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 FACIL: 50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Southern California 05000362
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 KRIEGER, R.W. Southern California Edison Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 90-012-00: on 900803, missed AC offsite power sources verification due to personnel error.

W/9 ltr.

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 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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INTERNAL:	ACNW		2	2		ACRS		2	2
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	NRR/DET/EMEB9H3		1	1		NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11		1	1
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EXTERNAL:	EG&G BRYCE, J.H		3	3		L ST LOBBY WARD		1	1
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Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P. O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92674-0128

R. W. KRIEGER
STATION MANAGER

TELEPHONE
(714) 368-6255

September 4, 1990


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 90-012
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(d), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving a missed AC offsite power sources verification. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: LER No. 90-012

cc: C. W. Caldwell (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																														
Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3												Docket Number (2) 01 51 01 01 01 31 61 21				Page (3) 1 of 0 5														
Title (4) MISSED AC OFFSITE POWER SOURCES VERIFICATION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR																														
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																				
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names					Docket Number(s)														
0	8	0	3	9	0	9	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	9	0	4	9	0	NONE					0	5	0	0	0	1	1
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																											
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0			<div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;"> <div style="width: 33%;">20.402(b)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">20.405(c)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(iv)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">73.71(b)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">20.405(a)(1)(i)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.36(c)(1)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(v)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">73.71(c)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">20.405(a)(1)(ii)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">X 50.36(c)(2)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(vii)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">Other (Specify in Abstract below and in text)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">20.405(a)(1)(iii)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">X 50.73(a)(2)(i)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">20.405(a)(1)(iv)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(ii)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">20.405(a)(1)(v)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(iii)</div> <div style="width: 33%;">50.73(a)(2)(x)</div> </div>																											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																														
Name R. W. Krieger, Station Manager												TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 5 5																		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																														
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)															Expected Submission Date (15)															
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO															Month Day Year _____															
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																														

At 0200 on August 1, 1990, with Unit 3 at 100% power, the Train "A" Diesel Generator (DG) 3G002 was removed from service for routine maintenance. In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, Action Statement a2, the operability of the remaining AC offsite sources was required to be verified by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.a within 1 hour and every 8-hours thereafter.

At 1840 on August 3, 1990, it was identified that the 8-hour AC offsite sources verification due at 1524, had not been performed. The surveillance was immediately initiated and satisfactorily completed at 1917.

The cause of this event is cognitive personnel error. The operators were aware that the surveillance was due at 1524; however, they failed to ensure that the surveillance was completed within the time limits required by TS 3.8.1.1.

For corrective actions: 1) appropriate disciplinary action has been administered to the personnel involved in this event, 2) the event will be discussed with appropriate Operations personnel, 3) the use of signage or additional enhancements as a further means for prompting the operators to perform non-routine Action Statement surveillances will be evaluated, and 4) a Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) Evaluation of this event will be performed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER 05000362	LER NUMBER 90-012-00	PAGE 2 OF 5
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Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Unit: Three
Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
Event Date: 8-3-90
Time: 1524

A. CONDITIONS AT TIME OF THE EVENT:

Mode: 1, 100% Power Operation

B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

1. System Information:

Units 2 and 3 each are provided with two independent Class 1E 4160V (4kV) AC electrical distribution systems [EB] (Train "A" and Train "B"). Each distribution system supplies electrical power to systems and components that are required for normal operation, to safely shutdown the plant, and to mitigate the consequences of Design Basis Events (DBEs).

The Class 1E 4kV distribution systems are normally energized by offsite sources. In the event that electrical power is not available from the offsite sources, each of the systems is powered by an emergency Diesel Generator (DG) [DG,EK]. When voltage on a 4kV bus decreases, a Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) is initiated, resulting in the automatic start of the respective DG.

2. Technical Specification (TS) Information:

TS 3.8.1.1 requires both DGs to be operable when the unit is in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. With one DG inoperable, TS 3.8.1.1, Action Statement a2, requires the operability of the remaining AC offsite sources be verified by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.a within 1 hour and every 8 hours thereafter. This surveillance requirement consists of verifying breaker alignment and bus voltage checks for the offsite power sources.

C. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

1. Event:

At 0200 on August 1, 1990, with Unit 3 at 100% power, the Train "A" DG (3G002) was removed from service for routine maintenance. In accordance with TS 3.8.1.1, Action Statement a2, the operability of the remaining AC offsite sources was required to be verified by

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION
UNIT 3

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performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.a within 1 hour and every 8-hours thereafter.

At 1840 on August 3, 1990, it was identified that the 8-hour AC offsite sources verification which was due at 1524, had not been performed. The surveillance was immediately initiated and satisfactorily completed at 1917.

2. Inoperable Structures, Systems or Components that Contributed to the Event:

None.

3. Sequence of Events:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
8/1/90	0200	DG 3G002 removed from service for routine maintenance.
8/3/90	1524	AC offsite sources verification due.
8/3/90	1840	Identified that the AC offsite sources verification due at 1524, had not been performed.
8/3/90	1917	AC offsite sources verification satisfactorily completed.

4. Method of Discovery:

During the Operations shift turnover, it was identified that the required surveillance had not been performed.

5. Personnel Actions and Analysis of Actions:

Upon identification that the required AC offsite sources verification had not been performed, the surveillance was immediately initiated.

6. Safety System Responses:

Not applicable.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER 05000362	LER NUMBER 90-012-00	PAGE 4 OF 5
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D. CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

Root Cause:

The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel error by the Control Operator (CO) (utility, licensed) and the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) (utility, licensed). The operators were aware that the surveillance was due at 1524; however, they failed to ensure that the surveillance was completed within the time limits required by TS 3.8.1.1.

Contributing Cause:

During the performance of non-routine Action Statement surveillances, administrative controls require that the CO log the time and date that the next surveillance is required to be completed. The CO properly logged this information. In addition, the surveillance due time was written on a note which was placed within the view of the operators. These practices were insufficient for prompting the operators to perform the 8-hour AC offsite sources verification due at 1524.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. Corrective Actions Taken:

Appropriate disciplinary action has been administered to the personnel involved in this event.

2. Planned Corrective Actions:

- a. This event will be discussed with appropriate Operations personnel.
- b. The use of signage or additional enhancements as a further means for prompting the operators to perform non-routine Action Statement surveillances will be evaluated. Appropriate corrective actions will be taken based upon the results of the evaluation.
- c. A Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) Evaluation of this event will be performed. Appropriate corrective actions will be implemented based upon the results of this evaluation.

F. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT:

There was no safety significance to this event since once the surveillance was performed, all the AC offsite sources were satisfactorily verified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER 05000362	LER NUMBER 90-012-00	PAGE 5 OF 5
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G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

1. Component Failure Information:

Not applicable.

2. Previous LERs for Similar Events:

Most recently, LER 89-015 (Docket No. 50-361) reported the failure to perform a non-routine Action Statement surveillance (4-hour Control Element Assembly (CEA) [AA] position verification) due to personnel error. The corrective actions associated with this event included procedural enhancements. These enhancements were specific to the 4-hour CEA position verification and therefore, could not have prevented this event.