration with the current licensing basis. STPNOC stated by letter (Reference 2) that the seismic walkdowns would be performed in accordance with Electric Power Research Institute EPRI-1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic." Following the NRC staff's initial review of the walkdown reports, regulatory site audits were conducted at a sampling of plants. Based on the walkdown report reviews and site audits, the staff identified additional information necessary to allow the staff to complete its assessments.

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By letter dated November 1, 2013 (Reference 3), the NRC requested additional information (RAI) related to seismic walkdowns. The Attachment 1 provides STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) response to the RAIs. Supplemental information that supports the RAI responses is provided in Attachments 2 and 3.

There are no commitments in this letter.

If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Ken Taplett at (361) 972-8416 or me at (361) 972-7566.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 12-2-2013



G.T. Powell  
Site Vice President

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Attachments:

1. STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Seismic Walkdowns
2. Supplement to Table 4-1 for Unit 1: Table 4-1A-U1
3. Supplement to Table 4-1 for Unit 2: Table 4-1A-U2

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## **ATTACHMENT 1**

### **STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Seismic Walkdowns**

**STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information  
Related to Seismic Walkdowns**

Note: References described in this Attachment are found at the end of the Attachment.

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a letter [Reference 1] requesting additional information per Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter called the 50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees conduct seismic hazard walkdowns to verify the plant configuration with the current licensing basis (CLB). The licensees stated by letter that the seismic walkdowns would be performed in accordance with Electric Power Research Institute EPRI-1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (walkdown guidance). Following the NRC staff's initial review of the walkdown reports, regulatory site audits were conducted at a sampling of plants. Based on the walkdown report reviews and site audits, the staff identified additional information necessary to allow the staff to complete its assessments.

**NRC RAI 1**

**Conduct of the walkdowns, determination of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs), dispositioning of issues, and reporting**

As a result of the audits and walkdown report reviews, the NRC staff noted that licensees' interpretations of the seismic walkdown guidance varied, which resulted in meaningful differences in the process used to disposition identified issues and in the documentation that was provided to the NRC staff. In particular, the application of engineering judgment in determining what constituted a potentially adverse seismic condition (PASC), the threshold for conducting licensing basis evaluations (LBEs), and determining what information was to be reported to the NRC staff varied.

The NRC staff intended that conditions initially marked No (N) or Unknown (U) in the field by the seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs) for which an analysis or calculation was performed would be considered as PASCs and that an analysis or calculation constituted an LBE. The walkdown guidance allows for analysis as part of engineering judgment; however, the intent was to allow for only simple analyses that could be readily performed in support of engineering judgment. Further, the walkdown activities were intended to allow for transparency in the licensee's process to demonstrate that PASCs were appropriately identified, that they were addressed in an appropriate manner, and the basis documented such that the current condition of the plant was clearly consistent with the CLB with regard to seismic capability.

During the audits, the NRC staff identified examples of field observations that were deemed not to be PASCs. However, the basis for the determination was not clearly recorded. In some cases, the field checklists were amplified by noting that the basis was engineering judgment. During site audit discussions, the staff was able to trace the basis for the engineering judgments and found that in many cases they were appropriate. It is expected that these situations would not be included in the walkdown report.

There were other situations that a PASC and LBE were not reported; however, the NRC staff found during the audit that a calculation, analysis (more than just simple), or evaluation was conducted but informally. An example is a confirmatory calculation performed to demonstrate that six anchor bolts out of eight was not a seismically adverse condition. Another example would be an analysis to demonstrate that an existing, slightly short weld was as seismically sound as the prescribed weld length in the plant design documentation. The staff expected these types of conditions and evaluations to be captured in the licensee's normal plant processes (e.g., condition report or corrective action program (CAP)), and also reported in the walkdown report, since they were potentially adverse seismic conditions that required more than applying judgment or simple analysis to address.

The NRC staff also found that the process that was used to deal with a field observation that was deemed to be a PASC was also not completely described or captured in the report. In many cases, the licensee reported that an LBE was not performed. However, during the audits, it was clear that an LBE (or an equivalent determination method) was performed and used in determining whether a PASC should be entered into the CAP. The staff expects that these conditions would be reported in the walkdown report.

On the whole, through the audits, the NRC staff found that it was able to conclude that the intent of the guidance was met when the licensee's overall process was completely explained, the information was updated to reflect the actual process, and results were updated. The self-assessments conducted by the licensees of the audited plants also identified the lapse in the description of the process used by the licensee to identify a PASC and disposition it. Therefore, in order to clarify the process that was followed, please provide a description of the overall process used by the licensee (and its contractors) to evaluate observations identified in the field by the SWEs. The process should include how a field observation was determined to be a PASC or not and how the bases for determinations were recorded. Once a determination was made that an observation was a PASC, describe the process for creating a condition report (or other tracking mechanism), performing the LBE (or other determination method), and the resultant action, such as entering it into the CAP, or documenting the result and basis.

Also, in order to confirm that the reported information supports concluding that the plant meets the CLB, please follow one of the following three acceptable alternatives:

- (a) Provide a supplement to the table or text from the original walkdown report, if needed, to include similar conditions as the above examples and situations and for conditions for which a calculation, analysis (if more than a simple analysis), or evaluation was used for a determination. The supplement should include a short description of each condition, how it was dispositioned and the basis for the disposition, as follows: 1) for each condition that was entered into the CAP, provide the CAP reference number, initiation date, and (if known) the planned completion date, or 2) for all other conditions, provide the result of the LBE (or other determination method), the basis for the result, and how (or where) the result was captured in the plant's documentation or existing plant process.

- (b) Following the plant's standard procedures, confirm that a new CAP entry has been made to verify if appropriate actions were taken when reporting and dispositioning identified PASCs (including conditions for which a calculation, analysis (if more than a simple analysis), or evaluation was used for a determination). The eventual CAP closeout, including the process followed and actions taken, should be in sufficient detail to enable NRC resident inspectors to follow up.
- (c) If no new conditions are identified for addition to the supplement or the CAP entry mentioned above is deemed not necessary, provide a statement of confirmation that all potentially seismic adverse conditions (including conditions for which a calculation, analysis (if more than a simple analysis), or evaluation was used for a determination) identified during the walkdowns and walk-bys were addressed and included in the report to the NRC.

### **STPNOC Response:**

#### ***Description of the Overall Process Used to Evaluate Observations Identified in the Field***

*The overall process which STPNOC used to perform the seismic walkdowns for STP Units 1 & 2 is described in the Seismic Walkdown Summary Reports 1 and 2 (the Report), submitted to the NRC [Reference 2]. As stated in Section 4.0 of the Report, the walkdown process was based on the requirements in EPRI Report 1025286 (the EPRI guidance) [Reference 3].*

*Section 4.0 of the Report describes the methodology which was utilized to evaluate field observations and to process any observations. The methodology was based on the requirements, such as those listed in Section 4.0 and Appendix D of the EPRI guidance, and was documented in a procedure utilized to perform the walkdowns.*

*The checklists used to document the initial field observations during the walkdowns and walk-bys are essentially the same as those in Appendix C of the EPRI guidance. A final checklist question requires identification of any PASC that was determined during the walkdowns and walk-bys.*

*Section 4.0 of the Report defines the potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs), identified in the EPRI guidance, on which the walkdowns should focus. These included:*

- *Anchorage conditions which did not comply with plant documents or were degraded,*
- *Visibly degraded equipment which could impact the function of the structures, systems, and components (SSC) or degraded non-safety related equipment which could impact nearby safety-related equipment,*
- *Equipment conditions which could result in adverse seismic conditions,*
- *Potentially adverse spatial interactions that could impact the SSCs during a seismic event, and*
- *Housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interactions.*

