

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY)

(San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station, Units 2 and 3)

Docket Nos. 50-301 O.L.
50-362 O.L.

Affidavit of Robert T. Jaske

I am the Acting Director, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

This affidavit is intended to set forth the position of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with respect to areas of concern identified by the Licensing Board on the above captioned proceeding with respect to the proper determination of Emergency Planning Zones and to the proper consideration to be given to off-site planning for earthquakes.


FEMA has applied the 10 and 50 mile Emergency Planning Zone sizes in accordance with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 REV-1 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations, specifically 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. These zones are established by emergency planning officials and are examined for adequacy by the FEMA REP staff when conducting its review of site-specific plans. With respect to the detailed application of EPZs to specific sites insofar as Federal actions are concerned, the FEMA REP staff interprets the zone sizes as being roughly circular with allowable variations in demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes and local jurisdictional boundaries to ensure that the boundaries are clearly defined, can be readily communicated to the public and account for local conditions near the nominal 10 mile or 50 mile boundary.

With respect to earthquakes it is the FEMA REP staff view that earthquake effects must be taken into account in the off-site emergency plans, given the seismic situation in California. The FEMA REP staff accepts as adequate for planning purposes an earthquake not more severe than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) as defined in 10 CFR Part 100.

No special seismic design of public alerting and notification systems or environmental capability is contemplated. In its evaluation, the FEMA REP staff believes there should be assurance of continued communication between the power station and outside agencies in order to obtain damage estimates both to the site and to transportation and communication facilities off-site as part of the coordinated response. Emergency Operating Centers (EOC) of each of the jurisdictions involved in the emergency planning effort should have suitably distant backup facilities to permit continued functioning of a jurisdiction's emergency response including notification to the public, given the possibility of failure of a primary EOC or its associated communications.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on June 23, 1981.


Robert T. Jaske