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December 6, 2013

ATTN: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

Subject: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3
Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287
Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Temporary Technical Specification Change to Add a Required Action Completion Time for One Keowee Hydro Unit Inoperable for Generator Field Pole Rewinds
License Amendment Request (LAR) No. 2012-01, Supplement 5

On June 27, 2012, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy) submitted a License Amendment Request (LAR) requesting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approve a Technical Specification (TS) change that adds a temporary Completion Time to TS 3.8.1 Required Action (RA) C.2.2.5 to allow time to perform major maintenance on each Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU). By letters dated December 14, 2012, May 28, 2013, and July 26, 2013, Duke Energy responded to NRC Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). Duke Energy provided additional information by letter dated November 26, 2013. By electronic mail dated December 2, 2013, NRC requested Duke Energy submit additional information. The enclosure provides the information requested. This submittal contains no Regulatory Commitments.

If there are any additional questions, please contact Boyd Shingleton, ONS Regulatory Affairs, at (864) 873-4716.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 6, 2013.

Sincerely,

Scott L. Batson
Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Station

Enclosure

A-001
NRR

cc w/Enclosure:

Mr. Victor McCree, Regional Administrator
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Enclosure

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI)

RAI

The following information is requested by the technical staff to support the completion of their review:

In the event of a loss of offsite power in all three Oconee units and a loss of coolant accident in one of the units please explain the following:

(1) Actions (manual and automatic) that must be taken to mitigate the consequence of an accident in one unit and bring the other two units in safe shut down condition when both KHUs are inoperable during the 62-day KHU outage and only power sources available are the power sources not credited in the accident analysis (Oconee FSAR Chapter 15).

(2) Operating procedures established and operator training provided for the above condition to ensure that this activity can be completed safely with all reactors at full power.

Duke Energy Response

(1) In this configuration (both Keowee Hydro Units (KHUs) inoperable), Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15 accident assumptions for a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) on one unit concurrent with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) on all three ONS units are met using a Lee Combustion Turbine (LCT). The LCT is not credited in UFSAR Chapter 15 accident analysis as an emergency power source. Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition H allows both KHUs to be inoperable for a limited time period (60 hours) for planned reasons provided a LCT is energizing both standby buses via an isolated power path prior to entering the TS Condition. In this configuration, the LCT is serving as the ONS emergency power source. The capability of a LCT to power LOCA loads on one ONS unit and LOOP loads on the other two ONS units is specifically addressed in UFSAR Chapter 8 (Section 8.2.1.4 and Table 8-1). With the standby buses continuously energized by a LCT, as required by TSs, the automatic actions of the emergency power switching logic (EPSL) as described in TS 3.3.17 Bases, Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Automatic Transfer Function, will seek out and align power from the charged standby buses to each unit's main feeder buses and associated required loads. There are no manual actions required to power these loads on any of the ONS units.

(2) For a LOCA/LOOP on one ONS unit and LOOP on the other two ONS units from a full power condition, there is no change in how the operator would respond with a KHU supplying power via transformer CT-4 or a LCT energizing the standby buses via transformer CT-5 prior to the event. Operators are trained and the emergency procedures are written to recognize that power may be supplied through CT-4 or CT-5. Since the standby buses were energized prior to the event, there are no operator actions required to restore power to the main feeder buses on any of the ONS units.