A summary of the walkdown report is as follows:

- *Before the walkdowns were started, STPNOC designated seismic walkdown team contacts that interfaced with plant personnel to retrieve information from plant documentation which was used to resolve many issues. Potential issues were documented in a condition report (CR).*
- *During each walkdown and walk-by, the two SWEs (contractor personnel accompanied by plant personnel) on each team compared the field conditions for SSCs to the existing plant seismic design documentation for the SSCs and identified any potential issues.*
- *Potential issues were documented in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) and Area Walk-by Checklists (AWCs). The SWEs obtained information from vendor documents, plant drawings, engineering standards, and from plant engineering personnel. The SWEs used this information along with their training, experience and judgment to determine whether the issue was a PASC.*
- *In some cases, especially those involving spatial interaction where a near-term action could quickly resolve the issue (such as an unrestrained cart in the vicinity of a seismically qualified cabinet), the SWEs identified the issue to plant personnel and it was immediately corrected (the cart was relocated or restrained). On returning from the field, a CR was immediately written to document the issue. The CR was closed after the issue was resolved. These issues are included in the CRs listed in Table 4-1 of the Report.*
- *If information could not be found to resolve the issue, the two SWEs discussed the issue and identified the item as an issue for which a CR was appropriate. The SWEs noted this in the checklist and identified it to the designated STPNOC seismic walkdown team contact.*
- *STPNOC procedure 0PGP03-ZX-0002A, "Condition Reporting Process Implementation" was used by plant personnel to determine whether the item met the criteria for a CR, and, if so, a CR was initiated. The process described in the Report is as follows:*
  - *A low threshold was used to identify and document potential adverse conditions observed during the walkdowns and walk-bys.*
  - *Table 4-1 of the Report [Reference 2] lists those potential adverse conditions, which have been submitted as CRs and included in the Corrective Action Program (CAP).*
  - *The items listed in Table 4-1 include non-seismic issues, such as various housekeeping and material condition items, as well as seismic issues.*
  - *Table 4-1 summarizes the issue, describes how the issue has been or is being addressed, and provides the current status of the resolution. Note that this was the "current status" at the time the Report was issued.*
  - *Table 4-1 also presents evidence that, even for most items where engineering judgment was used, a CR was initiated to document the item and the method of resolution.*
- *For those issues that required immediate operability determinations (IODs), these were performed by the on-shift Shift Managers on the basis of discussion with and input from plant engineering personnel. These cases are identified in Table 4-1. The equipment*



*was determined to be either operable or functional. Thus, as indicated in the Report [Reference 2], no significant issues that challenged the STPNOC seismic licensing or design basis were identified as a result of the walkdowns.*

*By identifying potential seismic issues at very low threshold using the CAP, the current licensing and design basis were confirmed to be maintained throughout the walkdown and walk-by process.*

### **Confirmation that Reported Information Supports Concluding the Plant Meets the CLB**

*STPNOC is providing additional information to the NRC based on Option "a" of the RAI as a supplement to Table 4-1 of the Walkdown Report. This additional information does not revise the existing information in the Table 4-1.*

*STPNOC evaluated all field observations and confirmed that the current condition of the plant was consistent with the CLB with regard to seismic capability. STPNOC initiated CRs to document and track the resolution of potential seismic issues identified during the walkdowns. This information was reported in Table 4-1 of the Report. While these CRs identified actions to be taken to correct certain as-found conditions, none identified a condition which would lead to the conclusion that the plant was not within the CLB.*

*Engineering judgment was used to disposition the majority of items identified in Table 4-1. The RAI indicates that those field observations that were resolved on the basis of engineering judgment would not be included in the walkdown report. However, STPNOC included all walkdown and walk-by field observations in Table 4-1 of the Report [Reference 2].*

*Table 4-1 identifies all of the CRs by CR number, provides a summary description, identifies those which are "Seismic Related", identifies any immediate actions taken, provides the CR status at the time the Report was issued, as well as the basis on which the issue was addressed or were planned to be addressed.*

*Table 4-1A-U1 and Table 4-1A-U2 (for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively) are provided as supplements to the respective Table 4-1 from the Reports (see Attachments 2 and 3). In addition to the information provided in Table 4-1, these tables provide supplemental information requested by the NRC in the RAI [Reference 4].*

*Only two of the items in the Table 4-1 supplements meet the definition of a PASC. In one instance (see page 5 of Attachment 2, CR 12-27108), the potential for unrestrained chains hanging near containment spray pumps was evaluated – Engineering determined that the existing configuration was acceptable and in accordance with existing design documents. In the second case (see page 9 of Attachment 2, CR 12-27776), bent stiffener plates were observed at the bottom of a Safety Injection (SI) accumulator tank – Engineering determined that this condition was degraded but remained acceptable for use. In both cases, a Condition Report Engineering Evaluation (CREE) was performed and it was determined that no additional actions were required. A CREE is analogous to a LBE referred to in this RAI.*

## **NRC RAI 2**

### **Conduct of the Peer Review Process**

As a result of the walkdown report reviews, the NRC staff noted that some descriptions of the peer reviewers and the peer review process that was followed were varied and, in some cases, unclear. In some cases, the staff could not confirm details of the process, such as if the entire process was reviewed by the peer review team, who were the peer reviewers, what was the role of each peer reviewer, and how the reviews affected the work, if at all, described in the walkdown guidance.

Therefore, in order to clarify the peer review process that was actually used, please confirm whether the following information on the peer review process was provided in the original submittal, and if not, provide the following.

- (a) Confirmation that the activities described in the walkdown guidance on page 6-1 were assessed as part of the peer review process.
- (b) A complete summary of the peer review process and activities. Details should include confirmation that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity. If there were cases in which peer reviewers reviewed their own work, please justify how this is in accordance with the objectives of the peer review efforts.

Also, if there are differences from the original submittal, please provide a description of the above information. If there are differences in the review areas or the manner in which the peer reviews were conducted, describe the actual process that was used.

### **STPNOC Response:**

*The Report provides the information requested by the NRC regarding the conduct and content of the peer review process [Reference 2]:*

1. *The Report identifies the experienced Peer Review Team members who performed the Peer Review Function for STP Units 1 & 2. Section 7.0 provides confirmation that the Peer Review Team participated in all of the activities identified on Page 6-1 of the EPRI guidance [Reference 3]. It also provides a summary of the activities they performed for each of these requirements.*
2. *A summary of the peer review process implemented for the STP 1 & 2 seismic walkdowns is explained in Section 7.0 of the Report, "Peer Team Review Summary". A summary of the peer reviewer involvement in each of the walkdown activities is as follows:*
  - *Selection of the SSCs in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL): The SSC's in the SWEL were initially identified by experienced STP plant personnel and walkdown team personnel (Section 3.0). The Peer Review Team then performed a*

comprehensive review of the SWEL, and their comments were resolved and incorporated in the final SWEL (Section 7.0).

- Review of a sample of the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) and Walk-by checklists: A walkdown package was prepared for each component listed on the SWEL and for each area walk-by to be performed (Section 4.0).

The Peer Review Team reviewed seismic walkdown packages for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SWCs before walkdowns were performed (Section 7.0). The initial sampling of the SWCs reviewed the determination of the equipment class and that related documentation was included (e.g., location drawings, anchorage details, etc.). These peer reviews confirmed that the packages were adequate to support the walkdowns.

- Review the licensing basis evaluations: A low threshold was used to identify and document potential adverse conditions observed during the walkdowns and walk-bys (Section 4.0).

The Peer Review Team sampled CRs submitted during the initial walkdown period between September 20<sup>th</sup> and October 1<sup>st</sup> 2012 and determined that the threshold level for generated CRs was low enough to ensure that any licensing basis issue would have been appropriately documented (Section 7.0).

- Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions into the CAP process: Consistent with plant procedures, PASCs identified during the walkdowns were entered into the CAP (Section 7.0).

The Peer Review Team determined that the threshold level for generated CRs was low enough to ensure that any licensing basis issue would have been appropriately documented (Section 7.0).

- Review the submittal report: A review of the submittal report was performed by members of the Peer Review Team and it was determined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter were met (Section 7.0).
- Summarize the results of the peer review process in the submittal report: Either plant or walkdown team personnel performed all of the walkdown activities, starting with development of the SWEL to completion of the walkdown report. The peer reviewers did not perform any of these walkdown activities and only performed their peer review activities, independently, after the respective walkdown activity was complete. There were no cases where a peer reviewer reviewed their own work.

The response provided above primarily comes from the Seismic Walkdown Summary Reports for STP Units 1 & 2 [Reference 2]. This demonstrates that there are no differences from the original submittal regarding the conduct of the peer review process.

**References:**

1. *Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of the Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident", March 12, 2012 (ML12056A046).*
2. *Letter from D.W. Rencurrel, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident", November 27, 2012 (ML13003A275)*
3. *EPRI Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic", May 29, 2012 (ML12164A751).*
4. *Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, "Request for Additional Information Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic Walkdowns", November 1, 2013 (ML13304B418)*

## **ATTACHMENT 2**

**Supplement to Table 4-1 for Unit 1: Table 4-1A-U1**

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-26948	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INSULATION IS TORN ON TOP/WEST SIDE OF CRE HVAC AIR HANDLING UNIT TRAIN A (ROOM 13).  REPAIR AS NECESSARY	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/20/12	CLOSED 06/25/13
12-26950	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - SURFACE CORROSION ON A JUNCTION BOX IN 10' EAB PENETRATION SPACE. JUNCTION BOX IS LABELED TB05. IT'S ON THE EAST WALL BEHIND THE PENETRATION SPACE EMERGENCY AIR HANDLING UNIT. LOOKS LIKE IT WAS NEVER PAINTED.  REPAIR AS NECESSARY	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/20/12	CLOSED 07/24/13
12-26953	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - MATERIAL WAS FOUND IN THE BOTTOM OF THE A TRAIN SEQUENCER CABINET ZLP801 (A SMALL LIGHT BULB, NUT & FASTENER). OPERATOR REMOVED THE MATERIAL. THIS CR IS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE FINDING. THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS DID NOT FIND THE ISSUE DEFICIENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE CABINET.  AN IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION WAS MADE BASED UPON THE LOCATION AND MASS OF THE OBJECTS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THEY COULD NOT BE ELEVATED TO AN AREA WHERE THEY COULD AFFECT ABILITY OF THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION.  AN INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERTAKEN TO DETERMINE HOW AND WHEN THE FME WAS LEFT THERE. LESSONS LEARNED WERE DEVELOPED AND SHARED WITHIN THE PLANT.	Y	CLOSED	Immediate Operability Determination (IOD) Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Material Removed	09/20/12	CLOSED 11/13/12

**Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-26976	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - FREON COLLECTION TANKS ON THE 10' EAB NEAR ESSEN CHILLER 12A DID NOT HAVE THEIR WHEELS SECURED AS REQUIRED IN OPGP03-ZA-0098 ADDENDUM 7 (CONTROL OF TEMP EQUIP/MATERIAL IN SEISMIC II/I AREAS). OPERATOR SECURED THE WHEELS USING THE BRAKES. IT APPEARS THE WHEELS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE LOCKED; HOWEVER, THE TANKS WERE CHAINED &amp; THAT MAY SUFFICE FOR ADDEND 7 STEP 4D WHERE THE TERM ETC IS USED. THIS CR SIMPLY DOCUMENTS THE FINDING.</p> <p>AN IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION WAS MADE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE TANKS WERE CHAINED SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT CONTACT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. THUS THE ESSENTIAL CHILLER OPERABILITY WAS NOT AFFECTED.</p>	Y	CLOSED	<p>IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Issue Corrected (Wheels Secured)</p>	09/20/12	CLOSED 10/09/12
12-26988	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - RUSTED BOLT ON EAB EMERGENCY ELECT PENETRATION SPACE AHU WARRANTS REPAIR.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/20/12	CLOSED 06/11/13
12-26991	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - IN ROOM 1, A CABLE TRAY HANGER HAS A VERY SMALL GAP BETWEEN IT AND A FIRE SPRINKLER HEADER. THE CABLE TRAY # IS A1XE1HTJAC (~8' NORTH OF LINE 24). THIS SHOULD BE EVALUATED AGAINST SEISMIC SEPARATION CRITERIA. SEE COMMENTS AND ACTION 1 FOR NON-ADVERSE CHARACTERIZATION.</p> <p>VISUAL EVALUATION OF THE PROXIMITY OF THE FIRE SPRINKLER PIPE TO THE UPPER PORTION OF A CABLE TRAY SUPPORT STRUT FOR TRAY NUMBER A1XEHTJAL CONCLUDED THAT A SEISMIC INTERACTION WOULD NOT BE ADVERSE BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVE SIZE AND RIGIDITY OF THE TRAY SUPPORT STRUCTURE.</p> <p>FURTHER ACTION NEEDED TO DETERMINE IF THE INTERACTION NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED.</p>	Y	CLOSED	<p>Engineering Judgment</p> <p>As-Found Condition Acceptable</p>	09/20/12	CLOSED 11/19/12

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-26992	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - FOUND A CART THAT WAS NOT SECURED TO PREVENT COMING INTO CONTACT WITH A SAFETY RELATED CABINET. CORRECTED THE SITUATION. THE CART WAS TIED OFF BUT THERE WAS ENOUGH PLAY IN THE ROPE THAT THE CART COULD STILL COME INTO CONTACT.  SEISMIC ENGINEERS DID NOT CITE THIS AS A SEISMIC DEFICIENCY BUT WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH STATION HOUSEKEEPING. THIS CART WAS FOUND IN THE RELAY ROOM.	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	09/20/12	CLOSED 10/15/12
12-26993	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - GROUND WIRE ON CONDUIT SUPPORT IS MISSING NUT/CLAMP. THIS IS ON THE FLOOR AT RT 8015.  REPAIR.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/20/12	OPEN 08/11/14
12-27020	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THERE IS CORROSION ON THE BOTTOM OF 2 SUPPORTS IN ECW 1A BAY. THESE SUPPORTS ARE NORTH & SOUTH OF THE ECW PUMP. THERE IS ALSO CORROSION ON THE ANCHOR BOLTS & NUTS & WASHERS ON THE ECW PUMP. PLEASE CLEAN & RECOAT. THIS CORROSION DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF ECW A TRAIN.  CLEAN AND RECOAT	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/20/12	CLOSED 04/25/13
12-27021	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - UNIT 1 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING, ROOM 002, ELEVATION 4'-0" 1) OBSERVED MORE THAN MILD CORROSION ON A UNISTRUT SUPPORT FOR WASTE SURGE TANK STRAINERS A AND B. 2) OBSERVED MORE THAN MILD CORROSION ON LIGHT SUPPORT LOCATED ON TRAIN A CEILING 3) OBSERVED ONE MISSING BOLT ON N1HFZSC9520 FHB SUPPLY AIR PLENUM 11B VDA-003 CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH.  SEISMIC ENGINEERS DOING THIS WALKDOWN BELIEVE THESE ITEMS DO NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AROUND THEM.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/21/12	CLOSED 08/16/13



**Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27022	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - IN ECW 1A BUILDING, A JUNCTION BOX COVER IS MISSING 3 FASTENERS. IT IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE 18, SO IT HAS 15. THIS JUNCTION BOX IS NOT LABELED BUT IT IN ON THE EAST WALL.</p> <p>THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS SAID THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH FASTENERS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURING. IF THE COVER DID FALL, IT WOULD NOT COME INTO CONTACT WITH ANYTHING SAFETY RELATED.</p> <p>REPLACE MISSING FASTENERS.</p>	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/21/12	CLOSED 01/31/13
12-27025	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - PERSONAL AIRLOCK AREA DOES NOT MEET THE STATION HOUSEKEEPING STANDARDS. WE FOUND UNSECURED ITEMS, SCAFFOLD CART WITH UNLOCKED WHEELS, SEVERAL ITEMS THAT COULD HAVE IMPACTED THE PAL CONTROLS &amp; AIR LINE. DAMAGE TO THESE SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE DOOR'S ABILITY TO STAY CLOSED BUT THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT MEET II/I CRITERIA. THE WALKDOWN TEAM &amp; OPERATIONS TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION TO SECURE/MOVE EQUIPMENT AS NECESSARY.</p> <p>PERFORMED IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY REVIEW FOR SEISMIC AND FIRE LOADING CONCERNS FOR MATERIAL HANDLING CART LEFT UNATTENDED AND UNSECURED. UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: DUE TO THE SIZE, LOCATION, AND COMPOSITION OF THE CART, IF A SEISMIC EVENT HAD OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THE CART WAS LEFT UNATTENDED, DAMAGE TO ADJACENT EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THEIR INTENDED DESIGN FUNCTION. THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF TRANSIENT COMBUSTIBLES FOR THAT ROOM WAS NOT EXCEEDED AND THE FIRE LOAD DID NOT CHALLENGE OPERABILITY OF THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS WITHIN THE ROOM.</p>	Y	CLOSED	<p>IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Issue Corrected (Equipment Secured/ Moved)</p>	09/21/12	CLOSED 10/15/12

**Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27073	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - SG RECIRC PUMP 11A DISCHARGE TO FW HEADER FLOW INDICATOR (FI-4194A) IS MISSING ONE OF ITS SIX SECURING SCREWS. INSTALL MISSING SCREW. SEISMIC ENGINEERS DO NOT BELIEVE THIS MISSING SCREW AFFECTS THE ABILITY OF THE INDICATOR TO MEET ITS SEISMIC II/1 CRITERIA.  IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINED PERFORMED. UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS.  SCREWS SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING THE NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOOD OPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	09/24/12	CLOSED 02/07/13
12-27083	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THERE IS DAMAGE TO THE INSULATION OF THE EAB MAIN AREA AIR SUPPLY ROOM VENTILATION IN ROOM 9.  REPAIR AS NECESSARY.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/24/12	CLOSED 05/29/13
12-27108	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - NEED TO EVALUATE THE CHAINS THAT HANG DOWN FROM THE CEILING IN THE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS ROOM. THE CHAINS CAN COME INTO CONTACT WITH THE PUMPS & OTHER EQUIPMENT. IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION WAS PERFORMED. UPON THE EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECT COMPONENTS WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION BASED ON THE SIZE LOCATION, FLEXIBILITY AND COMPOSITIONS OF THE CHAINS. IF A SEISMIC EVENT HAD OCCURRED, CONTACT WITH SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT WOULD BE UNLIKELY. IF THE CHAINS WERE TO CONTACT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT THE MOMENTUM AND FORCE. THE CHAINS WOULD GENERATE WOULD BE MINIMAL AND UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THE INTENDED DESIGN FUNCTION.	Y	CLOSED	<u>PASC</u> Condition Report Engineering Evaluation (CREE) 12-27108 Performed: Existing Configuration is Acceptable	09/24/12	CLOSED 10/18/12
12-27260	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - CCMOV0774 ACTUATOR HAS A SMALL OIL LEAK.  REPAIR AS NECESSARY	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/27/12	OPEN 03/05/14

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27312	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INLET PIPE FLANGE CONNECTION BOLTS ON TOP OF THE ESF DG FOST 12 ARE CORRODED. REPAIR/REPLACE AS NECESSARY	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/27/12	OPEN 05/27/14
12-27315	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW PUMP 1B HAS CORRODED ANCHOR BOLTS. REPAIR AS NECESSARY.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/27/12	OPEN 08/18/14
12-27319	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - EWFI6863 & EWFI6873 ARE BOTH MISSING 1 OF 6 MOUNTING SCREWS. THERE ARE ENOUGH SCREWS TO HOLD THE INDICATORS DURING A SEISMIC EVENT PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS. REPLACE MISSING SCREWS. ALSO THE INSTRUMENT ISOLATION VALVES ARE CORRODED FOR THESE INDICATORS. CLEAN/RECOAT.	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	09/27/12	CLOSED 10/20/12
12-27345	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE CHAIN FOR THE HOIST ABOVE BORIC ACID PUMP 1A IS IN CONTACT WITH THE PUMP. OPERATIONS WAS NOTIFIED TO TAKE ACTION TO MOVE THE CHAIN OFF THE PUMP IF POSSIBLE. SEE PAGE 3 FOR AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THIS IS NOT A SEISMIC CONCERN PER STP ENGINEERING.  SEISMIC FORCES ARE CAUSED BY INERTIAL REACTION TO SEISMIC SUPPORT MOVEMENTS. GENERALLY SPEAKING, SEISMIC DISPLACEMENTS ARE 2-3 INCHES AT THE MOST, AND MUCH LESS AT LOWER ELEVATIONS LIKE MAB 10. THE FORCE REQUIRED TO BEND STEEL OR MOVE CONCRETE BY AN INCH CAN BE VERY LARGE AND DAMAGING. A CHAIN IS VERY DIFFERENT BECAUSE IT IS FLEXIBLE. A SEISMICALLY-INDUCED SUPPORT MOVEMENT OF AN INCH OR SO WOULD CAUSE NO SIGNIFICANT INERTIAL FORCE IN THE HANGING CHAIN. THE CHAIN WOULD SIMPLY FLEX AND ACCOMMODATE THE MOVEMENT WITHOUT ANY APPRECIABLE INERTIAL OR IMPACT FORCES BEING GENERATED. THEREFORE, THIS CONFIGURATION MEETS CRITERION 3.1-C-2 OF SEISMIC II/I DESIGN CRITERIA 7A360NQ1003, REV. 3.	Y	CLOSED	Hoist Re-Located	09/27/12	CLOSED 10/11/12

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27486	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - 10' MAB PENETRATION SPACE GRADING ABOVE THE IA-FV-8565 IS NOT SECURED ON ONE CORNER AS IT SHOULD BE. REPAIR AS NECESSARY. THIS IS NOT A SEISMIC CONCERN BUT JUST AN OBSERVATION THAT SHOULD BE CORRECTED.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/01/12	OPEN 11/24/14
12-27508	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INSULATION IS DAMAGED & REMOVED FROM THE AREA AROUND CM-0008. REPAIR AS REQUIRED.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/01/12	CLOSED 05/14/13
12-27615	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - 2 UNISTRUTS ATTACHED TO A COLUMN THAT SUPPORTS EW-FI-6863 HAVE CHANNEL NUTS THAT ARE NOT ENGAGED WITH THE INSIDE LIP OF THE UNISTRUT ON ONE SIDE EACH. THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS DO NOT BELIEVE THIS AFFECTS THE COMPONENTS ABILITY TO SURVIVE A SEISMIC EVENT. REPAIR AS REQ'D. PHOTO ATTACHED ACTION 1.  FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH SEISMIC ENGINEERS, THERE ARE SUFFICIENT CHANNEL NUTS, WITH SUFFICIENT ENGAGEMENT TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS COMPONENT WILL SURVIVE A SEISMIC EVENT AND IS NOT AN OPERABILITY CONCERN.	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	10/03/12	CLOSED 02/11/13
12-27633	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - PIPE COUPLINGS DOWNSTREAM OF FP 0644 ARE CORRODED AND SHOULD BE CLEANED/RECOATED.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/03/12	CLOSED 09/05/13
12-27634	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INSULATION IS MISSING DOWNSTREAM OF CH-0305.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/03/12	CLOSED 12/06/12
12-27635	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - PIPE BETWEEN CH-0608 AND CHILLER IS MISSING INSULATION. REPLACE INSULATION.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/03/12	CLOSED 12/06/12
12-27637	16 DPM LEAK FROM ESSENTIAL CHILLWATER PUMP 11C. APPEARS TO BE COMING FROM PACKING INSIDE INSULATION. SEISMIC WALKDOWN	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/03/12	CLOSED 08/12/13

