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 50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Southern Californ 05000362  
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 PAPAY, L.T. Southern California Edison Co.  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
 ENGELKEN, R.H. Region 5, San Francisco, Office of the Director

SUBJECT: Final deficiency rept re potential release of contaminated water, initially reported 810107. Caused by inadequate motor control ctr assignments for Train A. Assignments will be changed prior to fuel loading.

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
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L. T. PAPAY  
VICE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE  
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February 3, 1981

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region V  
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza  
1990 North California Boulevard  
Walnut Creek, California 94506



Dear Mr. Engelken:

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

In a letter to your office dated January 7, 1981 we identified a condition which we considered potentially reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e). The condition concerns the potential that failure of one motor control center, following a Recirculation Actuation Signal, could cause a valve alignment which would result in contaminated water being pumped outside containment.

Enclosed are twenty-five (25) copies of a final report entitled, "Final Report on Miniflow Isolation in Response to Recirculation Actuation Signal, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3."

If you have any questions regarding this report we would be pleased to discuss them with you at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

Enclosures

cc: Victor Stello (NRC, Director I&E)

R. J. Pate (NRC, San Onofre Units 2 and 3)

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# FINAL REPORT ON MINIFLOW ISOLATION IN RESPONSE TO RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SIGNAL

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

## INTRODUCTION

This report describes a condition involving the postulated failure of a motor control center (MCC) which could result in an open path from the containment sump to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) during the recirculation mode of operation following a loss of coolant accident. It is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e)(3).

The condition described above was identified as a result of studies following TMI; it is considered a deficiency only when TMI activity levels are postulated to exist in the sump. This report includes a description of the condition and a summary of the planned corrective actions. Southern California Edison notified the NRC of a potentially reportable condition by letter dated January 7, 1981.

## BACKGROUND

The condition which is reported here was identified during a review of systems which might be handling reactor coolant with TMI activity levels. The Safety Injection Pump's minimum recirculation isolation valves were implemented with a different pattern of MCC assignments for Train A and Train B. Train B provided a single MCC for both the miniflow isolation valves and the related containment sump isolation valve. Train A provided two (2) MCCs, one for both miniflow isolation valves and another for the containment sump isolation valve. In Train A, after receipt of a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS), a single failure of the miniflow isolation valve MCC could result in the failure of both miniflow isolation valves to close, while RAS operation of the containment sump isolation valve MCC will result in the opening of the containment sump isolation valve. This could have provided a direct path to the RWST, and thus to the atmosphere, of potentially contaminated water.

The original design basis of the system was to rely on operator action to provide isolation of the leakage path by either remote closure of the sump valve or local manual action at the mini-flow line. As a result, offsite doses would be kept within acceptable limits.

FINAL REPORT ON MINIFLOW ISOLATION  
IN RESPONSE TO RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SIGNAL  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Page Two

DISCUSSION

The following discussion is responsive to 10CFR50.55(e).

Description of Deficiency

When TMI activity levels are postulated, appropriate operator actions might not be possible or might not be executed in time to limit the transfer of reactor coolant to amounts which would assure acceptable offsite dose levels.

Analysis of Safety Implications

No specific analysis has been performed to identify specific offsite doses resulting from this hypothetical scenario. Judgment indicates that if TMI source terms are used, satisfactory doses could not be calculated; therefore, corrective action would be appropriate.

Corrective Action

A review was conducted to determine whether additional similar situations were implemented in the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 design. It was concluded that this situation was unique. The review did not identify any other cases.

Motor control center assignments will be changed so that the Train A also utilizes a single MCC for both the miniflow isolation valves and the containment sump isolation valve. This corrective action, which will preclude occurrence of the reported condition from failure of a single MCC, will be completed prior to fuel load of Unit 2.