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27686	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - CCP 1A SKID IS BOLTED DOWN WITH SEVERAL BOLTS (18). THE BOLTS EACH HAVE 2 HOLD-DOWN NUTS EXCEPT FOR ONE BOLT. ONE IS MISSING ONE OF THE HOLD-DOWN NUTS. THIS DOES NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC ABILITIES OF THE SKID OR PUMP.</p> <p>PER DED: THE SECOND NUT ADDS NO STRENGTH. THE PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE NUT DESIGN IS TO PREVENT THE NUTS FROM COMING LOOSE. AS LONG AS THE SINGLE NUT IS TIGHT, IT IS ACCEPTABLE. REPLACE THE ONE MISSING NUT.</p>	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/04/12	CLOSED 02/21/13
12-27689	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - BAT 1A &amp; 1B BOTH ARE BOLTED TO THE FLOOR BUT THE HOLD-DOWN NUTS DO NOT HAVE WASHERS AS DETAILED IN THE DRAWINGS. INSTALL WASHERS. SEISMIC ENGINEERS &amp; STP ENGINEERS AGREE THESE MISSING WASHERS DO NOT AFFECT THE TANK'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION WAS MADE. ALL BOLTS SECURING BORIC ACID TANKS 1A &amp; 1B ARE INTACT AND ARE NOT DEGRADED PER ENGINEERING, MISSING WASHERS DO NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE TANKS AND THERE IS REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE BORIC ACID TANKS WILL PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked Washers Added</p>	10/04/12	CLOSED 02/07/13

**Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27776	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - TWO (2) OF 56 GUSSET PLATES CONNECTING THE TWO FLANGES OF THE DOUBLE FLANGE BASE OF THE ACCUMULATOR TANK IS BENT OUT OF PLANE. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE PROVIDED TO ASSIST OPERATIONS IN THEIR IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED, BUT THE NATURE AND LOCATION OF THE DAMAGE SUGGEST POSSIBLE PAST INAPPROPRIATE USE OF THE GUSSET PLATE AS A RIGGING PULL POINT. SINCE THE PLATE WAS NOT MEANT TO BE USED IN THAT FASHION, IT REACHED YIELD STRESS, RESULTING IN PERMANENT DEFORMATION. NO CRACKS ARE VISIBLE, AND THE DEFORMED REGION APPEARS TO BE LIMITED TO THE PORTION OF THE PLATE OUTSIDE THE BOLT. THE LARGEST LOADS WOULD EXIST BETWEEN THE BOLT AND THE TANK, WITH THE STRESS DIMINISHING OUTSIDE THE BOLT TO ZERO AT THE FREE EDGE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE OBSERVED DAMAGE IS CONCENTRATED IN THE REGION OF LOWEST STRESS. DAMAGE LIMITED TO A REGION OF LOW STRESS IN JUST TWO (2) OF 56 PLATES IS JUDGED TO HAVE ONLY MINOR SIGNIFICANCE. ENGINEERING NEEDS TO DO AN EVALUATION TO VERIFY IT IS OK TO LEAVE AS IS. PHOTOS ATTACHED. THIS CONDITION WAS FOUND ON 9/27/2012.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: NO CRACKS ARE VISIBLE, AND THE DEFORMED REGION APPEARS TO BE LIMITED TO THE PORTION OF THE PLATE OUTSIDE THE BOLT. THE LARGEST LOADS WOULD EXIST BETWEEN THE BOLT AND THE TANK, WITH THE STRESS DIMINISHING OUTSIDE THE BOLT TO ZERO AT THE FREE EDGE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE OBSERVED DAMAGE IS CONCENTRATED IN THE REGION OF LOWEST STRESS. DAMAGE LIMITED TO A REGION OF LOW STRESS IN JUST TWO (2) OF 56 PLATES IS JUDGED TO HAVE ONLY MINOR SIGNIFICANCE BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE ACCUMULATOR IS OPERABLE.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p><b>PASC</b> <b>IOD</b></p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>CREE 12-27776-2 Performed: Condition Determined Degraded but Acceptable for Use</p>	10/08/12	CLOSED 12/04/12

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27782	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - 2 ANCHORAGE NUTS ARE MISSING FROM THE BATTERY ROOM EXH FAN 11C. SEE COMMENTS ON PAGE 3 &amp; PHOTOS ATTACHED. REWORK BY REPLACING NUTS &amp; WASHERS.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION REPORT FOR THIS FAN IS VENDOR REPORT 4120--00027JA. IT SHOWS THE BOLTS HAVE A DESIGN MARGIN OF 9, COMPARED TO ALLOWED STRESS VALUES. THE ANALYZED CONFIGURATION HAD 3 BOLTS ON EACH OF 2 SIDES (6 TOTAL). THE ACTUAL CONFIGURATION HAS ONLY 4 GOOD BOLTS (LOCATED ON THE CORNERS) WITH MISSING NUTS ON THE MIDDLE BOLT ON EACH SIDE. SINCE THE MIDDLE BOLTS ARE LESS EFFECTIVE THAN THE CORNER BOLTS (DUE TO THEIR LOCATION ON THE NEUTRAL AXIS IN ONE OF 2 HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DIRECTIONS) IT IS CONSERVATIVE TO INCREASE BOLT STRESS BY A FACTOR OF (6/4) , WHICH IS THE SAME AS REDUCING MARGIN BY A FACTOR OF (4/6). REDUCED MARGIN IS (4/6) X 9 = 6, WHICH IS MUCH GREATER THAN THE REQUIRED VALUE OF 1. THEREFORE, THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN IS OPERABLE.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD</p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	10/08/12	CLOSED 06/26/13

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27950	<p>DURING THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER CHILLER UNIT 12C, A CRACK ON THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE GROUT PAD WAS IDENTIFIED. SHOULD BE REWORKED USING PROCEDURE 0PGP03ZE0051.</p> <p>UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: PER DRAWING 3M051C4005, REV. 19, DETAIL 1, SECTION A, THE GROUT PAD IS 2" THICK. THE CRACK ON THE NORTHWEST CORNER EXTENDS FROM THE PAD/FLOOR INTERFACE UPWARD TO THE TOP OF THE GROUT PAD THEN TURNS AND FOLLOWS THE WEST EDGE OF CHILLER 12C BASE PLATE FOR APPROXIMATELY 8 INCHES. THE CRACK IS APPROXIMATELY 0.107" MAXIMUM WIDTH AND 1.25" MAXIMUM DEPTH. THE SAME NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE GROUT PAD HAS AN APPROXIMATE 2 INCH RADIUS, 3/8 INCH DEEP CHIP CAUSED BY MECHANICAL DAMAGE. THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL CRACKS OR DAMAGE ON THE GROUT PAD. THE GROUT PAD IS FUNCTIONAL BUT DEGRADED AND THE GROUT SHOULD BE REWORKED USING PROCEDURE 0PGP03ZE0051. BECAUSE THE CRACK DOES NOT PROPAGATE FROM OR EXTEND TO THE ANCHOR BOLTS AND THERE ARE 24 ANCHOR BOLTS SECURING CHILLER 12C THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT CHILLER 12C, WILL PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION AND WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT.</p> <p>BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT IS OPERABLE.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD</p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	10/11/12	CLOSED 06/25/13



**Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27964	<p>THE PRESSURE GAUGE FOR PRESSURE INDICATOR, N1AFPI7550, IS MISSING ONE MOUNTING BOLT. DRAWING 7Z019Z45080 SHT. 176, ITEM 15 SHOWS 3 - #10 BOLTS FOR MOUNTING THE GAUGE. REPLACE THE MISSING BOLT. SEE COMMENTS FOR ENGINEERING REVIEW. SEISMIC WALKDOWN.</p> <p>UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING IT'S INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: THE PRESSURE GAUGE VENDOR, ASHCROFT, WAS CONTACTED FOR THE GAUGE WEIGHT WHICH IS 3.5 LBS. THE 2 - #10 BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING OVER 200 LBS. SO THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO SUPPORT THE GAUGE WITHOUT IMPACTING SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT IS OPERABLE</p>	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment	10/11/12	OPEN 03/28/14
12-27976	<p>THE PRESSURE GAUGE FOR PRESSURE INDICATOR, N1AFPI7537, IS MISSING ONE MOUNTING BOLT. DRAWING 7Z019Z45080 SHT. 176, ITEM 15 SHOWS 3 - #10 BOLTS FOR MOUNTING THE GAUGE. REPLACE THE MISSING BOLT. SEE COMMENTS FOR ENGINEERING REVIEW. SEISMIC WALKDOWN.</p> <p>UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING IT'S INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: THE PRESSURE GAUGE VENDOR, ASHCROFT, WAS CONTACTED FOR THE GAUGE WEIGHT WHICH IS 3.5 LBS. THE 2-#10 BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING OVER 200 LBS. SO THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO SUPPORT THE GAUGE WITHOUT IMPACTING SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT IS OPERABLE</p>	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	10/11/12	CLOSED 02/17/13
12-28083	DURING THE SEISMIC WALKDOWNS SEVERAL INSTANCES OF EQUIPMENT IMPROPERLY STAGED / SECURED IN SEISMIC II/I AREAS WERE NOTED. DISCUSSIONS WITH WORKERS INDICATED SOME AREAS THAT ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD WELL REGARDING THIS ISSUE.	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	10/15/12	CLOSED 10/18/12

Table 4-1A-U1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at Time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-28780	<p>DURING THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN OF THE 25 KVA SINGLE PHASE CLASS 1E INVERTER IT WAS IDENTIFIED THAT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE GROUT FOUNDATION HAS BEEN CHIPPED, LIKELY DUE TO MECHANICAL DAMAGE. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE INVERTER WILL PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION AND WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT. THE GROUT FOUNDATION IS FUNCTIONAL BUT DEGRADED AND THE GROUT CAN BE REWORKED AS A COSMETIC REPAIR USING PROCEDURE 0PGP03ZE0051.</p> <p>THE GROUT FOUNDATION IS FUNCTIONAL BUT DEGRADED UNTIL REPAIRS ARE COMPLETE. THIS CONDITION IS CHARACTERIZED AS COSMETIC AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERABILITY OF THE INVERTER FOR DP002.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>Functional Assessment Conclusion: Functional Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	10/25/12	<p>CLOSED</p> <p>07/03/13</p>
12-29166	THE INSULATION ON CCMOV0063 HAS A SEPARATION BETWEEN THE INSULATION ON THE PIPING & THE INSULATION FOR THE VALVE. THERE IS SCAFFOLDING UP TO THE VALVE CURRENTLY. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS.	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	10/30/12	<p>CLOSED</p> <p>11/15/12</p>

## **ATTACHMENT 3**

**Supplement to Table 4-1 for Unit 2: Table 4-1A-U2**

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27023	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTED AT 24 AFW PUMPS THAT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT BY:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. THE OIL LINE THAT RUNS BETWEEN BEARINGS HAS A PERFORATED PLATE ATTACHED TO THE TOP OF IT THAT APPEARS TO SOMEWHAT PROTECT FROM SOMEONE STEPPING ON THE OIL LINE. HOWEVER, THE PLATE IS ONLY ATTACHED TO THE LINE &amp; PRESSURE ON THE PLATE DIRECTLY PULLS THE OIL LINE. THE PLATE SHOULD BE FIXED TO THE FOUNDATION &amp; NOT THE OIL LINE. OR, AT LEAST, PUT A SIGN UP THAT SAYS DON'T STEP ON THE PLATE. THIS CONDITION EXISTS IN BOTH UNITS.</li> <li>2. THE COUPLING COVER IS MADE OF VERY LIGHT WEIGHT SHEET METAL &amp; MOVES CONSIDERABLY WITH PRESSURE. THE ENGINEERS BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISER TO BE MADE OF A STRONGER MATERIAL.</li> <li>3. THERE IS MINOR CORROSION IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS ALL OVER THE TURBINE, PUMP &amp; AUXILIARIES THAT SHOULD BE CLEANED UP &amp; REPAINTED THE NEXT TIME THE PUMP IS DOWN FOR ENOUGH TIME. EVALUATE AFW PUMP 24 COUPLING GUARD AS WELL</li> </ol> <p>NONE OF THESE ISSUES AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALITIES OF THE PUMP OR TURBINE.</p>	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/21/12	OPEN 03/17/14

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27096	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS- IN ROOM 010 IN ELEVATION 10', EAB, A ROD HANGER SUPPORT HAS BEEN OBSERVED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH CONDUIT A2XE1GRS099. SEE THE COMMENTS FOR PERSPECTIVE ON NON-ADVERSE NATURE OF CONTACT.</p> <p>REWORK ROD HANGER SUCH THAT A SEPARATION OF 3" IS ACHIEVED WITH CONDUIT A2XE1GRS099, PER SEISMIC SEPARATION CONTROL DRAWING UNIT 1&amp;2, 3A010S10003.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - THE SEISMIC WALK DOWN ENGINEERS THAT PERFORMED THE WALK DOWN NOTED THAT THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED NOT ADVERSE. -DESIGN ENGINEERING HAS PROVIDED A SECOND PARTY PEER REVIEW, AND CONFIRMS WITH THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS CONCLUSION OF ACCEPTABLE (SEE FOLLOWING JUSTIFICATION): THE DIAMETER OF THE CONDUIT IS MANY TIMES LARGER THAN THE HANGER ROD DIAMETER. THE ROD HANGER WILL READILY FLEX WITHOUT ADVERSE INTERACTION TO THE CONDUIT. NOTE THAT THE ROD HANGERS EXHIBIT SUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY AS THEY GO TO THE CEILING, THUS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE CONDUIT. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS CONDITION IS OPERABLE BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND EVALUATION BY ENGINEERING.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD</p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	09/24/12	CLOSED 08/28/13
12-27097	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - TRANSFORMER EDT02J2 IN ROOM 001 OF 10 FT ELEV EAB HAS 2 LOOSE ANCHORS (SUPPORT BOLTS) UNDER THE TRANSFORMER. THERE IS ENOUGH THREAD ENGAGEMENT TO PREVENT A II/I CONCERN PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS. REPAIR AS NECESSARY.</p> <p>*IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THE ANCHORS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED OR TIGHTENED AS THE NEXT AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD</p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	09/24/12	CLOSED 03/06/13

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27099	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE BASE ANCHORS HAVE MINOR CORROSION FROM CONDENSATION & THE INLET & OUTLET CHILLED WATER FLANGES HAVE CORROSION ON THE BOLTS.  REPAIR AS NECESSARY.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/24/12	OPEN 07/21/14
12-27102	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - A SMALL LIGHTWEIGHT CART WAS FOUND IN THE RELAY ROOM THAT WAS NOT SECURED PER ZA-98, ADDENDUM 7. ONLY 1 LEG OF THE CART WAS SECURED SO THE CART WAS ABLE TO COME INTO WITH A SAFETY RELATED CABINET. THE WHEELS OF THE CART WERE NOT PREVENTED FROM ROLLING ALSO. OPERATIONS TOOK PROMPT ACTION TO SECURE THE CART PROPERLY & REMOVE THE WHEELS. THE CART IS SO LIGHT THAT IS WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE ROOM PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS.  BASED ON ENGINEERING INPUT, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS LIGHT WEIGHT CART WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS ROOM. THE CART HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ROOM.	Y	CLOSED	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Issue Corrected (Secured Cart)	09/24/12	CLOSED 10/15/12
12-27103	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ESSEN CHILLED WATER FLOW INDICATOR IS MISSING 2 BOLTS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE ANCHORAGE PANEL. 4 ARE INSTALLED, 2 ARE MISSING. THERE IS ADEQUATE SECURING FOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS.  REPLACE MISSING BOLTS.  IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS. THE BOLTS SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOOD OPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	09/24/12	CLOSED 07/30/13

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27104	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - CCP 2B LUBE OIL COOLER CCW RETURN FLOW INDICATOR IS MISSING ONE BOLT ON TOP. THERE ARE 5 BOLTS THAT SECURE THE INDICATOR ADEQUATELY.</p> <p>REPLACE BOLT.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS. THE BOLT SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOOD OPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD</p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	09/24/12	CLOSED 03/16/13
12-27111	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS- IN ROOM 013, ELEVATION 10', OF THE EAB IT WAS IDENTIFIED ON TRAIN 'A' CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT ONE NUT WAS FOUND LOOSE, AND ONE ANCHOR BOLT WAS SUSPECT OF NOT BEING COMPLETELY SEATED ON THE FOUNDATION. PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS, THERE IS ENOUGH THREAD ENGAGEMENT AT THIS TIME TO MAINTAIN THE AHU'S SEISMIC QUALITIES.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD</p> <p>Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked Loose Nut</p> <p>Gap Acceptable per Site Installation Procedure</p>	09/24/12	CLOSED 12/06/12

Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns						
Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27140	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - A HANGER ON THE FIRE PROTECTION PIPE IN ESF DG 21 BAY ALONG THE SOUTH WALL (VERTICAL) IS TWISTED. PIPE HANGER SHOULD BE ROTATED 90 DEGREES & ADJUSTED TO CARRY LOAD.  PER DISCUSSION WITH ORIGINATOR, SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS DISCUSSED THIS CR AND CONCLUDED THAT THE TWISTED HANGER IS STILL CARRYING SOME VERTICAL LOAD BUT, BEING TWISTED, THIS WOULD NOT BE ITS FULL DESIGNED LOAD. THE SECOND HANGER AT THE TOP OF THE VERTICAL PIPE RISER ON THE HORIZONTAL PORTION JUST A FEW INCHES FROM THE ELBOW AT THE TOP OF THE RISER, IS CARRYING THE VERTICAL LOAD SUFFICIENTLY FOR ANY SEISMIC CONCERNS. FP PIPE SUPPORT IS CONSIDERED FUNCTIONAL BUT DEGRADED IN THIS CONDITION.	Y	OPEN	Functional Assessment Conclusion: Functional Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	09/25/12	CLOSED 06/26/13
12-27158	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT BOLTS & WELDS IN MAB CHILLED WATER IN THE FHB HAVE ENOUGH RUST TO WARRANT CLEAN & RECOAT:1. CH04632. CH04623. CH04644. CH04655. CH04666. CH0413THESE ARE IN ROOM 002 IN FHB 4' ELEV.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/25/12	CLOSED 06/25/13
12-27165	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INSULATION IS TORN/DEGRADED IN A COUPLE LOCATIONS AROUND CH-FE-9320 ON 4 FT ELEV OF FHB.  REPAIR AS NECESSARY	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/25/12	OPEN 02/25/14
12-27167	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ED-PI-8101 FHB CASK POOL PUMP DISCHARGE PI HAS A BORIC ACID LEAK JUST BELOW THE GAUGE.  I&C REPAIR NEEDED.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/25/12	CLOSED 09/16/13
12-27174	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW PUMP 2A HAS CORROSION AT THE BASEPLATE THAT SHOULD BE CLEANED UP & RECOATED.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/26/12	OPEN 07/21/14
12-27176	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - HCMOV0007 HAS SOME CORROSION & SLIGHT OIL LEAK THAT WARRANT REPAIR.  THIS SLIGHT AMOUNT OF CORROSION AND OIL SEEPING IS NOT AT THE QUANTITY THAT WOULD IMPACT THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE VALVE WHICH IS TO STAY CLOSED AS IT CURRRNRTLY IS. NOT AN OPERABILITY CONCERN.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	09/26/12	OPEN 01/04/14



**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27188	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ESSEN CHILLED WATER PUMP 21A HAS A COUPLING GUARD THAT IS BOLTED TO THE FLOOR WITH 4 BOLTS. 3 OF THESE BOLTS HAVE A SLIGHT GAP BETWEEN THE BOLT HEAD & THE LEG OF THE GUARD. THE COVER IS STILL STURDY & DOESN'T FLEX IN ANY DIRECTION.  IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THIS SLIGHT GAPS ON THE MOUNTING FASTENERS FOR THE COUPLING GUARD DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO THE CONTINUED OPERABILITY OF THIS PUMP AS DESCRIBED. ENGINEERS AGREE THAT THIS IS NOT AN OPERABILITY CHALLENGE. PUMP CONTINUES TO BE OPERABLE	Y	CLOSED	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	09/12/12	CLOSED 10/11/12
12-27484	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - EAB ROOM 212 HAS AN EMERGENCY LIGHT THAT IS MISSING A NUT. REPAIR AS NECESSARY. THERE IS NOT A II/I ISSUE, IT IS ADEQUATELY SECURED FOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS.	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	10/01/12	CLOSED 10/15/12
12-27485	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ROOM 76 & ROOM 106 NEED RELAMPED	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	10/01/12	CLOSED 11/12/12
12-27492	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ONE OF THE ESSEN CHILLED WATER LINES IN ROOM 206 HAS A CLAMP NEAR THE FLOOR PENETRATION THAT IS CORRODED & WARRANTS RECOATING. THIS IS FOR C TRAIN ESSEN CHILLED WATER.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/01/12	CLOSED 06/11/13
12-27499	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THERE IS LOOSE INSULATION ON 10' MAB MEZZININE LEVEL NEAR CC-137.  REPAIR AS REQUIRED	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/01/12	CLOSED 02/27/13
12-27552	SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW 2B HAS RUSTED BASEPLATE BOLTS ON THE WEST SIDE. THIS IS MORE THAN MILD CORROSION.  REPAIR/RECOAT.	N	OPEN	Non-Seismic	10/02/12	CLOSED 06/17/13

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27690	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - BAT 2A &amp; 2B BOTH ARE BOLTED TO THE FLOOR BUT THE HOLD-DOWN NUTS DO NOT HAVE WASHERS AS DETAILED IN THE DRAWINGS. INSTALL WASHERS. SEISMIC ENGINEERS &amp; STP ENGINEERS AGREE THESE MISSING WASHERS DO NOT AFFECT THE TANK'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.</p> <p>BASED ON ENGINEERING INPUT, SEISMIC RESTRAINT IS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT THE USE OF WASHERS AND THE TANKS CAN WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT GIVEN THE CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BOLTS AND NUTS INSTALLED.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	02/06/12	CLOSED 02/06/13
12-27832	<p>SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - 2 NON-CLASS ELECTRICAL JUNCTION BOXES (COVERS) ARE MISSING ONE BOLT EACH &amp; ONE OF THE PANELS (BFZZ0011) ALSO HAS 2 LOOSE BOLTS. REPLACE/REPAIR AS NECESSARY. SEE PAGE 3 FOR MED COMMENTS. THESE PANELS' TPNS NUMBERS ARE NOT IN MED. THEY ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN FHB-29' ROOM 4.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION N2VMBFZZ0031 IS THE TPNS OF ONE OF THE PANELS (ACT # 496963); N2VMBFZZ0011 IS THE TPNS FOR THE OTHER ONE (ACT # 540620) THE JUNCTION BOX HAS A LIGHT WEIGHT METAL COVER. ONE OF THE BOXES IS MISSING 1 BOLT WITH 2 OTHERS LOOSE. THE 15 REMAINING BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE LIGHT WEIGHT COVER FROM A SEISMIC II/I CONCERN. THE OTHER BOX IS MISSING 1 BOLT. THE REMAINING 7 BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE COVER FROM A SEISMIC II/I CONCERN. THESE CONDITIONS WOULD NOT THREATEN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS, AND THEREFORE NO OPERABILITY CONCERNS EXIST PER ENGINEERING.</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p> <p>Reworked</p>	10/09/12	CLOSED 12/01/12
12-27896	<p>A NUMBER 9 (#9) GAGE WIRE IS ATTACHED TO ONE OF FIFTY EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS ON SI ACCUMULATOR 2A. PLEASE REWORK BY REMOVING THE PIECE OF WIRE. THE BACKGROUND ON THIS WIRE IS THAT IT WAS USED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERMANENT SCAFFOLDING BUILT AROUND THE SI ACCUMULATORS. REVIEW OF THE CONDITION, THE SCAFFOLD, THE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE, AND THE PROCEDURE THAT INSTALLED THE SCAFFOLD CONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE WIRE TIE WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE ANCHOR BOLT OR ACCUMULATOR FUNCTION, AND 2) THE WIRE TIE IS</p>	Y	OPEN	<p>IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment</p>	10/10/12	OPEN 01/04/14

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

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CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
	<p>UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE SCAFFOLD INSTALLATION. THE REASON FOR THESE TWO CONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE SCAFFOLD ASSEMBLY ALREADY USES EMBEDDED HILTI BOLTS AND SEISMIC BRACES TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC STABILITY. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: A NUMBER 9 (#9) GAGE WIRE IS ATTACHED TO ONE OF FIFTY EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS ON SI ACCUMULATOR 2A. THE BACKGROUND ON THIS WIRE IS THAT IT WAS USED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERMANENT SCAFFOLDING BUILT AROUND THE SI ACCUMULATORS. REVIEW OF THE CONDITION, THE SCAFFOLD, THE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE, AND THE PROCEDURE THAT INSTALLED THE SCAFFOLD CONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE WIRE TIE WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE ANCHOR BOLT OR ACCUMULATOR FUNCTION, AND 2) THE WIRE TIE IS UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE SCAFFOLD INSTALLATION. THE REASON FOR THESE TWO CONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE SCAFFOLD ASSEMBLY ALREADY USES EMBEDDED HILTI BOLTS AND SEISMIC BRACES TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC STABILITY. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS. IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN TO TIE OFF THE SCAFFOLD FRAME TO THE FLANGE BOLT OF THE ACCUMULATOR TANK. THE SCAFFOLD FRAME IS ADEQUATELY TIED OFF IN THE HORIZONTAL DIRECTION BY 3 BRACES FOR SEISMIC LOADS. THIS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY SEISMIC ENGINEER AND AS SUCH DOCUMENTED IN THE DCP 02-86-10 SUPP. 1. THEREFORE, THE WIRE TIE-OFF TO THE ACCUMULATOR ANCHOR BOLT (ONE OF FIFTY-EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS) WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE ANCHOR BOLT, OR THE ACCUMULATOR, FROM PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION DURING A DESIGN BASES EVENT. LIKEWISE, THE WIRE TIE-OFF MAY BE REMOVED FROM THE ACCUMULATOR ANCHOR BOLT, SINCE ADEQUATE SCAFFOLD SUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE 3 SEISMIC BRACES. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE ACCUMULATOR IS OPERABLE</p>					

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27897	<p>DURING THE SEISMIC COMPONENT WALKDOWN OF E2C11-2 BATTERY CHARGER (TPNS 3E232EBC047H) IT WAS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR (1 OF 4) FASTENERS WHICH HOLD DOWN THE INDUCTOR IS FULLY ENGAGED, BUT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT. PLEASE REWORK THIS CONDITION BY TIGHTENING THIS FASTENER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPORATE INSTRUCTIONS. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS.</p> <p>FOR THIS ONE FASTENER THAT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT, THE LOCK WASHER IS NOT FLAT, INDICATING THAT IT COULD BE TIGHTER. ON THE REMAINING THREE BOLTS THE WASHERS, LOCK WASHERS AND NUTS APPEAR TO BE TIGHTLY CONNECTED. BECAUSE THE THREE REMAINING BOLTS ARE TIGHTLY CONNECTED, AND THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL BOLT STRENGTH MARGIN, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE INDUCTOR WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, AND THE PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDUCTOR AND THE BATTERY CHARGER ASSEMBLY WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE</p> <p>FOLLOWING: FOR THIS ONE FASTENER THAT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT, THE LOCK WASHER IS NOT FLAT, INDICATING THAT IT COULD BE TIGHTER. ON THE REMAINING THREE BOLTS THE WASHERS, LOCK WASHERS AND NUTS APPEAR TO BE TIGHTLY CONNECTED. BECAUSE THE THREE REMAINING BOLTS ARE TIGHTLY CONNECTED, AND THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL BOLT STRENGTH MARGIN, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE INDUCTOR WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, AND THE PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDUCTOR AND THE BATTERY CHARGER ASSEMBLY WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE BATTERY CHARGER IS OPERABLE</p>	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment	10/10/12	OPEN 06/09/14

**Table 4-1A-U2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During Walkdowns**

Information from Initial Report				Supplemental Information		
CR No.	Condition Description & Resolution at time of Report Issue (If Closed)	Seismic Related	Report Status	Condition Disposition	CR Issue Date	Current Status/ Forecast Closure
12-27969	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 2C HAS 1 JAM NUT OUT OF 14 THAT IS NOT TIGHT AGAINST THE FOUNDATION HOLD DOWN NUT.  IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE JAM NUT ON ONE OF 14 HOLD DOWN BOLTS IS NOT AN OPERABILITY ISSUE. PER ENGINEERING, THIS JAM NUT IS TO KEEP THE HOLD DOWN NUT FROM COMMING LOOSE. THE HOLD DOWN NUT IS NOT LOOSE. THE JAM NUT SHOULD BE TIGHTENED THROUGH THE NORMAL CAP PROCESS.	Y	OPEN	IOD Conclusion: Operable Based on Engineering Judgment  Reworked	10/11/12	CLOSED 06/26/13
12-28083	DURING THE SEISMIC WALKDOWNS SEVERAL INSTANCES OF EQUIPMENT IMPROPERLY STAGED / SECURED IN SEISMIC II/I AREAS WERE NOTED. DISCUSSIONS WITH WORKERS INDICATED SOME AREAS THAT ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD WELL REGARDING THIS ISSUE.	N	CLOSED	Non-Seismic	10/15/12	CLOSED 10/18/12